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How Viktor Yanukovych Won : Reassessing the Dominant Narratives of Ukraine's 2010 Presidential Election
Erik S. Herron East European Politics and Societies 2011 25: 47 DOI: 10.1177/0888325410388560 The online version of this article can be found at: http://eep.sagepub.com/content/25/1/47
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East European Politics and Societies Volume 25 Number 1 February 2011 47-67 2011 Sage Publications 10.1177/0888325410388560 http://eeps.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com
This article explores two prominent narratives through an analysis of election data. The first narrative is that Yanukovychs win was legitimate. While fraud may have been present, its scale was small and it was not decisive. The second narrative suggests that Ukraines major operational political cleavage separates eastern and western regions, rendering the central region of the country a crucial prize for candidates to secure victory in presidential contests. Keywords: Ukraine; election; president; fraud
Introduction
Ukraines 2010 presidential election produced a significant setback for the political forces behind 2004s Orange Revolution. The loss in 2010 was not the first electoral defeat, as the 2006 parliamentary election yielded a plurality win for Viktor Yanukovychs Party of Regions and ultimately a successful, but short-lived, anti-crisis coalition. But the loss of the presidency to the politician associated with electoral fraud in 2004 was a particularly stinging blow with potentially far-reaching consequences. Press accounts and political observers assessments suggest that the Yanukovych victory may be a harbinger for significant modifications to Ukraines domestic and foreign policy orientation. Early policy decisions by the Yanukovych administrationnotably the alteration of coalition formation procedures and the extension of Russias lease on port facilities in Sevastopollend support to this conclusion. More time must elapse, however, to fully assess the accuracy of the narrative declaring the election results to be a reversal of the Orange Revolution.
Authors Note: The author thanks participants in the conference Ukraines 2010 Presidential Election: What We Learned at George Washington University for comments, and especially Paul DAnieri for extensive suggestions. He also thanks Serhij Vasylchenko, Rhonda Houser, and Michael Lynch for technical assistance and Maksym Palamarenko for valuable feedback. All errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author. 47
Downloaded from eep.sagepub.com at Uni Lucian Blaga on January 13, 2011
Two other prominent narratives associated with the 2010 election are ripe for evaluation. Both of these narratives speak to the present and future status of Ukrainian political competition, but their assessment relies solely on analysis of election processes. The first narrative is that Yanukovychs win was legitimate. While fraud may have been present, its scale was small and it was not decisive, in contrast to the second round of the 2004 presidential election. The second narrative suggests that Ukraines major operational political cleavage separates eastern and western regions,1 rendering the central region of the country a crucial prize for candidates to secure victory in presidential contests. Winning strategies must take this dynamic into account. This article explores the two narratives through an analysis of election data. Election results provide rich source material that can be assessed at several levels: macroregional units,2 oblasts, electoral districts, and polling stations.3 The first section presents an analysis of election quality, focusing on evidence of anomalous outcomes. The second section assesses voting in both rounds of competition to gain insight into candidate strategies. The third section presents a unified model of election performance that accounts for features associated with both narratives. The article concludes with a discussion of the political narratives and the implications of the election for political competition in Ukraine.
A substantial literature on the quality of elections has emerged, focusing on various methods to detect data anomalies. Forensic accountants point to the need for a series of data interrogation tests to assess data quality and caution against the reliance on a single evaluative tool. Following their lead, the analysis in this section draws upon the election quality literature to assess data along several dimensions. First, the data are assessed at the national and regional levels according to a mathematical principle (Benfords Law) that facilitates the identification of anomalous results. Second, data analysis turns to the role of turnout in the production of results. High levels of turnout have been associated with fraud, as unusually high turnout may reflect efforts to stuff the ballot box.8 High turnout is especially suspect when combined with unanimousor near-unanimousresults in favor of a single candidate or party.9 While unanimous results are not definitive proof of fraudespecially in small polling stations located in areas associated with a candidates core supportersunanimous results that account for large numbers of voters may be suspect. Third, data on ballot invalidation are assessed as invalid ballots have also been associated with fraud.10 High levels of ballot invalidation can represent attempts to undermine vote acquisition by a particular party or candidate. Low levels of ballot invalidation can represent attempts to stuff the ballot box. Fourth, scholarship has noted that in some elections of suspicious quality, candidates in two-round elections inexplicably lost votes from the first to the second round.11 To account for this issue, the section addresses decay in support across the two rounds for both candidates, identifying the frequency, size, and impact of outcomes in which candidates vote totals decreased from the first to second round.
