Estrada v Desierto GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Ponente : Puno, J. Facts : 1.

In 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Philippines, while Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo was elected Vice-President. The president was accused with corruption, culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor ChavitSingsons accusations that the president received millions of pesos from jueteng lords. 2. The Senate and the House of Representatives began early investigations regarding the accusation, while key socio-political figures like Cardinal Sin, former Presidents Aquino and Ramos, the vice president, senior advisers and cabinet members called on the president to resign, and resigned from their cabinet posts themselves. 3. The impeachment trial began on 7 December 2000, with 21 senator-judges presided over by Chief Justice HilarioDavide. At a point when 11 senator-judges ruled against opening a second envelope of evidence showing the presidents P3.3 billion bank account under the name Jose Velarde, the public prosecutors resigned and a mass demonstration at EDSA began. 4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Rocos motion to postpone the impeachment trial until the House of Representatives resolved the lack of public prosecutors. 5. With the defection of more officials and of the army and police from the Estrada administration, the president attempted to appease public sentiment by announcing a snap election and by allowing the second envelope to be opened. The measures failed, and the calls for resignation strengthened. 6. On 20 January 2001, the president negotiated with representatives of the vicepresident. News broke out that Chief Justice HilarioDavide would administer the oath of presidency to the vice president at EDSA Shrine. Estrada issued two statements - one stating reservations on the constitutionality of Arroyos presidency, and another stating that he is incapable of dispensing his responsibilities as president, thus allowing Arroyo to be the acting president. 7. The Arroyo administration was met with acceptance by the different branches of government, by majority of the public, and by the international community. The impeachment trial was closed, despite sentiments such as those of Senator Defensor- Santiago that the impeachment court had failed to resolve the case, leaving open questions regarding Estradas qualifications to run for other

elected posts. 8. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded to file a series of cases regarding the corruption of Estrada. Estrada filed a motion compelling the Ombudsman to refrain from further proceedings until his term as president was over. He also filed a petition to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent president, temporarily unable to fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an acting president only. 9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform the parties that they did not declare the Office of the President vacant on 20 January 2001, b) to prohibit either party from discussing in public the merits of the case while in its pendency, c) to enjoin the Ombudsman from resolving pending criminal cases against Estrada for 30 days. Issues: I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy. II. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. III. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still president, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution. IV. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity Ruling: I. The petitions present a justiciable controversy because the cases at bar pose legal, and not political, questions. Hence, the cases are within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. Definition of political questions: ...those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. -Former CJ Roberto Concepcion Arroyos government is NOT revolutionary in character, since her oath was taken under the 1987

Constitution. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and the right to assembly. It is intra constitutional in this regard (within the scope of the Constitution). The resignation of Estrada that it caused and the subsequent succession of of Arroyo are subject to judicial review. II. Estrada is NOT a President on leave while Arroyo is Acting President. Under Section 11 Article VII, Estrada says that only Congress has the ultimate authority to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided by said provision. Hence, Arroyo has no power to judge Estradas inability to do his job as President. However, both houses of Congress expressed their recognition and support of Arroyo as the new President, and it is implicitly clear in this recognition that Estradas inability is no longer temporary. Thus, Congress has rejected Estradas claim of inability. Furthermore, Court cannot exercise its judicial power to revise decision of Congress in recognizing Arroyo. To do so would be to transgress principle of separation of powers, since this is a political issue. III. Estrada contends that he has not been convicted in the impeachment case and that he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit.

fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible press. Our judges are smart enough to know the law and to disregard camera drama and off-court evidence. Their exposure to media does not affect their impartiality. LAMBINO V COMELEC GR 174153 25 OCTOBER 2006 Ponente: Justice Carpio DOCTRINE | The Supremacy of the Constitution FACTS 15 FEBRUARY 2006 - The LAMBINO GROUP (Raul Lambino, EricoAumentado, and other groups) gathered signatures to create an initiative petition to change the Constitution. 25 AUGUST 2006 The Lambino group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify their petition. They cited Section 5(b), Section 5(c) and Section 7 of RA 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act) According to the Lambino group, they were able to collect 6,327,952 signatures amounting to 12% of the voting population, and at least 3% of the voters per district. They also claimed that COMELEC registrars verified these signatures. The petition aims to change the 1987 Constitution, specifically, Sections 17 of Article VI (The Legislature), and sections 1-4 of Article VII (The Executive), and seeks to add Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions). The changes sought by the groups petition would change the form of government in the country to unicameral-parliamentary. The Lambino group would have wanted a plebiscite asking the people if they wanted to change the 1987 Constitution, specifically changing government to a unicameral-parliamentary form. 31 AUGUST 2006 COMELEC denied the petition, citing rulings in Santiago v COMELEC and the inadequacy of RA 6735 to amend the Constitution. The Lambino group filed a writ of certiorari and mandamus to compel the COMELEC to

