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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY:

A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Copyright 2012 by the Ministry of Social Solidarity All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission. Published: Editor: Jo-Anne Bishop, Independent Consultant Layout: Thaiza Castilho/UNDP Photos: UNMIT/IOM/UNDP SERC and Dialogue Projects

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

PREFACE
Navigating the deep immensity of the seas of my Timor-Leste, I find in my countrys life cycle, with the crossroads of the causes of the "military-political crisis of 2006." Ah! My heroes and martyrs of the homeland, my children and my sisters, mothers and wives, my grandfathers, brothers, victims, you who are frail and vulnerable, if I could have that persuasive force to prevent this loss, perhaps I would at that time, but my hands did not get up there and my voice was not timely, because everything is interpreted emotionally, losing the true meaning of what the "State" and the building of the country, newly independent in this new millennium. But it happened after a very striking process, with RECONCILIATION made by CAVR, which we can collectively reflect on the causes and consequences, drawing on lessons learned from this violent path. After nearly four years of the restoration of independence, the vicious circle of violent tendencies made to appear on the stage of peace and harmony of our sovereign State - the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. But it did not amaze me! As human rights activist, activist of rights of women and children, I tried to link this to the cycle of violence or domestic violence based on gender, recognizing the fragility of us all, women, men, youth, human beings whose behaviors and attitudes will only change after a long journey of rehabilitation. All the people of Timor-Leste were victims and lived 24 years of violence and reprisals of various kinds, coming to accept all forms of violation as if it were the "daily bread"! Accepted as ORDINARY because the importance was on our INDEPENDENCE and our FREEDOM as people and as a SOVEREIGN NATION, which is the reason and justification of our suffering and our sacrifices. Returning to the 2006 crisis and reflecting on the causes, once again, we tell the world we renounced violence, that we are people with cultural identity that love PEACE and our contradictions and differences of ideas can be solved using the instruments that our LIAN NAINS taught us. We all have our UMA ADAT, the NAHE BITI BOOT, and the BUAH and MALUS, which constitute our originality and simple practices, the "TRADITIONAL" for CONFLICT RESOLUTION through open and frank dialogue, the critic and self-criticism, also the values that our strength and resistance and our heroes and martyrs of the country have left us with the cost of their own lives. We must have a generous heart and correct our attitudes and practices to recognize our mistakes, which directly or indirectly contributed to the so-called "Crisis of 2006" and commit to a truly collective, attitude and language, smooth and original as our ancestors taught us and our religious values in the light. This evaluation on the processes of reintegration of IDPs through the National Recovery
3 THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Strategy, aims to assess the political motivation, processes, moral and financial costs, methods, integrated gender approach, sensitivity to children's rights, avoiding the complexity of social envy in the breasts of the communities, returnees and residents of neighborhoods and the lessons learned here. The Ministry of Social Solidarity of the IV Constitutional Government, in partnership with national and international agencies that have worked hard with the highest spirit of SOLIDARITY, has offered to provide and share these experiences with political leaders, people of Timor-Leste in particular, and people of the world and the contemporary leaders of the world in general. The Ministry of Social Solidarity of the IV Constitutional Government led by Prime Minister Kay Hala Xanana Gusmo presented a final report on the process of reintegration of internally displaced persons on 18 February 2011, after the termination of proceedings on 30 December 2010. This document was sent to various institutions and civil society, including the Prosecutors Office, Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice, the Anti-Corruption Commission and other national and international agencies. Reflecting on the complexity of the process, the Ministry of Social Solidarity and the IV Constitutional Government have asked UNDP to carry out a process evaluation of the National Recovery Strategy by an independent international consultant, allowing the preparation of a fair, honest, credible report with appropriate recommendations for the future. From this perspective, we intend to launch this report, almost at the end of the mandate of the IV Constitutional Government and as part of celebrations of 10 years of Restoration of Independence, 100 years of the Manufahi Revolution and 500 years of the arrival of the Portuguese. So I want to highlight the vital support from the UNDP. Also I want to thank all those who were interviewed, either individuals or institutions, which contributed to bring light upon this experience for a lasting reintegration in line with universal standards of international rights for displaced persons as promoted by IOM. It is necessary and also very appropriate to give a word of appreciation and thanks to all State entities. His Excellency, the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Dr. Jos Ramos Horta, Nobel Peace Laureate, for his patience and perseverance in the dialogue processes, the Prime Minister of the IV Constitutional Government, the charismatic Kay Rala Xanana Gusmo for his politics and architecture as leader and head of government, the President of the National Parliament, Mr Fernando Lasama and all the distinguished Members of Parliament for their decision making to make this process possible. To my colleagues in Government, I highlight the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Jose Luis Guterres committed as coordinator of this process, as well as relevant ministries such as Finance, State Administration and Territorial Management, Justice, Education, Health, Economy and Development, SEFOPE, SEPI, the Secretary of State for Defense and Security, the F-FDTL and PNTL and their leaders. Finally, thanks to the UNPOL and national and international agencies such as UNDP by Mr. Finn Reske-Nielsen, Ms. Mikiko Tanaka, and IOM, through Mr Luiz Vieira and Mr Norberto Celestino that while partners were able to align and respond to policies and options of the State, and as might be expected, our brothers and sisters

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

"displaced" by their willingness to cooperate in the process. Finally, the growing recognition of the tireless work of the Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Jacinto Rigoberto de Deus, the National Director of Social Assistance, Mr Amandio Freitas do Amaral, the entire MSS Dialogue Team, the National Director Administration and Finance, Mr Rogrio Nelson Alves and his team, the Media Office, the Office of Inspection and Audit, the Legal Unit, employees, national and international advisors to the MSS for giving all your efforts. All my thanks.

Maria Domingas Fernandes Alves MINISTER OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report is based on interviews and focus group discussions with 75 persons including Government officials, representatives of the United Nations Country Team and international organizations, national and international non-governmental partners, local community leaders and former Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). The consultant is indebted to all of these persons whose views and comments helped to inform the content and findings of this report. The consultant would like to express her deep appreciation to the Ministry of Social Solidarity, in particular to Minister Maria Domingas Fernandes Alves, Secretary of State Jacinto Rigoberto Gomes, and Director Amandio Amaral Freitas, and to all the current and past advisors and staff of the DPBCS, who shared their valuable institutional knowledge and frank reflections about the implementation of the National Recovery Strategy. The consultant also appreciates the extensive support she received from staff of the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) who provided important organizational and logistical assistance, as well as significant substantive input, during the review and documentation process. Without the support and participation of all those involved in the consultation process, this Report would not have been possible.

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS


Aldeia Chefe Aldeia Chefe Suco CPRU CRS DPBSC FAO F-FDTL HHE HHES HHF HHK HHPS HHU IDP ILO IOM JPC JRS MoU MSS NDLP NDSA NGO NRC NRS OHCHR OTF PDHJ PNTL SERC Suco ToR TWG UNDP UNFPA UNICEF UNIFEM
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A territorial demarcation of community, smaller than a Suco (hamlet) Elected chefe or leader of the Aldeia Elected chefe or leader of the Suco Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit Catholic Relief Services Department of Peace-Building and Social Cohesion Food and Agriculture Organization Defence Force of Timor-Leste Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade/Together Building Stability Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia Sosial/Together Building Social Economic Development Hamutuk Harii Futuru/Building Our Future Together Hamutuk Hari'i Konfiansa/Together Building Trust Hamutuk Harii Protesaun Sosial/Together Building Social Protection Hamutuk Harii Uma/Together Building Housing Internally Displaced Person International Labour Organization International Organization for Migration Justice Peace Commission Jesuit Relief Service Memorandum of Understanding Ministrio da Solidaridade Social/Ministry of Social Solidarity National Directorate for Land and Property National Directorate for Social Assistance Non-Governmental Organization Norwegian Refugee Council National Recovery Strategy Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Operational Task Force Provedor dos Direitos Humanos e Justica/Provedor for Human Rights and Justice National Police for Timor-Leste Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs Territorial demarcation of community, typically encompassing several Aldeia (village) Terms of Reference Technical Working Group United Nations Development Programme United Nations Population Fund United Nations Children's Fund United Nations Development Fund for Women

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

UNMIT UNPOL WeCo WFP WHO

United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste United Nations Police Womens Committees World Food Programme World Health Organization

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface...................................................................................................................................3 Acknowledgments................................................................................................................6 Acronyms and Glossary of Terms.......................................................................................7 Executive Summary...........................................................................................................10 Rezumu Exekutivu.............................................................................................................18 Introduction........................................................................................................................26 Scope and Methodology of Review...................................................................................28 Background and Context of the NRS...............................................................................30 Review of NRS Implementation........................................................................................37 General Overview..............................................................................................................................................37 Review of the Five Pillars..................................................................................................................................40 Housing Pillar .........................................................................................................................................40 Protection Pillar .....................................................................................................................................52 Security Pillar..........................................................................................................................................56 Socio-Economic Pillar...........................................................................................................................59 Trust-Building Pillar ...............................................................................................................................63 Strategic Partnerships........................................................................................................................................67 Main Findings......................................................................................................................70 General.................................................................................................................................................................70 Achievement of Strategy Objectives..............................................................................................................72 Effectiveness of Coordination Mechanisms and Strategic Partnerships.................................................74 Sustainability of NRS Results...........................................................................................................................76 Potential for Replicability of the NRS Approach in Other Countries....................................................77 Lessons Learned.................................................................................................................79 Recommendations..............................................................................................................82 Annexes...............................................................................................................................86 Annex 1: List of Interviewees..........................................................................................................................86 Annex 2: List of Interview Questions............................................................................................................89 Annex 3: Terms of Reference...........................................................................................................................90 Annex 4: List of Sources...................................................................................................................................94 Annex 5: Overview of Dialogue Initiatives...................................................................................................97 Annex 6: Map of SERC projects.....................................................................................................................99 Figures Figure 1: Overview of NRS Implementation Responsibilities...................................................................38 Figure 2: Summary of Recovery Support Benefits Programme under the NRS Housing Pillar........41 Figure 3: HHU Pillar Process Flow Chat.......................................................................................................43

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As a result of the 2006 crisis, more than 150,000 people fled their homes and took refuge in 65 IDP camps in Dili and the districts. Moreover, a number of houses and buildings were damaged or destroyed. Finding a sustainable resettlement and reintegration solution was a high priority for the IV Constitutional Government. In response, in December 2007, the Government adopted the National Recovery Strategy (NRS), known in Tetum as Hamutuk Harii Futuru (HHF), in order to establish a concerted Government response to the needs of IDPs and affected communities throughout the country. The NRS consisted of five pillars: 1) Hamutuk Harii Uma (Housing); 2) Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (Social Protection); 3) Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade (Stability); 4) Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia (Socio-Economic Development) 5) Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa (Trust-Building) and was guided by three overarching objectives:

1) To adopt a new vision toward national recovery, one that not only promotes mutual
acceptance but strengthens communities, local economies, stability and the relationship between Government and the people of Timor-Leste, whom they serve. 2) To establish a concerted All of Government approach to address the range of issues, including, social, physical, legal, economic, security and political that combine to create obstacles to the resettlement of those who have been displaced.

3) To meet both the needs of those who have been displaced and the wider needs of
affected communities throughout the country.1 Given the key role of MSS in the implementation of the NRS and in overseeing the successful return, resettlement and reintegration of more than 150,000 IDPs, extensive knowledge and experience has been accumulated. In order to document the implementation process of the NRS, review results achieved and identify lessons learned/recommendations for future efforts in the area of peace-building, this Report has been commissioned at the request of MSS and with financial support from UNDP.

Summary of Key Findings:


General:
Overall, implementation of the NRS was a major success and the speed in which the return process took place was unprecedented as well as the absence of major conflict in communities following the return and reintegration process. In just over two and a half years after the launch of the NRS, all of the 65 IDP camps were closed, and in less than four years after the outbreak of the 2006 crisis, the vast majority of the estimated 150,000 IDPs were able to successfully

Office of the Vice Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Hamutuk Harii Futuru: A National Recovery Strategy, 19 December 2007.
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return and reintegrate with no major security incidents or significant escalations of violence reported and with a settlement rate of less than two percent.

The NRS worked because it set out to address the immediate impact of the crisis as well as pre-existing community-level vulnerabilities. The Strategy was focused on broader recovery issues, rather than the mere closure of camps and return of IDPs; therefore, through its comprehensive and cross-cutting approach across the five pillar areas (housing, protection, social economic development, security and trustbuilding) the NRS acknowledged the importance of addressing both the immediate humanitarian needs as well as the underlying causes of tension in communities.

The IV Constitutional Government demonstrated strong political leadership and will in working towards the resolution of the IDP issue. In its national programme, the Government promised the implementation of the return process by the end of 2007 and in his budget speech to Parliament on 18 December 2008, the Prime Minister listed three priorities for the year including resolution of the IDP, Reinado and petitioners problems. This speech was matched with a proposed allocation of $15 million to deal with IDP return and reintegration.

The NRS worked because it was introduced at the right time. After spending more than a year and a half in IDP camps and enduring difficult conditions, the majority of the IDPs were ready to return home but simply needed the means to do so, including the provision of security and resources to repair and reconstruct their homes. The culmination of different developments including the decision of the Government to reduce blanket food distribution to IDPs and the death of Major Reinado created an enabling environment for return and an important window of opportunity for the Government to implement the NRS.

MSS leadership was critical to the success of the return and recovery process. All stakeholders consulted during the NRS review process agreed that without the involvement of MSS, implementation of the NRS would not have been possible. MSS successfully led the closure of the 65 camps and served as the lead ministry for three of the five pillars. The implementation of the Cash Recovery Grants scheme proved to be an enormous undertaking for MSS and despite the immense challenges faced by the Minister and her staff, the housing pillar was successfully closed on 31 December 2010.

The use of dialogue to facilitate IDP return and reintegration was critical to the success of the NRS. The large volume of dialogue meetings and mediations between IDPs and their communities of return facilitated by the MSS Dialogue Teams from June 2008 to October 2010 played a key role in helping communities to resolve return-related problems and in supporting the reconciliation process.

Although the NRS was envisaged as a comprehensive response, across the five pillar areas of housing, protection, security, socio-economic development and trust-building, the Cash Recovery Grant scheme under the housing pillar

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

overshadowed the other components of the NRS. While efforts were made to inform the public and IDP community about all pillars of the Strategy, most IDPs, Government officials, civil society partners and the general public saw the Strategy as being about the Cash Recovery Grants. Meetings of the Inter-Ministerial Commission focused mainly on the housing pillar, in particular issues related to the payment of the Cash Recovery Grants. Even while conducting interviews about NRS implementation, many of the interviewees were only familiar with and able to speak about the recovery packages.

Although most of the results achieved under the NRS were within the housing, protection and trust-building pillars, results were also indirectly achieved in the other two pillar areas. A large number of initiatives contributed to security-related reforms and increased employment opportunities which were implemented separate from the security and socio-economic pillars, but which contributed to progress and achievements towards the objectives of both pillars.

While the National Recovery Strategy was envisaged as an All-ofGovernment approach to recovery, the ability of the Government to operationalize this approach was limited. While the first two Government retreats on the NRS were well-attended by key ministries responsible for implementation of the Strategy, by the third retreat, the participation of these ministries declined significantly and in some instances never fully materialized. While the housing, protection and trustpillar working groups met regularly, there were few meetings of the security working group and the social-economic working group only convened once. Some ministries with key responsibilities under the NRS also never engaged in the manner required to achieve some of the key actions set out under the NRS.

Important efforts were made by the Government to ensure that that NRS corresponded to the needs of IDPs. The Government undertook direct consultations with IDPs, including more than 50 IDP camp managers in order to identify the needs of IDPs and identify the main obstacles to their return. The input from these consultations directly informed the final approach and content of the NRS.

The remarkable progress that was made in closing the IDP camps and in facilitating the peaceful return and resettlement of IDPs was due to the concerted efforts by the Government and its international and national partners. In direct partnership with the Government, the UN, together with international and national NGOs played an integral role in supporting the initial humanitarian response to the crisis and in addressing the protection needs of IDPs in the camps. the Government allocated $15 million to the cash recovery component of HHF Program, HHU. In April 2008, during the Oramento Rectificativo (budget review) of 2008, the government allocated a further $20 million to MSS for HHU, and in 2009 the Government allocated another $30 million for Phase I and Phase II of HHU, bring the overall budget to USD65 million. The total amount of expenditure for Recovery Packages and associated operational costs was $56.8 million. The remaining approximately $9 million was returned to the Ministry of Finance. Important strategic partnerships were also formed

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with IOM and UNDP which involved the provision of technical assistance early on in the conceptualization and drafting of the NRS and in the implementation of the Strategy through the design and development of several key projects. Additionally, approximately $70 million was provided by the International Community through the Flash, Consolidated and Transitional Strategy and Appeals between 2007 and 2009 to address the humanitarian needs of IDPs, returnees and vulnerable populations (including in the areas of food assistance, shelter and non-food items, water and sanitation, security, education, economic recovery and infrastructure) as well as to support implementation of the five pillars of the NRS. to support implementation of the NRS.

The degree of coordination at a high and operational level that was required under the Strategy posed a significant challenge for the Government given its limited institutional capacity. Although the Inter-Ministerial Commission was initially envisaged as a mechanism for coordinating the implementation of the Strategy, this function was never fully realized due to the fact that the limited number of meetings held, focused predominantly on issues related to the housing pillar such as camp closures, the establishment and closure of transitional shelters and the recovery packages. In the absence of an effective Inter-Ministerial Commission, coordination between the five pillar working groups was inherently weak which hindered the development of cross-pillar cooperation and synergies.

The limited number of meetings convened by socio-economic and security pillar working groups directly hampered the overall coordination of NRS. Although many initiatives were implemented by the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Defence and Security, because these initiatives were not implemented as specific components of the NRS, the Government was unable to track and link these back to the NRS. Without regular working group meetings, important opportunities for cross-pillar cooperation were also missed.

Recommendations
General:
1. The sudden outbreak of the crisis in 2006, and the immediate need for a comprehensive
response to the crisis, underlined the important function of coordination mechanisms at a national level in order to engage and ensure the participation of relevant ministries. Given the cross-cutting dimensions of man-made and natural disasters (in terms of housing, security, socio-economic and protection needs), a coordination mechanism should be established under the Office of the Prime Minister to support an immediate all-ofgovernment response to future man-made and national disasters.

2. Ensuring accountability for criminal acts committed during the 2006 crisis will be critical
in order to sustain the return and reintegration results achieved through the NRS over the longer term. Individuals who committed crimes and human rights violations during

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

the 2006 crisis should be held accountable in accordance with the recommendations of the Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste.

3. The HHU programme provided sufficient opportunities to ensure that pending cases and
complaints related to the HHU Cash Recovery Grants programme were fairly and comprehensively addressed through efforts of MSS to receive, review and re-evaluate pending cases and complaints. In cases where complaints still exist, persons should be informed about the possibility to appeal the MSS decisions and to address their complaint to legal institutions. In order to avoid raising expectations about the possibility of reopening the HHU programme, it is important that such avenues for redress are consistently communicated by the Government and national institutions to all persons wishing to file complaints.

4. Historically, political discourse has had a powerful impact in Timor-Leste in contributing to


both the incitement and resolution of conflict. The high-level political dialogues and peace ceremonies convened in 2008 under the auspices of the former Presidents Dialogue Commission set a positive example for communities about political reconciliation. The 21 August 2010 Maubisse meeting, where historical leaders came together to discuss the issue of possible new leaders from the next generations to carry out the process of national development and state building into the future is another positive example. With the upcoming elections, it will be important for all political parties and leaders to continue to send messages of reconciliation and tolerance in order to ensure that their discourse does not serve to further inflame pre-existing tensions and divisions.

5. Following the closure of the NRS in December 2010, some persons have remained
without homes (with some continuing to illegally reside in former transitional shelters) due to unresolved property issues or the fact that they did not own property prior to 2006 and have since become vulnerable. Alternative housing is needed for vulnerable persons that remain without durable solutions following the 2006 crisis as well as for those persons who are living in homes but are not the original owner of the house and who will require alternative accommodation once the new Land and Property Law is adopted and implemented. Under the Millennium Development Goals Suco Programme, five houses will be built in each of the 2,228 aldeias every year for vulnerable persons, resulting in more than 55,000 houses being built by 2015.2 This Programme could offer important solutions for vulnerable persons who remain without adequate housing as well as for future cases of displacement that will be encountered following the adoption of the land and property legislation.

6. Land and property disputes remain a contentious issue for communities. The resolution
of land and property issues, through the finalization, adoption and implementation of the Land and Property Law is therefore critical in order to ensure that long withstanding issues related to occupancy rights are finally addressed and prevented from serving as a trigger for future conflict.
2

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Constitutional Government IV, Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, p. 111.
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7. One of the root causes of the 2006 crisis was the sense of perceived social and regional
inequalities which were exacerbated by high unemployment, poverty, food insecurity and a housing shortage. The Governments Strategic Development Plan for 2011-2030 acknowledges that urban-rural imbalances and inter-regional imbalances are inevitable in a fast-changing economy.3 In order to ensure that future development does not contribute to the further widening of real and perceived social and regional inequalities, increased efforts will be needed by the Government, International Community and civil society to support equitable future development.

8. Although the NRS provided IDPs with the means to repair and reconstruct their homes,
there are still homes which remain destroyed or severely damaged. In order to assess future housing needs and ensure effective urban-rural planning and budgeting, a comprehensive mapping of homes destroyed and reconstructed should be conducted.

9. Based on the experience of the NRS Cash Recovery Grants, important mechanisms are
needed to ensure that recipients of the different social protection schemes under MSS are not receiving double payments across the schemes. In order to track payments and benefits given, it is recommended that an integrated database be established within MSS to cross-check the distribution and payment of social protection benefits.

10. Security proved to be a major challenge for MSS during the estimation and verification
process for the Cash Recovery Grants awarded under the NRS. Given the significant number of compensation payments now being made to veterans and other groups, it is recommended that MSS undertake a comprehensive security review in order to ensure the safety and security of staff and prevent outside interference in internal processes to determine and administer such payments.

Peace-building:
11. Through the work of the former MSS Dialogue Teams during the IDP return and
reintegration process, MSS has developed significant institutional capacity to support the resolution of community level tensions and conflicts. The recent establishment of the new Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion (DPBSC), will ensure that this important capacity is not lost and that practical knowledge and experience of former Dialogue Team staff (many of whom are now staff members of the new Department) continues to enhance national and community capacity to respond to, and mitigate sources of tension and conflict through dialogue and mediation. In order to sustain the work of the new Department (which is now funded under a UNDP project until 2013), it is recommended that funds be allocated for permanent civil servant positions and an operational budget after 2013.

12. With the upcoming Presidential elections and anticipated adoption of the land law, the
DPBSC will have an important preventative role over the next year. As a conflict-prevention

Ibid, p. 116.
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measure to respond to tensions related to further land disputes and increased politicization, it is recommended that the Department ramp up its dialogue and training efforts this year and also consider the organization of a national/district-level peace-building workshop in order to socialize the role of the DPBSC and increase awareness about the dialogue process.

