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Journal of Intercultural Communication Research

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Intermedia Framing and Intercultural Communication: How Other Media Affect American Antipathy toward Al Jazeera English
Katie Brown & William Lafi Youmans Version of record first published: 14 Jun 2012.

To cite this article: Katie Brown & William Lafi Youmans (2012): Intermedia Framing and Intercultural Communication: How Other Media Affect American Antipathy toward Al Jazeera English, Journal of Intercultural Communication Research, 41:2, 173-191 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17475759.2012.685084

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Journal of Intercultural Communication Research Vol. 41, No. 2, July 2012, pp. 173191

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Intermedia Framing and Intercultural Communication: How Other Media Affect American Antipathy toward Al Jazeera English
Katie Brown & William Lafi Youmans
By covering underrepresented areas in the world, Al Jazeera English (AJE) can facilitate intercultural understanding among Americans. However, AJE is not widely available on television in the United States. Further, many Americans hold pre-formed suspicions of the channel. Through an online experiment, we find that pre-reception audience bias against AJE exists and correlates with prejudice against Arab Americans, limiting its conciliatory potential. However, Americans can change their views toward AJE depending on how it is covered by other media, or what we call intermedia framing, including both satiric soft news and hard news. An experiment finds that satiric news coverage decreases anti-Arab American prejudice and, when combined with exposure to AJE, elevates evaluations of the network. Keywords: Al Jazeera English; Intercultural Communication; Framing; Minimal Effects; Source Credibility; Arab Prejudice; Media; Race

In a segment covering the debut of Al Jazeera English (AJE) in 2006, Samantha Bee of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart visits the networks Washington, DC broadcast center. Bee pokes fun at AJEs perceived association with Al Qaeda among Americans, as well as its boring content. She asks how many people in the United States are watching the channel, quickly answering her own question with a stinging joke: Al Ja-ZERO! Coverage of AJE by other outlets like The Daily Show presented important publicity for AJE, offering insight into a channel many Americans saw simply as a belligerent in the war on terror. Bee was correct that the channel had very
Katie Brown is in the Department of Communication Studies at The University of Michigan. William Lafi Youmans is in the School of Media and Public Affairs at The George Washington University. Correspondence to Katie Brown, Department of Communication Studies, 105 South State Street, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA. Email: katiebro@umich.edu
ISSN 1747-5759 (print)/ISSN 1747-5767 (online) 2012 World Communication Association http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17475759.2012.685084

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few viewers, as it was not available on American televisions. It struggled to secure carriage deals with cable companies. As of early 2012, AJE was not available in over 90% of American TV households. Many Americans refused to watch the channel. Others took it one step further and pressured cable companies not to carry AJE, despite evidence the channel promoted intercultural understanding. Yet, emerging research shows the channels content moderates extreme views. Powers and El-Nawawy find a strong correlation between length of time watching AJE and holding moderate views, which evinced the channels conciliatory potential (2009). Content analyses demonstrate that AJE covers parts of the world under-reported by other news channels, such as CNN and the BBC (Al-Najjar, 2009; Figenschou, 2010; Painter, 2008). Taken together, these findings suggest that AJE can serve as a bridge between cultures, one of the marketing points that comes up in the networks press releases and promotional materials. However, we posit that a pre-reception audience bias limits the channels intercultural communication potential in the United States, even after the channel gained wide attention for its coverage of the Arab uprisings. This may not be permanent, though. We ask whether coverage of AJE by other mediaintermedia framingchanges how people evaluate AJE and thus increases the potential for intercultural communication. Established in 2006 as a sister channel to the Arabic news outlet Al Jazeera (AJ), AJE faced protests and criticism by those who associated the parent network with Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, a link reinforced by the George W. Bush administration and many in the American media (DiMaggio, 2008; Marash, 2007; Miles, 2005). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld frequently criticized the network for depicting casualties of American war efforts and giving voice to the countrys adversaries, writing in his memoir that Al Jazeera was a platform for terrorist propaganda (Rumsfeld, 2011). Linking Al Jazeera with Al Qaeda was inevitable given the resurgence of a paradigm outlined by Huntingtons thesis, Clash of Civilizations (1996), in the years after the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 (Miladi, 2006; Seib, 2005). Writing in the mid-1990s, Huntington took an essentialist, cultural view of global conflict, hypothesizing that future international conflict would involve blocs of nations, or civilizations, tied together by common, primordial cultural traditions. He hypothesized a central friction between a Western bloc sharing democratic, free market economics and a Judeo-Christian heritage, and an Islamic bloc defined by authoritarian politics and the religion of Islam. This was controversial but generated a tremendous amount of scholarship and popular attention. Some deemed it prophetic after the September 11, 2001 attacks (Abrahamian, 2003). It was also highly congruent with Osama bin Ladens view of the inevitable clash between the global, Muslim community and the United States (Wedeen, 2003). Clash of Civilizations relies on a view of culture as monolithic, not just nationally, but regionally, ignoring the rich diversity within, and great mixing and alliances between civilizations (Said, 2001). Still, it proved to be a powerful frame that resonated and continues to resonate with many Americans, Arabs, and Muslims. Despite the raging misperceptions and mutual suspicions between peoples, AJE could be a useful mediator serving the function of intercultural communication. As a

