Using Foucault to Analyse Ethics in the Practice of Problem Structuring Methods Author(s): J. -R.

Crdoba Source: The Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 57, No. 9 (Sep., 2006), pp. 10271034 Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals on behalf of the Operational Research Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4102317 . Accessed: 09/07/2013 10:41
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Journal of the Operational Research Society (2006) 57, 1027-1034

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Using Foucault to analyse ethics in the practice

of

problem

structuring methods

J-R C6rdoba*
The Business School, University of Hull, Hull, UK methods (PSM) developsin operationalresearch(OR) practice,the issue of As a new generationof problem-structuring ethics needs attention. This paper aims to contribute to examiningethics in the practice of problem structuring.The paper arguesthat PSM could influenceethical reflectionbut the scope of new developmentsis limited, as it is also the scope of ethical codes or norms in OR. Ethics needs to be understoodas a continuous developmentby individualsin relation to existing frameworksand codes. This view of ethics is inspired by Michel Foucault's ideas on power and ethics. Using Foucault's ideas, two main areas of inquiry are suggestedto enhance critical reflectionabout ethics: (a) individualizationof forms of ethics, and (b) possibilitiesand constraintsof ethics in power relations. Using these two areas, practitionersreflecton the ethics of their practice and relate it to their own ethical development. Journalof the Operational ResearchSociety (2006) 57, 1027-1034. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602080 Published online 5 October 2005 critical systems thinking;Foucault; power ethics; problem-structuring methods; self-reflection; Keywords:

Introduction As a young operational research (OR) practitioner, I remember asking an OR expert who visited my home country a few years ago: 'Who takes responsibilityfor the potential consequencesof using systemsmethodologiesin a situation?' To me the answerwas no differentfrom particular what one hears from experts in other managementscience fields:'It is up to those using them to take "good" actions'. My question was about the ethics of using systems methodologiesin practice.Since I asked it, I have furthered my understanding of systems thinking and the use of methodologies and methods to structureproblems. In the realm of critical systems thinking (CST), I have witnessed continuous debates and dialoguesabout how it is that these elements can embed notions of emancipationand improvement. Discussions have focused on debating contributions, which criticallyexamine assumptionsand underpinnings of methods and methodologiesin relation to the context and the circumstancesin which they are used (Jackson, 2000, 2003b; Ulrich, 2003; Mingers, 2005). In this direction, the debate continues about the meaning of 'true' pluralismas presentedby a varietyof authors(Jackson, 1999;Taket and White, 2000; Mingers,2003; Ulrich, 2003). With regard to the current emphasis on pluralistic methodology and multi-method (ology) in PSM development, one question remains.How do people deal withethical issuesin usingPSM? In relationto this question,the purpose
School,University Road,Hull,HU6 7RX,UK. of Hull, Cottingham
E-mail: j.r.cordoba@hull.ac.uk J-R C6rdoba,Centre for Systems Studies, The Business *Correspondence.:

of this paper is twofold: (1) To examine the treatmentof

ethics by developments in problem-structuring methods (PSM). In this examination, a review of debates on the ethics of OR (Gass, 1991, 1994; Taket, 1994a, b; Midgley, 1995) also helps to clarify the possible avenues to follow. (2) To provide a view of ethics that could contribute to critical self-reflection. The view is that of ethics as a continuous development by individuals who use the practice of structuring problems. This development can take place 'between' what is suggested by PSM and what is prescribed by codes or norms of ethics. The view aims at promoting reflection about the ethics that individuals bring and develop when using PSM. For reasons of brevity and clarity, in this paper, the term PSM embraces systems-based methods and methodologies. The paper is divided into the following sections. First, I describe current discussions on ethics in structuring problems from three perspectives: (1) critical systems thinking; (2) ethics in modelling and (3) self-reflection. I describe the treatment of ethics in the first two perspectives as embedding ethics in frameworks and codes but still outside the individuals and their dilemmas. Self-reflection arises as a possibility but it needs further critical thinking. I argue that in self-reflection it is necessary to account for a critical reflection of forms of ethics that influence individuals, and how they, in turn, deal with ethical dilemmas. To explore this possibility in more detail, I refer to the work of Michel Foucault on ethics and define two areas of inquiry for the critical analysis of ethics: (a) forms of individualization of ethics, and (b) possibilities and constraints of ethics in power relations. By doing this, I advocate a perspective on ethics in

