Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No.

2, Summer 2012

Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

William A. Rugh
Ambassador (ret.) Rugh was a U.S. Foreign Service officer for 30 years. He served at embassies in six Arab countries, including as ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (1992-95) and Yemen (1984-87). This article is based on his recent trip to Egypt.1

he Egyptian-American relationship has undergone several changes over the past six decades, and has now entered a new phase. The uprising that began on January 25, 2011, and ended by ousting President Husni Mubarak 18 days later led to a political revolution that has continued into 2012 and not yet run its course. The generals in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) who took over said they would transfer power to a new president and parliament as soon as they were democratically elected. The ultimate outcome of this transition is not yet entirely predictable, but it already seems clear that the domestic political scene has changed in significant ways and is unlikely to return to the kind of authoritarian rule Mubarak enjoyed. This in itself will have consequences for the U.S.-Egyptian relationship as new forces and new leaders assume power in Cairo. The uprising and its aftermath have been almost entirely an Egyptian domestic affair, and the Egyptian people have paid relatively little attention to the United States since it started. This is in contrast to turning points in the past, when the United States has been seen as the primary cause
2012, The Author

of Egypts problems (as in the disastrous 1967 war with Israel), or an important help (as in President Carters 1978 role at Camp David). It is probably true that the Obama administrations support of the militarys decision to jettison Mubarak made a difference. But the U.S. role was very quiet, and Egyptians give credit for the ouster to the large numbers of their citizens in Tahrir Square who persisted in their demands that Mubarak leave power. Unlike many occasions in the past, the questions of Israel and U.S. support for it have not been major topics of discussion during the many months since Mubarak departed. Israel became the focus of public attention only on one brief occasion, when a mob stormed the Israeli embassy; the United States did not even then become part of the discussion. Yet an issue over American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) arose unexpectedly and cast a spotlight on the U.S. relationship, causing bilateral tension for several months and revealing some latent Egyptian suspicions regarding American actions and intentions. THE NGO CONTROVERSY When Mubarak was overthrown as a result of a massive street protest against his
Middle East Policy 2012, Middle East Policy Council

36

Rugh: Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

rule and it seemed that Egypt might actually be entering a transition to democracy, the Obama administration was encouraged to think this was a positive development that America should embrace and support. U.S. officials pledged assistance, and private American organizations sought to take advantage of the opportunity to help Egyptians implement their expressed desire for democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. American NGOs that had been trying to promote democracy in Egypt since 2006, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), regarded the new situation as much more open to their efforts. But on December 29, 2011, Egyptian police raided the Cairo offices of 10 NGOs, including four American ones: the NDI and IRI plus Freedom House and the International Center for Journalists. The police confiscated documents and sealed the premises. Egyptian authorities charged 16 Americans and 27 other NGO staff with violating the law, and a judge imposed a travel ban on them. The authorities said that the NGOs had failed to register, as required by Egyptian law, and that they had spent foreign money in Egypt without necessary permissions. Some of the Americans were not in Egypt at the time, but seven were ordered not to leave the country, and three of those took refuge in the American embassy to avoid arrest. Reaction in Washington was surprise and indignation. The American NGOs have some U.S. government funding and high-level American support among members of Congress and other prominent American personalities. Senator John McCain is chair of IRI, and Madeleine Albright is chair of NDI; both boards include former and current members of congress. The IRI director in Egypt, Sam LaHood,
37

the son of U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, was one of the Americans who were sheltered in the U.S. embassy. Senior officials in the Obama administration criticized the Egyptian action against NGOs. Some voices on the Hill pointed out that Egypt receives more than $1.5 billion in financial assistance annually from the United States. Congress instructed the secretary of state not to release that money unless she could certify that Egypt was making progress toward democracy. Questions were raised about what had happened. Why did the generals in SCAF allow this action to be taken against American institutions when it could jeopardize the U.S. assistance that the military presumably wanted very badly? Moreover, since the NGOs were only working to help promote Egyptian democracy, which the Egyptian people themselves were obviously calling for with their revolution, why would the government not want that assistance? Ray LaHood told the press, We simply support the democratic process; we do not pick winners and losers. And why were they suddenly being targeted? They had been working in Egypt for years; some had even participated in the 2011 parliamentary election as monitors, invited to do so by the authorities. There must be some mistake. American diplomatic and private efforts went into high gear to try to resolve the problem. The U.S.-Egyptian relationship has been a cornerstone of Americas Middle East policy for more than three decades, and Egypt is, for U.S. interests, arguably the most important Arab country in the entire region. Thus, when the NGO crisis erupted a year later, senior U.S. officials approached the generals in SCAF to help resolve it quickly. Senator McCain flew to Cairo himself to make the case to lift the arrest order on the Americans.

Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012

Growing Criticism of America Yet the crisis was not so easily resolved. Voices in Egypt raised the stakes with inflammatory charges against the United States. Faiza Abulnaga, the Egyptian minister of international cooperation, made public statements alleging that the accused NGO personnel were actually working to undermine the Egyptian state, divert the Egyptian revolution, and serve American and Israeli interests. Leading personalities and the media echoed the accusations. Egypts premier daily newspaper published a front-page story with a banner headline: Investigations Reveal Facts about Dividing Up Egypt.2 The story asserted that a map found by police in an NGO office divided Egypt into four parts, proving that the United States planned to split Egypt into four separate countries. It also claimed that suitcases full of cash meant the NGO was paying millions of dollars to influence the parliamentary elections. Politicians and media pundits as well as the grand sheikh of Al Azhar, one of the Islamic worlds most revered institutions, took up the charges. Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed el-Tayeb announced on February 16 that he supported the call for rejection of American assistance and was establishing a Fund for Dignity and Respect (sanduq al azza wa al kirama) to raise 500 billion Egyptian pounds from private sources so that the country would be independent of foreign influence.3 He asserted that it was an affront to Egypts dignity to accept foreign money; its people could get along perfectly well without it. Such bravado raised eyebrows among Americans who knew that the Egyptian economy was suffering badly from the loss of foreign investment and tourism revenues. By June 2011, Egypts foreign38

currency reserves had fallen to $16 billion from the pre-uprising level of more than $20 billion. The government has so far maintained subsidies to prevent food prices from rising an important political measure. But serious import shortages could soon occur if something is not done to deal with the crisis. The Arab Gulf states promised nearly $3 billion in aid after Mubarak fell, but by May 2012 they had delivered only $1 billion, and were promising soon to deliver more. Cairo seemed to exacerbate the problem by turning down an IMF loan in 2011, although in spring 2012 it was again negotiating for a new $3.2 billion loan. Temporary Relief for the NGOs The trial of the 43 NGO staff members started February 26, but the three-judge panel resigned from the case, and it was transferred to an appeals court. There Judge Magdi Abdul Bari announced that the travel ban on the suspects had been lifted. The four American NGOs reportedly posted $5 million bail for their staffs, and on March 1, six of the Americans, along with seven other foreigners, left Egypt on a special plane brought in by the U.S. government; one American chose to remain behind. The Americans signed statements that they would appear for the trial if summoned, but as of May the trial had not resumed. State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland welcomed the decision but added, We have continuing concerns that the NGO issue be settled completely, ending up in the registration not only of our own NGOs but also of Egyptian NGOs. The judicial process was discussed for a few weeks. Some Egyptians, including the newly elected speaker of parliament, Saad El Kitatni, accused the judges of lifting

Rugh: Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

the travel ban under political pressure, which they denied. Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri felt obliged to declare, Egypt will never kneel, will never submit, and will never change its stand on the issue of foreign funding. He added that Egypt would not yield to threats over the annual aid it receives from the US. After Senator McCain visited Cairo and met with General Tantawi, he said that SCAF was working diligently to resolve the case. SCAF generals denied that they pressured the court, and it is likely that Abdul Bari did make the decision on the merits of the case, since he said the offense was a misdemeanor not requiring a travel ban. In his day, Mubarak would probably have phoned a judge and ordered the Americans released. The SCAF does not have this kind of power. With the travel ban lifted, the U.S. government still had to decide whether to override the congressional hold on Egypts annual assistance package requiring certification of progress toward democracy. Inside the administration, the matter was debated quietly. There were arguments for releasing all or part of it, or for awaiting further developments. Releasing it would open the administration to criticism from Congress and others for pandering to the generals. Stopping or delaying it would further add to bilateral tensions. Finally, on March 22, 2012, a senior State Department official said that Secretary Clinton had decided that, on the basis of Americas national security interests, she will waive legislative conditions related to Egypts democratic transition, allowing for the continued flow of Foreign Military Financing to Egypt. The official added, the move reflects our overarching goal: to maintain our strategic partnership with an Egypt made stronger and more stable by a
39