Benfords Law
Benfords Law is a concept from the mathematics literature that has been applied to the study of elections. Rediscovered by, and named for, Frank Benford, the principle describes how digits are distributed in naturally occurring datasets. Benford noted and empirically tested the proposition that digits are not uniformly distributed. For example, the first digit of any nonzero number could range from 1 to 9. In his assessment of datasets from diverse fields of inquiry, Benford found that the probability that the first digit is a 1, for example, is not equal to the probability that the first digit is a 9. In fact, the likelihood that 1 is the first digit is greatest, and the probability declines to 9.12 This discovery permits the evaluation of large datasets for the presence of anomalies. The approach has been applied widely to financial data, and some scholars13 have extended the use of Benfords Law to the assessment of election data.14 The null hypothesis is that data conform to the contours of a Benford-type distribution, and thus do not bear the hallmarks of manipulation. In Ukraines 2010 election, first- and second-digit tests reveal that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the national level and in most macro-regions. Neither candidates results exceed the critical chi-squared values when they are
aggregated at the national level, in contrast, for example, to Yanukovychs results in the 2004 election.15 In one case, Yanukovychs results in the East, the test data exceed the critical value, and the null hypothesis may be rejected. In two cases, Tymoshenkos results in Crimea and the Eastcentral region, the null hypothesis may be rejected only at the .10 level of confidence.16 While manipulation of the vote potentially explains anomalous outcomes, variation in polling station size is an alternate explanation that could account for some of the regional results. The mean size of polling stations in the East is 1,023 (with a standard deviation of 537). By contrast, the mean size of polling stations in the West is 697 (with a standard deviation of 535). In the areas of core support for the candidates where results are likely to be strongestpolling stations serving Yanukovychs core supporters are larger than those serving Tymoshenkos core supporters and more likely to yield ones as the first digit. The results of tests derived from Benfords Law reveal anomalous results but not evidence of widespread fraud. The overall condition of election data suggests that they are naturally produced, providing initial support for the legitimacy narrative.
Fifteen polling stations recorded unanimous votes for one of the candidates. Ten polling stations recorded 100 percent of the vote for Tymoshenko. All were located in Lviv or Ternopil, and the largest had 108 voters. Five polling stations gave Yanukovych 100 percent of the vote.They were also small, ranging from 12 to 24 voters, and were located in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Odesa. Unlike the results in 2002, where unanimous results were produced in large polling stations, and were decisive in at least one district, unanimous precincts produced little advantage for either campaign. Regardless of the mechanism by which these results were produced, neither campaign garnered enough votes in stations with complete turnout or unanimous support to affect the overall results of the election. Both candidates also enjoyed near-unanimous results in many polling stations. Tymoshenko garnered 95 percent or more votes in 746 polling stations (accounting for 469,493 total voters). Most of these polling stations were located in the West (Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk), but other regions were also represented (e.g., Chernighiv, Vinnytsya, Volyn). Yanukovych also benefited from highly partisan polling stations, but stations favoring him were fewer in number. Yanukovych received 95 percent or more of the vote in 390 polling stations (accounting for 394,984 voters) predominantly located in the East and South (Donetsk, Luhansk, Odesa). The number of votes in near-unanimous polling stations (864,477, or 3.4 percent) was nearly equivalent to the gap between the two candidates. But neither candidate disproportionately benefited from these precincts. Just over 54 percent of the voters casting ballots in stations strongly supporting one candidate were associated with polling stations favoring Tymoshenko, and 46 percent were associated with polling stations favoring Yanukovych. Once again, the overall impact of anomalous results was minimal, lending further support to the legitimacy narrative.