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network headquartered in the Middle Easts Qatar, AJE presents the possibility of being a communicative bridge between the United States and Arab countries. ElNawawy and Powers (2008, 2010) find that AJE is a conciliatory media source. They draw on the peace journalism literature, which posits news reporting oriented toward reconciliation that furthers understanding and thus non-violent solutions to conflict (Galtung, 2002; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). El-Nawawy and Powers outline an 11point typology of media characteristics with the potential to enhance intercultural communication (2008), including serving as a forum for the public, presenting diverse views or multiperspectivalism (Pfister & Soliz, 2011, p. 249), speaking to the audience as a global public, depicting underrepresented groups, avoiding demonization, and providing contextualization. Similarly, Tehranian (2006) considers media diversity key to the development of such peace journalism (2002), especially media that do not over-represent the lives of those in advanced, industrialized states and allow for cross-checking other news sources on issues of conflict. Al Jazeera, he finds, is an example of this. To test this empirically, ElNawawy and Powers studied how watching AJE moderates viewer attitudes toward other cultures (2008, 2010). Their reception study surveyed American Muslims in Toledo, OH, one of the few places AJE was available on a cable system at the time of the study. Respondents views on conflict correlated with duration of AJE viewing: those watching for longer amounts of time tended to exhibit less hostility toward other groups. Whether AJE moderated the views or attracted those with more moderate views, and thus openness to exchange across identities, it suggests the network can serve as an intercultural bridge. If AJE can serve as a venue for mediatized recognition (Cottle, 2006), by which media represent cultural Others, on their own communicative terms, thereby negotiating cross-cultural tensions (El-Nawawy & Powers, 2008, p. 21), it could add to the growing corpus of work on intercultural communication that considers mediation. Though historically focused on face-to-face (FtF) interactions, researchers have begun to turn their attention to the promise of electronically mediated contact (Pfister & Soliz, 2011, p. 248), including television and movies as parasocial interactions (Schiappa, Gregg, & Hewes, 2005). The promise of viewing AJE online, like digital media in general, is limited by the problem of self-selecting audiences. In a high-choice media environment, people have greater ability to develop a media diet reflecting their pre-existing preferences, which can fuel polarization rather than reconciliation (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, 2009; Prior, 2007; Sunstein, 2002). This position puts aside traditional audience reception research premised on media effects, and looks more closely at selective exposure dynamics. Thus, there appears to be an inherent limit on AJEs conciliatory potential. The channel will only attract those already oriented toward intercultural exchange. However, metacommunication suggests one important area of research. People learn about media from other media, creating a potential middle ground between direct effects and selective exposure. For AJE to serve as a conciliatory medium for Americans subscribing to a clash of civilizations framework, they must have easy access and be willing to watch with an