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1028 Journal oftheOperational Research Vol. 57,No.9 Society

OR practice as a continuous developmentthat is framed within ethical views of doing and being 'good'. These views are developed when using PSM or following the codes and norms of ethics. Ethics in problem-structuring methods The use of PSM in criticaland informedways has been the subject of developmentsand controversiesin the realm of CST (Flood and Jackson, 1991; Jackson, 1991, 2003b; Midgley, 2000; Mingers, 2001, 2003, 2005; Ulrich, 2003). Currentdebates develop in relation to the 'true' nature of CST. For Ulrich (2003), there are two strandsin CST: one that emphasisescomplementarism or pluralismat the level of methodsand methodologies;anotherthat exploresthe use of the notion of systemsboundaryand boundarycritiqueto supportcriticalthinking.Ulrich advocatesthe second strand as involving 'deep' (and true) pluralism, and not the first strand, which he regards as only promoting methodology choice. Conversely,Jackson (2003b) advocates the first one and prefers to keep pluralism at the level of critically informeduse of methodologiesso that practitionersrespect different methodologies' paradigmatic assumptions and encourage reflectionusing a variety of them. For Mingers (2003), there are other forms of thinking about pluralism that includethe creativedesign of methods,multi-methodology and multi-method developments. He suggests multimethod research and combining methods from different paradigmsundera theoreticalperspectiveof criticalrealism. Midgley (1990, 2000) also develops his own version of pluralism by advocating the combination of different methods to address different research questions in a situation of intervention. This debate on pluralism and criticallyinformed use of methodologies and methods has not reachedan end point. To Maclagan (1989), the debate requires learning and cross fertilizationbetween OR and other disciplineslike ethics and organizational development. A possible way out of this debate could be, as Rosenhead (1994) suggests,a deeperreflectionon the type of clientsthat OR practitionersserve with a view to focusing on those clients who are at a disadvantage. In CST, the notion of 'improvement' (formerly called emancipation)has become central to inform the development and use of methodologies and methods and to guide in their interventions(Flood and Romm, 1996; practitioners Jackson,2003a;Midgley, 1996;Ulrich, 2003). Improvement has been defined as enabling people to develop their full potential as human beings and addressing constraints (includingthose relatedto power) that inhibit this development (Midgley, 1996).Although definedin differentways in can be seen as a common CST (Munro, 1997),improvement goal to be achievedby OR practitioners. Improvementas an ethical stance has been reviewedand advanced from differentperspectivesbecause of its underpinnings on Habermas'work and more specificallyon his

communicative ethics (Munro, 1997; Taket, 1994b; Willmott, 1997). For Habermas, it is only through collective dialogue that improvements in society can be defined (Habermas,1984).One of the main criticismsto this is that it is assumed that people are somehow 'waiting' to be emancipated (Brocklesbyand Cummings, 1996), and that seeking improvements requires establishing upfront ideal situations of dialogue between parties (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996; Jackson, 2000; Taket, 1994b). To this, it has been argued that considerationof the power relationsthat affect dialogue should be part of critical thinking in OR practice (Brocklesbyand Cummings, 1996; Midgley, 1997; Taket, 1994b). This has led practitioners to use Michel Foucault's ideas to underpinfurtherdevelopments. Using Foucault's ideas on knowledge and power, Flood (1990) and Midgley (1997) developed frameworks for systemic intervention based on the existence of power relations that influence decision making. Flood (1990) suggests that knowledge can be elicited to help people to define their own emancipation and to remove barriers towards it. Midgley (1997) relates power relations to judgements about systems (boundary judgements). For him, the nature of improvement is better defined as temporary and local. Identification and exploration of power formations enables people to see different ethical stances taken and define improvementsin considerationof power. Midgley'sframeworkinvolves three phases:critique (identificationof boundaries),judgement (reflectionon the values that supportboundaries)and action. This framework
'...simply gives people more scope to judge who they are,