successful transition to democracy. Clinton was invoking a provision in the law allowing an exception on national security grounds, thus releasing the $1.5 billion. The State Department official argued that Egypt had made more progress [toward democracy] in 16 months than in the last 60 years. But the official allowed that more work remains to protect universal rights and freedoms.4 DEEPER IMPLICATIONS The NGO incident is instructive. It reveals some of the dynamics of the current Egyptian political scene relating to Egyptian law on NGOs and how key players in Egypt regard American attempts to support their democracy. There is some confusion about the NGO law and its application. The NGOs have always required licensing and permission before spending foreign money in Egypt. However, the bureaucracy has often been slow to respond to license applications, and the NGOs believed they could start working anyway under the assumption that the license would be granted. One regulation even provided that lack of denial of an application within 60 days constituted acceptance of the organization as a legal entity.5 The American NGOs therefore understandably assumed they were protected even though they lacked licenses. The Egyptian governments willingness to have them help monitor the parliamentary elections encouraged them to think they would be welcome to promote democracy in other ways. The crackdown surprised them. Minister of International Cooperation Faiza Abulnaga, who ordered the crackdown in December, asserted that the action was no different from those undertaken by U.S. law-enforcement officials. 6 She was probably referring to the Foreign

Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012

Agents Registration Act (FARA), first went with it. Publicly rejecting American passed by Congress in 1938. The act and other foreign influence is now fashionrequires anyone representing a foreign able and certainly more possible. government or organization to register Some Egyptians have criticized Abulwith the Department of Justice. However, naga as a retrograde influence, one of FARA requires no specific licensing, only the holdovers (falool) from the Mubarak disclosure. And the few prosecutions of regime seeking to turn the clock back to FARA violations have sometimes resulted an authoritarian era. It is true that not all in fines, but certainly not in threats of jail senior Mubarak officials have been purged. time, as in the Egyptian case. One reason is that the SCAF generals Abulnaga claimed that the crackdown probably discovered that, for the sake of was triggered by Washingtons announceeffective government functioning, they ment in June 2011 of a $40 million grant cannot disqualify everyone associated with to the NGOs the Mubarak to promote [It was] even claimed that the NGOs were regime. MinEgyptian part of an Israeli plot and...were targeting istries must democracy. be managed religious organizations. These were She did not by people especially incendiary accusations in the explain, who know however, why Egyptian context. their institushe chose to tions and how order a police raid and a travel ban instead to get things done. Apparently, Abulnaga of simply asking the NGOs to suspend opwas regarded as one of those people. She erations. Nor did she explain why she then probably recognized the popular wave of used the issue to make public accusations xenophobia that has come with the uprising against Washington for trying to harm and was trying to ride it to enhance her own Egypt. She even claimed that the NGOs power inside the system. were part of an Israeli plot and encouraged She is not alone in expressing disthe press to say that the NGOs were target- trust of foreign intervention and NGOs. ing religious organizations. These were Few Egyptians know much about these especially incendiary accusations in the NGOs; they work quietly and do not seek Egyptian context. or attract much media attention. When the Minister Abulnaga has long been authorities shut them down and accused known to U.S. officials as very tough and them of breaking the law, and worse, the adversarial. American ambassadors have public was unable to hear the NGOs side tangled with her in the past and not always of the story: that they believed they were won. But in some ways she represents part only helping the Egyptian people. of the new post-Mubarak public mood, as Political-party representatives who Egypt tries to restore its pride and selfspoke out on the matter also knew little respect. Most Egyptians used to be afraid about NGOs other than what the governto criticize Mubaraks friends, such as the ment said. Since the official rhetoric put United States. Today there is a much greater the case in terms of national pride and willingness to criticize authority, especially rejection of unwanted foreign influence, it the Mubarak system and everything that was easy for them to applaud the action.
40

