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~~~What Can We Learn from a War We Lost?\.,..H ST~~~~he Relevance of the HeliWopter Vietnam Experience,''_ for Today's Assault Doctrine LA2

''

Major~~~

Fran

T.Tad*

T~SheoRlea

of

thaned Viietnamy Experienc

At-

S~U.S.

Army Command and General Staff Col lege Foo't Leavenworth, Kansas
\*
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."-N"

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ie unlimited.

Approved for public release; distribution

~~2

December 1985""-"

86-2190,-..

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IWORK IjNIT ACCESSION NO..

11. TITLE (Include Secur"t ClassifiE ition)

WHAT CA.N

WE LEARN P7ROMW A WAR Wt-E LOST?

THE RELEVANCE

OF

THE VIETNAM

EXPERIENCE FOR TODAYS AISSAULT HELICOPTER DOCTRINE_________

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) TADDONTO, FRANK 13a. TYPE OF REPOPRT 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION T. MAJ, US ARMY___________________ 13b, TIME COVERIU 14. DATE 01 REEPORT Y-rA.A"_thijav1 1`1, PAGE COUNT

17. FIELD

COSATI CODES 6ROUP SUB-GROUP

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Corn.nue on reverie if necessary and identify by blork number)

VIETNAM LAM SON 719

AIRMOBILE OPELRATIONS

-This study attempts to determine if the Vietnam experience may be tused rje ,.nr..'1 A-IrOI)"MPrnpt. of the U.S. Army's assault helicopter doctrine for today and for the future. The study postulatcs that important * lessons 'Learned during Vietnam are overshadowed by a reliance on technology coupled with the negative overtone-, of that war. Following a historical review of' the development of airmobility leading1r to arl he emloment of airmobile units in Vietnam, the study analyze th * conduct of LAM SON 719, a combined operation conducted into Laos in 1971. *The analysis reveals numero'.as doctrinal- principles, adhered to during, the operation. The study also reviews the development of airmobile doctrine includinir the impact of the Vietnam War on its development. * The conclusion of this study is that the Vietnam experience does, indeed provide valuable lessons which may be useful today and in the future. The Vnlsi-s of current doctrine revealsthtahohad ut.tda'
*22a. 20. D'STRIBUT ION /AVAILABILITY OF AflSTR.ACT CluriCLASSIFIED/tJNLIMITED 0 SAME AS RPT. NAME Ol` RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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All other editions are obsole','e.

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U-= UNLASS IF IED.

OF T.h11 PAOS CLASIPICATION ,LCuRITY

airmobile doctrine fails to incorporate important principles used during Also, continued emphasis on preparing for a mid to high intensity the war. war in NATO has caused the Army to neglect its ability to conduct Finally, the study concludes that operations in a low intensity conflict. many of today's Army leaders are the professionals who conducted airmobile operations in Vietnam and it is time to capitalize on their wealth of knowledge.

'"

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.......................................................................................................

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

,..

What Can We Learn iron.

War We Lost?

"The Relevance of the Vietnam Lxperience "for Today's Assault Helic-ipter Doctrine

Major Frank

.addonio

School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Approved for public release;

distribution

is unlimited.

2 December 1985

86-2190

S... >,,..:, ,.. .:-:-.,.'-,-; -.; .,_. -;. ... -,. -.. ..; ,. . .-... .- -.-_... .. .. -. o :- I

Schou,

of Advanced Military Studies

monograph Opproval

Name of Student:

Frank T. Taddonia,

Major,

Aviation

Title of Honograph:

What Can We Learn From A War We Lost? The Relevance of the Vietnam Experience for Today's Assault Helicopter Doctrine

Approved by:

Seminar Leader (LTC Thomas G. Ferousso, Ph. D.)

-) (COL

--

.MA)

-/

Director,

School

oi Advanced

Richard Hart Sinnreich,

Military Studies

,_ _ (Philip J. BrooKes,

. Ph. D.)

_Director,

Graduate Degree Programs

Li

L%

Accepted this _

day of

'CCC*40't

1985. Accesion For

NTI.S

CRA&I
L

DTIC TAB U!iannounced Justificalioll

,'N LL '" Y
-

b ibut:on .
Availab;;ity Codes

Dist

'D~sst " ".i Avail a,-c, orc

V.
ABSTRACT
N.

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM A WAR WE LOST? THE RELEVANCE OF THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE FOR TODAY'S ASSAULT HELICOPTER DOCTRINE, by Major Frank T. "Taddonio, USA, 49 pages.

This study attempts to determine if the Vietnam experience may be used meaningfully in the development of the U.S. Army's assault helicopter doctrine for today and for the future. The study postulates that important lessons learned during Vietnam are overshadowed by a reliance on technology coupled with the negative overtones of that war. Following a historical review of the development of airmobility leading to the early employment of airniobile units in Vietnam, the study analyzes the conduct of LAM SON 719, a combined operation conducted into Laos in 1971. The analysis reveals numerous doctrinal principles adhered to during the operation. The study also reviews the development of airmobile doctrine including the impact of the Vietnam War on its development. The conclusion of this study is that the Vietnain experience does, indeed, provide valudble lessons which mnay be useful today and in the future. The analysis of current doctrine reveals that, although adequate, today's airmobile doctrine fails to incorporate important principles used during the war. Also, continued emphasis on preparing for a mid to high intensity war in NATO has caused the Army to neglect its ability to conduct operations in a low intensity conflict. Finally, the study concludes that many of today's Army leaders are the professionals who conducted a'rrnobile operations in Vietnam and it is time to capitalize on their wealth of Knowledge.

[.I
_ -

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. . .

-.

.-

- -

- . -

Table

of

Contents

Page Section 1. Introduction ............ .................. The Problem ............... ................... Purpose ................ ... .................... Early Developments ........ ............ .. 1 2 4 5 14 14 14 16 20 26 32 32 33
25

II. III.

...

Analysis of LAM SON 719 ...... .......... . . Introduction to the Battle ... ....... . ... The Strategic Setting .... ............. .. The Tactical Situation .... ............. ... The Fight .......... ................... ... Doctrinal Principles Derived from LAM SON 719 Post War Developments .... ............. The War's Influence on Doctrine ....... Organizational Stuidies .... ............ Current Air Assault Doctrine ........ Conclusion .......... .................. ............. ..... .. .......... .. .. .. ......... .. ..

IV.

V. APPENDIX A, B. C. D.

39 41 42 43 44 45 48

The Area of Operation .... U.S.

Army Aviation Task Organization ................ ...... .

Enemy Situation ........ Operation Plan-Phase 11. Endnotes. . ..... Bibliography .....

................... .................

....

*!

~1

'I

------------------------------------

SECTION 1

.1)
INTRODUCTION

Arny Aviation is

a relatively young branch

in the U.S. Army. 12, 1983,

Although

,QK

officially designated as a separate branch on April extend back to June 6,

its roots

1942 when the Secretary of War approved an organic separate from the rapidly growing Army Air Corps, In November of

fixed wing aviation unit, 4or the field artillery that year,

to perform observation missions.(1)

US. Army field artillery light observation aircraft experienced carrier, USS Ranger, in the

combat as four L4's flew,.from the aircraft

western Mediterranean to Casablanca.

role unfamiliarity caused one of them coordination

Aircraft recognition problems and

to ut. shut down b>- friendly fire. the use of these aircraft and As

improved with ground forces,

expanded to include controlling of Army Air Corps attack aircraft conducting surveillance.(2)

Development

of the Army's aviation assets strugg:ed through World War 11 and Korea. Any conceptual

twenty seeds

years and two major wars,

which may have been planted during the Korean War were unable to grow during the years when the U.S. dominant. competition strategy of massive retaliation was

Emphasis on nuclear weapons coupled with interseruice for limited funds stifled the Despite all of ideas possessed by Army leaders

concerning airmobility.

the overwhelming hurdles there were enough persevering -

encountered during the decade following 1950, visionaries to advaice

the concept of iirmobility into the 1960's.(3)

II

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- " . .. " .'

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. . .

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However,

the concept was still

growing as the first

airmobile units entered

combat action in Vietnam. Other than the recent U.S. military involvement in Grenada, the

Vietnam conflict is
the d.S.

the only major source of combat experience from which

This is an the and

Army can develop assault helicopter doctrine.(4)

p-

vxtremely valuable point to remember as today's Army leaders plan for employment of aviation other branches, little in tomorrow's battles. Unlike is infantry, armor,

the U.S. Army aviation community

able to derive very Army's combat to did not

in the way of doctrinal in World War 11

lessons from the U.S. particularly

experience

and Korea,

as pertains

airmobility and air assault operations,

The helicopter,

after all,

make its appearance on the battlefield with the U.S. Army until War, and even then,

the Korean

it was used exclusively for command and control, Extensive war gaming, significantly

Iliazzon, medical e,.,acuaton. and lImited observation. analysis, assist by far testing, and realistic training

in the field will

in the development is actual combat.

of doctrine.

However,

the most reliable measure

THE PROBLEM

The negative

connotations of the Vietnam War may be obscuring any lessons collected to date. the Vietnam War was lost. If Indeed, as the title

combat-derived (octrinal of this paper suggests, fact exists,

any question of this

is now called

one merely needs to remember it is

that Saigon

Ho Chi

Minh City ard that

the North Vietnamese flag which flies

in that city

"2

today. causes.

Numerous volumes exist which cover Faulty political

that subject and its underlying errors are subjects discussed issues may well According "When
Lt

aims and strategic

elsewhere. overshadow to Shelby L.