what situation they are in, and how they should act' (Midgley, 1997, p 283). Flood and Romm (1996) go further on questioningthe ethics of improvement.In intervention using systems methodologies,in the definition of improvements they suggest that people ask questions like 'Are we doing the right things?Are we doing things right?'so that ethical reflectioncan take place. These frameworksconsider that once issuesof power and ethics are identified,people are able to discernand act accordingly.C6rdoba (2002) argues that reflection on systems boundaries should also include ethics as a source continuous reflectionon the practitioners' of criticalthinking. In all the above alternatives, how individuals think critically about dealing with potential ethical dilemmas remains unexplored. More needs to be said about how individuals reflect on their ethics and how frameworksof systemsmethodologiesand methods influencethis reflection. In this regard,Jackson (2000) makes this possibilityexplicit when he reviewsan earlymeta-methodological development to facilitate intervention or methodology TSI) (total systems choice, accordingto the nature of the methodology and the context of application: thatmoreneedsto be andI wouldagree, Others wouldinsist, of usingTSI,andaboutthe roleof saidto clarify theprocess

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J-R foucault toanalyse ethics 1029 C6rdoba-Using

andtheethical commitments thatshebrings to the the 'agent' intervention (p 393). This indicates that there is a need to reflect on how individualsdeal with ethical issues by consideringtheir own ethics and the ethical commitmentsthat frameworksoffer them.

tioners-as Mason (1994) suggests-try to fit their values with those of their clients previouslyto the model-building process. At some stage of this process, for instance, practitionersmight discover that they do not agree with what a client wants to achieve. With regard to the appearance of ethical dilemmas, Gass (1991) advocates
following ethical codes and standards of good practice. These

Ethics in modelling In a wider context of OR practice,debates on the issue of ethics have taken place about the use of OR methods and techniquesto modelling (Gass, 1991, 1994; Midgley, 1995; Taket, 1994a,b). Models provideinsightson what decisionmakers need to do with a view to providing insights (descriptive or prescriptive) about the situation being modelled. The impacts of models in decision and policy making generateethicalissues that those buildingmodels or using them should take into account. As Wallace (1994) argues, there is concern that 'large numbersof non-experts of use sophisticatedmodels with little or no understanding the process behind them--the assumptions, simplifications and world-viewthat go into the making of the model' (p 3). This and other considerationsprompt questions about the professional responsibility that modellers should assume with their clients, the results of their models and the potential impacts of models to different groups of stakeholders. According to Gass (1987, 1991), considering issues of professionalism and ethics in OR modelling should lead practitionersto conceive modelling activities as processes that need to be managedadequately.This means takinginto considerationethical implicationsof activitieslike gathering data and information about a situation, constructing a model with relevantstructures and parameters, and presenting models to clients. Additionally, ethical considerations should be taken into account in the use of models by decision-makersas Bradley and Schaefer (1998) propose. Professional practice in modelling generates a series of internalnorms to follow in the process(ie having alternative ways of modelling,working with accuratedata, documenttheirmodels to evaluationby peers), ing activities,subjecting as also external norms. The latter refer to keeping communicationas open and clear as possible with clients throughout the stages of modelling, striving to reflect the situation and the clients' values as clearly as possible and working with honesty, truthfulnessand respect for other people (Gass, 1991; Mason, 1994; Bradley and Schaefer, 1998). Other considerationsof ethical practice refer to the need for keeping'politicalinterference' or misusesof models for differentpurposes other than the originalones 'outside' the modellingactivity(Wallace,1994;Bradleyand Schaefer, 1998). The integration of values into models could present dilemmas for practitionersbuilding them, even if practi-