Rugh: Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

The grand sheikh of Al Azhar, who under Mubarak might have checked with the presidents office first for advice on what to say, probably saw no reason not to join the chorus of those condemning the NGOs. Most of the media, although now headed by new chief editors, were still staffed by reporters trained in the Mubarak era who simply took the story from the government without bothering to investigate the American NGOs side of the story. There were a few exceptions. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypts most outspoken and courageous critic during the Mubarak era, who had endured prison and then exile, returned to Cairo when Mubarak fell and began writing regular newspaper op-eds. He used his columns to criticize Abulnaga sharply and defend the NGOs. Other writers and the public, however, seemed to accept her allegations against the NGOs uncritically. But What about the Generals? Why did the generals in SCAF not prevent the U.S.-Egyptian crisis over the NGOs? It is important to remember that SCAF, despite its legal authority as the highest political body in the land, does not have the powers that President Mubarak had. They succeeded him but did not inherit any of the levers of power he had developed over the years. Mubarak not only controlled the security services and appointed the prime minister; he also completely dominated the parliament through his National Democratic Party, which controlled the vast majority of seats. He also appointed the heads of all major media outlets, including not only radio and television but the leading newspapers; he appointed the grand sheikh of Al Azhar and the university presidents; and he influenced many of the judges. The SCAF
41

generals did not inherit any of this power. Moreover, the generals in SCAF assumed authority on a temporary basis, and consistently said they would only keep that authority during the transition to democracy and would leave when a new parliament and a new president were in place. In February 2011, they were riding high in popular esteem. The Egyptian army has long been respected by the public, in contrast to the feared police and other security forces that were hated for their corruption and brutality. The army deployed in Tahrir Square during the uprising provided a calming presence without the use of force, and when the generals orchestrated the peaceful removal of Mubarak, this only increased their prestige. Yet, in the 16 months since then, they have been increasingly blamed for a variety of problems because they were in charge. For example, the generals have been blamed for not stopping the escalating street crime, although they have explained to visitors that the army is trained to fight wars and defend the countrys borders, not to patrol the streets. The real problem is the lack of a properly trained police force. During the 2011 uprising, when angry mobs attacked the police and burned down police stations, many officers fled and did not return. The ones who remained are still poorly trained and are now afraid of the public. The government has failed to undertake a significant effort to recruit new people and train them in law enforcement that is respectful and fair. Many Egyptians today worry that crime is becoming an increasing problem; they tell stories of people they know who were mugged or robbed. The American press has reported on this,7 but, as one Egyptian-American long-time resident in Cairo told me, Egyptians notice street crime now because it

Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012

was essentially zero under Mubarak. This observer said it is still much lower than in any large American city. The generals have attempted to govern, but it has not been easy. When they tried to set a parliamentary election date, the liberals said it was too early and they needed more time to prepare, so the generals postponed the date more than once. The Muslim Brotherhood and others have increasingly complained about various matters, such as military trials for civilian lawbreakers. The regular gatherings in Tahrir Square that started with the simple demand in January 2011 that Mubarak step down, continued after he left and turned increasingly against SCAF, the group officially in charge. SCAF started its own website and Facebook page to communicate better with the street, and SCAF generals appeared from time to time in Tahrir Square to make their case, but the criticism continued. Thus by the time the NGO issue arose, SCAF was in a somewhat weakened position and planning to step down in a few months. All indications are that they did not know in advance that Abulnaga was going to shut down the American NGOs. They must have realized quickly that her action was popular, so were disinclined for political reasons to take any hasty action to put a stop to it. They knew the issue was causing problems with the U.S. relationship, but domestic political circumstances trumped this concern. They heard members of Congress calling for a reexamination of the assistance package but seemed not to believe it was really in jeopardy. One general told a visiting American that he was confident President Obama would not allow the flow of aid to Egypt to stop a serious overestimate of the presidents power. Yet to some analysts looking at the nature of the military aid package,
42

