1411236

Psychology. The Cognitive Powers by James McCosh; Introduction to Psychological Theory by Borden P.
Bowne; Psychology by John Dewey The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Nov., 1887), pp. 146-159 Published by: University of Illinois Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1411236 . Accessed: 09/07/2013 12:20
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cians,on the otller hand, who used to practicehealing artsin the who was also a philgoodold time,when " Godlikewas the doctor, in the body,and to to take some interest osopher,"are beginning and physiohygiene readbooks on mindcures,and psycho-physics, of religionand and to realize that the student logicalpsychology, neglectthe studv of the comof idealism cannot,with impunity, of morbidpsychosis. NVedesire, for our part, to see mon forms which now seems destined to mark the psychologicalmovement, as the last quarterof a century tlle presentas the psychological, age, keptin the severesl;sense has been the biologico-evolutionary are vast and scientific. Tlle dangersand difficulties experimental and the speciousfalse ways many,but we have a nucleusof solidly establishedfacts, and the rewardof every achievementis likely of to be at least no less than any that have crownedthe progress sciencein the past. But we musteverremindourselvesthatwhile "strange thingsare true,tlley are not trulyknown till thev are and unfruitful." relatedto whatis tested,else theyremain solitary afresh Greatcreditis due the Englishsocietyforcallingattention side of humanlife,and forlatermakingknownto to the mysterious ofthe valuableworkof the FrellchinvesEnglishreaderssomething ofParis,Nancy,etc. Mr. BIevershas takellgreatpains to see tigators manyof these nzenand theirwork. If good hypnoticsubjectsare in France thanin England,it wouldseem thatghost lllorenumerous classesin England. It is amongcultivated scers are nlost common to be hoped, however,that the indication of more independent work in the study of abnormalstates now apparent will lead to theoryof teleand thatthe crudeand premature moresolid results, per se in some sense, but pathy,w hich is by no means impossible, as yet lacks everythingapproacllingproofsave to amateursand speculative psychologistswill he allowed to lapse to forgetfulin and observers lless. To the carefuland patient experimenters and farsurerand farmoreuseful this fieldthereare no^rfar better ?esultsthan these,thoughby methodsfar harderand slower. But to labor. lt is by these that^ e prefer By JAMESMcCosH, D. D Potoera. Cognstive The Psyc7wology. LL. D., etc., President of PrincetonCollege. New York, 1886. Pp. 245. ProP. BOWNE, Theory. BY BORDEN to Paychological I?wtroduction fessorof Philosophy in Boston University. New York, 1887. DEWEY,Ph. D., AssistantProfessorof PhiBY JOHN Psyc7wology. University. New York, lS87. Pp. 427. losophyin WIiclligan by another on the above list is to be supplemented The workfirst emotions on the motive powersof the mind,includingconscience, powers are here treatedin threebooks as and will. The cognitive respectively presentative,representativeand comparative. Dr. years, and compares forthirty-four McCoshhas taughtpsychology darned till hardlya thread of his workto Uncle Toby's stockings, the original fabricremains. The book is neither dull or dry,but illustrations stories, in proseand poetry, aboundsin apt quotatiolls sudden and unexpectedbut always ilupressive morals and hormostdirect and in the clearest passages,anclseems to reflect, tatory of the author,not only personality and beneficent lvay,the strong
p.
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his convictions, but even very many illcidelltsfromhis own experience being interspersed. Almost every page containstaking points admirably presented to catch the wanderingattentionof 'listlessstudentsin llon-electiveclasses. The book is of Jalue to -every thoughtful teacherof this subject for its pedagogicalsuggestilJeness. It is evidently made up of three factors: (ieneral matters of miscellaneoussorts,which,in an unusually prolollgedexperienceas a teacher,its author has found ef3ective and beneficial withthe averagecollegesenior-the essential points ill the Scotch philosophy, or more particularly in Thoma's Brown Stewart, Butler, Macintosh, Abercrombie, A. Stnith, etc., hich ilave survivecl from a long-ago studyof thesewriters; and, thirdly, such material 'in contemporary psychology as in-some cases its commanding importancehas brought to the attention of everyeminentadministrative educator, ancl in other cases such as mere accidental or personal relations (as with his distinguished pupils, Professors Macloskie, Allen Starrand :F. M. Baldwin), have impressedupon the author'smind. That with his advanced years,his heavy educationalcares and responsibilities so vigorouslv borlle,ancihis early absorption in the Scotch philosophy, the iimitations of lvhichthose who most directly inheritits traditionsnow best see, Dr. McCosh should have maintaineda mind so opell to so manyof the newer nfluences in the rapidlywideningfieldof psychology, is a striking illustrationof the beneficent eSects of the true spirit inbred bv studies in this domain, and makes the task of the honest and friendly critic particularly unpleasallt. Judgedfroma scientific *standpoint, however,little that is good can be said of the lzook The wood-cuts of brain and sense organsthat are inserted are but littlemorerelatedto the text than the marginalfigures with which ancientmissalswere illuminatedwere Ntollt to be. It is perhaps something to associate the study of perceptiollin tlle olclabstract fashionwith even the pictures of these thillgs, althoughbut in the mo3tcasual way, as xveassociate a boolvwiththe treeunder^rllich we read it. There is all apparelltincommellsurability betweenseeing,feeling and thinlring on the olle 'hand, and the visualalld tactile image of the corona,corpora and vermicelli ot' tlle convolutions, on the other,to the llovice,tllateven merejuxtaposition mayallel7iate Symbolic fi$ureslike the ondell of Mr. Bettsor tlle pyramidof Dr. Hopkins,or the circlesof modernlogicians,or current (liagrams illustrating aphasia, etc.,have obviousillustrative ralue. The relationbetaveen thought and brain,hosever, is anythingbut obvious but appears more plainlyas the allatomyof brain anclanalysis of psychicprocessesbecomefiner. It is far less, and-perllapsilOta11 by virtue of its laorphology,but ratherby virtueof its finer anatomlcal and chemical ploperties,that the brain is the orgall of psychic actierities, as yet but imperfectly Illlknown. This, ^ê believe, should be carefullyindicated,or else the anatomicalpart passed over,in elementary teaclling. Manyof the allusionsto finer structures and processesby Dr. ZIcCosll are inexcusablycareless,to use no stronger terms.AVeare tolllthat "all alongthe spinalcolumll thereis automaticactionwhich is refies." " There is a cell called a ganglioninto mllichone nerve entersand from^-hich another goes out." Questionsof structure are referrecl to physiology. The communication from the spinal cord is "up bv the medullaw ollongata and the crura cerebri to the corpora striata and optic thalami." " The actionto thebraintrar els at the rateof 140to 150