should ensure that models are built and used appropriately and that the activity of modelling satisfies clients' requirements. Codes contain a seriesof principlesand norms to follow. For example, they stipulate for example that '...the [OR] analyst's biases are not embedded in the results [of the models]' (Gass, 1991, p 11), (bracketsadded). Codes and standards can also encourage practitionersto stop their activity if their values do not fit with those of clients. Nevertheless, this does not sit well with emphasis on accuracy, objectivity and reliability of models. Managing both demandsfor objectivityand integrationof valuescould contributeto createmore tensionsratherthan solving them; in dealingwith ethical in otherwords, to infusecontradiction dilemmas (Maclagan, 1989). As with frameworks and methodologies that embed ethical commitmentsrelated to improvement and pluralism, the use of codes leaves unexplored the issue of how individualsidentify and deal with ethical dilemmas. This can be important also when practitioners consider that frameworks or codes do not apply to their own ethics or the situationat hand.

Ethics and self-reflection It can be arguedthat frameworks for the criticaluse of PSM on codes embed 'ideal'forms of encouragereflecting action; behaviourof practitioners. How to transformreflectioninto action is left to practitioners'judgements. In 'between' applying PSM or following codes or norms of practice, people can have dilemmas about situations and about themselves. They can experiencetensions and conflicts in relation to how to proceed. If I myself am an OR how do I deal with not feeling sure about what practitioner, a PSM tells me to do or what a code prescribes? What if I have other views?How can I be criticalabout myself? In this regard,Taket (1994b)suggeststhat the practiceof OR embeds continuous ethical decisions that cannot be ascribed to frameworksor codes but to the practitioners themselves. Taket reflects on her own practice where, for instance, in order to benefit her clients, she adopted a differentethical behaviourto that prescribedby OR codes. In these situations,Taketfollowedher own ethicalprinciples and intuition and used power available to her as an OR expert. For Taket, codes and norms that are prescriptive about 'what to do' are doomed to fail. Nevertheless,codes and norms could help practitioners to identifyand deal with ethical dilemmas.

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1030 Journal oftheOperational Research Vol. 9 57,No. Society

Instead of ascribingethical responsibilityto frameworks and codes, Taket (1994b) suggests that people should continuously exercise self-reflectionabout ethics. Practitioners should continuouslyask themselvesquestionsabout theirdecisionsand the implicationsthat these could have for people involved. Practitioners should acknowledge their in the processesthat they are facilitating.The non-neutrality role of personaljudgementhere is very important,as Bowen (1981)also suggests.It is essentialthatjudgementbecomesa sourceof influencenot only to practitioners but also to their clients and in dealingwith potential conflictsbetweenthem. Self-reflectioninvolves a deeper introspectionabout one's own values, as Mason (1994) describesit. Additionally, as Maclagan (1989) points out, ethical reflection requires considering the diversity of values and conflicts in the context of intervention. With self-reflection, Taket (1994b) puts forward a valuable way of conducting ethical self-reflectionso that individuals can continuously deal with ethical dilemmas themselves. Self-reflectioncan be seen as a 'capacity' of individuals.As such, it requiressome degreeof expertise:to be continuously ethicallyaware,with capabilitiesto reflecton ethics and power. Taket (1994b,p 130)suggeststhat 'At any point where a dilemma arises...I, myself, as an active (be it undercoveror out in the open) agent must evaluate and weigh up alternativeactions in each particularcontext. This necessitates forming a view on power relations in particular'. The capacity of self-reflectionthat Taket proposes and Midgley (1995) and Gregory (1992, 2000) extend further entails practitioners to be able to raise (individuallyor with others)ethicalissues and to deal with them. Gregory(2000) suggestsindividualand collectiveprocessesof self-reflection and criticalappreciationto guide ethicaldebate. Expertiseis requiredto use appropriatemethods to gather information to reflect on (ie knowledge or willingnessto apply or use and hermeneutic techniques).When ethical psychoanalytical dilemmas arise, Gregory (1992) suggests that 'the force of the better argument' should inform discussions. In Taket and Gregory'sviews, however,it is assumedthat the system individuals being intervenedis composed by self-reflective who have a fair (if not reasonablytotal) degreeof freedomto choose the goals they wish to pursue (Munro, 1997). What needs to be fully addressed in self-reflection is how practitioners are able to identify and deal with ethical dilemmas;how they can manage tensionswhen dealingwith such dilemmas;and how they can reflecton their own views in case they contradictexisting PSM, frameworksor codes. Self-reflectionas a capacity should itself be subjected to critical review as a form of developing particularforms of ethics at the expense of others. To suggest a way forward for self-reflectionon ethics, MichelFoucault'sideas on powerand ethicsare presentedin the next section.