the president would in fact be likely to do everything possible to keep it alive. It is of substantial benefit to the U.S. economy, paying for military equipment built in the United States, such as M1 Abrams tanks manufactured in Ohio, an important state in the 2012 presidential election. What about the Judges? The judiciary has been playing an important role since the uprising. Egyptians like to think their judiciary is an institution that is traditionally independent of political pressures. But during the Mubarak era, some judges tended to follow the wishes of the regime, while others showed their independence. For example, when prominent dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim was convicted and sent to jail on trumped-up charges by one judge, he was released on appeal by another, who was apparently not intimidated by Mubarak and ruled on the merits of the case. Today when trials occur, savvy analysts look closely at who the presiding judge is, in order to predict whether the defendant will get a fair trial. In the NGO case, the appeals-court magistrate realized the travel ban was unfair and voided it, despite the fact that he might anger the administration. The presiding judge in the trial of President Mubarak is considered independent, so the case may be decided on its merits. This probably means he will be acquitted on the capital charge but convicted of corruption. Whatever the verdict, in the current atmosphere of more open debate, some will accuse the court of one sort of bias or another. THE NEXT PREOCCUPATIONS Following Washingtons decision to go ahead with the assistance package, the confrontation over American NGOs disap-

Rugh: Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

peared from public debate in Egypt. Everyone was much more focused on internal issues, including major ones such as the election of a new president and the review of the constitution, not to mention security and the economy. The trial of the Americans in the NGO case was expected to resume, but as of this writing (May 2012) nothing more has been heard about it. This is probably helpful for the U.S. relationship, since it is unlikely the accused Americans who left Egypt would return for a trial. In Washington, however, the Obama administration is closely watching Egypts internal developments and trying to ascertain the nature of the new administration. Like most Egyptians, American officials are following the preparations for the presidential election, the rewriting of the constitution, the economic situation, and speculation about the future role of the military. Assessing the Parliament The good news is that a democratically elected bicameral parliament has now started its work. After Mubarak resigned, political parties sprang up, and large numbers of Egyptians who had been totally apathetic and pessimistic about politics under Mubarak, became enthusiastic participants in the political process. Egyptians who had never voted during the Mubarak era suddenly became politically active. Young people, in particular, were participating in political rallies and discussions as never before. They believed the process was now open and allowed unrestricted involvement in politics for the first time in memory. Most party leaders sought to present their platforms as ecumenical and inclusive of multiple trends in society. The Coptic Christian billionaire Naguib Sawiris formed the Free Egyp43

tian Party, which specifically appealed to Muslims (If you are Christian, when you join me, bring three Muslims with you), while the Muslim Brotherhood sought to attract Christians to its new Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The series of elections was held in a manner that was peaceful and judged to be fair, a complete reversal of the blatantly rigged process under Mubarak. Representatives of the Carter Center who observed the parliamentary elections said, The results appear to be a broadly accurate expression of the will of the voters. However, the ultimate success of Egypts transition will depend on the earliest possible handover of power to a civilian government that is accountable to the Egyptian people. The Carter Center also regretted that only 12 women had been elected to parliament.8 The elections to the two houses of parliament, the Peoples Assembly and Shura Council, awarded 70 percent of the seats to Islamists. The FJP, representing the Muslim Brotherhood, won 42 percent, while the al Noor party, representing the more orthodox salafis, won more than a quarter of the seats. The liberal Egyptian Bloc won only 7 percent (35 out of 508). The success of the FJP was expected, but the strong showing by the salafis was a surprise. The Islamists benefitted from their superior organizational abilities around the country. The Muslim Brotherhood and the salafis are known and respected for their social services on the local level, providing education, medical care and food to the poor; that helped them win the election. But the voting also reflected a strong sense among the electorate that, after decades of Mubarak cronyism, Egypt needed leaders who were not corrupt, and the Islamists filled the bill. It also reflected the fact that the vast majority of Egyptians consider

Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012

themselves devout Muslims and say in polls that Islam is important in their daily lives. This does not mean that they necessarily want the new parliament to pass strict Islamic laws such as a ban on alcohol or rigid restrictions on dress for women. (Egyptian analysts think that Egyptian salafis picked up their conservative ideas from Saudi Arabia.) Most Egyptians do not want Egypt to become like Iran or even Saudi Arabia; they simply want an honest, uncorrupt government that provides basic services to the people. It is not clear how well the two major Islamist parties in parliament, the Brotherhoods FJP and the salafists al Noor, will work together. They may occasionally join ranks to form coalitions, but they may also have trouble working together. The Muslim Brotherhood has had years of working within the political system as independents in Mubaraks parliaments, since religious-based parties were banned. They are more familiar with parliamentary practices than are the salafis, who stayed out of politics in the Mubarak era and were more purely ideological. In February, during one of the early sessions of the new Peoples Assembly, a salafist al Noor MP stood up from his seat at three in the afternoon and declared that it was prayer time and everyone should go to pray. The presiding delegate, also an Islamist but from the FJP, gaveled him down, saying he was out of order. The salafist shouted his insistence that everyone go immediately to pray. The chairman calmly responded that the Prophet Muhammad had allowed the faithful to delay their prayer if they were in the middle of an important activity, so the session would not be interrupted. The salafist MP stormed out of the hall with his colleagues, complaining about the ruling.
44