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feetin the second. The actionfrom the braintravelsabout 100feet in the second." The authorhastenson through thisstrange region WhiCh iS dismissed with a caution that all materialistic ideas must be leftbehind,despite the temptation of youtllto the contrary in the studyof psychology. " We are not to allow ourselvesto look on minditself, or any of its operations,as occupying space, as exten(led or having figure,as having weight or levity, height or depth, elevation or depression,attractionor repulsion,solidity or elasticity,motion or rest, light or darkness,warmthor frigidity. " Even words derived from material objects, as idea psychic,spirit,feeling,emotiotl, impression,understanding, conception and apprehension, must be strippedof materialistic associations with their etymologies. But why then tlle anatomical illustrations,which not only precede, but follow? AVhythen the skin withits "two layers," and the nerves in the tongue,fingersand lips " generated at thesepointsby use," and " the muscle sense, including in it the volition and the resistance which first gives us the idea of Power, Potency, Energy or Force, out of which proceeds our idea and conviction as to causation? " XVhy are we told that " distinctnessof vision requires that objects shall be so far apart that their images on the retina shall reach more than one cone?" Why, apart from the manysuch inaccurate or mistakenstatements, is space givento the anatomical alld physiological relationsof aphasia, memoryand association, etc.? Still we are thankfulfor the good will towards scielltific psychology, and commendthe sagacitythat sees its importance,even if the former be as yet all unreconciledwith the traditions of the intuitiveschool and the latter uninstructed in details. A still more grave defectof the l)ook is the essential failure of the authorto profit fromboth Greelzand Germanphilosophy. There is abundant evidence here, ancl in his other works,that he has nevertakenthe troubleto acquaillt himself,in ally historic or sympathetic ^^rayR with the great writersin his field in both these languages. He elseBhere declaresthatidealismhas no place in philosophy, and thatthe latterw ill neverbe properlv established till this is acknowledged, but pleads forthe old Scotch" realism," as the ideal " Americanphilosophy." As the Scotch school may be said to representhard-headedcommonsense, withouttlle refinements or subtleties thatare bred of specializedresearch, by any set method or direction, this is a most convenientattitudefor a busyman, wllo mustkeep up the semblanceof philosophy on short allowanceof time and informationand must commenditself to many practicalXmericanmindswho cultivatethe power to make summary snap-judgments on all topics,finiteor intillite. lVe believe, however, that blindness to the great lessolls of historical philosophy involves the gravest loss to students. A course in idealism,as treated by Kant, whomour authorcannot abide, Plato Hegel anel the rest,we beliete, stimulates the developmentof mental power,gives inner resourcesagainst all corrodingnessimisms,tact to solve the practicalproblemsof life and mind and zest,breadth and insightin any intellectualcareer unsurpassed if not unequaled by any other element of modern education. It especially illumillates religioussentiments, and gives both poise and a repertory of weaponsagainst doubt,and oughtto be entirely indispensable to all who wlYould speak and be heard on religious
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topics. That Dr. BIcCosh,with his great and long opportunities, has failed to utilize these deep sources of wisdom we regardas as of science. of religion,as mreli deplorablefor the real interests This, we believe, will be the verdict of those laborers in the withthe religiousstandphilosophicfieldmostnearlyin sympathy point of the author. which anel self-assertation Ollce more thereis oftena dogmatism is only calculated to entail prejudices and seriously to limit of rnentalpower and futureefEectiveness. After the unfoldment thatman's knowledge"beginsnot with relations,but with stating I undern this proposition, vith things," he adds, " in laying do^^ mine one of the most fatal as I regard it-errors of the dav." is both beyond our widest thought, Aftersaying that the infinite he says: can be addecl or subtracte(l, and that to which nothing aspect, I foundthat I had been out thistwo-fold working " After we are conhy Aristotle." The greatproblemwhether allticipated is dismissedwiththe statement sciousof all our mentaloperations, " I hold thatwe were COllSCiOUS of the acts at the time, but that they were not retained,as there was nothingto fix them in the memory." Again, " I do not agree+îth the theoryof thosewho mentalnction." Each ofgeniusto unconscious ascribetlle creations ill philosophicallitview long current of these is a commollplace and in the most momentous erature,but is stated dogmatically manner,îthout facts or argumentsto sustnillit, as if it were a have traced greatand original discovery. Thus he conclu(les "Xxe and have the lowestto the highest, from the powers of intelligence shownhow our coCIlitionnnd ideas arise." This modest claim is studyin thisfield. The book further hardlycalculatedto encourave and is of all gradesof aboundsin irrelexanciesand discontinuity, hortatory to veryimpressive ofgarrulity fromthe extremes merit, thatthe problemnas perorations. Had it been clearlyrecognized only together bringing primerin psychology, to writean attractive the resultsmostuniversallyassentedto, and of most practicalimthe book, with some material portance,and pedagogicallyfirst, anfl many minor changes,mighthave been made cornmendable. Teachers who introduceyouug men, seniorsthougllthey be, into mustexpendtheirwisdomin showingwhereto begin thesestudies, incenfurnish of a sense of finality, and shunningthe inculcation in the tive to those who need it to pursue their studiesfurther or graduate hislaboratory, school, the psycho-physic theologicall in or educationalstudy. 