Foucault on power and ethics Developmentsof criticalapproachesto the use of PSM have includedFoucault'sideas on power (Flood, 1990;Brocklesby and Cummings,1996;Valero-Silva,1996),and the notion of power has been used as an aide whose use unveils possibilitiesand constraintsfor action (Munro, 1997;Taket, 1994b;Taket and White, 1994). When comparingFoucault to Habermas' ideas, Brocklesby and Cummings (1996) suggest that Foucault'swork can underpincriticalthinking as follows: Criticalthinking[informed by Foucault'sideas] is about for oneself about how these'unnatural' thinking categories shouldbe frameworks, [models, theories] shapeourselves...it about encouraging individualsto question any set of about freeingthemselves to use frameworks in categories, theirownwaysdepending on theirownreason andtheirown circumstances... (p 747,brackets added). An alternative slant on Foucault'swork that highlightshis ideas on ethics can supportindividuals'self-reflection in the use of PSM and in dealing with ethical dilemmas. As Foucault himself declares, his researchproject could sound to some as an incoherentcollection of essays, books and interviews(Foucault, 1980). This is part of Foucault's purpose to analyse in varied ways the issue of the subject (Foucault, 1980, 1982b), and the ways in which we have become the subjectsthat we are. The question of the subject for Foucault is central, even more than the question of power in society. For Foucault, the meaning of subject is twofold: 'someone subject to someone else by control and dependence,and tied to his own identity by a conscienceor self-knowledge' (Foucault, 1982a, p 212). Both meaningsin the above definition suggest a form of power, which subjugatesand makes one subjectto it (Foucault, 1982a). Foucault describesin his analysis how individualshave been constituted as subjects of knowledge, and how the quest for knowledge(will to know) in Westernsocietieshas transcendedinto 'a will to truth' (Foucault, 1984b). He is interested to see how the relationshipsbetween these two wills evolve; in other words, how individuals themselves become subjects of knowledge and ethics. To trace these connections, he uses the notion of power. Foucault's work goes through different stages, and his of power is dynamic.He claims that power is understanding elusive, thereforeneedinga varietyof strategiesto analyseit (Foucault, 1980, 1982a, 1984b).A general feature of power is that it inducesactionsoverotheractions(Foucault, 1984a). Power is not only disciplineor a form of overt coercion. It can take many forms that continuously unfold, support, cancel or resist each other. Power is always alreadypresent (Brocklesby and Cummings, 1996). Its operation is associated with forms of knowing and acting. In analysing power, knowledge and ethics also need to be analysed (Foucault, 1982b).

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J-R foucault toanalyse ethics 1031 C6rdoba-Using