Invalid Ballots
In any election, some voters cast ballots that are invalidated. Invalidation may result from unintentional errors (e.g., voters mismark the ballot), or intentional invalidation (e.g., voters make clear that their real intent is to cast an invalid ballot through the marks they place on the ballot).20 While researchers have not fully investigated the normal range of ballot invalidation, it likely varies by institutional features (e.g., complexity and stability of election rules, ballot design, and technology used to record the vote) and social features (e.g., levels of voter literacy, and civic education). A challenge to the evaluation of ballot invalidations effects, however, is that if invalidation is used as a means to falsify the vote, both high and low levels of invalidation could be suspect.21 High levels of invalidation could be associated with efforts to reject ballots associated with a competitor. Low levels of invalidation could be associated with efforts to stuff the ballot box. Both of these processes could be at work simultaneously.22
The analysis of invalid ballots begins by assessing the correlation between candidate performance in the second round and levels of invalid ballots, using polling-station-level data. The results indicate that votes for Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, measured as the proportion of votes received, are not statistically linked to the level of ballot invalidation. Correlation coefficients are not significant at the .05 level, nor even at the more relaxed .10 level. More polling stations reported perfection in the completion of ballots than high levels of invalidation. In the second round, 3,734 (11 percent) polling stations reported no invalid ballots. Tymoshenko performed better in these polling stations, receiving, on average, 56 percent of the vote to Viktor Yanukovychs 40 percent.23 Polling stations reporting no invalid ballots were unequally distributed across the country, with many located in the West.24 By contrast, three hundred polling stations reported a level of invalid ballots three or more standard deviations above the mean, accounting for less than 1 percent of the total voting results. These polling stations were also distributed unequally across the country, but the performance of candidates does not statistically differ in them.25 Another way to assess invalid ballots is to investigate change between the two rounds of competition. While the ballot was simpler in the second round because voters confronted fewer choices, and lower error rates are not unreasonable to anticipate under these circumstances, wide swings in voter competency are unlikely. In some polling stations, however, invalid ballot rates dropped substantially. Between the two rounds, 632 polling stations (around 1.9 percent) recorded improvements in ballot completion greater than 5 percent (that is, the difference in invalid ballots was equivalent to 5 percent or greater of the number of ballots cast in the second round).26 Fewer polling stations (221) revealed 5 percent or greater increase in the invalidation rates between rounds. In these polling stations, voters became less capable of completing ballots.27 Both candidates vote accumulation in the second round was negatively correlated to the change in ballot invalidation rates.28 In general, the level of invalid ballots is unconnected statistically with candidate performance. The only exception is in polling stations reporting no invalid ballots; in these cases, Tymoshenko performed better than Yanukovych. While the ballot invalidation differential revealed some unusual cases in which completion rates improved, or declined, at relatively high rates, invalid differentials affected the candidates in a similar manner. Overall, Tymoshenko may have benefited disproportionately from votes in polling stations reporting no invalid ballots, but this anomaly does not falsify the legitimacy narrative.
Decay in Support
Some scholarship has raised questions about the likelihood of candidates losing votes in multiround competitions.29 In two-round competition, surviving candidates are generally expected to enjoy an increase in their vote totals, assuming that they
Note: The map identifies the increase or decrease in votes acquired at the district level in the second round, using the first round as a baseline.
are able to mobilize core voters and gain some support from first-round losers. In Ukraine, the total number of voters increased between the first and second rounds, although some polling stations experienced a decline in the number of voters casting ballots. Because the second round was decisive, the election was highly contentious, and both campaigns made efforts to mobilize core supporters and supporters of first-round losers, we would generally expect the number of ballots cast for the two candidates to increase. Both candidates, however, experienced some decay in voting support between the two rounds. Tymoshenko lost 2 percent or more votes in 34 precincts. Some precincts witnessed substantial vote decay, and many were located in the East.30 While the vote decay in these polling stations is suspicious, the nationwide vote loss in these precincts was 4,752 and would not have affected the overall outcome of the election. Compiling and assessing data at the district level, Tymoshenko experienced a net loss in only one district406 votes in district 109 in Luhansk Oblast (see Figure 1). Viktor Yanukovych lost 2 percent or more votes between rounds in fifteen polling stations, several of which were in his areas of strength.31 The total loss in these polling stations amounted to 530 votes. Compiling and assessing data at the district level,
Note: The map identifies the increase or decrease in votes acquired at the district level in the second round, using the first round as a baseline.
Yanukovych lost votes in four of the five districts located in Ternopil Oblast, accounting for 12,184 votes (see Figure 2). His vote loss in individual polling stations was smaller than the 2 percent threshold reported above, but the cumulative effect across Ternopil was substantial. While vote decay is suspicious, it was locally concentrated and not large enough to be decisive. Both candidates experienced some loss in votes across the two rounds, contrary to expectations. The total amount of vote loss was small, and was concentrated in the areas of their opponents greatest strength.
Summary
The assessments in this section yielded anomalous outcomes, and some outcomes disproportionately benefited one candidate. Notably, Tymoshenkos superior performance in polling stations reporting no invalid ballots and higher levels of vote decay for Yanukovych in Ternopil, raise questions about the potential for vote manipulation to have produced these outcomes. Even if anomalous results are attributable to fraud, these outcomes were not systematic, widespread, or decisive, lending support to the legitimacy narrative. Given that the data generally do not point to fraud, the next section will adopt a more benign interpretation of the outcomes, privileging mobilization as the underlying cause for changes in performance between the first and second rounds.
