LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND THOUGHT: Language, speech and thought

OLEH SUMARTI 08501044

JURUSAN PENDIDIKAN BAHASA PROGRAM STUDI PENDIDIKAN BAHASA DAN SASTRA INGGRIS PROGRAM PASCASARJANA UNIVERSITAS NEGERI MAKASSAR 2009

LANGUAGE, SPEECH AND THOUGHT

SUMARTI

Abstract

For thousands of years philosophers have pondered the meaning of meaning, yet speakers of a language can easily understand what is said to them and can produce strings of words that are meaningful to other speakers. We use language to convey information to others can easily understand what is said to them and can produce strings of words that are meaningful to other speakers. We use language to convey information to others (my new bike is pink); ask questions (who left the party early?); give commands (stop lying!) and to express wishes (may be there peace on earth). Language, speech and thought have a real tighty relationship.

Introduction Language is a needed which will not release since the human being borne until he/she die. In historical, Wikipedia (2009) explained shortly origin of language; Even before the theory of evolution made discussion of more animal-like human ancestors common place, philosophical and scientific speculation casting doubt on the use of early language has been frequent throughout history. In modern Western Philosophy, speculation by authors such as Thomas Hobbes, and later Jean-Jacques Rousseau led to the Acadmie franaise declaring the subject off-limits. The origin of language is of great interest to philosophers because language is such an essential characteristic of human life. In classical Greek philosophy such inquiry was approached by considering the nature of things, in this case human

nature. Aristotle, for example, treated humans as creatures with reason and language by their intrinsic nature, related to their natural propensities to be "political", and dwell in city-state communities.

Definition of language Richards Jack & Schmidt Richards (2002) stated that Language is the system of human communication which consists of the structured arrangement of sounds (or their written representation) into larger units, e.g. MORPHEMES, WORDS, SENTENCES, and UTTERANCES. In common usage it can also refer to non-human systems of communication such as the language of bees, the language of dolphins. Language is a form of symbolic communication in which elements are combined to represent something other than themselves. Language can also refer to the use of such systems as a general phenomenon. Strictly speaking, language is considered to be an exclusively human mode of communication. Although other animals make use of quite sophisticated communicative systems, sometimes casually referred to as animal language, none of these are known to make use of all of the properties that linguists use to define language.

The Features of Human Language

(Adapted from Hockett, Charles. 1960. The Origin of Speech)

Hockett isolated 13 features that characterize human language and which distinguish it from other communication systems. The following diagram graphically represents each of the thirteen features. Each feature is numbered and listed below the diagram, along with a more developed discussion of the feature.

1. Vocal-auditory channel -- This means that the standard human language occurs as a vocal (making sounds with the mouth) type of communication which is perceived by hearing it. There are obvious exceptions: writing and sign language are examples of communication in the manual-visual channel. However, the vast majority of human languages occur in the vocal-auditory channel as their basic mode of expression. Writing is a secondary, and somewhat marginal form of language, while sign languages are in limited use, mostly among deaf people who are limited in their ability to use the auditory part of the vocal-auditory channel. 2. Broadcast transmission and directional reception -- This means that the human language signal is sent out in all directions, while it is perceived in a limited direction. For spoken language, the sound perpetuates as a waveform that expands from the point of origin (the mouth) in all directions. This is why a person can stand in the middle of a room and be heard by everyone (assuming they are speaking loudly enough). However, the listener hears the sound as coming from a particular direction and is notably better at hearing sounds that are coming from in front of them than from behind them. 3. Rapid fading (transitoriness) -- This means that the human language signal does not persist over time. Speech waveforms fade rapidly and cannot be heard after they fade. This is why it is not possible to simply say "hello" and have someone hear it hours later. Writing and audio-recordings can be used to record human language so that it can be recreated at a later time, either by reading the written form, or by playing the audio-record.

