to the petitioners.

He alleged that the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, depriving him of said two parcels of land. He further alleged that he vs. was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having inherited ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee. them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the provisions of section 38 of Ramon Salinas, for appellants. the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision of the case, and that the Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee. said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land TRENT, J.: described in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both Alba, are the only heirs of Doa Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the petitioners, wasmodifying the former decree by excluding from the same the two married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this the 13th of July, 1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. decision and judgment the petitioners appealed and now insist, first, The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have registered the that the trial court erred in reopening the case and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the reason that said following-described property: decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of court erred in holding that the two parcels of land described in the Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon which are situated three houses appellee's motion are not their property. and one camarin of light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on forma part of the land described in the petition and were included in the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo the decree of February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on owners of the remainder of the land described in the said decree. the south by the same stream and the lands of the capellania; andThe petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of same, including the two small parcels in question, by purchase, as is Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo. evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the cane and is assessed at $1,000 United States currency. The petition, Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan. which was filed on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by a Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, plan and technical description of the above-described parcel of land. 1895, a state grant for several parcels of land, including the two After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of parcels in question. This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of February, 1908, a decree in accordance with the provisions of property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same year. paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four this case the appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in petitioners, as coowners, subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente question. It is also admitted that the name of the appellee does not Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey. appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these parcels as the Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case, their tenant and for this reason they did not include his name in their including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was of the two parcels of land which are described in said motion, and occupying the said parcels as the absolute owner under the estate which, according to his allegations, are included in the lands decreed grant by inheritance. G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910

The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of parcels as their lessee at the time they presented their application for these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the grant from the appellee as one of the occupants of the land. They believed that it the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of was not necessary nor required that they include in their application 1864. the names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its died prior to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was decree had been entered in February of the same year? about six years of age when their mother died. So these children were The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn minors when the father of the appellee obtained the estate grant. to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the is to contain an accurate description of the land. It shall contain the petitioners, who were then minors, rented the land owned by the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and petitioners' deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of three addresses of all occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to representative of the petitioners, rented the same land for a period of find them. In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be sworn six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental to, the applicant is required to state and set forth clearly all mortgages contract was duly executed in writing. This land was cultivated during or encumbrances affecting said land, if any, the rights and interests, these six years by Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his children, one of legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose Grey, for expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together with their himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. place of residence and post office addresses. Upon receipt of the de la Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be published into this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and his twice in the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits that all persons appearing to have an interest in the land sought to be his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, inregistered and to the adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may fact, cultivate the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the two concern." In addition to the notice in the Official Gazette the Land small parcels in question were not included in these contracts. In the Court shall, within seven days after said publication, cause a copy of rental contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person the appellee the land is not described. In the rental contract between named in the application whose address is known; to cause a duly Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a conspicuous of the appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included, place on every parcel of land included in the application, and in a according to the description given therein. This was found to be true by conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the town in which the court below, but the said court held that as this contract was made the land is situated. The court may also cause other or further notice of by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la the application to be given in such manner and to such persons as it may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has served the Cruz, the appellee. notice as directed by the court by publication or mailing shall be The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the conclusive proof of such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, parents of the petitioners in 1864, as is evidenced by the public if no person appears and answers, the court may at once, upon motion document of purchase and sale of that year. The same two parcels of of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general land are included in the state grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla default. By the description in the published notice "to all whom it may de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was obtained after the death of the concern," and by express provisions of law "all the word are made petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it is clear that the parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default an order." If

the court, after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive fraud. his application, a decree or registration shall be entered. The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title statutes has been frequently raised. Two distinctions have been noted thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following by the Australian courts; the first is the distinction between the section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,meaning of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, effect of certificates of title, and its meaning in the sections relating to whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, the protection of bona fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud. In none of the groups of the or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any sections of the Australian statutes relating to the conclusive effect of proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by that of the South Australian group. (Hogg on Australian Torrens System, fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review p. 834.) within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.) With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to above. It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstanding interest which he admits but also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By express provision of law the world are made parties defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern." Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the circumstances as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all persons, including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation. effect of certificates of title, it has been held in some cases that the "fraud" there mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and every kind of fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the deliberate acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has been held to be "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose, the same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was there absent the element of intention to deprive another of just rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)

By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on Privy Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person Waihopi, decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his Supplementary affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that Addendum to his work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not meaning should be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they statutes (Act No. 496). honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the meaning of the word as used in our statutes, will in each premises with the surveyor when the original plan was made. case be a question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts would Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of constitutes this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, from the fact an circumstances in each particular case. The only intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some question we are called upon to determine, and have determined, is manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the

petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud. It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due process of law, in violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law. Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and purpose of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form. The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word. This system was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No. 496. The interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of private individuals. At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to registration of title to land, because immovable property is becoming more and more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)

First. It has substituted security for insecurity. Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from months to days. Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "three R's" can transact his own conveyancing. Fifth. It affords protection against fraud. Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.) The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land was made by Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued. The certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned therein. Under the old system the same sale would be effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.) By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of transactions with interest in land whose declared object . . . is, under governmental authority, to establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)

The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all may evicted because his vendor had, unknown to him, already sold countries in which the Torrens system has been enacted. Cases of error the and to a third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel no doubt will always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared with himself protected against any defect in his vendor's title. ( Id., p.the number of registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the 21.) average risk of error being only 2 cents for each dealing. In The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of Queensland the risk of error was only 1 cents, the number of titles, made by Sir Robert Torrens, has been fully justified in its use:

registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and in Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the whole time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including some of the States of the American Union, and practical experience has demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project. In

object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to Torrens system has been the subject of judicial decision in the courts ofall persons interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code the United States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert,of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will 56 Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175binds everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings given is Mass., 71.) by general notice to all persons interested. Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges Registration Act," was copied substantially from the Massachussetts (supra), did not rest its judgment as to the conclusive effect of the law of 1898. decree upon the ground that the State has absolute power to The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme determine the persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude courts of those States. that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the part of the that we never heard of it before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtadopetitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.) or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law. Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing withunder the provisions of sections 101 and 102 of the Land Registration a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment withoutAct (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide. personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and as to costs. It is so ordered. those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.) This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714);G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991 The Mary (9 Cranch, 126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); BrownSOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. Levee Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., vs. secs. 606, 611. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and THE If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANTENOR S. VIRATA and the some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or Antonio M. Chavez for petitioner. objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern theRodolfo M. Dela Rosa for respondent Intestate Estate of Antenor S. right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the Virata.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner for quieting of title and declaring Antenor Virata as the true and lawful owner of the disputed property. The antecedent facts are as follows: On September 28, 1982, petitioner, a domestic corporation, filed an action for quieting of title against the respondent estate of Virata alleging that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite, with an area of 48,182 sq. meters, covered by Certificate of Title No. T-80889 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, which was issued on February 24, 1976; that Virata, during his lifetime thru the use of fraud, caused the issuance of Certificate of Title No. T-11520 RT 1660 on September 1, 1959 thru an administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original title covering the same parcel of land; that by reason of the said reconstitution and subsequent issuance of TCT No. T11520 RT 1660, there now exists a cloud on the title of petitioner. As gathered by the respondent appellate court and trial court, the evidence for the petitioner consists of the following: Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 32, as amended, Julian Pearanda submitted with the Bureau of Lands, thru its District Land Office at Rosario, Cavite an application dated November 22, 1968, in a verified Indorsement dated November 25, 1968, to purchase a friar land which was subscribed and sworn to before Manuel Cupino, Acting District Land Officer (Exh. "D"). The application covers Lot No. 7449 of the Imus Friar Lands Estate, situated at Barrio Molino, Bacoor, Cavite, containing an area of 4 hectares, 81 ares and 82 centares. Said application was accompanied by a "SALAYSAY" (Exhibit "A") signed and sworn to by one Mabini Legaspi before said District Land Officer Cupino, purporting to transfer to, and to waive in favor of, Julian Pearanda, all the rights of executor to Lot No. 7449. Following the routine in cases of this nature, District Land Officer Cupino referred to Land Investigator Alberto Buhain for investigation and in a verified Indorsement dated November 25, 1968, said investigator made a Report (Exh. "B") on the result of his investigation, to District Land Officer Cupino, District Land Office No. III-8 Bureau of Lands, Rosario, Cavite, certifying that applicant Julian Pearanda is the actual occupant of Lot No. 7449, has introduced improvements consisting of upland rice