Executive immunity provision of 1973 Constitution was no longer included in the 1986 Constitution. This is in accordance with SC ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. When the president has resigned, then proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him IV. Estrada argued that respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him because of prejudicial publicity on his guilt, and that respondent has also developed bias. In People v Teehankee, Jr. and Larranaga v Court of Appeals it was laid down that the right of an accused to a

grant their petition because a) Santiago is not a binding precedent and b) their petition expresses the will of the sovereign people. Various individuals and parties filed pleadings in support of and against the Lambino groups petition. Among them, the Binay group, the Solicitor- General, former President Estrada, and different political parties. They were called intervenors for the case. 10.Opposing intervenors questioned the following: a. The Lambino groups standing to file the petition The validity of the signature gathering campaign The compliance with the minimum number of signatures for an initiative petition (Section 2 Article XVII of the Constitution) The nature of proposed changes as revisions, and not mere amendments

However, the Constitutional Commission was very clear in their deliberations that any initiative petition must contain the full text of the proposed amendments before being signed by the people. The Lambino group merely submitted a copy of the signatures, which they gathered together with a question on whether or not they agreed to a shift to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government. It is also unclear whether the Lambino group circulated copies of their proposed amendments, but even if they did, Lambino himself testified to circulating only a very limited number of copies. Without the full text of the proposal, the people signing the petition could not have known what Lambino intended to allow Parliament to choose the end of their term, to further amend the Constitution without reason, to discriminate against senators by choosing the Prime Minister from among the House of Representatives, etc. Section 2 only allows peoples initiative to amend the Constitution, and not to revise it. The proposed petition which changes the form of government is a revision of the Constitution, which can only be carried out by the Congress (3/4 vote) or by a Constitutional Convention. A revisit of Santiago v COMELEC is not necessary. a.Regardless of any reversal in the Santiago decision, this petition will still warrant dismissal based on its failure to comply with Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. b.Even if RA 6735 were valid to implement peoples initiatives, these initiatives must first comply with the Constitution before any RA. c.Even if the Lambino group complied with the Constitution, they still violate RA 6735 because their signatories did not sign the petition but were merely attached to the petition signed by the

e. The compliance with RA 6735, limiting initiative petitions to one subject ISSUES Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2 Article XVII of the Constitution regarding amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative; Whether the Supreme Court should visit its ruling in Santiago v COMELEC declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition RULING The petition does not comply with Section 2 Article XVII of the Constitution. Section 2 provides for the amendment of the Constitution through initiative petition by the people.

Lambino group. d.Furthermore, the petition violates RA 6735 that states that petitions submitted to the electorate must contain no more than 1 subject. 3. COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the initiative. a. COMELEC upheld the Supreme Courts ruling in Santiago and PIRMA (Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action) v COMELEC. CONSTI 1 TOPIC: Judicial Review The authority given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing the judicial system of the United States to issue writs of mandamus to public officers appears not to be warranted by the Constitution. February 24, 1803 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 Marbury vs. Madison PONENTE: Marshall, CJ FACTS: The late President of the US, Mr. Adams, nominated applicants, including William Marbury, to the Senate for their consent to be appointed justices of the peace of the District of Columbia Senate advised and consented to the appointments Commissions in due form were signed by the said President appointing them justices and the seal of the US was in due form affixed to the said commissions by the Secretary of State, John Marshall, but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams term as president Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the commission ISSUES: Does Marbury have a right to the commission? Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and 4.

5.

determine whether they are unconstitutional and so valid? Can the Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Art 3 of the Constitution? Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

1. 2. 3.

