OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O.

2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Morata vs. Go October 27, 1983 | Escolin Facts: Respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages. Petitioners filed a MTD, stating that the complaint failed to allege that the plaintiffs didnt avail of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508 and that there was no certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. CFI denied the MTD. Issue: WON the complaint in the case at bar is required to undergo the conciliation proceedings under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law Held: YES. The conciliation process at the barangay level, as prescribed by P.D. 1508, is a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court. It is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well. The relevant provisions of law are quoted as follows: SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases: [1] Where the accused is under detention; [2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; [3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and [4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: [1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; [3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; [4] Offenses where there is no private offended party; [5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government. Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes" its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, embodying the directive "to desist from receiving complaints and petitions in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the CFI, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts under B.P. No. 129. Aquino, J., concurring: The impression that the law applies only to cases filed in inferior courts does not seem to be correct. Of course, the law applies only to disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay or to those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality. Cases between or among those persons should undergo the conciliation process, whatever may be the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved as long as they do not belong to the following cases: (a) Where the parties involved reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities unless such barangays adjoin each other; xxxx The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court contemplates situations for the enforcement or nullification

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The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

of settlement or arbitration award. If there is no award, the city or municipal court will have no occasion to intervene. Uy vs. Contreras September 26, 1994 | Davide, Jr. Facts: Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde (hereinafter Atayde) the other half of the second floor of a building located in Makati. She operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor. The sublease contract expired. Petitioner was not able to remove all her movable properties. An argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing. Respondent filed a complaint with the barangay captain. The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain but was rescheduled because only the petitioner appeared. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati. Respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses. In her counteraffidavit, petitioner alleged the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of Manila. Petitioner filed a MTD which was denied by the respondent Judge. Issues: WON the information should be dismissed for being premature Held: YES. The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof, revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. It may thus be observed that the revised katarungang pambarangay law has at least three new significant features, to wit: 1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.

2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. 3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary." What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of the complaint is unclear; obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or" is not found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the pangkat secretary. Such suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days. While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code. Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. Prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Where, however, the fact of noncompliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper. The Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which provides: Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are

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The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

estopped from disavowing the authority of the body, which they themselves had sought. Wingarts v. Mejia March 20, 1995 | J. Regalado Facts: These administrative complaints were an offshoot of three criminal cases decided by respondent judge and involving the Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo Munar. Complainant Johan L.H. Wingarts was the accused in criminal cases for malicious mischief and grave threats which was filed by Munar. Because of this, Wingarts made a counter-charge against Col. Munar resulting in the third criminal case for usurpation of authority. For the criminal cases for malicious mischief, respondent judge is charged with malicious delay in the administration of justice since the case allegedly dragged for more than a year. Complainant also charge respondent judge for taking cognizance of the criminal cases for grave threats despite lack of prior barangayconciliation. The said case was later dismissed and indorsed to the barangay official concerned. The third complaint charges respondent judge for rendering an unjust decision in the criminal case for usurpation of authority. Complainants insist that in the said criminal case, the two accused therein, Capt. Manuel and Col. Munar who are both military lawyers, violated the prohibition against their appearing in civil courts without the necessary authorization. But the judge acquitted both accused. Judge says that he took cognizance of the complaint believing that substantial requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law have been met since a certification from the barangay captain was submitted. Regarding the allegation on delay, he also said that the case was decided 1 month and 3 days after it was submitted for decision. Regarding the unjust decision, he said that it was the result of his honest findings based on the evidence and the law. The Office of the Court Administration made the following findings: a. First charge is meritorious: Judge should have exercised greater prudence, Grave threats fall within the purview of the section requiring conciliation (Secs 408(c) and 412 of LGC). Such actuation however does not appear to be tainted with malice or evil intent. b. Second charge: The delay does not appear to be malicious. It was because of the postponements that the parties asked for. c. Third charge: it was not established that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust judgment and he doesnt appear to have been motivated by an evil or corrupt motive.