and other seasonal crops; that Pearanda's occupation of the land is derived through a voluntary assignment of right of the former occupant, Mabini Legaspi, and that the same is free from claims and conflicts and that the said applicant has established his rights over the subject land, in view of which, said investigator recommended that said lot be awarded to applicant Julian Pearanda according to law. Thereafter, the Report having been submitted to Cupino, the latter directed investigator Buhain to prepare an Information Sheet (Exh. "G" up to "G-3") and Cupino made the Appraisal Report (Exh. "E-2"). The above requirements having been accomplished, District Land Officer Cupino forwarded Pearanda's application to the Director of Lands, thru the Chief, Land Management Division, recommending disposition of Lot No. 7449 be made in accordance with the findings of his office, to Julian Pearanda, pursuant to the provisions of C.A. of No. 32, as amended. By second Indorsement dated December 16, 1968, Higinio P. Sunico, Chief, Land Management Division, acting for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the application of Julian Pearanda, recommending that Lot No. 7449 be sold to said applicant without public auction for a sum of P1,198.00 (Exh. "I") and by a 3rd Indorsement dated December 16, 1969, the application of Julian Pearanda was returned by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources , to the Director of Lands , Manila, approving that sale without auction, to Julian Pearanda, of lot No. 7449. Pursuant to this approval, the Director of Lands authorized the District Land Officer, Rosario, Cavite, to sell without auction to Julian Pearanda, and directing that the sales contract should be executed soonest (Exh- "I"). The Director of Lands and Julian Pearanda executed , therefore, Sales Contract No. V-447 (Exh. "K"), on February 28, 1969, for a consideration of P1,198.00, to be paid in ten (10) monthly installments, the first installment of P290.00 having been paid upon execution of the sales contract and the payment of the P1,198.00 was fully paid on August 6, 1969 (Exh. "O"). The contract price of the land having been paid by Pearanda , Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Isoceles Pascual, on August 13, 1969, issued the final deed of conveyance of lot No. 7449 (Exh. "8") in favor of Julian

Pearanda and the said deed of conveyance contains the physical and technical description of the lot in question (See Exh. "S-l"). xxx xxx xxx On the basis of said Deed of Conveyance No. 10431, the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued on November 14, 1969 in favor of Julian Pearanda TCT No. T-39631 (Exh. "Z-6") which on its face shows it to have come from a direct transfer from OCT no. 1002, and on February 17, 1976, the plaintiff, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "Z") bought said Lot No. 7449 as a consequence of which, TCT No. T-39631 was cancelled and new TCT No. T-80889 was issued on February 24, 1976 to the plaintiff, Solid State Multi Products Corporation. Plaintiff Solid State Multi-Products Corporation enrolled Lot No. 7449 with the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 20893 which was superseded by Tax Declaration No. 10973 and continued to religiously pay the realty taxes as covered by receipts of tax payments (Exh. for 1977 and Exh. "7-19" for 1984) and the subject property is in its actual possession since its acquisition from Pearanda up to the present. (pp. 109-112, Rollo (Emphasis Ours) On the other hand, respondent Virata denied the allegations in the complaint and presented evidence to prove his claim over the land. The appellate court and trial court made the following findings: . . . on March 20, 1943, the Director of Lands, Mr. Jose F. Dans, gave authority to sell at public auction Lot No. 7449 of the Imus Estate, containing an area of 4.8182 hectares at the price of not less than its appraised value of P290.00 (Exh. X-33). Accordingly on April 20, 1943, the Bureau of Friar Lands Agent Severo Rivera issued a Notice fixing the public auction of Lot No. 7449, among others, on May 5, 1943 at 10:00 a.m. (Exh. 1). On said date, Mabini Legaspi (appellee Virata's predecessor-in-interest) submitted a winning bid of P290.00 and paid P29.00 (10% of the purchase price) and even issued Bureau of Lands Official Receipt No. 77735 dated May 5, 1943 (Exh. 7). The subsequent installments were paid on January 14, 1944, April 24, 1944, August 17, 1944, and September 20, 1944 in the amounts of P29.00, P29.00, 87.00 and P116.00, respectively. The payments were evidenced by Official Receipts Nos. 78396, 783392, 784704 and 78466 (Exhs. 7-A, 7-B, 7-C and V)

On December 12, 1944, the Bureau of Lands, through Mr. Vicente Tordesillas, sent a letter to the Register of Deeds at Imus, Cavite, requesting the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title to eight persons, among whom was Mabini Legaspi, specifying with respect to him Lot No. 7449 with an area of 4.8182 located at Bacoor, Cavite Exh. 2). Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. A-2188 to Mabini Legaspi who held ownership of the property up to December 6, 1957 when he executed a Deed of Sale transferring it to Antenor S. Virata (Exh. 6). The deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds on December 10, 1957 . . . . On the same day, December 10, 1957, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 11520 (Exh. 12) to Antenor Virata . . . However, on June 7, 1959, the Provincial Capitol building of Cavite which housed the Registry of Deeds was burned, destroying land records and titles in d registry among which were the records relating to Lot No. 7449. On September 1, 1959, the Registry of Deeds administratively reconstituted the original of TCT No. T-11520 based on owner's duplicate certificate (Exh. 12) and renumbered the same as TCT No. (T-11520) RT-1660. xxx xxx xxx The sentence of TCT No. 80889 issued in the name of appellant on February 24, 1976 came to the knowledge of Antenor Virata in August 1978 when he received a subpoena from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in connection with its investigation of the conflicting land titles on Lot No. 7449. Virata presented Mabini Legaspi as his witness. NBI Agent Manuel C. Dionisio took the sworn testimony of Mabini Legaspi on August 27, 1978 (Exh. 10) and submitted a written report (Exhs. 9 to 9-H) of his investigation on October 27, 1978. Mabini Legaspi in her sworn testimony (Exh. 10) declared that she acquired Lot 7449 during the Japanese occupation and in support of her acquisition, she presented to NBI agent Dionisio the carbon or duplicate original of the notice of public auction and the letters dated December 12, 1944 of Vicente Tordesillas of the Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds requesting the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi, which documents were substituted on the same occasion with xerox copies (Exh. 1 and 2) also marked as Exhibits 10-C and 10-D, respectively, after a comparison with the duplicate originals. Legaspi also presented

the originals of the receipts of payment she made to the Bureau of Lands, which were substituted with xerox copies (Exhs. 7, 7A, 7-B and 7-C, also marked as Exhibit 10-E, 10-F 10-G and 10H) after comparison with the original. She (Mabini) also testified on the sale of the lot in favor of Antenor Virata on December 6, 1957, presenting as proof thereof, the duplicate or carbon original of the Absolute Deed of Sale of Agricultural Land, which was likewise, substituted with xerox copies (Exhs. 6 to 6-F, inclusive, also marked Exh. 11). Mabini Legaspi testified that the originals of Exhibits 1 and 2 got lost. She said she placed the documents on the table in her house after returning from the NBI investigation, thinking "all the while that those documents will be useless because I had my property sold." (Tsn., p. 17, December 19, 1984). She denied having sold the land to Julian Pearanda, nor having waived her right over the land in his favor (tsn., p. 12, March 18, 1985). (pp. 113-116, Rollo). On June 15, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered for defendant Virata and against the plaintiff, to wit: a. Dismissing the complaint which states no cause of action; b. Recognizing that defendant Virata is the true and lawful owner of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T11520) RT 1660 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite and holding that the same is valid; c. Declaring that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-80889 in the name of plaintiff, the Solid State Multi Products Corporation is null and void and of no force and effect and is, therefore, ordered cancelled; d. Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the costs of the proceeding. SO ORDERED. (p. 70, Rollo). Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July 13, 1987, the respondent appellate court rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioner assigning the following errors:

THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THE BASIC CONSIDERATION THAT THE CONTESTED PROPERTY CAME FROM THE FRIAR LANDS ESTATE THE DISPOSITION OF WHICH IS GOVERNED BY SPECIAL LAWS SPECIFYING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ITS ACQUISITION FROM THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH SALE, WHICH LAW AND SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD SERVE AS THE MEASURE AGAINST WHICH THE EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THIS CASE SHOULD BE WEIGHED, SUCH GROSS ERROR LEADING THE APPELLATE COURT TO (A) ERRONEOUSLY INFER THE EXISTENCE AND/OR DUE ISSUANCE OF THE SUPPOSED TCT NO. A-2188 (IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN INTEREST), FROM DOCUMENTS THAT CAME AFTER WERE BASED ON SUCH TCT NO. A-2188, CLEARLY BEGGING THE ISSUE WHICH IS PRECISELY WHETHER OR NOT THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WAS IN FACT ISSUED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE FRIAR LANDS ACT AND CA-32 TO COVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION; (B) ERRONEOUSLY BASE ITS DECISION IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON TCTs ISSUED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT IT IS THE BUREAU OF LANDS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE (NATURAL RESOURCES) WHICH DISPOSES FRIAR LANDS AND NOT THE REGISTER OF DEEDS WHOSE RECORDS CAN BE NO BETTER THAN THE RIGHT IT HAS REGISTERED; (C) ERRONEOUSLY DISREGARD THE PATENT INADMISSIBILITY OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE ORIGINALS OF WHICH WERE NEVER PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT; (D) ERRONEOUSLY IGNORE THE LACK OF PROBATIVE VALUE OF SUCH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUCH LACK OF PROBATIVE VALUE BEING PATENT ON THE FACE OF SUCH DOCUMENT; (E) ERRONEOUSLY IGNORE THE VERITY THAT THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE COULD SUPPORT NO MORE THAN THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAD MERELY A QUESTIONABLE INCHOATE AND INCOMPLETE RIGHT TO

ACQUIRE THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, WHICHSec. 12 of Act No. 1120 provides in part: QUESTIONABLE INCHOATE AND IN FACT UNCOMPLETED . . . the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said RIGHT CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE TITLE OF settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail PETITIONER'S PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST WHO WAS that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and THE ACTUAL POSSESSOR THAT APPLIED FOR THE occupant the amount of land so held by him at the price so PURCHASE OF THE LAND EVERY NEEDED STEP FOR THE fixed payable as provided in this Act at the Office of the Chief of PURCHASE HAVING BEEN PASSED UPON AND RECORDED the Bureau of Public Lands . . . and that upon the payment of BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS WHOSE RECORDS SHOW ONE the final installment together with all accrued interest the AND ONLY TITLE ISSUED OVER THE LAND, THAT IS, THE Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said TITLE OF THE PETITIONER'S PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance , which (pp. 20, 22, Rollo) shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in We find the petition impressed with merit. section one hundred and twenty two of the Land Registration Act. Since the assigned errors were interrelated, it would be well for this Court to discuss them jointly. Also, Sec. 18 of the same Act provides: Petitioner does not question the factual findings made by the No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public respondent appellate court and supported by the records (p. 22, Rollo). Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until It does not however accept the legal conclusion made by the appellate approved by the Secretary of the Interior. (Emphasis ours) court and trial court that the registered title of private respondent to Similarly, Sec. 2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A. No. 316 provides in the land should prevail over its own title. part: Petitioner contends that Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act provides the procedure for the sale and disposition of the friar lands to private persons; that pursuant thereto, the acquisition by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest Julian Pearanda of the disputed Lot 7449, which was formerly part of the friar lands estate, was in compliance with all legal requisites laid down in Act No. 1120, for the validity of the sale by the government in favor of Pearanda of such friar lands. . . . The persons who, at the time of the subdivision survey are actual and bona fide occupants of any portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten hectares, shall be given preference to purchase the portion occupied at a private sale and at a price to be fixed in such case , by the Director of Lands , subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce , after taking into consideration its location, quality, and any other circumstances as may affect its value, the provisions of section twelve of Act Numbered Eleven hundred and twenty, as amended, to the contrary, . . . (Emphasis ours)

It also argues that the sale of Lot No. 7449 to respondent's predecessor, Mabini Legaspi, and the issuance of a certificate of title in her favor was in violation of the Friar Lands Act as there was no required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar lands were Resources. purchased by the government for sale to actual settlers and occupants

There is no dispute here that the land involved in this case is a friar at the time said lands are acquired by the government. The Bureau of land and that the laws which are applicable are Act No. 1120, know as Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that the government the Friar Lands Act, providing for the administration and temporary has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant. The latter then leasing and sale of certain haciendas and parcels of land, commonly shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so known as friar lands, and Commonwealth Act No. 32 dated September fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the 15, 1936 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 316 dated June 9, certificate. 1938, which provided for the subdivision and sale of all the portions of The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so the friar lands estated remaining undisposed of. called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the

property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be in installments in 1943; that on December 12, 1944, the Bureau of cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. The purchaser Lands sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Cavite requesting the becomes the owner upon the issuance of the certificate of sale in his issuance of certificates of title to several persons including Mabini favor subject only to the cancellation thereof in case the price agreed Legaspi, in whose favor TCT A-2188 was issued; that subsequently on upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L-16925, March 31, 1962, 4 December 6, 1957, she sold the disputed land to respondent Virata, SCRA 849.) which was evidenced by a deed of sale registered with the Registry of Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued Deeds of Cavite on December 10, 1957; that on the same date, TCT interests, the government shall then issue a final deed of conveyance No. 11520 was issued in the name of Virata. Due to the fire which in favor of the purchaser. However, the sale of such friar lands shall be gutted the building housing the Registry of Cavite on June 7, 1959, the valid only if approved by the Secretary of Interior as provided in Act No. latter administratively reconstituted the original of TCT No. 11520 on 1120. Later laws, however, required that the sale shall be approved by September 1, 1959, based on the owner's duplicate certificate and the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. In short, the approval by renumbered the same as TCT No. 1120 RT 1660. the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the Apparently, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi occurred much earlier validity of the sale. than the date of acquisition of same lot by petitioner's predecessor, It is undisputed that petitioner's predecessor, Julian Pearanda was the and the evidence presented by respondent Virata indicates that the actual occupant of Lot 7449 when he filed his application to purchase latter's predecessor paid the purchase price of Lot No. 7449 on the said lot on November 22, 1968; that on December 16, 1989, the installments.