4. Interchangeability -- This means that the speaker can both receive and broadcast the same signal. This is distinctive from some animal communications such as that of the sticklefish. The sticklefish make auditory signals based on gender (basically, the males say "I'm a boy" and the females say "I'm a girl"). However, male fish cannot say "I'm a girl," although they can perceive it. Thus, stickle fish signals are not interchangeable. 5. Total feedback -- this means that the speaker can hear them self speak and can monitor their language performance as they go. This differs from some other simple communication systems, such as traffic signals. Traffic signs are not normally capable of monitors their own functions (a red light can't tell when the bulb is burned out, i.e.). 6. Specialization -- This means that the organs used for producing speech are specially adapted to that task. The human lips, tongue, throat, etc. have been specialized into speech apparati instead of being merely the eating apparati they are in many other animals. Dogs, for example, are not physically capable of all of the speech sounds that humans produce, because they lack the necessary specialized organs. 7. Semanticity -- This means that specific signals can be matched with specific meanings. This is a fundamental aspect of all communication systems. For example, in French, the word sel means a white, crystalline substance consisting of sodium and chlorine atoms. The same substance is matched with the English word salt. Anyone speaker of these languages will recognize that the signal self or salt refers to the substance sodium chloride.

8. Arbitrariness -- This means that there is no necessary connection between the form of the signal and the thing being referred to. For example, something as large as a whale can be referred to by a very short word. Similarly, there is no reason that a four-legged domestic canine should be called a dog and not a chien or a perro or an anjing (all words for 'dog' in other languages). Onomatopoeic words such as "meow" or "bark" are often cited as counter-examples, based on the argument that they are pronounced like the sound they refer to. However, the similarity if very looses (a dog that actually said "bark" would be very surprising) and does not always hold up across languages (Spanish dogs, for example, say "guau"). So, even onomatopoeic words are, to some extent, arbitrary. 9. Discreteness -- This means that the basic units of speech (such as sounds) can be categorized as belonging to distinct categories. There is no gradual, continuous shading from one sound to another in the linguistics system, although there may be a continuum in the real physical world. Thus speakers will perceive a sound as either a [p] or a [b], but not as blend, even if physically it falls somewhere between the two sounds. 10. Displacement -- This means that the speaker can talk about things which are not present, either spatially or temporally. For example, human language allows speakers to talk about the past and the future, as well as the present. Speakers can also talk about things that are physically distant (such as other countries, the moon, etc.). They can even refer to things and events that do not actually exist (they are not present in reality) such as the Easter Bunny, the Earth having an emperor, or the destruction of Tara in Gone with the Wind.

11. Productivity -- This means that human languages allow speakers to create novel, never-before-heard utterances that others can understand. For example, the sentence "The little lavender men who live in my socks drawer told me that Elvis will come back from Mars on the 10th to do a benefit concert for unemployed Pekingese dogs" is a novel and never-before-heard sentence (at least, I hope it is!), but any fluent speaker of English would be able to understand it (and realize that the speaker was not completely sane, in all probability). 12. Traditional Transmission -- This means that human language is not something inborn. Although humans are probably born with an ability to do language, they must learn, or acquire, their native language from other speakers. This is different from many animal communication systems where the animal is born knowing their entire system, e.g. bees are born knowing how to dance and some birds are born knowing their species of bird-songs (this is not true of all birds). 13. Duality of patterning -- This means that the discrete parts of a language can be recombined in a systematic way to create new forms. This idea is similar to Productivity (Feature 11). However, Productivity refers to the ability to generate novel meanings, while Duality of patterning refers to the ability to recombine small units in different orders.

What is speech? There are many linguistics stated what is speech it self, other of them are: B. Watson (extreme): thought and speech are one and the same thing; Ivan S. M. (less extreme): when a child thinks he invariably talks at the same time; Vigotsky and

Piaget: speech is involved in communication of knowledge between people; Osgood: intact thought processes disconnect from the ability to produce articulate speech. Speech is the physical production of sounds. These sounds (consonants and vowels) are produced in sequences to create words. Producing speech sounds involves the muscles, nerves and brain working together to plan and execute movements of the tongue, lips, palate, and jaw.

