Niel Nino Lim

Proceedings and E-Journal of the 7th AMSAR Conference on Roles of Media during Political Crisis Bangkok, Thailand, 20th
May 2009
The Media Lens in Question: Exploring Class Consciousness in Reporting National Political Crises Niel Nio Lim, MA University of Santo Tomas jcartmire@yahoo.com
Abstract This qualitative exploratory study examines class consciousness as a factor of media bias in reporting national political crises, particularly during EDSA Dos and EDSA Tres in 2001 which exploited the socio-economic divisions of the Post-EDSA1 (1986 onwards) Philippine society and highlighted their differences on viewing governance, democracy and politics. It focuses on these events as an experience of meanings with which People Power, as a means of democratization, is characterized in an era of free and modern media, a factor condition absent in 1986. Both events, particularly in terms of media coverage, reveal that even as media conform to measures of objectivity, it is still prone to identify with a certain set of values or ideals, which during a divisive political crisis may not necessarily resonate with the rest of the public that looks to it as an impartial arbitrator. This reality and its consequences, which remained dismissible until 2001, deepen our understanding and perhaps allow us to resolve the roles media play during national political crises.
Post-EDSA refers to the period following a turning point in Philippine history. EDSA or the 1986 People Power was the first bloodless revolution that overthrew a dictatorship (Ferdinand Marcos government) and served as an inspiration for several demonstrations in Eastern Europe, Africa, South Korea and Thailand.
Proceedings and E-Journal of the 7th AMSAR Conference on Roles of Media during Political Crisis Bangkok, Thailand, 20th May 2009
The Media Lens in Question: Exploring Class Consciousness in Reporting National Political Crises The change in Philippine presidency in 2001 offers much insight into the dynamics of media effects during a national political crisis than any single event in the post-EDSA era. Unlike in past or even more recent cases, such as the numerous scandals which have hounded Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo since 2005, the first five months of 2001 does not simply deal with the more familiar inquiry of mobilization-malaise or the traditional arguments of bias. What it does is cast doubts on the credibility of the medias agenda-setting function itself and exploits the line between being a watchdog and a demagogue. Revisiting and comparing the two consecutive People Power demonstrations which occurred merely within five months, particularly in terms of media coverage, reveals that even as standards of accuracy, balance, fairness and truthfulness are followed as measures of objectivity, journalists and media institutions alike are still prone to identify with a certain set of values or ideals, which during a divisive political crisis may not necessarily resonate with the rest of the public that looks to them as an impartial arbitrator. Preference for these values in turn exposes the paraideological (Gans, 1979) bias of a profession and industry dominated by the educated middle class and owned by the affluent elite. This reality and its consequences, which remained dismissible until 2001, deepen our understanding and perhaps allow us to resolve the roles media should play during national political crises. DIS/COVERING CRISES From when it began on December 7, 2000, television media has covered much of the proceedings of Joseph Estradas impeachment trial in the Senate. Regular programming on the two leading stations was made to accommodate the live coverage of the trial, with several flash reports throughout the day. Radio stations likewise delivered blow-by-blow accounts, most with commentaries against the besieged president. Newspapers, including some tabloids, continued to provide more in-depth reports, but some did so with notably transparent agendas. In fact, when the impeachment complaint was filed in the House of Representatives in October, a tabloid named Pinoy Times (Filipino Times) began a series of special editions committed solely to making sure that the (gambling) scandal would be
reported in full.2 In the same letter to the reader, the tabloids president asked, Will this reach EDSA People Power II? Wait and see3 On January 17, 2001, Estradas impeachment trial was suspended indefinitely after the House prosecutors resigned en masse over the refusal of the senator-judges to open a sealed envelope, purportedly containing incriminating evidence against Estrada, the day before. The Catholic Church, which was instrumental in the 1986 People Power, immediately mobilized its flock to protest at EDSA Shrine, a historic landmark erected in remembrance of the bloodless revolution which overthrew Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship. The next day, similar demonstrations were conducted in several key cities around the country. The crowd swelled4, picketed and partied5 on EDSA from then on until the next two days as Estradas government crumbled. The media covered the frenzy all throughout and referred to the five-day event as EDSA Dos (EDSA Two), taking its name after the 1986 EDSA People Power. Foreign experts, however, criticized what they called a step backwards democracy (Mydans, 2001; Docena 2006), as it appeared that the countrys elite has ganged up on a popularly-elected president who identified with and stood as the mythic hero of the poor. The following months remained politically unstable. Supporters of Estrada, mostly the urban and rural poor, were outraged at what they perceived as an injustice and on April 25, when Estrada was arrested they also began occupying EDSA Shrine in protest. On April 28, Jaime Cardinal Sin appealed once more to the faithful to wear blue shirts to show their outrage at the alleged desecration of the shrine by supporters of Estrada, a remark that drew a line marginalizing the poor stationed at EDSA. While the media likewise covered their demonstrations, it was noticeable that unlike during EDSA Dos, television stations did not cut programming to accommodate the coverage of events and less footage which panned at the gathered crowd were shown. Radio commentators and newspaper columnists were also less sympathetic with the protesters as they were with those in EDSA Dos. The only media
2
Quotation translated in English; the original Filipino text reads para masiguradong kumpleto ang coverage namin tungkol sa iskandalong ito, para na rin sa kaalaman ng aming mambabasa.