13. There is a need to consolidate and coordinate efforts and programmes around peacebuilding and conflict prevention in order to avoid duplication of efforts. At the Government-level, there is a need for further coordination and clarification of roles and responsibilities between the DPBSC, the National Directorate for the Prevention of Community Conflicts under the Secretary of State for Security and the National Directorate for Land and Property under the Ministry of Justice. This is particularly important in order to ensure coordination in the mediation and resolution of community conflict (including those related to land and property disputes) since mediation teams will be established under all three offices. At the level of civil society, there are also a number of international and national NGOs involved in conflict resolution and peace-building. In order to ensure effective coordination within Government ministries and between civil society and the Government, it is recommended that a Government-led and chaired coordination body be established. Given MSS past experience as the lead Ministry for the Trust-Building pillar of the NRS, and its accumulated expertise and practical experience in the resolution of conflict and promotion of social cohesion, the new DPBSC would be well-positioned to lead such coordination efforts.

14. Given the accumulated knowledge of MSS DPBSC about the causes and dynamics of
conflict in communities throughout the country, the Department is well-placed to play a supportive and coordination role within the Government in ensuring that processes and approaches instituted during the implementation of the Strategic Development are conflict-sensitive. In this regard, the Department should work with other ministries to support the mainstreaming of a conflict-sensitive approach in the planning and implementation of national development processes.

15. In order to ensure meaningful participation of women in dialogue and peace processes, in
line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, the DPBSC, in coordination with the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality, should support the organization of specific peace-building and conflict resolution trainings for leaders of womens networks and NGOs in order to increase their capacity to actively participate in the resolution of conflicts. Technical support could also be given to support the development of womens peace networks.

16. The MSS DPBSC, in collaboration with networks of the National Directorate for the
Prevention of Community Conflict and Beluns Early Warning and Early Response System, should undertake a mapping and assessment of communities with a past history of conflict and which are facing current tensions related to areas such as youth gang violence, higher rates of violent crime and political animosities. In areas determined to be high risk, the DPBSC should support an increased number of dialogue meetings and mediations as a preventive measure, particularly in the lead up to the 2012 elections, and

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also coordinate with the Ministry of Defense and Security so that an increased security presence can be deployed, where necessary, in order to deter and respond to potential acts of violence.

17. The MSS DPBSC should cooperate with the Ministry for State Administration and
Territorial Planning, in order to ensure that training and support for Chefe Suco in the areas of mediation and conflict resolution are institutionalized within support programmes and initiatives and provided on an annual basis.

18. The DPBSCs Training, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit should focus its time and
resources on the development of training seminars for areas that have not yet had any form of training. Participants of such trainings should include an increased number of youth and martial arts groups, representatives of religious communities and political parties. It is also recommended that the Unit provide follow-up/refresher trainings for community leaders who attended past trainings in order to deepen their knowledge and address challenges they face in mediating conflict in their communities.

19. The MSS DPBSC should advocate for the inclusion of civic education and peace
education into the curriculum and training for new civil servants. Such training would ensure that Government officials, particularly those based in the districts, are wellequipped with knowledge about how to facilitate and support community-based resolution processes.

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REZUMU EZEKUTIVU
Tan krize 2006, ema liu nain 150.000 mak halai husik hela sira-nia uma hodi b hela iha kampu dezlokadu internu hamutuk 65 iha Dili no distritu-sira. S-tan, uma no edifsiu lubuk ida mak hetan estragu ka destrusaun. Hodi buka solusaun realokasaun no reintegrasaun sustentbel mak sai hanesan prioridade aas ida b Governu Konstitusionl Dahaak. Nunee, iha Dezembru 2007, Governu adopta Estratjia Rekuperasaun Nasionl (National Recovery Strategy - NRS), koesidu iha Ttun hanesan Hamutuk Harii Futuru (HHF), atu bele estabelese resposta ida konsertida hosi parte Governu-nian b nesesidade oioin hosi ema-sira dezlokadu internu hamutuk ho komunidade-sira neeb afetadu iha rai-laran nee. NRS nee iha ai-riin lima: 1) Hamutuk Harii Uma (Horik-fatin); 2) Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (Protesaun Sosil); 3) Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade; 4) Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia (Dezenvolvimentu Ssio-Ekonmiku) no 5) Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa (Harii-Fiar) neeb hetan orientasaun hosi objetivu jerl tolu:

1)

Atu adopta vizaun foun ida b rekuperasaun nasionl, ida neeb laos deit promove simu-malu maib fortifika komunidade-sira, ekonomia lokl, estabilidade no relasaun entre Governu no povu Timor-Leste, neeb mak sira serv.

2)

Atu estabelese aproximasaun konsertida ida hosi Governu Hothotu hodi responde b asuntu oioin, inkluindu asuntu sosil, fzikl, legl, ekonmiku, seguransa no poltika neeb hamutuk bele kria obstkulu oioin b re-estabelesementu hosi ema-sira neeb sai dezlokadu.

3)

Atu prienxe nesesidade oioin hosi ema-sira neeb dezlokadu no nesesidade jerl hosi komunidade-sira neeb afetadu iha territriu nee tomak.

Tan-nee papl MSS-nian iha implementasaun NRS no iha supervizaun b retornu neeb susesu, re-estabelesementu no reintegrasaun hosi ema-sira dezlokadu internu hamutuk liu nain 150.000, akumula ona koesementu estensivu no esperinsia. Atu dokumenta prosesu implementasaun NRS, revee rezultadu-sira neeb atinji ona no identifika lisaun-sira neeb aprende ona/ rekomendasaun oioin b futuru iha rea harii-dame, Relatriu ida-nee komisionadu ho pedidu hosi MSS no ho apoiu finanseiru hosi PNUD.

Sumriu hosi Deskoberta-sira Prinsipl:


Jerl:
Jerlmente, implementasaun hosi NRS sai hanesan susesu boot ida no prosesu retornu neeb akontese lalais nee la-ho presedente nunee ms auznsia hosi konflitu boot iha komunidade-sira leet depois prosesu retornu no reintegrasaun. Iha deit tinan rua ho balu depois lansamentu hosi NRS nee, konsege taka ona kampu hothotu b emasira dezlokadu internu neeb hamutuk 65, no la too tinan haat depois krize 2006 nakfera, maioria hosi nmeru ema-sira dezlokadu internu neeb tuir estimative

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hamutuk 150.000 bele fila-hikas no reintegra ho susesu hodi la-ho insidente seguransa nian neeb boot ka eskalasaun signifikativu hosi violnsia neeb relata no ho taxa reestabelesementu la liu hosi pursentu rua. NRS nee funsiona duni tan nia harii atu f resposta b impaktu imediatu hosi krize nee nunee ms vulnerabilidade-sira neeb mosu nanis ona iha nvel komunidade. Estratjia nee foka b asuntu rekuperasaun oioin neeb larga, duk foka deit b taka kampu no lori-fila ema-sira dezlokadu internu; tan-nee, liu-hosi ninian aproximasaun neeb abranjente no sempre iha relasaun entre rea pilr lima neeb iha (horik-fatin, protesaun, dezenvolvimentu ssio-ekonmiku, seguransa no harii-konfiansa) NRS rekoese importnsia atu responde nesesidade umanitria imediata no ms responde b kauza-sira prinsipl hosi tensaun oioin iha komunidade-sira. IV Governu Konstitusionl demonstra lideransa poltika ida forte no vontade hodi buka solusaun b asuntu IDP nian. Iha ninian programa nasionl, Governu nee promete implementasaun prosesu retornu iha tinan 2007-nia rohan no iha ninian intervensaun kona-b orsamentu iha Parlamentu iha 18 Dezembru 2008, Primeiru Ministru alista prioridade tolu b tinan neeb inkluindu solusaun b problema IDP, Reinado no petisionriu-sira. Lokusaun ida-nee apr duni ho proposta alokasaun orsamentu hamutuk $15 millaun atu lida retornu no reintegrasaun b IDP. NRS nee traballa duni tan introdz nia iha tempu neeb prpriu. Depois hela iha kampu dezlokadu liu perodu tinan ida ho balu no infrenta kondisaun oioin neeb difsil, maoiria hosi dezlokadu internu prontu atu fila-hikas b sira-nia uma maib simplesmente presiza meius atu fila, inkluindu fornese seguransa no rekursu oioin hosi hadiak no harii-hikas sira-nia uma. Kulminasaun hosi dezenvolvimentu oioin nee mak inklui dezisaun hosi Governu atu redz distribuisaun ai-haan b IDPs no Major Reinadu ninian mate kria ambiente neeb posibilita prosesu retornu no sai ms hanesan janela oportunidade importante ida b Governu atu implementa NRS. Lideransa MSS nian krtiku b susesu iha prosesu retornu no rekuperasaun. Parseiru hothotu neeb halo konsulta durante prosesu revizaun NRS konkorda katak la-ho involvimentu hosi MSS, NRS ninian implementasaun sei sai imposvel. MSS ho sesu lidera prosesu taka kampu hamutuk 65 nee no servi hanesan ministriu neeb lidera pilr tolu hosi pilr lima. Implementasaun hosi eskema Osan Rekuperasaun nian sai duni hanesan atividade ida enorme b MSS no mask Ministra no ninian funsionriusira hamosu dezafiu oioin neeb imensu, pilr horik-fatin nian konsege taka duni ho sesu iha 31 Dezembru 2010. Uzu hosi dilogu atu fasilita IDP-nia retornu no reintegrasaun sai krtiku b NRS-nia susesu. Volume dilogu enkontru no mediasaun neeb larga entre IDP-sira no komunidade lokl neeb Ekipa Dilogu hosi MSS fasilita hosi Juu 2008 too Outobru 2010 asumi papl prinsipl ida hodi tulun komunidade-sira rezolve problema oioin neeb relasionadu ho prosesu retornu no hodi suporta prosesu rekonsiliasaun.

19

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Mask prevee ona NRS nuudr resposta abranjente ida, hosi pilr lima neeb iha (horik-fatin, protesaun, seguransa, dezenvolvimentu ssio-ekonmiku, no hariikonfiansa), eskema Osan Subsdiu b Rekuperasaun (Cash Recovery Grant) neeb tama iha pilr horik-fatin nian mak domina tebes komponente-sira seluk hosi NRS. Mask iha duni esforsu oioin hodi informa pbliku no komunidade IDP-sira kona-b pilr hothotu hosi Estratjia nee, maioria IDP-sira, ofisil-sira Governu nian, parseirusira hosi sosiedade sivl, no pbliku jerl haree Estratjia nee mak Osan Subsdiu b Rekuperasaun deit. Enkontru-sira hosi Komisaun Inter-Ministeril prinsiplmente foka deit b pilr horik-fatin nian, partikulrmente kona-b asuntu-sira neeb relasionadu ho pagamentu hosi Osan Rekuperasaun nian. Nunee ms bainhira halo hela entrevista kona-b implementasaun NRS nian, ema-barak hosi sira neeb hetan entrevista hatene no bele koalioa deit kona-b pakote rekuperasaun.

Mask rezultadu-sira neeb atinji iha NRS-nia okos mak iha pilr horik-fatin, protesaun no harii-konfiansa nia laran, rea pilr rua seluk ms indiretamente atinji rezultaduhirak nee. Inisiativa lubuk ida kontribui b reforma oioin neeb liga ho seguransa no oportunidade aumentadu b impregu neeb mak pilr seguransa no dezenvolvimentu ssio-ekonmiku implementa ketak, maibe kontribui nafatin b progresu no alkansu b objetivu oioin hosi pilr rua nee.

Mask prevee Estratjia Rekuperasaun Nasionl nee hanesan aproximasaun ida hosi Governu Tomak nian b rekuperasaun, kapasidade Governu nian hodi operasionaliza aproximasaun nee limitadu. Mask retiru rua dahuluk hosi Governu nian kona-b NRS hetan atendimentu neeb diak hosi ministriu-sira prinsipl neeb responsvel b implementasaun hosi Estratjia nee, too iha retiru datoluk, partisipasaun hosi ministriusira nee tuun makaas tebes no iha kazu balu nunka bele materializa ho kompletu. Maske grupu traballu hosi pilr kona-b horik-fatin, protesaun no harii-konfiansa halo enkontru regulr, grupu traballu pilr seguransa nian halo deit enkontru neeb oitoan no grupu traballu pilr dezenvolvimentu ssiu-ekonmiku nian konvoka deit enkontru dala ida. Ministriu balu neeb asumi responsabilidade prinsipl tuir NRS ms nunka involve lols atu atinji asaun-sira prinsipl neeb estabelese ona iha NRS-nia okos.

Governu halo duni esforsu importante lubuk ida hodi garante katak NRS responde duni b nesesidade oioin hosi IDPs. Governu halo konsulta direta ho IDPs, inkluindu konsulta ho jerente kampu IDP liu 50 hodi nunee bele identifika nesesidade oioin hosi IDPs no atu identifika obstkulu prinsipl b sira-nia prosesu retornu. Informasaun oioin neeb mai hosi konsulta-hirak nee diretamente informa aproximasaun finl no kontedu hosi NRS.

Progresu notvel neeb halo hodi taka kampu IDP nian no hodi fasilita retornu neeb pasfiku no re-estabelesementu hosi IDP-sira bele akontese tan esforsu konsertidu oioin hosi parte Governu no ninian parseiru-sira internasionl no nasionl. Iha parseria direta ho Governu, ONU, hamutuk ho ONG-sira internasionl no nasionl halao papl ida integrl hodi apoia resposta umanitria inisil b krize no responde b nesesidade protesaun b IDP-sira iha kampu dezlokadu oioin. Parseria estratjika importante ms

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forma ho OMI no PNUD neeb involve iha fornesementu asistnsia tknika inisil iha NRS nian konseptualizasaun no ezbosu no durante implementasaun hosi Estratjia nee liu-hosi dezeu no dezenvolvimentu hosi projetu-sira importante balu. S-tan, Komunidade Internasionl fornese aproximadamente $70 millaun liu-hosi Flash, Consolidate and Transitional Strategy and Appeals entre 2007 no 2009 hodi apoia implementasaun hosi NRS. Grau koordenasaun iha nvel aas no operasionl neeb mak nesesita tuir Estratjia nee hamosu dezafiu ida signifikativu b Governu tan ninian kapasidade institusionl neeb limitadu. Mask Komisaun Inter-Ministeril nee inisilmente prevee hanesan mekanizmu ida b koordenasaun implementasaun hosi Estratejia nee, funsaun ida-nee nunka realiza kompletamente tan faktu katak nmeru enkontru neeb oitoan, foka makaas liu b kestaun-hirak neeb relasionadu ho pilr horik-fatin nian hanesan taka kampu, estabelesementu no taka uma provizriu no pakote oioin kona-b rekuperasaun. Bainhira la iha Komisaun Inter-Ministeril ida neeb efikz, koordenasaun entre grupu traballu pilr lima nee sai fraku neeb mak impede dezenvolvimentu kooperasaun inter-pilr no sinerjia oioin. Nmeru enkontru limitadu neebe mak grupu traballu hosi pilr ssio-ekonmika no seguransa diretamente f impaktu b koordenasaun jerl NRS nian. Mask inisiativa barak mak Ministriu Dezenvolvimentu Ekonomia no Ministriu Defeza no Seguransa implementa, tan implementasaun hosi inisiativa-hirak nee laos komponente espesfika NRS nian, Governu hetan susar hodi buka-tuir no liga fali inisiativa-hirak nee ho NRS. Hodi la iha enkontru grupu neeb regulr, lakon ms oportunidade-sira importante b kooperasaun inter-pilr.

Rekomendasaun
Jerl:
1. Tan surtu derepenti hosi krize iha 2006, no nesesidade imediata b resposta ida neeb abranjente, sublia ona funsaun importante hosi mekanizmu koordenasaun iha nvel nasionl ida atu involve no garante partisipasaun hosi ministriu-sira relevante. Tan dimensaun oioin neeb liga-malu hosi dezastre-sira neeb ema-mak-halo (kona-b nesesidade b horik-fatin, seguransa, ssio-ekonmiku no protesaun), mekanizmu koordenasaun ida tenke estabelesida iha Gabinete Primeiru Ministru nia okon atu apoia resposta imediata hosi governu-tomak (all-of-government) b dezastre-sira neeb ema mak halo ka dezastre-sira nasionl iha futuru. 2. Garanti responsabilidade b aktu-sira kriminl neeb komete durante krize 2006 sei sai krtiku atu sustenta rezultadu retornu no reintegrasaun neeb alkansa ona liu-hosi NRS iha longu termu. Ema-sira neeb komete krime no violasaun direitu-sira ema-nian durante krize 2006 tenke toma responsabilidade tuir rekomendasaun hosi Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste.
21 THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

3.

Programa HHU fornese oportunidade sufisiente hodi garante katak kazu-sira pendente no keixa-sira neeb relasionadu ho progrorama HHU-nia Cash Recovery Grants nee responde duni iha maneira ida justa no abranjente liu-hosi esforsu oioin hosi MSS atu simu, revee, no re-avalia kazu-sira neeb pendente no keixa-sira. Bainhira sei iha nafatin keixasira, presiza informa b ema kona-b posibilidade atu halo rekursu b MSS-nia desizaun-sira no atu hatoo sira-nia keixa-sira b instituisaun-sira neeb legl. Atu evita espetativa-sira neeb aas kona-b posibilidade atu loke-fali programa HHU, importante katak medida-sira atu rekompensa nee Governu no instituisaun-sira nasionl komunika iha maneira ida konsistente b ema-sira neeb hakarak atu hatoo sira-nia keixa oioin.

4.

Istorikamente, diskursu poltika f ona impaktu ida makaas tebes iha Timor-Leste hodi kontribui b instigasaun no rezolusaun konflitu. Dilogu poltika nvel-aas no serimnia oioin kona-b dame neeb konvoka iha 2008 iha auspsiu Komisaun Dilogu hosi antigun Prezidente nian f ezemplu pozitivu ida b komunidade-sira kona-b rekonsiliasaun poltika. Enkontru Maubisse iha 21 Agostu 2010, bainhira lder-sira istrika halibur malu hodi koalia kona-b asuntu lder-sira foun neeb posvel hosi jerasaun foun atu halao prosesu dezenvolvimentu nasionl no harii estadu iha futuru nee sai hanesan ezemplu pozitivu seluk-ida. Ho eleisaun neeb mai dadaun, importante b partidu poltiku no lder poltiku hothotu atu nafatin haruka lia-menon rekonsiliasaun no tolernsia atu garante katak sira-nia diskursu la serve tan atu sunu tensaun no divizaun neeb iha-nanis ona.

5.

Depois taka NRS iha Dezembru 2010, ema balu sei sai nafatin uma-laek (hodi nafatin hela ileglmente iha hela-fatin temporriu uluk) tan seidauk iha solusaun b kestaun propriedade ka faktu katak sira la sai nain b propriedade molok 2006 no hosi tempu neeb kedas sai ona vulnervel. Presiza iha horik-fatin alternativa b ema-sira vulnervel neeb mak seidauk hetan solusaun-sira durvel depois krize 2006 nunee ms b ema-sira neeb hela iha horik-fatin-sira maib sira laos nain b uma-hirak nee no sira nee sei presiza alojamentu alternativu bainhira adopta no implementa ona Lei Rai no Propriedade neeb foun. Iha Programa Suku nian hosi Objetivu Dezenvolvimentu Milniu, sei harii uma lima iha aldeia ididak neeb hamutuk 2.228 tintinan b ema-sira vulnervel, hodi nunee sei harii uma liu 55.000 iha 2015. Programa ida-nee bele oferese solusaun-sira importante b emasira vulnervel neeb la iha nafatin horik-fatin neeb adekuadu no mos kazu dezlokamentu oioin neeb sei mosu depois adopta lejislasaun kona-ba rai no propriedade.

6.

Disputa oioin kona-b rai no propriedade sei sai nafatin asuntu ida kontensioza b komunidade-sira. Tanb-nee, solusaun b asuntu-sira relasionadu ho rai no propriedade, liuhosi finalizasaun, adopsaun no implementasaun Lei Rai no Propriedade sai krtiku atu garante katak asuntu-sira pendende relasionadu ho direitu okupasaun nian finlmente hetan resposta no prevene hodi sai fali hanesan kauza b konflitu iha futuru.

7.

Kauza prinsipl ida hosi krize 2006 mak sentimentu persebidu dezigualdade sosil no rejionl neeb hetook aat liu tan ho dezempregu neeb aas, pobreza, inseguransa alimentr no falta hela-fatin. Governu-nia Planu Dezenvolvimentu Estratjiku b 2011-2030 rekoese katak dezekilbriu urbana-rurl no dezekilbriu inter-rejionl mak inevitvel iha ekonomia ida neeb muda-lalais. Atu bele garante katak dezenvolvimentu iha futuru la

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kontribui b dezekilbriu sosil no rejionl real no persevida neeb hetook luan, Governu, Komunidade Internasionl no sosiedade sivl sei presiza esforsu-sira neeb hetook barak hodi apoia dezenvolvimentu futuru neeb ekitvel. 8. Mask NRS f duni meius b IDP-sira hodi hadiak no harii-hikas sira-nia uma, sei iha umasira neeb hetan destroisaun ka estragu makaas. Atu avalia nesesidade b uma nian iha futuru no atu garante planu urbanu-rurl no orsamentu neeb efetivu, tenke halao mapeamentu ida abranjente b uma-sira neebe mak hetan destroisaun no rekonstrusaun. 9. Bazea b esperinsia hosi NRS-nia Cash Recovery Grants, presiza mekanizmu importante oioin atu garante katak resepiente-sira hosi eskema protesaun sosil oioin neeb diferente hosi MSS la simu pagamentu dupla iha eskema-hirak nee. Atu haree-tuir pagamentu no benefsiu oioin neeb f ona, rekomenda atu estabelese baze-de-dadus ida integrada iha MSS-nia laran atu cross-check distribuisaun no pagamentu hosi benefsiu oioin protesaun sosil nian. 10. Seguransa sai duni hanesan dezafiu ida prinsipl b MSS durante prosesu estimasaun no verifikasaun b Osan Subsdu b Rekuperasaun (Cash Recovery Grants) nian neeb mak NRS haraik. Tan nmeru kompensasaun pagamentu nian neeb signifikativu nee halao dadaun b veteranu no grupu-sira seluk, rekomenda atu MSS halao revizaun seguransa abranjente ida atu garante salvasaun no seguransa b funsionriu-sira no prevene interfernsia esterna iha prosesu interna atu determina no administra pagamentu-sira hanesan nee.