The continuing debate

over these emotional

important military doctrinal Stanton, noted historian

lessons requiring study. veteran,

and Vietnam combat

the war was finally over,

the United States military had to build a new shreds of its tattered remnants."(5) As

volunteer army from the smallest the Army exited Vietnam, their

many wanted to forget the nightmare which haunted

lives for man> years. Today's emphasis on mid to high intensity combat and focus on the

European battlefield may also be diminishing the importance of lessons learned in Vietnam. During 1972, the focus of the U.S. Army tactical

doctrine shifted dramatically from counterinsurgency to conventional

wariare. Commander, According to Gencrtl Dunn A. U.S. Starr', who was at the time "...we decided

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), ccncepts

to begin with developing operational difficult problem, served to intensify increased level

to cope with our most

the mechanized war."(6) the Army's interest

The Middle East War of 1973 in Europe. The

in a mechanized war

of sophistication

and lethality of weapons on that technology in weapons

battlefield emphasized development.

the need for advanced

In this era of high technology systems and solutions to problems, is understandably difficult to recall and effectively utilize ago. the simple as

it

'1

basic methods and tools used over a decade well as fire support systems,

Command and control, capitalized on the

have significantly

advancements of computer

technology.

The Army is currently

integratin--

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highly sophisticated tank killers such as the Apache (AH-64) As we refine our capabil ity to deal with the Soviet/Warsaw the plains of Europe, are we losing or simply ignoring the

helicopter. Pact threat on important data .. I

c.

collected during combat with a less sophisticated It is quite possible that while yet least

enemy in Southeast Asia? .

the U.S, Army prepares for the most very little attention is

dangerous and demanding,

likely, war, lo

focused on the most likely possibilityGeneral Dave R. Palmer,

intensity conflict.

As Major Army

formerly the Deputy Commandant of the U.S.

Command and General Staff College and now commanding the Ist Armored Division, in his widely praised history of the Vietnam War, ingredients of preparedness, an intellectual therefore, is wrote, "One of

the essential

a diligent and

honest stud> of the past, successes and failures.' in Vietnam. must not be

examination of historical "We did many things right Tne errors I

He further explained,

And many wrong. ignored

-

Those lessons must not be lost.

to be repeated."(7)

PURPOSE

The primary purpose of

this monograph

is

to determine of

if

the Vietnam Army's

experience may be used meaningfully assault helicopter doctrine for

in the development

the U.S.

today and for the future.

Consideration

must be given to the appropriateness

of the Vietnam confl ict to the This is

*

development of assault helicopter doctrine for tomorrow.

"especially significant
light

since the U.S.

Army force structure now contains The intent .

infantry divisions designed for low intensity conflict. is to demonstrate

of the research

the value of the airmobile concept as i If the Vietnam

"was developed

and practiced

in Vietnam for today.

4.2."

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experience provides a meaningful should be incorporated

basis for doctrine,

then by all means, It is imperative

it

into the manuals we use today.

that a reliance on technology and the emphasis on tomorrow's mid to high intensity bat
t

lefield not cause a disregard for lessons learned in

yesterday's war.
-rd

I-.

SECTION 11

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

During the 1950's, growth and development.

Army aviation was marked by a lack of direction for On January 15, 1960, the Army Chief of Staff Deruty Commanding General of

appointed Lieutenant General Gordon B. Rogers, Continental Army Conmand,

to chair the Army Aircraft Requirements Board. laid the

The Rogers Board,

often overshadowed by later developments,

foundation for a significant building process which occurred during the follow,ng decade. It outlined detailed requirements regarding three types surveillance and transport. First, it Also, the board's

of aircraft - observation, report

included two key recommendations.

recommended a recognizing the need to Secondly, the

replacement policy for aircraft of every ten years,

keep up with operational requirements and advancing technology.

the board recommended that a study be conducted to determine whether concept of air fighting units was practical. possihilit>y of tactical combat,

This concept recognized the for

units canable of using the "third dimension" including,

incorporating their own organic aircraft

possibly, armed

helicopters.

The Rogers Board provided the necessary guidance for the procuremprnt of material, and personnel planning

development of aviation, for the future.(B)

Secretary of Defense,

Robert S. McNamara,

in the spring of 1962, then Comnanding General convene the "Tactical

directed that Lieutenant General

Hamilton H. Howze,

of Strategic Army Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps,

S..
.

. .

m . . . ..

. .

.-

. -

".

".

..

"

'

"

"-.'

Mob;lity Requirements Board." conducted by the Army,

Totally dissatisfied with previous studies the board to study ' --

McNamara advised all members of

aviation requirements of the Army unconstrained by traditional military

doctrine.(9) Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, an avid proponent of

airmobility and noted aviator,

indicated that,

"The most significant major K

activity of the Board throughout testing and evaluation of airmobility." Although

its deliberations was the investigation, and operational concepts of

the organizational

the Howze Board conducted its exhaustive

testing and (ninety days), the

evaluation within the constraints of a very short suspense the implications of the findings were far reaching. It

recommended

creation of two types of completely airmobile combat units, divisions and air cavalry combat brigades. additional reconnaissance substantially increase its mobility.(1O) stating, The board has only a single, general conclusion, adoption by the Army of the airmobile concept - however imperfectly it may be decrihed and justified in this report - is necessary and desirable. In smne respects the transition is inevitable, just as was that from animal mobility to motor.(11) Half way around the world, and lift

air assault

The board also advocated A propo-al was also made to

capability.

the number of aircraft Howze emnhasized

in a ROAD division to enhance

General

the board's significance by

the struggle with the shortcomings of the

airmobility concept was ongoing. The first (Light two Army aviation units, the 57th Transportation Company

Hel icopter)

and the 8th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter), 1961. While the airmobility

arrived in South Vietnam on December 11,

7
'-Vo

concept was studied, units,

tested,

and evaluated

in the United States,

these

along with others that followed,

adapted themselves under combat

conditions. LAM SOM II.

Characteristic lessons were those learned during LAM SOt I anu These two operations were conducted HNoze delivered his final in August 1962, the same

morth that General

report. of the
I.

LAM SOM I was an airmobile raid, conducted by 1 Corps (Army Republic of Vietnam), encountered, which was

designed to kill or capture any enemy and seize enemy documents. It

destroy supplies and equipment,

called for a thirty minute air strike by twenty-one fixed wing aircraft to precede the airrnobile landing of a 200-man main force. as a dummy parachute drop, A thirty man were also employed.
r.

diversionary force,

as well

The airmobile assets were

twenty-two CH-21's of the 93rd and 8th the Vietnamese Air Force. This

Transportation Companies and ten CH-34's of orperation was highly successful. 3 1/2 hours, There were

The main force was on the ground for only

twenty-two enemy killed in action and only three later died). Even with this success, there

friendly troops wounded (one were mishaps. The Commander,

I Corps (ARVN),

attempted to use a C-47 for

an airborne command post; however, subordinates due

he was unable to establish contact with Also, a miscount during

to a confusion of frequencies.

the extraction almost caused txe aircraft LAM SOM II operation, was planned

u ivetur1,

to the pi cup zone. as the previous, Fog in the objective

in much the same manner factor.

but weather became a significant

area caused a long delay between landing. fire

the preparatory

fires and the airrmobile Ito be hit by ground lasted eight hours

The loss of surprise caused every aircraft The operation

and two CH-21's to be destroyed.

resulting

in two South Vietnamese being Killed and four Americans wounded.

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Fifty-two enemy were killed,

eight captured and tons of enemy food, in addition to the capture of the battalion had

clothing, weapons and ammunition destroyed valuable documents. been preparing It One enemy prisoner

indicated that

to attack a government outpost for the previous nine days. including the enemy, that the airmobile

was soon apparent to all,

raid was a practical superior enemy.

means of contacting and surprising a numerically

The South Vietnamese and the aviation units were learning of landing zones 0 The importance of compromise and was a key

quickly about the selection between

landing too far from the objective, placing the aircraft

forfeiting surprise,

landing too close, lesson.

in a vulnerable position,

They also learned about the necessity

of employing all available

firepower to protect zones,(12)

the helicopters arriving and departing from landing and error" and innovation continued for

As the period of "trial

Army aviation units in Iietnam, take a giani leap forward.

the concept oi di.obilitx was about to

The 11th Air Assault Division was activated earlier by the Howze Board. selected t,. lead the division Brigadier General

to test concepts outlined Kinnard was training,

Harry W.O.

through this intensive period of

testing and evaluation which continued from 1963 to 1965. equipment were brought together Army. at Ft. Benning,

Men and around the

Georgia from all

In the absence of any existing doctrine,

the division worked

intensely to develop procedures night fornations,

in many areas including formation flying, ilight and +orward area refueling (later General) John R. Galvin

nap of the earth

operation.(13) noted,

As Lieutenant Colonel

There were no training texts or standard operational methods; The diligent effort

these had to be formulated as the division grew."(14)

and perseverance

of all members of the test division paid big dividends. C.W.G. Rich, who had overall responsibility for testing He in the

r"

Lieutenant General the concept,

submitted his interim final

report on December 1, 1964.

recommended strongly that an air assault type division be included Army's force structurel5) This report,

in conjunction with other tests

and studies including the "Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structure 04 the Army (ARCSA I) Study", led to the tentative decision (Test) in March 1965

to convert

the 11th Air Assault Division

to a full-fledged member of

the force structure.(16) All of the precepting events led directly to the activation of on July 1, 1965. One month later, the Ist

Cavalry Division (Airrobile)

twenty to the its

troop and cargo ships carried the men and aircraft of the division hostile environment o South Vietnam.(17)

Less than ninety days after the central highlands of

S1

activation at Ft. Benning,

the unit arrived in

South Vietnam and established a base of operations astride Highway 19 at An Khe. Although separate helicopter companies had conducted airmobile in Vietnam since December was significant 1961, the arrival of the Ist Cavalry

operations Division

(Airmobile)

in that it

was a unit specifically

designed for airmobile war-fare.(18) After only three weeks of small unit operations, Division (Airmobile) under fire. committed the Ist Cavalry

its units to a test of the airmobile concept the North Forces camp, to
.