Quotation translated in English; the original Filipino text reads Hanggang Edsa People Power II? Kaya? Abangan An alternative translation may read Can we do an EDSA People Power II? Wait and see
4 Many accounts prove that Catholic schools have encouraged (and required) their students to go to EDSA Shrine; these were done systematically and in rotation with others who were also mobilizing their group
Street parties were an attraction during EDSA Dos; several performers entertained the people at EDSA to make them stay in protest at the shrine
outfits which continued to cover the demonstrations live were the cable channel Net 25 and the radio station DZEC, both of which owned by the Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ), a Christian sect supportive of Estrada. But on April 30, both stations went off air without warning or explanation, after agents from Malacaang were sent to the sect leadership. Amid speculations of a coup plot against the new administration, a twist to People Power (Doronila, 2001) occurred on May 1 when the mass gathered at EDSA began marching to Malacaang. About 50,000 Estrada loyalists armed with stones, tear gas, truncheons lead pipes, Molotov bombs and sumpak6 (Cruz in Doronila, 2001) stormed the Palace in an attempt to reinstall Estrada to power. The hostility and threats against journalists and stations accused of bias made it difficult to cover the on-going demonstrations. Protesters harassed several correspondents covering the siege and even turned over an OB van of a television station in anger. Violence lasted for hours but the attempt was unsuccessful and left a number of people injured and dead. While on the one hand the bloody storming of Malacaang appeared to be an orchestrated political response, it also seemed to be an upheaval that had the trappings of a social revolution on the other, but local pundits quickly dismissed what was loosely dubbed as EDSA Tres (EDSA Three) as a mere riot to reinstall a corrupt president. To this day, some even continue to refuse referring to it as EDSA Tres or an act of People Power. ASCETIC, MESSIANIC MIDDLE CLASS The rule of law is essential to a well-functioning society and is indicative that political mechanisms function as they should in context of modern democracies. This ideal is of course challenged when actual conflicts arise, especially when it becomes a national crisis as in the case of Estradas ouster in 2001. But what has been peculiar was how a supposed power grab was rationalized by the collective outpouring of spontaneous energy into the righteous anger of an inherently-revolutionary class (Villegas, 2009; also in Abulad, 2001; Ceniza, 2001; Mercado, 2001; Pasricha, 2001; Rodriguez, 2001). Asian protests have been commonly led by a middle class (Lee, 2002) and while it has been increasingly defined by gaps in educational attainment than in income (Goldthorpe, 1996), middle classness remains problematic. Class politics has since been analyzed using several perspectives such as culture,
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Crudely made guns
social status, structure and organization, and collective interest and consciousness, with particular focus on class crystallization (Landecker, 1963; Fantasia, 1995), but looking at the middle class as a fixed group of people may be misleading (Platt, 1925), particularly when it comes to political views and participation, as in the case of the Philippines where after making the 1986 People Power a success it has remained politically absent until in 2001. What became apparent in EDSA Dos was that the middle class allowed for a particularly democratic vision of values to be espoused which made its boundaries permeable and enabled it to accept members from other classes, so long as they had been imbibed with a set of specific values, the least of which was working and living honestly (Villegas, 2009). To say that the middle class is the locomotive of democratization (Lee, 2002) and at the same time view it as a value-based group suggests that it has become an operative distinction with no disciplined political organization to channel demands resulting to a social construction of a savior class sought after during national political crises to save democracy and allow the possibility of social transformation through their values (Villegas, 2009). When middle class opinion becomes the norm with which the discourse of right and wrong in politics is contextualized, rationalized and accepted or rejected, institutions often modify how they should respond to a crisis with little regard to the larger context with which it should operate. Cases in point were the defection of the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the government at a time when public pressure against Estrada was mounting, both of which citing the middle class sentiment. So even as it would have been an act of treason to defect from the chain of command during other circumstances7, giving in to middle class pressure became reason enough to justify their decision both politically and morally, notwithstanding the resulting EDSA Tres, some three months later. MEDIA VANGUARDISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS While it may be acceptable for certain institutions to divert from the ideal, it poses a problem when the institution in question is the media which is expected to remain objective. As a social arbiter, the public looks to the media for accurate, balanced, fair and truthful information with which they could base their opinion on, making it a journalistic imperative to avoid judgment. The moment media delivers judgment, it marginalizes part of the public