Power produces asymmetricrelations between people. It seduces, invites but also subjugatesand constrains. Resistance to power is a form of power itself, as it shows where the next actions against it are located, or where they are going to develop (Burrell, 1988; Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994;Brocklesbyand Cummings, 1996). Foucault does not advocate a total resistanceor liberation from power. For him this is impossible. Instead, he acknowledges the importance of power to regulate social relations between people in society (Foucault, 1984a).He would regardpower as an aide for individuals,which enablesthem to assess their options for action, denounce and act upon situations of domination (Foucault, 1984a), where individuals have no possibilitiesof exertingtheir freedomor where this freedom is threatened. In his later historical analyses of sexuality, Foucault how it is that (1984b)uses the notion of powerto understand there are a variety of ways of dealing with ethics, how individualsand their thinkingbecome an ethical and moral domain. He identifiesa variety of forms of ethics that have been deployed through history in relation to the 'will to know' of individualsabout themselves.He says about his latter work (Foucault, 1984c,p 387): In the case of sexuality, it was the development of a moral attitude thatI wanted to isolate; but I triedto reconstruct it the play that it engaged in withpolitical structures through in the relation between self-control and domina(essentially tion of others), and with the modalities of knowledge (selfandknowledge of different areasof activity). knowledge The series of Foucault's analyses of sexuality (Foucault, 1977, 1982b, 1984b,e, 1985) focus on how individuals develop their own relationshipswith themselvesin relation to prescribedmoral codes, rules of conduct and principles. In this respect, a complementary view emerges to use Foucault in the analysis of ethics when using PSM. As Brocklesbyand Cummings(1996) suggest, Foucault's ideas support individuals in deciding how to best use codes, methodologiesor frameworksto develop strategicpositions in relation to power relationsin a situation.This can apply to self-reflection, as Taket (1994b)advocates.However,here Foucault is also suggestingreflectingon individualethics as a source of critiqueand action. He says: is more.Fora ruleof (ethical) conduct is onething; 'There the conductthat may be measured But by this ruleis another. another in whichone oughtto form thingstillis themanner oneself as an ethical subjectacting in reference to the elementsthat make up the code' (Foucault, prescriptive 1984b, p 26) (parenthesis added). With this, Foucault sets individualson a quest of ethical developmentthat is not fixed or dependenton existingforms of ethics, but is dynamicand continuouslyevolving instead. He argues that ethics is a work of art (Foucault, 1984e), where subjects (individual, collective) explore different possibilitiesof being by experimentingwhile being in their

present condition(s). In other words, individuals develop their ethics abiding to existing elements that influence it, while imaginingnew ways of being ethical. This requiresa continuous revision and modification of what one is and what one thinks (Foucault, 1984d); in other words, a continuousrevisionof the limits of ethicalsystemsthat bind individualsto act. The above has three main implicationsfor practitioners concernedwith ethics in the use of PSM. First, it means that to apparently limited options to behave ethically (ie by or code), there followingthe principlesof a PSM, framework is scope to create or re-createways of being and acting, as well of developing new forms of relations between individuals. Second, there is encouragementto transformreflection (or self-reflection) on ethicsin a processof individualor collective development. The proposed quest is not about our true 'selves',as Foucault (1984e) clarifies. rediscovering Neither is this an invitationto adopt ancientforms of ethics (eg Greek) (Foucault, 1982b).Instead, it is an invitationto imagine and experimentwith new possibilitiesof action in our own present time (Foucault, 1984e) in relation to existing power conditions that influence our actions. Foucault is also saying that it is possible for individualsto have their own ethical purposesin action. Third, Foucault is suggestingthat to develop ethics, there is space to manoeuvre in 'between' existing forms and discourses. Individuals can examine these elements and decide how to use them to their own advantage, and use power associated with them in a positive way (Midgley, 1995).These forms include,for instance,PSM, frameworks, methodologies,codes or norms.Extendingan understanding of self-reflection with the above leadsone to arguethat in the face of power relations,thereare forms of adoptingethically acceptable ways of proceeding,which individualscan follow (consciously,unconsciously),or of doing otherwise.Individuals can use these forms as they see fit as Brocklesbyand Cummings(1996) suggest,but also with a view of developing them according to what is considered appropriate for themselvesand others.

Ethical analysis: forms of individualizationand possibilities and constraints in relation to power Having highlighted the relevance of Foucault's ideas to ethicalself-reflection, in this sectiontwo areas of inquiryare definedto complementreflectionon ethicsin the use of PSM or codes of ethics in OR. It is reasonableto argue that Foucault's ideas on ethics invite practitionersto recognize the implications that any PSM, framework, code or personal principle has for the individualethics of those involvedin a situation.In the light of power relations, some of these influencescan be traced and reflectedupon. These elementscan be seen as defining not only what is to be 'known'about ethics in orderto take

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1032 Journal oftheOperational Vol. Research 9 57, No. Society

ethically grounded decisions. Such elements influence the ethical behaviour of people, what we are allowed or disallowedto be or do, and thereforewhatwe are. Methods or frameworks(including those on self-reflection)can be seen as embedding debates on ethics and with them developingparticularforms of dealing with it, even if they providespaces for individualfreedomand choice (Foucault, 1982a). Drawing on Foucault's ideas on ethics and power, the following are two areas of inquiry that practitionerscan on ethics: explore to extend self-reflection
(a) Individualization of ethics as a source of critique.