'Rhis book illustrates, torico-philosophical a word, not realism in any saving sense as the author claims,but in every respect,which makes thatword philosophiecclecticism cally offensive. Bowne's book is mailllydevotedto what he holds to be Professor as distilletfrom of pure or introspectixe prillciples the underlying of empiricalpsychology. These prinby all forms and presupposed ciples, he thinks,are best illustratedin common facts, and tllat " has an " odorof of madhouse and hospitalstories an " authology quackery." Though physiology"means well," and is an "estiseems to psychology in reconstructing mable science," its influence the authordeclining. He is COllSCiOUS thatin his book many " will what theydo not iind whattheywant," and " still more will fincl owing to omissionsare confes.sed, not want," and many arbitrary the plan ofthe work,but othersare as freellotto read as he to publish, etc. The workfallsintotwo parts the factorsof the mental
laO
life,and theircombination. The startingpoint is the analysis of the individual consciousness. Psychologyis a subjectiveand not an obJectixre science,and is based on introspection.It is not truly studied by an analysis of language. Psychogenesis, observations of animals,etc., "admit of almostno experiment,"and its "facts admit of no exact measurement." "The man who feels cold is cold," etc. All materia]istic assumptions are tobe " repudiated in advance." Anatomicaldiscreetness is inconsistent withmentalUllity. If the brainsecreted thought we could collect and look at it as we do bile. Materialismrejectsthe realityof the selfas the subjectof the mentalstates,whichis the burdenofwhat positivedoctrine the book contains. " Thoughtand feelings demanda subject,and have no meaningapart fromit." "Rational life, by its very nature demands a unitary consciousness and a unitary subject." Neither the matter ofthe physicist, northethinking matter of thehylozoist northe theory of two parallel series, is rational. " If materialism be truereason is exploded." It is depressing, has no standardof truth,afflicts the pure psychologist mrith "tedious superficialities and drolleries." " What ever progress brain physiology may make it will neverbringus one step nearerto materialism." It has " an irresistible tendency towarderror, superstition and falsehood," and it has " falsified experienceat the start,"and givesa " manikinconceptionof humanity." The diiculty in identifying physical and mentalfactslies in their completeunlikeness. Vibrationsare not sensations. "No peering, even into the living brain, would give theleast suspicionofthe mentalseriesattending it." Again,nerves neverfeel. Sensationsare mentalreactions againstnervousactions and are notpassed along " fromone atonzto another, like a letter from hand to hand." A sentient nervousaction is a square circle. The doctrineof the specificenergs of nerves "has been largely abandoned." Itisthe "terminalstructure"inwhich the specific energy resides. Thus " concerning the particular formof the nervousactionnothing can be known," but " our completeignorance ofwhattakes place in the nervesis no psychological loss." Neither practically nor " psychologically shouldwe be better off if we knemr all aboutthe form of the nervousaction in any special experience and the place of its location." All such facts are "not properly psychological facts at all," nor even "facts of any kind" to the idealist. The psycho-physic law represents"no significant principle." A blind enthusiasm has magnified Fechner's formula into undue importance. " In the name of a mathematicalformula psychology is loaded down with meaninglessabsurdity. " All explanationsof after images are " purely hypothetical." The mixture of colorsby rotating disk " does nottake place in the mind but in the nerves." Such works as Helmholtz "Sensations of Tone" and " Physiological Optics"-" reveal no new psychological principles." There are probablyno unconscious sensations. Ideas haveno intensity and also no attractive or repulsiveforces bv u-hich theyseparate or unite. The studies of association-time merely show what was known before, lriz.: that familiar processesare quickest. The "cerebral theory" of meluory,which fills a long appendix,"has generally been regardedas demanding separate cells for the preservation of distinct experiences." itCach idea " we are told," is based on the action of a separate cell. Molasses e.g. has an odor,taste,a name for ear and ee is of many kinds and associated with manythings,and is afterall but one word,
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wllile a man like Mezzofantispoke fluently thirty, and knew something of seventy-two languages. Eaeh one of all these variations demands a eell, and thus if the eerebralists were rightthe eells " would get filled up," and the possibilitiesof experienee and knowledge would be exhausted. The faets of aphasia on the eerebraltheory" lead to the mostfantastieand grotesqueassumptions and whimsies." It is all "physiologieal mythology born of materialism." It " neeessarily inereases our diffieulties without adding any insight," " explains the obseure by the obseurer," abounds in " unmanageable features," is a purely gratuitous hypothesis," a pieee of "physiologiealmetaph^rsics," "immensely inereasesour diffieulties without addingany insight,"ete., ete. The " thought-faetor," aeeordingto Professor Bowne, worksover sensation under the idea of time, spaee, eause, ete. Sensation is set overagainstthe self, elassified and related. If Mill's " psyehie ehemistry " theoryof the origin of spaee-perception were true, it woulds'bringthinkingtoan end." 