A member of parliament who was elected on a liberal platform told me recently that early sessions of the Peoples Assembly have been chaotic and unruly, since most of the members are new to the process and have not organized themselves to conduct legislative business. He said there are some discussions across the aisle between Islamists and secularists, but most of these are based on previous personal friendships rather than new alliances, which have yet to form. Members of parliament are slowly learning the ropes, but it will take time before they are fully functional. The Presidency The presidency is the next institution to be filled. SCAF set voting for May 23-24, with a runoff on June 16-17, the winner to be announced by June 21. SCAF is scheduled to turn over power by the end of that month. Preparations for the presidential election caused considerable speculation that SCAF generals and others may be pulling strings behind the scenes, but actually no political group has been dominant. Twenty-three candidates applied for certification by the Presidential Election Commission (PEC), but the senior judges who constituted the PEC approved only 13. They disqualified Mubaraks former intelligence chief Omar Sulaiman, putting to rest rumors that the SCAF generals were secretly maneuvering to get him elected. They also disqualified Keirat al Shatir, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the popular preacher Hazim Abu Ismail, the candidate of the salafis, contradicting rumors that SCAF was conspiring with the Islamists to capture the presidency. Sulaiman had failed to gather the required 30,000 signatures for his application; Shatir

Rugh: Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

had been jailed twice under Mubarak and, although SCAF had pardoned him, he had failed to get a court order restoring his political rights. Ironically Abu Ismail, a strong critic of the United States, was disqualified because his mother had become an American citizen (family members of candidates may not have foreign citizenship). He tried to contest the ruling, claiming his mother only had a green card, but the PEC said they had a letter from the State Department confirming her U.S. citizenship. His reaction: Why accept that [letter]? Are you going to obey American orders? Of the 13 certified candidates, only four were thought to have a chance of winning. Polls showed the frontrunner to be Amr Moussa, 75, Mubaraks foreign minister 1991-2001 who resigned in a disagreement with the president and then became secretary-general of the Arab League. His support comes from secular and liberal Egyptians who want an experienced leader with nationalist credentials (he was known for his criticism of Israel). Moussa is urbane and sophisticated, and well known to American diplomats and other Westerners. Also a strong contender was Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was expelled when he declared his candidacy. Many secular liberal Egyptians I spoke to recently said they prefer him over Moussa because he is trustworthy in addition to being moderate. He is also helped by an endorsement from the salafis, who apparently see him as an effective way to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood nominated Muhammad Mursi as a backup candidate to the disqualified Kheirat al Shatir. He could win with Brotherhood backing but lacks charisma and name recognition. Finally, Ahmad Shafik, Mubaraks last prime minister, will
45

get votes from Mubaraks supporters and non-Islamists, but he is tainted by his past service. The other candidates are leftists, socialists, Marxists, Islamists and liberals who have little chance of winning. Writing a New Constitution Debates over the writing of the constitution constitute another test of where the Egyptian political system is heading. In March 2011, a national referendum passed by a wide margin, stipulating that the new parliament would appoint 100 people to a commission to rewrite the constitution. One year later, the parliament named a commission of 50 parliamentarians and 50 outside experts. However, when the Brotherhood joined the salafis to ensure that three-quarters of the commission members were Islamists, the secular and liberal members walked out in protest of the lack of balance. The sheikh of Al Azhar, Ahmed el-Tayeb, also declared that the commission was not balanced. On April 10, the Administrative Court voided the commission as insufficiently representative of the Egyptian people, and parliament was charged with establishing a new one. There are several contentious issues in the review of the constitution. One is Chapter 4, defining the role of the president. In Mubaraks day, the president was all powerful, but the Islamists want more power in the legislature, where they have a majority. The constitutional powers of the president may therefore change after he is elected. (Muhammad Elbaradei was originally a candidate in 2011, but then dropped out. As he told me then, he could not run for president without a clear job description.) Another issue is the provision that Islam is the main source of legislation, something that hard-line Islamists want strengthened (to say the only

Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012

source) and secularists want weakened. And if the commission wants to stipulate that parliament controls the military budget, as the Brotherhood has hinted, the generals in SCAF may object. Other Pending Issues The trial of Mubarak and his sons is another pending issue whose resolution could be politically explosive. The former president has been indicted for allegedly giving the order to fire on innocent civilians during the January-February 2011 uprising. The prosecutor has asked for the death penalty in this case, and many Egyptians believe he deserves to die. On the other hand, Egyptian legal experts say no conclusive evidence has been presented that would lead to Mubaraks conviction on the charge, and it now seems unlikely he will get the death penalty. Whatever the verdict, some Egyptians will be pleased and others unhappy. A verdict is due June 2, but the generals probably would like it postponed so they will not be in charge when it is handed down. There has been constant speculation that the generals in SCAF will renege on their promise to give up authority once democratic institutions are in place. There is an understandable suspicion that rulers do not give up power, another legacy of the Mubarak era. In addition, the Egyptian military has been a major player in the countrys politics since independence in 1952. Moreover, the army owns a large portion of the economy (estimated at over 30 percent) that it wants to protect: if the parliament or the writers of the new constitution take that away, SCAF might stay to protect its vested interests. But all signs at this writing are that SCAF will withdraw from political power at the end of June. The economy will be a daunting chal46

lenge for whoever is in charge of the government in the coming months and years. By the end of June, Egypt should have a new president, a new prime minister and cabinet, and possibly a new constitution and a parliament ready to pass new legislation. With these political developments behind them, the public will turn its attention to Egypts increasingly serious economic situation. Insecurity has decimated the allimportant tourism industry and has scared away most foreign direct investment. That needs to change. The government has managed to keep food prices from rising, but it cannot continue such a policy without crippling the economy. Reforming the subsidy program, however, could lead to severe political consequences. And worker strikes for higher wages continue. CONCLUSION Uncertainties remain, but the outlines of Egypts new political system have begun to emerge. First, it had been tightly controlled from the top and sclerotic under Mubarak, but it has opened up considerably. Parties, the media and individuals are freer than they were. The trajectory so far has shown positive signs: a new parliament has been elected in a fair and relatively peaceful process, new political parties have emerged, and most important, the public has shown unprecedented enthusiasm to participate in politics. There is constant jockeying and give-and-take between the main players, but none are afraid to challenge the SCAF generals. The mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square have continued to recur and, although they have not spawned specific political leaders, their demands have had an impact. Some judges have shown courage. The new system so far has been one of disbursed political power; even SCAF as the formal and legal

Rugh: Egyptian Politics and American Diplomacy

authority of the state has nowhere near the power that Mubarak exercised behind a facade of a sham democracy. The new parliament is more likely to balance the powers of the president. This is all new. There has been some violence, but far less than in Syria and Yemen, where political transitions are also ongoing. Second, the pride most Egyptians feel about the way their youth and their army behaved in removing President Mubarak, and their sense of national renewal in transitioning to a truly democratic system, have come with a certain amount of xenophobia about foreign interference. Egyptians who chafed under Mubaraks rule also resented his close association with the United States and believe he followed Washingtons wishes on Israel/Palestine and the Iraq War. So, when he was overthrown, their criticism of U.S. influence over Egypt emerged. Although Egyptians are not focused much on foreign-policy issues because so much is going on domestically, resentment of outside interference is still an element in the current political scene. The next president will have to manage that resentment to ensure it does not damage positive relations with other countries that Egypt needs. Third, clearly Islamists will play an important role in Egyptian governance, at least in the near future, but it is too early to predict exactly how they will carry out that mandate. Already they have shown some unpredictability. The Muslim Brotherhood was not going to contest so many seats in parliament or run a presidential candidate; they expressed a desire for various views to be expressed in the constitutional committee, but then took actions that reversed these promises. The salafists won more seats than expected, then joined with the Muslim Brotherhood to pack the
47