Based on the evidence aggregated at the polling station, district, and regional levels, both candidates seem to have been successful in mobilizing voters in areas of their core support: Yanukovych in the East (Donetsk and Luhansk) and Tymoshenko in the West (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil).
Summary
The results in this section suggest that the regional cleavage narrative also finds support, as the two major candidates drew upon core support in Ukraines far eastern and western regions. Both campaigns faced the task of mobilizing core voters, attracting voters who supported first-round losers, and extending support in central regions.
This challenge was especially acute for Tymoshenko, who was burdened with a 2.5 million vote deficit in the first round of competition. Core voters in eastern and western regions were engaged, evidenced by increases in turnout. Tymoshenko and Yanukovych also performed well in regions that supported compatible first-round losers. But neither candidate was successful in systematically attracting voters in regions where Tihipko was most effective. Some districts where Tihipko performed best were also located in the center, an area crucial for second-round success.
Note: Cell entries are predicted probabilities generated via Clarify. All explanatory variables, except for those featured in the table, are set to zero.
The relative effects of interactive terms uncover important dynamics. Table 1 shows the predicted results for Tymoshenko and Yanukovych generated through simulations based on the models including all explanatory variables.47 In Table 1, values for most independent variables are held at zero; turnout and location vary as specified on the table. For example, the first cell in the table shows the predicted result for a polling station in Crimea with 50 percent turnout. Under these conditions, we would expect Tymoshenko to secure 32 percent of the vote on average, and Yanukovych 68 percent. At higher levels of turnout, we would expect to see poorer performance by Tymoshenko and better performance by Yanukovych. While Crimea is generally associated with Yanukovych support, rendering this outcome unsurprising, elevated turnout is associated with stronger Yanukovych performance only in this region. Increases in turnout are associated with stronger Tymoshenko performance in all other regions except the South. As turnout varies from 50 to 90 percent, Tymoshenko
Note: Cell entries are predicted probabilities generated via Clarify. All explanatory variables, except for those featured in the table, are set to zero.
is expected to enjoy better performance in the East (the expected value at 90 percent is 6.2 percentage points higher than at 50 percent), Eastcentral (8.0), Northcentral (2.3), West (6.4), Westcentral (7.9), and Southwest (20.3). Even in Yanukovychs core region (East), higher levels of turnout are associated with stronger Tymoshenko performance. While Tymoshenkos relative gains are higher as turnout increases, the absolute effect of turnout in this region still benefits Yanukovych. An increase of 40 percentage points in turnout raises Tymoshenkos vote acquisition by 6.2 percentage points, on average, in the East. If, for example, we begin with Tymoshenkos predicted performance in the East (3.74 percent) and apply it to a polling station with 1,000 registered voters, she would receive roughly 19 votes to Yanukovychs roughly 482 votes.48 If turnout in this hypothetical polling station increased to 90 percent, Tymoshenko would receive roughly 90 votes to Yanukovychs 803. Tymoshenkos share of the vote increases, but the absolute effect of increased turnout benefits Yanukovych, who would receive 321 additional votes to Tymoshenkos 71. Increased turnout benefited Tymoshenko in relative terms across most of the
country, but the effects of turnout increases in absolute terms tended to benefit Yanukovych. The intensity of variation in turnouts effect is smaller than the influence of Tihipkos performance. Table 2 displays predicted outcomes for Tymoshenko and Yanukovych, varying Tihipkos performance and region. Turnout is held constant at the national mean in this table, and all other factors are held at zero. Higher values for Tihipkos first-round performance are positively associated with Tymoshenkos second-round performance in the East, Eastcentral, and Southwest regions. Tihipkos performance is positively associated with Yanukovychs second-round performance in Crimea, South, West, and Westcentral regions. To continue the example from above, in a hypothetical polling station with 1,000 registered voters in the East, a 30 percentage point difference for Tihipko is associated with a 6.4 percentage point difference for Tymoshenko, slightly higher than the yield for a 40-point swing in turnout. Second-round outcomes are split in Tihipkos regions of strength, with Tihipko performance positively associated with Tymoshenko votes in the Eastcentral region and Yanukovych in the South. But stronger Tihipko performance is also associated with stronger second-round candidate performance in the opponents core regions (Tymoshenko in the East and Yanukovych in the West). This outcome is consistent with an interpretation of Tihipko support as a reflection of protest in the first round. Voters who did not support Tymoshenko in the West, or Yanukovych in the East, may have found Tihipko to be a viable alternative in the first round. These voters may have exhibited one of many behaviors in the second roundvoting for the rival of the candidate they opposed, voting against all, or abstaining.