Harii-ps:
11. Liu-hosi servisu antigu Ekipa Dilogu MSS-nian durante prosesu retornu no reintegrasaun IDP, MSS dezenvolve ona kapasidade institusionl neeb signifikativu hodi apoia rezolusaun b tensaun no konflitu iha nvel komunidade. Estabelesementu foin lalais b Departamentu HariiDame no Koezaun Sosil (Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion - DPBSC) neeb foun, sei garante katak kapasidade importante ida-nee sei la lakon no esperinsia hosi funsionriu-sira iha Ekipa Dilogu antigu (barak mak ohin-loron sai nuudr funsionriu b Departamentu foun nee) kontinua atu eleva kapasidade nasionl no komunidade atu responde b, no mitiga fonte oioin b tensaun no konflitu liu-hosi dilogu no mediasaun. Atu bele sustenta servisu hosi Departamentu foun nee (neeb mak dadaun nee hetan fundu hosi projetu PNUD nian too 2013), rekomenda atu aloka fundu b pozisaun funsionriu permanente no orsamentu operasionl ida depois 2013. 12. Ho eleisaun Prezidensil neeb mai dadaun no adopsaun antesipada hosi lei b rai, DPBSC sei asumi papl preventative ida importante iha tinan oin. Nuudr medida prevensaun ida atu responde b tensaun oioin neeb relasionadu ho disputa oioin kona-b rai neeb mosu barbarak no politizasaun neeb aumentu, rekomenda atu prepara didiak ninian esforsu dilogu no formasaun tinan nee no ms konsidera atu organiza kolkiu kona-b harii-dame iha nvel nasionl/distritu atu sosializa papl hosi DPBSC no hasae sensibilizasaun kona-b prosesu dilogu

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

13. Iha nesesidade atu konsolida no koordena esforsu no programa oioin kona-b harii-dame no prevensaun konflitu atu evita duplikasaun hosi esforsu-sira. Iha nvel-Governu, iha nesesidade ida atu kontinua koordenasaun no klarifikasaun kona-b funsaun no responsabilidade entre DPBSC, Diresaun Nasionl b Prevensaun Konflitu-sira iha Komunidade iha Sekretariadu Estadu b Seguransa no Diresaun Nasionl b Rai no Propriedade iha Ministriu Justisa. Idanee partikularmente importante atu garante koordenasaun iha mediasaun no rezolusaun iha konflitu komunidade nian (inkluindu hirak neeb relasionadu ho disputa rai no propriedade nian) tan ekipa mediasaun nian sei estabelese iha gabinete tolu nee hotu. Iha nvel sosiedade sivl, iha ms ONG-sira internasionl no nasionl lubuk ida neeb mak involve iha rezolusaun konflitu no harii-dame. Atu garante koordenasaun neeb efetivu entre ministriu-sira iha Governu-nia laran no entre sosiedade sivl no Governu, rekomenda atu estabele rgaun koordenasaun ida neeb Governu mak lidera no xefia. Tan MSS-nia esperinsia pasada nuudr Ministriu koordenadr pilr Harii-Konfiansa hosi NRS, no ninian persia akumulada no esperinsia prttika iha rezolusaun konflitu no promosaun koezaun sosil, DPBSC foun nee iha pozisaun-diak atu lidera esforsu koordenasaun hanesan nee. 14. Tan koesementu akumuladu hosi MSS-nia DPBSC kona-b kauza no dinmika oioin hosi konflitu iha komunidade-sira iha nasaun nee, Departamentu nee iha pozisaun ida diak atu asumi papl apoiu no koordenasaun iha Governu-nia laran hodi garante prosesu no aproximasaun-sira neeb institui ona durante implementasaun Dezenvolvimentu Estratjiku nee sensvel b konflitu. Tan-nee, Departamentu nee tenke servisu hamutuk ho ministriusira seluk atu apoia abordjen hosi aproximasaun neeb sensvel b konflitu iha planifikasaun no implementasaun hosi prosesu dezenvolvimentu nasionl. 15. Atu bele garante partisipasaun signifikativu b feto-sira iha prosesu dilogu no paz, tuir Rezolusaun 1325 hosi Konsellu Seguransa Nasoens Unidas nian kona-b Feto, Paz no Seguransa, DPBSC, hodi koordena hamutuk ho Sekretariadu Estadu b Promosaun Igualdade, tenke apoia organiza formasaun espesfika kona-b harii-dame no rezolusaun konflitu b ldersira hosi rede feto nian no ONG-sira hodi eleva sira-nia kapasidade atu partisipa ativamente iha rezolusaun konflitu. Presiza fornese ms apoiu tkniku b feto-sira iha dezenvolvimentu rede b dame. 16. MSS-nia DPBSC, hodi servisu hamutuk ho rede-sira hosi Diresaun Nasional ba Prevensaun Konflitu Komunidade no Belun-nia Aviza Antesipada no Sistema Resposta Antesipada, tenke halo mapeamentu no avaliasaun ba komunidade-sira ne'ebe iha istoria konflitu iha pasadu no ne'ebe mak dadaun ne'e infrenta hela tensaun oioin ne'ebe relasionadu ho area-sira hanesan violensia entre grupu joventude, taxa krimi violensia ne'ebe aas no animozidade politika. Iha area-hirak ne'ebe determina ho risku aas, DPBSC tenke apoia aumenta numeru enkontru dialogu no mediasaun hanesan medida preventiva, partikularmente molok atu tama ba eleisaun jeral 2012, no mos atu koordena ho Ministeriu Defeza no Seguransa atu nune'e bele koloka prezensa seguransa ida ne'ebe maka'as, bainhira nesesita, atu nune'e bele hatauk no responde ba aktu potensial violensia nian. 17. MSS-nia DPBSC di'ak-liu koopera ho Ministeriu Administrasaun Estatal no Ordenamentu Territorial, atu bele garante katak formasaun no apoiu ba Xefe Suku-sira iha area mediasaun

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

24

no rezolusaun konflitu ne'e institusionaliza iha programa apoiu-sira no inisiativa-sira nia laran no fornese tuir formasaun ne'e tintinan. 18. DPBSC-nia Unidade ba Formasaun, Monitorizasaun no Avaliasaun di'ak-liu aloka ninian tempu no rekursu oioin ba iha dezenvolvimentu formasaun kolokiu ba area-sira ne'ebe seidauk hetan tipu formasaun ruma. Partisipante-sira ba formasaun hanesan ne'e di'ak-liu inklui grupu jovensira no grupu arte marsial ho numeru ne'ebe boot, reprezentante hosi komunidade relijioza no partidu politika. Rekomenda mos atu Unidade ne'e fornese formasaun tuir-mai/resiklajen ba lider komunitariu sira ne'ebe mak atende ona formasaun uluk atu nune'e aprofunda sira-nia matenek no responde ba dezafiu oioin ne'ebe sira hasoru bainhira halo mediasaun ba konflitu iha sira-nia komunidade. 19. MSS-nia DPBSC tenke advoka b inkluzaun edukasaun svika no edukasaun paz nian iha kurrkulu no formasaun b funsionriu-sira pbliku. Formasaun hanesan nee sei garante katak ofisil-sira Governu nian, partikulrmente sira neeb hela iha distritu-sira, iha koesementu neeb diak kona-b oins atu fasilita no apoia prosesu rezolusaun bazeadu iha komunidade.

25

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

INTRODUCTION

The impact of the April-May 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste was devastating for the country. As a newly independent nation, the crisis triggered the collapse of fragile state institutions built up in the short time since the countrys independence in 2002 and large-scale displacement of approximately 150,000 internally displaced persons. As a result, the attention and priorities of the Government of Timor-Leste and the International Community rapidly turned to addressing the urgent humanitarian situation and responding to the volatile security situation. Finding a sustainable return solution was a high priority for the IV Constitutional Government and, in response, in December 2007, the Government adopted the NRS. The aim of the Strategy was to establish a concerted Government response that would meet both the needs of the IDPs and the affected communities throughout the country. The Strategy acknowledged that in order to ensure sustainable return of IDPs, the root causes of the crisis would need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. As a result, the NRS was comprised of five pillars:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Hamutuk Harii Uma (Housing) Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (Social Protection) Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade (Stability) Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia Sosial (Socio-Economic Development) Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa (Trust-Building)

In implementing the Strategy, the Government established strategic partnerships with international and national partners who provided important technical and logistical support and strategic advice to the Government in its efforts to achieve national recovery and ensure the sustainable return and reintegration of IDPs. Almost four years after the adoption of the NRS, and following the official closure of the HHF Programme in February 20104, the Ministry of Social Solidarity, as the lead ministry responsible for the implementation of the Strategy is now interested to assess the results, impact and lessons learned that have emerged. The International Community has also expressed interest in having a further analysis of the NRS as a case study for other countries recovering from crisis. With these aims in mind, the overall objective of the MSS-led review and documentation of the NRS is to review progress towards the NRS objectives and document the process, results, and main lessons learned and to develop a Final Report which will serve as a reference to be shared with a wide audience such as civil society, international agencies, and Government institutions.5

The National Recovery Strategy/HHF Programme was officially closed on 18 February 2010 under Government Resolution No. 8/2010.
5

MSS/UNDP Timor-Leste, Terms of Reference for a Consultant for the Review and Documentation of the National Recovery Strategy. MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 26

In pursuit of this objective, the focus of this review and documentation is: 1. 2. 3. 4. To assess the extent to which the NRS has achieved its overall objectives; To review results achieved in the various pillars of the NRS; To describe and assess the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms and strategic partnerships established to support of the implementation of the NRS; To identify key factors that will require attention in order to improve prospects for sustainability of the results and the potential for replication of the approach in other countries; To describe the main lessons that have emerged; and To provide a set of recommendations, including for future efforts related to peace-building, in order to consolidate the gains achieved by the NRS.

5. 6.

This review concludes with a set of recommendations including specific recommendations related to future initiatives needed in the area of peace-building to consolidate the gains achieved by the NRS.

27

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF REVIEW

Scope
Given the breadth and depth of the NRS as a comprehensive and cross-sectoral strategy, this documentation and review focuses only on the implementation of the Strategy including the period from when it was adopted in December 2007 until when it officially closed in December 2010. This report does not therefore include a comprehensive overview of the humanitarian response to the 2006 crisis which has already been addressed in other reports.6

Methodology
In documenting and reviewing the NRS, the views and opinions of a wide range of relevant national authorities, community beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders/partners involved in, and affected by implementation of the Strategy, were actively sought and included within the overall findings of this report. Between 22 September 19 October 2011, the consultant met with a total of 75 persons (52 men and 23 women) including 29 government officials from seven different ministries/secretaries of state, 18 officials from the UN Country Team, 15 representatives from international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), one representative of a national institution, seven local leaders from three districts and IDP representatives. When examining the results and impact of the strategy, gender considerations, were taken into account and mainstreamed into the methodology and findings. Efforts were also made to include an equal number of both women and men in the consultation meetings and interviews. For a full list of interviewees, see Annex 1. In the original evaluation proposal submitted to the CPR Unit, a comprehensive list of evaluation questions was developed (see Annex 2) which were used as the basis for the interviews. Questions were then asked according to the relevant role/involvement of each interviewee in the NRS implementation process. Finally, the review and findings were informed by a comprehensive document review that was conducted prior to, and during, the documentation and review process. A list of key documents reviewed is included in Annex 4.

In 2009, the international humanitarian and recovery community in Timor-Leste (UN and INGOs) led by OXFAM and with the support of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, commissioned an evaluation of its humanitarian response to the 2006 crisis. The purpose of the evaluation was to consider the nature of the humanitarian emergency generated by the 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste and assess the appropriateness of the interagency response from April 2006 to mid-2008. Source: UNMIT, The Humanitarian and Recovery Update, Issue No. 2, December 2009, p. 3.
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 28

Limitations
In conducting the consultations for this report, the consultant was informed that many of the key staff and stakeholders who were directly involved in the implementation of the NRS were no longer in their posts. In cases where these persons were still in Dili, the consultant was able to reach these persons and interview them. In cases where staff and stakeholders were no longer in Dili, efforts were made to conduct interviews by telephone and to send out questionnaires electronically. In some cases, where it was not possible to meet with key stakeholders, the consultant relied on information received through past interviews she conducted as part of the evaluation of two UNDP/MSS projects under the Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa/Trust-Building pillar of the NRS.7 In spite of these attempts, there remained instances where important stakeholder feedback was not possible due to the fact that new staff were not present during the implementation of the NRS and therefore lacked the institutional knowledge necessary to provide relevant information. Another limitation the consultant encountered was in meeting former IDPs. Due to the volume of consultations required and time limitations, it was not possible to undertake a comprehensive and systematic consultation process with former IDPs. Instead, the consultant chose to rely on finding from the Return Monitoring Project Final Report recently completed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).8 A final limitation was the discrepancy in available information related to the work and progress of the five pillar areas of the NRS. While some pillars (such as the Housing and Trust-Building pillars) were extremely well-documented, information about the other three pillar areas was much more limited. This, combined with the unavailability of many of the key informants, made it difficult for the consultant to undertake a comprehensive documentation of the implementation progress and final results of all five pillars.

7 Between March-June 2011, the consultant conducted external evaluations of the MSS/UNDP projects, Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue and Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs. 8

The consultant is extremely grateful to IOM for agreeing to provide her with a preliminary copy of this report so that the findings and consultations from it could be used in order to provide useful information about the perceptions and views of IDPs and community leaders.
THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

29

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT


The social, economic and political impact of the 2006-2007 crises in Timor-Leste was significant in that it further compounded past sources of conflict and tension. While the dismissal of the petitioners, and subsequent violence and destruction of property that followed, may have served as a trigger for the displacement of more than 150,000 persons, the cause of the instability and displacement are deep-rooted and complex. In assessing the effectiveness of the Government of Timor-Lestes NRS in dealing with the consequence and causes of protracted displacement, it is therefore important to first examine the historical, political, economic, social and cultural factors that contributed to the crisis. Displacement is, unfortunately, not a new phenomenon for Timor-Leste. The first occurrence was reported during the Portuguese colonial era when many families lost their land as a result of commercial interests and were forced to resettle internally.9 During the 1974-1975 civil war, in which thousands of people were killed in combat and hundreds of political prisoners executed, tens of thousands of civilians were displaced to West Timor.10

The most significant displacement occurred during Indonesian occupation between1975-1999 when state-sponsored forced displacement programmes resulted in entire villages being

9 Bugalski, Natalie, Post Conflict Housing Reconstruction and the Right to Adequate Housing in Timor-Leste: An Analysis of the Response to the Crisis of 2006 and 2007, 27 July 2010, p.3. 10 United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, October 2006, para. 16.

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

30

resettled.11 In the months leading up to the UN-sponsored popular consultation to determine whether the country would remain an autonomous region of Indonesia or become an independent state, an estimated 60,000 people were displaced from their villages to urban centres when pro-integrationist militias supported by the Indonesian army, waged a campaign of violence, destruction and illegal mass deportations.12 Following the positive vote for independence, wide-scale human rights abuses, burning and looting by the militias resulted in the destruction of much of the countrys infrastructure and housing stock13, the collapse of the economy and state institutions and the forced displacement of the majority of the population.14 Among the displaced were hundreds of thousands of Timorese who were pushed out of Dili into West Timor as refugees. The initial returnees to Dili, IDPs who had fled eastwards, rapidly and illegally occupied most of the few houses that were not destroyed; therefore, upon the return of many of the IDPs from West Timor, they found their homes occupied by mainly easterners. Due to the fact that land and housing records were destroyed by the pro-integrationist militias, returnees were unable to prove ownership of their occupied homes and unable to file claims to their property due the absence of a land claims process.15 The problems of returnees were further compounded by critical housing shortages and high housing prices due to the large number of persons choosing to stay in Dili given the lack of economic activity in the districts.16 As a newly independent state, apart from the challenges posed by displacement, Timor-Lestes development and prosperity was hampered by a range of other factors including high unemployment rates, historical political division dating back to the civil war, regional economic disparities, increasing perceptions of east-west cleavages, fragile state institutions and weak rule of law. The majority of the countrys population was affected by poverty and chronic deprivation with one fifth living on less than one United States dollar per day. Timor-Leste was ranked 142nd out of the 177 countries included in the UNDP Human Development Report 2006. It was against this backdrop, the crisis of 2006 emerged.

Outbreak of the 2006 Crisis


On 9 January 2006, members of the Timor-Leste armed forces (F-FDTL) submitted a petition to the President and Chief of Defense concerning alleged discrimination against members from the
11 In its 2005 report, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) observed that between 1975 to 1999, almost all persons in Timor-Leste have experienced at least one period of displacement, CAVR. 2005. Chega!., Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, s 7.3.7. (www.cavrtimorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm). 12 Lopes, Ibere, Land and Displacement in Timor-Leste, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 43 June 2009, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3007. 13 Militia were reported to have damaged up to 30% of houses in Dili and an estimated 80% of houses across the country. Harrington, Andrew, Ethnicity, Violence and Land and Property Disputes in Timor-Leste, East Timor Law Journal, 2007, http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org. p. 59. 14 15

Bulgalski, p.3.

In an attempt to regulate occupations of homes, Law No 1/2003 was adopted which enabled more than 6,000 illegal occupants to submit applications for regularization of their occupation in exchange for leases with DTLP. As a result of this Law, 50% of houses in Dili became occupied illegally (Harrington, p. 74).
16

Ibid.
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31

western areas of the country. Following the decision of the petitioners to abandon their barracks on 17 February, on 16 March, the Chief of Defense announced the mass dismissal of 594 soldiers, representing almost 40 percent of the armed forced. On 24 April, the petitioners, held demonstrations in front of the Government Palace which became increasingly critical towards the Government, particularly as outside parties joined the demonstration including youth and political elements. On 28 April, the last day of demonstrations, violence erupted when a group of the demonstrators started to throw stones and attack the Government offices. The violence, which then spread quickly to other parts of Dili, included the burning of more than 100 homes owned mainly by easterners in Rai Kotu.17 As a result of the violent riots, five persons were killed, at least 60 injured and a significant number of properties were damaged including the total destruction of 45 homes and the damage of 116.18 Additionally, the physical damage and psychological impact of the violence, caused an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 Dili residents (out of a total population of around 180,000) to become displaced. While most fled to surrounding mountains and outer districts, at least 5,000 sought refuge in churches and other public buildings throughout Dili.19 On 25-26 May 2006, the security situation again deteriorated when renewed fighting broke out between the pro-government troops and disaffected Falintil soldiers. This outbreak of violence lasted for several days and included communal fighting between easterners and westerners as well as further lootings and burnings of houses and government buildings. This violence resulted in the death of 40 people and a significant rise in the number of displaced persons with the population of IDP camps increasing by 300% in 24 hours with more than 20,000 residents fleeing their homes to camps outside the city.20 The overall impact of the April-May 2006 crisis was devastating for Timor-Leste. At least 37 persons were killed and approximately 150,000 persons were displaced (with an estimated 73,000 persons in IDP camps in and around Dili and 78,000 who moved to districts outside Dili).21 More than 2,200 houses were destroyed and more than 1,600 damaged, which rendered more than 20,000 persons without a home to return to.22 As concluded by the UN Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, the violent events of April/May 2006 were an expression of deep-rooted problems inherent in fragile State institutions and a weak rule of law.23 One of the key factors underpinning the crisis was secondary land
17

United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, October 2006, para. 50.

18 Statement of Sukehiro Hasegawa, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste and Head of Mission of the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste. United Nations Security Council, 5432nd Meeting, 5 May 2006, New York. 19 20

Ibid.

United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, October 2006, para. 101. United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, October 2006, para. 101.

21

22 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007), 1 February 2007, para. 52. 23

United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, October 2006, para. 221.
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 32

occupation issues dating back to 1999 which were re-awakened during the population displacement in 2006. For past IDPs from West Timor whose homes were illegally occupied by easterners, some saw the crisis of 2006 as an opportunity to take back their property. Perceived social cleavages and discrimination between easterners and westerners, especially when fanned by political elements also contributed to upheaval in 2006.

Initial Response to the Crisis


Following the crisis, immediate humanitarian relief efforts to the estimated 150,000 IDPs were mobilised by the Government of Timor-Leste and the international community. A Flash Appeal outlining priority rapid response activities aimed at mitigating the humanitarian consequences of the crisis and outlining a multi-sectoral relief operation to be undertaken over a three month period was launched for USD 19 million and was 114 percent funded.24 In close collaboration with international partners, the Government took significant measures to address the humanitarian needs of the IDPs. Several United Nations agencies,25 together with international and local non-governmental organizations26, provided food assistance, protection, shelter, camp management and camp coordination, water and sanitation services, education and emergency health interventions. IOM, through its camp management teams, partnered with MSS to ensure that the daily basic assistance and protection needs of IDPs were met including water and sanitation upgrades and tent replacements; coordination and logistics for food distribution; provision of information on Government policies; support to intra and inter-camp and community dialogues and other conflict mitigation activities, support to camp leadership structures; and daily monitoring of camp services, including those for health, security, education, protection, child friendly activities as well as water and sanitation.27 The UN Food and Agricultural Organization, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), provided support for the development of livelihoods and cash-for-work projects, particularly aimed at neighbourhoods of Dili affected by the crisis. All activities related to humanitarian assistance were coordinated by the former Minister of Labour and Community Reinsertion and the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, with support of the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.28

24 25

United Nations, Timor-Leste Crisis: June-September Flash Appeal, June 2006.

These included the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF).
26 These included Austcare, Belun, CARE International, Concern Worldwide, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Jesuit Relief Service (JRS), Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam and Plan International 27 28

Ministry of Social Solidarity, Annual Report: Words of Solidarity, 30 August 2007 30 August 2008, p. 18.

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007), 1 February 2007, para. 50.
33 THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

In order to assess property damages and immediate housing needs, UNDP, under its Urgent Damage Assessment and Recovery Planning Project, conducted assessment surveys of damaged houses in order to better plan the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase between October 2006 and April 2007.29

Initiatives to foster national dialogue and political reconciliation at a national level were also given an elevated importance in November 2006. Under the auspices of the Presidents Dialogue Commission, a series of mid-level dialogue events between political parties and civil society took place and was followed by a high-level political dialogue and traditional peace ceremony which included state officials, political party leaders and commanders of the F-FDTL and PNTL.30 These initiatives helped to renew political cooperation and reconciliation at a high level and served as the beginning of a process to overcome the political impasse that existed following the crisis. Initiatives were also undertaken to support community-level dialogue under the Government-led Simu-Malu (Accept Each Other) programme, established under the Ministry of Labour and Community Reinsertion, which aimed at facilitating the reintegration of IDPs and addressing social cleavages and tensions in various neighbourhoods, particularly around the IDP camps.31 While this programme helped to address reduce violent incidents between some sections of IDP camps and surrounding neighbourhood gangs, it was less successful in supporting IDP reintegration and in providing solutions to overcome obstacles to IDP return such as resolution of land and property issues and support for rebuilding homes damaged or destroyed during the 2006 crisis.32
29 United Nations Development Programme, Urgent Damage Assessment and Recovery Planning Project, Progress Report, January-February 2007. 30 31 32

Ibid, paras 3-4. Ibid, para. 6.

The International Crisis Group asserted that neither programme worked because of insufficient staff and resources and because the problem required more than just dialogue.
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 34

The Imperative to Resolve the IDP Crisis


At the time the IV Constitutional Government took office in August 2007, more than 100,000 persons still remained displaced in Dili and the districts. [Prime Minister] Gusmo and other political leaders were conscious of the highly visible evidence of the recent crisis and the failure of the Government and to restore confidence, stability and normalcy in the capital, more than a year and a half since the conflict broke out. The camps were in plain sight throughout Dili, situated at locations such as the airport and hospital grounds and in front of an upmarket hotel in the city centre.33 In response to this protracted situation of displacement, and in recognition of the increasing urgency to provide durable solutions to IDPs to facilitate their return, relocation and reintegration, the newly elected Government made resolving the displacement crisis one of its main priorities. In its national programme, the Government promised the implementation of the return process by the end of 2007.34 In an effort to translate these words into action, an inter-ministerial retreat, chaired by the Vice Prime-Minister, was held on September 2007 and attended by relevant ministers, UN agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders. The objective of the retreat was to reflect on experiences and lessons learned under the first constitutional government in dealing with IDP issues and to identify required actions to support IDPs to return to their homes or to relocate to other suitable areas.35 The retreat resulted in recommendations on the establishment of a Framework for Action to Address IDP Issues and the creation of a Technical Working Group (TWG) to develop the Framework into a broader strategy.36 The TWG was led by the Ministry of Social Solidarity and comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of State Administration, Secretary of State for Security, Ministry

[T]he return and resettlement of IDPs is indeed only a first step on a long road to the sustainable stabilisation of communities. Indeed, we must recognise that not all conflicts have been resolved.The challenges to sustainable return are a manifestation of the 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste and of the broader societal and political problems which led to it. [] In order to ensure national recovery and ongoing community stability, it will therefore be necessary that the Government honestly assess and acknowledge the root causes of the crisis and work closely with communities to deal with them.The stability of communities is dependent on interventions involving a variety of sectors including infrastructure, policing, an improved justice system, housing, improvements to social capital and community services and mediation.