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open mind. A golden opportunity to attract new audiences came to AJE in early 2011. AJEs coverage of the protests and eventual overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt garnered unprecedented praise in the United States. As AJE became a primary news source for Americans following Arab protest movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and other Arab countries during these months, demand for AJE grew. Online viewing, the primary means for Americans to watch AJE, skyrocketed (Elder, 2011). Importantly, the clash of civilizations frame that defined elite discourse around AJE during the Bush administration gave way to a more receptive Arab spring frame (Youmans, 2011). Both frames emerged as a result of media coverage of AJE. After the Egyptian revolution, news reports indicated that the White House kept abreast of the protests in Egypt through AJE (Harnden, 2011; MacNicol, 2011). American public thinkers (Bollinger, 2011), prominent media figures (Hagey & Tau, 2011; Kaplan, 2011; Kristof, 2011; Rich, 2011), and government officials (Bauder, 2011; Kayyem, 2011; Radia, 2011) praised the networks in-depth reporting on events in the Arab countries and began asking why the channel was not available on television. Many journalists and observers wondered if this would be AJEs moment in the United States (Bauder, 2011; Burman, 2011; Ferguson, 2011; Harnden, 2011; Worth & Kirkpatrick, 2011; Robichaux, 2011). Despite this praise, public voices challenged the growing receptivity of AJE, charging that the network was anti-American and biased (Capehart, 2011a, 2011b; Kincaid, 2011). They protested against AJEs cable presence (Circelli, 2010). Although new media campaigns by AJE and its fans generated tens of thousands of letters calling for cable carriage (Wilkerson, 2011), AJE was still not carried widely on American TVs even a year later, in early 2012. The growing attention for AJE may have been limited to a small number of Americans who are highly involved and attentive. If so, AJEs role as a conciliatory medium is limited. However, given the greater attention afforded AJE in the media, one possibility for eroding American suspicion of AJE could lie in how other media depict the network. The present paper asks, How does coverage by other media and/or actual exposure to AJE change perceptions of the network? We term this media-on-media framing intermedia framing. Specifically, this study measures American prejudice against AJEs brand by having participants watch and evaluate the same AJE news clip with different news logos in an online experiment conducted the month after the Egyptian uprising. To understand how intermedia framing affects reception to the network, we also consider the role of media frames in affecting these evaluations by first showing some participants an ironically humorous Daily Show report versus a straight NBC news package, both about AJE.

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Literature Review In this study, we draw from and seek to extend four main bodies of literature: news framing, metacoverage, source credibility, and Arab prejudice in America. Here, we offer a brief overview of each and explain their applicability.

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News Framing and Metacoverage We propose the concept of intermedia framing based on the idea that people increasingly learn about media from other media. The framing piece suggests that how other media are represented impacts how the public evaluates those media when viewing them directly. Though scholars differ in their definition (Weaver, 2007), the general consensus is that framing refers to the organizing principles used by news media to relay a news story to an audience and the potential effects of these organizing principles on that audience (Druckman, 2001; Iyengar, 1991; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Price & Tewksbury, 1996; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007). Framing is thus a process, often conscious, that allows for the construction and definition of an issue for public consideration (Nelson et al., 1997). Iyengar (1991) shows how news frames can affect public opinion, as moderated by audience characteristics. We propose intermedia framing as a specific mechanism that can contribute to metacommunication research, which looks at communication about communication (Esser, 2009; Simons, 1994). Building on previous content research and conceptualization (Esser & DAngelo, 2003), Esser (2009) advances the concept of metacoverage to capture how news media report on themselves, other news media, governments, and other political actors strategic communications. He applies the concept to war coverage, a topic rife with metacoverage, as his analysis of media coverage during the recent Iraq war demonstrates. Further, he shows how various categories of framing are at play: (1) conduit frames depict medias role in communication efforts; (2) strategy frames reveal contestation between media and political actors; (3) accountability frames hold news media up to the critical standards of democratic theory; (4) personalization frames are about particular reporters or media figures (pp. 715717). These frame types do not consider how media coverage can frame one particular media outlet despite the well-observed tendency among American political officials and U.S. news media to discuss Al Jazeeras reporting as a factor in hostilities during the Iraq war (Samuel-Azran, 2010; Youmans, 2012). Esser negated this potential, claiming that media organizations do not usually criticize each otherunless they are motivated by ideological animosity or business rivalry (Esser, 2009, p. 713). Motivations aside, American news media actively covered the network and its Arabic and English services as part of the war on terror and Iraq news stories. Thus, intermedia framing allows for the occasion where news media report on a particular media outlet in such a way that can impact how the public assesses it. Metacoverage research on Al Jazeera further complements the present research. King and Zayani (2008) consider how AJE is covered in print media, focusing on the networks branding. They find that AJE is rarely mentioned with terrorism or antiWest violence in global print media coverage, unlike the AJ. Relatedly, Samuel-Azran also shows how western news media package, edit, and disclaim AJ content it transmits in order to lessen its critical edge (2010). This paper contributes to this