In an attempt to cut South Vietnam in two,

Vietnamese Army launched attacks against south of Pleiku.

the Plei Me Special action with

The division entered (he

the mission

search and destroy over a 1500 square mile battlefield. BAYONET lasted thirty-five days and later became

Operation SILVER la Drang

known as the

10

,o,

.,

.7I.

Valley campaign. maximum advantage combat.(19) employment

The division used

its airmobile flexibility

o the

and defeated three North Vietnamese regiments in open the division improved air, its

During the course of this campaign, of aerial rocket artillery, of pathfinders,

tube artillery and tactical its

learned the value entire *.'

and demonstrated

ability to move All these lessons were the

-'

infantry battalions and artillery batteries. hit by enemy fire,

at the cost of fifty-nine aircraft ground,

three while on

and only fuur shot down (three its first

were recovered).(20) Many of

The division

had passed

test with flying colors. improved future

the lessons learned the

in this initial

combat

operations and enhanced

development of airmobility. A review of the 1963 and 1967 versions of Field Manual Airmobile Operations, indicates significant evolution 57-35,

in techniques and

procedures occurred over those four y2ars. reflect the change indicates that it in overall U.S. is strategy

These two editions ciearly in that the 1963 version

applicable to nuclear warfare whereas the later manual The experiences of combat in Vietnam are Its list of missions adds riverine of counterinsurgency to

refers to nonnuclear warfare.

woven throughout the 1967 manual. operations, long range

patrols, and others t/pical

thca mission list

of the 1963 manual.

Additional guidelines for command and discussion of aerial resulted in

staff reconnaissance,

coupled with a very extensive

reconnaissance

and surveillance within the

i,telligence section,

from fighting an elusive enemy in Asia.

Another signiHicant

improvement

the 1967 edition was the very detailed outline of battle drills, specific diagrams which explained escort duties, forrrition changes,

including

actions on contact, infantry. Use of

and even seating configuration for the

S.. - ,'t

..

pathfinders and the selection, were expanded and covered

preparation,

and operation

of landing zones in 1967 were experiencc for airmobile

in detail.

The doctrine writers

conscious ot the valuable in Vietnam and quickly operations. The tactical of support

lessons being learned through combat them into the Army manual

incorporated

lessons were learned constantly Initially,

from the first

commitment

to South Vietnam.

Army aviation's role was to train units and, when necessary,

the Army of the Reputlic of South Vietnam (ARYN)

to provide them with mobility, communications, and command and control

superior to that of the Viet Cong. administrative support General The aviation units also provided training teams.A21) the As

to military advisory group this early support

Tolson points out,

"represented

lowest order

of airmobility...that "B"."(22)

is, simply transport

people from point "A" to point excluded from the and

Many problems existed because did not control the

the pilots were

planning stages,

tactical

air support or artillery,

did not share responsibility for The planning and conduct combat experience was gained. !!nttated

success or +ailure of the mission,,'23) assaults rapidly improved as

of airmobile

Planning for these operations was normially

vwhen the aviation battalion was assigned a mission by higher These misston requests were passed the operation. Although to the aviation company the

headquarters.

assigned to support

the companies possessed

flexibil ity to resoond to missions

in less than an hour,

normally daily evening.

mission requirements were received by 1800 hours on the previous if sufficient time wa available, an aerial reconnaissance

was conducted by

members of toe aviation company arid the supported unit. reconnaisv.ance, details concerning the pickup zone,

During the altitudes,

routes,

12

landing zooes and flight formations were coordinated. the plan,

Any deviation from was

,'.

either prior to or during the conduct of the mission,

coordinated with the ground force cornmander.(24)

Liaison officers (LNO's)

"performed a

key function

in planning and conducting these miesions.

Officers from the aviation unit supporting the airmobile would coordinate directly with the supported ground unit. reconnaissance, mess and medical In addition to the aerial

liaison officers would plan for the refueling requirements, support. During the execution phase, one LNO would fly in

"the

lead aircraft and another would often fly above and behind the flight. in aviation units, which was

Something that has been forgotten today discovered early in Vietnam, best qual ified improved,

was the need for liaison officers to be the As this planning process

and most expericenced officers. air movement

units refined their

techniques. to the landing zone or objective three to five aircraft. Nip

Formation

flyiig was employed enroute

"area.

The most common formation used was a "VlQ of the disembarkation of troops. the

This facilitated

Armed helicopters were troop carrying in marking the landing

always employed in an escort role to protect helicopters.

Scout helicopters normally assisteQ

zone with smoke and remained rescue missions. than once often different

in the area for radio relay and to assist with

Units learnel very early that using the same route more caused aircraft to be hit by ground fire. as well The use of

routes to and from the landing zone, the norm.

as primary and

alternate routes became

This logic also applied to repetitive

use of the same landing zones.

Single ship landing zones were not used and These

the use of the same landino zone over and over again was avoided.

._

13

-:

and many other

improvements were made by aviation units

in order to adjust

to their environment. This environment of the war. did not significantly change until the latte,- years First, in 1969,
-

There were

two major reasons for this change. military forces.

the decision was made to withdraw U.S.

This required

buildup cf the South Vietnamese military.

called, arrival

Vietnamization, as it was
Second, as a result of losses of Viet regular the."

changed the focus of combat operations. of U.S. combat

troops in 1965 and extremely high

Cong guerilla forces, forces had increased.

contact with North Vietnamese Army (NVA)

The NVA forces employed more sophisticated weapons air defense environment thought of only as low Although it in some areas. The

which caused a mid-intensity war in South Vietnam and one isolated is often

intensity conflict,... the the of

in place and time. intensity conflict,

contained many of

elements of low whole conflict that very difficult

any point of view which considers

as low

intensity fundamentally misunderstands the nature Many actions which occurred possess One major operation,

war.

implications in

for today and the future. many ways, assaults.

similar to other battles of airmobile to a

points out the progress made The 1971 incursion

in the conduct

into Laos exposed Army aviators Their participation

formidable air

defense environment.

in LAN SON 719

certainly put the airmobile concept to the test.

"I-,

14

. . . . .

. .

SECTION III

ANALYSIS OF LAM SON 719

INTRODUCTION TO THE BATTLE

LAM SON 719 was a combined operation conducted 8th to April 9, 1971.

into Laos from February . The

The mission was to destroy supplies and and destroy NVA forces.

installations,

disrupt lines of communications

operation was executed by United States Army forces and forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARYN) V ietnamese Army (NVA). the operation. against forces of the Viet Cong and North in

United States Air Force elements also took part of the operation was the northern in Laos adjacent two

The ],cation

provinces of South Vietnam and the area provinces.

to these

THE STRATEGIC SETTING

The long years of American

involvement

in

the Vietnam War reached a the President of the

major turning point when Richard M. Nixon became United States. Vietnam

His meeting with the President of the Republic of South of the redeployment
-

in June of 1969 concluded with the announcement forces from Vietnam as an

of American

integral part of Nixon's program of

M "Vietnamization*.

This program called for the turningj over of the conduct

the Republic of Vietnam. Outlining the two

of the war to the soldiers of

15

.'-

V&

I.

principal components of Vietnamization, PresidEt

summarized the new American policy:

Nixon concisely,

The first (component) is the strengthening of the armed forces of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills, and overall capability. The second component is the extensio, of the pacification program in South Vietnam.(25) As the development of the Vietnamese forces progressed, of the U.S. Army declined so that as the year ten divisions deployed to Vietnam were still the size and role

C.
-

7V

1971 began only six of the there.

This transition within the borders of the Republic of Vietnam was accompanied by serious developments outside successful government coup in March of 1970, in Cambodia. He General its borders. After a of the

Lon Nol assumed control

immediately directed the NVA and the Viet Cong, to leave his country. into Cambodia to North _

who had long exploited Cambodia's neutrality,

Vietnam reacted with a series of operations launched

establish a line of communications.

from Lon Nol, was launched

Responding to a request for assistance

a combined American-South Vietnamese cross border operation in May 1970. the Cambodian Campaign was highly successful. for United States forces "By

By many accounts, 30 June 1970, from Cambodia,

which was the deadline

to withdraw and and 7,000

Allied forces had eliminated 5,000 enemy troops, ammunition and assorted

captured 9,300 tons of weapons, tons of rice. However,

supplies,

Most enemy bases had been overrun and destroyed."(26) well known journalist their and author, noted that the

Stanley Karnow,

Conmnunists were

able to replace

lost equipment with the support of their strategic focus Regardless of

the Soviet Union and China.

He further states that

then shifted to the northern provinces of South Vietnam.(27)

16
..........................................
." .. ...

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . .

is-

opinions, it is a fact that a large region of South Vietnam was now secure and that up to'a year of time had been bought as the enemy would be unable to return until after the monsoon season. With the bases in Cambodia virtually eliminated, the commanders in North Viet nam real ized it was necessary to reinforce those units in Laos. In order to accomplish this task, the NVA would have to rely heavily on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.(28) area west of Khe Sanh. Allied intelligence discovered this build up in the The planning for another cross border operationa

comnmenced to retain the initiative seized in 1970 and disrupt the Communist buildup. This time, the incursion would be into Laos.