'l'he notion that sensationor thatthe mindis extendedis also a " whimsey." If the thought of extensionis extendedthe thought of infinite extensionmustrequire an infinitely largemind to contain it. Mill's view of the natureof the thinking selfis " plain nonsense." By the theorvof the " permanentpossibilitiesof sensation " " language has been outraged," and " we are in the lowest depths of unintelligibility." " The metaphysical denial of the realityof substanceleads to nonsensein the mentalworldand to nihilismand solipsismin the outerworld." " The associativetheory is one ofthe sorriest efortsof speculation." " Materialismeannot be joined with any sensational philosophy nithoutmutualdestruetion." This alliance is "one of the many ineonsisteneies of evolutionary thinking." Mind-stufE and psyehoplasm are " highlyelegantconceptions " as " figures of speechthat defyall interpretation." " Evolution has no sueh importance for psychology as its friends imagine." Its factsare " without theoreticat signifieanee." Herbert's deduetionof feelingsis " a failurein all respeets." Physiologiealastheties is rejeeted,for a noise hurts a ners-e no morethan a notedoes. The elaim thatthe selfis made out ofthe sum of mentalstatesis made up of " some extravaganee some ambiguity and eonsiderable nonsense." Fiehte's view of the rise of self-eonseiousness "is an abuse of language." NVhether we can be eonseiousof morethan one thingat a time is " an idle question." The view that memory " is the form of mentalaetion most dependenton physieal eonditions " is " probably mueh exaggerated." Many faetsof aphasia are " utterly opaque on anv theory." The treatment of the judgmentin formal logie is " entirely false to its psyehologiealeharaeter," " highlyartifieial,"and " oftendoes violenee to the psyehologieal faet," " a barren studyof verbalpermutations." This tendeney reaehesits climax in the laterforms of ssymbolie logieby beeoming purelymechanical. The fourth dimension theories are like reasoningon the assumptionof a square cirele. The soul is in direetinteraetion with the brain,but need not be in it, but at an infinite dibstanee fromit. and in faet is not .in spaee at all. The subjeet of loealization of the funetionsof the brainis " in entire uneertainty." That the groundof insanityis physieal " ean hardlybe said to be made out." Yet the soul and Dody are in some kind of interaetionand mutual dependenee " Certainforms of memory seem evell eonditioned by physiealpar
ticipation."
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Besides these salient points,the book of Prof. Bowne contains much currentpsychologicalmatter and a few subtle criticisms. Thoughhis spiritis muchmore narrowand provincial, the author is farbetter read in both the ideal and empiricalliterature of his topicthan the writer of the book noticed above. But his worksurpasses anything we have ever read in the fieldof modernpsychology, not only in its hardihood of brunt (lenial of acceptedfacts and interpretations, which if sustainedwouldreducemanya settled consensusback to the plane of debate,but in offensive and ill-bred language,which can only tendto lowerthe tone of the controversy, and which fills us all alollg with painful doubts whethera selfrespecting reviewer ought to touch it. Students whose knowledge of psychology was derived fromthis book aione, would be le(l to believe that all workers in a vast field of science, nof only deal largely in "plain nonsense," "whimsies," that "outrage language," "are loaded with meaninglessinconsistencies," if indulged in are liable to "explode reason," "bring thinking to an end," etc., but that scientific men at heart know better and are "ever seeking to evade," "explain away, " "escape" some greatand obviousfirst truth of reason. They wouldthinkthatthose who seriously study the localization of functionsin the brain psycho-physics, symboliclogic, neurologicalphysiology, comparative psychology, psycho-genesis, the two greatworksof Helmboltz and all wholaborin thosefields; thatmorbid psychology, theunconsciousin all its forms, and everything thatsavors of matter, evolution or sensation, representa vast incoming tide of perversity whippedup, to be sure,by diabolic cunninginto fineand insidious intellectualsillabub,which is s^ eet to the palate, but which it is not merelyfollybut morallyinfectious to imbibe. The resources againstthese new rnenand methodsand topics are first bravadoof negation. Eane notseveral criticalinventoriesof human powers shown that understanding can never know this, and reason can never do that? No faculty or investigator must be allowed to poach beyond the lines laid down by the great Kantean survey even for an hypothesisor conjecture. It is the functionof the philosopher to enforce the licetand non-licet ofthe code. Secondly mind must be dematerialized,whicll now means deneuralized. To do this at es-ery pointis Professor Bowne's chiefefort. Among the manyphobias,or morbidfears,now quitewell defined, is mysophobia, or fear of dirt,firstdescribed in 1878,which impels the patientto wash everyobject he must touch,and to wash the hands afterdreadedcontactwitheverything more palpable than thinair oftenscoresof timesa dav, to avoid pollutionor contamination.Its analoguewe may call hylephobia,or morbid fear of materialism also a verymoderndistemper, which afflicts, now and then,a philosopherwitha horror of contact with the fresh factsof scienceso necessary to his survi+ral in the world of modern thought, and impels him to trvto purge everyelementof rnatter from factshe cannot escape. IIylephobia, however, is now often regarded as a sacredmadness,as epilepsy used to be. It befallsonly the good * and the richerand {airer the world of sense,and the moreviolent the phobia againstit, the more surpassingly rich and fairand real roust the purelysubjective,rational,ideal world appear. All the wisdomof scientific psychology melted in this author's crucibleis but slag and dross,and thatof so malodorous a kind that not only is he as excusable for the oft-repeated errors and ignorance of de-