Foucault suggests analysing ethics and power in modern in society by looking at differentforms of individualization which people are given possibilities for choice under the guise of 'freedom'or 'individualchoice' (Foucault, 1982a). These forms should be subjectedto critique.In the practice of PSM, individualization can be understoodas the offering to individualsof possibilitiesto reflecton ethics. Individualization can take many forms: frameworks to deal with ethical issues, guidelines,codes, and sets of guidelines,selfreflection-and even this paper! Analysis of individualization of forms of ethics should be directedat looking at forms in which individualsare encouragedto adopt forms of being ethical. This could be encouragedvia PSM, but also via the adoption of codes, norms, frameworks,practices or roles. Analysis should also include situationswherepeople debate about, resist or conflictwith these forms (Foucault, 1982a). In this regard,two key questions to addressin this analysis are as follows: * What forms of being ethical are privilegedor resistedto influenceethical behaviour? * How are they privilegedor resisted? In supportingthis inquiry,Foucault's(1984b)exploration of ethics offers the following elementsfor analysisfor forms of being ethical or behavingethically:
(1) The determination of the ethical substance. The way in

As an exampleof how ethicalformscan be analysed,let us supposethat in the practiceof PSM, it has become an ethical 'norm' to be confidential about the information received from clients by analysts. Maintaining confidentiality of information binds OR analysts to behave ethically. Concan be seen as a 'substance'(point 1 above) about fidentiality which ethical behaviouris expected. Practitionerscan then adhere to codes, regulationsand norms that make explicit how they should exert this confidentiality (modes of subjection, point 2). They can devise different ways of complyingwith these norms in their work: for example, by not showing resultsof interviewsto other analysts,protecting electronicfiles associatedwith these, signing and getting agreements of confidentiality(point 3). Finally (point 4), they can do so in orderto become ethicallyawareanalyststhe type of individuals they want to be (good OR professionals).This type of analysiscan be applied to other issues that arisein the use of PSM but with regardto which there is conflict about their status as 'ethical'. offersOR analystspossibilities Adheringto confidentiality of action (ie exploring further issues with clients in confidentiality),as well as constraints (not being able to reveal information to third parties). Further analyses of these possibilitiesand constraintsin relation to ethics as a process of developmentare needed as follows.
(b) Possibilities and constraints in relation to power. Having

identifiedforms of ethics that influenceethical judgement, analysis of what is possible to be or do follows. It is importantto become aware of dominantand non-dominant forms of ethics that influenceethical decisions in order to decide how to support, resist or act in relation to them. Following Foucault, practitionersand those involved in a situation can still follow, obey and reason as much as they like (Foucault, 1984e), and influence ethics while acting within what is permitted.This means acknowledgingwhat is possible to do within these accepted practices, whilst exploringconditions that make it possible for people to be able to reflect on ethics. A key question to facilitate the design of strategiesto develop people's ethics is: How can we
develop the ethical subjects we want to be?

which individualshave to constituteparts of themselves as the prime material of their moral conduct. These aspects of thought and behaviourconstitute subjectsof criticalreflection.
(2) The mode(s) of subjection. The way(s) in which

individuals establish relations to rules and recognize themselvesas obliged to put them in practice.These can be seen in explicit adherences to principles, norms, codes, in the acceptanceand subordinationto them. (3) The ethicalwork. This involves differentforms of doing work on oneself and relationsto others to comply with rules. Individualsmight have differentways of working on themselves. (4) The telos. This is the type of ethical subjectsthat people aspireto be.