THE TACTICAL SITUATION

The operational area (see Appendix A) for LAM 60rq 719y was the Tchieporie District of Savannakhet Province, in southeastern Laos.A29) The area was

bounded on the east by Quang Tri Province, South Vietnam, with the Demilitarized Zone and Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam immediately northeast. The depth of the operational area was limited to Tchepune in

the west, and width of the area varied from ten to twenty kilometers north and south of Route 9 in Laos.(30) Weather had a major effect on the timing of airi-obile operations in support of LAM SON 719. Weather conditions at three locations directly at coastal base camps where most

affected airmobile operations: (1)

helicopters were kept at night, (2) at the forward staging area at Rhe Sanh, where only a few helicopters remained overnight, and (3) in the operational area over Laos. Early morning fog, rain, and cloud cover

17

sometimes delayed airmobile and tactical or early afternoon. natural haze, smoke,

air operations until

late morning

5Sharply reduced visibility caused by a combination of and dust raised by artillery and air strikes caused of aircraft.(31)

flying safety hazards and complicated command and control The geography of the operational area was varied. valley was central to the area, parallel

The Xe Pon River

to Route 9 on its north bank, (See and aid for . ,.' -

generally running east-west irom the Laotian border to Tchepone. Appendix A) Because of the rugged terrain adjacent to the river,

weather conditions, aircraft.

the Xe Pon River became a valuable navigational

The area north of the river was restricted to infantry and broken terrain. Two distinct

operations because of heavy vegetation terrain features south of-the river, escarpment,

the Co Roc Highland and a high These prominent features

Rii

influenced military operations.

dominated Route 9 and provided excellent onservation into the Tchepone areas.

Sanh arid

This area also contained heavy vegetation which provided This factor, coupled with the

for excellent cover and concealment. numerous trails throughout the area, move undetected.

provided the NVA the capability to

LAM SON 719 was conducted and controlled by I Corps (ARVN), by General Hoang Kuan Lam.(32) Division (ARVN)

commanded

The corps was augmented by the 1st Airborne infantry battalions and Division

(three brigades with nine

Artillery) and two Marine brigades with another Marine Brigade and its division headquarters available by Lieutenant General if necessary.

XXIV Corps (U.S.), commanded

James W. Sutherland,

planned and coordinated all U.S. influenced the

support for the operation.(33)

Two significant factors First, U.S.

forces committed to the operation.

ground force were not

----

-- _-'----.-... -------

.......

_....

..

,......_....,.

_..........,

..

..-....

permitted to cross the border al'owed to participate with support

into Laos.

Second,

no U.S.

advisors were Therefore,

their respective Vietnamese

units.

the extensive U.S.

involved in the cperation required extremely this would be the first time in

detailed planning and coordination since many years their own. During the conduct of the operation, that major South Vietnamese

ground units would be completely on

airmobility support was In addition to the 101st Airborne of providing of LAM SON 719. In I'-.--

recognized as an essential continuing missions Division (Airmobile) command and control order to support in its

requirement ior success. assigned area of

operations,

was tasked with the responsibility of all aviation elements in support

three

division equivalents over extended distances (one kilometers) the division

way from Khe Sanh to Tch'pone was fifty-three required augmentation. Companies (UH-1H), It

was augmented with four Assault Helicopter Support Helicopter Companies (CH-47), two all

two Assault

Air Cavalry Troops,

and two Assault Helicopter

Battalion headquarters,

detached from other divisions. (see Appendix suppnrt, 8)

The commander of the control units.

101st Aviation Group assault, assault

exercised operational weapons helicopter

over all

and aerial

He was able

to assign

responsibility of direct support for each major ARVN unit to a separate assault helicopter battalion. in the area of operations prior to the initiation of

The enemy forces LAM SON 719 (see Division;

Appendix C),

consisted of 24B Regii.ent, and Ist VC Regiment,

304th NVA 2d VC Diuision;

-

the division headquarters

and the 64th Regiment, logistic network

320th 1NVA Division,

The enemy supported the elements of the

in the operational

area with subordinate

I
19.-

r.

r'crw

.- ,'

.g '

- -. '. v'

.-

;- -

-*

*-

.- *

. I *-

' I

. ..

..

i'N

559th Transportation Group. stations),

The elements,

called 8inh Trams (military> infiltrating personnel There were three and

were responsible for the movement of

supplies through Trams located

their areas of responsibility.(34) area of LAM SON 719.

8Binh

CN

in the operational

This factor had a

significant impact on the operation since each Binh Tram controlled as many as three antialrcraft battalions with weapons ranging from 12.7 mm through 100rmm. 22,000; On February 13,000 were 8, 1971, it was estimated that total in support. enemy strength was It was also "

in combat units and 9,000

estimated that the enemy possessed the capabil ity to reinforce these units wjithin two weeks 1,th einht regirments. 35) in four phases. Phase 1I,

The combined operation was to be executed

called Dewey Canyon 11, required the Ist Brigade, (Hechanized) to advance on U-Day, occupy
tlih

5th infantry Division and cleer PRoute conducted

ihe Oarh area,

9 to the Laotian border. diversionary attacks Engineer Group (U.S.)

The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)

in the A Shau Valley from U-Day to D+4. was assigned the mission to repair

The 45th

Route 9 up to the

Laotian border and to rehabil;tate During this phase, areas and prepare In Phase II and B-52 strikes, Armored Brigade,

the Khe Sanh airstrip for C-130 use. their movements to assembly
-

ARYN forces were to corplete to attack, (see on order,

across the border into Laos.

Appendix D) following a massive artillery preparation reinforced by the 1st It

the Ist ARVJN Airborne Division, was to launch

the main attack along Route 9,

repairing

as the/ progrcssed; three battal ions of the airborne division were to air assault into Objective A Loui and two other fire support bases. Battal ions

IK.
,-

of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division's 1st and 20 Regiments were to air. assault in'n the Co Roc area to protect the corp's southern flank. The Ist

20

ARVN Ranger Group was to insert its three battalions by helicopter blocking positions northeast of A Loui to protect Following to drive this and seizure of Objective A Loui,

into

the northern flank.

the Ist Armored Brigade was

to Tchepone for link-up with the 3d Airborne Brigade which was to into Tchepone. The Marine Brigades would remain in reserve at

air assault

Khe San~h.
Phase 111, successful Tchepone south. the exploitation phase, was to be initiated after the

link-up at Tchepone.

The Airborne Division would search Division would search

area while the Ist ARVN Infantry

to the

The Ist ARUN Ranger Group would continue the north. U.S.

to occupy blocking to provide fire support, Phase IV was the The U.S. XXIV Corps The plan
'

positions in

units would continue

helicopter support, withdrawal

and tactical

air for ARYN units.

phase to be conducted under one of two options.

mission during this phase remained unchanged. and I Corps completed preparation

On January 22d, orders.

of their operational

was to be executed on January 30th.(36)

THE FIGHT

flu.

Q G st -" lga iy sde,

I... c ..

5+h ...

1,&an r v Diuij inn rnrrmpnrced o pea.. peration 5 exactly . . n........ ... .... on January 20, 1971. The brigade advanced Simultaneously,

as scheduled,

at 0001

hours,

toward Khe Sanh and the Laotian border the (U.S.)

in two elements.

101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) patrols

conducted heavy attacks by to divert the

fire and reconnaissance enemy's attention. the Ist Brigade,

into the A Shau valley three

Beginning at 0830 hours, (U.S.)

infantry battalions of into threE

5th Infantry Division were airlifted

2.

2 1
..............................

" '"
-,

landing zones battalion

in the Khe Sanh area.

All

lifts

were

complete and each the

in its assigned area by 1530 hours.

For the inext few days,

American units continued to clear Route 9,

Khe Sanh,

and the area up to the the 3d ard 8th

Laotian border without significant enemy contact. of February,

Between

all of the I ARYN Corns units redeployed to attack positions The only significant incident which occurred during

and assembly areas.

this period was an attack by a U.S.

Navy aircraft on the ARVN forward carrier, Killed six, and

elements that destroyed one M113 armored personnel wounded fifty-one AR'NkJ personnel. These were

the first

casualties of LAM

SON 719.
The attack (8-52) into Laos commenced on February 8th with eleven Arc Light targets and to support troop

sorties flown against designated

landing zones.

The 1st ARVN Armored Brigade Task Force advanced nine day. Three battalions of the

kilometers westward along Route 9 the first 3d Regiment, Ist ARVN

Infantry Division air assaulted into LZ's HOTEL and

BLUE.

Two battalions-of the 1st ARYN Airborne Division air assaulted to

and 31, and one ranger battalion was inserted into LZ Ranger

Objectives 30 South.

The ranger

insertion was met with fire from 12.7mm antiaircraft

machineguns, but the insertion was completed. operat;on en gaged

Gunships supporting the

ne,,y forttfied pon.tions rausino secondary explosions U.S, gunships were also busy in the area
-

which lasted over an hour. northwest of LZ 31 where

they engaged enemy armored vehicles in the area of operations.

the first

evidence of enemy armored units day, 105mm howitzer

Also on this 30 and 31.

batteries were airlifted into LZ's HOTEL, heavy rainfall

On February 9th,

precluded any air moves and no On February 10th, a battal ion of the

significant enemy contact was made.

22

ist

ARVN Airborne Division was air assaulted this battalion at 1555 hours. handed in LZ DELTA. ten days,

into A Loul. Also,

The armored TF the Ist

linked up with ARVN Infantry

a battalion of

During the next search,

the ARYN units continued During this period, The

to expand

their

finding numerous caches. the enemy.