Summary
The general models of election performance provided additional support to both narratives. Regional variation in turnout was compatible with an explanation based on mobilization. Regions associated with strong performance by first-round losers matched second-round expectations: Tymoshenko tended to receive more votes in micro-regions where Yatseniuk and Yushchenko performed well, and Yanukovych tended to receive more votes where Symonenko performed well. Neither candidate systematically attracted voters in micro-regions where Tihipko performed well, but both candidates and against all votes were associated with Tihipko support in some regions.
Conclusions
The analysis points to several conclusions about political narratives and the state of Ukraines electoral politics. While the elections produced anomalous results, they were not one-sided. In some cases they appear to marginally benefit Tymoshenko,
and in other cases they appear to marginally benefit Yanukovych. Because the anomalies were not systematic, widespread, or decisive, it is reasonable to conclude that Yanukovychs win was based on competition in a credibly free and fair environment. This interpretation supports the legitimacy narrative. The legitimacy of Yanukovychs victory suggests that the Ukrainian political market remains reasonably competitive, a legacy of the Orange Revolution. If political actors accept the consequences of real electoral competition (i.e., the potential for losses and alternation in power), the process represented by the 2010 presidential election bodes well for democratic consolidation in Ukraine. The progress represented by the 2010 presidential election could be undermined if impediments to free and fair competition emerge in the form of restrictions on contestation or participation prior to the next election cycle. Upcoming local elections will be a first test of the legitimacy narratives robustness. Competition also revealed the persistence of regional divisions, with both campaigns mobilizing core supporters and attracting votes in areas associated with firstround losers. The Tymoshenko campaign benefited from relative gains in mobilization across much of the country, but these gains were inadequate to overcome the firstround deficit. While registering improvements in the decisive round, Tymoshenkos failure points to the challenges of mounting an electoral strategy primarily based on western core support. The analysis suggests that a candidate who appeals to the center and can attract votes in the West could be a formidable challenger. Tihipko positioned himself as a legitimate alternative in key regions of the center and South, evidenced by his performance in urban districts of Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Kyiv. The behavior of areas associated with Tihipko supporters suggests that they are a constituency seeking an alternative. In the second round, areas of Tihipko support were positively associated with Tymoshenko support in some districts, Yanukovych support in others, and also robust against all voting. If these outcomes reflect a vote of no confidence against Ukraines dominant politicians, entrepreneurial political actors may be able to carve out a successful strategy to challenge the dominant East-West electoral divide. Tihipko himself may have abandoned this role, however. His decision to accept a deputy prime ministers post in Mykola Azarovs government could tarnish his brand as an outsider positioned between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. The election also yields potential lessons for the main rivals. The results suggest that Yanukovych may have reached the limits of mobilization gains in his regions of core support. Attracting more consistent support from central regions of the country could strengthen his position in future elections. If Tymoshenko aims to return to the prime ministers post or gain the presidency, she may benefit from studying Yanukovychs example. After his defeat in the 2004 presidential election, Yanukovych hired a powerful political consulting firm and followed advice on how to rebuild his image. His subsequent campaigns for parliament and the presidency were more disciplined, and modest changes to his behavior permitted Yanukovych to portray
himself in a more flattering light than during the 2004 campaign. Tymoshenko may herself benefit by reinvention that allows her to retain many of her core voters but also extend support spatially and ideologically.