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work by considering how media coverage of AJE impacts the audiences receptivity to the channel. Intermedia framing also serves as a concept parallel to intermedia agenda-setting (Boyle, 2001; Breen, 1997), a similar meta application of one of the key concepts of media effects theory. Intermedia agenda-setting looks at how news media story selection is influenced by other news medias agendas, or what they cover. Pack journalism, as Timothy Crouse observed in The Boys on the Bus (1973), is an example of intermedia agenda-setting. Intermedia agenda-setting, however, focuses on media effects on other media, not on actual viewers. We propose intermedia framing to fill this void. In an era of media globalization and high-choice media environments, publics can more easily access media from around the world. Since metacoverage is now more frequent, as Esser (2009) demonstrates, people have more occasions to learn about other channels and sources through their regular news diet. Intermedia framing is thus a useful concept not only for analyzing a more complex media environment, but also for intercultural research centered on mass media. While the presence of foreign media has long been a source of resentment and fear, domestic media can be vital to facilitating its reception. The foreign media can then offer windows into other cultures to those willing to watch, listen, or read. The ways in which domestic media report on new sources of information can help shape the publics openness to them, and can in turn impact the prospects for mass-mediated intercultural communication. Intermedia framing is most clearly justified if we find that: (a) assessments of AJE differ between those who are just exposed to its content, versus those who are exposed to its content after watching other news media reports about the channel in other words, vicarious exposure; or (b) that assessments of AJE vary with exposure to different types of intermedia framing. Source Credibility The current study also relates to the literature on source credibility, which we see as important for facilitating intercultural communication. We propose that intermedia framing can influence level of trust of the media framed. Beginning with Hovland and Weiss (1951; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) and through the 1970s, the persuasive effects of source credibility were posited to moderate media effects (Sternthal, Phillips, & Dholakia, 1978). In the 1970s, however, researchers began working to identify the bases of communicator credibility. Findings emerged that indicated highly contextual and conditional effects. Moderating variables explored included political involvement (Dean, Austin, & Watts, 1971; Johnson & Scileppi, 1969; Rhine & Severance, 1970) and pre-existing dispositions toward an issue (Bock & Saine, 1975; Sternthal et al., 1978), among others. More recent media credibility scholarship focuses on evaluations of biasor how people evaluate sources (Eveland & Shah, 2003). Of particular relevance is the body of research that considers media bias assessments at the group-level, which includes work on the hostile-media phenomenons focus on partisanship as determining perceptions of

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antagonistic media bias (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Hostile media bias research suggests partisans with strong beliefs are more likely to evaluate media content as biased (Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001). Given the wide perception of AJE as anti-American, we test whether many will presume the network is biased and hostile. If so, is there an intermedia framing effect? That is, will perceptions of the source change if people are exposed to different types of news about that source? Specifically, we consider the impact of satiric soft news versus hard news coverage of AJE on how people evaluate AJEs credibility before and after exposure. Researchers employ the term soft news to include such diverse formats as network and cable newsmagazine shows, entertainment and tabloid magazine shows, and daytime and late-night talk shows (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006, p. 342). Though often grouped with other late night comedy shows and soft news in general, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart is a unique series with a prominent position in todays political and media landscapes alike. Young adults view the series as an important source of political information (Baum, 2005; Hollander, 2005). Daily Show ` -vis their network newsviewers demonstrated superior campaign knowledge vis-a viewing counterparts (Young, 2004). Further, the content of the series campaign information is comparable to hard news (Fox, Kaloen, & Sahin, 2007). Going beyond research on campaign and politics content, we posit that in ironically satirizing other media, The Daily Show frames these other media. The Daily Show is particularly interesting as a framing device because it employs meta-disparagement humor, or jokes that explicitly target a marginalized identity while implicitly targeting those who would laugh at the joke at face value (Brown, 2012; Brown & Betz, 2011). If disparagement humor refers to jokes in which one party is victimized, belittled, or suffers some misfortunes or act of aggression (Hobden & Olson, 1994, p. 239), meta-disparagement humor adds a layer of irony to create the multi-level targets of ironic satire, making it more difficult to predict. Research shows that direct disparagement humor leveled at minorities increases prejudice toward these groups (Ford & Ferguson, 2004; Greenwood & Isbell, 2002; Hobden & Olson, 1994; Martin, 2007). But, given its ironic intention, The Daily Shows meta-disparagement jokes, in particular its early segment on AJE, may in fact have the opposite effect. Prejudice against Arabs Finally, this study seeks to add to the relatively small literature on prejudice against Arabs in America. Compared to African American prejudice, racism against Arabs is a less studied phenomenon. Arabs in America have encountered waves of discrimination linked to international politics. The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States in particular catalyzed overt discrimination and violent attacks of Arab Americans (Cainkar, 2008). Despite the fact that just 20% of Muslims are Araband not all Arabs are Muslimthe two identities are often conflated (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008; Read, 2008). Stereotypes of both groups include being violent (Alsultany, 2008; Cainkar, 2008; Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008) and backwards in