Xanana Gusmo, Prime Minister of TimorLeste on 21 November 2008

33 34

Bugalski, p. 23. Fourth Constitutional Government Programme, presented to the Parliament on 13 September 2007.

35Ministry

of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p. 2. Ibid. p. 2.
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36

35

of Health as well as national and international agencies including UNDP, IOM and the local NGO Belun.37 The final version of the NRS was presented to the Council of Ministers and approved on 17 December 2007. On the day prior to the official launch of the National Recovery Strategy, the Prime Minister, in his budget speech to Parliament on 18 December 2008, listed three priorities for the year including resolution of the IDP, Reinado and petitioners problems. This speech was matched with a proposed allocation of $15 million to deal with IDP return and reintegration. These actions and measures underlined the strong political leadership and will of the new Government to put in place both resources and a national strategy to work towards the resolution of the IDP issue.

37

Ibid, p.2.
36

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

REVIEW OF NRS IMPLEMENTATION


General Overview
The NRS was developed as a comprehensive and all-of-Government response to support national recovery following the 2006 crisis. The Strategy recognized the complex and delicate nature of recovery and the importance of concerted efforts by the Government, communities, civil society and the International Community in order to address both the immediate impact of the crisis and pre-existing community-level vulnerabilities. The final NRS was officially endorsed by the Council of Ministers on 17 December 2007, and was guided by the following three overarching objectives:

1) To adopt a new vision toward national recovery, one that not only promotes mutual
acceptance but strengthens communities, local economies, stability and the relationship between Government and the people of Timor-Leste, whom they serve.

2) To establish a concerted all-of-Government approach to address the range of issues,


including, social, physical, legal, economic, security and political that combine to create obstacles to the resettlement of those who have been displaced.

3) To meet both the needs of those who have been displaced and the wider needs of
affected communities throughout the country.38 Regarding the first objective, the vision set out in the Strategy acknowledged that the mere closure of camps and return of IDPs would not be enough to ensure post-crisis recovery. Instead, recovery required solutions to address the wide range of obstacles to the return of IDPs as well as measures to resolve protracted and deep-rooted social problems, tensions and conflicts. The need to rebuild weak state institutions, instill trust in the Government and foster a sense of social cohesion and national identity, were also seen as integral to the recovery process. In this regard, efforts were made to ensure that the NRS responded to: a) the need for enhanced trust between communities and the Government and IDPs and communities of return; b) the requirement for high-level leadership in reconciliation efforts; c) the need for improved security in communities; d) the provision of socio-economic opportunities to promote increased employment and income generation; and e) the strengthening of a sense of shared history and national identity.39 In responding to each of these areas, the final NRS outlined a framework for national recovery based on five pillars: 1) Hamutuk Harii Uma (Housing); 2) Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (Social Protection); Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade (Stability) Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia (Socio-Economic Development) Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa (Trust-Building).

38 Office of the Vice Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Hamutuk Harii Futuru: A National Recovery Strategy, 19 December 2007. 39 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Evaluation of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Lessons Learnt and Recommendations, 18 December 2009, p. 11.

37

THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

In terms of the second objective, the NRS recognized that reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged and destroyed homes would only address one of many obstacles to return and that, in order to ensure successful recovery, social, physical, legal, economic, security and political issues facing IDPs and their communities of return also needed to be resolved. In order to ensure a holistic response to recovery, the NRS called for a concerted effort by the Government, communities, civil society and the international community. In order to ascertain government leadership and engagement for implementation the Strategy, nine government ministries40 were given responsibility under each of the five pillars of the NRS. To ensure that the NRS corresponded to the needs of IDPs, the Government (including the Prime Minister and Minister of Social Solidarity) undertook direct consultations with more than 50 IDP camp managers in order to identify the main obstacles to IDP return and to ensure that the NRS contained concrete actions to overcome these obstacles.41 In drafting the strategy, the TWG was guided by the instructions of the Prime Minister42 that a variety of options were required to empower IDPs to choose the manner in which they resettled from camps, and that one of these options would be to elect to receive a direct cash transfer.43 Under this option, IDPs choosing to return or resettle were entitled to different amounts according to the level of destruction of their homes. The NRS also acknowledged that in order to be successful, the recovery process would have to address not only the needs of IDPs but also the wider needs of affected communities throughout the country. The Strategy therefore recognized the need to ensure that food-security, social protection and employment opportunities were secured for wider communities in order to alleviate social jealousies and enable the wider recovery process. In support of the above-mentioned objectives, the Office of the Vice-Prime Minister was tasked with overall coordination of the cross-governmental NRS and specific ministry responsibility was assigned within each of the five pillars.

Figure 1: Overview of NRS Implementation Responsibilities

40 These included the following ministries: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries; Ministry of Defence and Security; Ministry of Economy and Development; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Infrastructure; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Social Solidarity; Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Planning 41 Interview with Amandio Amaral Freitas, Director of Social Assistance and General Coordinator of HHF Programme, 23 September 2011. 42 This instruction was likely influenced by feedback that the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Social Solidarity received during their meetings with IDP camp managers about the need to provide financial support to enable IDPs to reconstruct their homes. 43 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Evaluation of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Lessons Learnt and Recommendations, 18 December 2009, p. 11.

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

38

To coordinate implementation within each of the five NRS pillars, working groups were established during a Government NRS retreat in February 2008. The responsibilities of each of the working groups were to review existing measures in place relevant for their pillar, propose measures for the future, determine responsibility for implementation, establish mechanisms for coordination with other elements of the overall strategy and identify budgetary requirements. While three of the working groups met regularly (housing, protection and trust-building), the security working group met only for a short time and the social economic working group met only once. In an attempt to facilitate coordination and coordination across the pillars, three different Government retreats were convened that were attended by the Vice-Prime Minister, relevant ministries and representatives from UNMIT, the UN agencies, IOM and international and national NGOs. Although the first two retreats were well-attended, by the third retreat, participation was reduced. Operational issues were resolved through a regular NRS/HHF Operational Task Force (OTF) which was chaired by the Director of the National Directorate for Social Assistance of MSS. The OTF brought together international partners and senior civil servants to agree on a common approach for policy implementation and to provide policy suggestions to the Special Inter-Ministerial Commission (IMC). Issues requiring higher-level resolution were referred to the IMC. Under the Strategy, the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality was tasked with ensuring that all elements of the Strategy strive to meet the specific protection needs of women and children and begin to reverse the heightened levels of violence in homes, schools and society at large that resulted from the Crisis.44 In order to ensure effective coordination of humanitarian activities within the International Community, a Humanitarian Coordination Committee (HCC), chaired by the UNMIT Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, was established which brought together representatives of UN agencies, NGOs and international organization. The Committee worked closely with the Government to ensure linkages with international assistance projects.45 The HHC was followed-up by the cluster system, which was launched on 31 March 2009 and comprised of 11 clusters,46 reflecting the global humanitarian structure. The clusters focused on enabling sustainable recovery from the 2006/2007 crisis and assisting the Government towards natural disaster preparedness, emergency response and contingency planning.

44 45

National Recovery Strategy, p. 2.

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21 August 2007 to January 2008), 17 January 2008, para. 52.
46 The 11 clusters include: Camp Coordination and Management, Health, Recovery, Logistics, Education, Nutrition, Emergency Shelter, Protection, Emergency Telecommunications, Water Sanitation Hygiene and Food Security

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Review of the Five Pillars


Housing/Hamutuk Harii Uma

Photo: Beto IDPs return home with support of an MSS recovery package, 10 March 2008

The objective of the Housing/Hamutuk Harii Uma (HHU) pillar was to provide IDPs with a variety of viable options that allow[ed] for their durable return or resettlement with due respect for their rights and dignity and in accordance with international standards such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.47 Implementation of this pillar was led by MSS together with the Ministry of Infrastructure, Ministry of Justice (National Directorate for Land and Property) and the Ministry of State Administration. Implementation of this pillar was also supported through technical advice and assistance provided by IOM, UNDP and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The NRS, though the HHU pillar, recognized the ongoing nature of the development of land and property legislation,48 as well as the need to offer rapid solutions to IDPs wishing to return home or resettle. The pillar also recognized that unresolved property/occupancy rights were only one of

47 48

National Recovery Strategy, p. 2.

In his article, Ibere Lopes points out that clarifying land rights would [have] require[d] not only a lengthy and expensive cadastral survey, but also the passage of legislation, particularly of a Transitional Land Law, in order to determine criteria for resolving conflicting claims, rights acquired through adverse possession, validation of previous titles and other sensitive issues. There was no chance that such a controversial piece of legislation could be debated and approved quickly, and resolving the displacement crisis was an urgent matter. Lopes, Ibere, Land and Displacement in Timor-Leste, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 43 June 2009.
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 40

many multifaceted factors impeded the return of IDPs. In light of these considerations and the Governments decision to prioritize return over the resolution of property rights, the Housing pillar focused on restoring occupants to their former places of occupancy prior to April 2006. The Strategy also recognized the various reasons why IDPs were refusing to leave the camp49 and took these factors into account when developing and implementing the Housing pillar. In order to implement the Housing pillar, a comprehensive operational plan was developed which set out a number of options for displaced households depending on whether they were will and able to return and the extent of damage to their home. Figure 2: Summary of Recovery Support Benefits Programme under the NRS Housing Pillar50 51
IDPs able and willing to return home IDPs unwilling or unable to return home

If their house was uninhabitable51 IDPs were Steps required: able to choose between: a) MSS verification in the local community to determine whether there is a willingness a) either a $4,500 Cash Recovery Grant in to allow the household to return t wo i n s t a l l m e n t s p a i d o n ly a f t e r verification by MSS that the household is b) In cases where such willingness existed, in an alternative, legal accommodation and MSS was responsible for facilitating a t h e h o u s e h o l d h a s m ove d t o a n voluntary meeting between the household alternative, legal accommodation and and local community representatives permanently left the camp c) If at the end of this process IDP households remained unwilling or unable b) a basic house (two rooms and a bathroom) to return, households were eligible to constructed and provided by the receive a basic house (two rooms and a Government (at a value of $3,000) bathroom) constructed in an alternative combined with a $1,500 cash payment made location and provided by the Government in one installment after the IDP household (at a value of $3,000) together with a cash moved into their new household and payment of $1,500 in one installment after permanently left the camp. the IDP household moved into their new house and permanently left the camp. If their house was habitable but severely damaged (i.e. with 50% structural damage), IDP households were entitled to receive a $3,000 cash payment for reconstruction purposes and if the house was partially damaged (less than 50% structural damage), IDP households were entitled to a payment of $1,500 also for reconstruction purposes.

As the HHU pillar was implemented, additional components were added in response to new and emerging challenges encountered by MSS staff and its partners. One such change was the decision

49 These reasons were as follows: a) many people had had their houses destroyed, damaged or occupied by others after their departure and thus no longer had adequate alternative shelter; b) Many people had been displaced by violence or fear of violence during the crisis, and continued to fear reprisals if they left the perceived security of the camp; c) Many people remained in camps as a means to obtain the humanitarian assistance and to guarantee that they were included in any future assistance offered to camp residents; and , d) Many people were utilizing the camps on an ad-hoc basis as temporary shelter whilst they studied or sought employment. National Recovery Strategy, p. 18. 50 51

National Recovery Strategy, Hamutuk Harii Uma Operational Plan, pp. 1-2.

Uninhabitable was defined under the Strategy as destroyed or so severely damaged that it no longer provides adequate shelter, i.e. it does not have a minimum of two functional rooms and a bathroom, National Recovery Strategy, HHU Operational Plan.
41 THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

to establish temporary shelters in order to provide alternative accommodation for IDPs willing but unable to return. The Government, together with the NRC, supported MSS with the construction of 595 transitional shelters in five different locations in order to help IDPs to move from tented camps into temporary shelters while they awaited more durable solutions. NRC also served as camp managers of all transitional sites, and worked with MSS to address humanitarian and protection issues in a systematic way in accordance with humanitarian standards.52 In order to facilitate the eventual close of the Transitional Shelters, in October 2009, the Government decided to increase the financial support offered to people living in transitional shelter sites to $1,500. Following this decision, movement from the camps was rapid and as of November 2009, 84% of families had moved out of transitional shelters.53 Another change was the decision to provide payments in one installment, rather than having a second payment following verification that families had commenced reconstruction or were living in alternative accommodation or had permanently left the camp.54 In response to further demands from IDPs and increasing pressure to close the camps, additional cash payments of $200 were also made to families who were tenants in the houses they were living in but who had their property looted during 2006 as well as to the groups of youth and students living in the camps.55 A final alteration was made on 5 November 2009, when the Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters announced commencement of Phase II of the National Recovery Strategy: recovery assistance for possessions and assets which were lost during the 2006/07 crises. Under Phase II the government provided a single payment of $500 to each IDP family that registered with MSS, and had a valid file number.

The HHU Implementation Process


In order to implement the Recovery Support Benefits Programme, a comprehensive process laid out within the HHU Operational Plan which outlined the different steps of the process and determined responsibility for each step. The original flow chart (see figure 3 below) was divided into seven stages including:

1. Registration whereby each family was required to fill in two forms one registering
the entire profile of the family and another registering the familys assets lost during the crisis;

2. Database entry involving the creation of a profile containing names of all family
members, ages, electoral card numbers and the location of the home; 3. Archival of database folders;

52 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p. 6. 53 54 55

UNMIT, The Humanitarian and Recovery Update, Issue No. 2, December 2009. Bugalski, p. 21.

International Crisis Group, Timor-Lestes Displacement Crisis, Asia Report No. 148, 31 March 2oo8, p. 13; Bugalski, pp. 21-22;
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 42

4. Verification entailing visits of MSS Verification Teams to camps to meet with the IDP family
and chefe de Aldeia to review and verify information provided and sign forms confirming that the family lived in the house prior to displacement and complete another form about the level of damage;

5. Estimation involving calculations by MSS Estimation Teams to classify each case and
determine which recovery package the household is entitled to; 6. Socialization to inform families about their entitlements; 7. Payment involving the cross-check of the list from the Estimation Team in order to detect any previous payments followed by sending the list for approval to the Secretary of State and HHF Programme Director and then if approved to the Minister of Finance. Figure 3: HHU Pillar Process Flow Chart

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

In implementing this process, MSS faced significant obstacles during each stage of the process. While many of the specific challenges have already been identified and reported on by MSS56, overarching challenges included enormous pressures to resolve the IDP problem as well as limitations in terms of human resources and institutional capacity, shortage of resources and lack of cooperation from key ministry partners. In terms of the first challenge, there was severe political pressure on the leadership and staff of MSS to solve IDP problems expeditiously in order for the Government to deliver on its promise to address the IDP issue as one of its three national priorities by the end of 2008. As a result, by the time all tented camps closed in August 2009, there was a growing sense of urgency within the Government to wrap up up the IDP issue by resolving the issues related to the 420 families remaining in transitional shelters. The pressure facing MSS in the daily implementation of the HHU pillar meant that staff were significantly overstretched and this inevitably compromised the quality of the process and contributed to many unanticipated problems and challenges which MSS had to resolve along the way. The pressure to close the camps, and the lax attitude towards the dispersal of money to deal with the problem, can perhaps explain the inadequacy of efforts or the insufficient time spent on building the necessary levels of capacity to ensure proper implementation of the administrative systems to register eligible households.57 MSS staff also faced intense pressure from IDPs and other persons trying to influence the outcome of individual cases including through bribes and threats of violence targeting MSS staff in charge of the process.58 At times, MSS staff feared their security and the safety of their families and requests to the Secretary of State for Security and UNPOL to establish police posts at the Ministry in order to deter security incidents as well as cases of people entering MSS and attempting to change information in the database. On different occasions and in response to specific security incidents, UNPOL provided static security to the Ministry and PNTL taskforce members were also assigned to provide security.59 In its report to the Prime Minister, MSS described this backdrop of tremendous political pressures and security threats, as a chaotic environment.60 In addition to the fact that IDPs had regular

56 On 31 March, the Minister of Solidarity submitted a comprehensive report to the Prime Minister on the closure of the NRS-HHFP which was also discussed within the Council of Ministers. The Ministry also prepared an internal evaluation which included a comprehensive assessment of challenges, including for each phase of the HHU Pillar implementation process and contained practical recommendations on how to address such problems. See: Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Evaluation of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Lessons Learnt and Recommendations, 18 December 2009 and Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Report on Programma Hamutuk Harii Futuru: Encerramento Hamutuk Harii Uma (December 2009 March 2011). 57 58

Bugalski, p. 24.

Interview with Secundino Rangel, Former Deputy HHF Programme Director and Sophia Cason, Former Advisor to MSS, 3 October 2011.
59 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p. 12 and Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Evaluation of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Lessons Learnt and Recommendations, 18 December 2009, pp. 58-60. 60 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p. 25.

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

44

access to MSS and were regularly able to threaten and pressure ministry staff, the general environment of responding to a complex humanitarian problem against extremely difficult time pressures contributed to this environment. These problems were compounded by the overall limited institutional capacity of the Government, given Timor-Lestes status as a newly independent nation. Many ministries, including MSS still lacked institutional capacity, especially in dealing with a strategy as large in scope as the NRS. As a result, the Ministry relied heavily on UNDP and IOM for support in developing and implementing the HHU pillar, given the previous cooperation that both organizations had with the ministry early on after the crisis. Given IOMs previous experience in the camps and UNDPs involvement through the Urgent Damage Assessment and Recovery Planning Project, both organizations were well-placed to be involved in the coordination and implementation of the HHU pillar. As a result, both organizations continued to provide technical advisors to MSS to support different aspects of the implementation process. Regarding the lack of resources faced by MSS in implementing the HHU pillar61 , although the Government allocated $15 million under the 2008 budget for IDPs humanitarian needs and housing grants, and an additional $5 million following the budget ratification process in April 2008, this fell short of the $50 million budget required for the recovery programme.62 A final challenge MSS faced during the implementation of the HHU pillar was limited cooperation from other relevant ministries. While it was envisaged that the Ministry of Infrastructure would provide a high level of support to MSS and be directly involved in conducting the initial assessments of damaged property, this task remained with MSS. In identifying and allocating land for new settlement areas and transitional shelters, cooperation with the Ministry of Justice was also extremely limited and as a result, the resettlement option was never made a real alternative for IDPs, mainly because the Ministry of Justice did not allocate State land for these purposes.63 In response to these and other challenges that MSS faced during implementation of the HHU pillar, it undertook many measures to resolve problems and to further improve the process. An important development which supported this change was Ministerial Decision No. 1/2010, signed by the Minister on 25 August 2010 which defined procedures and criteria to be followed by IDPs and which stipulated a minimum age for an IDP to receive a payment, the types of property to be compensated and an approach to deal with double-claims.64 The decision included detailed categories of destruction and the subsequent payment IDPs would be entitled to within each category.65 Under the same resolution, the Government requested that MSS process an additional
61 The other four pillars of the Strategy were not properly costed and as a result, no funds were budgeted by the Government for them. Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Evaluation of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Lessons Learnt and Recommendations, 18 December 2009, p. 32. 62 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Evaluation of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Lessons Learnt and Recommendations, 18 December 2009, pp. 31-32. 63 Interview with Alfredo Zamundio, Former Country Director, NRC, Timor-Leste, Dili, 2 October 2011; Bugalski, p. 21 64 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p. 6. 65

Ibid, p. 6.
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45

5,000 cases of families who had allegedly missed the original registration deadline. In order to equip MSS with the necessary resources to deal with these cases and complete the HHU programme by the end of 2010, the National Parliament approved an additional $4.1 million during the budget rectification in June and July 2010.66 In processing these 5,000 cases, as well as further complaints from 1,500 alleged beneficiaries who claimed they did not receive their compensation, MSS decided, based on its accumulated lessons learnt, to make significant improvements to the implementation process for the recovery packages.67

"I would like to thank the IDPs, receiving communities, all our partners, the Chefe Sucos and Chefe Aldeias, PNTL and UNPol for helping MSS to successfully implement the National Recovery Strategy and ensuring that IDPs have been able to peacefully reintegrate into their communities.Within one year and a half, working together, we have managed to close all 65 tented IDP camps, and soon we will have closed all four Transitional Shelter sites. I sincerely hope that after the closure of all the camps and Transitional Shelters, the situation in all the receiving communities will continue to remain stable, and that all of you can help contribute to the development of Timor-Leste" Maria Domingas Fernandes Alves, Minister of Social Solidarity on 21 September 2009 on the occasion of the closure of the transitional shelter in Tasi-Tolu.

MSS developed comprehensive systems to improve the data collection and registration processes in order to better secure data and minimize potential administrative errors. Improvements made by MSS included: 1) the development of a significantly improved database; 2) recruitment of technical staff for the database section, in particular, a qualified advisor to ensure quality control and an IT advisor; 3) the establishment of a monitoring team tasked to monitor every house verified and consult with neighbours or other informants to know the cause of destruction, when the destruction happened and the property status of the house; 4) ensuring a secure environment for the verification and estimation processes by requesting PNTLs Task Force and UNPOL to protect MSS staff when they were on the ground; 5) handing over estimation work to an impartial international specialist from IOM; 6) establishing a digital back-up system for all physical files in the MSS archive; 7) conducting additional public service delivery on three different occasions whereby IDPs were given further opportunities (following the passing of process deadlines) to complete their documents and lodge complaints; 8) development of a security package for the Bank Payment Authority containing photos and copies of electoral cards of beneficiaries in order to deal with the problem of multiple persons with the same name as well as cases of fraud.68 During this phase, MSS received technical assistance and advice from IOM in improving the process of registration and verification of claims as well as the final payment process and, in upgrading MSS

66 International Organization for Migration, Final Report to AusAID, Technical Support to the Government of Timor-Leste to Complete the Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building Our Houses Together) Programme, March 2011, p. 3. 67 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Report on Programma Hamutuk Harii Futuru: Encerramento Hamutuk Harii Uma (December 2009 March 2011), p. 12. 68 Interviews with various MSS staff members, 13-20 October 2011; Interview with Sra. Nur Aini Alkatiri, Deputy Director, Bank Payment Authority, 11 October 2011; Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], pp. 9-20.