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tails his pages betrayas he ^ ould be for holdillg his llostrils in a foulalr, but ^ê suspect that this itnoranceand audaciousdefiance of authoritiesis a partof the disease, and thus as sublillleas the filthill mhichwhite-souledanchoritesalorieel. Thubs it woul(l be llot only a long, but an all too-thankless, and exen idle task,to point out the blundersin detail. Althoughstudentsof the book +ôul(l find it infectiousof this mania, theywould get xerylittle knoxvledgeof the adversaryaaainst whosll they were to crusade. Indeed, they would hardly suspect evell the existence of a vast an(l concillient body of facts concerning the vali:litrand ssitnificance of whichthereis no disputeamolla those competent to judge, and still less would they glimpse their ast variety,their w ide-reachingsuggestieness, or realize the unsurpassedmental discipline and moral vigorthey afford, the quickeningof all the )sychological rootsof the religioussentiments of reverence, subordination and hopefulness thev hring. Ngainst the old materialism of Bvichner, Moleschott,(>'arl Wrogt, or (,'zolbe. which is the real objectof manyof our authors'attacks,and of M llich man residua still linger,especially among yount men, his meapons are occasionally efTectixe, but the psycho-lzhysicsof to-dayis far nearer the standpoilltof Kant than of these writers,and admits, as fullr as Profebssor Bolvlle himself,the utter incommensurability that appears betweena pllysical solid and collsciousactivity. He repudiates mad-house tales, but Mr. Galtonsays: " No professor of metaphysics, or sychology, or religion, can claim to knowthe elementsof whathe teaches,unless he is acquainted^ ith the ordinary phenomenaof idioev, madness and epilepsv. He must studythe rnanifestations of disease and congenitalfolly,as well as those of society and high intellect." The spiritanimatingthis volurneis utterly unlike thatof Lotze, whom the authorfollowedwith such fidelity in an earliern-ork, or thatof Prof.Alexander,who admirably says: " There are t^rocommonmistakes-one, the denunciation of physiologicalmethods by men xvho have never seen a ganglion cell; the other,the denunciationof subjective methods by men who have never given aSnhour to introspectioll.It does not appear to be llecessarar, however, thata knowledge of one set of facts should be incompatiblevith a knonrledge of the other set. A combination of the two is the ideal psychology." WVe would not lav aside thisalmostpurelynegative book,+^rhich it is generally rery hard to treatseriously, however, without expressingsome real obligations to the author,to whose vigorousanalvsis mre are indebted for some insiaht,and who has pointedout a fe^^r real defects in both the methods and inferencesof modernpsychology. These defects are by llo means fatal, but very slight, incidental,and eaSsily corrected. "Indeed," he says, "if our melltal possession shollld suddelllyshrink to what we kllow, the residue would be paSltry and pitiablein the extreme. It is onlyby venturing beyond knowledge thata social or evell mentalexistencebecomespossible." This cheap opinion of knowledge may perhaps aSccount for his uncermonious way of treating it, and his struggles beyond it, if it be a strugglefor mental existence,every evolutionist will easily excuse. Again,he exclaimsin a collapsillgor despairillg ^ ay, near the end of the book, " thereis a great body of factswhich suggest that the mental life canllotgo on mrithout the physical. Can any light be thro^N-n on this question?" That is, indeed, the serious question, but does it not belong at the begillnina of any helpful
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book,devoted so largely to just this question,ratherthan at the end ? That is, at least, preeiselywhere the psseho-physies he so perhorreseesbegins, and that is just the question. Even the fewisolatedfaetshe reports, if sympathetieally serutinized, startus. so hopefully, at least,towards answering. Dr. Dewey's book is to Hegel as Prof.Bowne's is to Lotze. In eaeh ease the spiritof the mastersanimates the pupil,but has llot gained in insightor breadthof view. Dr. Dewey is a less servile discipleof a better master, is on the whole bettertrained,not only in psyehology, but in the generalfieldof philosophy, and his book is pervaded by an indefinitely betterspirit,and his material is wroughttogether with far more vigor,eohereneeand originality. There is no trace of eynieismor vulgarity. The author unfolds withthe mostcharming and unreservedfrankness and enthusiaslll the schemeof absolute idealism in a simple yet eomprehensive way, well ealculated to impressbeginnersln philosophy, to whom the book is addressed, and withhelpfulpedagogiediverslons. Psyehologyis the scieneeof the " self," whiehhas the powerof reeognizing itselfas I, knowsthatit exists,or " existsforitself." This is eonseiousnesswhieh " can be neither defined or deseribed." "The fact of the existeneeof self or of eonseiousnessis accordingly a unique, individual fact." The eontentof knowledge is. universal,for all eould know it. Psychologyis definedas "the scieneeof the reproduction of some universalcontent or existenee whether of knowledgeor aetionin the formof individual,unsharable conseiousness." Thus "physiological psychology cannot aid psychology direetly. The mere knowledge of all the functions of the brain and nervesdoes nothelp the scienee,except so far as it occasionsa more penetrating, psychologiealanalysis,and thussupplements the deficieneies of1introspeetion." Physiological faetsare "of no avail, for they tell us only about eertain objectixTe processes " "The ultimateappeal is to self-eonsciousness."Knowledge 1S thus universal,while feelingis individual,and will eonnects the two. These three are not faculties but inseperable aspectsof consciousness, resulting fromartificiai anakJsis, but for conveniencemade the basis of the three-fold divisionof the book the greaterpart of whieh is given to knowledge. Here, too,lies. its ehiefmerltand originality. Sensation is " the elementary eonseiousness whieh arisesfrom the reaetion of the soul upon a nervous impulse,eondueted to the brain from the affeetion of some sensory nerve-ending by a physieal stimulus." The latteris always some formof motion. "A sensation is a eonseiousness @ it not only exists,butit existsforthe self." Yet we are told on the next page that^ve have no more direetkllowledge of it than of an atc)m, and thatit iS not immediately present in eonseiousness. Sensationstell us nothing but theirown existenee,or how the subjeet is afected. Motionand sensationhave nothing in eommon. Despite the usual dualistie " ehasm, " lnOtiOll iS lnerelya mental phenomenon . The nervousehangeis not eause, but stimulus or oeeasionon whieh the soul develops sensation. A sensation is "the transitions of the physieal into the psyehieal." On this whole topieof sensation,it is impossible to grasp the author's meaning. Sensations are not knowledge. They are purelysubjective, separateand distinct, each fromeaeh; in short,ehaotie. Knowledgeeonsistsin the proeesses of relating theseindividual feelings and diseretefragments. They
PSYCHOLOGICAL
LITERATURE.