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social, political, moral, and religious terms (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008, p. 81). These stereotypes unify many Americans against an imagined, monolithic enemy (Alsultany, 2008; Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008; Joseph, DHarlingue, & Wong, 2008). Brown (2012) finds that discrimination against Arabs is believed to be more acceptable than that against women, blacks, or gays. Here, we consider prejudice against Arabs as a possible explanation for negative pre-assessments, or hostile media bias, against AJE. If people project group prejudices onto media, then such media are unlikely to be able to play a conciliatory role. However, we believe intermedia framing may be able to overcome opposition to AJE based on latent ethnic prejudice.
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Hypotheses Based on the active public resistance to AJE and its commonly perceived association with Al Qaeda, we hypothesize that antipathy for AJE is more pronounced than for Western news outlet CNN International (CNNI). We showed participants the same news clip with different logos and asked them to assess the channels based on what they watched. We propose the following hypothesis to establish baseline attitudes `-vis CNNI. toward AJE vis-a
H1: Participants will rate AJE more negatively than CNNI.

If intermedia framing plays a key role in creating these disparate evaluations, we expect it can change them as well, depending on how it is framed. Asking if evaluations of AJE change with exposure to other media coverage of AJE assumes that metacoverage matters for audiences. Specifically, this study examines the differences between hard news and satiric soft news packages on AJE on how people evaluate AJE in terms of bias, trustworthiness, intention to watch the network, and support for cable carriage. Specifically, we predict that a serious piece of hard news coverage that considers AJE with a war on terror frame will increase negative evaluations of AJE, while satiric soft news coverage of AJE with an ironic war on terror frame will boost evaluations of the network because it makes light of the view that AJE is a threat.
H2a: Hard news coverage of AJE will increase negative evaluations of AJE. H2b: Satiric soft news coverage of AJE will decrease negative evaluations of AJE.

As outlined above, intermedia framing in this context is contingent upon the idea that assessments of AJE differ between those who are just exposed to its content versus those who are exposed to its content after watching other news media reports about the channel. Given the positive boost expected for those that view a metadisparagement frame of AJE that undermines prejudice against the network, we expect this positive assessment will be intensified by subsequent exposure to AJE. In accordance with hostile media bias, this will not hold for those who see an AJE piece preceded by hard news coverage of AJE or no story on AJE (control).
H3: Exposure to actual AJE coverage will boost assessments of AJE, but only after exposure to satiric soft news coverage of AJE.

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We also expect no effect of either frame or their interaction on evaluations of CNNI given that both the hard news and satiric soft news pieces pertain to AJE. ` -vis AJE and null results regarding CNNI would speak to the Significant effects vis-a power of intermedia framing.
H4: None of the clip conditions will affect evaluations of CNNI.

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This study also considers the way in which assessments of media are related to prejudice toward an affiliated ethnic group. In this sense, responses to global media may include projecting of sentiments toward the region and peoples from which the media source originateda dynamic consistent with hostile media bias. As such, we predict that Arab American prejudice is a deeper construct linked to negative evaluations of AJEand not CNNIregardless of exposure to stories on or content from AJE.
H5: Arab American prejudice will correlate negatively with evaluations of AJE but not CNNI.

While we predict that a hard news frame of AJE will negatively impact evaluation of AJE and a meta-disparagement frame will have the opposite effect, we are unsure how these framing stories will influence evaluations of Arab Americans. Thus, we propose the following research question.
RQ1: How will hard news and satiric soft news coverage of AJE affect Arab American prejudice?

Methods Participants The sample includes 249 Americans (52.6% female) recruited from Amazons Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Berinsky, Huber, and Lens (in press) find evidence that Mechanical Turk offers more diverse and representative samples than do university subject pools typically used in experimental research. To ensure an American sample and maximize participation quality, we mandated that all participants live in the United States and have a minimum approval rating of 95%. Users participated in exchange for $.25 or $.50. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 82, with a mean of 34.8 years. Among the participants, 83.9% identified as white, 4% as Latino/a, 10% as Asian-American, 2.4% as American Indian or Alaskan Native, 3.2% as AfricanAmerican, and 0.8% as Arab American or other, respectively. The mean political ideology was 3.51/7, or moderate. Procedure Between February 23 and March 22, 2011, participants completed the online experiment. To start, we asked participants about their news viewing habits. Then, participants were randomized into one of three media framing conditions: NBC Nightly News, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, or control (no video). Both the