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IDP database and digitalizing 20,000 IDP files.69 Of the total 6,500 cases verified by MSS during 2010, payments were received for 1,727 cases. On 31 December 2010, the HHU Programme was officially closed. Despite this closure, there still remains a group of persons who are unsatisfied with the decision they received from MSS.70 According to the Commission to Defend the Rights of Victims (Komisaun), 25 percent of cases are allegedly still pending.71 The Commission has had past opportunities to share their lists of such cases with the President, Prime Minister, Vice-Prime Minister, Council of Ministers, MSS and PDHJ and in response to past lists, MSS has re-opened the HHU programme, re-evaluated cases and amended payments where it was deemed necessary to do so.72 Representatives of the Commission, along with other persons unsatisfied with MSS decision, have been encouraged by MSS staff to appeal the Governments decision and to address their complaint to legal institutions.73 The HHU Programme provided significant opportunities for the re-evaluation of cases and the review of complaints related to the Cash Recovery Grant scheme. The deadline was extended on three different occasions, from the original timeframe of December 2009 to early and then mid-2010. The final extension was an opportunity for beneficiaries who had not been able to follow schedules and protocol of the HHU programme or had been late in submitting requests for registration.74 Further attempts to receive and review IDP cases were made by MSS through the provision public attendance opportunities for IDPs from 2008 to 2010 which were attended by an estimated two thousand persons.75

69 International Organization for Migration, Final Report to AusAID, Technical Support to the Government of Timor-Leste to Complete the Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building Our Houses Together) Programme, March 2011. 70 Interviews with Silverio Baptista, Deputy Provedor, Provedor for Human Rights and Justice, 18 October 2011; Members of the IDP Commission to Defend the Rights of Victims Komisaun, 14 October 2011. 71 Interview with Members of the IDP Commission to Defend the Rights of Victims Komisaun, 14 October 2011. 72 Interview with Members of the IDP Commission to Defend the Rights of Victims Komisaun, 14 October 2011. 73 Interview with Karim Elguindi, Advisor, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters and the National Directorate for Social Assistance, 13 October 2011. 74 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Report on Programma Hamutuk Harii Futuru: Encerramento Hamutuk Harii Uma (December 2009 March 2011), p. 3. 75

Ibid, p. 3.
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Based on the identification of pending cases from public attendance opportunities, MSS proceeded to conduct final verifications and estimations of damages to homes and to clarify cases that claimed to be worth more than the value MSS had originally awarded to them. MSS also received and reevaluated more than 304 official claims forwarded by other offices of the Government. As mentioned previously, the extension of the HHU programme also enabled MSS to strengthen its institutional and technical capacity to effectively deal with the implementation of the Cash Recovery Grants scheme and to identify and correct any administrative errors previously made during the initial stages of the programme. According to MSS, the extension of the programme was an opportunity for MSS to reorganize itself and work with recent lessons learned in order to obtain a satisfactory closure and to erase any doubts that may have existed from earlier in the programme.76 In light of these extensive efforts to receive, review and re-evaluate pending cases and complaints related to the HHU programme, it can be concluded that ample opportunity was provided to persons to ensure that their cases were fairly and comprehensively addressed. In such cases where complaints still exist, persons have been encouraged by MSS staff to appeal the Governments decision and to address their complaint to legal institutions. In order to avoid further re-opening the HHU programme, it is therefore important that such further avenues for redress are consistently communicated to persons wishing to file complaints.

Main Findings
1. Despite the plethora of challenges faced by MSS and its partner organizations during the
implementation process, the overall achievements under the HHU pillar were

76

Ibid. p. 3.
48

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

remarkable. In just over two and a half years after the launch of the pillar, all IDP camps were closed,77 and in less than four years after the outbreak of the 2006 Crisis, the vast majority of the 150,000 persons displaced after the Crisis were able to successfully return and reintegrate with no major security incidents reported78 and with a settlement rate of less than two percent.79 Additionally, after a one-year extension to ensure final verification of all outstanding cases, recovery payments for all eligible IDPs were completed in less than a three year timeframe.80

2. The decision of the Government to prioritize the return of IDPs over the resolution of land
and property ownership contributed to the successful and rapid implementation of the NRS due to the fact that IDPs were ready to leave the camps but simply needed support in doing do (i.e. in with reconstruction and repair of their homes, with the provision of security and with the use of dialogue to address and resolve community conflicts and tensions). This readiness of IDPs was confirmed by various meetings held between the Government and IDPs prior to the development of the NRS. Due to the complex and compounded nature of land and property disputes in Timor-Leste and the absence of a legal framework, resolving property and land ownership questions would have significantly prolonged the humanitarian crisis and would not have responded to the needs of IDPs.

3. The approach of Cash Recovery Grants proved to be an effective strategy for the
Government in enabling and supporting the return of more than 150,000 displaced persons. While there were many doubts expressed by the International Community about this approach, in the end, it addressed the needs of IDPs and responded to their expressed desire to return. The options provided through the HHU pillar enabled and empowered IDPs to make informed decisions about whether or return or resettle and ensured that return was on a voluntary basis. Cash transfers also worked because of nature of TimorLeste and the fact that money from cash transfers filtered out into communities.

4. While three different options were provided to IDPs under the HHU pillar, not all
options were available. The resettlement option was never made a real option for IDPs due to a lack of alternative land and housing and the option for IDPs willing to return to receive a Government-constructed house also never materialized. While the vast majority of IDPs opted for Cash Recovery Grants, the unavailability of the other two alternatives81 undermined the ability of IDPs to return and resettle, especially in cases
77 The last camp to close was Metinaro on 22 August 2009, Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p.3. 78 Interview with Commander Pedro Belo, Commander of PNTL in Dili District, Ministry of Defence and Security, 12 October 2011, 79 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p. 25. 80 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p. 3. 81 While transitional shelters provided a temporary resettlement option and an interim form of alternative accommodation for IDPs, once the shelters closed, IDPs unable and unwilling to return were without options.

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

where it was not possible to resolve land ownership issues and in cases where IDPs were unwilling to return due to security problems or inter-personal conflict.

5. The HHU pillar was clearly the most challenging pillar to implement and over time,
extensive efforts were made by MSS leadership, staff and partner organizations to learn from these challenges and to apply lessons learnt in order to further improve the process.

6. In implementing the Cash Recovery Grants scheme, the Government maintained a


flexible approach in order to respond the evolving dynamics and needs of IDPs. In this regard, towards the end of the NRS implementation process when pressures were high to close the camps, the existing criterion was adjusted to fit specific situations. For example, in order to deal with renters who had property looted during the 2006 crisis; a $200 reintegration package was offered to support them to leave the camps.82

7. The registration and payment system for the Cash Recovery Grants failed to implement
measures to guard against gender discrimination. In most instances, payments were made to male heads of households and in cases where the grants were not spent on the reconstruction of homes, women were unable to equally benefit from the grants. There were also cases where men receiving the grants re-married and in such situations, women were left in a vulnerable situation without housing.

8. Pressures to solve the IDP crisis, together with the pace of implementation of the HHU
pillar created what MSS has termed as a chaotic environment. Setting up mechanisms and processes to deal with the registration, estimation, verification and payment of thousands of claims had to be done quickly which meant that the ability to design airtight procedures was limited. The intense pressures in implementing the Recovery Cash Grants programme under the NRS significantly challenged the institutional capacity of MSS and as a result, it was inevitable that administrative errors would be made. While it was initially difficult for MSS to detect manipulation of data and to put in place the necessary system controls and oversight mechanisms, the leadership and staff of MSS conducted internal reviews of the process and identified important lessons learned in order to identify ways to further improve the system. By the time that the remaining 5,000 cases were dealt with the main challenges and shortfalls were addressed a comprehensive database was developed, IDP files were digitized and the payment process was improved and measures put in place to avoid double-payments.

9. Through the HHU programme ample opportunity was provided to persons to ensure
that their cases were fairly and comprehensively addressed through efforts of MSS to receive, review and re-evaluate pending cases and complaints. In such cases where complaints still exist, persons have been encouraged by MSS staff to appeal the Governments decision and to address their complaint to legal institutions.

82 Timor-Leste Humanitarian Coordinating Committee (HCC), 6 May 2008, Summary of 22 May 2008 HCC Meeting in Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Timor-Leste: IDPs Have Returned Home, but the Challenge of Reintegration is Just Beginning, 9 December 2009, p. 5.

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

50

10. The $56.8 million 83 paid out in Cash Recovery Grants created an important influx of
cash into communities. Given the nature of family structures in Timor-Leste, it is inevitable that a significant amount of this money was spread out to other families. While the Cash Recovery Grants were intended to assist IDPs with the reconstruction of their homes, some IDPs chose to use the funds for livelihood purposes. Past return monitoring reports indicated that many returning IDPs were unable to engage in livelihoods, either because of lack of opportunity or problems with access to start-up capital, and have been using their recovery package funds for daily living expenses instead of rebuilding homes.

83

In the 2008 General Budget


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51

Protection/Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (HHP)

Photo:Vulnerable IDPs preparing to leave Jardim Camp, 21 May 2008.

The objective of the Protection/HHP pillar was to [c]reate a response to vulnerability among the population attributing due attention to the specific necessities of internally displaced.84 While the HHP pillar placed a high importance on the needs of IDPs, a key principle guiding implementation was that social protection needs and vulnerabilities of communities-at-large also needed to be addressed in conjunction with those of the displaced, in order to mitigate social jealousy and violent conflict. Implementation of this pillar was led by MSS together with the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Planning, the National Directorate for Water and Sanitation, the Provedor for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), Oxfam, Plan International and Triangle.85 Efforts of these ministries and organizations to support the HHP pillar were coordinated through the Protection Working Group (established during the February 2008 NRS Government retreat). This body met regularly and played an important role in ensuring that protection-related activities in camps and wider communities were well-coordinated among the various national and international actors. Within the HHP pillar two types of activities were envisaged by Government and its partners in support of its objective. The first objective was to address the food security needs of the food
84 85

National Recovery Strategy, p. 3.

Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation], p. 6.
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 52

insecure, and the second was to provide psycho-social and other support as required together with food security strategy. In addressing food security needs, the HHP pillar acknowledged that the 2006-2007 crises exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities faced by Timor-Lestes population. According to UNICEF surveys, 15 percent of children in the IDP camps needed immediate treatment for malnutrition; 57 percent of respondents to a World Food Programme survey reported that they had ceased their primary income or livelihood activity. Shortages of food occurred both in camps and as a result of the pressure on extended family, who were hosting displaced persons outside Dili.86 In order to determine the number of food-insecure people in IDP camps and among the non-IDP population the World Food Programme (WFP) undertook an emergency food security assessment in Dili in 2007 so that options could be identified to help restore longer-term food security.87 The assessment revealed that 50 percent of persons receiving food assistance were not food insecure while a further 50 percent of the general population not receiving food assistance was food insecure.88 Recognizing food assistance in camps as a strong pull factor for people to stay,89 the Government, with support from WFP, was able to successfully phase out blanket feeding by moving to half rations and then to targeted feeding of vulnerable groups. The return and reintegration process also increased the vulnerability of certain groups such as women and children in both receiving and returnee communities and many organizations undertook projects and activities to address and help alleviate vulnerabilities of these groups. Many of the IDPs, in particular women and children suffered from trauma following the violence of 2006 which in some instances was further exacerbated through incidents of gender-based violence occurring in the camps.90 In order to address concerns specific to the needs of women and children, the Womens Committee

Dialogue played an important role in the reintegration process. After the crisis, the situation was tense and communities did not accept IDPs to return back. Dialogue created an understanding among communities and resulted in increased support for the reintegration of IDPs. Jacinto Rigoberto Gomes, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, MSS

(WeCo) Project was established under the coordination of Rede Feto and in partnership with CARE International, Irish Aid, Alola Foundation, Concern, UNIFEM and MSS. Under the project, Womens Committees were established in various IDP camps primarily throughout Dili district between 2007 and 2008.

86

United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, October 2006, para. 101.

87 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21 August 2007 to January 2008), 17 January 2008, para. 51. 88 89 90

Ibid. 70,000 people are being fed by WFP every month in Dili Minutes from the 20 January 2007 meeting of the Womens Committee Working Group Meeting,
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The Womens Committees played an important role in ensuring that the specific needs and problems of women were addressed in the management of camps, including issues related to gender-based violence. The work of the Committees also resulted in increased consultation between women and men regarding the return to their communities of origin. In order to further improve womens access to information and to support systems for returning women who are either victims, or at risk of becoming victims, of gender-based violence, IOM undertook a multifaceted programme to support activities that improve access to essential services such as education, health and livelihood support for displaced women. During the humanitarian crisis, psychosocial services and conflict resolution initiatives, targeting women and children, were also implemented. Child protection focal points and support teams were also set up within the IDP camps and materials were developed by UNICEF which provided improved access to information on child safety and protection issues and enhanced child protection activities.91 Plan provided training to the Child Protection Focal Points in the IDP camps and transitional shelters. In response to cases of reduced access of IDP children to regular education services, the Ministry of Education was active in identifying teachers and students within the camps and in encouraging and supporting them to access to schools. The Ministry also provided catch-up classes for those IDP children who missed significant periods of schooling and provided referrals for cases of traumatized children to the appropriate service providers.92 In order to sustain the protection results of the Strategy, under the leadership of MSS, protection policies and programmes were also developed in order to ensure an institutional response to the needs of food-insecure and vulnerable persons. Such responses included the MSS Pension and Veteran programme, the MSS Vulnerable Group Feeding programme in the districts, the 16 kg of rice returns package, the development of a Social Assistance policy and the development of Conditional Cash Transfers programmes such as Bolsa da Me (Mothers Purse) which supports single mothers to send children to school.

Main Findings
1. Overall, the Protection pillar provided a successful response to vulnerability which was
initially focused on addressing the specific needs of IDPs and which has since evolved into a broader policy and programmes to address the social protection needs of vulnerable persons.

2. The decision to phase out blanket feeding in the IDP camps and to move towards the
targeted feeding of vulnerable groups proved to be an effective approach in removing the pull factors from the camps and in reducing social jealousy between IDPs in the camps and neighbouring communities.

91 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21 August 2007 to January 2008), 17 January 2008, para. 52. 92

Interview with Ministry of Education, 4 October 2011.


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3. The Womens Committee (WeCo) Project played a key role in ensuring that the specific
needs and problems of women were addressed in the management of camps, including issues related to gender-based violence. The work of the Committees also resulted in increased consultation between women and men regarding the return to their communities of origin.

4. The trauma suffered by a vast number of people, particularly women and children, during
and after the crisis, was significant and while a number of organizations worked to provide counseling and psycho-social support, many persons remained without any form of support or assistance, particularly those persons who never reside in the camps.

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Security/Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade

Photo: IDPs moving out of the airport camp, 6 August 2008

The objective of the Security/Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade (HHE) pillar was to strengthen the mechanisms of the State to respond to multi-tiered security issues so as to create an environment of stability that is conducive to the return or resettlement of IDPs, in keeping with the protection responsibilities undertaken by the State within the context of International Humanitarian Principles.93 The Security pillar/HHE acknowledged that perceptions of security were informed both by experiences at the community level and as a result of high-level political decisions and discourse. As such, the HHE pillar identified the need to create an enabling environment to assist IDPs to leave the camps, while simultaneously responding to the underlying conflict dynamics that had an impact on perceptions of security and insecurity within the country-at-large. The death of Major Alfredo Reinado in February 2008 and the surrender of Salsinha and his group involved on the attack on the President and the Prime Minster resulted in an immediate and widespread improvement in community perceptions about security and contributed to an acceleration of IDP returns.94 As acknowledged by the HHE Working Group, various other initiatives also contributed to enhanced perceptions of security among the population. These included the building of static

93 94

National Recovery Strategy, p. 4.

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 8 January to 8 July 2008), 29 July 2008
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police posts in critical areas, ongoing cooperation between the Falintil Force Defence Timor-Leste [Armed Forces] (F-FDTL) and the PNTL as facilitated by a newly established Liaison Officer position, scheduling of police rotations, support for the justice sector, ad hoc trainings on conflict transformation for youth and martial arts groups, and strategic dialogue initiatives involving active PNTL participation.95 The results of a nationwide community-police perception survey conducted by the Asia Foundation between August and September 2008 revealed that 53 percent of the national public surveyed stated that the security situation in their locality improved compared to one year ago and an even larger majority of respondents believe that security had specifically improved in Dili (78 percent).96 In creating an enabling environment for IDP return, both UNPOL and PNTL played an integral role in providing security for IDPs through escorting IDPs back to their communities during go-and-see visits and during their final move back. In 14 areas, 19 police posts were established where high tensions existed in order to provide sustained security for IDPs.97 These measures had an important role in supporting IDPs to leave the camps and also helped to foster greater trust between the police and communities. The improved security environment also helped to prevent incidents of conflict in communities of return. According to the same survey by the Asian Foundation, citizens, community leaders, and police respondents were asked to measure whether or not there has been an increase in conflict associated with the return of the IDPs. The results revealed that among all groups of respondents there is near unanimous agreement (95 percent) that there has been not been an increase in conflict following the return of IDPs.98 The same survey showed that only two percent of the general community considered IDP returns to be the most serious security issue in their neighbourhoods, and only five percent of respondents in areas that received large numbers of returnees believed that social tensions have increased as a result. Under the Security pillar, important links and synergies were established with the Trust-Building pillar, specifically regarding PNTL (and when necessary F-FDTL) presence during community dialogues and regarding cooperation toward identifying solutions to specific security concerns raised by IDPs and members of recipient communities.

The return process was an impressively fast process. People did not think it would work but it did. Sierra James, Programme Manager and Co-Founder of Ba Futuru

95 United Nations, Transitional Strategy and Appeal 2008: A Consolidated Plan to Support Nation Response to Humanitarian and Recovery Needs of Internally Displaced People and Vulnerable Communities and Strengthen Disaster Risk Management in Timor-Leste, 2008. 96 Liam Chinn and Silas Everet, A Survey of Community-Police Perceptions, The Asia Foundation, East Timor, 2009, p. 7. 97 Interview with Commander Pedro Belo, Commander of PNTL in Dili District, Ministry of Defence and Security, 12 October 2011. 98

Ibid. p. 21.
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In responding to the underlying conflict dynamics that affected perceptions of security, the Secretary of State for Security used the EHH working group as an important vehicle for discussing the need for a conflict prevention strategy.99 Such discussions helped to inform and shape the establishment of the National Directorate for the Prevention of Community Conflict.100

Main Findings
1. Overall, the implementation of the Security pillar was successful in creating an
environment of stability that was conducive to the return of IDPs. No major security incidents or further escalations of violence occurred following the return, resettle and return of more than 150,000 IDPs. The strong presence of PNTL and UNPOL in communities of return (through the provision of police escorts and the establishment of police posts) helped in achieving this result by providing an important enabling environment for IDP return. These measures had an integral role in supporting IDPs to leave the camps and also helped to foster greater trust between the police and communities.

2. While various developments and initiatives contributed to enhanced perceptions of


security at a national and community level, the death of Major Alfredo Reinado in February 2008 and the surrender of Salsinha and his group involved on the attack on the President and the Prime Minster removed a widely perceived security threat and encouraged a significant number of the IDPs to leave the camps.

3. Important links and synergies were established between the Security and Trust-Building
pillars, specifically regarding PNTL (and when necessary F-FDTL) presence during community dialogues and regarding cooperation toward identifying solutions to specific security concerns raised by IDPs and members of recipient communities.

99 The 100

development of this strategy was included as one of the expected outputs for the Working Group, Terms of Reference,Terms of Reference for the Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade Working Group, April 2008. E-mail correspondence from Rebecca Engen on 13 October 2011, Senior Advisor, Belun.
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Social-Economic/Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia

Photo: MSS and UNDP install rope pump in the community of Duyung, 25 November 2010

Delayed economic development in Timor-Leste was both a cause and further consequence of the crisis in 2006. As discussed previously, the lack of economic opportunities, particularly in rural areas, increasing poverty and high unemployment rates, especially among the youth population, contributed to deep frustration and tensions that were in some instances further exacerbated by perceived inequalities within and among different communities. Following Timor-Lestes independence in 2002, a number of development programmes were initiated, including initiatives to generate increased employment. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the crisis resulted in the delayed launch and implementation of many of these planned activities which served to exacerbate frustrations and tensions. In response, immediately following the crisis, the former Ministry of Labour and Community Reinsertion identified the immediate need for an instrument to create short-term employment opportunities focused on unemployed youth and IDPs, through the implementation of Cash-for-Work programmes.101 The UNDP and ILO Servi Nasaun (Work for the Nation) project was developed to address this need. The project ran from July to December 2006 and provided 464,872 workdays to 37,000 beneficiaries.102 Following the completion of the Servi Nasaun project, a new UNDP-ILO Work for Peace (Serbisu Ba Dame), project was developed and implemented between February to September 2007, in order to address sources of instability undermining development and provide

101

United Nations Development Programme and the International Labour Organization, Final Narrative Report on the Timor-Leste Work for Peace Project (Projetu Serbisu Ba Dame), December 2007, p. 9.

102

United Nations Development Programme and the International Labour Organization, Final Report: Work for Conflict Prevention and Meeting Basic Needs (Servi Nasuan Project), December 2006, p. 3.
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a short-term bridge between the emergency humanitarian response and medium-term development initiatives.103 While these projects were implemented prior to the introduction of the NRS, their approach and results had an important influence on the development and focus of the Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia Sosial (HHES) pillar which recognized the need to create immediate livelihood opportunities (such as cash for work initiatives) but also underlined the importance of providing livelihood opportunities over the longer term that are linked to Government programming.104 The agreed objective of the HHES pillar was therefore to create livelihood opportunities throughout the country that would have short, medium and long term benefits for communities and their members, including special attention to the promotion of economic activities that contributed to the reintegration of displaced persons.105 Under the lead of the Ministry of Economy and Development, the HHES Working Group agreed that it was imperative not only to begin addressing livelihood needs in general, but also to ensure that the reintegration of IDPs would not be hampered by a perception of competition for scarce employment, income and other livelihood opportunities. There were a number of employment programmes implemented by the Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment (SEFOPE), in partnership with ILO, which were accessed by and which directly assisted communities of return to find gainful employment. In the post-conflict period 2006/2007 District Employment Centres were instrumental in worker recruitment and placement in labour-based infrastructure works. In May 2008, the Short-Term Employment Creation Department (STEC) was created within SEFOPEs Division of Employment. The STEC department was responsible for coordination with district government authorities and Public Works in community mobilization, planning, road selection, procurement of goods and services for road works, and administration of labour wages at the rate of $2/day.106 In order to shift the focus from temporary to more sustainable employment, the Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Infrastructure Development and Employment Generation project was developed and implemented between July 2008 until January 2010 by ILO in collaboration with the Ministry of Infrastructure, the Ministry of Economy and Development and SEFOPE. Although the project was not developed as a direct response to HHES pillar, it indirectly supported the pillars aim to develop livelihood opportunities over the longer term linked to Government programming. The project, which reflected the Governments overall Development Strategy, contributed to employment generation, poverty reduction, economic growth and peace-

103 104 105 106

Ibid. National Recovery Strategy, p. 6. Ibid. UNMIT, The Humanitarian and Recovery Update, Issue No. 1, September 2009
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building through the rehabilitation, construction and maintenance of rural infrastructure using labour-based work methods.107 In order to support the livelihoods of vulnerable members in communities of return, the Women in Self-Employment (WISE) project was executed by ILO in close cooperation with SEFOPE.The Project contributed to easing the burden of returnees on the host communities economy by promoting the creation of self-employment opportunities for potential women entrepreneurs in Baucau, Viqueque and Lautem Districts.108 By the end of the nine-month project, a total of 775 womens potential entrepreneurs were assisted in starting their own business and successfully market their products.109 Although many of these projects were developed outside of the NRS and were not part of the HHES pillar it is clear that they positively contributed towards the creation of short and longer-term livelihood opportunities for communities and their members, and that they helped to generate employment opportunities which supported the return and reconciliation process. While all of the aforementioned projects indirectly contributed to the overall success of the NRS, the inability of the HHES Working Group to meet regularly (only one meeting was convened),110 limited the establishment of synergies and cooperation between the HHES and other pillars under the NRS. Although the Ministry of Economy and Development regularly participated in the Government NRS retreats, the lack of an inter-ministerial and inter-agency forum to discuss socio-economic development within the context of IDP return and national recovery meant that some important needs were not addressed as part of the HHES pillar. One example of this was the development of linkages between recovery and return support to IDPs with investment in infrastructure in communities of return. Based on findings of IDP return monitoring reports, which cited the lack of basic community infrastructure (i.e. repair of water storage or drainage facilities or reconstruction of schools) as a threat to stability, there was a pressing need to develop projects to address such needs in order to alleviate social jealousy and mitigate conflict in communities of return. In the absence of a functioning HHES Working Group, projects to address these needs were developed under the Trust-Building pillar by MSS together with UNDP and IOM. These projects included the MSS/UNDP Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs (SERC) project and IOMs Enhancing Stabilisation through Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs project were developed. As previously discussed, the aim of the Projects was to re-establish and strengthen social ties, improve living conditions and lessen potential triggers of conflict by meeting needs in basic community services and infrastructure through participatory processes that involve both former IDPs and their recipient communities.

