Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-6339

of

the

Philippines COURT

April 20, 1954

MANUEL LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee. Manansala and Manansala for Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee. MONTEMAYOR, J.: In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of "Waval Taxi." He employed among others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs abovementioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs. The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action and the trial court for the time being denied the motion saying that it will be considered when the case was heard on the merits. After trial the complaint was dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which Tribunal after finding only questions of law are involved, certified the case to us. The parties are agreed that the plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed compensation based on the hours or the period of time that they worked. Rather, they were paid on the commission basis, that is to say, each driver received 20 per cent of the gross returns or earnings from the operation of his taxi cab. Plaintiffs claim that as a rule, each drive operated a taxi 12 hours a day with gross earnings ranging from P20 to P25, receiving therefrom the corresponding 20 per cent share ranging from P4 to P5, and that in some cases, especially during Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays when a driver worked 24 hours a day he grossed from P40 to P50, thereby receiving a share of from P8 to P10 for the period of twenty-four hours. The reason given by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is that the defendant being engaged in the appellants.

taxi or transportation business which is a public utility, came under the exception provided by the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and because plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, that is to say, they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20 per cent of their gross earnings "their situation was therefore practically similar to piece workers and hence, outside the ambit of article 302 of the Code of Commerce." For purposes of reference we are reproducing the pertinent provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, namely, sections 1 to 4. SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted. SEC. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the employer working for him. SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or impending emergencies, caused by serious accidents, fire flood, typhoon, earthquakes, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss of life and property or imminent danger to public safety; or in case of urgent work to be performed on the machines, equipment, or installations in order to avoid a serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar nature; but in all cases the laborers and the employees shall be entitled to receive compensation for the overtime work performed at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional. In case of national emergency the Government is empowered to establish rules and regulations for the operation of the plants and factories and to determine the wages to be paid the laborers. SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of work shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration: Provided however, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication. Under section 4, as a public utility, the defendant could have his chauffeurs work on Sundays and legal holidays without paying them an additional sum of at

least 25 per cent of their regular remuneration: but that with reference only to work performed on Sundays and holidays. If the work done on such days exceeds 8 hours a day, then the Eight-Hour Labor Law would operate, provided of course that plaintiffs came under section 2 of the said law. So that the question to be decided here is whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and holidays included. It will be noticed that the last part of section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra compensation for over-time work "at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional'" and that section 2 of the same act excludes application thereof laborers who preferred to be on piece work basis. This connotes that a laborer or employee with no fixed salary, wages or remuneration but receiving as compensation from his employer uncertain and variable amount depending upon the work done or the result of said work (piece work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is not covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he work in excess of 8 hours a day. And this seems to be the condition of employment of the plaintiffs. A driver in the taxi business of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, in one day could operate his taxi cab eight hours, or less than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, or even 24 hours on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, with no limit or restriction other than his desire, inclination and state of health and physical endurance. He could drive continuously or intermittently, systematically or haphazardly, fast or slow, etc. depending upon his exclusive wish or inclination. One day when he feels strong, active and enthusiastic he works long, continuously, with diligence and industry and makes considerable gross returns and receives as much as his 20 per cent commission. Another day when he feels despondent, run down, weak or lazy and wants to rest between trips and works for less number of hours, his gross returns are less and so is his commission. In other words, his compensation for the day depends upon the result of his work, which in turn depends on the amount of industry, intelligence and experience applied to it, rather than the period of time employed. In short, he has no fixed salary or wages. In this we agree with the learned trial court presided by Judge Felicisimo Ocampo which makes the following findings and observations of this point. . . . As already stated, their earnings were in the form of commission based on the gross receipts of the day. Their participation in most cases depended upon their own industry. So much so that the more hours they stayed on the road, the greater the gross returns and the higher their commissions. They have no fixed hours of labor. They can retire at pleasure, they not being paid a fixed salary on the hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis. It results that the working hours of the plaintiffs as taxi drivers were entirely characterized by its irregularity,