Speech Production In this section, we study the behavior of our vocal mechanism. Despite the fact that there are many aspects of this system that we do not completely understand (particularly around the vocal folds), our ability to conduct experiments with our own speech mechanism allows us to quickly verify much of its behavior. A. The Vocal Organs 1. Lungs serve as an air reservoir and energy source. 2. The Larynx and the Vocal Cords: The larynx contains the vocal folds. The vocal cords consist of folds of ligament extending from the thyroid cartilage in the front to the arytenoids cartilages at the back. The space between the vocal folds, called the glottis, is controlled by the arytenoid cartilages. For normal breathing, the arytenoids are spaced well apart. They come together when sound is produced.

The vocal cords may be closed, blocking the flow of air, and then opened suddenly to produce a glottal stop.

For unvoiced consonants, the folds may be completely open (such as when producing ``s'', ``sh'', and ``f'' sounds) or partially open (for ``h'' sounds).

Voiced sounds are created by vibrations of the vocal folds. The rate of vibration of the vocal cords is determined primarily by their mass and tension, though air pressure and velocity can contribute in a smaller way.

Normal speech varies over an approximate range of one octave. Typical speech center frequencies are 110 Hz (men), 220 Hz (women), and 300 Hz (children).

During a ``normal'' mode of vibration, the vocal cords open and close completely during the cycle and generate puffs of air roughly triangular in shape when air flow is plotted against time.

A ``breathy'' voice quality is produced during an open phase mode of vibration, such that the folds never completely stop the air flow through them.

A minimum of air passes through the folds, in short puffs, when producing a ``creaky'' voice.

Feedback from the vocal tract has little influence on the vibrations of the vocal folds (in constrast to the lips and horn interaction of the brass musician).

For normal vocal effort, the waveform of the air flow is roughly triangular in shape over time. This produces a ``buzzy'' sound which is rich in harmonics, falling off in amplitude as.

Unvoiced consonants make extensive use of broadband noise, caused by turbulent air flow through a constriction in the vocal tract.

B. The Vocal Tract: The vocal tract can be considered a single tube extending from the vocal folds to the lips, with a side branch leading to the nasal cavity. The length of the vocal tract is typically about 17 centimeters, though this can be varied slightly by lowering or raising the larynx and by shaping the lips. The pharynx connects the larynx (as well as the esophagus) with the oral cavity. The oral cavity is the most important component of the vocal tract because its size and shape can be varied by adjusting the relative positions of the palate, the tongue, the lips, and the teeth. C. Speech Articulation The smallest units of speech sounds are called phonemes. One or more phonemes combine to form a syllable, and one or more syllables to form a word. Phonemes can be divided into two groups: vowels and consonants. Vowels are always voiced. There are approximately 12 to 21 different vowel sounds used in the English language. Discrepancies usually are due to disagreement over what constitutes

a pure vowel sound rather than a diphthong (a combination of two or more vowels into one phoneme). Consonants involve rapid and sometimes subtle changes in sound. Consonants may be classified according to their manner of articulation as plosive (p, b, t, etc.), fricative (f, s, sh, etc.), nasal (m, n, ng), liquid (r, l), and semivowel (w, y). Consonants are more independent of language than vowels are.

D. Vocal Tract Resonances: Formants Phonemes are distinguished from one another by the resonances of the vocal tract. The peaks that occur in the sound spectra of the vowels, independent of pitch, are called formants. Just three formants are typically distinguished.

E. Vocal Tract Models Though the exact shape of the vocal tract is quite complex, many of its most prominent features can be recreated with simple models. The resonances of a closed-open cylinder of 17 centimeters occur around 500, 1500, and 2500 Hz, which are close to the formant frequencies of the vowel sound . Two-tube models of the vocal tract capture the many of the important features of the vowel sounds ``ah'', ``ee'', and ``oo''. Models composed of two cavities with a connecting constriction can approximate the formants associated with several consonant sounds.