155
must be transformed not only into unities higher than those of time and space, objects, relations and ideals, but they must be changed into the self that knows and idealizes. To this end the mind must react upon sensuous material in attention,and retain the appercievedcontentin memory. Thus sense becomes significant,and its elements coherelltly related. Association " never leaves sensuous elements isolated." It combines airpulses to tones, makes all colors out of the tllree elementary sensations, fuzes and redintegrates according to tlle familiar rubrics of successive, simultaneous,contiguous and similar,etc Artistsuse philosophersnotice,the associative tie that broadens but does not burden the mind, and controlshabit. These productsof synthesismay be disassociatedby diSerentinfluences, as interest or value is givento difEerent elements. Sensationsare thus distinguished by tone,by nearnessof relationto self,lllorality, etc., till apperruptive organs,or "ways in lvhich we tend to interpret sensations," are establishecl. t)isassociationthus breaks uD the mechanism burststhe bonds thatwouldtie the minddown t-oobjective data, allows it to plav freely, according to its interests, and breaksup control by environment. Thus ideal internalends may be pursued bv attention,which is internallv initiated, to the ends of the self. Attention is "that activity ofthe self whichconnectsall elementspresented to it intoone whole, with reference to theirideal significance." On thefundamental principle that"nothing can be in consciousness which consciousnessdoes not Dut there," attention, as the organ of selection, is veryimportant. It selectsonlythoseelementswhichpointbeyondthemselves. Thus only interpretedsensations,arld never sensationsas such, enter into our knowledge. 'rhis is idealization, for it passes beyond present existence. By attention the whole organized self is broughtto bear or "read into" selected sense elements so as to give them meaning by "reading itself into them." Thus unity, idealization, meaning, (listinctness arise. AttentiOsl is fundamentallya "self-developingactivitv." Thus îth the aid ofthe assimulative funetion of retention "the worldbecomes objectified self,and the selfsubjectified world." "The worldknonn is the externalized self;the self-existing is the knownor internalized world." Leaving the activities of knowledge,its stages are studied as perception, memorv,imagination, thinkingand intuitiOll respectively. PerceitSing is "opposed to thinking," because it is objectiveand notsubjective. XTisual and tactualspace are briefly considered, to show how it is the mrill whichseparates objects from itself. This is the centraldistilletion in this fielel wheredifferelltiation predominates over identification. Memory is higher for the presentis transcended. All itisobjects are "wholly ideal." Past and present are related or unifie(lin rythm. Memoryis possible only wherethereis a permanent selfamid changing expressions. Imaginationembodies ideas and is freed fromthe limitationsof memory. It is a "universalizing activity,"releasingthe ideal from the pettyand particular, makingpoetryin a sense truerthan history, and impliesa basal unitybetweenman and man,alld man and nature;in short,demonstrates the "unixersal self of humanity"in organicunitywithnature. Thinking still further"(lissolves out" the universal and ideal "to discoverthe meaningof factsulliversally." It is distinguished as (a) conception, which "is the apperceptionof the apperceptive process;" (b) judgment, whichrefers the
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PSYCHOLOGICAL LITEXATURE.