as distinguished from the specific regular remuneration predicated on specific and regular hours of work of factories and commercial employees. In the case of the plaintiffs, it is the result of their labor, not the labor itself, which determines their commissions. They worked under no compulsion of turning a fixed income for each given day. . . .. In an opinion dated June 1, 1939 (Opinion No. 115) modified by Opinion No. 22, series 1940, dated June 11, 1940, the Secretary of Justice held that chauffeurs of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. who "observed in a loose way certain working hours daily," and "the time they report for work as well as the time they leave work was left to their discretion.," receiving no fixed salary but only 20 per cent of their gross earnings, may be considered as piece workers and therefore not covered by the provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law. The Wage Administration Service of the Department of Labor in its Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 dated May 28, 1953, under "Overtime Compensation," in section 3 thereof entitled Coverage, says: The provisions of this bulletin on overtime compensation shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, non-agricultural laborers or employees who are paid on piece work, contract, pakiao, task or commission basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the employer working for him. From all this, to us it is clear that the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no valid support. As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks of "salary corresponding to said month." commonly known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week or month, then computation of the month's salary payable would be impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in his book entitled "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines," Vol. 1, 4th edition, p. 160, says that article 302 is not applicable to employees without fixed salary. We quote

Employees not entitled to indemnity. This article refers only to those who are engaged under salary basis, and not to those who only receive compensation equivalent to whatever service they may render. (1 Malagarriga 314, citing decision of Argentina Court of Appeals on Commercial Matters.) In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur. Paras, C.J., concurs in the result. Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-6705 December 23, 1954 of the Philippines COURT

1950, as held by this Court in Lara vs. Del Rosario, 94 Phil., 778 ,50 Off. Gaz., p. 1975). Nevertheless, the Court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the appellant had acquired no right to a divorce that the Court bound to recognize after the effectivity of the New Civil Code. The Court reasoned out as follows: Counsel's argument in support of the alleged right of the plaintiff would be indisputable if (it were ) not for the following provision of Article 2254 of the new Civil Code. 'Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can raise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.' The above quoted provisions is entirely new, not found in the old Civil Code. Evidently it is designed to meet situations like the present. Under its explicit and unequivocal terms no acquired or vested right can rise from offenses or acts which infringe upon the rights of others. It follows therefore that the acts of concubinage of the defendant, which are not only against the law, but infringe upon the rights of his wife, could not and did not give rise to o a vested right in favor of the plaintiff which would entitle her to secure a divorce from her husband, the defendant herein. Under Article 97 of the new Civil Code the most that the wife is now entitled to in case of concubinage on the part of the husband is to secure a legal separation. (Rec. on Appeal, p. 14. In our opinion, the judgment appealed from is incorrect. It should be apparent, upon reflection, that the prohibition of Article 2254 must be directed at the offender, not the offended party who is in no way responsible for the violation of legal duty. The interpretation adopted by the Court below results in depriving a victim of any redress because of the very acts that injured him. The protection of vested rights is but a consequence of the constitutional guaranty against deprivation of property can in no way constitute such due process. Our view of the true import of Article 2254 is supported by the Report of Code Commission submitted to the Legislature in explanation of the motives behind the innovations of the proposed Civil Code. Speaking of Article 2274 of the draft (now Art. 2254 of the Code), the Report states: It is evident that no one can validly claim any vested or acquired right if the same is founded upon his having violated the law or invaded the rights of others. It follows that Article 2254 can not militate against the right of appellant to secure an absolute divorce as a result of the concubinage of her husband. Despite the change in legislation, plaintiff-appellant is protected by Article 2253 of the new Civil Code:

PATROCINIO RAYMUNDO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DOROTEO PEAS, defendant-appellee. Augusto Francisco for Doroteo Penas in his own behalf. appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: Patrocinio Raymundo has brought up this case by direct appeal on points of law against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (case No. 1169), denying her petition for a decree of divorce under Act 2710. The facts are clear and not disputed. Appellant Raymundo and appellee Doroteo Peas were validly married to each other in Manila on March 29, 1941. The spouses lived together until 1949, but had no children, nor acquired conjugal property. Sometime in July 1949, the husband Doroteo Peas abandoned his wife, appellant herein, and during August and September, 1949, lived maritally with another woman, Carmen Paredes. At the instance of the deserted wife, an information for concubinage was filed on October 3, 1949 (Criminal Case No. 11140). The husband, Peas, was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the Court of First Instance of Manila on May 5, 1950. Pending his appeal, on July 14, 1950, the wife instituted the present proceedings, praying for a decree of absolute divorce. The conviction of Doroteo Peas was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on October 31, 1951. The Court below found that the acts of concubinage that gave rise to the action, as well as the judgment of conviction rendered by the Court of First Instance, took place before the repeal of Act 2710 by the new Civil Code, (which becomes effective on August 30,

Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under the regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize them.lawphil.net