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NBC Nightly News and Daily Show clips came from 2006 and report on the launch of AJE. The NBC Nightly News clip includes footage of Osama bin Laden, commentary from the Bush administration, and discussion of backlash, all linking the network to Al Qaeda. The report then roots AJEs inability to find cable distribution to its Arab viewpoint. The Daily Show clip likewise includes imagery of Al Qaeda leaders, commentary from the Bush administration, and discussion of distribution woes as linked to an Arab identity, but the framing is ironic and humorous, and shifts blame to the American public while mocking American news. Then, in this 3 3 design, we again randomized participants into one of three conditions: AJE, CNNI, or control (no video). Participants in the video conditions watched a straightforward AJE news clip about potential peace talks between the Taliban and government in Kabul. AJEs coverage of Afghanistan has been found to be overall more positive about Afghanistans futureand less focused on violence than CNNIs and the BBCs (Measuring Peace in the Media, 2010). In the AJE condition, participants watched the original clip. In the CNNI clip, participants watched the same clip cleaned of AJE markings and re-edited to appear like a CNNI clip. Participants were then asked to indicate how biased and trustworthy they would rate AJE and CNNI, as well as their intention to watch AJE and CNN, on a 7-point Likert scale. Participants were also asked, If your local cable company was considering carrying AJE (CNNI), would you have a preference or try to influence its decision?, with 5 options ranging from I would directly pressure the company in support of carrying AJE (CNNI) to I would directly pressure the company against carrying AJE (CNNI). Participants answered the questions for the news condition they were in and then for the other network, presented in a brief description as a competing news station. The order of network question presentation to the control group was counter-balanced such that half answered AJE questions first, while half saw CNNI questions first; no differences were found between responses across the counter-balanced control groups, indicating no ordering effects, with one exception noted in the results. We also gauged Arab American prejudice using Bushman and Bonaccis (2004) Arab American Prejudice scale, adapted under Bushmans guidance ( 0.93 for Bushman and Bonaccis original scale;  0.91 for our adapted version). Finally, participants answered demographic questions (Table 1).

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Results To test Hypothesis 1that AJE will be evaluated more negatively than CNNIwe compared responses to the four evaluation questions across clip conditions. AJE was evaluated as significantly more biased than CNNI (t 6.74, p50.001), with a mean of 4.72 for AJE compared to a mean of 3.97 for CNNI on a 7-point scale ranging from extremely unbiased to extremely biased. AJE was also rated as less trustworthy than CNNI, with a mean of 4.22 for AJE, placing it on the untrustworthy side of the scale, compared to 3.22 for CNNI, placing it on the trustworthy side of the

Journal of Intercultural Communication Research Table 1. Model for H2a, H2b, and H3.
Dependent variables U Unbiased T Trustworthiness L Likelihood of watching C Cable Carriage DV C1 C2 C1xC2 PID FN Independent variables C1 clip 1 condition (soft/hard news) C2 clip 2 (AJE/CNNI) PID Political ideology FN Frequency of news watching

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Table 2. Findings for H2a, H2b, and H3.

AJE Bias C1 C2 C1xC2 PID FN Trust * * *** *** *** * 2.98*** YES/NO * *** Watch * ** *** * *** ** 2.79*** NO ** * *** Carriage Bias CNNI Trust Watch Carriage

Model in General F 5.15*** SUPPORT Hs YES

5.74*** NO

5.56*** YES

3.55*** YES

x.xx* NO

3.00*** YES

* p50.10; ** p50.05; *** p50.01.

scale. Participants were also significantly less inclined to watch AJE (M 2.97) compared to CNNI (M 1.90, t 7.91, p50.001). Participants additionally indicated significantly less support for AJEs cable carriage compared to CNNI (t 5.92, p50.001), with a mean of 3.02 for AJE, on the negative end of the spectrum, compared to 2.63 for CNNI, closer to indifference. This offers strong support for Hypothesis 1. In order to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b and Hypothesis 3, we estimate a general linear model predicting each outcome variable separately, with clip 1 condition (control, soft news, or hard news), clip 2 condition (control, AJE, or CNNI), and their interaction as predictors, and political ideology (PID) and frequency of news viewing in general as covariates (Table 2). The model is significant for AJE bias (F(10, 226) 5.15, p50.001), with PID as the only significant predictor (p50.001). The interaction term is marginally significant (p 0.07). Post-hoc tests indicate significant differences within the AJE second clip condition, such that those who first watched the Daily Show framing of AJE rated AJE as less biased (adjusted M 4.95, holding PID and news viewing frequency constant at their means) than those in the control condition (adjusted M 4.22, p 0.10) and CNNI condition (adjusted M 3.94, p 0.02). The bias results offer support for H2a (hard news coverage will increase negative evaluations of AJE), H2b (satiric soft news