ideal,or universal, to theparticular element; and (c) reasoning, whicl is the recognition of relations. The highest reasoning is philosophy which is ''completescience," an(l seeks to find a true universe. Intuition is immediate knowledge of the world, self and God. F,^rery factis seen to be relatedto every other,the whole is foun(l in the part,and this completed interdependence is necessity. The w orld is knowllbecause we idealize it,an(l theselfis lznown because it is realized. This process goes on through the self and from this fact we gain the conception of freedom. God is the trueselfrelated, or the organicunion of the self, and the world, of the ideal and the real. The goal of all knowletlge or truthis "the colllplete manifestation of the unifying and distinguishing activities of the intelligence,"and all erroror agnosticislll is emphasizing one to the exclusion of the other of these processes Feeling is " the internalaspectof mentallife," and exists so far as consciousness is unobjectified. As the latteris never complete feelillg,though unique and unsharable is "as wide as the whole realmof self," and is the undividualside of its activity. lf the self ;s furthered, pleasure; if hindered, pain results. Successful adjustxnent is pleasant. Feelings are sensuous and formal,qualitative ntellectual, astheticand personal. The last three have gradually llnfolded intouniversality. Under per,sonal feelinaspeace, dependence, faith, obligation,remorse,humility,sympathy,love, conscience, etc., are treated. Conscience, e. g., is a "feeling of the llniversal and objectiveworthof personal acts, but in what degree the feelings are true to fact depend upon how universal and objective is the self which feels. " WVill originatesin sensuous impulses. It is the selfrealizingitself. The essence of self is the self-determining activity of the will which is objectifying activity. Science is the objectified will. Wili finds its motivein feelin its resultin knowledae. It unitesthe individual and the universe joins the finite selfand the infinite personality in whichtruth, happiness and righteousness are unitedin one. T)r. Desvey's book is admirably adapted to reproduction by a resumdof salientpointsand ever recurrent phrases. Its meritand originality are great,but theyall lie in the scheme rudelyoutlined above. That the absolute idealism of Hegel could be so cleverly adapted to be " read into" such a range of facts,new and old, is indeed a surpriseas great as when geologyand zoologyare ingeniouslysubjectedto the rubricsof the six days of creation. The oldergeneses,whetherof the world or of mind,are so simple anfl ultimate, have been rounded to such epic completenessand sublimity, that as theyare supersededby still largerand loftierconceptions,their dissolutivephases are oftenpathetic. The pathos here lies in the naive unconsciousness withwhich the systemof universalconsciousness unfoldsall its vast canvas of definition on the stormiest of all seas that science triesto navigate. Definitions make the fibre of the book,and even the favorite form of sentence. The authoris always workingfrompartial to completedefinitions or conversely. There are scoresof formally quite novel definitions of nearlyall the subjectmatter of psychology. They are treatedas Iself-luminous, or, at most,theirfitor self-relation is their justification, and these constitute the warp of the entirefabric. Viewed from the standpoint of facts,very fewof themare satisfactorv, and many we believe to be fundamentally wrongand misleading. To enter upon this, however, could only at most open perhapslong
157
but certainly fruitless contronersy.But the authoris more intellt on the mutualinterpretation and coherenceof his networkof definitionsthan on theirrelationto facts,and it is just thls that makes his book as unitary as Dr. McCosh's is ramblingand incoherent, as positiveas Professor Bowne is negative. The " self," e. g.,istreated bas somethingof settled and exact connotation, simple and undefinable and immaterial, withouta hint or suspicion of the xast problems openedby both disease and by hypnotism, pointing to its derivitive,or at least exceedinglycomplex nature. Iemory is treated only as a memberof a hierarchv of faculties, and with llo wordto suggest thattherenow lies the chieffieldof controversv ill psychology betweena nlaterialand pneumatic view of soul. The whole vast field of what was at firstand so crudelytermedby Hartmanthe unconscious, and wherethe scientific studvof psvehic activitieshas of late won its chieftriumphs, is substantially ignored althoughconsciousness itself, withwhich the author is solely concerned,we are told " can be neitherdefined or described." To say that an act is unconscious means simply that" theact is done bv the body" as a resultof simultaneous association Besides definitions, the other ingredientof the book is illustratie facts. In the selection and use of these, for which the uriter is often indebtedto the resultsof modernscientific metho(ls and is duly grateful, lies the other chief meritof the lsool which, however, by a man of greatabilit^Tas Dr. Dewev clear]r isX might have been written half a centuryago, and have been poorer only by a numberof pat physiologicalillustratiolls. The facts are never allowed to speak out plainly for themselves or left to silence, but are always "read into" the system which is far more important than they. They are llearerto the sphere of sensation, incohate, dark, solitary, than to the pure self-luminous light of self-consciousness, which is turnedon them in these pages. In the field of these facts the statementsare extremely oftenvague,inexactand even mistaken, and abound in the errors, oftenpetty, sometimes grave,of non-expertness. These we can only sample. " A toave lexgth of .ooons millimetre," it is said, can excite the sense of hearing. The retinalimage is " interrupted by the blind spot." Flavor is said to involvetactile elements. The toIle of a tuningforkis simple; " all othersare complex." The whole statement of thisgreatdiscovery, which Helmholtzcalls " the most importantof recent times," is vague and general to the vergeof utter unintelligibility.l?our or five times ill the book we are told of the lowerand upperlimits of tone-perception, and the sensation above 40,000xribrations a second is repeatedly describedas " M hirring,"a termit hardlyseems as if one who had once feltit could apply. " NVhirring " is near the lowerlimit. " It is highlyprobable thatthe auditory llervecontinuesthe sound stimulus in vibrating form." Heat is said to be a stimulus that " afEects all sensory organs alike." Touch "is distributed by meansof the skin over the whole body." Again, "the skin is regardedas made up of myriadsof sensory circles." All but hot and cold spotson the skin Fare said to be "sensitiveto no kind of temperature distinction," and cocoine anaethesia and leaves the parts afEected "as sensitiveto differences of heat alld cold as ever." " The reasonthatwe do not see the starsin the daytimeis that theydo notgive ToW of the light of the sun." The psycho-physic law unquestionablymerits far fullertreatment ill any psychology. Almost nothingis said of in-