Issue: WON the OCA were correct in its findings (YES. Although the SC disagrees with the punitory sanction recommended) Held: Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith, bias or partiality on his part, respondent judge should have exercised the requisite prudence, especially under the environmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal case where personal liberty was involved. He should have carefully examined all relevant facts and issues and avoided the improvident issuance of the warrant of arrest without a circumspect review of the case which, after all, did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or complicated legal questions. Moreover, judges are directed to desist from improvidently receiving and desultorily acting on complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon Tagapamayapa. The repeatedly ruled that the proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court or other government office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed without compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. As to the charge of malicious delay in the administration of justice, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Court Administrator that while there was some delay in hearing the case, the same does not appear to be malicious nor deliberate. Corpuz vs. CA June 19, 1997 | Romero Facts: Carlito Corpuz and Juanito Alvarado were tenants of Lorenzo Barredo. Allegedly, Alvarado and other tenants signed a waiver that Barredo could sell his property to any person who can afford the same. Barredo subsequently sold his property to Corpuz; hence, a tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado. Carlito Corpus and Juanito Alvarado were tenants of Lorenzo Barredo. Allegedly, Alvarado and other tenants signed a waiver that Barredo could seel his property to any person who can afford the same. Barredo subsequently sold his property to Corpuz; hence, a tenancy relationship was established between Corpus and Alvarado. Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding him to vacate the room he was occupying because the formers children needed it. Alvarado refused to vacate the room as demanded, prompting Corpuz to file an ejectment case. Alvarados defenses were (1) the waiver was a forgery and (2) the dispute was not reffered to the Lupong Tagapayapa. MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room. RTC reversed the MTC on the ground that the sale to Corpuz was a subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing Authority (NHA) and must be resolved first. It also

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. 2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal of the case for unlawful detainer. The CA affirmed the RTC. Issues: (1) WON the ejectment case should be suspended pending the resolution of the case in the NHA (2) WON the case should be first referred to the Lupon Tagapaya Held: (1) NO. The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases and the only issue to be resolved is the physical or material possession over the real property, not the ownership. However, an exception is when the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership, like in this case. Suits for annulment of the title or document over the property which should not be considered in the abatement of an ejectment suit. The underlying reason is for the defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit (summary in nature) by the simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon. The case before the NHA cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the jectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the parties. (2) YES, but may be waived. The Court has held that the failure to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutues a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment. This defense was only stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's answer. Also, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein. Bonifacio Law Office vs. Judge Bellosillo December 16, 2002 | Panganiban Facts: Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr. of the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo of the MTC of Quezon City. It is alleged that said respondent Judge referred the said ejectment case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint, that the matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certification to File Motion was attached to the annex of the the verified complaint.

The Clerk of Court advised him that perhaps he should submit the minutes of the hearings held in the barangay. Despite complying with said advice, no action was still taken by the court. The inordinate delay of respondent on acting upon said case has caused him so much suffering as his family is forced to rent a house to live in at a monthly rental rate of P19,000.00. The OCA found respondent either ignorant or negligent in referring the case back to the barangay despite the presence of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File Action. It also faulted him for disregarding the Rules on Summary Procedure Issues: WON the findings of the OCA are proper Held: Partially. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA regarding the rules on summary procedure, but disagree with those relating to the barangay proceedings. The records reveal that such Certification was improperly and prematurely issued. In what appears to be a pre-printed standard form thereof, the x before the second enumerated statement clearly shows that no personal confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. Respondents position that the Pangkat was not constituted, and that no face to face conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is substantiated by the Minutes submitted by complainant. Evidently, complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings. Also, the Certification to File Action was issued on March 1, 1996, less than fifteen days after the first scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman. Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to conciliate between the parties and to settle the case before it. Hence, respondent judge was not incorrect in remanding the case to it for completion of the mandated proceedings. Respondent rendered judgment on the case only on January 7, 1998, almost a year from the time the case had been deemed submitted for resolution. Unacceptable is his explanation that he waited for the defendants to avail themselves of their right to appeal the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution. He has no duty to wait, because the law mandates him to act and decide the case promptly. Mendova vs. Judge Afable December 4, 2002 | Sandoval-Gutierrez Facts: Mendova filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion San Julian, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada. A certification from the barangay chairman confirmed such fact. The minutes showed that the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.

OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O. 2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Mendova then filed a complaint for physical injuries with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San JulianSulat, Eastern Samar which was dismissed by the respondent Judge on the ground of prescription. Complainant filed with the Office of the Court Administrator an administrative complaint against respondent judge. He alleged that in dimissming the case, respondent judge didnt apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of the LGC. In his comment, respondent admitted that he was wrong and that he had a mental lapse due to heavy workload in applying the rule of prescrption in the RPC instead of the LGC. The OCA found respondent guilty and recommended that he be fined P3,000.00 with a warning that a commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Issue: WON respondent judge is administratively liable for dismissing the criminal case on the ground of prescription Held: NO. The Court has repeatedly stressed that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as an MR. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge. In the case at bar, the records show that Mendova did not bother at all to file an MR. No reason was advanced why complainant failed to do so. Thus, the administrative complaint is premature. Moreover, pursuant to Section 410(c) of the Local Government Code, the prescriptive period is interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the barangay, and resumes upon receipt by the complainant of the Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat Secretary of the barangay. In the present case, records fail to show when the complainant received the Certification to File Action. Complainant failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification and so clearly, he cannot now fault respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of prescription. While respondent judge admitted his mistake, such may not be considered ignorance of law. It can only be an error of judgment.