Chamoy & Beryl Digested Cases Republic v. CA and Molina Republic v.

CA and Molina GR 108763, 13 February 1997 Facts: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separatedin-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse. Issue: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity Held: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals & Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos On November 19, 2010 Article 36: Psychological Incapacity Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court. ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar. HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has

been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage. Luzon Surety Co vs de Garcia Facts: 1) Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co Inc, executed a surety bond in favor of PNB Victorias Branch to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Chavez in the sum of PhP9,000. 2) Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement binding themselves solidarily liable to indemnify Luzon Surety Co Inc against any and all damages, costs and and other expenses which the petitioner may sustain or incur in consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid; and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for attorney's fees. 3) On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of PhP4,577.95, in interest, attorneys fees and other costs. 4) On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia.

5) On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay PNB in solidarity. The same decision likewise ordered the third party defendants Chavez, Garcia and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co. the amount to be paid to PNB. 6) On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to satisfy the claim of the petitioner. A writ of garnishment was soon issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses from their sugar plantation. 7) Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled in favor of them. Issue: WON the CPG could be liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety agreement Held: No. Decision appealed from was affirmed. Costs against petitioner. Ratio Decidendi: Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course. (1408a) Petitioner contends that Garcias transaction as a guarantor through which he acquires the capacity of being trusted, adds to his reputation and enhances his standing in the community. He can thus secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their conjugal partnership. While not entirely without basis, such argument cannot prosper for it would negate what is expressly provided for in Article 161. In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the wefare of the spouses. There is none in this case. While Garcia by thus signing the agreement may be said to enhance his reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the provision. Its language is clear; it does not admit of doubt. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to. It peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed. So it is in this case. That is how the Court of Appeals acted, and what it did cannot be impugned for being contrary to law.

BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA 29 SCRA 864 October 30, 1969 FACTS: Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donors name. In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages. On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondents name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan. The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being inofficious. HELD: Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial courts order of dismissal sustained. Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness

of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents. Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. Tenchavez v Escano (1965) Tenchavez v Escano (1965) Facts: Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFICebu. Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act. Issues: 1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued. 2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband. Held: 1. YES At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation. For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose

means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils. Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. 2. YES The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages. It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited. But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum". Leouel Santos vs CA Leouel Santos vs. CA GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs. Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code. HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied. G.R. No. L-57211 March 18, 1985 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. MACLI-ING, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, BRANCH III, SY PIAO, LEE GIOK YAN, OSCAR SY and JOSE SY, respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Republic seeks to annul the Decision of the former Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet (Branch III), the dispositive portion of which reads: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby ordered as prayed for that (a) the Certificate of Live Birth of OSCAR SY and the entries in the corresponding Civil Registry of Births of the Local Civil Registry of Births be corrected by deleting the name 'Esteban' as the name of his father and substituting therein the true, correct and official name 'PIAO', so that the name of his (Oscar Sy's) father be read as "SY PIAO", SY being the family name and PIAO being the first name in the Chinese way of writing names, and (b) the Certificate of Live Birth of JOSE SY as well as the corresponding entries in the Civil Registry of Births of the City Registrar of Baguio be corrected so that the name JOE be corrected to read as "JOSE", after the required fees have been paid and the requirements of the law shall have been complied with. SO ORDERED. In a verified Petition filed before the lower Court (Spec. Proc. Case No. 882 [62]), private respondents sought to correct the entries in the respective Registries of Birth of Oscar Sy and Jose Sy. The entry sought to be corrected in the birth record of Oscar Sy is the name of his father from "Esteban Sy" to "Sy Piao" upon the claim that "Esteban" is only his father's nickname. And as to the birth record of Jose Sy, it is prayed that the name "Joe" therein be corrected to read "Jose". Petitioner opposed the corrections requested on the ground that the remedy availed of was improper considering that the changes sought are substantial in nature.

After a full-dress hearing, respondent Court authorized the corrections prayed for, hence, this appeal in so far as the correction of the entry in the record of birth of Oscar Sy is concerned. Thus, the correction ordered entered in the birth record of Jose Sy has become final and executory. The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court upon which private respondents anchor their Petition is applicable only to changes contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code, which are clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence. 1 It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily affect the Identity of the father. 2 In that sense, it can be said to be substantial. However, we find indubitable evidence to support the correction prayed for. In the Alien Certificate of Registration of the father (Exhibit "C"), his name appears as "Sy Piao". The same is true in his Immigrant Certificate of Residence (Exhibit "C-3 "). In the "Record of Annual Report in Person of Alien" of the father from 1961 yearly up to 1974, he always signed his name as "Sy Piao". His Income Tax Return for the calendar year 1972 also lists his name as "Sy Piao" (Exhibit "G-1"). The school records of Oscar Sy both in high school and at St. Louis University in Baguio, recorded the name of his father as "Sy Piao" (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"). Oscar Sy and Jose Sy are brothers of the full blood. And yet, in their respective birth certificates, it is only in Oscar's birth certificate that the name of their father listed as "Esteban Sy." In Jose's birth certificate, his father's name is "Sy Piao". Testimonial evidence was likewise presented showing that Esteban is the father's nickname by which he was known by his Filipino friends. That explains why Mrs. Felicidad Meris, who attended to Oscar's birth, supplied the father's name as "Esteban Sy". The mother, Lee Giok Yan, also joined the Petition and declared that Sy Piao is her husband and the father of Oscar and Jose and their four other children. We find no reason to doubt that "Sy Piao" and "Esteban Sy" are one and the same person. In the case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as well as subsequent cases predicated thereon, we forbade only the entering of material corrections in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action. The proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, were not summary. The Petition was published by order of the lower Court once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in accordance with law. The Solicitor General was served with copy of the Petition as well as with notices of hearings. He filed his Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise duly served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in attendance at the hearings in representation of the Solicitor General. He participated actively in the proceedings, particularly, in the cross-examination of witnesses. And, notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to appear to show cause why the petition should not be granted, no one appeared to oppose except the State through the Solicitor General. But neither did the State present evidence in support of its Opposition. In sum, no doubt has been cast on the credibility of private respondents' allegations nor upon the evidence adduced by them. Noteworthy also is the fact that neither the citizenship, paternity, filiation, or status of Oscar and Jose, nor that of their father is in issue. WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.