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved the sale of Nowhere in the evidence for the respondent or in the records of this the lot without auction to Pearanda; that a sales contract was case however, would show that a certificate of sale was ever issued by executed between the Director of Lands and Pearanda on February the Bureau of Lands, which would vest ownership and title over the 28, 1969 for a consideration of P 1,198.00 payable in 10 monthly land in favor of Mabini Legaspi. The existence of the official receipts installments; that upon the full payment of the price, the showing payment of the price of the land by Legaspi does not prove Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued the final that the land was legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale deed of conveyance of Lot No. 7449 in favor of Pearanda. having been executed by the government in her favor. Viewed from all Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. 39631 in angles, the acquisition of the lot by Legaspi was highly irregular and the name of Pearanda, and when the latter sold the land to petitioner, void, and not in compliance with the procedure mandated by law for TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT No. T-80889 was issued in favor the sale of friar lands. For one thing, Mabini Legaspi allegedly of the latter. purchased the land in a sale at public auction, which procedure is Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made by Pearanda was in nowhere provided in Act No. 1120 or in C.A. 32, as amended by C.A. compliance with law. The execution of the sales contract vested the 316. The laws expressly state that an actual occupant of the land shall right of ownership in Pearanda over the land. There is no doubt purchase the lot occupied by him at a private sale and not in a sale at whatsoever that the said sale was valid as it was approved by the public auction (Sec. 2, C.A. 32 as amended). Further, neither was there Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the sale made any deed of conveyance issued to Legaspi by the government after the by Pearanda in favor of the petitioner transferred the ownership of the full payment of the installments on the disputed lot.

land in favor of the latter resulting in the proper issuance of TCT No. T- Highly significant at this point is the ' e fact that there was neither 80889 in its name. allegation nor proof that the sale was with the approval of the On the other hand, the antecedents leading to the acquisition of title Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. The absence of such approval by respondent Virata are clearly shown in the records. The latter's made the supposed sale null and void ab initio. Without the certificate predecessor, Mabini Legaspi bought Lot 7449 in a sale by public of sale to prove the transfer of the ownership of the land from the auction held on May 5, 1943 conducted by the Bureau of Lands and government Mabini Legaspi and without the required approval of the friar lands agent Severino Rivera, and paid the purchase price thereof sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, We find that

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Mabini Legaspi did not in any manner acquire ownership over the land G.R. 78728, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 354, emphasis ours). Further in 1943. The ownership or title over the friar land, specifically Lot No. if a person happened to obtain property by mistake or to the prejudice 7449 remained in the government until Pearanda, petitioners of another with or without bad faith, the certificate of title which may predecessor, lawfully acquired ownership over the same lot onhave been issued to him under the circumstances may and should be February 28, 1969 by virtue of a sales contract executed in his favor. cancelled or corrected. The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not Our unavoidable conclusion in this case is that the title of petitioner vest ownership upon her over the land nor did it validate the alleged under the Torrens land system should be upheld considering that no purchase of the lot, which is null and void. Time and again, it has been previous valid title to the same land existed. held that registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the title over a particular property. Our land registration laws do not give respondent Court of Appeals dated July 13, 1987 is hereby REVERSED. the holder any better title than that what he actually has (De man et Petitioner Solid State Multi-Products Corporation is hereby declared the al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L- 46935 December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA true owner of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656). 80889. The Register of Deeds of Cavite is ordered to cancer transfer Although a period of one year has already expired from the time the Certificate of Title No. (T-11520) RT 1660 in the name of respondent certificate of title was issued to Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged Antenor Virata. sale from the government, said title does not become incontrovertible SO ORDERED. but is null and void since the acquisition of the property was in violation of law. Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is imprescriptible (Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 70191, October 29,G.R. No. 171056 March 13, 2009 1987, 155 SCRA 270). In one case, this Court ruled that an adverse DINAH C. CASTILLO, Petitioner, claimant of a registered land who is in possession thereof for a long vs. period of time is not barred from bringing an action for reconveyance ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS, MARIETTA L. which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property against a registered LINATOC, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, owner relying upon a Torrens title which was illegally or wrongfully Respondents. acquired (Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718). In DECISION actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was void ab initio, a claim of prescription ofCHICO-NAZARIO, J.: the action would be unavailing (Corpus, et al. vs. Beltran, et al., 97 Phil. 1 722; Agne vs. Director of Lands, G.R. L-40399, February 6, 1990, 181 Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 SCRA 793). Being null and void, the sale made to Mabini Legaspi and of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Dinah C. Castillo seeking the 2 the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto produced no legal effects reversal and setting aside of the Decision, dated 18 October 2005, of whatsoever. Quod nullum est nullum producit affectum (Agnes vs.the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533, as well as the 3 Director of Lands, supra). There being no title to the land that Mabini Resolution, dated 11 January 2006 of the same court denying Legaspi acquired from the government, it follows that no title to the reconsideration of its afore-mentioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Joint Resolution 4 dated 28 April same land could be conveyed by the former to respondent Virata. 2004 and Joint Order5 dated 20 June 2005 of the Office of the Deputy Even assuming that respondent Virata was a purchaser in good faith Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, and for value, the law is, as between two persons both of whom are in dismissing petitioner Dinah C. Castillos complaint for grave good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, against respondent vendor bereft of any transmissible rights (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals,public officers Antonio M. Escutin (Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas)

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and Marietta L. Linatoc (Linatoc), together with private individuals the Primary Entry Book and Registration Book of the Register of Deeds Lauro S. Leviste II (Leviste) and Benedicto L. Orense (Orense). of Lipa City in accordance with Act No. 3344 10: (a) Notice of Levy;11 (b) 12 13 and (d) Writ of Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla Certificate 14of Sale; (c) Affidavit of Publication; Execution. (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Tax Declaration No. 00942-A,15 indicating that she owned 5,000 square Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City,square meters. Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449. When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-

Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able square-meter share in Lot 13713, she was shocked to find out that, to secure an Order6 dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving thecancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129642 16 and Tax K. Mortilla, et al." and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to Declaration No. 00949-A,17 both in the name of Francisco Catigbac residential, commercial, and recreational uses. She was also able to get (Catigbac). The reverse side of TCT No. 129642 bore three entries, from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification 7 statingreflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty, to wit: that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the ENTRY NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: In favor of name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy LEONARDO YAGIN: For purposes more particularly stipulated in the of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself.8 Lastly, the Register of Deeds of contract ratified before Atty. Ernesto M. Vergara of Lipa City as per Lipa City issued a Certification 9 attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of Doc. No. 639; Page No. 29; Book No. LXXVI; Series of 1976. co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by a certificate Date of instrument 2-6-1976 of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the Date of inscription 6-26-2002 at 11:20 a.m. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. ENTRY NO. 185833: SALE IN FAVOR OF SUMMIT POINT REALTY & Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, DEVELOPMENT CORP: and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May ENTRY NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE: Of the parcel of land 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction described in this cert. of title is hereby sold and cancelled TCT No. sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point 134609(SN-6672938) Vol. 671-A, having been issued by virtue of Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and the aforesaid instrument ratified before Perfecto L. Dimayuga, Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She immediately went to Notary Public for Makati City as per Doc. No. 148; Page 31, Book the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President, No. LXVII, Series of 2002. Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and Date of instrument: July 22, 2002 even threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste Date of inscription: July 25, 2002 at 2:30 P.M.18 family, was too powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with. The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May 2002, and petitionerOn 25 July 2002, at 2:30 p.m., TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was bought Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713. issued in its place. On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following documents, on her incidents prompted petitioner to file a Complaint acquisition of Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, recorded in The foregoing Affidavit19 before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon

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charging several public officers and private individuals as follows:

Register of Deeds, it was not accompanied by a Secretarys Certificate 32. I respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and attesting to the existence of a Board Resolution which authorized said July 2002 and onwards in Lipa City, Atty. Antonio M. [Escutin], the purchase by Summit Realty. There was no entry regarding such a Register of Deeds of Lipa City[;] Aquilina A. Mistas, the Local Secretarys Certificate and/or Board Resolution, whether on TCT No. Assessment Operations Officer III of the City Assessors Office of Lipa 129642 or TCT No. T-134609. A Secretarys Certificate eventually City[;] Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, Office of the City Assessor of surfaced, but it was executed only on 30 July 2002, five days after TCT Lipa City, who are public officers and acting in concert and conspiring No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was already issued. with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L. Orense, Executive Vice- The Deed of Absolute Sale was presented before and recorded by the President and Vice-President, respectively[,] of Summit Point Realty Register of Deeds of Lipa City on 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., at exactly and Development Corporation x x x while in the discharge of their the same date and time TCT No. T-134609 was issued to Summit administrative functions did then and there unlawfully, through evident Realty. Petitioner theorizes that for this to happen, TCT No. T-134609 bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence and with manifest partiality was already prepared and ready even before the presentation for towards Summit caused me injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 byrecording of the Deed of Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds. cancelling my TD #00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried. The agency City and instead issuing in the name of Francisco Catigbac TC #00949- Catigbac supposedly executed in favor of Yagin was extinguished by A when aforesaid personalities well knew that TCT No. 129642 was Catigbacs death. Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no longer had already cancelled and therefore not legally entitled to a new tax authority to execute on 22 July 2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot declaration thereby manifestly favoring Summit Point Realty and 1-B in favor of Summit Realty, making the said Deed null and void ab Development Corporation who now appears to be the successor-in- initio. interest of Francisco Catigbac, all to my damage and prejudice. 20 Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbacs (Emphasis ours.) death, having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the Petitioners Complaint Affidavit gave rise to simultaneous Petition for Issuance of New Owners Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu administrative and preliminary (criminal) investigations, docketed as of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial Court OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, respectively. (RTC) of Lipa City. During the ex parte presentation of evidence in the Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in the circumstances latter part of 2000, Orense testified on behalf of Summit Realty that surrounding the alleged sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty and in the Catigbacs property used to form part of a bigger parcel of land, Lot 1 documents evidencing the same. of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square meters, covered by TCT The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after Catigbacs death, Lot 1 was executed on 22 July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as Catigbacs informally subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or attorney-in-fact, appeared to be a "one-way street." It did not express successors-in-interest, some of whom again transferred their shares to the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate other persons; Summit Realty separately bought subdivided parts of its consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. No representative Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a consolidated area of of Summit Realty signed the left margin of each and every page of said 105,648 square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey; despite Deed. It also did not appear from the Deed that a representative of the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No. 181 Summit Realty presented himself before the Notary Public who covering the same was never cancelled; and the owners duplicate of notarized the said document. The Tax Identification Numbers of Yagin, TCT No. 181 was lost and the fact of such loss was annotated at the of TCT No. 181 with the Registry of Deeds. as vendor, and Summit Realty, as vendee, were not stated in the Deed. back of the original copy 21 Subsequently, in an Order dated 3 January 2001, the RTC granted the Petitioner also averred that, being a corporation, Summit Realty could Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and directed the issuance of a new only act through its Board of Directors. However, when the Deed of owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac, under the Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B was presented for recording before the same terms and condition as in its original form.

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Petitioner further cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty 25, 2002. Also, on this same day, July 25, 2002, Annex "J" was in connection with Catigbacs property, purportedly without legal presented to Atty. [Escutin] at 2:30 p.m. simultaneously, at exactly the personality and capacity. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 same time of 2:30 p.m. TCT No. T-134609 in Summits name was February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet issued by Atty. [Escutin] WITHOUT benefit of the submission of the it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin necessary documentation such as the Board Resolution, DAR had no participation at all in said case. Likewise, it was not Yagin, but Clearance, Revenue Tax Receipts for documentary stamps, real Orense, who, through a letter22 dated 27 June 2001, requested the property tax clearance, proof of payment of transfer tax, tax cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new declaration, articles of incorporation, SEC certification, license to sell certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was Orenses request which and/or certificate of registration by HLURB, etc. Without the total and resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, lightning speed cooperation of Atty. [Escutin] to close his eyes to the later cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of total absence of said vital documents, the desperately needed TCT to Summit Realty. erase my interest and ownership would not have come into existence. Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. Atty. [Escutin] had indeed acted in concert and in conspiracy with 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT Leviste and Orense in producing Annex "H" and Annex "K".

No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the former29. Thereafter, Leviste and Orense utilized the already cancelled TCT cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioners Tax No. 129642 in the name of Francisco Catigbac to be the basis in Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still seeking the cancellation of TD #00942A in my name (Annex "F"). The issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty. Tax Mapping Division of the Office of City Assessor of Lipa City opined Piecing everything together, petitioner recounted in her Complaint that my 5,000 sq.m. was (sic) part and parcel of the 105,648 sq.m. Affidavit the alleged scheme perpetrated against her and the covered by TCT No. 129642. A photocopy of the Certification from said division is hereto marked and attached as Annex "P", hereof. Aquilina involvement therein of each of the conspirators: Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III of the Office of the 28. Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation went into action City Assessor of Lipa City then conveniently caused the disappearance right after I paid Orense a visit sometime May 2002. Summit of my Notice of Levy and other supporting documents which she had resurrected from the grave. (sic) Francisco Catigbac whom they knew personally received from me on March 13, 2002. For her part of the to be long dead to face possible litigation. This is the height of malice conspiracy likewise, Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, forthwith and bad faith on the part of Summit through its Lauro Leviste II, the cancelled by TD#00942-A and in lieu thereof she issued TD #00949-A Executive Vice President and Benedicto Orense, the Vice President. I in the name of Francisco Catigbac. I dare say so because Mistas and had only in my favor a tax declaration to show my interest and Linatoc were presented a cancelled TCT as basis for obliterating my ownership over the 5, 000 sq.m. of the subject parcel of land. 5,000 sq.m. The fact of cancellation is clearly stated on the posterior Evidently, Leviste and Orense came to the desperate conclusion that side of TCT No. 129642. Both can read. But the two nevertheless they needed a TCT which is a far better title than any tax declaration. proceeded with dispatch in canceling my TD, though they had ample Both then methodically commenced their evil and illegal scheme by time and opportunity to reject the request of Summit who is not even causing on June 26, 2002 at 11:20 a.m. the inscription with the the registered owner appearing on TCT No. 129642. Francisco Catigbac Register of Deeds of Lipa City of a purported Special Power of Attorney could not have been in front of Mistas and Linatoc because he was in favor of Leonardo Yagin (Annex "I"). Next, the Deed of Absolute Sale already six feet below the ground. Mistas and Linatoc could have (Annex "J") was made the following month in order to make it appear demanded presentation of the document authorizing Summit in that Yagin unilaterally sold to Summit the subject parcel of land requesting for the cancellation of my TD. Also, they could have purportedly belonging to Francisco Catigbac. Since the latter was demanded from Summit any document transferring my interest and already dead and realizing that the agency was already extinguished,ownership in favor of a third party. Or, at least, they could have Annex "J" was not signed or executed by Leviste or Orense. This fact annotated in Tax Declaration No. 00949-A the fact that I bought my however did not deter the two from securing a BIR clearance on July 5,000 sq.m. from a public auction sale duly conducted by the court

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sheriff. Alternatively, Linatoc and Mistas should have advised Summit 2. The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights to the effect that since they already appear to be the owners of the or interest of the adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on subject parcel of land, the new tax declaration should bear their name Execution by the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch instead. Mistas and Linatoc indeed conspired with Summit in the illegal 30, San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. and unwarranted cancellation of my TD and in covering up the behindCastillo vs. Raquel Buenaventura. The registered owner, Summit the-scenes activities of Summit by making it appear that it was Point Realty and Development Corporation nor its predecessor-inFrancisco Catigbac who caused the cancellation. Even Leonardo Yagin, interest are not the judgment debtor or a party in the said case. the alleged attorney-in-fact did not appear before Mistas and Linatoc. Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them Yagin could not have appeared because he is rumored to be long dead. (Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever, her adverse claim is against The aforementioned acts of the two benefitted (sic) Summit through Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds no title over their manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusable the property.25 negligence. Perhaps, there is some truth to the rumor that Yagin is Escutin did mention, however, that petitioner may elevate en consulta dead because he does not even have a TIN in the questioned Deed of to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the denial of her request for Absolute Sale. If indeed Yagin is already dead or inexistent[,] the allged registration of the Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and payment of the purchase price of P5,282,400.00 on July 25, 2002 is a annotation of her adverse claim on TCT No. T-134609. This petitioner mere product of the fertile imagination of Orense and did on 3 July 2003. Leviste.1avvphi1.zw+ To dispute this assertion[,] the live body of While her Consulta was pending before the LRA, petitioner filed a Leonardo Yagin must be presented by Orense and Leviste.23 Supplemental Complaint Affidavit26 and a Second Supplemental After filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Complaint Affidavit27 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square meter pro- Luzon, bringing to its attention the aforementioned developments. In indiviso share in Lot 13713 registered with the Register of Deeds of her Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit, petitioner prayed that Lipa City. She also sought the annotation of her Affidavit of Adverse Sta. Ana be included as a co-respondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and Claim on the said 5,000 square meters on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, averring that the latters actuation deprived Realty. petitioner of a factual basis for securing a new title in her favor over Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of her 5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, because the Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriffs public auction sale of the said property to her could never become final Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance registered, since: without the registration of the Sheriffs Deed. The Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance is a Mode of Transfers (sic) The persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F ownership in favor of the Plaintiff, [Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it filed their respective Counter-Affidavits. happen (sic) that the presented Tax Declaration [No.] 00942-A is Respondent Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit that TCT No. Talready transfer (sic) in the name of the said [Dinah] C. Castillo, 134609 reflected the same date and time of entry of the Deed of therefore[,] the registration of Sheriff (sic) Final Sale is no longer Absolute Sale between Yagin (as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact) and necessary.24 Summit Realty, i.e., 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., in accordance with Escutin likewise denied petitioners request to have her Affidavit of Section 5628 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Adverse Claim annotated on TCT No. T-134609 on the following Property Registration Decree. He emphasized that his duty as Register grounds: of Deeds to register the Deed of Absolute Sale presented before him 1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not adverse to the was purely ministerial. If the document was legal and in due form, and registered owner. The registered owner is Summit Point Realty and there was nothing mutilated or irregular on its face, the Register of Development Corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-Deeds had no authority to inquire into its intrinsic validity based upon proofs aliunde. It was not true that he allowed the registration of the 134609 of the Registry of Deeds for Lipa City. Deed of Absolute Sale notwithstanding the absence of the required

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documents supporting the application for registration thereof. On the issuance of Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. 00949-A for such function contrary, all the required documents such as the DAR Clearance, pertained to another division over which she did not exercise authority. Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Certificate Authorizing Registration Thus, it was also not within her function or authority to demand the (CAR), Real Property Tax, Transfer Tax, Secretarys Certificate and presentation of certain documents to support the cancellation of Articles of Incorporation of Summit Realty were submitted. While it was petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A or to cause the annotation of true that the Secretarys Certificate did not accompany the Deed of petitioners interest on Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. 00949-A. Absolute Sale upon the presentation of the latter for registration, Respondent Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment Operation Section 117 of the Property Registration Decree gives the party Officer II of the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, she was in charge seeking registration five days to comply with the rest of the of safekeeping and updating the North District Records. With respect to requirements; and only if the party should still fail to submit the same the transfer of a tax declaration from one name to another, her duty would it result in the denial of the registration. The License to Sell and was limited only to the act of preparing the new tax declaration and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Registration of Summit assigning it a number, in lieu of the cancelled tax declaration. It was a Realty are only required when a subdivision project is presented for purely ministerial duty. She had no authority to demand the registration. The use of TINs in certain documents is a BIR requirement. presentation of any document or question the validity of the transfer. The BIR itself did not require from Yagin as vendor his TIN in the Deed Neither was it within her jurisdiction to determine whether petitioners of Absolute Sale, and issued the CAR even in the absence thereof. The interest should have been annotated on Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. Register of Deeds, therefore, was only bound by the CAR. As to the 00949-A. Examining the documents presented in support of the Certification earlier issued by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City transfer of the tax declaration to anothers name was a function attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and belonging to other divisions of the Office of the City Assessors. The Perla, was not covered by any certificate of title, Escutin explained that flow of work, the same as in any other ordinary transaction, mandated the Register of Deeds was not technically equipped to determine her to cancel petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and to prepare whether a cadastral lot number was within a titled property or not. and release Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. 00949-A after the transfer Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring or participating in the cancellation of had been reviewed and approved by other divisions of the Office. It petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A for, as Register of Deeds, he was also not true that TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was was not concerned with the issuance (or cancellation) of tax already cancelled when it was presented before the Office of the City declarations. Assessors; the photocopy of said certificate of title with the Office bore Respondent Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for Administration ofno mark of cancellation. the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, disputed petitioners Leviste and Orense, the private individuals charged with the allegations that she personally received from petitioner copies of the respondent public officers, admitted that they were corporate officers Notice of Levy and other supporting documents, and that she caused of Summit Realty. They related that Summit Realty bought a parcel of the disappearance thereof. Although she admitted that said documents land measuring 105,648 square meters, later identified as Lot 1-B, were shown to her by petitioner, she referred petitioner to the previously included in TCT No. 181, then specifically covered by TCT Receiving Clerk, Lynie Reyes, who accordingly received the same. No. 129642, both in the name of Catigbac. As a result of such Mistas maintained that she was not the custodian of records of the purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was transferred from Catigbac to Office and she should not be held responsible for the missing Summit Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to believe in good documents. She opined that petitioners documents could have been faith that said property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of among those misplaced or destroyed when the Office of the City the latters certificate of title over the same. Catigbacs right as Assessor was flooded with water leaking from the toilet of the Office of registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was the City Mayor. As Assistant City Assessor for Administration, Mistas superior to petitioners, which was based on a mere tax declaration. identified her main function to be the control and management of all Leviste and Orense rebutted petitioners assertion that the Deed of phases of administrative matters and support. She had no hand in the Absolute Sale between Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, and cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and the Summit Realty was a "one-way street." The Deed was actually signed