ARYN units made inserted

increasing contact with two battalions

Ist ARVN Infantry Division

into LZ's DON and DELTA. Additional forces,

A ranger battal ion air assaulted artillery and supplies were air Ist ARVN

into LZ RANGER NORTH. lifted into A Loui

and other LZ's.

Elements of the 3d Regiment,

Infantry Division and supporting artillery were lifted to fire base HOTEL
Il and LZ GRASS, By February 19th, penetration Battalion in into Laos. pressure increased on the northern flank of the

The enemy

continued attacks against

the 39th Ranger position

the RANGER NORTH area ,w)hile isolating the 21st Ranger On the afternoon of the 20th,

at RANGER SOUTH by fire. aircraft reported Battalion.

reconnaissance 35th

an estimated 400 to 500 enemy troops encircl ing the radio contact with

At 1700 hours,

the 39th Battalion ,,Ja5 lost, the 21st Ranger Battalion the decision to withdraw

Two hundred had fought their way out and reached poit tion. Due to the increasing enemy pressure,

this force from RANGER SOUTH was made and executed on the 25th. With the extraction of RSNGER SOUTH, intense Fire Support Base (L) Resupply and medical The availability of 31 r.

received more frequent evacuation became

and

attacks.

increasingly more

difficult.

helicopter gunships became even more critical. 25th, twenty tanks supported by

At 1520 hours on February Fire Support Base 31

infantry attacked

after an intense artillery

barrage.

Four minutes later the base was

23

overrun.

The commanders of the 3d Airborne

Brigade

and 3d Artillery

Battalion were captured although a number of AR'N losses at Fire Support Base 31 totalltd

troops managed to break out. 155 killed and missing. The

enemy lost an estimated 250 killea and eleven PT--76 and T-34 tank., General Lam, I Corps sARQN) commander, sensed that his attack He, w'as
6P

bogging down and the enemy reaction was growing stronger. made the decision to regain the

therefore,

initiative by orienting on the original forces in the Quang Tri area, the

objective of Tchepone.

By repositioning

Marine brigades were moved forward to occupy Fire Support Base HOTEL and Fire Support Base seize Tchepone. DELTA. The ist ARVN Infantry Division was ordered to the Ist ARVN Division

Between March 3rd and 6th,

completed a series of air assaults toward the town by using the escarpment just south of Route 9. The air assaults were conducted successively Although all into

LZI's LLO , LiZ and SOPHIA UEST.(Z') were occupied landings had When successfully, to be aborted

of these landing 7ones

enemy opposition at LOgo was so strong that twice to allow for additional landed, the preparatory fires,

the Ist Battalion of the

Ist Regiment

insertion had cost The final

eleven helicopters

shot down and forty-four

hit by gunfire.

objective of Tchepone was now within reach. On March 6th, 120 hel icop ters were assembled at Khe Sanh into LZ HOPE, to conduct An

the air assault of two battalions

north of Tchepone.

extensive preparation was conducted by B-52's and various tactical aircraft. Elements of the 2d Squadron 17th Cavalry reconnoitered targets, by fire them to

prepared landing zones and covered into the Khe Sanh area where depart ninety minutes early.

the assault.

An enemy attack

the hel icopters were staged forced This was unimportant

due to the careful

I
24 '

planning and detailed coordination conducted earlier.

By 1343 hours, both

battalions and the regimental command post had landed safely at HOPE. According to General Tolson, "This large combat assault was carried out in what was considered to be the most hostile air defense environment ever encountered in the entire war, yet only one Huey was hit and it made a safe Both battalions immediately attacked In the process these units uncovered and equipment as well as hundreds m

landing in the objective area."(38) south and west, occupying the town.

large caches of rice, weapons,

gas masks,

of enemy dead resulting from the B-52 strikes. Concerned about the deteriorating weather and heavy enemy reinforcements, withdrawal the I Corps (ARVN) Commander decided to execute a timed New enemy forces were Ground forces frequently had

from Laos beginning or March 19th.

executing heavy pressure throughout the area.

to move overland to alternate pick up zones due to the enemy situation. Antiaircraft fires throughout the area became even more intense. The last
'I"

elei',vnts of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division were extracted on March 21st.

"1he lst
24 tI.

lRYN forces departed Laos from Fire Support Base HOTEL on MARCH The initial test of the Vietnamization process had ended.

The balance sheet for LAM SON 71? is difficult to assess accurately. :rncrler to counteract the ARVN incursion, five divisions, armor reiLiment, twelve infantry regiments, the enemy built his forces up to at least two battalions of an Enemy 7.

and at least nineteen antiaircraft battalions.

v.-ssets in personnel were estimated at 20,000 or 50% of the total force i,,'o'j d. Equipment losses included over 5,000 individual weapons; more 1,200 tons o4
-

th&,i 1,500 crew served weapons; 20,000 tons of ammunition;

rice; over ninety tanks; more than 100 artillery and mortar pieces and 422

25
rw.

.................................................................. ,.*.

trucks.

Friendly losses

in personnel

were 215 killed and thirty-eight

missirql -ror the U.S.

forces,

and 1,764 killed plus 689 missing for the ARVN equipment losses to the AR'N force light tanks, included

forces. The most significant eighty-seven combat vehicles, pieces, forces,

fifty-four

ninety-six artillery For the U.S.

thirty-one bulldozers and over the most noteworthy equipment

1,500 radio sets.

losses resulted from flying over

90,000 sorties at a cost of 108 helicopters destroyed. The termination of LAM SON 719 brought mixed results. had been severely curtailed; ended real other in forty-five days. The operation it the

originally designed to last ninety days, that the operation fell short of

Many felt

exploitation which was desired to the west of Tchepone. instances in Vietnam, when the operation his defense

As in many the

in Laos was completed,

enemy was detected re-establishino he had so recently vacated.,39)

in the very base areas which

k7'

."

26
. . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. ..-

DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES DERIVED FROM LAM SON 71?

The immediate significance gained from LAM SON 719 jas the total disruption of activity within Base Area 604 in Laos. all logistic operations in the area ceased. During the operation, benefit was

An additional

derived from this since February and March were usually the most favorable time for resupply prior to the monsoon season. Also, detailed intelligence

was gained regarding the network o4 stations along the Ho Chi Mith Trail. This would increase the effectiveness of air strikes addition, Colonel Palmer points out that, The most far-reaching result of LAM SON 719 was to delay for nearly a year the possibility
of an1

in the future.

In

joiVasiOr

L..

LI..

men and equipment chewed up in the futile effort to wipe out the Southern columns would take Hanoi the remainder of 1971. Saigon had gained still more time to develop and prepare. Vietnamization would not have to face its test that yearA(40) Whatever conclusions were drawn regarding the operation, binds all after a-tion comments, without U.S. support, summaries, reports, one common thread
-

articles and books

specifically airmobile,

the Vietnamese would not have

completed the mission.

The Army aviation units involved had faced the most

intense air defense environment encountered by Army helicopter pilots to date in the war and there were many lessons learned as a result. A key element to the successful employment of aviation assets during LAM

SON 719 was derived from detailed planning and coordination conducted prior to execution of each airmobile operation. Several meetings and briefings were

held daily using the guidance established by the I ARVN Corps Commander. After a review of the previous day's events and the planned operations, 27 he

16
would aporove an allocation for support. then set out to employ the available operations, day. an evening briefing began Both ground and aviation commanders At the conclusion of daily -

assets.

the planning process for the following

4

Aviation batt:alion commanders attended these situation briefings and Upon

-

normally received twertt/-four nours notification of a planned operation. receiving-this concept of operation,

,I

supporting units were notified so that

the designated Air Mission Commander and Ground Commnander could formulate their plans. This planning process was continuous until execution. Although such as

aviation units are extremely flexitle, that used duriny LAM SON 719, their use. insures

a detailed planning process, that maximum benelit

is derived from

The planning of flight routes assumed increased

importance during the

operation as it

continued toward Tchepone.

Routes were selected to capitalize

The-

on friendly positions in the event of bad weather or torced iandin4yi. were also chosen to avoid known enemy positions. continuously varied and changed based on the These routes were situation. The

tactical

selection of routes was normally keyed to recognizable the Xe Pon River valley becoming a natural weather The proper flight altitude was just as critical the intense antiaircraft threat. aircraft safely operated at route,

terrain resulting

in

especially during poor

as route selection due in South Vietnam, Aviators quicKly

to

During most operations

1500 feet above ground level.

learned to adjust this altitude during LAM SON 719. 4,000 and 6,000 feet above ground level were flown

Optimum altitudes between to prevent losses to small

arms and 12.7 mm machine gun fire. This optimum altitude had employed "hugging" did not prove viable in all situations. The enemy

tactics by moving within ten to twenty meters of a

28

" .' "

"

... ".

. "

'.'

"

",

""

"*

"

..

..... "'"

." .

...

'

.. """

'"

-"

"

. .

"~

perimeter

or fr.iendly position. level

The enemyr's proximity exposed

friendly units

to an unacceptable

of risk as they would attempt to employ attack air support. The enemy also gained the advantage As a result, of

helicopters or tactical placing accurate

fires into the

landing zones.

aviators used nap -h.

of the earth or low level positions.

flying techniques as they approached friendly as close to the earth's

This method of flight places the aircraft This flight

surface as possible.

technique would present only a fleeting of an

target to the enemy and also gain surprise by the sucdden appearance

aircraft,
Prior to LAM SON 719, various different sizes and types of aircraft suitable landing areas, coupled with The loose

formations were used.