In answeringthe above question, it is essentialto analyse power relationsthat enable influentialforms of ethics to be accepted. Foucault's genealogicalmethods can help in this the widercontext of relationsin which respectto understand such forms have been deployed. Genealogy explores the context of knowledgein termsof social practicesthat sustain it via power relations.The aim of a genealogy of forms of ethics would be to describethe conditions of emergenceof the presentforms of ethics and their connectionswith wider social practices.Analysis would enable individualsto assess what can be contingent to a situation in relation to ethics; what can be changed, and what can be followed in relation to power. Kendall and Wickham (1999) offer a detailed explanationof the use of Foucault'sgenealogythat could be In the realmof CST, Valero-Silva employedby practitioners.

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to analyse ethics 1033 J-RC6rdoba-Using foucault

(1996) and Vega-Romero (1999) provide genealogical analyses of knowledge practices which could help in analysing how ethics has been dealt with and what could be done about it. In the above example, an analysis of power relations associated with confidentiality can yield insights as to how it came to be accepted as 'ethical'. To the identification of some of these power relations (ie decision-makers endorsing confidentiality to protect their views; pressures from professional bodies, etc), OR practitioners can devise power strategies to develop their own ethics. If, for example, they find it ethical to facilitate inclusion of marginalized groups, they could decide to voice the interests of these groups while still respecting confidentiality norms (ie not mentioning specific names). They could also use their power as OR experts (Taket, 1994b) to work with these groups and find favourable positions for them within confidentiality norms while they advocate further developments of such norms (ie some degree of flexibility). The definition of strategies will depend on what OR practitioners consider ethical to be and what is possible to do. The interaction between these two areas of inquiry and their relation to existing PSM, approaches and codes can be seen in the following Figure 1. The two areas of inquiry (individualization, possibilities and constraints) constitute forms of critical thinking that operate in relation to existing forms of dealing with ethical issues (PSM, critical frameworks, codes of ethics). These areas can be developed iteratively and their use does not have to be sequential. In an intervention situation, PSM, frameworks, codes and self-reflection can be seen as framing but not limiting self-reflection on ethics. Self-reflection on ethics will aim at relating potential dilemmas or tensions among forms of ethics at interplay and exploring their associated power relations. With this identification, individuals should be more able to assess how they can develop

their own ethics in relation to power relations and the constraints and possibilities for action that power offers.

Concluding remarks
In this paper, a critical view about the treatment of ethics by problem-structuring methods (PSM) has been offered. It has been argued that trends in developing 'true' pluralist frameworks for the use of PSM as well as trends to establish codes of ethics provide the 'scenario' or 'battleground' in which practitioners deal with ethical issues. When these elements do not provide guidance, sound judgement and self-reflection by individuals themselves should help, in principle, to deal with tensions or dilemmas. Self-reflection on ethics has been put forward as an alternative to devolve ethical responsibility from these to practitioners themselves. However, it needs to go beyond its current nature as a capacity. Self-reflection needs additional reflection about how people deal with ethical dilemmas and their own judgements. In other words, self-reflection on ethics needs a critical review of its emergence and purpose(s). Michel Foucault's ideas on power and ethics have been used to provide a critical perspective of how ethics can be analysed in practice when ethical issues arise (or when ethics becomes a relevant aspect of PSM practice). With these ideas, self-reflection can become a continuous process of ethical development by practitioners and those involved in interventions. Two areas of inquiry are proposed to complement self-reflection on ethics: (a) forms of individualization of ethics, and (b) possibilities and constraints of ethics in power relations. As a source for critical thinking, the two areas of inquiry intend to complement rather than replace existing ways of reflecting on ethics via PSM, CST or codes. For OR practitioners, this thinking could help them to formulate their own ethical questions and provide their own answers. Through the paper, the question at the beginning of the paper of 'who takes responsibility for the use of PSM in a situation?' has been transformed into a question of 'how this responsibility can be critically assumed by individuals?' To continue answering these questions, further research is needed about ways to reflect on ethics and power in the practice of problem structuring in OR.

FRAMEWORKS PSM, CRITICAL

Individuals and their ethicaldilemmas

a. Individualisation of ethics

How can we develop the type of ethical subject do we want to be? b. Possibilities and constraints

*Whatforms of being ethical are privileged? How?

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CODES, NORMSOF ETHICS

Figure 1

Two areas of inquiry into ethics.

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