16. VILLARICO V. COURT OF APPEALS 309 SCRA 193 FACTS Sps.

Teofilo and Maxima Villarico, filed an application for confirmation of the title over a parcel of land which they allege they bought from Teofilos father. Said application was opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms part of the public domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan and is not available for private appropriation. The TC dismissed the case since the property forms part of the public domain therefore the certificate of title is void. The CA affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, thus the case at bar. ISSUE: Whether or not the property still forms part of the public domain HELD: YES > The SC held that both the TC and the appellate court correctly adjudged the area to be within the unclassified forest zone therefore incapable of private appropriation. > There has been no showing that a declassification has been made declaring the said lands as disposable or alienable and the spouses have not showed evidence to lead to the court to rule otherwise. > Thus, if the land in question still forms part of the public forest, then possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.

Resitituta an application for a Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted pronouncing him (married to Resitiuta) as the owner of the land. A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between petitioner, Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta with the consent of her husband for a period of 10 years. The lease of contract having expired, Restituta filed for unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal Court but on appeal in the CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became the owners of a parcel of land with the house thereon previously owned before the barter by Tan Queto. After the barter agreement, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building without any objection from Restituta. Afterwards Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. The respondent courts decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court led to the reformation of the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta from a sale to a conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents. Hence, this petition for a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents was valid hence a paraphernal property.

17. 18. CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO. V. BERCILLES | 66 SCRA 431 FACTS: The land sought to be registered in this case was formerly a part of a street. Through a resolution, it was declared to be an abandoned road and not part of the City development plan. Thereafter, it was sold through a public bidding and petitioner was the highest bidder. He then sought to register said land but his application was dismissed. HELD: The portion of the city street subject to petitioners application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use. Then it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property of the State. It is also very clear from the Charter that property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. 19. 20. Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals| G.R. No. L-35648, March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54 FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or by way of purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration thereof. The donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner

HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited. The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal funds of her own). 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court| G.R. No. 66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218 FACTS: The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. In 1919 the lands of the east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, OCT 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by Eulogio Agustin. As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the west bank. The shifting of

the river and siltation continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by Solana Cadastre were Pablo Binayug and Maria Melad. Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was Agustins Lot 8457, depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Binayug on the western bank. However, 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed and in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river. In April 1969, while the Melads, Binayug, Urbina and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the easter side of Cagayan River, Agustin, the heirs of Baldomero Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo Balisi, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the Melads, Binayug and Urbina from the premises. ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of accretion is lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the river. HELD: No. The ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the course of the river (Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed), and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation. Article 459 provides that whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfer it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years. Article 463 provides that, whe never the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current. 27. Vda. De Nazareno v. Court of Appeals| G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996, 257 SCRA 589 FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Private respondents Salasalan and Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from Antonio Nazareno, petitioners predessor-in-interest. Private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC of Cagayan de Oro City. The MTC rendered a decision against private respondents which was affirmed by the RTC. After several petitions for annulmentof judgment by private respondents which were all dismissed, the decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied. Before Nazareno died, he caused the approval by the Bureau of lands of the survey plan with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. The said petition was protested by private respondents. After conducting a survey of the subject land, land investigator Avelino labis recommended that the survey plan be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land application covering their respective portions. Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of lands Ignacio who denied the Motion. Respondent Director of lands Abelardo Palad ordered Nazareno to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced; he also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof. A petitioner filed a case for annulment of the previous decisions with the RTC but was dismissed. The CA affirmed the RTC decision contending that the approved of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can claim ownership of the subject land by virtue of Art 457 of the Civil Code. HELD: No, accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art 457 of the NCC requires the concurrence of the requisites mentioned in the Article. These are called rules on alluvion, which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current o f waters. The word current indicates the participation of the body of water in the flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners, however, admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas creek and the Cagayan River. The Bureau of lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust. Petitioners submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules of alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. The subject being public land is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of public dominion.