F. Prosodic Features of Speech Prosodic features are characteristics of speech that convey meaning, emphasis, and emotion without actually changing the phonemes. Pitch, rhythm, and accent.

Speech community Speech community is a concept in sociolinguistics that describes a more or less discrete group of people who use language in a unique and mutually accepted way among themselves. There many reason about speech community namely: speech community means group of people who share some identifiable aspect of their linguistic communication; more importantly there should be some self as a community. Speech communities can be members of a profession with a specialized jargon, distinct social groups like high school students or hip hop fans (see also African American Vernacular English), or even tight-knit groups like families and friends. In addition, online and other mediated communities, such as many internet forums, often constitute speech communities. Members of speech communities will often develop slang or jargon to serve the group's special purposes and priorities. Exactly how to define speech community is debated in the literature. Definitions of speech community tend to involve varying degrees of emphasis on the following: a. Shared community membership b. Shared linguistic communication

However, the relative importance and exact definitions of these also vary. Some would argue that a speech community must be a 'real' community, i.e. a group of people living in the same location (such as a city or a neighborhood), while more recent thinking proposes that all people are indeed part of several communities (through home location, occupation, gender, class, religious belonging, and more), and that they are thus also part of simultaneous speech communities. Similarly, what shared linguistic communication entails is also a variable concept. Some would argue that a shared first language, even dialect, is necessary, while for others the ability to communicate and interact (even across language barriers) is sufficient. The underlying concern in both of these is that members of the same speech community should share linguistic norms. That is, they share understanding, values and attitudes about language varieties present in their community. While the exact definition of speech community is debated, there is a broad consensus that the concept is immensely useful, if not crucial, for the study of language variation and change. A person can (and almost always does) belong to more than one speech community. For example, a gay Jewish waiter would likely speak and be spoken to differently when interacting with gay peers, Jewish peers, or his co-workers. If he found himself in a situation with a variety of in-group and/or out-group peers, he would likely modify his speech to appeal to speakers of all the speech communities represented at that moment.

The meaning of thought According to AS Hornby in Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary of Current English (1974: 899), thought are power, process of thinking; way of thinking characteristic of a particular period, class, nation, etc.; (for) care, consideration; idea, opinion, intention, formed by thinking.

The genetic roots of thought and speech (Vygotsky) Thought and thinking are mental forms and processes, respectively ("thought" is both.) Thinking allows beings to model the world and to deal with it according to their objectives, plans, ends and desires. The most important fact uncovered through the genetic study of thought and speech is that their relationship undergoes many changes. Progress in thought and progress in speech are not parallel. Their two growth curves cross and recross. They may straighten out and run side by side, even merge for a time, but they always diverge again. This applies to both phylogeny and ontogeny. In animals, speech and thought spring from different roots and develop along different lines. This fact is confirmed by Koehlers, Yerkess, and other recent studies of apes. Koehlers experiments proved that the appearance in animals of an embryonic intellect i.e., of thinking in the proper sense is in no way related to speech. The inventions of apes in making and using tools, or in finding detours for the solution of problems, though undoubtedly rudimentary thinking, belong in a prelinguistic phase of thought development.

In Koehlers opinion, his investigations prove that the chimpanzee shows the beginnings of an intellectual behavior of the same kind and type as mans. It is the lack of speech, that infinitely valuable technical aid, and the paucity of images, that most important intellectual material, which explain the tremendous difference between anthropoids and the most primitive man and make even the slightest beginnings of cultural development impossible for the chimpanzee [18, pp. 191192]. There is considerable disagreement among psychologists of different schools about the theoretical interpretation of Koehlers findings. The mass of critical literature that his studies have called forth represents a variety of viewpoints. It is all the more significant that no one disputes Koehlers facts or the deduction which particularly interests us: the independence of the chimpanzees actions from speech. This is freely admitted even by the psychologists (for example, Thorndike or Borovskij) who do not see anything in the chimpanzees actions beyond the mechanics of instinct and of trial-and-error learning, nothing at all except the already known process of habit formation [4, p. 179], and by the introspectionists, who shy away from lowering intellect to the level of even the most advanced behavior of apes. Buehler says quite rightly that the actions of the chimpanzees are entirely unconnected with speech; and that in man the thinking involved in the use of tools (Werkzeugdenken) also is much less connected with speech and with concepts than are other forms of thought. The issue would be quite simple if apes had no rudiments of language, nothing at all resembling speech. We do, however, find in the chimpanzee a relatively