Notes
1. Analysis of earlier presidential elections has noted that Leonid Kuchma was victorious in 1994 by garnering votes in the eastern half of the country along with central regions in the western half, and in 1999 by capturing the west and some areas east of the Dnipro River. 2. The article uses eight macro-regions defined by historical, social, and political similarities (Lowell W. Barrington and Erik S. Herron, One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences, Nationalities Papers 32:1[2004]: 5386). The macro-regions are East (Donetsk and Luhansk), Eastcentral (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizka), Crimea (Crimea and Sevastopol), South (Kherson, Mykolayiv, and Odesa), Northcentral (Chernighiv, Cherkassy, Kirovohrad, Kyiv City and Oblast, Poltava, and Sumy), West (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil), Westcentral (Khmelnitsk, Rivne, Vinnytsya, Volyn, and Zhytomyr), and Southwest (Chernivtsy and Zakarpatska). For clarity, the macro-regions will be capitalized while general directional terms will not be capitalized. 3. This analysis uses data from 33,683 polling stations compiled from results provided by Ukraines Central Electoral Commission. The total number of polling stations slightly differs between the two rounds, likely due to additional ships serving as special polling stations in Odesa during the second round. (The first round featured33,673 polling stations.) Analysis using polling station data must be interpreted with caution as these data do not reveal the attitudes or behaviors of individual voters, rendering the interpretation particularly vulnerable to problems of ecological inference. However, polling station data can reveal variation in micro-regional results and can thereby provide additional insights into election dynamics. 4. See http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2010/02/42679_en.pdf. 5. See http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/press-conference/31465/. 6. Both campaigns traded allegations about fraud, especially in the first round. 7. See http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2010/02/42816_en.pdf. 8. Cf. Mikhail Myagkov and Peter C. Ordeshook, The Trail of Votes in Russias 1999 Duma and 2000 Presidential Elections, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34:3(2001): 35370. See also Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dmitry Shakin, Fraud or Fairytales: Russia and Ukraines Electoral Experience, Post-Soviet Affairs 21:2(2005): 91-131. 9. Erik S. Herron and Paul Johnson, Fraud before the Revolution: Special Precincts in Ukraines 2002 Parliamentary Election, in Ingmar Bredies, Valentin Yakushik, and Andreas Umland, eds., Aspects of the Orange Revolution III: The Context and Dynamics of the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections (Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem-verlag, 2008). 10. A. A. Sobyanin and V. G. Sukhovolskiy, Demokratiya, Ogranichennaya Falsifikatsiyami: Vybory i Referendumy v Rossii v 1991-1993 Gg (Moscow: Project Group for Human Rights, 1995). 11. Valentin V. Mikhailov, Osobaya Zona: Vybory v Tatarstane (Ulyanovsk, Russia: Kazan Branch of the International Assembly to Protect Rights, 2000); and Mikhailov, Kolichestvo Demokratii: Analiz Vyborov Prezidenta RF 1996 G, v Regionakh, Armageddon 3:1(1999): 134-53. 12. The first-digit probabilities in the Benford distribution are 1 = .301, 2 = .176, 3 = .125, 4 = .097, 5 = .079, 6 = .067, 7 = .058, 8 = .051, and 9 = .046. 13. Walter R. Mebane, Election Forensics: Vote Counts and Benfords Law (Paper presented at the 2006 Summer Meeting of the Political Methodology Society, University of CaliforniaDavis, July 2006); and Mark J. Nigrini, Monitoring Techniques Available to the Forensic Accountant, Journal of Forensic Accounting 7:2(2006): 32144. 14. Some aspects of election data present challenges to the application of Benfords Law. Data in polling stations are constrained by the lower bound of zero but an upper bound that varies from place to place, depending on the number of individuals registered. This feature of polling station data produces