The lack of large,

the enemy's tactics caused the aviators to adjust their formations. trail formation was widely used during the operation to antiaircraft fires. for security, to reduce used

vulnerability in the past this method

Although tight formations had .een and suppressive

navigation,

fires by door gunners,

increased the possibility of several aircraft being hit during an engagement.

A majority of landing zones throughout or two ship touchdowns. the area were only large enough for one at

The units compensated for this by establishing

least thirty second separation between aircraft or groups of aircraft.

these techniques reduced the possibiiity of a loss of more to a single engagement. A significant amount of planning entered The potential

tAll of

than one aircraft

into the selection of pickup

zones and landing zones. mission,

of hostile fire dictated that every be planned and and fire support. LZ's since their. both ground and

regardless of type,

size or number of aircraft,

executed as a combat operation complete with reconnaissance Aviators preferred going into new LZ's as opposed to 'secure" use of firepower would be unrestricted. During LAM SON 719,

aviation commanders learned that the use of new or not previously

i
.. . . .

29
. . . .. A-

,Ii

used pickup zones enhanced success and created unit was to be extracted, prepare

fewer

casualties.

Whenever a

the ground commander would move to a new location to This reduced the enemy's ability to direct fires

the site for pickup. This concept

into the area.

also worked for landing zones.

The use of B-52

strikes to construct greatly losses.

landing zones as opposed to the use of natura" areas the unit to get on the ground with minimum

increased the ability of

Thorough and detailed reconnaissance was an aviation operations conducted during LAM SON 719. the reconnaissance with extraction. no smaller

integral

component of all

Air cavalry units performed

than a troop size unit for each assault or as much as three or four

These units performed reconnaissanctr The air

days prior to a planned air assault. unit over

aLtudl

cavalry commander directed his information pinpointino the

a wide area

in order to deny the enemy r.Jtes to be used. sites,

ladijig zones or such

During this early reconnaissance. were destroyed by using Air Force passed to the air landing zones, the air Close .

enemy positions, assets.

as antiaircraft

The results of

this continuous

reconnaissance were

mission commander and the ground commander. approach and departure routes, and alternate fires on

Once the primary

areas 'Mere selected,

cavalry unit provided suppressive coordination with commander. the artillery

the day of execution.

and Air Force was conductet reconnaissance, the tactical A change

by the air cavalry

Based on a final informed of for changes.

the ground and air mission if needed, any

L.

commanders were recommendations to LZ SOPHIA, landing of execution

situation and,

such

as this occurred during approach in the

requiring an additional

hour of preparatory fires prior to

the assault elements. of all air assaults.

Air cavalry units played a major role

30

During continue or

the execution ot to break

these air assaults,

the decision whether

to

off the assault,

when friendly forces were confronted by In order to assist in involved in the the

serious enemy contact, making this decision, critical phases of

was very difficult to make.

there was normally a senior commander

the operation.

This alleviated the burden from either to make

air mission commander or the ground commander while in the middle of heavy contact. to the senior commander,

this difficult decision

Both subordinate commanders would make but, ultimately he made the decision.

recommendations

The resumption of a combat which caused the break. were altered,

assault was affected by altering the condition additional alternate firepower was applied, or routes

Often,

and occasionally,

landing zones were used. every mission. A

"The

ability to recover downed crews was integrated.into for every ten troop lift

planning figure of one chase aircraft deveIoped. H1wever,

helicopters was difficult, the

when a mission was considered extremely The best time to rescue

ratio was changed to 1:5, immediately after Finally,

a downed crew proved to be

the aircraft

had gone down and prior to any enemy reaction. in

the demand for armed helicopters during LAM SON 719 resulted

this asset being the limiting factor on when and where missions would be conducted. It was imperative that armed escort be provided not only during The u5C
U

combat assaults but also during single ship missions as well. attack helicopters

T'

in tank engagements placed more demand on these aircraft. implications for the

The results of these engagements would have far ranging future development of airmobility doctrine.(41)

I
-

The results of LAM SON 719 could have been used to forecast unfortunate destiny of the ARVN forces operating without counterparts. However, the

the

their U.S.

implications for Army aviation would be realized

in the near future.,

31

-----------------------------.
. -, ,

_ALI

SECTION IV

POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS

THE WAR'S INFLUENCE ON DOCTRINE

[..

The Vietnam War had a negative impact on the U.S. Army's tactical airmobility doctrine. The Army departed that conflict with a doctrinal manual

which failed to capitalize on the numerous techniques and procedures learned during combat. Its immediate focus turned toward Europe, simultaneously

disregarding the valuable experience gained in a war against an elusive enemy in Indochina. Army aviation focused on the employment of attack helicopters

to the detriment of airmobility doctrine as a whole. Just as it appears that the U.S. Army aviation doctrine writers into the 1967 version

incorporated aviation's early Vietnam combat experience of FM 57-35, This manual,

the opposite seems to be true of the authors of the 1971 edition.

-*1

coincidentally published on the same day that the brave men of

the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) were extracting the last Vietnamese trom Laos, inexpli cabi y uitted . any , of ,athes arc-ar dctz.
n,, ,or

rt

..

rres-ful

air-mobile operation which had been either learned since.

included in the 1967 edition or

Previously published details on reconnaissance had been All of the helpful diagrams and sketches

reduced to a very small paragraph. regarding landing zones,

aircraft formations,

and battle drills were removed.

The annexes with checklists and orders had been replaced by a discussion of the roles of attack helicopters. It is possible that the authors envisioned The highlight of this manual was a

changes to follow throughout the decade.

32

1:i2

chapter added to discuss combat serv!ce operations.

support

incident

to airmobile

Upon withdrawing from Vietnam, global warfare. commitments. For the U.S.

the United States began this meant a return

to reassess

its

Army,

to conventional the Army had Emphasis on

Instead of capturing the valuable

lessons of that war, problems.

to deal with serious manpower,

morale and leadership

basic military operations contributed to the neglect experience. more lethal In 1973, the Middle East War revealed

of the Vietnam

that the next war would be This conflict

than any conflict for which the Army was prepared. the Army's emphasis on the mid to high

accelerated Europe.

intensity battlefield of

The development

of organizations relied on mechanized and armored For Mrmy Aviation, the the lessons of

formations due to their mobility and firepower.(42) attack helicopter would receive all airmobility learned

the attention while

in Vietnam faded like a bad dream.

ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES

During the decade

following

the 1973 Arab Israeli

War,

a myriad oi
-

studies and evaluations were conducted As the Army evdiuated itsel organization community.

to assess the needs oF Army Aviation. improved,_

and worke. d to-ward develop in-i an the European battlefield, for

for a conflict on In 1974,

so did the aviation Structure ot

N

the "Aviation Requirements III) was initiated.

the Combat

the Army III" (ARCSA directed aviation to evaluate in combat

This compreheic~ive

study was of Army 0f course,

and develop requirements for the structure with integration

into the combined arms team. use of attack

primary emphasis was given to the most effective The final report, published in 1977, made several

helicopters. regarding

recommendations

33

attack helicopters

and their need to combat

the Warsaw Pact threat.

AIso,

concept of pooling the divisional

aviation assets under a Combat Aviation iniplemented.(43) as TRADOC Commander, initiated a

Battalion was recommended and later In August 1978, General

Donn A Starry,

study for redesigning the division.. FoLused strictly

itructure of the Army w; th emphasis on the heavy on the NATO environment, the organizational

designs were

targeted for 1986. The flexible

"Target servicing" was the key to mission of aviation forces would be critical to

accomplishment.

nature

destruction of the enemy. come into existence. Europe, had come to

A year

later,

the Air Cavalry Attack Brigade would all geared toward

The results of 4ive different studies, fruition.(44) tests were conducted including TAC E'QAL I to evaluate in 1977,

Numerous other attack helicopters TA,.AL in 1...

the survivability also in

of 1977,

JAWS I and 11

and J-CTCH

, hi ch has been ongoing since 1976. but,

Not only has to air

tank killing been brought to the forefront,

in recent year-s air

combat with helicopters has ,.Iso drawn a lot of attention. Considering all cf the emphasis on attack helicopters, General Harry it
W.6,

is

important to (Ret.)

be reminded of a warning given by Lieutenant

Kinnard

in a 1980 Aviation Diqest article on airmobility, My caution is that we must continue to think of Army Aviation and airmobility as being all inclusite of the five functions of conmbat. If we stress attack helicopters while forgetting their airborne meais of support inherent in tne other four functions of combat, we will never develop the fullI potential of our. attack helicopters and besides we will oerlook the enormous potential of a fully rounded airmobile force.

(45)

34
.

~* P

-..---

-v~.--

CURRENT AIR ASSAULT DOCTRINE

Following publication

of

the 1971 edition

of FM 57-35, for airmobile

it

took the Army The

fully nine years to publish an updated manual current manual, Operations, 1971 FM 90-4, Airmobile

operations.

was published on October 8, 1980.

It

is

an

improvement over the

edition since many details deleted from the previous manual were restored Although it is a comprehensive guide, there still remains much

once again.

room for improvement.

All of the detailed planning and coordination performed during LAM SON

719 receives the attention of one chapter.

of an aipmobile operation operations. - loading,

The manual recognizes four phases

landing, and ground is treated the-

air mo-temant,

The planning considerations for each of these phases

to gts oWn SeLtioI.

The discussion Q- res.ponaibil i'ies falls far short of of just who does what in the

mark ntcessary to provide an underitanding sequence.

Short paragraphs addiess division and then battalion It is time to be include

responsibilities without any regard to the brigade level. specific about tasks to be accomplished the combat aviation brigade. brigade would today. responsibilities. LZM SON 719,
- -of

at each level,

which should

The 101st Aviation Group performed just as a important to include it among the organizationil

It

is

Just as the group planned and allocated resources during today. This chapter also addresses the factor How long does it take to

so will a brigade but it

planning time, plan a battalion

doesn't provide guidelines.

air assault?