107

International Labour Organization, Project Proposal, Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Development and Income Generation, May 2008.
108 109 110

International Labour Organization, Final Report on the Women in Self-Employment (WISE) Project, 2008, p. 5. Ibid, p. 6. Interview with Ben Larke, former MSS Advisor, 5 October 2011.
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The two projects also contained cash-forwork components to build community infrastructure. Through these projects, IDPs and non-IDPs in areas of high return were able to benefit financially which also helped to alleviate social jealousy issues between these two groups. This was particularly important in light of the cash recovery packages received by IDPs.

Main Findings 1. Although HHES pillar was the


most inactive, many unintended results, which did not directly take place directly under the NRS framework, contributed towards the results of the Government in this area. The

Community stabilisation goes beyond the mandate of a single ministry and thus the whole of Government must work together with their development and humanitarian partners and donor agencies to achieve sustainable recovery for the IDPs. Just as the success of the response to the crisis depended on coordination between different ministries, the recovery even more so depends on successful coordination between, and involvement of, ministries and also the international community. Finn Reske-Nielsen, Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination, UNMIT, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator at the Third HHF Retreat, 21 November 2008 (Source: MSS Final Report of Retreat, p. 5).

cumulative effect of these initiatives in creating viable income, employment and livelihoods for IDPs and non-IDPs helped to create an enabling environment for return and indirectly contributed to the overall success of the NRS.

2. The short-term cash-for-work projects implemented immediately after the crisis


provided a sudden injection of cash into communities through the short-term employment projects which helped to contribute to the stabilization of communities and rendered them more open to return. The involvement of non-IDPs in such projects also helped to mitigate social jealousies towards those IDPs who received cash recovery payments under the NRS.

3. The inactivity of the HHES Working Group meant that the various initiatives related to
the objectives of the pillar were not coordinated within the NRS framework. This limited coordination between this pillar and the other pillars and has also made attribution of the NRS final results and achievements difficult.

4. In cases where communities identified the lack of basic community infrastructure as a


potential threat to stability, these needs were addressed under the Trust-Building pillar through the MSS/UNDP SERC project and IOMs Enhancing Stabilisation through Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs project. Both projects aimed at building social cohesion and militating against renewed conflict by engaging communities in planning projects such as drainage works and bridges that were of common benefit to the community.

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Trust-Building/Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa

Photo: Community reconciliation after the Urahou Dialogue Process, 31 May 2008

The objective of the Trust-Building/Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa (HHK) pillar was to increase trust between the people and the Government and to strengthen communities by guaranteeing the participation of the displaced in the planning and management of initiatives for the promotion of return, resettlement and reintegration.111 In order to achieve sustainable return and reintegration, the NRS recognized the importance of dialogue and trust-building initiatives in promoting reconciliation and resolving deep-rooted problems and tensions in communities. The NRS also acknowledged that return was a two-way process dependent upon both the willingness and ability of IDPs to return and the willingness of recipient communities to accept and integrate IDPs back into their communities.112 Under the HHK pillar, various projects and initiatives were undertaken by MSS as the lead ministry, together with its international and national partners, in order to increase trust amongst returning IDPs, people of the community and the Government and to promote return, relocation and reintegration of IDPs through community dialogue and other trust-building activities. In the aftermath of the 2006 crisis, three projects were jointly developed by MSS and UNDP with financial support from the Government of Australia, the Government of New Zealand and the UN Peace-Building Fund in order to support implementation of the Trust-Building pillar of the NRS. One of these projects was the Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue (hereinafter referred to as the Dialogue Project), which involved the establishment of
111 112

Ibid. National Recovery Strategy, p. 8.


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seven dialogue teams within MSS (five in Dili and two teams in Baucau and Ermera) to address the root causes of community conflicts that were preventing the closure of IDP camps and impeding the return and reintegration of IDPs into their communities.113 From June 2008 to October 2010, the MSS Dialogue Teams facilitated 770 mediations, 55 largescale community-level dialogue meetings and conducted 106 additional preparatory meetings between IDPs and their communities of return114 (see Annex 5 for a more comprehensive breakdown). These mediations and dialogue meetings played an integral role in helping communities to resolve return-related problems and in supporting the reconciliation process by repeatedly bringing together IDPs and members of receiving communities. In cases where IDP houses were occupied, the Dialogue Teams worked with the National Directorate of Land and Property (NDLP) to support the mediation and resolution of land and property disputes. The Dialogue Team also played a key role in addressing social cleavages and deep-rooted grievances and animosities, some of which were connected back to events in 1975 which were preventing the return of IDPs back to their communities. The dialogue meetings and mediations facilitated by the MSS/UNDP Dialogue Teams also helped to increase the willingness of IDPs and recipient communities to identify shared solutions to past conflicts. This sustained interaction generated through the dialogue process helped to breakdown tensions and facilitate the reconciliation process. Through the dialogue process, communities identified shared goals and common solutions and built relationships which resulted in enhanced mutual respect and understanding.

Photo: Minister of Social Solidarity addressing participants of a community dialogue


113

Past studies led by the Provedor for Human Rights and IOM indicated that obstacles to IDP return, that often continue post-return, commonly included: the condition of homes (either damaged or destroyed); land and property disputes; secondary occupancy and insufficient water supply. Many of those surveyed, both IDPs and host community members, expressed that dialogue and mediation were needed to resolve tensions around these issues and improve receptivity towards IDP return generally.
114

UNDP, Final Report on the Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue Project, June 2008-October 2010.
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The attendance of high-ranking government officials (including the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Social Solidarity at community-level dialogue meetings and ceremonies also played a key role in instilling greater trust and confidence in the Government and provided communities with an important opportunity to directly discuss their needs and concerns. The second major project was the MSS/UNDP NGO Small Grants Fund which focused on supporting international and local NGOs to undertake activities to contribute towards implementation of the HHK pillar. By funding NGOs in this way, UNDP aimed to improve coordination and ensure that the different activities occurring in the area of trust-building complemented other MSSled initiatives at the community level.115 Under this Project, grants were administered to implement trust-building activities at the community level in Dili and other districts, which included support to dialogue processes, youth exchange schemes,

"The return of these families is a result of the Ministrys ongoing work to help those IDPs who are willing and able to return home to do so. Each of the families who returned had received a recovery grant from the Ministry of Social Solidarity to help them rebuild or repair their homes". Amandio Freitas Amaral, National Director of Social Assistance, on the occasion of the return of the 92 IDP families from Canossa Has Laran on 25 March 2008

dissemination of information regarding the NRS and post return/relocation monitoring of IDPs and their communities. Ten organizations (four international organisations, five national organisations and one intergovernmental organisation) were selected for funding during the first phase of the project in 2009. These organisations included Austcare, East Timor Crises Reflection Network, Ba Futuru, CARE International, Caritas Australia, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Renetil, the Sub-Commission for Justice and Peace-Liquisa Parish, the office of the Provedor and IOM. Following the completion of all ten projects, MSS requested that the project continue for another year to support the final year of the implementation of the HHK pillar. AusAID provided an additional contribution to fund the extension of the project in 2010 in the amount of $500,000. Eight organisations were selected for funding in 2010 (five national organisations and three international organisations) and including the East Timor Crises Reflection Network, Ba Futuru, CARE International, Caritas Australia, CRS, Renetil, Kolega da Paz, and the office of the Provedor. Activities of these organizations targeted at risk communities and youth, and were implemented across all districts of Timor-Leste. The SERC project has developed participatory processes for planning and implementation in conjunction with the communities that have had experiences with conflict. The focus of these projects is to improve social cohesion by helping to prepare the restoration of ties between the community and ensure that all community members benefit from such projects. During the implementation of SERC project 21 small scale infrastructures were offered to different communities as well as numerous stabilization activities.

115

Barnes, Frances, External Evaluation Report for Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy: NGO Small Grants Project and Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanism for Dialogue Project, p. 26.
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Finally, as discussed under the Socio-Economic pillar, in response to the findings of IDP return monitoring reports which cited the lack of basic community infrastructure as a threat to stability, the MSS/UNDP Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs (SERC) Project and IOMs Enhancing Stabilisation through Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs project were developed. Both projects aimed to re-establish and strengthen social ties, improve living conditions and lessen potential triggers of conflict by meeting needs in basic community services and infrastructure through participatory

The cluster groups appear[ed] not to correlate let alone coordinate with the nine priority working groups developed by the Timorese Government.These groups were in existence prior to the rolling out of the UN clusters and were defined in accordance with the national recovery strategy. Norwegian Refugee Council, HalfWay Home, Evaluation of Shelters and Camp Management in TimorLeste, September 2009.

processes that involve both former IDPs and their recipient communities. All of the above-mentioned projects were successfully coordinated through the HHK Working Group which was chaired by MSS and facilitated by UNDP. The Working Group served as a forum for all partners supporting the HHK pillar to present their activities and results and to develop important synergies between projects and ensure that they continued to respond to the evolving needs of IDPs and communities of return. During meetings, information on issues and policies relating to the return and relocation process was shared with partners, including IOM, national and international NGOs, UN Police (UNPOL), other UN agencies, PNTL, and other line ministries and departments. Meetings were held on a weekly basis in the districts of Dili and Baucau.

Main Findings 1. The ability of the Government to achieve return and reintegration of IDPs and to build
trust with communities was made possible through the cumulative effect of various initiatives and projects implemented under the HHK pillar including projects implemented by various international and national NGOs under the MSS/UNDP Small Grants project.

2. While the Cash Recovery Packages assisted IDPs to rebuild and reconstruct their homes,
the dialogue meetings, combined with enhanced security measures, enabled IDPs to successfully return and reintegrate into their communities. The large volume of dialogue meetings and mediations conducted by the MSS/UNDP Dialogue Teams played a key role in resolving community conflicts and social tensions that were impeding the return and reintegration of IDPs into their communities. These mediations and meetings also directly contributed to the resolution of more than 700 IDP cases between 2008 and 2010116 and facilitated the successful return and reintegration of more than 10,000 households.

3. The HHK Working Group was a highly effective forum for facilitating cooperation
between the Government and its international and national partners. It provided an important opportunity to coordinate international and national efforts in support of the
116

Interview with Dialogue Team members


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HHK pillar and created a mechanism for information-sharing, including updates on the situation in camps and on monitoring results related to the different projects.

4. The dialogue initiatives implemented under the HHK pillar helped to strengthen the
public perception of State officials by facilitating the active involvement of high-ranking authorities during some of the more complex and higher-profile dialogue meetings. As a result of their position and authority, the presence of these officials helped support positive outcomes and also provided an important forum for communities to discuss their problems with the Government and seek support for their communities. As staff of MSS, the continuous presence of the Dialogue Team members in the communities and their positive role in the resolution of community-based conflicts and support for community stabilization activities helped to foster greater trust in the Government and made them more amenable to further cooperation.

5. The use of traditional dispute approaches used by the MSS Dialogue Teams contributed
towards the successful resolution of community-level conflicts. While more than 5,000 land cases solved through dialogue processes, less than 200 cases reverted to the courts.117

Strategic Partnerships
The NRS established a clear Government framework which was used as the basis for civil society and the international community to support the Governments efforts to implement a comprehensive response to support IDP return and reintegration. In line with the objectives and five pillars of the NRS, a significant number of initiatives and projects were implemented by the international community and civil society. MSS developed important strategic partnerships with IOM and UNDP in the development and implementation of the NRS. Both organizations were actively involved in supporting the Government to conceptualise and draft the Strategy; in providing continuous technical assistance to MSS in the implementation of the Strategy (in particular, the housing and trust-building pillars); and in implementing different projects to support MSS in achieving the objectives set out in the NRS. While IOMs support to the mass displacement of 2006 was initially focused on the provision of direct humanitarian assistance to the displaced population, overtime, IOMs role expanded to include initiatives to support communities in addressing return and reintegration-related challenges. IOM provided important technical assistance to MSS during drafting and implementation of the second phase of the Cash Recovery Grants which provided compensation to individuals who lost assets during the crisis. IOM teams also supported MSS to increase cohesion and stability in return communities through its return monitoring project, its Community Stabilization Project (see Trust-Building pillar section for more detail), its pre-return assessments and its reintegration programme in the sucos of Hera and Vila Verde which were implemented in cooperation with the NGO Belun.
117

Interview with Antonio Carceres, National Mediator for Land Disputes, National Directorate for Land and Property, Ministry of Justice, 12 May 2011.

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As mentioned in the above-section on the housing pillar, IOM also continued to provide technical and advisory services to MSS in dealing with the registration, verification and final payment of the last 5,000 IDP claims and also worked with MSS to upgrade its IDP database and digitalize its files.

IOM staff supporting MSS to facilitate IDP Jardim Camp move, 21 May 2008

As discussed previously, UNDP played an integral role in supporting MSS to successfully implement the HHK pillar through the Dialogue and SERC projects as well as through its management of the small grants fund for NGOs related to conflict prevention and peace-building activities. Through these projects, UNDP helped to build MSS capacity at an institutional and community level to respond to and help mitigate conflict in communities of return. The capacity of MSS to support further dialogue initiatives and the resolution of communitybased conflicts will now be sustained through the newly established DPBSC which UNDP is supporting through its project Support to the Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion in Timor-Leste. As discussed in the previous section, MSS also formed strategic partnerships with a core group of international and national organizations under the MSS/UNDP Small Grants Programme, including Austcare, Ba Futuru, CARE International, Caritas Australia, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), East Timor Crises Reflection Network, Kolega da Paz, Renetil, Sub-Commission for Justice and PeaceLiquisa Parish, PDHJ and IOM. In implementing the housing pillar, MSS received critical support from the Norwegian Refugee Council in the construction of 595 transitional shelters in five different locations in order to help IDPs move from tented camps into temporary shelters while they awaited more durable solutions. NRC also served as camp managers of all transitional sites, and worked with MSS to address humanitarian and protection issues in a systematic way in accordance with humanitarian standards.
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Dialogue Meeting

MSS also established strategic partnerships with several UN agencies in responding to humanitarian and protection needs of IDPs in the camps through the provision of food assistance, protection, shelter, camp management and camp coordination, water and sanitation services, education and emergency health interventions.118 In addressing socio-economic needs of wider communities, the Ministry of Economy and Development, in particular, SEFOPE, collaborated closely with ILO on the implementation of a number of employment programmes which were accessed by and which directly assisted communities of return to find gainful employment.

118

These included the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF).
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MAIN FINDINGS
General

1. Overall, implementation of the NRS was a major success and the speed in
which the return process took place was unprecedented as well as the absence of major conflict in communities following the return and reintegration process. In just over two and a half years after the launch of the NRS, all of the 65 IDP camps were closed, and in less than four years after the outbreak of the 2006 crisis, the vast majority of the estimated 150,000 IDPs were able to successfully return and reintegrate with no major security incidents or significant escalations of violence reported and with a settlement rate of less than two percent.

2. The NRS worked because it set out to address the immediate impact of the
crisis as well as pre-existing community-level vulnerabilities The NRS was focused on broader recovery issues, rather than the mere closure of camps and return of IDPs; therefore, through its comprehensive and cross-cutting approach across the five pillar areas (housing, protection, social economic development, security and trustbuilding) it acknowledged the importance of addressing both the immediate humanitarian needs as well as the underlying causes of tension in communities such as perceived regional disparities, deep-rooted political animosities, weak state institutions and security apparatus coupled with high rates of poverty and unemployment. The Strategy also recognized the importance of addressing the needs of wider communities, and not only IDPs. This approach was particularly apparent in the protection and social-economic pillars. Both pillars acknowledged the importance of ensuring that food and social assistance programmes, as well as income-generation and employment opportunities reflected and responded to the needs of all communities in order to avoid further exacerbating social jealousies between returning IDPs and their recipient communities.

3. Strong political will and leadership at a strategic level made return and
recovery possible The IV Constitutional Government demonstrated strong political leadership and will in working towards the resolution of the IDP issue. In its national programme, the Government promised the implementation of the return process by the end of 2007 and in his budget speech to Parliament on 18 December 2008, the Prime Minister listed three priorities for the year including resolution of the IDP, Reinado and petitioners problems. This speech was matched with a proposed allocation of $15 million to deal with IDP return and reintegration. After taking office, the President and Prime Minister also met directly with IDPs, including more than 50 camp managers, in order to identify obstacles impeding their return, and a national strategy was developed in order to overcome these obstacles. The Prime Minister was actively involved in the creation of the NRS and not only led the initial process of bringing together key ministries to develop

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the Strateg y but also gave clear instructions about the approach of the Strategy and insisted that, in order to address IDP concerns, it contained a Cash Recovery Grant option. Through the Governments efforts to lead the initial development of the Strategy and to put in place significant resources and a national strategy to work towards the resolution of the IDP issue, the role of the IV

Without the ability to link information and data about IDP households with data on their properties and housing destruction, the process became IDP-centric, rather than house-centric. Luiz Vieira, Former Chief of Mission, International Organization for Migration in Timor-Leste

Constitutional Government was integral to the success of the NRS. The President, Prime Minister and Minister of Social Solidarity also had an active and visible role during the reconciliation process. All three officials personally attended numerous dialogue meetings and ceremonies in communities and were directly engaged in the resolution of protracted and complex community conflicts.

4. The NRS worked because it was introduced at the right time


After spending more than a year and a half in IDP camps and enduring difficult conditions, the majority of the IDPs were ready to return home but simply needed the means to do so, including the provision of security and resources to repair and reconstruct their homes. While the Cash Recovery grant scheme under the NRS provided an initial incentive for IDPs to leave the camps, the decision of the Government to reduce blanket food distribution to IDPs in Dili to half rations in February 2008 provided a further incentive for IDPs to leave the camps and return home. Other contributing factors were the death of Major Alfredo Reinado on 11 February 2008 and resolution of the petitioners issue in June 2008 119 which created an improved perception among IDPs about the general security situation and resulted in acceleration of returns immediately after.120 The culmination of these different developments created an enabling environment for return and an important window of opportunity for the Government to implement the NRS.

5. MSS leadership was critical to the success of the return and recovery process
All stakeholders consulted during the NRS review process agreed that without the involvement of MSS, implementation of the NRS would not have been possible. MSS successfully led the closure of the 65 camps and served as the lead ministry for three of the five pillars. The implementation of the Cash Recovery Grants scheme proved to be an enormous undertaking for MSS and despite the immense challenges faced by the Minister and her staff, the housing pillar was successfully closed on 31 December 2010. In areas where gaps in implementation existed, such as addressing the basic infrastructure needs of communities of return, MSS, together with UNDP and IOM, designed and implemented
119

On 4 June 2008, the Government adopted a legislative decree that offered financial compensation packages to petitioners who decided to return to civilian life. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 8 January to 8 July 2008), 29 July 2008, para. 7.

120

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 8 January to 8 July 2008), 29 July 2008, para. 45.
71 THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

community stabilization projects in order to mitigate social jealousies in areas of high return. The Minister was directly engaged in supporting the dialogue processes and attended several dialogue meetings and ceremonies where her presence and strong leadership supported the resolution of protracted community conflicts.

6. The use of dialogue to facilitate IDP return and reintegration was critical to
the success of the NRS The 770 mediations, 55 large-scale community-level dialogue meetings and 106 preparatory meetings between IDPs and their communities of return facilitated by the MSS Dialogue Teams from June 2008 to October 2010, played a key role in helping communities to resolve return-related problems and in supporting the reconciliation process. The Dialogue Teams also helped communities to address and discuss social cleavages and deep-rooted grievances and animosities, some of which were connected back to events in 1975, which were preventing the return of IDPs back to their communities. The sustained interaction generated through the dialogue process helped to breakdown tensions and facilitate the reconciliation process and through the dialogue process, communities were able to re-build relationships at the community-level which resulted in enhanced mutual respect and understanding and contributed toward sustainable return and reintegration.

7. Although the NRS was envisaged as a comprehensive response, across the


five pillar areas of housing, protection, security, socio-economic development and trust-building, the Cash Recovery Grant scheme under the housing pillar overshadowed the other components of the NRS While efforts were made to inform the public and IDP community about all pillars of the Strategy, most IDPs, Government officials, civil society partners and the general public saw the Strategy as being about the Cash Recovery Grants. Meetings of the InterMinisterial Commission focused mainly on the housing pillar, in particular issues related to the payment of the Cash Recovery Grants. Even while conducting interviews about NRS implementation, many of the interviewees were only familiar with and able to speak about the recovery packages.

8. Although most of the results achieved under the NRS were within the
housing, protection and trust-building pillars, results were also indirectly achieved in the other two pillar areas A large number of initiatives contributed to security-related reforms and increased employment opportunities which were implemented separate from the security and socio-economic pillars, but which contributed to progress and achievements towards the objectives of both pillars.

Achievement of Strategy Objectives


Objective 1: To adopt a new vision toward national recovery, one that not only promotes mutual acceptance but strengthens communities, local economies, stability and the relationship between the Government and the people of Timor-Leste, whom they serve.
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 72

9. Through its comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach across the five pillar areas of housing,
protection, social economic development, security and trust-building, the NRS provided a new vision of national recovery based on a comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach.

10. While the Strategy recognized and proposed specific actions to address the specificities
of problems IDPs encountered in the camps and Transitional Shelters, and also included measures to overcome obstacles impeding their return and reintegration (through the Cash Recovery Grants, dialogue processes and security measures), the Strategy recognized the importance of addressing not only the needs of IDPs but also the broader needs of communities.

11. The vision of the NRS to strengthen the relationship between the Government and
communities was realized during the implementation of the Strategy. Through the provision of food, security, social assistance and temporary shelter, the Government directly engaged with IDPs and communities of return to address their needs. The Governments participation, namely that of the President, Prime Minister and Minister, in a number of high level and community-level dialogue meetings and ceremonies also helped to strengthen its relationship with communities and support increased engagement.

Objective 2: To establish a concerted All of Government approach to address the range of issues, including: social, physical, legal, economic, security and political that combine to create obstacles to the resettlement of those who have been displaced.

12. While the National Recovery Strategy was envisaged as an All-of-Government


approach to recovery, the ability of the Government to operationalize this approach was limited. While the first two Government retreats on the NRS were well-attended by key ministries responsible for implementation of the Strategy, by the third retreat, the participation of these ministries declined significantly and in some instances never fully materialized. One example of this was related to the role of the Ministry of Infrastructure under the HHU pillar. While the Ministry had direct responsibility for conducting the initial assessments of damaged property, this task remained with MSS. The Ministry of Infrastructure also had the responsibility to provide a corps of engineers to ensure the tranched payments were being used to build sound houses. This was also not given sufficient priority and planning by the Ministry to be implemented.121 In identifying and allocating land for new settlement areas and transitional shelters, cooperation with the Ministry of Justice was also extremely limited and as a result, the resettlement option was never made a real alternative for IDPs, mainly because the Ministry of Justice did not allocate State land for these purposes.