Conceding that there can not be a vested right in the continuation of a law recognizing absolute divorce (Grant vs. Grant, 32 Am. Rep. 506), still , the terms of Article 2253 are sufficiently broad to protect the rights of the appellant to a remedy against her husband's infidelity in conformity with the terms of the old legislation. True that the new Civil Code does not recognize absolute divorce, but only legal separation (Articles 97 to 108), thereby impliedly repealing Act 2710; but other provisions of the Code clearly safeguard rights and actions arising under the preceding law. Its Article 4 expresses the well established principle that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided"; and Article 2258 plainly indicates that rights and actions already existing (and a fortiori, actions already initiated) should be governed by the prior legislation. Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which methods or course to pursue. Further, Article 2267 explicitly enumerates the articles that are to apply to actions pending (like the present) when the new Civil Code became effective, and Articles 97 to 108 on legal separation are not included therein. Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code becomes effective: (1) Article 29, relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;. (2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. The plain implication of these provisions is that the Code did not intend its provisions on legal separation to apply retroactively; and that the change from absolute divorce to legal separation was not designed to affect at the time the reform was introduced. Thus the present case is readily distinguished from the case of divorce proceedings instituted under Executive Order No. 141 of the Japanese occupation Executive

Commission, and which were pending at the liberation of the Islands. We ruled in Pea de Luz vs. Court of First Instance of Leyte, 43 Off. Gaz., p. 4102, that such pending divorce proceedings must be dismissed because the occupation divorce law ceased to be in force and effect upon liberation of the national territory, and because the proclamation of General McArthur in Leyte on October 23, 1944, had abrogated all occupation legislation absolutely and without qualification. The repeal of Act 2710 by the new Civil Code is in a different position, since the transitional provisions of the latter law expressly prescribe, as we have seen, the subsistence of rights derived from acts that took place under the prior legislation. It is of no comment that the conviction of the husband only became final after the new Civil Code, denying absolute divorce, came into effect, for their Court has already ruled in Chereau vs. Fuentebellla (43 Phil., 220) that section 8 of Act 2710 1is only evidentiary in character, since it merely has reference, of course, to the species of proof required to establish the basal fact on which the right to the divorce rests; and the circumstance that this fact is not so proved in no wise impairs the jurisdiction of the Court.". The decision appealed from is reversed, and a new judgment shall be entered granting a decree of absolute divorce as prayed for. Without costs. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes 1 A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action. Sec. 8, Act 2710. AZNAR ET AL VS GARCIA FACTS: Edward Christensen is a citizen of the State of California and domiciled in the Philippines. He executed in his will acknowledging his natural daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as sole heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who is declared by the Supreme Court in its decision as acknowledged natural daughter of Edward C. Counsel of Helen asserts that her claim must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Phil. law. Counsel of Maria insists that Art. 16 (2) provides that the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON applies in intestate and testamentary successions and since Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be applied. Lower court ruled that CA law should be applied thus this petition for review. Issue: What law should be applicable Philippine or California Law?

Ruling: The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and testamentary successions with respect to order of succession and amt. of successional right is regulated by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON. California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and manner he desires. Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law on the contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the LAW OF HIS DOMICILE. These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedents domicile the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. RULING: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern and corollarily access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and issuances issued by one manMarcosare in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive and legislative powers. The generality of law (Civil Code, Art. 14) will never work without constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice and is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime. YAO KEE VS SY-GONZALES F: Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Kaloocan City, where he was residing, leaving behind substantial real and personal properties here in the Phils. Petition for letters of administration filed by his natural children, was opposed on the ground that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee, in Fookien, China on 1/13/31 and that the oppositors are the legitimate children. The probate court rendered judgment in favor of the oppositors; this was modified and set aside by the CA w/c held that both sets of children were acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration. HELD: For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance w/ said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and customs of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only bec. they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a

S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its citizens: One for residents therein as provided by the CA Probate Code and another for citizens domiciled in other countries as provided by Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California. The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return of question of law to the testators domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred back and forth between 2 states. The SC reversed the lower courts decision and remanded the case back to it for decision with an instruction that partition be made applying the Philippine law. Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) FACTS: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence." On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact." The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. _________________________________________