well-developed language, in some respects most of all phonetically not unlike human speech. The remarkable thing about his language is that it functions apart from his intellect. Koehler, who studied chimpanzees for many years at the Canary Island Anthropoid Station, tells us that their phonetic expressions denote only desires and subjective states; they are expressions of affects, never a sign of anything objective [19, p. 27]. But chimpanzee and human phonetics have so many elements in common that we may confidently suppose that the absence of humanlike speech is not due to any peripheral causes. The chimpanzee is an extremely gregarious animal and responds strongly to the presence of others of his kind. Koehler describes highly diversified forms of linguistic communication among chimpanzees. First in line is their vast repertory of affective expressions: facial play, gestures, vocalization; next come the movements expressing social emotions: gestures of greeting, etc. The apes are capable both of understanding one anothers gestures and of expressing, through gestures, desires involving other animals. Usually a chimpanzee will begin a movement or an action he wants another animal to perform or to share e.g., will push him and execute the initial movements of walking when inviting the other to follow him, or grab at the air when he wants the other to give him a banana. All these are gestures directly related to the action itself. Koehler mentions that the experimenter comes to use essentially similar elementary ways of communication to convey to the apes what is expected of them. By and large, these observations confirm Wundts opinion that pointing gestures, the first stage in the development of human speech, do not yet appear in

animals but that some gestures of apes are a transitional form between grasping and pointing [56, p. 219]. We consider this transitional gesture a most important step from unadulterated affective expression toward objective language. There is no evidence, however, that animals reach the stage of objective representation in any of their activities. Koehlers chimpanzees played with colored clay, painting first with lips and tongue, later with real paintbrushes; but these animals who normally transfer to play the use of tools and other behavior learned in earnest (i.e., in experiments) and, conversely, play behavior to real life never exhibited the slightest intent of representing anything in their drawings or the slightest sign of attributing any objective meaning to their products. Buehler says: Certain facts warn its against overestimating the chimpanzees actions. We know that no traveller has ever mistaken a gorilla or a chimpanzee for a man, and that no one has ever observed among them any of the traditional tools or methods that with humans vary from tribe to tribe but indicate the transmission from generation to generation of discoveries once made; no scratchings on sandstone or clay that could be taken for designs representing anything or even for ornaments scratched in play; no representational language, i.e., no sounds equivalent to names. All this together must have some intrinsic causes [7, p. 20].

Yerkes seems to be the only one among modern observers of apes to explain their lack of speech otherwise than by intrinsic causes. His research on the intellect of orangutans yielded data very similar to Koehlers; but he goes further in his conclusions: He admits higher ideation in orangs on the level, it is true, of a three-year-old child at most [57, p. 132]. Yerkes deduces ideation merely from superficial similarities between anthropoid and human behavior; he has no objective proof that orangs solve problems with the help of ideation, i.e., of images, or trace stimuli. In the study of the higher

animals, analogy may be used to good purpose within the boundaries of objectivity, but basing an assumption on analogy is hardly a scientific procedure. Koehler, on the other hand, went beyond the mere use of analogy in exploring the nature of the chimpanzees intellectual processes. He showed by precise experimental analysis that the success of the animals actions depended on whether they could see all the elements of a situation simultaneously this was a decisive factor in their behavior. If, especially during the earlier experiments, the stick they used to reach some fruit lying beyond the bars was moved slightly, so that the tool (stick) and the goal (fruit) were not visible to them at one glance, the solution of the problem became very difficult, often impossible. The apes had learned to make a longer tool by inserting one stick into an opening in another. If the two sticks accidentally crossed in their hands, forming an X, they became unable to perform the familiar, much-practiced operation of lengthening the tool. Dozens of similar examples from Koehlers experiments could be cited. Koehler considers the actual visual presence of a sufficiently simple situation an indispensable condition in any investigation of the intellect of chimpanzees, a condition without which their intellect cannot be made to function at all; he concludes that the inherent limitations of imagery (or ideation) are a basic feature of the chimpanzees intellectual behavior. If we accept Koehlers thesis, then Yerkess assumption appears more than doubtful. In connection with his recent experimental and observational studies of the intellect and language of chimpanzees, Yerkes presents new material on their linguistic development and a new, ingenious theory to account for their lack of real

speech. Vocal reactions, he says, are very frequent and vari ed in young chimpanzees, but speech in the human sense is absent [58, p. 53]. Their vocal apparatus is as well developed and functions as well as mans. What is missing is the tendency to imitate sounds. Their mimicry is almost entirely dependent on optical stimuli; they copy actions but not sounds. They are incapable of doing what the parrot does so successfully. If the imitative tendency of the parrot were combined with the caliber of intellect of the chimpanzee, the latter undoubtedly would possess speech, since he has a voice mechanism comparable to mans as well as an intellect of the type and level to enable him to use sounds for purposes of real speech [58, p. 53]. In his experiments, Yerkes applied four methods of teaching chimpanzees to speak. None of them succeeded. Such failures, of course, never solve a problem in principle. In this case, we still do not know whether or not it is possible to teach chimpanzees to speak. Not uncommonly the fault lies with the experimenter. Koehler says that if earlier studies of chimpanzee intellect failed to show that he had any, this was not because the chimpanzee really has none but because of inadequate methods, ignorance of the limits of difficulty within which the chimpanzee intellect can manifest itself, ignorance of its dependence on a comprehensive visual situation. Investigations of intellectual capacity, quipped Koehler, necessarily test the experimenter as well as the subject [18, p. 191]. Without settling the issue in principle, Yerkess experiments showed once more that anthropoids do not have anything like human speech, even in embryo.

Correlating this with what we know from other sources, we may assume that apes are probably incapable of real speech. What are the causes of their inability to speak, since they have the necessary voice apparatus and phonetic range? Yerkes sees the cause in the absence or weakness of vocal imitativeness. This may very well have been the immediate cause of the negative results of his experiments, but he is probably wrong in seeing it as the fundamental cause of the lack of speech in apes. The latter thesis, though Yerkes presents it as established, is belied by everything we know of the chimpanzees intellect. Yerkes had at his disposal an excellent means of checking his thesis, which for some reason he did not use and which we should be only too happy to apply if we had the material possibility. We should exclude the auditory factor in training the animals in a linguistic skill. Language does not of necessity depend on sound. There are, for instance, the sign language of deaf-mutes and lip reading, which is also interpretation of movement. In the languages of primitive peoples, gestures are used along with sound, and play a substantial role. In principle, language does not depend on the nature of its material. If it is true that the chimpanzee has the intellect for acquiring something analogous to human language, and the whole trouble lies in his lacking vocal imitativeness, then he should be able, in experiments, to master some conventional gestures whose psychological function would be exactly the same as that of conventional sounds. As Yerkes himself conjectures, the chimpanzees might be trained, for instance, to use manual gestures rather than sounds. The medium is