How about a company size lift?

Commanders

today do not need specifics; however, The extensive reconnaissance pricr to an assault times, three is

guidel ines are always useful. area At

and preparation of the operational

not adequately addressed anywnere

in the manual.

to four days. of air cavalry reconnaissance was performed during

35

IL>.

LAM SON 719. routes,

Although

the manual

indicates various means i the important use

r selecting 4 air cavalry for this manual -

pickup zones, is

and landing zones,

this task

understated.

In order to provide a better- guide, of air cavalry

needs to thoroughly discuss the employment

in conjunction with

the planning process for an airmobile operation. The selection and designation extensive coverage. discussed terrain, in detail. All of the of flight routes and altitudes receives routes are maximizing are all

important aspects of flight

The lessons of avoiding enemy positions, features

and using recognizable Also,

in the event of poor weather are itemized. "the Oine

addressed. apparent

factors affecting flight altitude in the manual is

inconsistency the

the statement altitude."

that If

greater

the

Threat air defense, all

lower

the flight

this were

true then the earth. to

flights during LAM SON 719 would have been stated in too general a concept.

conducted at nap of This issue is

This factor is

so sensitive

the aviation field that a separate field manual Battlefield Countermeasures survivability. defense Some of and Survivability)

(FM 1-101, Aircraft is used to discuss

the cogent aspects of altitude selection versus air incorporated into the airmobile manual. This would

threat should be

afford the ground commander a better understanding of techniques. The section which has certainly addresses the landing phase is particularly useful of the and

incorporated many previous lessons.

A preponderance

section details the factors necessary for utilization. terrain, Once again,

landing zone selection

and

references are made

to the enemy disposition, the tradeoff ihere is a of

and weather.

The early

lessons of Vietnam regarding are discussed.

landing too near discussion, drills;

or too far from an objective

with accompanying appendix, it

covering

landing formations and hattle to the Vietnam

however,

seems to be dated with respect

36

experience and current practice.

As indicated during LAM SON 719, Today, cruise".

the

formation adopted as the standard was loose trail. aviation units employ a formation called "'tactical the same as loose trail manual

most combat In essence, The current it is

and minimizes aircraft vulnerability.

still refers to various "old style" formations once used but now This needs to be updated to take advantage of a lesson learned and

obsolete.

to coincide with current procedure. Several other aspects of landing zones are not addressed in the manual. There is no discussion regarding the possible need to construct landing zones as occurred during LAM SON 719. U.S. forces will What appears to be a good landing zone to The use of B-52 strikes

also be obvious to the enemy.

provided areas previously not available.

The authors of the manual may have

the jungles of some laudirig

been thinking of the plains of Europe and not underdeveloped nations. Additionally,

the use of smoke to conceal

areas was often used in Vietnam, This may be possible because,

but,

not -fully discussed in today's manual. the capability to

other than artillery or air,

smoke an area by using a helicopter has been lost.

Currently, LIH-60's and

much of the UH-1 fleet do not possess the capability to provide a smoke screen as aircraft once did in Vietnam. Other significant lessons not incorporated in the current rnanual include During much of

the use of liaison officers and breaking off a combat assault. Vietnam, including LAM SON 719,

aviation units sent LN0's to the ground units The use liaison officers l Many operations have been

to insure close, receives

continuous coordination.

inadequate attention in today's manual.

successful due to the efforts of a young lieutenant or warrant officer acting in the capacity of an LNO. Also missing from the manual is the key discussion

of that difficult decision concerning when to break oft an 37

.........................

'-"- :'.'..-'".''.".""'"''""''.%

'-''

. .. ,,"-..

. , " .,..A. -- .

-"'.--' ,'-

-'-'"''. '

-. , "'- .

.- .-'. : -, . -. . --- :,:.'' .

..-

'

-' ."7"

insertion.

This topic certainly deserves outlining since the enemy will

Just the mention of several

rarely cooperate with any planned assault.

methods which may be used to continue an aborted assault will benefit commanders. In general, There it is is fair to state tha, today's manual is adequate but not since and

complete..

an entire chapter devotod to the

threat needlessly

the Army has published a three volume set on threat organization, operations. successful These pages may be better served by citing historical and, perhaps, unsuccessful airmobile operations.

tactics,

examples of

Another in detail a

possibility may be using part of the manual specific air

to completely discuss

assault operation from beginning to end the current manual is beneficial

in a given scenario.

In many ways, interpretation. guide for action,

leaves too much latitude for which Is is it supposed to be a the -

This

for a manual

but only up to a certain point.

not possible that

101st Airmobile

Division could be using techniques which are Division,

totally different

from the 82d Airborne Infantry Division? best tactical should,

and this unit even different from the 2d for the Army divisions? include the

Should not the airmobile doctrine

techniques and procedures +or use by all incorporate the best

The manual

indeed,

techniques and practices,

especially

those which have

been tested in combat. 38

38

CONCLUS I ON

Prior to America's involvement in the Republic o-f Vietnam, the

development deployed of airmobility was still in its early stages. Aviation units

to that war only to experiment with different methods o4 conducting That entire conflict caused a severe stagnation In order to turn of trends and

airmobiles.

ideas toward our commitment around, Europe.

in Europe.

the entire process

complete emphasis has been placed on All of

the mid to high intensity war, of ol the valuable experience f,:-

this occurred to the detriment in Vietnam. All of

gained during the war

the tests and stucies conducted

during the post-Vietnam er; have been formations with specific

geared to mechanized and armored on attack helicopters. The

emphasis for aviation

whole concept of an airmobility to be fostered once again. Sufficient point where

team has been neglected but has the potential

time has passed and all

the wounds have healed enough

to the

a need exists to open

the books to the Vietnam War. in that war are the senior

Many of the

batxalion and brigade commanders Army today. about Thry are

leaders of our

in a position

to educate

the professionals of the Army, There ar the

the successes and failures of

the war and why the>' occurr ed.

many 4,;rums which can be used employment of

to capitalize on their experience with

aviation assets during Vietnam. itself, no on3 can deny that the U.S. Army

As for the Viotnam experience performed all of its tactical

operations extremely well. innovation of that war.

The employment of An infinite nuniber

airmobility was a major

tactical

aof air assault operations wtre conducted and they all serve source of learning for today a.1d the future, LAM SON 719 is

as a valuable only one of

39
2*

S.

-..

....

..

.. -.

,---

.;

i-

".

,"

these,

yet a myriad of lessons may be drawn from a study of in Vietnam contains doctrinal

its

conduct. F

Every operation

lessons which must be studied

today.
simply,

As was pointed out earlier, many people mistake the Vietnam War as)
a low intensity conflict. LAM SON 719 should serve to awaken these
-

individuals to the fact that air defense In environment.

aviators in that war faced an extremely hostile

light of it

the benefits which can

be derived from the Vietnam falls short. A combination

experience,

appears

that the current doctrine intensity focus,

of maintaining a mid to high guide for application combat lessons. It is in

coupled with a very general advantage of important

that setting has not taken important

extremely these

that the current doctrine be as, today's organizational and

updated to incorporate equipment changes.

lessons,

as well

Many years have passed since the Army exited Vietnam, lot has changed. U.S. interests lie

but

in a way,

not a

in many regions of the world today where

the enemy force will

fight

in much

the same manner as the North Vietnamese.

Although many lessons discussed advanced stage of the Army;

in this paper may seem basic considering the in the recent operation in Grenada

one can find

mistakes that were made twelve years ago. Vietnam experience do have application The Army today is eventuality, imperative conflict stated, but

The lessons derived from our

today. least likely, receives much or any unit, As General in the first most dangerous less priority. It is

preparing for the likely conflict

the most

that a Light Infantry Division,

not be committed to a George C. Marshall phases of a war and

to relearn the lessons of the past. "We remain without modern experience

must draw our conclusions from history."(46)

40

'.4-

V.o

I-.

APPENDIX A THE AREA OF OPERATION (EXTRACTED FROM LAM SON 19 Y..MG NGUYEN DUY HINHi)

tk
0 i

LL

iw

VU

Z:

I-

>

141

APPENDIX U.S.

ARMY AVIATION TASK ORGANIZATION FROM MULTIPLE SOURCE.S)

(EXTRACTED

US ARMY
AVIATION UNITS

ARVN
UNITS

III

xx::
10i OT
II S -223 . .. .".-"

:, -

-- 2-17

"

CAB A 4-77

-E"101XX
101

153

XX
\A58X 101 -N

L~~ 101
101
AHB6
II

VN

L-.14 . XX
CAB

II I

__159F_] XX
.A

S HB L
..

:-

14
:-:..

42

D;FD CS U-2--

"N L I

":42

APPEND IX C
ENEMY SITUATION (EXTRACTED FROM FINAL REPORT
-101ST

ABN DIV (AMBL)

--

-J

-J

C-

72

00 CAC

L.3

........................

APPENDIX D
OPERATION PLAN PHASE II

(EXTRACTED

FROM LAM SON 719 BY MG NGUYEN DUY HINH)

CC-

>,0 0 ~0

-J -

.
,-.

440 .. .-... . ..

~
-

N.

/
I Th

"-c,

.(

/,-."

<

I +"+.

"

, \ v/

'

...---.