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coverage of AJE will decrease negative evaluations of AJE), and H3 (exposure to actual AJE coverage will boost assessments of AJE, but only after exposure to satiric soft news coverage of AJE.). The model was also significant in predicting CNNI Bias (F(10, 226) 3.97, p50.001). PID is again a significant predictor (p50.001), while this time clip 2 is also significant (p 0.03). An ANOVA (F(2, 246) 3.55, p 0.03) with post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Tukeys correction reveals those in the CNNI viewing condition tend to rate CNNI significantly more favorably than those in the control (p 0.05) or AJE condition (p 0.05). As the AJE Bias results demonstrate, exposure to AJE did not give AJE the same boost. The model is likewise significant in predicting trustworthiness ratings of AJE (F(10, 226) 5.74, p50.001). PID (p50.001) and Clip 2 (p 0.05) are both significant predictors of trustworthiness. An ANOVA (F(2, 246) 2.89, p 0.06) shows a marginal effect whereby those in the AJE condition rated AJE as more trustworthy than those in the control condition (p 0.06). The trustworthiness results do not support H2a or H2b and counter H3, as exposure to AJE alone boosted perceptions of the network. The model is likewise significant for ratings of CNNI trustworthiness, but only PID is a significant predictor. We also estimate the model to predict intention to watch AJE (F(10, 226) 2.98, p50.01) and CNNI (F(10, 226) 2.79, p50.01). For AJE ratings, PID (p50.001), frequency of news viewings (p 0.06), and clip 1 condition (p 0.06) are significant or marginally significant. An ANOVA (F(2, 245) 3.42, p 0.03) reveals, relative to control, those in the Daily Show (p 0.09) and NBC Nightly News (p 0.05) first clip conditions are less likely to indicate a desire to watch AJE in the future. With intention to watch, we find support for H2a, but no support for H2b or H3. For intention to watch CNNI, PID (p50.001), frequency of news viewing (p 0.03), and clip 1 (p 0.09) are again significant or marginally significant predictors. There are, however, no significant pairwise comparisons. We also estimated the model to predict support for cable carriage of AJE (F(10, 226) 5.56, p50.001) and CNNI (F(10, 226) 3.00, p 0.001). For AJE carriage, PID is significant (p 0.001) and the interaction term is marginally significant (.06). Post-hoc tests reveal that the AJE second clip is driving this difference, with those who first watch The Daily Show (adjusted M 3.45, with PID and news viewing frequency held constant at their means) more likely to support carriage than those in the NBC Nightly News (M 2.70, p50.01) and control (M 2.73, p 0.010) conditions. The carriage results thus offer support for H2b and H3. Taken together, these four models offer surprising results: it seems a one-two punch of a satiric soft news framing of the network and actual exposure to AJE can together overcome antipathy toward AJE. For CNNI, we see a significant effect of PID (p50.001) and the second clip (p 0.04), as well as a marginally significant interaction term (p 0.09). Post-hoc tests are not relevant to the hypotheses. It is also important to note that the control for second clip condition (no clip) counter-balanced presentation order of questions about each network. There was an unexpected significant difference such that CNNI carriage received greater

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support when participants first answered questions about AJE, suggesting a compensation effect. Next, we consider the relationship between clip condition and Arab American prejudice (H4). We find significant correlations between Arab American prejudice and AJE evaluations, such that, as prejudice increases, reports of the following decrease: unbiased ratings (r 0.353, p50.001), trustworthiness (r 0.472, p50.001), likelihood to watch (r 0.399, p 0.001), and support for cable carriage (r 0.491, p50.001). Correlations between Arab American prejudice and CNNI evaluations are non-significant. These results offer support for H4Arab American prejudice will be correlated with negative evaluations of AJE but not CNNI. The same general linear model is significant (F(10, 226) 2.83, p50.01) in predicting Arab American prejudice, a composite Arab American prejudice score. Both political ideology (p50.001) and the soft versus hard news clip 1 (p 0.02) were significant predictors. An ANOVA (F(2, 236) 3.02, p 0.05) and subsequent pairwise comparisons with a Tukeys correction reveal that those in The Daily Show condition demonstrated significantly lower levels of anti-Arab sentiments than those in the control condition (p 0.04). Thus, we find an answer to our research question. In line with the H2a, H2b, and H3 results, exposure to satiric soft news coverage decreases Arab American prejudice.