different available digits across polling stations (i.e., more 1s are available in a precinct with 2,000 registered voters than in a station with 1,000 registered voters). Polling stations can also produce singledigit or zeros as results, undermining analysis of first and second digits. The application of Benfords Law confronts not only statistical problems, but also issues related to the interpretation of results. The presence of anomalous data does not constitute proof of fraud. Indeed, seemingly anomalous results could be produced in natural strongholds for candidates or by a candidates own poor performance. Lastly, Benfords Law is unlikely to identify diffuse or low scale fraud. 15. Erik S. Herron, Elections and Democracy after Communism? (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 16. In previous elections, some national-level data failed to conform to a Benford-type distribution (notably the Communist Party in 2002s constituency races and Viktor Yanukovych in the third round of the 2004 presidential election). Nonconforming results were present in the East, Eastcentral, South, and Northcentral regions in past elections, but this analysis was conducted at the oblast level (see ibid.). 17. The correlation coefficients are all significant at the .05 level and are .1800 for Tymoshenko, .1536 for Yanukovych, and .3142 for against all. 18. The decisive votes were cast in prisons (Herron and Johnson, Fraud before the Revolution). 19. The distribution of polling stations reporting 100 percent turnout is as follows: 12 in Crimea, 15 in Vinnytsya, 8 in Volyn, 53 in Dnipropetrovsk, 88 in Donetsk, 6 in Zhytomyr, 1 in Zakarpatska, 20 in Zaporizka, 8 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 9 in Kyiv Oblast, 8 in Kirovohrad, 43 in Luhansk, 27 in Lviv, 8 in Mykolaivsk, 53 in Odesa, 15 in Poltava, 13 in Rivne, 11 in Sumska, 12 in Ternopil, 25 in Kharkiv, 6 in Kherson, 9 in Khmelnitsk, 4 in Cherkaska, 3 in Chernivets, 4 in Chernighiv, 13 in Kyiv City, and 3 in Sevastopol. 20. For example, the author has witnessed polling station commissions evaluate ballot papers with text such as they are all thieves written on the paper in lieu of a recorded vote. 21. Sobyanin and Sukhovolskiy, Demokratiya, Ogranichennaya Falsifikatsiyami. 22. In the second round of the 2004 presidential election, the author observed a polling station commission deem ballots with additional marks valid for Viktor Yanukovych, but analogous ballots invalid for Viktor Yushchenko. 23. The results of a paired two-sample t-test indicated that the outcomes are significantly different: t = 19.54. 24. Polling stations with low levels of ballot invalidation were distributed in the following way: 76 in Crimea, 240 in Vinnytsya, 228 in Volyn, 47 in Dnipropetrovsk, 196 in Donetsk, 232 in Zhytomyr, 29 in Zakarpattya, 81 in Zaporizka, 90 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 133 in Kyiv Oblast, 142 in Kirovohrad, 105 in Luhansk, 333 in Lviv, 122 in Mykolaivsk, 156 in Odesa, 172 in Poltava, 122 in Rivne, 123in Sumska, 259 in Ternopil, 132 in Kharkiv, 91 in Kherson, 227 in Khmelnitsk, 137 in Cherkaska, 22 in Chernivets, 136 in Chernighiv, 39 in Kyiv City, 10 in Sevastopol, and 54 abroad. 25. Polling stations with high levels of ballot invalidation were distributed in the following way: 12 in Crimea, 14 in Vinnytsya, 5 in Volyn, 17 in Dnipropetrovsk, 11 in Donetsk, 16 in Zhytomyr, 11 in Zakarpattya, 8 in Zaporizka, 14 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 27 in Kyiv Oblast, 12 in Kirovohrad, 11 in Luhansk, 10 in Lviv, 6 in Mykolaivsk, 27 in Odesa, 14 in Poltava, 10 in Rivne, 11 in Sumska, 5 in Ternopil, 11 in Kharkiv, 7 in Kherson, 11 in Khmelnitsk, 10 in Cherkaska, 7 in Chernivets, 7 in Chernighiv, 5 in Kyiv City, and 1 in Sevastopol. 26. Polling stations reporting 5 percent or greater improvements in ballot completion were distributed in the following way: 12 in Crimea, 28 in Vinnytsya, 13 in Volyn, 49 in Dnipropetrovsk, 19 in Donetsk, 23 in Zhytomyr, 36 in Zakarpattya, 30 in Zaporizka, 10 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 33 in Kyiv Oblast, 19 in Kirovohrad, 23 in Luhansk, 24 in Lviv, 23 in Mykolaivsk, 48 in Odesa, 32 in Poltava, 22 in Rivne, 20 in Sumska, 20 in Ternopil, 26 in Kharkiv, 15 in Kherson, 36 in Khmelnitsk, 25 in Cherkaska, 9 in Chernivets, 22 in Chernighiv, 14 in Kyiv City, and 1 in Sevastopol. 27. Polling stations reporting 5 percent or greater increase in the ballot invalidation rate were distributed in the following way: 7 in Crimea, 13 in Vinnytsya, 4 in Volyn, 12 in Dnipropetrovsk, 11 in Donetsk, 13 in Zhytomyr, 3 in Zakarpattya, 7 in Zaporizka, 5 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 22 in Kyiv Oblast, 7 in Kirovohrad,
9 in Luhansk, 6 in Lviv, 3 in Mykolaivsk, 21 in Odesa, 14 in Poltava, 7 in Rivne, 9 in Sumska, 4 in Ternopil, 9 in Kharkiv, 4 in Kherson, 7 in Khmelnitsk, 8 in Cherkaska, 3 in Chernivets, 6 in Chernighiv, 6 in Kyiv City, and 1 in Sevastopol. 28. Correlation coefficients are significant at the .05 level and are .107 for Tymoshenko and .142 for Yanukovych. 29. Cf. Mikhailov, Osobaya Zona. 30. Polling stations reporting 2 percent or greater vote loss for Tymoshenko were distributed in the following way: 1 in Cherkaska, 1 in Dnipropetrovsk, 6 in Donetsk, 1 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 2 in Kharkiv, 1 in Kyiv Oblast, 13 in Luhansk, 1 in Mykolaivsk, 1 in Odesa, 2 in Poltava, 1 in Sevastopol, 1 in Sumska, and 3 in Zaporizka. 