constitutional committee and in a surprise announcement supported former Muslim Brotherhood leader Aboul Fotouh. Every indication so far is that Islamist members of parliament are not likely to move quickly to change society according to strict religious principles, and that for a time at least they will recognize and respect the longstanding traditions of the country. They say they support free-market principles, and this could help the economy. If Aboul Fotouh wins the presidency, he is unlikely to change Egyptian society radically. In fact, American-Egyptian relations might well benefit from good relations with a moderate Islamist president of the largest country in the Arab world. The Israel-Egyptian peace treaty does not seem to be in jeopardy, but minor disputes with Israel may arise in the future. For example, in April 2012 Egypt terminated a Mubarak-era contract to supply natural gas to Israel that many had criticized because the price paid was considerably below market level. The deal was arranged by wealthy businessman Hussain Salem with support from Mubarak; after Mubarak was deposed, the court convicted Salem of corruption for it. Egyptians welcomed cancellation as correcting a mistake of the Mubarak regime.9 American policy in this situation should be sensitive to the new currents unleashed by the uprising and to the more open environment that started in February 2011. The United States has significant interests in its relationship with Egypt, and Washington can nurture that relationship if it is open to new ways of thinking about a country that had changed little over the past four decades. The U.S. government will undoubtedly face several policy questions in the months ahead. One is how to deal with Egypts new Islamist leaders.

Middle East Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2012

The Obama administration has already opened a dialogue with Egyptian Islamists in key positions in Cairo, the very people Mubarak did not want us to talk to. That is wise; Washington should continue to develop good relations with any Islamists who are willing to talk to us. We should also find opportunities to show respect for Islam. This would help undo the damage caused by the impression created by the Bush administration that America is hostile to Muslims. If the parliament should pass legislation in any way undermining the peace treaty with Israel, the United States should of course speak out clearly against that. If it passes domestic Islamic legislation for example, banning alcohol or un-Islamic books U.S. officials should explain the American view of those measures, while at the same time being careful to show respect for Egypts sovereign right to govern itself. A second challenge may arise if Egypt takes steps we regard as undemocratic.

Here too, U.S. officials should express disapproval but avoid the appearance of meddling in Egyptian politics. The NGO controversy clearly revealed that the Egyptian public and leadership have less tolerance now for the kind of heavy-handed democracy promotion they saw under the Bush administration. The third area of interaction is in economic development, and here it would be wise for Washington to do everything it can to help Egypts economy in this difficult transition period. American economic assistance to the new Egyptian government would be in our national interest, as an investment in the countrys prosperity and as a visible gesture of support for the countrys new direction. Congress and others may wish to tie assistance to Egypts domestic situation, but it would be prudent of U.S. officials to delink the two as much as possible. Egyptian stability is in our interest as well as theirs.

This essay is a revised and updated version of The Egyptian NGO Case: Politics and Diplomacy, published in the online journal American Diplomacy in March 2012. 2 Al Ahram, February 12, 2012. 3 Al Ahram, February 17, 2012. 4 Susan Cornwell and Arshad Mohammed, Clinton to Let Military Aid to Egypt Continue: State Department Official, Reuters, March 22, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/23/us-egypt-usa-aid-idUSBRE82L13D20120323. 5 David J. Kramer, Egypts Full-Frontal Assault on Civil Society, Washington Post, March 11, 2012, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-ngo-raids-are-a-full-frontal-assault-on-civil-society/2012/03/11/ gIQAP1jx5R_story.html. 6 Fayza Aboulnaga, Why Egypt Moved against Unregistered NGOs, Washington Post, March 9, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-egypt-moved-against-unregistered-ngos/2012/03/05/gIQAEHrf1R_story.html. 7 Leila Feidal, Rising Crime Has Some Egyptians Yearning for the Old Police State, Washington Post, March 13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rising-crime-has-some-egyptians-yearning-for-the-old-police-state/2012/03/09/gIQAwwzB9R_story.html. 8 The Carter Center, Carter Center Witnessing Mission for Egypt Peoples Assembly Elections Executive Summary of Findings, press release, January 13, 2012, http://cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-011312.html. 9 Niveen Wahish and Sherine Abedl-Razek, Egypt Blocks the Pipe, Al Ahram Weekly, May 1, 2012, http:// weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1095/fr2.htm.
1

48

Copyright of Middle East Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.