13. The inability of the Government to operationalize the NRS as an all-of-Government


response was also apparent with the working groups established for each of the five pillars.
121E-mail

correspondence from Phillippe Brewster, Former Advisor to MSS on HHF and DRM Programme.

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While the housing, protection and trust-pillar working groups met regularly, there were few meetings of the security working group and the social-economic working group only convened once. Some ministries with key responsibilities under the NRS also never engaged in the manner required to achieve some of the key actions set out under the NRS.

Objective 3: To meet both the needs of those who have been displaced and the wider needs of affected communities throughout the country.

14. Important efforts were made by the Government to ensure that that NRS corresponded
to the needs of IDPs. The Government undertook direct consultations with IDPs, including more than 50 IDP camp managers in order to identify the needs of IDPs and identify the main obstacles to their return. The input from these consultations directly informed the final approach and content of the NRS.

15. Under the NRS, the priority needs identified by IDPs were addressed, namely the
dispensation of Cash Recovery Grants to support the repair and reconstruction of homes; the provision of security through police accompaniment on go-and-see visits and the establishment of police posts in areas of return with high tensions; and fulfillment of protection needs in the camps and transitional shelters.

16. The NRS acknowledged the importance of addressing the wider needs of affected
communities throughout the country and in response, efforts were made to ensure that food-security, social protection and employment opportunities were secured for wider communities in order to alleviate social jealousies and enable the wider recovery process. The MSS/UNDP SERC project and IOMs Enhancing Stabilisation through Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs project played an important role in addressing the needs of communities of return through the engagement of communities in the design, planning and implementation of infrastructure projects perceived to be of common benefit to the community.

Effectiveness of Coordination Mechanisms and Strategic Partnerships 17. The remarkable progress that was made in closing the IDP camps and in facilitating the
peaceful return and resettlement of IDPs was due to the concerted efforts by the Government and its international and national partners. In direct partnership with the Government, the UN, together with international and national NGOs played an integral role in supporting the initial humanitarian response to the crisis and in addressing the protection needs of IDPs in the camps. Important strategic partnerships were also formed with IOM and UNDP which involved the provision of technical assistance early on in the conceptualization and drafting of the NRS and in the implementation of the Strategy through the design and development of several key projects. Additionally, approximately $70 million was provided by the International Community through the Flash, Consolidate and Transitional Strategy and Appeals between 2007 and 2009 to support implementation of the NRS.

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18. The degree of coordination at a high and operational level that was required under the
Strategy posed a significant challenge for the Government given its limited institutional capacity. Although the Inter-Ministerial Commission was initially envisaged as a mechanism for coordinating the implementation of the Strategy, this function was never fully realized due to the fact that the limited number of meetings held, focused predominantly on issues related to the housing pillar such as camp closures, the establishment and closure of transitional shelters and the recovery packages.

19. In the absence of an effective Inter-Ministerial Commission, coordination between the


five pillar working groups was inherently weak which hindered the development of crosspillar cooperation and synergies. The only real opportunities for cross-pillar exchange were during Government retreats including the 26 February 2008 retreat when the pillar working groups were first established and the 21 November 2008 retreat when the working group members came together to discuss results and ongoing priorities related to the implementation of the NRS. The lack of an effective cross-ministerial coordination mechanism meant that there was no overarching mechanism to oversee and ensure that the implementation results of the NRS were achieved

20. The limited number of meetings convened by socio-economic and security pillar working
groups directly hampered the overall coordination of NRS. Although many initiatives were implemented by the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Defence and Security, because these initiatives were not implemented as specific components of the NRS, the Government was unable to track and link these back to the NRS. Without regular working group meetings, important opportunities for cross-pillar cooperation were also missed; for example, in the absence of a functioning socioeconomic working group, MSS, together with UNDP and IOM, ended up taking on new projects to address infrastructure needs in communities of high return.

21. Under the Strategy, the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality was tasked with
ensuring that all elements of the Strategy strive to meet the specific protection needs of women and children and begin to reverse the heightened levels of violence in homes, schools and society at large that resulted from the Crisis.122 While significant efforts were made to address specific protection needs of women and children under the Protection pillar, gender mainstreaming across work of the other pillars was limited.

22. The Cluster System was officially introduced in Timor-Leste in March 2009 to better
coordinate the response to the conflict and also to plan for potential future emergencies, particularly natural disasters; however, by the time the clusters were introduced and terms of reference and work plans finalised, almost all displacement camps had closed and only transitional shelters remained. In this regard, the standardized approach of the cluster system was not customized to address the specific needs of the Timorese Government and did not correspond to the shifting national priorities from humanitarian response to national development.
122

National Recovery Strategy, p. 2.


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Sustainability of NRS Results


While the 65 IDP camps established in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis have disappeared, with the majority of IDPs having successfully returned into their communities, many of the underlying tensions and root causes of the crisis in 2006 have yet to be resolved and thus, continue to pose a threat to the long-term stability of the return and reintegration process.

1. Unresolved issues related to land and property ownership. While the decision of
the Government to prioritize return over the resolution of land and property issues proved to be the right one, the adoption and implementation of a legal framework is necessary in order to clarify and resolve complex and deep-rooted tensions over disputed land and property rights and entitlements and ensure the prevention of future conflict.

2. Accountability for crimes committed in 2006. All perpetrators of past crimes


committed during the 2006 crisis need to be brought to justice and held accountable for their actions. Without such accountability, people will not be deterred from settling old scores, as was the case in 2006, when some persons used the outbreak of violence as an opportunity to seek revenge for past injustices, particular those related to the occupancy of their property after 1999.123

3.

Socio-economic inequalities. Given that perceived social and economic inequalities were a contributing factor of the 2006 crisis, it will be critical to ensure conflict-sensitive and equitable national development. Sustainability of NRS results under the social economic development pillar will also depend on the Governments ability to continue to address challenges such as poverty, unemployment and access to basic social services.

4. Unresolved political animosities. The 2006 crisis reignited deep-rooted political


tensions and animosities that related back to the 1975 civil war. Although MSS Dialogue Teams helped to facilitate dialogue around these tensions, their ability to resolve these long withstanding animosities was limited. The upcoming elections will therefore be an important test of political stability and political party leaders will have an important role in ensuring that their actions and rhetoric do not further inflame past political animosities.

5. Factional division between F-FDTL and PNTL. Given that the 2006 crisis was
triggered by deep-rooted tensions between the police and military, sustained efforts to build a professional and impartial police and military forces and to complete the process

6.

of security sector will remain key factors in ensuring longer-term stability in Timor-Leste. Rapid population growth in Dili. The situation in Dili in 1999 underlined how high housing prices and the lack of alternative housing for persons who lost property in past conflict helped to fuel the crisis in 2006. The population in Dili has increased from 175,730

123Bugalski, pp. 37-38.

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people in 2004 to 234,026 in 2010 and as a result, the demand for housing has exceeded the supply.124 As rural livelihoods remain fragile, the potential for migration to urban areas such as Dili will only increase, placing further demands on housing needs and diminishing the limited stock of affordable housing.

Potential for Replication of NRS Approach in Other Countries


The successful closure of IDP camps and return of IDPs within a three-year timeframe provides an interesting case study for other countries emerging from crisis and dealing with significant population displacement. In examining the replicability of the NRS approach in Timor-Leste, it is necessary to consider the enabling factors which made rapid return and reintegration of IDPs in Timor-Leste possible following the 2006 crisis.

1. The majority of IDPs had a strong desire to return. As discussed in previous


sections, once the high-level political and security circumstances changed following the death of Major Alfredo Reinado and resolution of petitioners issues, community perceptions about security improved significantly and for many IDPs, obstacles to return were immediately lifted. Once security concerns were resolved and after the Cash Recovery Grants were in place to deal with the other main obstacles to return (namely the destruction of property), the number of IDPs willing to return increased substantially.

2. The Government was able to allocate significant resources to provide IDPs


with the means to return. In the context of Timor-Lestes significant income from oil and gas revenues, for the Government, the cash payment system was an easy fix for a Government flush with natural resources money but weak in institutional development.125 As a result, the Government was able to allocate $56.8 million in cash payments to IDPs.

3. There was strong political will from the Government to solve crisis. As
discussed previously, resolution of the IDP issue was made one of the three National Priorities of the IV Constitutional Government in 2008 and strong political will was evident through the leadership of the Government in developing the Strategy and in actively engaging with IDP leaders and communities to discuss and resolve barriers to return.

4. IDPs were well-informed about the NRS implementation process


Government officials met frequently and often with IDP leaders, service providers and others in an effort to inform policy formulation and response and to minimize the potential for violent conflict or misunderstandings.126 High level Government officials

124

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Constitutional Government IV, Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, p. 109.
125 126

Bugalski, p. 24.

Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Evaluation of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Lessons Learnt and Recommendations, 18 December 2009, pp. 8-9.
77 THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

also made frequent visits to IDP camps in order to ensure open lines of communication with the displaced living in the camps.127

5. The use of dialogue to address and resolve barriers to return and


reintegration worked because it was a culturally relevant approach for communities in Timor-Leste. The approach of the MSS Dialogue Teams was based on Timorese traditional concepts and practices used to resolve conflict and maintain social cohesion. The approach relied on local cultural practices and incorporated traditional concepts such as ceremonies used in Timor-Leste to solve conflicts including nahe biti boot 128 and tara bandu129 ceremonies. During the dialogue meetings, spiritual leaders were also given a key role in the conflict resolution process.

6. The strong culture of forgiveness in Timor-Leste contributed to the


expeditious resolution of community-based conflicts and tensions. The Catholic Church has had important influence in efforts to foster peace, social cohesion and reconciliation in Timor-Leste. In addition to playing a key role in the humanitarian response to the crisis and in supporting dialogue initiatives in communities, the strong influence of the Catholic Church has also made people more amenable to forgiveness. This culture of forgiveness has been further encouraged through President Jose Ramos Hortas high-level dialogues with Indonesia in order to promote reconciliation and forgiveness between the two countries.

127 128

Ibid, p. 9.

Literally translated to mean spreading of the big mat ceremony whereby a palm leaf mat is spread out as part of a traditional conflict resolution ceremony by those agreeing to accept each other and not engage in further conflict.
129 A

customary means by which rules and norms are established for social control.
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MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Reintegration of IDPs is a time-consuming and complex process compared to


return and relocation. In order to achieve sustainable reintegration, it is necessary to deal with social dynamics and tensions in communities, through efforts to mitigate social jealousies and ensure equal access to resources and livelihoods. While some government officials saw the closing of the IDP camps as the end point of the return process, MSS, together with its international and national partners took a more intermediate perspective and developed projects and activities to follow-up the immediate return of IDPs and to support their sustained return and reintegration. The cumulative effect of the numerous projects implemented under the HHK pillar by a large number of international and national NGO partners was significant in supporting the reintegration process. The work of the MSS/UNDP Dialogue Teams also played an integral role in the resolution of conflict at a community level in order to facilitate the return and reintegration of IDPs.

2. The decision to promote return before determining property and land


ownership was the right post-crisis response for Timor-Leste and contributed to the expeditious return of IDP families in less than four years. The resolution of land and property issues would have taken years due to the absence of land and property legislation and the past destruction of land and property records by the pro-integrationist militias in early 2000. Giving priority to the resolution of land and property issues would have left thousands of IDPs in camps for an extended period of time without solutions to address their immediate barriers to return. In recognition of the fact that many IDPs were willing but unable to return and, that unresolved property and occupancy rights were only one of many and multifaceted factors impeded the return of IDPs, the Governments decision to focus on return therefore proved to be the right one.

3. For return to be durable there must be a holistic approach and not simply a oneoff cash grant. While the use of Cash Recovery Grants under the NRS addressed one of the main obstacles to return identified by IDPs, many other barriers needed to be addressed in order to facilitate durable return and reintegration of IDPs. In this regard, the NRS acknowledged and responded to the need for reconciliation efforts to address protracted community conflict and tensions as well as the need for improved security in communities and the provision of socio-economic opportunities to promote increased employment and income generation.

4. Peace is not absence of conflict and while conflict-free co-existence may imply
reconciliation, the stability of Timor-Leste cannot be measured only in terms of occurrence or absence of violence or crisis. There remains a pressing need to address potential triggers of conflict as well as root causes of conflict including land and property issues, unemployment, poverty, regional disparities, increased urbanization and housing shortages in order to ensure long-term stability and social cohesion.

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5. Given the enormous pressures and threats faced by MSS officials in the
administration of the Cash Recovery Grants, the establishment of strong control mechanisms at an earlier stage in the process would have helped to ensure integrity of the process. In such a context, and in order to protect staff from outside influences and pressures, it is important and necessary in such situations to ensure that specific confidentiality policies and codes of conduct for staff are in place, including the issuance fines in order to deter potential cases of fraud; and the establishment of an independent body to oversee the verification and estimation processes.

6. The initial verification process was challenged by the absence of a land and
property registry and an incomplete assessment and mapping of damaged property. The abandoned UNDP project to record housing damage and link this information with households using a Geographic Information System (GIS) could have improved the administrative process, enhanced MSS ability to identify and detect multiple claims to individual houses and prevented cases of fraudulent claims.

7. Administering the Cash Recovery Grants exposed MSS staff to significant


security threats which should have been mitigated at an earlier stage. MSS strived to maintain an open door policy in order to allow IDPs to submit and follow-up on the status of their claims; however, in some instances where IDPs were dissatisfied with decisions related to their cases and resorted to physical threats in order to influence their outcome of their case, the security of MSS staff was at risk. In light of MSS continued role in the provision of compensation packages, most recently to veterans, it will be important for MSS, with the support of the Ministry of Defence and Security, to re-assess its security policies in order to address the safety needs of staff and ensure that the integrity of the decision-making processes related to compensation schemes is not compromised.

8. Resource mobilization was easy at height of crisis but difficult after the crisis
was stabilized. The initial Flash Appeal which was developed immediately after the crisis for $19 million and which set out priority rapid response activities to be undertaken over a three-month period in order to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the crisis was 114 percent funded. The Consolidated Appeal prepared by the UN and NGO partners together with the Government in January 2007 covered a six-month period and was launched for $36 million but was only funded at 69 percent ($16.6 million).130 With the increasing shift away from an emergency humanitarian response towards recovery and development, donor interest began to wane further and the 2008 Transitional Strategy and Appeal, which requested $36.3 million, was only 60% funded ($30.1 million).131

130

United Nations, Transitional Strategy and Appeal 2008: A Consolidated Plan to Support National Response to Humanitarian and Recovery Needs of Internally Displaced People and Vulnerable Communities and Strengthen Disaster Risk Management in Timor-Leste, 2008, p. 1. Financial Tracking Service, Timor-Leste - Transitional Strategy and Appeal 2008, List of Appeal Projects (grouped by Component (within Module)), with funding status of each as of 22-November-2011, http:// www.reliefweb.int/fts
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 80

131

9. The use of Recovery Cash Grants under the NRS has shown that monetary
incentives to demonstrate the reach of the Government are not sustainable over the longer-term and have the potential to create dependency. The receipt of Cash Recovery Grants by IDP households was the first time that many persons were able to tangibly feel the presence of the Government in their lives; however, during the process of dialogue, MSS staff and Government officials engaged with communities on a non-monetary basis to support the resolution of conflict. In order to sustain the presence of the State in communities, such approaches to community engagement will continue to play an important role in building trust and strengthened relations between the Government and communities.

10. While the cluster system launched in Timor-Leste reflected the global
humanitarian structure, it did not fully correspond to the evolving needs of the Government of Timor-Leste. By the time the clusters were launched in Timor-Leste in March 2009, and terms of reference and work plans finalised, almost all displacement camps had closed and only transitional shelters remained. In this regard, the standardized approach of the cluster system was not customized to address the specific needs of the Timorese Government and did not correspond to the shifting national priorities from humanitarian response to national development. By the time the cluster system was introduced, the focus was already on the government-led National Priorities Working Groups which also resulted in limited government participation in the cluster system.132

132

Medhurst, Louisa, Protection and Early Recovery in Timor-Leste, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue No. 46, March 2010.
81 THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

RECOMMENDATIONS
General 1. The sudden outbreak of the crisis in 2006, and the immediate need for a comprehensive
response to the crisis, underlined the important function of coordination mechanisms at a national level in order to engage and ensure the participation of relevant ministries. Given the cross-cutting dimensions of man-made and natural disasters (in terms of housing, security, socio-economic and protection needs), a coordination mechanism should be established under the Office of the Prime Minister to support an immediate all-of-government response to future man-made and national disasters.

2. Ensuring accountability for criminal acts committed during the 2006 crisis will be critical
in order to sustain the return and reintegration results achieved through the NRS over the longer term. Individuals who committed crimes and human rights violations during the 2006 crisis should be held accountable in accordance with the recommendations of the Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste.

3. The HHU programme provided sufficient opportunities to ensure that pending cases and
complaints related to the HHU Cash Recovery Grants programme were fairly and comprehensively addressed through efforts of MSS to receive, review and re-evaluate pending cases and complaints. In cases where complaints still exist, persons should be informed about the possibility to appeal the MSS decisions and to address their complaint to legal institutions. In order to avoid raising expectations about the possibility of re-opening the HHU programme, it is important that such avenues for redress are consistently communicated by the Government and national institutions to all persons wishing to file complaints.

4. Historically, political discourse has had a powerful impact in Timor-Leste in contributing to


both the incitement and resolution of conflict. The high-level political dialogues and peace ceremonies convened in 2008 under the auspices of the former Presidents Dialogue Commission set a positive example for communities about political reconciliation. The 21 August 2010 Maubisse meeting, where historical leaders came together to discuss the issue of possible new leaders from the next generations to carry out the process of national development and state building into the future is another positive example. With the upcoming elections, it will be important for all political parties and leaders to continue to send messages of reconciliation and tolerance in order to ensure that their discourse does not serve to further inflame pre-existing tensions and divisions.

5. Following the closure of the NRS in December 2010, some persons have remained
without homes (with some continuing to illegally reside in former transitional shelters) due to unresolved property issues or the fact that they did not own property prior to 2006 and have since become vulnerable. Alternative housing is needed for vulnerable
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 82

persons that remain without durable solutions following the 2006 crisis as well as for those persons who are living in homes but are not the original owner of the house and who will require alternative accommodation once the new Land and Property Law is adopted and implemented. Under the Millennium Development Goals Suco Programme, five houses will be built in each of the 2,228 aldeias every year for vulnerable persons, resulting in more than 55,000 houses being built by 2015.133 This Programme could offer important solutions for vulnerable persons who remain without adequate housing as well as for future cases of displacement that will be encountered following the adoption of the land and property legislation.

6. Land and property disputes remain a contentious issue for communities. The resolution
of land and property issues, through the finalization, adoption and implementation of the Land and Property Law is therefore critical in order to ensure that long withstanding issues related to occupancy rights are finally addressed and prevented from serving as a trigger for future conflict.

7. One of the root causes of the 2006 crisis was the sense of perceived social and regional
inequalities which were exacerbated by high unemployment, poverty, food insecurity and a housing shortage. The Governments Strategic Development Plan for 2011-2030 acknowledges that urban-rural imbalances and inter-regional imbalances are inevitable in a fast-changing economy.134 In order to ensure that future development does not contribute to the further widening of real and perceived social and regional inequalities, increased efforts will be needed by the Government, International Community and civil society to support equitable future development.

8. Although the NRS provided IDPs with the means to repair and reconstruct their homes,
there are still homes which remain destroyed or severely damaged. In order to assess future housing needs and ensure effective urban-rural planning and budgeting, a comprehensive mapping of homes destroyed and reconstructed should be conducted.

9. Based on the experience of the NRS Cash Recovery Grants, important mechanisms are
needed to ensure that recipients of the different social protection schemes under MSS are not receiving double payments across the schemes. In order to track payments and benefits given, it is recommended that an integrated database be established within MSS to cross-check the distribution and payment of social protection benefits.

10. Security proved to be a major challenge for MSS during the estimation and verification
process for the Cash Recovery Grants awarded under the NRS. Given the significant number of compensation payments now being made to veterans and other groups, it is recommended that MSS undertake a comprehensive security review in order to ensure the safety and security of staff and prevent outside interference in internal processes to determine and administer such payments.
133

Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Constitutional Government IV, Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, p. 111.
134

Ibid, p. 116.
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Peace-building 11. Through the work of the former MSS Dialogue Teams during the IDP return and
reintegration process, MSS has developed significant institutional capacity to support the resolution of community level tensions and conflicts. The recent establishment of the new Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion (DPBSC), will ensure that this important capacity is not lost and that practical knowledge and experience of former Dialogue Team staff (many of whom are now staff members of the new Department) continues to enhance national and community capacity to respond to, and mitigate sources of tension and conflict through dialogue and mediation. In order to sustain the work of the new Department (which is now funded under a UNDP project until 2013), it is recommended that funds be allocated for permanent civil servant positions and an operational budget after 2013.

12. With the upcoming Presidential elections and anticipated adoption of the land law, the
Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion will have an important preventative role over the next year. As a conflict-prevention measure to respond to tensions related to further land disputes and increased politicization, it is recommended that the Department ramp up its dialogue and training efforts this year and also consider the organization of a national/district-level peace-building workshop in order to socialize the role of the DPBSC and increase awareness about the dialogue process.

13. There is a need to consolidate and coordinate efforts and programmes around peacebuilding and conflict prevention in order to avoid duplication of efforts. At the Government-level, there is a need for further coordination and clarification of roles and responsibilities between the DPBSC, the National Directorate for the Prevention of Community Conflicts under the Secretary of State for Security and the National Directorate for Land and Property under the Ministry of Justice. This is particularly important in order to ensure coordination in the mediation and resolution of community conflict (including those related to land and property disputes) since mediation teams will be established under all three offices. At the level of civil society, there are also a number of international and national NGOs involved in conflict resolution and peace-building. In order to ensure effective coordination within Government ministries and between civil society and the Government, it is recommended that a Government-led and chaired coordination body be established. Given MSS past experience as the lead Ministry for the Trust-Building pillar of the NRS, and its accumulated expertise and practical experience in the resolution of conflict and promotion of social cohesion, the new DPBSC would be well-positioned to lead such coordination efforts.

14. Given the accumulated knowledge of MSS DPBSC about the causes and dynamics of
conflict in communities throughout the country, the Department is well-placed to play a supportive and coordination role within the Government in ensuring that processes and approaches instituted during the implementation of the Strategic Development are conflict-sensitive. In this regard, the Department should work with other ministries to

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support the mainstreaming of a conflict-sensitive approach in the planning and implementation of national development processes.

15. In order to ensure meaningful participation of women in dialogue and peace processes, in line
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security,135 the Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion, in coordination with the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality, should support the organization of specific peace-building and conflict resolution trainings for leaders of womens networks and NGOs in order to increase their capacity to actively participate in the resolution of conflicts. Technical support could also be given to support the development of womens peace networks.

16. The MSS DPBSC, in collaboration with networks of the National Directorate for the
Prevention of Community Conflict and Beluns Early Warning and Early Response System, should undertake a mapping and assessment of communities with a past history of conflict and which are facing current tensions related to areas such as youth gang violence, higher rates of violent crime and political animosities. In areas determined to be high risk, the DPBSC should support an increased number of dialogue meetings and mediations as a preventive measure, particularly in the lead up to the 2012 elections, and also coordinate with the Ministry of Defense and Security so that an increased security presence can be deployed, where necessary, in order to deter and respond to potential acts of violence.