The case was not the same in 2005 and 2006 when members of civil society were courting the military to defect from Macapagal-Arroyo amid an election cheating scandal
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which does not subscribe to its opinion and in theory render them somewhat voiceless. More particularly, in cases of political crisis, a partial media poses as a demagogue which may sway public opinion with its ability to whip up hysterical enthusiasm. The notion that middle classness is value-based suggests that, in situations where the media is mostly composed of educated, middle class journalists, as in the Philippines, reporting may be value-laden, a type of bias that reflects collective class consciousness. Again, in theory, however conscious or unconscious bias may be, it goes against objective, and thus ethical, reporting but Cohen-Almagor (2005) argues that the relationship of facts and values in such context is deficient. Citing moral examples of rather extreme cases, such as rape and terrorism, he contends that there are basic ethical standards that sometimes require normative and biased reporting (Cohen-Almagor, 2005) if only to educate the public between right and wrong (as in rape) and protect the very idea of democracy from which journalism thrives (as in terrorism). He continues that (m)oral journalism will necessitate acknowledgment that objectivity is not an end in itself, that on certain matters objectivity in the sense of prescribing moral neutrality is a false idea (Cohen-Almagor, 2005). Interestingly, this brings to question whether or not class bias, defined as a partial, valueladen perspective which affects news selection and framing, becomes acceptable during national political crises. During the impeachment trial, while the cases against Estrada were bribery and corrupt practices, the media, particularly newspapers and tabloids, gave quite as much attention to his being an adulterer and in the case of many tabloid, his being a college drop out. His questionable lifestyle, such as his taste for luxury and the properties he and his mistresses owned, became the moral angle with which the issues against him were personalized and in many instances exaggerated to magnify his unsuitability as president. Estrada, a popular actor who has since served as a town mayor, a senator and vice president, won by landslide in the 1998 presidential elections despite his lack of college education and known infidelity. Not without political baggage, as early as 1999, Estrada has been heavily criticized for the company he keeps, many of which were Marcos cronies, as well as his unusual work ethic, which starts in the afternoon and goes on until midnight with a drinking spree. When the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism has released its first report on his decadent
midnight cabinet (Moller & Jackson), numerous critical stories against him and his government spurred in mainstream media. Estrada fought back against media outfits critical of his government as he used political pressure to force the closure of The Manila Times, a newspaper then owned by a Taipan8, and with the aid of his connections in business and showbiz, inspired an advertising boycott against The Philippine Daily Inquirer, the leading mass circulation broadsheet (Moller & Jackson; Doronila, 2001). These sent a temporary chilling effect until seven small newspapers published a PCIJ article on his hidden assets on the same day as his State of the Nation Address in July 2000. The reports had little immediate impact but on August 2000 another PCIJ report on Estradas real estate acquisitions made it to television news as the first critical broadcast against him (Moller & Jackson). Despite his attempts to cripple the financial base of media institutions and charm and co-opt them at the same time through his friends in showbiz, exposs continued to snowball (Doronila, 2001). While media should always remain critical of government, it appeared that it was easier for the mass media to demonize Estrada9 than it is to demonize others10 because the image and values he stood for were beyond what was acceptable to a middle class orientation which journalists have. In fact, participants of EDSA Tres have peculiarly cited this class bias during the coverage of his impeachment trial and EDSA Dos as one of the factors that influenced them to join the protests. Gans (1979) argues that if the news includes values, it also contains ideology. That ideology, however, is an aggregate of only partially thought out values which is neither entirely consistent nor well integrated; and since it changes somewhat over time, it is also flexible on some issues. The coherence between this view and Philippine middle classness coincides with the notion of moral journalism (Cohen-Almagor, 2005). Although traditional studies contend that media bias is a function of personal and corporate interest (Chomsky in Peck, 1987 and Cogswell, 1996; Bagdikian, 1990; Entman and Herbst in Bennett & Entman, 2001; Goldberg, 2003; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006), to consider the middle class and the values it represents as an imperative of democratization presents an
8 Filipino-Chinese businessman; Taipan is commonly used to refer to a multi-million Filipino-Chinese businessman who has a big stake in a particular industry 9
Quoted from an interview respondent
The respondent, a media professional, compares the treatment media gave to Estrada during his impeachment trial and EDSA Dos and to Macapagal-Arroyo during the height of an election cheating scandal in 2005 and 2006
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alternative perspective and rather suggests that class bias, particularly during political crises, is vanguard. MIDDLE/MEDIA CLASS BIAS In a survey of EDSA Dos and EDSA Tres participants11, results show that majority of those who had access to newspaper and television reports were highly influenced to join the mass demonstrations and that among different media (newspaper, radio, television and the Internet), television news became the most influential. A qualitative look12, however, reveals different dynamics. In the case of EDSA Dos, participants who were influenced by the media said that they more likely considered news as confirming evidence, citing how the televised impeachment trial already influenced their opinion on the issue. On the other hand, EDSA Tres participants, particularly the lower classes13, said that the skewed coverage of EDSA Dos as against the little and obscured coverage of pro-Erap rallies and the televised arrest of Estrada has antagonized and encouraged them to join the protests. While those who joined EDSA Dos dismissed accusations that Estradas ouster was a result of trial by publicity, EDSA Tres participants were critical of the class bias they observed during the coverage of the political crisis. One participant criticized: In EDSA Dos, channels two and seven14 decided to cut regular programming sacrificing millions of pesos, but there was news blackout during EDSA Tres. This is an example of rich people power. They sacrificed millions of advertising revenues because they decided that those people gathered in EDSA was news and they wanted it everyday. We should carry that and frame it tight shot, the people shouting and chanting, so that it creates an impression that the whole Philippines is against Erap15. The same news value was there in EDSA Tres. Hundreds, thousands of people were in EDSA for a different cause, but they chose to be silent. They didnt interrupt regular programming.16
11 12
Survey conducted from May to September 2006 with a sample of 100 each for EDSA Dos and Tres
Four focus group discussions among EDSA Dos and EDSA Tres participants were conducted from May 2006 to March 2008
13
Focus group participants for each event were divided into two groups as determined by their family income; those who belong to a family earning Php20,000 (US$440+) or less per month were classified as lower class respondents, while those who belong to a family earning Php50,000 (US$1100+) or more per month were classified as middle to upper class
14 15 16
ABS-CBN Channel Two and GMA Channel Seven are the Philippines top two television stations Joseph Estradas screen name as an actor; he later used it as his moniker in politics Responses are edited for presentation, but transcriptions follow the emic tradition
Class bias was also a significant theme that emerged from interview findings.17 The idea of a trial by publicity during EDSA Dos was likewise rejected but most observed that while a convoluted effort from the media to influence public opinion was hard to prove, the priming and framing of issues during the crisis were skewed towards EDSA Dos protesters. One respondent, a media professional, observed that the media was irresponsive during EDSA Tres: Definitely something went wrong after the impeachment trial, because media was unable to really do what it should do, which was to expose what was really happening. Now, why was it unable to do that? First, media owners have biases which affect the coverage. Second, events were moving too fast and in too many places; either focus on the Palace or the demonstrations against Macapagal-Arroyo, but its very difficult to do both, even if you have the biggest network. Then you have to put it all together because youre trying to meet your press deadline or the evening broadcast. And third, even if there were groups who were focusing on what was going on in the Palace and in the opposition camp, they forgot to look at what the people at EDSA were there for. Remember, on EDSA One, we just spent as much time going out in EDSA asking people Why are you here? What are you doing here? I think they didnt do it as much during EDSA Two and they were afraid to do it on EDSA Tres because they might be assaulted. But the question you had at EDSA Two is the same question you have at EDSA Tres. There were all these assumptions that were reported about why EDSA Tres happened or what EDSA Tres was, but not enough on what the people on EDSA Tres actually felt and thats something media should have been doing, because thats what reporters do. You go there, you talk to people. Im a bourgeois columnist but I was at EDSA Tres talking to people, asking them why. I did not see too many of my colleagues doing that. A media analyst criticized: Goodness! Some of the reporters I heard over the radio, during the beginning of EDSA Tres were saying Whats happening there? Were here at the protest site and here are the people... Then the anchor asked, How does it smell there? Thats class bias. Its like youre saying Ah, theyre poor anyway. The announcer actually asked that then they started laughing. You can clearly see the middle class bias, thats why they didnt cover much of EDSA Tres or if they did, they were hostile. They had antipathy towards the protesters. Arguing that media has contributed to the perception that what EDSA Tres participants did was plain criminal behavior, he continued to explain: The media people
17
In-depth interviews were conducted from June 2006 to April 2007; 11 interviewees were selected for their expertise or personal knowledge of the crisis, prominence, willingness and availability
who did investigative coverage of EDSA Dos were middle class and in that sense, I think, they got sucked into a process that was based on a wrong premise that the middle class had the right to remove somebody, who was nevertheless elected by 11 million people. Another respondent, also a media professional, attempted to contextualize: Apparently, even if this country is a poor country, its aspirations are middle class aspirations. We reflect the class biases of the ruling class and Im afraid that media often manifests those biases unintentionally by their choice of stories Our class biases as media people manifest themselves, sometimes in insidious ways. CONCLUSION Philippine post-EDSA media has been more critical of government than at any period in history. Years of stifled press freedom during the Marcos dictatorship resulted to a robust media that soon proved to be no longer a novelty (Coronel, 1999). Along with changes in communication technology (Co, 2001; Celdran, 2005), its explosion was no longer something to marvel at and be thankful for. Instead, a decades enjoyment of the benefits and distractions provided by a rowdy and noisy press brought along a creeping cynicism about the media and their excesses and a foreboding sense that freedom was a curse rather than a blessing (Coronel, 1999). The onslaught of electronic media18 (Co, 2001) likewise made politics heavily reliant on the power of images (Taylor & Saarinen, 1994) and allow modern political populism to thrive (Co, 2001). Results of the Social Weather Stations (SWS) national survey on January 27, a week after the triumph of EDSA 2, showed a turn around support for Macapagal-Arroyo, whose net trust ratings increased 47 points nationwide. Half of the public also believed that she will be better than Estrada, a big surge from only about a fifth (19%) who believed she will be a better president before EDSA 2 (January 6 to 9). But the same results show that only two percent of the whole population personally joined a demonstration in January 2001 and only most of them (83%) were against Estrada; the remaining 17 percent were mobilizing in his defense. Media reports, however, downplayed this. If, as the sole justification for its being, the basis
18
Including mobile phones which have been very instrumental during EDSA Dos (Co, 2001; Pertierra et. al., 2000; Celdran, 2005; Villegas, 2009); this particular medium, however, is deliberately excluded from the study due to its interpersonal nature and the absence of agenda-set mediation
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of the Macapagal-Arroyo presidency lies alone on those who were at EDSA, then it does rest on loose and shifting sands and might tragically open a Pandoras box more potent than the malaise it seeks to address (Vitug in Doronila, 2001). Doubts on the viability of People Power as a political solution is similar and mutually exclusive with the dilemma of valuebased vanguardism in media reportage as highlighted in the 2001 national political crisis. In particular, how should media cover a political crisis that when moralized will lead to consequences that are prone to undermine legal systemic mechanisms19 as well as the sanctity of democratic processes?20 Defining media class bias as vanguard not only makes it acceptable but also necessary, particularly during national political crises when solutions are sought. But left unchecked, this would cause misgivings on the nature of medias agenda-setting function and result to collective distrust and cynicism from the part of the public media continues to marginalize with its espoused values in an era of a mass-mediated public sphere. Case in point is the abhorrence towards media of EDSA Tres participants, whose continuing demand for recognition and a place in history apparently reflects their collective struggle for sociopolitical belongingness. These rough generalizations from the Philippine experience in 2001 suggests a new perspective on objective reporting and a potential research gap on whether a media class bias of any kind is acceptable, necessary and beneficial at any time and in particular during national political crises.
19 20
Such as the aborted impeachment trial of Estrada
Such as the disregard for Estradas popular mandate and the public support he still had, albeit not mobilized, during EDSA Dos
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Proceedings and E-Journal of the 7th AMSAR Conference on Roles of Media during Political Crisis Bangkok, Thailand, 20th

Crudely made guns

Quoted from an interview respondent

Such as the aborted impeachment trial of Estrada

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