RULING/HELD + RATIO: 1. Yes, Marbury has a right to the commission. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when President Adams signed the order. The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. This will happen when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. 2. Yes, the law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. When the President of the US appointed him as justice of peace, he already had legal rights to the office for 5 years, which in turn, gave him a right to the commission. And the refusal to deliver is a violation of that right and hence he is entitled to a remedy. 3. Yes, the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and valid It is the duty of the Judicial Department to interpret the law. And if two laws conflict each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary Legislative act, the Constitution and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. 4. No, Congress can not expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Art 3 of the Constitution that states that: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If the Legislature had the discretion to apportion the judicial power between Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, then this section will be entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at

liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance. 5. No, the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writes of mandamus To enable this court to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. Application for write of mandamus was denied and Marbury did not get the commission. NOTES: Writ of Mandamus court order for someone to execute a certain duty Appellate Jurisdiction the power of a court to review and revise a lower courts decision CONSTI 1 TOPIC: Judicial Review The main issue is the legitimacy of the Electoral Commission as the final judge on contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly but with relation to the class topic it is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Key issue: Separation of power JULY 15, 1936 63 PHIL 139 Jose A. Angara vs. Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio C. Mayor PONENTE: Laurel, J. FACTS: Sept. 17, 1935 4 person race for the position of Member of the National Assembly (refers to the legislature of the Commonwealth of the Philippines from 1935 to 1941) for the 1st District of Province of Tayabas Oct. 7, 1935 Jose A. Angara was proclaimed Member-Elect (Losers were Ynsua, Castillo, Mayor) Nov. 15, 1935 Jose A. Angara took his oath of office Dec. 3, 1935 Resolution No. 8 was passed by the National Assemby RESOLUTION CONFIRMING THE PROCEEDINGS OF THOSE MEMBERS WHO ARE NOT AGAINST PROTEST FILED. Resolved: That the proceedings of election of Deputies against those not

been duly submitted a protest before the adoption of this resolution are, for the present, are approved and confirmed. Adopted, December 3, 1935. *From google translate, original in Spanish. December 8, 1935 - Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election Jose A. Angara, being and pushing that Ynsua be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified December 9, 1935 - the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides: The Commission will not consider any protest that is not filed on or before this date. * From google translate, original in Spanish. December 20, 1935 - Jose A. Angara, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period; December 27, 1935 - Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation December 31, 1935 - Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying Angaras "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

ISSUES: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy? 2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance(recognition) of the protest filed against the election of the Angara notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by

resolution of the National Assembly? (*Note: The Electoral Commission was assembled after Resolution 8 was passed ) RULING/HELD + RATIO: 6. Yes, That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. 7. No, We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission prescribe. In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person.

NOTES: Summary of the points in the opinion, its a lengthy read. Just to let you know of the other points that were used. In bold are those that are related to the topic for class. (a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial. (b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. (c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only

constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments. (f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. (h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. (i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitaterei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. ( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. (k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest. (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-

elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. (m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed. Subject: Constitutional Law Topic: Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review Summary: This was a case questioning the constitutionality of the Probation Act that was used by Cu Unjieng as basis for his petition for probation. It tackled whether or not the question of constitutionality was raised properly and whether or not the Probation Act is constitutional based on the conditions stated. November 16, 1937 G.R. No. L-45685 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION Petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, Respondents. LAUREL, J FACTS: The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila, with HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor on October 15, 1931. The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prisioncorreccionalto eight years of prison mayor. (Jan. 8, 1934) Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prison correccionalto seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgments in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were all denied on December 17, 1935. Final judgment was enteredon Dec. 18, 1935. He filed for certiorari to the Supreme Court but got denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial, then remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.

Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. He states he is innocent of the crime; he has no criminal record; and that he would observe good conduct in the future. CFI Manila, Judge Tuason referred Cu Unjiengs application for probation to the Insular Probation Office which recommended DENIAL on June 18, 1937. CFI Manilas seventh branch, Judge Vera, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937. The Private Prosecutor, HSBC, filed an opposition to granting of probation of Cu Unjieng, assailing the constitutionality of the Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful and improper delegation to provincial boards. CFI Manila concurred in the opposition of HSBC except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act. 4221. Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those provinces wherein the probationary officer is granted salary not lower than provincial fiscals by respective provincial boards. In Sept. 14, 1937, the City Fiscal of Manila concurs for the first time with the issues raised by the other petitioner and files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised by HSBC, arguing later on Oct. 6, 1937, that probation is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief Executive. Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based on these three grounds: a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive b. It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power c. It denies the equal protection of the laws HELD/RATIO: 1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts unless properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a

determination of the case, lismota. Constitutionality issues may be raised in prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as they may also be raised in mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings. The general rule states that constitutionality should be raised in the earliest possible opportunity (during proceedings in initial/inferior courts). It may be said that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws, as in this case. The well-settled rule is that the person impugning validity must have personal and substantial interest in the case (i.e. he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement). If Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the People of the Philippines have substantial interest in having it set aside. 2. a. No. There exists a distinction between pardon and probation. Pardoning power is solely within the power of the Executive. Probation has an effect of temporary suspension, and the probationer is still not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts upon him as he remains to be in legal custody for the time being. b. Yes. Section 11 of the Act. 4221 raised a problem. It states that the act shall apply only on provinces that provide salary on probation officers. This gives the administrative board of every province the power to determine for themselves, whether or not to apply the law or not through providing or not providing salary for probation officers. Probation Act does not lay down any definite standards by which the administrative boards may be guided in the exercise of discretionary powers. This therefore becomes a surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. It is unconstitutional. c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, some provinces may choose to adopt the law or not, thus denying the equal protection of laws. It is unconstitutional. Topic: Mootness (topic elaborated in Doctrines/Notes) Pormento, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Estrada, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010 Ponente: Corona (CJ) FACTS Private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected as the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 11, 1998 elections. He sought the same position in the May 10, 2010 elections. In opposition to respondents candidacy, petitioner Evillo C. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification. The petition was denied by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the motion for reconsideration he subsequently filed was denied by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010, a mere three days away from the date of the elections. Private respondent was not elected the second time he vied for the position. ISSUE Whether or not respondent is covered by the ban on the President from any reelection HELD NO. Since respondent only vied for the position and was not elected, there is no justiciable controversy to be decided by the Supreme Court. The ban itself is on reelection, which would mean that a person, once elected for the position, cannot be elected again. The Court denied and dismissed the pettiion. DOCTRINES/NOTES Judicial review can only be rendered if there is an actual ongoing controversy brought before the Court by real parties having adverse interests, which would be considered a justiciable question. Otherwise, the Court will be providing its opinion on a matter in which the issues involved are already academic and dead. Such is not included in the power given to the Court. The Court should exercise judicial restraint in an issue mooted by subsequent events. In this case, the subsequent event is the fact that respondent did not win the elections, which would render the decision of the Court as to the issue at hand useless.

CONSTI LAW 1 Topic: Mootness

February 15, 2008 G.R. No. 177927 Florante S. Quizon, petitioner, vs. Hon. Commission on Elections (2nd Division), Manila, Atty. Arnulfo H. Pioquinto (Election Officer, Antipolo City), and Roberto Villanueva Puno, respondents. Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. ----Facts: Petitioner Quizon and private respondent Puno were congressional candidates for the First District of Antipolo City during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. On April 17, 2007, Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) against Puno, claiming the latter is not a resident of the First District of Antipolo City. Puno was declared the winner and so on June 5, 2007, Quizon filed this Petition for Mandamus alleging that the COMELEC had not rendered a judgment on his previous petition. On July 31, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution, dismissing the instant Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of the COC of respondent Roberto V. Puno because he is a resident of the First District of Antipolo City. The petition for mandamus was thus mooted by aforementioned Resolution. Issue: Whether or not the petition for mandamus holds merit to resolve Quizons pending petition for respondent Punos disqualification Held:

of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act in a certain way. The Court may only compel COMELEC to exercise such discretion and resolve the matter but it may not control the manner of which it will exercise said discretion. A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.