16

on the left margin by both Yagin and the representative of Summit registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which deed served as basis Realty. The inadvertent failure of the representative of Summit Realty for its issuance. to sign the last page of the Deed and of both parties to indicate their As to his denial to register [herein petitioners] Affidavit of Adverse TINs therein did not invalidate the sale, especially since the Deed was Claim and Sheriffs Certificate of Final Sale, through the issuance by signed by witnesses attesting to its due execution. Questions as the Registry of Deeds Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana, of the 29 June regards the scope of Catigbacs Special Power of Attorney in favor of 2003 Order denying registration thereof, such matter had been raised Yagin and the effectivity of the same after Catigbacs death can only be by herein [petitioner] in a letter-consulta to the Administrator of the raised in an action directly attacking the title of Summit Realty over Lot Land Registration Authority (LRA) on 03 July 2003. As the criminal and 1-B, and not in an administrative case and/or preliminary investigation administrative charges respecting this issue is premised, in part, on a before the Ombudsman, which constituted a collateral attack against matter still pending with the LRA, we find it premature to make a said title. Leviste and Orense further explained that since the owners finding on the same. duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and was judicially ordered replaced only on 3 January 2001, entries/inscriptions were necessarily made It is for the same reason that we deny the motion contained in the thereon after said date. As to Orenses failure to show petitioner any Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit praying for the inclusion, as document proving ownership of Lot 1-B by Summit Realty when the additional respondent, of Juanita H. Sta. Ana, who is impleaded solely latter paid him a visit, it was not due to the lack of such documents, on the basis of having signed, by authority of Escutin, the 29 July 2003 but because of petitioners failure to establish her right to peruse the Order of denial of [petitioners] application for registration. same. Orense also denied ever threatening petitioner during their Finally, respondent Escutin was able to successfully demonstrate, meeting. Finally, according to Leviste and Orense, petitioners through Consulta 2103 dated 25 July 1994, wherein the denial of allegations were based on mere conjectures and unsupported by registration by the Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City evidence. That particular acts were done or not done by certain public was upheld by the LRA Administrator, that the (sic) it was practice in officials was already beyond the control of Leviste and Orense, and just the different Registries that Examiners are given authority by the because they benefited from these acts did not mean that they had a Register to sign letters of denial.30 hand in the commission or omission of said public officials. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon declared in the same After more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C- Joint Resolution that there was no basis to hold respondents Mistas and 03-0728-F were finally submitted for resolution. Linatoc administratively or criminally liable: In a Joint Resolution29 dated 28 April 2004, the Office of the Deputy In this respect, this Office notes that while [herein petitioner] alleges Ombudsman for Luzon gave more credence to respondent Escutins that Aquilina Mistas caused the disappearance of the Notice of Levy defenses, as opposed to petitioners charges against him: and other supporting documents received from [petitioner] on 13 Going to the charges against respondent Escutin, he convincingly March 2003 when she applied for the issuance of a Tax Declaration in explained that he allowed the registration of the allegedly defective her favor, she did not present her receiving copy thereof showing that Deed of Sale because he, as Register of Deeds, has no power to look it was Mistas who received said documents from her. Neither did she into the intrinsic validity [of] the contract presented to him for show that Mistas is the employee responsible for record safekeeping. registration, owing to the ministerial character of his function. Next, we find, as convincingly answered, the allegation that Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said respondent, all the respondent Marietta Linatoc cancelled Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and documents required for the registration of the Deed of Sale were issued Tax Declaration 00949-Q (sic) on the basis of a cancelled submitted by the applicant. Transfer Certificate of Title upon the behest of Summit [Realty], which We likewise find said respondents explanation satisfactory that Sectionwas not the registered owner of the property. 56 of P.D. 1529 mandates that the TCT bear the date of registration of Respondent Linatoc, meeting squarely [petitioners] allegation, admits the instrument on which the said TCTs issuance was based. It is for having physically cancelled Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and having this reason that TCT 134609 bears the same date and time as the prepared a new declaration covering the same property in Catigbacs

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[name], as mandated by the flow of work in the City Assessors Office. bases.32 However, she denies having the authority or discretion to evaluate the As to whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 correctness and sufficiency of the documents supporting the square meter property, which issue comprised the very premise of application for the issuance of the Tax Declaration, arguing that her OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, the Office of the Deputy official function is limited to the physical preparation of a new tax Ombudsman for Luzon ruled that such matter was not within its declaration, the assignment of a new tax declaration number and the jurisdiction and should be raised in a civil action before the courts of cancellation of the old tax declaration, after the application had passed justice. the other divisions of the City Assessors Office. In the end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed: Verily, [petitioner] failed to establish that respondent Mistas and Linatoc, are the ones officially designated to receive applications for WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully recommended issuance of Tax Declaration, evaluate the sufficiency of the documents that : (1) the administrative case against public respondents ANTONIO supporting such applications, and on the basis of the foregoing M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be recommend or order the cancellation of an existing Tax Declaration and DISMISSED, for lack of substantial evidence; and (2) the criminal case direct the annotation of any fact affecting the property and direct the against the same respondents including private respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and BENEDICTO L. ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for lack of issuance of a new tax declaration covering the same property. probable cause.33 In fact, there is even a discrepancy as to the official designation of said 34 respondents. While [petitioner] impleads Mistas, in her capacity as In a Joint Order dated 20 June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Local Assessment Officer, and Linatoc, in her capacity as Records Clerk, Mistas, in her counter-affidavit, alleges a different designation, The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in its Joint Order, took i.e., Assistant City Assessor for Administration, while Linatoc claims tonotice of the Resolution dated 17 December 2002 of the LRA in be the Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the City Assessors Consulta No. 3483, which involved circumstances similar to those in Office. petitioners case. The LRA distinguished between two systems of land With the scope of work of said respondents not having been neatly registration: one is the Torrens system for registered lands under the defined by [petitioner], this Office cannot make a definitive Property Registration Decree, and the other is the system of determination of their liability for Grave Misconduct and violation of registration for unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which charges both relate to the of the Property Registration Decree). These systems are separate and distinct from each other. For documents involving registered lands, the performance or discharge of Mistas and Linatocs official duties. 31 same should be recorded under the Property Registration Decree. The Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any registration, therefore, of an instrument under the wrong system probable cause to criminally charge private individuals Leviste and produces no legal effect. Since it appeared that in Consulta No. 3483, Orense for the following reasons: the registration of the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan, the Certificate of Sale Anent private respondents, with the alleged conspiracy to unlawfully and the Affidavit of Consolidation was made under Act No. 3344, it did cause the transfer of the title of [herein petitioners] property to not produce any legal effect on the disputed property, because the Summit sufficiently explained by respondent Register of Deeds, such said property was already titled when the aforementioned documents allegation against private respondents loses a legal leg to standwere executed and presented for registration, and their registration on.1avvphi.zw+ should have been made under the Property Registration Decree. Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not able to sufficiently outline the official Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in the functions of respondents Mistas and Linatoc to pin down their specific same Joint Order, took into account petitioners withdrawal of her accountabilities, the imputation that private respondent (sic) conspired appeal en consulta before the LRA of the denial by the Register of with said public respondents respecting the cancellation of Tax Deeds of her request for registration of the Sheriffs Deed of Final Declaration No. 00942-A is likewise stripped of any factual and legal Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which prompted the

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LRA Administrator to declare the consulta moot and academic. For that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of want of a categorical declaration on the registerability of petitioners the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in dismissing petitioners Complaint documents from the LRA, the competent authority to rule on the saidAffidavit against respondents. matter, there could be no basis for a finding that respondent public Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals officers could be held administratively or criminally liable for the acts reads: imputed to them. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. The challenged Joint Resolution dated for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court challenging the 28 April April 28, 2004 and Joint Order dated June 20, 2005 in OMB-L-A-032004 Joint Resolution and 20 June 2005 Joint Order of the Office of the 0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F are hereby AFFIRMED.38 Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.35 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. In its Resolution dated 11 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied SP No. 90533.1avvphi1 petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for failing to present new 36 The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on 18 October 2005,matter which the appellate court had not already considered in its also finding no reason to administratively or criminally charge earlier Decision. respondents. Essentially, the appellate court adjudged that petitioner Petitioner now comes before this Court via the instant Petition for can not impute corrupt motives to respondents acts: Review on Certiorari, with the following assignment of errors: Without evidence showing that respondents received any gift, money I. or other pay-off or that they were induced by offers of such, the Court cannot impute any taint of direct corruption in the questioned acts of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN respondents. Thus, any indication of intent to violate the laws or of AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION flagrant disregard of established rule may be negated by respondents 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF honest belief that their acts were sanctioned under the provisions of PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE existing law and regulations. Such is the situation in the case at bar. PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT (sic); Respondent Register of Deeds acted in the honest belief that the II. agency recognized by the court in LRC Case No. 00-0376 between the registered owner Francisco Catigbac and Leonardo Yagin subsisted with THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN respect to the conveyance or sale of Lot 1 to Summit as the vendee, RULING THAT RESPONDENTS COULD NOT BE HELD and that the Special Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR UNDULY FAVORING SUMMIT TO presented as evidence during said proceedings are valid and binding. THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER.39 Hence, respondent Escutin was justified in believing that there is no legal infirmity or defect in registering the documents and proceeding The Petition at bar is without merit. with the transfer of title of Lot 1 in the name of the new owner Summit. As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property, On the other hand, respondent Linatoc could not be held Registration Decree which provides: administratively liable for effecting the cancellation in the course of SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case ordinary flow of work in the City Assessors Office after the documents of loss or theft of an owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice have undergone the necessary evaluation and verification by her under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to superiors.37 the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent policy of the Supreme soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost Court not to interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry investigatory power. If the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any new finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction clothed with grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court pronounced may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and

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registered.

as Lot 1-B. Catigbacs title to Lot 1-B passed on by sale to Summit Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, Realty, giving the latter the right to seek the separation of the said the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a portion from the rest of Lot 1 and the issuance of a certificate of title new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the specifically covering the same. This resulted in the issuance of TCT No. fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in 129642 in the name of Catigbac, covering Lot 1-B, which was all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, subsequently cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree. of Summit Realty. Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only ordered Petitioners reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in lieu of the is totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the issuance of lost one. However, respondents did not only issue a new owners a lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also cancelled petitioners Tax the cancellation of petitioners tax declaration. Declaration No. 00942-A and issued in its place Tax Declaration No. The cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. Respondents did not even annotate because of the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but petitioners existing right over 5,000 square meters of Lot 1-B or notify of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT No. 181 (and Petitioner maintains that a new owners duplicate of title is not a mode subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of acquiring ownership, nor is it a mode of losing one. Under Section of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of 109 of the Property Registration Decree, the new duplicate of title was the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is issued only to replace the old; it cannot cancel existing titles. binding and conclusive upon the whole world. 43 All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. 44 Therefore, Petitioners position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous upon presentation of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the City Assessor arguments and befuddled reasoning. must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different from name a tax declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. 40 Title, therefore,thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any certificate may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership ofAssessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons property.41 Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of on one and the same property. ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. 42 Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a petitioners title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbacs registration. ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbacs certificate of title is binding upon the Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the issuance of the whole world, including respondent public officers and even petitioner new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but from its purchase of the herself. Time and again, the Court has ruled that tax declarations and same from Yagin, the attorney-in-fact of Catigbac, the registered owner corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or of the said property. Summit Realty merely sought the issuance of a ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that evidence of the same.45 Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 it could accordingly register thereon the sale in its favor of a square meter property from Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it is substantial portion of Lot 1 covered by said certificate, later identified important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her

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title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly observed that, "[c]uriously, "Under Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807, otherwise known as the as to how and when petitioners alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, 'misconduct' is a ground for K. Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 disciplinary action. And under MC No. 8, S. 1970, issued by the Civil described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far Service Commission on July 28, 1970, which sets the 'Guidelines in the remained utterly silent."46 Application of Penalties in Administrative Cases and other Matters Petitioners allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B Relative Thereto,' the administrative offense of 'grave misconduct' to Summit Realty by Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, are beyond carries with it the maximum penalty of dismissal from the service (Sec. the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to IV-C[3], MC No. 8, S. 1970). But the term 'misconduct' as an consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had already administrative offense has a well defined meaning. It was defined in acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot 1- Amosco vs. Judge Magno, Adm. Mat. No. 439-MJ, Res. September 30, B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its 1976, as referring 'to a transgression of some established and definite ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be collaterally rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence attacked in the administrative and preliminary investigations by the public officer.' It is a misconduct 'such as affects the conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as effects his the Property Registration Decree categorically provides that a character as a private individual.' In the recent case of Oao vs. Pabato, certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be etc., Adm. Mat. No. 782-MJ, Res. July 29, 1977, the Court defined altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in 'serious misconduct' as follows: accordance with law. For this same reason, the Court has no Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous, this jurisdiction to grant petitioners prayer in the instant Petition for the would be merely an error of judgment and not serious misconduct. The cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty. term `serious misconduct is a transgression of some established and Which now brings the Court to the second issue raised by petitioner on definite rule of action more particularly, unlawful behavior of gross negligence by the magistrate. It implies a wrongful intention and not a the administrative liability of respondents. mere error of judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it establishes that reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were petitioners Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman for corrupt or inspired by intention to violate the law, or were a persistent Luzon gave rise to two charges: (1) OMB-L-A-03-0573-F involved thedisregard of well-known legal rules. We have previously ruled that administrative charge for Gross Misconduct against respondent public negligence and ignorance on the part of a judge are inexcusable if they officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-0728-F concerned the criminal charge for imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 47interpretation. This is not so in the case at bar." (Italics supplied.) against respondent public officers and private individuals Leviste and Orense. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there must be reliable the Court of Appeals, dismissed both charges. In the Petition at bar, evidence showing that the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired petitioner only assails the dismissal of the administrative charge for by an intention to violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of grave misconduct against respondent public officers. Since petitioner well-known legal rules. Both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for did not raise as an issue herein the dismissal by the Office of the Luzon and the Court of Appeals found that there was no sufficient Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, of the evidence to substantiate petitioners charge of grave misconduct criminal charge against respondent public officers for violation of against respondents. For this Court to reverse the rulings of the Office Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the same of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals, it must necessarily review the evidence presented by the parties and decide became final and executory.48 on a question of fact. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of In Domingo v. Quimson,49 the Court adopted the well-written report andthe evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.50 recommendation of its Clerk of Court on the administrative matter then Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a Petition for Review pending and involving the charge of gross or serious misconduct:

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under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In order to resolve this issue, the or not done a particular act. A perfect example was her assertion that Court would necessarily have to look into the probative value of the respondents Mistas and Linatoc should have annotated her interest on evidence presented in the proceedings below. It is not the function of Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. However, she the Court to reexamine or reevaluate the evidence all over again. This failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or recognizes the Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction in these cases being limited annotation of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the any reliable evidence, petitioners charge that respondents conspired lower courts or administrative bodies performing quasi-judicial with one another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is functions. It should be emphasized that findings made by an nothing more than speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just because administrative body, which has acquired expertise, are accorded not the acts of respondents were consistently favorable to Summit Realty only respect but even finality by the Court. In administrative does not mean that there was a concerted effort to cause petitioner proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only substantial. 51 prejudice. Respondents actions were only consistent with the Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall not recognition of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to disturb findings of fact. The Court cannot weigh once more the Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidence submitted, not only before the Ombudsman, but also before evidenced by certificates of title.

the Court of Appeals. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive, as long as they are hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 18 October 2005 and Resolution supported by substantial evidence.52 Substantial evidence is thedated 11 January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533 amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Dinah C. adequate to justify a conclusion.53 Castillo. The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Office of the SO ORDERED. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that respondents did not commit gross misconduct. Evident from the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution of the former and the 18 October 2005 Decision of the latter is that they arrived at such findings only after a meticulous consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties. Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to convincingly explain that they had only acted in accordance therewith in their dealings with petitioner and/or her documents. Respondents also enjoy in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty. The burden of proving otherwise by substantial evidence falls on petitioner, who failed to discharge the same. From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions held by respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor. How then could she even assert that a particular action was within or without their jurisdiction to perform? While it may be true that petitioner should have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was being cancelled, she was not able to establish that such would be the responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her insistence that respondents should have done

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