beside the point; what matters is the functional use of signs, any signs that could play a role corresponding to that of speech in humans. This method has not been tested, and we cannot be sure what its results might have been, but everything we know of chimpanzee behavior, including Yerkess data, dispels the hope that they could learn functional speech. Not a hint of their using signs has ever been heard of. The only thing we know with objective certainty is not that they have ideation but that under certain conditions they are able to make very simple tools and resort to detours, and that these conditions include a completely visible, utterly clear situation. In all problems not involving immediately perceived visual structures but centering on some other kind of structure mechanical, for instance the chimpanzees switched from an insightful type of behavior to the trialand-error method pure and simple. Koehler introduced the term insight (Einsicht) for the intellectual operations accessible to chimpanzees. The choice of term is not accidental. Kafka pointed out that Koehler seems to mean by it primarily seeing in the literal sense and only by extension seeing of relations generally, or comprehension as opposed to blind action [17, p. 130]. In connection with this description of ape speech, we should like to make three points: First, the coincidence of sound production with affective gestures, especially noticeable when the chimpanzees are very excited, is not limited to anthropoids it is, on the contrary, very common among animals endowed with voice. Human speech certainly originated in the same kind of expressive vocal reactions.

Second, the affective states producing abundant vocal reactions in chimpanzees are unfavorable to the functioning of the intellect. Koehler mentions repeatedly that in chimpanzees, emotional reactions, particularly those of great intensity, rule out a simultaneous intellectual operation. Third, it must be stressed again that emotional release as such is not the only function of speech in apes. As in other animals and in man, it is also a means of psychological contact with others of their kind. Both in the chimpanzees of Yerkes and Learned and in the apes observed by Koehler, this function of speech is unmistakable. But it is not connected with intellectual reactions, i.e., with thinking. It originates in emotion and is clearly a part of the total emotional syndrome, but a part that fulfils a specific function, both biologically and psychologically. It is far removed from intentional, conscious attempts to inform or influence others. In essence, it is an instinctive reaction, or something extremely close to it. There can hardly be any doubt that biologically this function of speech is one of the oldest and is genetically related to the visual and vocal signals given by leaders of animal groups. In a recently published study of the language of bees, K. v. Frisch describes very interesting and theoretically important forms of behavior that serve interchange or contact and indubitably originate in instinct. In spite of the phenotypical differences, these behavioral manifestations are basically similar to the speech interchange of chimpanzees. This similarity points up once more the independence of chimpanzee communications from any intellectual activity.

We undertook this analysis of several studies of ape language and intellect to elucidate the relationship between thinking and speech in the phylogenetic development of these functions. We can now summarize our conclusions, which will be of use in the further analysis of the problem. 1. Thought and speech have different genetic roots. 2. The two functions develop along different lines and independently of each other. 3. There is no clear-cut and constant correlation between them. 4. Anthropoids display an intellect somewhat like mans in certain respects (the embryonic use of tools) and a language somewhat like mans in totally different respects (the phonetic aspect of their speech, its release function, the beginnings of a social function). 5. The close correspondence between thought and speech characteristic of man is absent in anthropoids. 6. In the phylogeny of thought and speech, a prelinguistic phase in the development of thought and a preintellectual phase in the development of speech are clearly discernible.

Ontogenetically, the relation between thought and speech development is much more intricate and obscure; but here, too, we can distinguish two separate lines springing from two different genetic roots. The existence of a prespeech phase of thought development in childhood has only recently been corroborated by objective proof. Koehlers experiments with chimpanzees, suitably modified, were carried out on children who had not yet learned

to speak. Koehler himself occasionally experimented with children for purposes of comparison, and Buehler undertook a systematic study of a child on the same lines. The findings were similar for children and for apes. The childs actions, Buehler tells us, were exactly like those of the chimpanzees, so that this phase of child life could rather aptly be called the chimpanzoid age; in our subject it corresponded to the 10th, 11th, and 12th months. ... At the chimpanzoid age occur the childs first inventions very primitive ones to be sure, but extremely important for his mental development [7, p. 46]. What is most important theoretically in these as well as in the chimpanzee experiments is the discovery of the independence of the rudimentary intellectual reactions from speech. Noting this, Buehler comments: It used to be said that speech was the beginning of hominization [Menschwerden]; maybe so, but before speech there is the thinking involved in the use of tools, i.e., comprehension of mechanical connections, and devising of mechanical means to mechanical ends, or, to put it more briefly still, before speech appears action becomes subjectively meaningful in other words, consciously purposeful [7, p. 48]. The preintellectual roots of speech in child development have long been known. The childs babbling, crying, even his first words, are quite clearly stages of speech development that have nothing to do with the development of thinking. These manifestations have been generally regarded as a predominantly emotional form of behavior. Not all of them, however, serve merely the function of release. Recent investigations of the earliest forms of behavior in the child and of the childs first