Discussion and Conclusion AJE faces a public antipathy that persisted even in the wake of elite-level accolades for the networks Egypt coverage. Evidence suggests the typical viewer is unwavering in her pre-conceived evaluations of AJE, with inclinations linked to deeper constructs of Arab American prejudice and ideological leanings. This does not bode well for the prospects of AJE being a channel of mediatized recognition of a cultural Other for many Americans. That is, it will be difficult for AJE to become an intercultural window to the world for those prejudiced against the network. Actually watching the channel, albeit measured by viewing only one report, does not greatly change attitudes toward AJE. We find that, by and large, resistant audience perceptions of AJE endure despite exposure to an actual report by the network, a report of a high enough quality to elevate ratings of CNN International when attributed to that network. The glimmer of hope lies in the potential for intermedia framing effects. Intermedia framing as a concept found support in our study. First, we showed that vicarious exposure to AJElearning about it via other coveragemattered differently from, and interacted with, the effects of direct exposure to AJE. Second, we showed how different types of frames about AJE had different effects. The metadisparagement framing of AJE by The Daily Show decreased perceptions of AJE bias and increased support for AJE cable carriage among those also in the AJE condition. Thus, the Al Ja-ZERO! sized audience put forth in The Daily Show piece on AJE is not inevitable if satiric framing of this very sort can undermine institutionalized

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prejudice and set the stage for actual exposure. Taken together, our findings offer an empirical basis for intermedia framing as a concept of audience effects linked to metacoverage. This work has consequences for the role of news media in helping individuals navigate increasingly complex information environment. If The Daily Show and other media coverage can offset protests and latent audience bias against foreign channels to some degree, it suggests that journalists, program writers and hosts, and others working in media are cultural ambassadors who can help or hinder the publics openness to foreign media. The prospects of foreign media serving an intercultural communication function depend to some degree on how they are processed and depicted by domestic media. This is not necessarily promising since, as Esser notes (citing Meyer, 2002), Media actors pursue their own interests (striving for public attention, economic success, and professional reputation) and follow a distinct media logic (in terms of selection criteria and presentational styles) that often clashes with the political publicity logic (striving for message control, strategic communication, and public opinion formation)in both Germany and the United States (2009, p. 716). Also pertinent to research on intercultural communication is the relationship between The Daily Shows satiric skewering of the mainstream medias portrayal of AJE as a platform for terrorism. Just a few moments of comedic undermining of institutionalized prejudice decreased prejudice on an interpersonal level. Given the increased discrimination against Arab Americans in the wake of the war on terror, this suggests satire can decrease prejudice. Perhaps by laughing at the absurdity of discrimination, we can become more aware of our own prejudices, thus helping open intercultural acceptance. The exact mechanisms require further research. The results also suggest that scholars looking at prejudice against Arab Americans post-9/11 can explore countervailing media coverage that may have mitigated the well-documented backlash. The limitations in this study point to further research. To evaluate the effect of effects (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, p. 716), or the normative and policy implications, researchers must be sure to measure the effects properly. Assuming there are high rates of selective exposure, manipulational control designs cannot closely resemble reality. Accordingly, Bennett and Iyengar (2008) suggest that experimental researchers use designs that combine manipulation with self-selection of exposure (p. 724) to avoid generalizability problems. Rather, our design attempts to simulate incidental or involuntary exposure, rather than self-selection. Forcing exposure revealed latent biases against AJE, an important factor in understanding its intercultural potential. Further research could test audience selection behaviors to gauge active source avoidance among populations in general. Additionally, our media sample is not fully representative. We include just one news story watched in a particular historical context, right after AJEs Moment. Future studies could consider the effects of long-term exposure over time. Limitations notwithstanding, we feel that motivating and exploring the concept of intermedia framing contributes to our understanding of new types of media effects

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in a high-choice age of communication proliferation. While many scholars have taken to considering selective exposure in opposition to the effects tradition, audience reception research could move into a third area of vicarious exposure, which explores metacoverage, or media about media. Even those who have selfselected themselves as audiences will learn about other media. After all, choosing which media one views of the many available is itself subject to framing and other mediatized influences. Intermedia framing is a concept that can add to the conceptual tools for scholarship in an age in which metacommunication is ubiquitous. As a concept, intermedia framing can motivate further content analyses and more audience reception studies looking at different forms of media. In practice, intermedia framing can facilitate intercultural communication.

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