Re. Saturnino V. Bermudez No. L-76180 | October 24, 1986 Quick points: This case seeks to clarify who are the incumbent Pres and VP referred to in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 of the proposed 1986 Constitution. Note that after the February 1986 Snap Elections, Makasiar named Marcos as Pres and Tolentino as VP, while Teehankee named Aquino as Pres and Laurel as VP. The court dismissed the case as a) it is not within their jurisdiction, the petition is in effect a suit against the President and s/he is immune from suits during her incumbency, and b) there is no cause of action, it being in public records and common public knowledge that Aquino and Laurel are the incumbent Pres and VP, and in view of the fact that the Aquino Govt. is THE Philippine Government, de facto and de jure. Context: Post-EDSA I Revolution. The 1986 Constitution has been drafted but has not yet been ratified. The case in the syllabus is under Freedom Constitution. Related Law / Provision(s): Article XVIII, Section 5 of the proposed1986 Constitution: Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extend to noon of June 30, 1992. Facts: Impleading no respondents, and with reference to Article XVIII, Section 5 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, Mr. Bermudez petitioned declaratory relief for the court to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice

NO. Petition DISMISSED. Because a Resolution was already issued by the COMELEC while the petition for mandamus was pending, the instant case was then rendered moot already. The issuance of a writ commanding COMELEC to resolve the petition for disqualification will no longer serve any purpose because there is a decision already. o The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and expedite, not to inquire and adjudicate. Furthermore, the writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty only. When the act sought to be performed involves the exercise

President Arturo M. Tolentino, being referred to under the said section 7 [sic] of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution, refers to. That is, the petitioner asked the court to declare WHO are the incumbent Pres and VP referred to in the aforementioned article. Issue: Whether or not the petition holds in Court Ruling: The Court dismissed the petition based on, a) the Courts lack of Jurisdiction over the matter and 2) lack of cause of action. Lack of Jurisdiction it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. The petition also amounts, in effect, to a suit against the President, when the President, during her incumbency and tenure, is immune from suits or from being brought to court. Lack of cause of action It is a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons. The Court added that in previous cases questioning the legitimacy of the Cory Aquino Government (e.g. Lawyers League vs Pres Aquino), the Court dismissed such cases stating that the legitimacy...is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people...have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Concurring Opinions Melancio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., and Feliciano, J.J. The Supreme Court cannot declare who were the duly elected Pres and VP in the absence of evidence and of a legislature. The petition should be address not to this court but to other departments of government...The certified [election] returns are transmitted to the Legislature which proclaims...who were duly elected... In the absence of a legislature, we [the Court] cannot assume the function of stating, and neither do we have the factual or legal capacity to declare who were elected Pres and VP. No factual and legal capacity as copies of the certified returns...have not been furnished to this Court, nor is there a need to do so.

Cruz, J. Dismissed the petition, seeing no actual conflict of legal rights, as the Constitution we are asked to interpret has not yet been ratified and is therefore not yet effective. Definition of Terms: Declaratory Relief a judges determination of the parties rights under a contract or statute for information (not for any court order). An official declaration of the status of a matter in controversy. De facto by fact De jure by law CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I TOPIC: Standing QUICK SUMMARY/IMPORTANT POINTS and RELATION TO COURSE TOPIC/DOCTRINE: The petitioners of this case questioned the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 because it sets limits for retired elected officials regarding age, pending cases and their eligibility to run. Dumlao is a former governor of Nueva Vizcaya covered by the said provision while Igot and Salapantan are taxpayers who also found the provisions in Batas PambansaBlg. 51, 52 and 53 to be unconstitutional. The SC ruled the provisions to be valid except for prima facie evidence being a factor for judging eligibility. January 22, 1980 No. L-52245 PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT AND ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. (PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.) FACTS Substantive Facts Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya who has filed his certificate of candidacy for Governor in the forth coming elections. He questioned the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 because he felt that it was directed towards his specific case he being 65 years old and a retired elected official who has received payment of the retirement benefits. Igot and Salapantan are taxpayers and voters for the coming elections. They questioned section 4 of the Batas PambansaBlg. 51 regarding a judgment of conviction being final before being an issue for running for office. Procedural Facts o Original action was done at the SC. o There are procedureal

infirmities. Dumlaos petition is alien from Igot and Salapantans petitions. Judicial review follows certain functions but this petition in particular does not meet all. Important DATES and LAWS/ISSUANCES/DECREES BatasangPambansaBlg. 52 section 4 BatasangPambansaBlg. 51 section 1 Art XII-C section 2 of the Constituion ISSUES WON the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 regarding age and retirement limits is unconstitutional WON the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 regarding prima facie evidence being grounds for disqualification is valid RULING/HELD + RATIO The SC declared that the FIRST PARAGRAPH is VALID. 1. Dumlao has not been adversely affected by this paragraph because no case has been filed against him in the COMELEC. The question is posed in the abstract. Igot and Salapantan would have been qualified as the proper party if, as taxpayers, the issue was about appropriation of public funds but it was not. The case was still entertained though because of public interest in the case. 2. The COMELEC has primary jurisdiction over Dumlaos case because section 2 Art. XII-C of the Constitution leaves COMELEC in charge of qualifications of all elected officials. 3. The thought behind the age limit is so that younger blood may be incorporated into the political sphere but retirement in itself may be in question. 4. The provision applies to Dumlao because he is already retired from the same office of which he wishes to run for again. The fact that he changed his mind on the matter is what brought him to this predicament. The SC declared that the SECONDPARAGRAPH is NULL and VOID. 1. There is a constitutional provision that states that the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This paragraph contravenes that because a candidate is disqualified from running only because charges have been filed against him. It condemns before one is truly heard. 2. Time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from proving his innocence since

elections are imminent. NOTES: (OPTIONAL) Equal protection: persons similarly situated are similarly treated [CONSTI 1 | YU | D2017] Date Title Ponente Doctrine FACTS June 16 2009 GR 187883 Lozano (P) vs. Nograles (R) CJ Puno Justiciability

P filed for the nullification of House Resolution 1109 that called for the convening of the members of Congress for the purpose of amending or revising the constitution

ISSUES WoN the Court has justiciable jurisdiction in deciding abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions HELD Petition DISMISSED Does the Court have justiciable jurisdiction in deciding abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions? o NO. While the Courts power of judicial review may be awesome, its scope is limited only to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties with actual legal claims. The Court is in no position to decide on actions yet to be executed. o In the present case, HR 1109 did not adversely injure or prejudice said Ps since the resultant effect of the HR has yet to transpire and therefore could not warrant an intervention from the Court. o Furthermore, Art VIII Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the Courts settle only actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, as governed by the rule of locus standi or the standing to sue. In the present case, Ps locus standi, a necessary requirement for constitutional questions to flourish, has not been proven since: P has yet to demonstrate that he personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because

of the allegedly illegal conduct of govt Ps alleged injury is fairly traceable to challenged action Ps alleged injury may be redressed by the legal remedy of the Court

Sandiganbayan, in both Civil Cases Nos 0033-A and F, subsequently sequestered said shares and items on the basis of the unconstitutionality of PD 755, PD 961, and PD 1468. Hence this petition.

Quotable Quote Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit. (CJ Puno, 2009) [CONSTI 1 | YU | D2017] Date Title Ponente Doctrine FACTS Sept 17 2009 GR No 177857-58 COCOFED (P) v Republic (R) J. Velasco Jr. Justiciability

ISSUES WoN the Sandiganbayan has justiciable jurisdiction to decide in this case WoN the Sandiganbayan has the justiciable right to review the constitutionality of assailed PDs HELD Petition DENIED Does the Sandiganbayan have justiciable jurisdiction to decide in this case? o YES. Jurisdiction of a court over a specific subject matter, as settled in Magay v. Estiadan and Allied Domecq Philippines v Villon, is clearly conferred by law. Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the cause or causes of action as alleged in the complaint. o In the present case, PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975 and EO 14 vests the Sandiganbayan with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, or cases of ill-gotten wealth. Does the Sandiganbayan have the justiciable right to review the constitutionality of assailed PDs? o YES. As settled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, lower courts, while mindful in the fact that the examination of constitutional questions is generally reserved for the Supreme Court, are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the Supreme Court. o In the present case, the Sandiganbayan resolved itself to decide on the issue of constitutionality of the assailed PDs since this is the core of the Ps complaint: that insofar as the coconut levy is concerned, these decrees had been enacted as tools for the acquisition of illgotten wealth for specific favored individuals and where the defense is grounded solely in the very laws the constitutionality of which are being questioned we find more

P filed a civil class action suit in behalf of all coconut farmers for the retrieval of the sequestered shares and assets of said members of P in the UCPB owned by alleged Marcos crony Eduardo Cojuanco Jr. R contends that these shares and assets were sequestered on the basis that said items were illgotten wealth, that these coco levy funds, by its nature, were taxes that should be used for public purposes alone, yet it has been ruled in previous cases that Cojuangco et al used said coco levy funds for their personal gain. Acquisition of said shares and assets were authorized by RA 6260 (1971) that established the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), as subsequently amended by PD 276 (Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund), PD 582 (coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF), PD 755 (Acquisition of Credit bank for Coconut Farmers and distribution of Shares therewith), PD 961 (Codification of Coconut Laws), PD 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code), and LoI 926 (Coco Levy be placed in UCPB). Transactions were handled by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA). After EDSA I, the Aquino administration issued EO 1 (Creation of PCGG), EO 2 (ill-gotten wealth may come in the form of shares of stocks, etc), and EO 14 (Sandiganbayan as the court of exclusive and original jurisdiction over illgotten wealth cases)

reason to resolve this constitutional question at this stage of the proceedings (June 20, 1989). QED: It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case, especially when the case of either one party is anchored on the constitutionality of the assailed statute.

and academic? Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court still promulgated a ruling even though the petitioner had already been freed from detention and excluded from criminal proceedings. Such act is rooted from the symbolic function of the Court to educate its members on the Constitutional guarantees of the Constitution and to rule on cases involving matters or great public importance.

Salonga v. Cruz Pao G.R. No. L-- 59524 Doctrine: Cases involving matters of great public importance or posing important legal questions need not be dismissed even though the same had already become moot and academic. The Supreme Court has the symbolic function of educating (the members of the) bench and (the) bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. Facts: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August to September, 1980. On September 6, 1980, Victor Lovely almost killed himself as a result of the explosion of a bomb in his room. Several pictures showing JovitoSalonga and his wife taken during the party of Cong. Raul Daza were found in his possession. He was charged with subversion and illegal possession of firearms. On Sept. 20, 1980, the younger brother of Victor, Romeo was presented on national TV and stated in an interview that his brother, Victor, went to the petitioners house multiple times and that the day after their 2nd visit, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that the petitioner was linked to the bombings. Minutes after the Oct. 19, 1980 speech of President Marcos, a bomb exploded. Those who were implicated by Lovely were arrested thereafter. The petitioner was placed under hospital arrest and was later transferred to an isolation room at Fort Bonifacio. He was released and allowed to travel for humanitarian reasons on November 1981. Petitioner contends that there is no prima facie evidence that would corroborate the case charged against him. A series of pleadings and motions ensued thereafter. On January 1985, respondent Judge granted the motion of the Fiscal to exclude the petitioner in the subversion case. Such motion would deem the case to be moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court can promulgate a ruling in a case where the subject mater of such had already become moot Javier vs. Commission on Elections

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 TOPIC: SYMBOLIC/MATTERS OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE QUICK SUMMARY/IMPORTANT POINTS and RELATION TO COURSE TOPIC/DOCTRINE: September 22, 1986 144 SCRA 194 EVELIO B. JAVIER petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

(PONENTE: CRUZ, J FACTs Petitioner and Private Respondent were candidates for the BatasangPambansa in Antique (during the May 1984 elections) Petitioner approached the Commission to question the canvass returns of the elections, because of what he called attempts to railroad the private respondents proclamation. His complaints were dismissed and the respondent was proclaimed the winner by the 2nd Division of the Comission. Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court, arguing that the proclamation was void as it should have been made by the Commission en banc and not merely one of its divisions (en banc: term used to indicate that all of the judges on an appeals court panel are participating in a case)

Petitioner was gunned down in broad daylight while the court was still considering his case (dated: February 11. 1986) The Private Respondent has since gone missing, People Power overthrew the Marcos Regime, and the BatasangPambansa was abolished thereby rendering the issues of this case moot and academic Justice Cruz maintains that despite it being moot and academic: Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. (emphasis added), which is why he rejected the motion of the Solicitor General to dismiss the petition. ISSUES 1. Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of proclaiming the private respondent the winner of the election? RULING/HELD + RATIO Sec 3 of Art 12-C of the 1973 Constitution, which was: The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the BatasangPambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision. was interpreted by the Solicitor General to allow the divisions of the Comission to decide preproclamation controversies in this case as said controversy was not a contest at the time. SG describes that a contest should involve contention of both parties for the same office where the one contesting wants not only to oust the intruder but also to be put into office. Commission decides controversies after proclamation SC calls the SGs interpretation irrational and couldnt have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution. Interpreting it this way gives more powers to the division than to the Commission en banc. Constitution clearly intended for the Commission to get full authority for election cases (supported by the 1978 Election Code, Sec 175) Further, the SC defines the term contest as any matter involving the title or claim of the title to an

elective office, made before or after the proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. The purposes of Sec 3 (Art 12C 1973 Consti) could not have been achieved had the Commission been only been able to act en banc after the proclamation (it would have been too late). WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it mood and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution. (emphasis added)

CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINIONS Justices Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano concurred, the later adding Sec 2&3 of Art 12C of the Constitution do not distinguish between pre and post proclamation or the terms cases and contests.

Francisco de Agbayani vs. PNB G.R. No. L23127 29 April 1939 Doctrine: Effects of Declaration of Nullity/Operative Fact Facts: Plaintiff obtained a P450 loan maturing on July 19, 1944 1945, EO No. 32 under President Osmena held a debt moratorium for the next 4 years. 1948, RA 342, extended the debt moratorium for another 8 years which extended the debt moratorium to 1965. In 1953, SC declared that RA 342 is unconstitutional through Ruttervs Esteban. In 1959, the balance amounted to P1,294. In July 13, 1959 PNB filed extra-judicial foreclosure. July 19, 1959, the plaintiff was granted writ of preliminary injunction. The lower court decided favoring De Agbayani from proceeding with an extrajudicial

foreclosure sale. Issues: 1. WoN the statute subsequently declared unconstitutional shall have legal effects Held: 1. Yes, the statute subsequently declared unconstitutional shall have legal effects although only for the period between 1945 to 1953. Ratio: According to the orthodox view, the unconstitutionality of the said act could not be the basis for any legal rights or duties nor can it justify legal acts under it. The orthodox view may also not be realistic. It is an accepted doctrine that prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality, the act must have been in force and complied with. In effect only 8 years has been prescribed from March 10, 1945 to May 18, 1953 when ruling over Rutter vs. Esteban was promulgated.

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of LOI 1465. PPI argues in defense that Fertiphil has no locus standiin the case because it has no personal and substaintial interest nor will it sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. PPI continues by saying that incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company. Issues: 1. WoNFertiphil has locus standito question constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. Held: Petition is denied Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mere procedural technicality. Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or seeking a refund. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil.

Planters Products, Inc. vsFertiphil Corp G.R. No 1660066 14 March 2008 Facts: Planters Products, Inc and Fertiphil Corp are domestic, private corporations providing fertilizers and agricultural products such as pesticides. In 1985, President Marcos, through his legislative powers, issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465. Imposing a levy of P10 per bag of fertilizer until Planers Product, Inc. becomes financially viable. From 1985 to 1986, Fertiphil has remitted an amount of P6, 689, 144 to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority which is the despository of PPI. FPA voluntarily stopped the collection of after the Edsa Revolution. Fertiphil demanded a refund, however, PPI refused. Castro vs. Deloria GR NO 163586 Doctrine: Acts performed under the impression of constitutionality of a law cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of nullity of the law or its interpretation, thus the declaration can only have a prospective application. Facts: Sharon Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC Guimaras for Malversation of Public Funds amounting to 556, 681. 53 pesos. Petitioner pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information. RTC denied the Motion to Quash on March 20,

2001. Petitioner was found guilty by the RTC and again by the CA for the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Issue: 1) Whether or not at the time of filing of the Information (after Uy v. Sandiganbayan) the Ombudsman still had the prosecutorial powers to prosecute the petitioner even though it was laid out in Uy v. Sandiganbayanthat the same shall be limited only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Whether or not the ruling in Uy v. Santiago can be applied in the present case without violating the ex-- post facto law proscription in the Constitution

2)

Held: Petition denied. SC reconsidered its 1999 ruling on March 20, 2001 and held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by regular courts filed or pending at the time when its 1999 ruling was operative on the issue. A judicial interpretation of the law constitutes part of the law as of its passage.