17. The MSS DPBSC should cooperate with the Ministry for State Administration and
Territorial Planning, in order to ensure that training and support for Chefe Suco in the areas of mediation and conflict resolution are institutionalized within support programmes and initiatives and provided on an annual basis.

18. The Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion Training, Monitoring and
Evaluation Unit should focus its time and resources on the development of training seminars for areas that have not yet had any form of training. Participants of such trainings should include an increased number of youth and martial arts groups, representatives of religious communities and political parties. It is also recommended that the Unit provide follow-up/refresher trainings for community leaders who attended past trainings in order to deepen their knowledge and address challenges they face in mediating conflict in their communities.

19. The Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion from the MSS should advocate
for the inclusion of civic education and peace education into the curriculum and training for new civil servants. Such training would ensure that Government officials, particularly those based in the districts, are well-equipped with knowledge about how to facilitate and support community-based resolution processes.

135

The Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security on 31 October 2000. The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES


Ministry of Social Solidarity 1. Maria Domingas Fernandes Alves, Minister of Social Solidarity 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Jacinto Rigoberto Gomes, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Ministry of Social Solidarity Amandio Amaral Freitas, Director of National Directorate for Social Assistance and General Coordinator of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Program Sebastiao Guterres, Advisor to the Minister of Social Solidarity Agostinho Cosme Belo, former Dialogue Team member and current Chief of Department, MSS DPBSC Miquel Soares Trindade, former Dialogue Team member and current member of the Community Strengthening Unit, DPBSC Leonito Gueterres, former Dialogue Team member and current Regional Focal Point for Dili District, DPBSC Florido Corte-Real, former Dialogue Team member and current member of the Training, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, DPBSC Serafin R. M. de Jesus, former Dialogue Team member and current member of the Dialogue and Mediation Unit, DPBSC

10. Carmelita Casimiro Martins, former Dialogue Team member and current member of the Dialogue and Mediation Unit, DPBSC 11. Arnaldo Venancio Gusmo, former Dialogue Team member and current member of the Community Strengthening Unit, DPBSC 12. Carme Ribeiro de Jesus, former Dialogue Team member and current member of the Dialogue and Mediation Unit, DPBSC 13. Ramiro Lelo Bato, former Dialogue Team member and current Head of the Dialogue and Mediation Unit, DPBSC 14. Joanita Silvira da Costa, former Dialogue Team member and current Head of the Community Strengthening Unit 15. Domingos Pinto Tavares, former Dialogue Team member and current member of the Training, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, DPBSC 16. Adao Jorge Baptista Pinto, Member of the Training and Monitoring Unit, DPBSC 17. Karim Elguindi, Advisor, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters and the National Directorate for Social Assistance 18. Bemvindo Aquino da Silva, Database Officer 19. Secundino Rangel, Former Deputy HHF Programme Director 20. Ben Larke, Former Advisor 21. Sophia Cason, Former Advisor Line Ministries 22. Bendito Freitas, Secretary of State, SEFOPE 23. Commander Pedro Belo, Commander of PNTL in Dili District, Ministry of Defence and Security
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 86

24. Lidia Lopes de Carvalho, National Directorate for Prevention of Community Conflict, Secretary of State for Security 25. Antonio Carceres, National Mediator for Land Disputes, National Directorate for Land and Property, Ministry of Justice 26. Rosa Vong, Ministry of Infrastructure 27. Maria Filomena Babo, Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality 28. National Director for Secondary Education 29. Sra. Nur Aini Alkatiri, Deputy Director, Bank Payment Authority

National Institutions 30. Silverio Baptista, Deputy Provedor, Provedor for Human Rights and Justice United Nations 31. Finn Reske-Nielsen, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Governance Support, Development and Humanitarian Coordination, United Nations Integrated Mission to Timor-Leste 32. Louis James Gentile, UNMIT Chief, Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section, Representative of the Office o the High Commissioner for Human Rights 33. Nadia Hadi, Head of Office of the Resident Coordinator 34. Preston Hiroki Pentony, Political Affairs Officer 35. Jose Marcal, National Programme Officer, World Food Programme 36. Jose Assalino, International Labour Organization UNDP 37. Mikiko Tanaka, Country Director 38. Alissar Chaker, Head of CPRU 39. Jose Marcelino Cabral Belo, Chief Technical Advisor/Project Manager, MSS/UNDP Strengthened Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue Project / Support to Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion Project 40. Yolanda Rodriguez OBrien, Programme Officer, CPRU 41. Auxiliadora dos Santos, Programme Officer, CPRU 42. Rui A. Gomes, Economics Specialist, MDG, Assistant Country Director and Head of the ProPoor Policy Unit Donors 43. Ruth Maria Jorge, Attach, Programme Officer International Relations/Stability Instrument, Delegation of the European Union to Timor-Leste International Organizations 44. Norberto Celestino, Chief of Mission, IOM 45. Luiz Vieira, Former Chief of Mission, IOM 46. Barney Chittick, Former IOM Staff 47. Valentina Bacchin, Former Head of Returns and Reintegration Team, IOM

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48. Phillippe Brewster, Former Advisor to MSS on HHF and DRM Programme National/International NGOs 49. Sierra James, Programme Manager, Ba Futuro 50. Vidal Campos Magno, Peace-building Project Coordinator, Ba Futuro 51. Luis Ximenes, Director, Belun 52. Sara Dewhurst, Programme Manager, Belun 53. Maria de Jesus, Belun 54. Rebecca Engel, Senior Advisor, Belun 55. Florentino Sarmento, Head of Office, Baucau, CRS 56. Catharina Maria, Project Manager for Peace-building and Governance, CRS 57. Maria Barreto, Director, Fokupers 58. Xisto dos Santos, Human Rights Officer, HAK 59. Cesar Manuel da Silva, Project Coordinator JPC 60. Jose Pereira Soares, Project Officer, JRS 61. Alfredo Zamundio, Former Country Director, Norwegian Refugee Service in Timor-Leste 62. Manuel dos Santos, Acting Director, Pradet Districts/Sub-Districts/Sucos/Aldeia 63. Antonio Ribeiro, Chefe Camea, Cristo Rei Sub-District, Dili District 64. Eurico da Costa, Chefe Comoro, Dom Aleixo Sub-District, Dili District 65. Sr. Julio do Rosaro Lemos, Lisapat, Sub-District Halolis (Ermera) 66. Sr. Antonio Babo Madera, Ermera District 67. Sr. Antonio Maia dos Santos, Chefe Suco, Sub-District Ermera/District Ermera 68. Manuel Soares Gueteres, Chefe Suco Bado Hoo,Venilale Sub-District, Baucau District 69. Sr, Diamantino Estanislao Gueterres, Chefe Suco Wailaa,Venilale Sub-District, Baucau District Former Internally Displaced Persons 70. Faustina da Silva (Fatuhada) 71. Catarina A (Becora) 72. Plasida Birnardino (Comoro) 73. M. Freitas (Camea) 74. Matalim A.F. (Comoro) 75. Alberto Tilman (Comoro)

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ANNEX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS


1) To what extent did the National Recovery Strategy achieve its three overall objectives? a. How did the Strategy support the development of a new vision toward national
recovery that promotes mutual acceptance and strengthens communities, local economies, stability and the relationship between the Government and people

b.

of Timor-Leste? To what extent was a concerted all of Government approach undertaken? To what degree was the National Recovery Strategy able to address the range of social, physical, economic, security and political issues that impeded the resettlement of IDPs?

c. To what extent did measures and actions undertaken under the Strategy meet
the needs of IDPs and wider communities affected by the crisis?

2) What were the main results of the five different pillars of the National Recovery
Strategy?

3) To what extent did networks, coordination mechanisms and strategic partnerships


support implementation of the National Recovery Strategy?

4) What key factors will require more attention in order to improve prospects for
sustainability of the results of the National Recovery Strategy and the potential for replication in other countries?

5) What main lessons learned emerged during and after implementation of the Strategy? 6) What future initiatives are needed in the area of peace-building to consolidate gains
made through the National Recovery Strategy?

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

ANNEX 3: TERMS OF REFERENCE


23903 - Consultant: Review and documentation of the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) - Dili, Timor Leste Job ID/Title: Scope of advertisement: Category (eligible applicants): 23903 - Consultant: Review and documentation of the National Recovery Strategy (NRS) Globally advertised (Including jobs.undp.org) External External defines as applicants external to UNDP and to the UN Common system, including UNDP non-staff. UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Crisis Prevention and Recovery 24-Jun-11 Individual Contract International Consultant Approved by cecilia.quirino on 10-Jun-11 @ 02:10:PM English Portuguese 15-Jul-2011 6 Weeks 6 Weeks

Brand: Practice Area: Additional Practice Area: Application Deadline: Type of Contract: Post Type and Level: Current status: Languages Required: Starting Date: Duration of Initial Contract : Expected Duration of Assignment:

(date when the selected candidate is expected to start)

Background: As a result of the 2006 crisis, more than 150,000 people fled their homes and took refuge in 65 IDP camps in Dili and the districts. Moreover, a number of houses and buildings were damaged or destroyed. Finding a sustainable resettlement and reintegration solution was a high priority for the IVth Constitutional Government. To address the displacement issue, the Government adopted in December 2007, the National Recovery Strategy, known in Tetum as Hamutuk Harii Futur, to establish a concerted Government response for the displacement problem and promote social reintegration that meets both the needs of the IDPs and the affected communities throughout the country. The Hamutuk Harii Futuru comprised five pillars: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Hamutuk Harii Uma (Housing) Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (Social Protection) Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade (Stability) Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia Sosial (Socio-Economic Development) Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa (Trust-Building)

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The Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) has developed strategic partnerships with international and national partners to implement the National Recovery Strategy, which facilitated through its recovery packages the closure of 65 camps and 6 transitional shelters, and hence, the reintegration of the 16,500 registered IDP families in communities. Objective: The overall objective of this assignment is to review progress towards the National Recovery Strategy objectives and document the process, results, and main lessons learned. The Final Report will serve as a reference to be shared with a wide audience such as civil society, international agencies, and Government institutions. Description of Responsibilities: In pursuit of the overall objectives, the following key issues will be addressed during this assignment: 1. Assess the extent to which the National Recovery Strategy achieved its overall objectives based on (1) a desk review of relevant reports by MSS and stakeholders, (2) interviews with a list of stakeholder organizations and beneficiaries; and (3) Focus group discussion(s) with members of relevant coordination forums (Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa working group, representatives of the Operations meetings, etc.); 2. Compile results achieved in the various pillars of the National Recovery Strategy, including statistics, testimonies from beneficiaries and pictures; 3. Describe and assess networks, coordination mechanisms and strategic partnerships established to support of the implementation of the National Recovery Strategy; 4. Describe key factors that will require attention in order to improve prospects for sustainability of the results and the potential for replication of the approach in other countries; 5. Describe the main lessons that have emerged; 6. Provide a set of recommendations for future initiatives needed in the area of Peace building to consolidate the gains achieved by the National Recovery Strategy. Expected Outputs & Deliverables 1. Executive summary and preliminary report: The consultant will present a summary of the findings and preliminary recommendations at the conclusion of the field research component of the evaluation. (S)he will present this information in the following formats: a) A verbal presentation (debriefing). This presentation will be used to share preliminary recommendations and receive feedback from MSS and its counterpart. b) A Preliminary Report not exceeding 10 pages in length (excluding annexes) and including an executive summary. This report is to be submitted no later than one week after signing the contract. 2. Final Report: The consultant will submit an analytical report (1) documenting the National Recovery Implementation process, and (2) highlighting: achievements, constraints, lessons learned and (3) providing recommendations for ensuring sustainability of outcomes. 3. Other: The consultant will provide: a) All questionnaires, pictures and copies of raw data collected during the field research. b) A PowerPoint presentation outlining the main findings of the review as per the approved final report.

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The final report incorporating MSS, UNDP and other stakeholders comments shall be submitted by the consultant at the end of the contract. The consultant should follow the table of contents laid out below detailing the minimum reporting requirements for the final report. Report Format: Title Page List of acronyms and abbreviations Table of contents, including list of annexes Executive summary Introduction Background and context of the National Recovery Strategy Description of the National Recovery Strategy its rationale, results and external factors which are likely to have affected results Purpose Methodology Findings Lessons learnt Recommendations Conclusions Annexes Methodology for evaluation approach The analytical review will be done through a combination of processes including a desk review, selected site visits and interviews with stakeholders and beneficiaries and will include: A desk review: MSS will provide necessary internal documentation, including specific agreements, and technical reports. The Consultant will also be required to make reference to any other external documentation which is appropriate for the study. Field-based research involving no fewer than 5 calendar days and including the following: - A series of interviews with former IDPs, beneficiary community members, NGOs and other counterparts, partner organizations, and other persons that MSS, UNDP or the Consultant deems necessary. - Field visits to conduct discussions with District Officials and beneficiary community members. - Other field-based research techniques as proposed by the Consultant, including focus-groups, small-sample surveys, etc. Consultations with MSS National Directorate of Social Assistance and Natural Disasters and relevant partners; Discussions with the Senior Management of MSS; In preparing the work plan, the Consultant is required to keep in mind that field visits will require pre-arrangements with local authorities. Competencies: Demonstrated excellent written and oral communication skills in English; Ability to communicate in Tetum. Knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia or Portuguese is an asset. Otherwise a full time Tetum interpreter should be factored in the Consultants financial proposal. Strong negotiating skills and ability to work independently; Cross-cultural management experience and sensitivity;

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High level planning, organizational and time management skills, including flexibility, attention to detail and the ability to work under pressure to meet changing deadlines; Well developed interpersonal skills , including the ability to liaise effectively at all levels; Analytical and problem solving skills of a high order, including the ability to formulate recommendations and policy advice desirable. Qualifications: Masters degree in political science, international relations, development studies, Social Sciences, monitoring and evaluation or any other relevant discipline; Relevant background and experience in review, assessment and evaluation. Familiarity with the Results Based Management approach is an asset; Minimum three years of international experience in monitoring and/or evaluation the areas of development assistance, preferably in a post-conflict context; The consultant must prove experience in having conducted at least three final evaluations for International Development Agencies; Experience and knowledge of the socio-political context of Timor-Leste is a strong an asset.

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ANNEX 4: LIST OF SOURCES

Barnes, Frances, External Evaluation Report for Support to the Trust-Building Pillar of the National Recovery Strategy: NGO Small Grants Project and Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanism for Dialogue Project. Black, Richard and Gent, Saskia, Sustainable Return in Post-Conflict Contexts, International Migration,Vol. 44, IOM, 2006. Bugalski, Natalie, Post Conflict Housing Reconstruction and the Right to Adequate Housing in TimorLeste: An Analysis of the Response to the Crisis of 2006 and 2007, 27 July 2010. Chega!, Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR), 2008. Daniel Fitzpatrick, Land Issues in a Newly Independent East Timor (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2001). Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Constitutional Government IV, Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030. Government of Timor-Leste, Final Report, Third HHF Retreat: Working Together for Stability Strengthening Community Stability and Sustainable Return A Whole of Government Approach, 21 November 2008. Government of Timor-Leste, Terms of Reference, Terms of Reference for the Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade Working Group, April 2008. Government of Timor-Leste, Working Together to Build the Foundations for Peace and Stability and Improved Livelihoods of Timor-Leste,Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting, 28-29 March 2008. Harrington, Andrew, Ethnicity, Violence and Land and Property Disputes in Timor-Leste, East Timor Law Journal, 2007, http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Timor-Leste: IDPs Have Returned Home, but the Challenge of Reintegration is Just Beginning, 9 December 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ refworld/docid/4b20b69d2.html Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), West-Timor/Indonesia: Durable solutions still out of reach for many new citizens from former East Timor province, 25 August 2010, available at: http:// www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c76113a2.html Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Timor-Leste: IDPs returning home, but to ongoing poverty and lack of access to basic services, 31 October 2008, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ refworld/docid/490b12092.html International Crisis Group, Timor-Lestes Displacement Crisis, Asia Report No. 148, 31 March 2008. International Labour Organization, Final Report on the Women in Self-Employment (WISE) Project, 2008. International Labour Organization, Project Proposal, Investment Budget Execution Support for Rural Development and Income Generation, May 2008. International Organization for Migration, Final Report to AusAID, Technical Support to the Government of Timor-Leste to Complete the Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building Our Houses Together) Programme, March 2011. International Organization for Migration, Return Monitoring Project Final Report, October 2011.

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Kvernrod, Merethe; Powels, Anna; Da Silva, Pedro; and McKenzie, Colin, Norwegian Refugee Council Evaluation Report, Half-Way Home: Evaluation of Shelters and Camp Management in Timor-Leste, September 2009. Liam Chinn and Silas Everet, A Survey of Community-Police Perceptions, The Asia Foundation, East Timor, 2009. Lopes, Ibere, Land and Displacement in Timor-Leste, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 43 June 2009, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3007 Medhurst, Louisa, Protection and Early Recovery in Timor-Leste, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue No. 46, March 2010. Ministry of Social Solidarity, Final Report, Third HHF Retreat, Working Together for Stability: Strengthening Community Stability and Sustainable Return - a whole of government approach, Friday, 21 November 2008. Ministry of Social Solidarity, Secretary of State for Social Assistance and Natural Disasters, Closure of the Programme Hamutuk Harii Futuru (Building the Future Together), Report to the Prime Minister, February 2011, [Unofficial English translation]. Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Evaluation of Hamutuk Harii Futuru Lessons Learnt and Recommendations, 18 December 2009. Ministry of Social Solidarity, Internal Report on Programma Hamutuk Harii Futuru: Encerramento Hamutuk Harii Uma (December 2009 March 2011). Ministry of Social Solidarity, Long-Term Strategic Plan of MSS 2011-2030, July 2009. Ministry of Social Solidarity, Annual Report: Words of Solidarity, 30 August 2007 30 August 2008. Ministry of Social Solidarity, Annual Report: A Year of Solidarity, 2009, Office of the Vice Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Hamutuk Harii Futuru: A National Recovery Strategy, 19 December 2007. Rede Feto, Minutes from the 20 January 2007 meeting of the Womens Committee Working Group Meeting. United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste, Final Report on the Strengthening Early Recover for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs Project, March 2011. United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste, Final Report on the Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue Project, June 2008-October 2010. United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste, Urgent Damage Assessment and Recovery Planning Project, Progress Report, January-February 2007. United Nations Development Programme and the International Labour Organization, Final Narrative Report on the Timor-Leste Work for Peace Project (Projetu Serbisu Ba Dame), December 2007. United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste and the International Labour Organization, Final Report: Work for Conflict Prevention and Meeting Basic Needs (Servi Nasaun Project), December 2006. United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste and the Ministry of Social Solidarity of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Project Document, Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs, November 2008. United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste and the Ministry of Social Solidarity of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Project Document, Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue, May 2008.

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United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste and the Ministry of Social Solidarity of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Project Document, Support to the Department of Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion in Timor-Leste, October 2010. United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for TimorLeste, Geneva, October 2006. United Nations Security Council, 5432nd Meeting, 5 May 2006, New York. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007), 1 February 2007. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 21 August 2007 to January 2008), 17 January 2008. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 8 January to 8 July 2008), 29 July 2008. United Nations, Timor-Leste Crisis, June-September Flash Appeal, June 2006. United Nations, Transitional Strategy and Appeal 2008: A Consolidated Plan to Support National Response to Humanitarian and Recovery Needs of Internally Displaced People and Vulnerable Communities and Strengthen Disaster Risk Management in Timor-Leste, 2008. United Nations, UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration, 2009. UNMIT and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Human Rights, Facing the Future: Periodic Report on Human Rights Developments in Timor-Leste: 1 July 2009 - 30 June 2010. UNMIT, Press Release following the visit to Timor-Leste of the Representative of the Secretary General on the human rights of IDPs, Mr. Walter Kalin, 12 December 2008. UNMIT, The Humanitarian and Recovery Update, Issue No. 1, September 2009 UNMIT, The Humanitarian and Recovery Update, Issue No. 2, December 2009. UNMIT, The Humanitarian and Recovery Update, Issue No. 3, March 2010.

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The Dialogue Project aims to address the root causes of conict in communities through promoting dialogue and mediation, including the use of cultural conict resolution mechanisms, and better public access to relevant information to support smooth and sustainable reintegration of IDPs and promote social cohesion in communities.

Number of Activities by Location


CSA Preparatory meetings

Mediations* are conducted between conicting parties, individuals and/or families over land, secondary occupation and/or border issues.

Preparatory meetings are relatively small meetings organised to help IDPs and various groups in the community identify issues for discussion, resolve obstacles and dene the proper mechanisms to be used in the dialogue meeting.

Dialogue meetings are large community meetings involving IDPs, host communities, government ofcials and relevant stakeholders to seek agreement on the reintegration of IDPs and build mutual relationships among the conicting parties in order to resolve problems in communities.

Dialogue Meetings Training

The community leaders training on the facilitation of dialogue processes and mediation efforts.

Community Stabilization Activities (CSA) are small-scale community stabilization activities such as musical, cultural and sporting activities that bridge past divisions, build strong inter-community relationships, and promote peace and dialogue.

6 2 1 17 33 1 11

13

21

1 6 6 17

Dialogue 55 Preparatory 106

Baucau

*Mediations were calculated using Frekuensia as categorized by the Dialogue Project.

Projection/Datum: WGS84

Map Data Source(s): UNDP CPRU/SERC, Hamutuk Harii Konansa, UNMIT GIS Unit

6 1

1 16

Created on 1 March 2010 by Vincent Fung of the Ofce of UN Resident Coordinator in Timor-Leste.

This map is to support the recovery activities in Timor-Leste.

770

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Dili, Timor-Leste

Updated 16 March 2011 - Accumulative Returned and Resettled IDP Households and Community Infrastructure Projects Delivered by MSS/UNDP SERC Project

SERC

6 - Duyung Construction of community shallow wells


+
Peace

Dame no Futur

Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of I

+
Infrastructure Growth

+
Sustainability

7 12 14 19 18 15 8 11 10 9

16

Projection/Datum: WGS84

Web Resources: http://sites.google.com/site/clusterstimorleste

Map Data Source(s): HCT Minutes (09/11/2009), IOM Post Return Monitoring Project, UNDP CPRU/SERC, UNMIT GIS Unit

Created on 23 November 2009 by Vincent Fung of the Ofce of UN Resident Coordinator in Timor-Leste.

This map is to support the international communities recovery activities in Timor-Leste.

17

20

The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

ERMERA
11 - Caqueo Laran Rubbish Collection Completed 12 - Mota Claran Rehabilitation of Grotto & Surrounds 14 - Camea Public toilets and Water Tank 15 - Macocomate Rehabilitation of drains 16 - Aimutin Rubbish Collection 17 - Sao Jose Community Meeting Place 18 - Mascarinhas Rehabilitation of Sports Court and Chapel 19 - 25 de Abril Multi function Sports Facility 20 - Rio de Janeiro Rubbish collection

1 - Mauc Rehabilitation of Community Centre

4 - Rai Nain Rehabilitation of a Vollyball Court

8 - Berbidu Drainage and Catchment Management

21 - Atara Volleyball Court 22 - Lasaun Youth Centre 23 - Atsabe Villa Youth Centre

23 22 21

2 - Mundo Perdido Rehabilitation of a Football Field & Associated Works

5 - 4 de Setembru Rehabilitation of Water Supply System

9 - Burbulau Rehabilitation of Water Supply

3 - Zero III Rehabilitation of a Preschool and surrounds

7 - Delta III Rehabilitation of a Volleyball Field

10 - Culau Laletec Rehabilitation of drainage system

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The document has been funded by UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

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THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED