Yao Kee vs Sy-Gonzales Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese, died on Jan 17, 1977, leaving his properties in the Philippines.

His natural children, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy, filed a petition for grant of letters of administration. However the petition was opposed by Yao Kee stating that she, being married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931, is the lawful wife of the deceased and that her children are the legitimate children of the deceased. The probate court held in favor of the opposition. This was modified and set aside by the Court of Appeals which held that both sets of children were acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration. Issue: WON the facts of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was proven. HELD: Custom is defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. [Article 12, Civil Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: 1) The existence of the foreign law as a question of fact 2) The alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot be considered as proof of Chinas law or custom on marriage not only because they are self serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children; it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another and they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiats recognition of Sze Sook Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood.

Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceaseds acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their fathers acknowledgment, evidence by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the CFI wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance Martinez vs. Van Buskirk Facts: On Sept. 11, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Martinezs carromata was hit by the defendants uncontrolled delivery wagon, causing a serious cut on the plaintiffs head and damaging the carromata and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. The defendant, on behalf of his cochero explained that the cochero was a good servant and was considered reliable and as part of delivery, his cochero tied the driving lines of the horses on the front of the wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the forage to be delivered. While unloading, a vehicle drove by and cracked a whip, which frightened the horses and they ran away. With these facts the court found the defendant guilty of negligence. Issue: WON an employer who has hired a trusty driver and has a gentle and tractable team, is deemed liable for the negligence of the driver in handling the team, under the provision of the article 1903 of the civil code: liability referred to in this article shall cease when the person mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. Held: Reversed. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances. The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.

CORPUS VS. CABALUNA, JR. FACTS: Lourdes Corpus filed a case against Judge Cabaluna, Jr. for GROSS FRAUD for adjudicating to spouses Procopio and CleofeCabalfin cadastral lot 1762 which is the same lot awarded to her and several others after the Court of 1st Instance of Iloilo decided on the formers favor in September 5, 1955 and affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 26, 1963 following a civil case they filed against TiburciaBrabanco& Felix Amijana. In August 26, 1953.The case was filed on the ground that Judge Cabaluna knew of the pendency of the civil case before the Court of Appeals but still ratified a deed of sale of the said lot and awarded it in favor of the Sps. Cabalfin. Apart from the above case, Corpus & her co-plaintiffs filed a petition to set aside the decision rendered by Judge Cabaluna, Jr. and to order another hearing on the groud that cadadstral lot 1762 is the same lot litigated and awarded to them. Judge Cabaluna inhibited himself and forwarded the records to the Courts of the 1st Instance of Iloilo for a hearing on merits. A case was also filed by the same complainant against Spouse Cabalfin for annulment of the decision awarding them the same cadastral lot. ISSUE: Is Judge Cabalunaliable for the offense? HELD: The Court of First Instance of Iloilo recommended for the exoneration of the respondent for lack of evidence to substantiate the charge. Such recommendation was concurred by the office of the Secretary of Justice. For gross fraud to prosper there is a need of clear and convincing evidence that the respondent knew that one of the parcels involved and adjudicated to complainant was the same property which he awarded to sps. Cabalfin. Such evidence was not present in this case. Further, there was no proof showing that the respondent connived with the Claimant Camarista and/or Sps. Cabalfin in causing the approval of the latters claim. PEOPLE VS. PURISIMA FACTS: The respective petitioners filed separate criminal cases against corresponding accused in the courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar charging the latter with ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON in violation of PD No. 9, specifically on the account of the respective

offenders willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside weapons (described in PD No. 9) which are not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn livelihood. On the motion to quash filed by the accused, the judges handing the respective cases ORDERED FOR THE QUASHING OR DISMISSING on a common ground that the information did not allege facts, which constitute the offense penalized by PD No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime that the carrying outside of the accuseds residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected wit or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. ISSUE: People petitioned for the review of the decisions of the Courts citing the Provision of PD no. 9 and Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 when the Phils. was placed under a state of Martial Law, General order No. 6 and 7 dated September 23, 1972. Question: Whether the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under PD no. 9? HELD: Petitions for review was denied and the orders of the respondent judges dismissing or quashing the information concerned was affirmed, subject to the right of the State or petitioner to file either an amended information under PD no. 9, par. 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance. Wisdom behind the decision: (1) It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, court expressly requires that for information to be sufficient it must state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or commissions complained of as constituting the offense. (2) PD No. 9 holds 2 elements for the offense to be treated as a criminal violation 1st, the carrying outside ones residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and 2nd, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. (3) There is an obvious manifestation of ambiguity in the presidential decree based on the position taken by the petitioners that PD 9(3) covers one and all situations were a person carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose. Therefore, it becomes now a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning of the law, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state. (4) In the interpretation of legislative measure, the legislative intent of the law is the controlling factor.