158
stinctor of morbidor anthropological psychology.Omissions, however,may be pardoned, inaccuracies never. If we are to have facts antlresultsof laborious scientific work,let them be statedclearly and exactly. Dr. Dewey's method is through and through speculative,and psychology in its leading featuresis to him one of the mostcompleteand finishedsciences,insteadof being in the most interesting stage of uncertainty and incompleteness. Not onlyall actual butall possiblefuture factsare certainto take theirplace in thisidealisticscheme. They may indeed enrich it, but can never essentially changeit. In the open fieldof research, however, it is precisely these general views that are now most uncertainand wavering. Is self-consciousness inscrutible,and ultimate, and supreme? What is it, what is the self,and what is knowledge?Is therea ' chasm?" Is sensationpureand manifold, or is it the most perfect knowledge, reasonbeingsensation in the making,as Maeh assumes? What are ideas, and can we know an " organic unity" more complete than, say, a gaglion cell? Is not such an unity rather in the nervoussystemthan in consciousthought?What if consciousness be not only a partial and fragmentary manifestation of individuallife,but,as some postulate, a formof disintegration, a set of signsof the imperfect workingof our infinitely complicated automatic apparatus? None of these are open questionsfor Dr. Dewey. It is not enough to knoweven if we knowtruly, but we mustknowthatwe know. It is notsufiicient forlight to shine * it mustlightitself. Even " the perceivedworldis morethan the existent world." One vvho philosophizes by this method might exactlyas well writea text book on any science whateveras on psychology. The light is always esselltiallylightingitself,from whateverobjectsit happens to be reflected. As an artist is less interested in the subject of a picture pritltedon the programme, or the philologist cares less for the story of a classic writerbut both are moreintenton an ulterioranalvsis that shall reveai the great elements of style and motive, and reach a meaning below the author'sconsciousness, so the modernpsychologist studiesthe great systemsof philosophicthought-this with the rest. In the system of "progressivfe self-realizationi" in the idealistic sense he sees the llft and expansion of adolescent, altruistic forces, always inspiringand ennobling, which every young man is the stronger and broader for having felt,the enthusiasm of which no student of any philosophic subjectcan miss withoutgrave loss, and to the meaning of which,havingfelt, he will always remainpious. But it is a stageof development whichmindsthatcometo fullscientificF maturity are certainto transcend.Its phrasesgrowdim and unreal and have a hollow,uncertain sound,in the quest of something more definiteand real and systematic. WVere this issue reached at the end, or tendenciesto thislargerview seen in the author,the propadeuticvirtueof the book would be greatly enhanced. To students inclinedto immerse themselves in an ideal view of the worldit will proveverystirnulating, but dire will be the disappointment of those who hope to findin it the methodsor resultsof modernscientifie psychologr. The literary references at the end of the chapters will prove very helpful,but thoseof mostscientific value are not much utilizedin the text, and nearly all these authorswould notagree with the argument, forsuch it is, of the work. Finally, for classroomuse the book is far fromsatisfactory.Statisticsnow before us,embracing nearlythreehundredcolleges,are veryfar from sus-
109
taining thestatemetlt of the preface that" it is the custom ofour colleges to makepsychology tehe path by whichto enter thefields of philosophy." Elen7ents of Phygotogtcat Psyc7wotogy. A Treatise of the Activities andNature of the Mind, from thePhysical andExperimental Pointof Niew. By George T. Ladd, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. NewYork,1887. pp. 696. Thanksto Professor Ladd's book it is at last possibleto read a plain statement of the facts of a good partof the fieldof experimental psychology in English. Its merit in thisfundamental respect is incomparably greater than any one book in ourlanguage, andit is likely tobe fora longtimeindispensable to every student of thesubject notfamiliar withGerman. Roughly speaking, overfiveof his nine hundred paaes are devoted to a condensedand generally clearly arranged account of results ofspecial scientific investigations, less concisely stated thanin Hermann, but morelucidthan in NVundt. The factsare often gathered wlth great industry from many special monographs more recent thanthe chief German text books, andalong somelinesbrought down todate without substantial omissions. The authQr is notintent on illustrating anytheory orsystem belonging to an utterly different attitude periodand method, or stageof development, butthesystem consistsin a plaingrouping ofthefacts which areallowed tospeakout for themselves. Taken all in all,thebookcannot failto havea most wholesome andstimulating effect on the study of mental phenomenon in the institutions of higher education in thiscountry.It should be readbystudents of medicine and theology, as wellas of philosophy, and teachers whodesire to know the scientific basisof modern methods of pedagogy will derivegreatbenefit fromits pages. The vastfields of morbid and also of anthropological psychology, psycho-genesis and instinct, whichmight be included ln thetitle, areexcluded, and evenwithin thelimits imposed on himselfbythe author, thereare many deficiencies, butfrom the fact of so large a book, covering onlya part of its field, the reader wilI readily inter theimmense accumulation of material whichalready crow(ls the psycho-physic domain, and superficial or disparaging text-books in this fieldwill henceforth be impossible, or at least ignored.All thisappliesto the first twoparts, ortothefirst twothirds of the book only. The first part is devoted to the nervous mechanism.The nervous elements are{irst considered chemically and histologically and physiologically, andthen theircombination intoa system involving a sketchof the general anatomy of the cerebro-spinal system. Nerves as conductors, automatic and reflex functions and organs, the development of thenervous system and the mechanical theory of its action, are each givena chapter. Part secondis on the correlations of the nervous mechanism and the mind. Twolongchapters aregieren tolocalization, and twoto the quality of sensations, one to theirquantitythencometwo chapters vaguely entitled the presentations of sense,devotedto the perception, as it is morecommonly termed of space, form motion, etc.;thencomephysiological time,feelings, and a finai andisolated anthropological chapter on certain statistical relations of the bodyand mentalphenomena.These chapter# are illustrated by one hundred and fourteen wood cuts,about ninety of

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Psychology. The Cognitive Powers by James McCosh; Introduction to Psychological Theory by Borden P.

PSX-CHOLOGICAL LITERATE RE.

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