31. Polling stations reporting 2 percent or greater vote loss for Yanukovych were distributed in the following way: 1 in Chernighiv, 1 in Dnipropetrovsk, 4 in Donetsk, 2 in Kharkiv, 2 in Luhansk, 1 in Odesa, 1 in Sevastopol, and 3 in Zaporizka. 32. Cf. Ralph S. Clem and Peter Craumer, Shades of Orange: The Electoral Geography of Ukraines 2004 Presidential Elections, Eurasian Geography and Economics 46:5(2005): 36485; and Paul Kubicek, Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour, Europe-Asia Studies 52:2(2000): 27394. See also Clem and Craumer, Orange, Blue and White, and Blonde: The Electoral Geography of Ukraines 2006 and 2007 Rada Elections, Eurasian Geography and Economics 49:2(2008): 127-51. 33. Three hundred ninety polling stations showed gains in turnout three or more standard deviations from the mean; 1,059 showed gains two or more standard deviations from the mean. 34. This figure includes results for polling stations located abroad. 35. Tymoshenkos district-level gains (measured by raw votes) are 3 standard deviations from the mean in 5 districts (4 in Lviv, 1 in Ternopil), 2 to 3 standard deviations from the mean in 6 districts (2 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 3 in Kyiv City, 1 in Volyn), 1 to 2 standard deviations from the mean in 20 districts (1 in Khmelnitsk, 6 in Kyiv City, 4 in Lviv, 4 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 1 in Rivne, 1 in Vinnytsya, 1 in Sumska, 1 in Chernivets, 1 in Kyiv Oblast), 0 to 1 standard deviation from the mean in 50 districts, 0 to 1 standard deviation from the mean in 134 districts, and beyond 1 standard deviation from the mean in 11 districts (2 in Donetsk, 9 in Luhansk). 36. Yanukovychs district-level gains (measured by raw votes) are greater than 2 standard deviations from the mean in 9 districts (1 in Kharkiv, 3 in Odesa, 2 in Donetsk, 1 in Dnipropetrovsk, 2 in Luhansk), 1 to 2 standard deviations from the mean in 32 districts (7 in Dnipropetrovsk, 2 in Sevastopol, 6 in Kharkiv, 2 in Mykolaivsk, 4 in Zaporizka, 3 in Crimea, 1 in Luhansk, 6 in Donetsk, 1 in Odesa), 0 to 1 standard deviations from the mean in 52 districts, 0 to 1 standard deviations from the mean in 100 districts, and beyond 1 standard deviations from the mean in 33 districts (1 in Zakarpattya, 2 in Vinnytsya, 2 in Khmelnitsk, 3 in Rivne, 5 in Ternopil, 4 in Volyn, 8 in Lviv, 6 in Ivano-Frankivsk, 1 in Chernivets, 1 in Sumska). 37. The correlation coefficients are all significant at the .05 level. They are .2458 for Tymoshenko, .1944 for Yanukovych, and .6126 for against all votes. 38. The correlation coefficients are all significant at the .05 level. They are .0986 for Tymoshenko, .2931 for Yanukovych, and .7214 for against all votes. 39. The correlation coefficients for Tymoshenko and against all votes are significant at the .05 level. They are .1594 for Tymoshenko and .4352 for against all votes. 40. The correlation coefficients are all significant at the .05 level. They are .5150 for Tymoshenko, .5295 for Yanukovych, and .1575 for against all votes. 41. The correlation coefficients are all significant at the .05 level. They are .5638 for Tymoshenko, .5545 for Yanukovych, and .1249 for against all votes. 42. The correlation coefficients are all significant at the .05 level. They are .4061 for Tymoshenko, .4025 for Yanukovych, and .0526 for against all votes. 43. The Southwest is not included in Tymoshenkos areas of support due to results in Zakarpattya, which have been attributed to the involvement of Viktor Baloha.
44. Southwestern districts in Chernivtsy and Zakarpattya also registered turnout declines. 45. The Northcentral region is excluded as the comparison category. 46. The data were analyzed using regression with robust standard errors and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). In the former approach, the data were also clustered by district to account for error correlation. Supplementary tables with full results are available at http://vse-na-vybory.blogspot.com. 47. The interpretation of the table requires several caveats. The results are point predictions but are accompanied by confidence intervals. Thus, the point estimates are an approximation. Moreover, as noted in the text, other explanatory variables are held at zero to emphasize the independent effects of turnout and region on results. 48. Values do not sum to 500 due to rounding.
Erik S. Herrons research focuses on political institutions, especially elections and political parties. He has traveled extensively in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, including a semester as a Fulbright scholar in Ukraine. He has also been an international observer for seven elections in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine. He has authored many articles, chapters, and books about electoral politics in the post-communist region.