reactions to the human voice (by Charlotte Buehler and her circle) have shown that the social function of speech is already clearly apparent during the first year, i.e., in the preintellectual stage of speech development. Quite definite reactions to the human voice were observed as early as during the third week of life, and the first specifically social reaction to voice during the second month [5, p. 124]. These investigations also established that laughter, inarticulate sounds, movements, etc., are means of social contact from the first months of the childs life. Thus the two functions of speech that we observed in phylogenetic development are already present and obvious in the child less than one year old. But the most important discovery is that at a certain moment at about the age of two the curves of development of thought and speech, till then separate, meet and join to initiate a new form of behavior. Sterns account of this momentous event was the first and the best. He showed how the will to conquer language follows the first dim realization of the purpose of speech, when the child makes the greatest discovery of his life, that each thing has its name [40, p. 108]. This crucial instant, when speech begins to serve intellect, and thoughts begin to be spoken, is indicated by two unmistakable objective symptoms: (1) the childs sudden, active curiosity about words, his question about every new thing, What is this? and (2) the resulting rapid, saccadic increases in his vocabulary. Before the turning point, the child does (like some animals) recognize a small number of words which substitute, as in conditioning, for objects, persons, actions, states, or desires. At that age the child knows only the words supplied to him by other people. Now the situation changes: The child feels the need for words and, through

his questions, actively tries to learn the signs attached to objects. He seems to have discovered the symbolic function of words. Speech, which in the earlier stage was affective-connative, now enters the intellectual phase. The lines of speech and thought development have met. At this point the knot is tied for the problem of thought and language. Let us stop and consider exactly what it is that happens when the child makes his greatest discovery, and whether Sterns interpretation is correct. Buehler and Koffka both compare this discovery to the chimpanzees inventions. According to Koffka the name, once discovered by the child, enters into the structure of the object, just as the stick becomes part of the situation of wanting to get the fruit [20, p. 243]. We shall discuss the soundness of this analogy later, when we examine the functional and structural relationships between thought and speech. For the present, we will merely note that the greatest discovery of the child becomes possible only when a certain relatively high level of thought and speech development has been reached. In other words, speech cannot be discovered without thinking. In brief, we must conclude that: 1. In their ontogenetic development, thought and speech have different roots. 2. In the speech development of the child, we can with certainty establish a preintellectual stage, and in his thought development, a prelinguistic stage. 3. Up to a certain point in time, the two follow different lines, independently of each other.

4. At a certain point these lines meet, whereupon thought becomes verbal and speech rational. We are therefore forced to conclude that fusion of thought and speech, in adults as well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a circumscribed area. Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do not participate in this fusion and are affected only indirectly by the processes of verbal thought.

Conclusion Speech and language are tools that humans use to communicate or share thoughts, ideas, and emotions. Language is the set of rules, shared by the individuals who are communicating, that allows them to exchange those thoughts, ideas, or emotions. Speech is talking, one way that a language can be expressed. Language may also be expressed through writing, signing, or even gestures in the case of people who have neurological disorders and may depend upon eye blinks or mouth movements to communicate. While there are many languages in the world, each includes its own set of rules for phonology (phonemes or speech sounds or, in the case of signed language, handshapes), morphology (word formation), syntax (sentence formation), semantics (word and sentence meaning), prosody (intonation and rhythm of speech), and pragmatics (effective use of language).

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