/"

ENDN OTES

ENONOTES 1. Earl R. McClendon, 1954), p. 3. "The Army Aviation Story," U.S. 1961') :1-2. Army' ,' N. Army Aviation, 1947-1953 (Alabama: Air

University,

2. William K. Kay, Aviation Digest, 7 (June

S. Among the visionaries are Colonel Jay D. Yanderpool, Chief of Combat Developments at the U.S. Army Aviation School, 1956, who pioneered the armed helicopter concept. Also Major General James M. Gavin, Army Staff 6-3, who fostered early ideas of air cavalry and Major General Hamilton H. Howze, Director oi Army Aviation, who conceptualized completely airmobile units. 4. According to FM 1-100, Combat Aviation Operations, an air assault operation is an operation in which assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support), using the firepower, mobility, and total integration of helicopter assets in their ground or air roles, maneuver on the battltfield under the control of the air or ground commander to engage and destroy enemy forces. 5.

C-

@m, (California:

Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise .nd Fall of an American Presidio Press, 1985), n. 368.

6. General Donn A. Starry, "A Tactical Evolution FM 100-5," Miilitary Review, 58 (August 1978) :4. 7. Dave Richard Palmer, Press, 1978) p. 341. Summons of the Trumpet, (California: D.C.: Presidio U.S.

8. John J. Tolson, Airmobility, 1961-1971 Government Printing Office, 1973l , p. 9.

(Washington,

9. LTC Donald F. Harrison, "Developments in Airmobility in the United States Army," U.S. Arm/ Aviation Diqest 15 (Jurpe I6Y) :23. 10. Robert S. (March 1963) :20. 11. 12. 13. Tolson, p. McNarmara, "The Prospects for Army Airrnobility," A 13

24. "Sure Wins I and 2," r 13 (June 1963) :43-47.

Colonel Bryce Denno, Tolson, p. 52.

14. John R. Galvin, Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1969), p. 281. 15. 16. Tolson, Ibid., p. p. 56. 61. 45

'

1k

17.

Galvin, p. Colonel

22?.

18.

Robert S. l'eller,
1969)

"Tactical Airmobility
:7.

is the Answer,"

U.S.

Army Aviation Dioest 15 (Guily 19. Starton, pp. 56-60.

20.

Tolson,

pp.

82-83.
in Vietnam,'

U.S.

21. LTC (RET) Thomas J. Sabiston, "Army Aviation Operation Army Aviation Digest P (January 1963) :15. 22. 23. "olson, Ibid. p. p. 28. 28.

24. 25.

Ibid., Palmer,

pp. pp.

36-37. 280-281.

26. General Nguyen Du>' Hinh, Lam Son 719 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Maliitary Histoir., 1984), p.7. 27. Stan)e;/ Karnow, Vietnam; A History (New YorV.: Penguin Hlooks,

198"'),

p.

610.

29. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a complicated network of trails and roads through the Laotian panhandle and Cambodia ending in numerous regions of South Vietnam. Originally used by the Viet Minh as j communications system i:H their struggle against the French, the North Vietnamese developed this once s,.impie trail into a major- logistical structure. Used by the North to infiltrate large quantit'e of suppliys, equipment, and men, the trail system was improved to include medical, supply and maintenance facilities. The network became so sophisticated that a pipeline was installed to support extensive vehicular movements. 29 AccordIing to sever a sources Lam~" Sn -ll n North YJie!ami ij C the site where Le Loi, an almost legendary Vietnamese folk hero, inflicted a resounding defeat on an invading Chinese Army in 1427. 30. (HO, USARVN, Final Report - Afirmobile 0perations 19,'), vol. in Support rf LAM SON 719 II: p. I-1.

101st Airborne D ivision (Airnmobi le), 31. 32. Ibid., pp. 1-6, 1-7. (ARYN)

The organic units of I

Corps

included;

1st ARUN infantry Division (two regiments with eight battalions and Division Artiflerx) 1st ARVN Ranger Group (three range.' battalions, one battalion) Ist ARYAN Armored Brigade (three ca'.alry squadrnns'.

46

rr-r

zs. .%r.r.

r,

-t

"*

W'" - 7r . . r -. .

- ".-.

-.

"."'.,'"+ . . .. - .

-..

'.Z

''..''

L,.-_

LL . .,

.....-.

10th ARVN Engineer Group 33,

(two

engineer battalions) to XXIV (U.S.) Corps were:

The major units assigned

101st Airborne Division Kirmobile) 11th Brigade, 23d Infantry Division (one infantry battal ion, one cavalry squadron, one artillery battalion) 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) one cavalry squadron, one artillery battalion) 34. Each Cinh Trani had a mix of attached transportation, engineer-, medical, communication, liaison, and antiaircraft battalions. They each had up tc a battalion size infantry forces assigned for security and all other units had a secondary mission to fight as infantry. 35. 36. 101st Fiial Hint, pp. Report, pp. A-15, A-16. -_

36-40.

37. Several sources indicate that Enrg ish names were chosen for objectives, firebases and the like to facilitate communications between ARYN units and the supporting U.S. forces. 38, Tolson, p. 242.

the

39. A majority of the information in the section entitled "The Fight" has been extracted from the 101st Final Report and Hinh-s LAM SON 719.

40.

Palmer,

p. 308.

41. The lessons discussed in the section entitled, "Doctrinal PrinciplesDerived from LAM SON 719" were extracted from the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Final Report. 42. Major Robert A. Doughty, Leavenvworth Papers: The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976 (Ft. Leavenworth, Combat Studies Inctitute, 1979), pp. 40-46.

Ks:

43. Major Carnton L. Hood, "Determining the Optimum Aviat on Organization for the Operational Level of war" (MMAS thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1984), p. 40. 44. Ibid., pp. 42-45.

--

45. LTG (RET) Harry W.O. Kinnard, "Airmobility Revisited," U.S. Army. Aviation Digest 26 (June 1980) :5. Kinnard indicates that the five functioas of combat are: mobility, firepower, logistics, intelligence, and cormmand, control and communications. 46, George C. Marshall, "Pro.;iting by War Experiences," Journal 18 (January 1921) :37, The Infa.ntry

."4?

-9,

,V

-IL-

'9

p.r
r

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Galvin, Jrhn R. LTC (USA). Warfare. New York: Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam:

Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Hawthorne Books, 1969. A History. New York: Penguin Books

1984.
Palmer, Bruce, Jr. Gen. (USA). Military Role in Vietnam. of Kentucky; 1984. The 25-Year War: America's Lexington, Kentucky: The Univeristy

Palmer, Dave Richard. MG (USA). Summons of the Trumpet: Novato, California: Presidio Press; 1978. Stanton, Shelby L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army. Novato, California: Presidio Press; 1965. Student Hood, Papers

Carlton L. MAJ (USA). "Determining the Optimum Aviation Organization for the Operational Level ot War." MHAS Thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas; 1984. Articles

Denno,

Bryce, COL (USA). pp. 43-47.

"Sure Wins I

and 2."

Army.

June,

1963,

Harrison, Donald F., LTC (USA). U.S. United States Army." pp. 20-24. Kay,

"Developments In Airmobility In the June 1969, Army Aviation Digest.

l r

William K. 'The Army Aviation Story." Digest. June 1961, pp. 1-2.

U.S.

Army Aviation

Kellar, Robert S. COL (USA). "Tactical Airmobility is U.S. Army Aviation Digest. July 1969, pp. 2-8.

the Answer."

Kinnard, Harry W.O. LTG (RET). "Airmohility Revisited." Aviation Digest. June-July 1980, pp. 2-5. Marshall, George C. "Profiting by War Experience." Journal. January 1921, pp. 34-37. McNamara, Robert S. "The Prospects March, 1963, p. 20.

U.S.

Armyn

The Infantry

for Army Airmobility."

Army

48

...........................

.........------

4-

".

.'

. .-..

.,.

p1 -.

. -

Sabiston, Thomas J. LTC (RET). "Army Aviation Operation in Vietnam." U.S. Army Aviation Dicest. January, 1963, pp. 14-20. Starry, Donn A. GEN. "A Tactical Evolution-FM 100-5." Review. August 1978, pp. 2-11. Government Reports and Studies Doughty, Robert A. MAJ (USA). Leavenworth Papers: The Evolution of the U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine. 1946-76. Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas; August, 1979. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army LAM SON 719. Hinh, Nguyen Duy MG. Center of Military History; 1964. McClendon, Earl R. Army Aviation, 1947-1953. Documentary Research Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; May, 1954. Tolson, John J. Airmobility. 1961-1971. Vietnam Studies, Washington, D.C.: 1973. Department of the Army U.S. Government Printing Office; Military.

Weinart, Richard P. A Hictory of Army Aviton 1?50 1962 Phase 11: 1955-1962. History Office, Office of the Chief o4 Staff, U.S. Army Trainirng and Doctrine Command: Ft. Monroe, Virginia; November 1976. USARVN Final Report - Air mobile Operations in Support of LAM SON 719. HO, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); 1971. USARVN After Action Report,
Corps; 1971.

K'

Operation LAM SON 719.

HQ, HO,

XXIV
*"

. USARYN..........

OpnPrAt ion LAM SON 719. t;prt

11th Infantry,

23d Infantry Division; 1971. USARVN Operational Report - Lessons Learned. Brigade, 5th In4antry Division; 1971. HO, Ist Infantry

U.S. Army Publications Department of the Army, Field Manual 57-35, Airmobile Operations U.S. Army AG Publication Center; Baltimore, Maryland: Septert]r 1963, Department of the Army, Field Manual 57-35, Airmobile Operations.. U.S. Army AG Publ ication Center; Baltimore, Maryland; March 1967. Department of the Army, Field Manual 57-35, Airmobile Operations U.S. Army AG Publ cation Center: Baltimore, Maryland: March 1971.
ta'

49

I:
7.