On September 3, 1965, two criminal cases No. 80006 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, and No. 80007 also of the same Court, Branch XIV identical in every respect, except for the fact that they pertain to different editions of the same textbook, were filed against Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of Act 3134, otherwise known as the Copyright Law, as amended. The information in Criminal Case No. 80007 alleged That on or about July to September, 1963, in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, as the proprietor aid general manager of the National Book Store, as enterprise engaged in the business of publishing, selling and distributing books, did then and there, wilfully and illegaly sell and distribute spurious and pirated copies of the high school textbook, entitled General Science Today for Philippine School, First Year, by Gilam, Van Houten and Cornista, said accused knowing that said book was duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., and was being distributed exclusively by its sister corporation, Alemar's or Sibal and Sons, Inc. 1 On September 7, 1965, identical motions to quash 2 were filed by accused Ramos on the ground of prescription, alleging therein, inter alia, that: xxx xxx xxx Consequently, the delivery of the alleged offense was made as early as July 17, 1963 and all subsequent knowledge or discoveries of posterior sales and possession of said books by the respondents, including that involved in the police search of September 4, 1963 were only confirmatory of the first. Under 91 of the Revised Penal Code and in the light of the aforequoted ruling announced in the Pangasinan Trans. Co. case, supra; the prescriptive period, therefore, commenced to run on the day after such discovery on July 17, 1963 and, accordingly, the offense has long since prescribed since under the Copyright Law, Act 3134: Sec. 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance of the Philippine Islands and shall prescribe after two years from the time the cause of action arose. Assuming arguendo, that the last actual sale should be the starting point of computation, again the offense charged has prescribed, since, as already pointed out, the documented evidence on this point shows that the last sale was made on August 30, 1963. The prosecution, also in both cases, filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash 3 raising two issues, to wit: 1. That the issue of prescription in this case can be resolved only after the presentation of evidence and hence, it is premature to raise that issue before trial

G.R. No. L-25265 May 9, 1978 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SOCORRO C. RAMOS, defendant-appellee, PHOENIX PUBLISHING HOUSE INC., intervenor. G.R. No. L-25644 May 9, 1978 SOCORRO C. RAMOS, petitioner, vs. HON. PLACIDO RAMOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch III, CFI, Manila; and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by State Prosecutor DELIA P. MEDINA, respondents. Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifica P. de Castro and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for People of the Philippines. Florence D. Regalado for Socorro C. Ramos. Sevilla & Aquino Law Office for Intervenor. SANTOS, J.: The above-entitled cases the first an appeal and the second a special civil action are decided jointly because they raise a common issue which arose from the prosecution of a common defendant, Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of the copyright law viz, whether or not the extra day in the leap year, 1964 should be taken into consideration in the computation of the two-year period of prescription provided in Section 24 of the copyright law. The factual and procedural antecedents follow.

2. That, as the violation committed by the defendant was a continuing offense, the two-year prescriptive period may be counted from September 3, 1963, or one day before the search in defendants' premises , which confirmed her possession of spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in question. The prosecution's theory is that "(T)he crime being a continuing offense, the statute of limitations begins to run from the completion of the last act or series of acts which constitute the offense, " and this last act was committed on September 3, 1963. Therefore when the information was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed within the two-year period, albeit the last day of the prescriptive period. Again, in both the accused filed a "Reply to Opposition to Motion to Quash." 4 She alleged that even assuming that the crime is a continuing offense, the prescriptive period should start from August 30, 1963, the date of the last invoiced sale, and not September 3, 1963, as there was no indubitable proof that she had sold copies of the questioned book on that date. Nonetheless, accused contended that even if the prescriptive period should start from September 3, 1963, as proposed by the prosecution, the two-year period was tolled on September 2, 1965. She pointed out that two years mean a period of 730 days in accordance with Article 13 of the New Civil Code, and 1964, being a leap year consisting of 366 days, the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965. Hence, "... . when the information was filed on September 3, 1965, the offense, if any, had already prescribed. " The prosecution filed a Rejoinder 5 in both cases alleging as follow: l. That February 28, and 29, 1964, should be regarded as one day only, and consequently, the two-year period commencing on September 3, 1963 would end on September 3, 1965; 2. That under Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the proceedings in the fiscal's office; 3. That prescription would not lie in this case because the complainant never waived the right to prosecute the defendant. Accused Ramos, also in cases, filed an Urgent Motion to Strike the Rejoinder, 6 on the ground that it was filed after the case had been submitted for resolution. She prayed that "in the event that the same should at all be considered and allowed, that the accused be notified thereof and granted reasonable opportunity to file a surrejoinder...". It appears that the Rejoinder was admitted by both trial courts, but a Surrejoinder 7 was filed only in Criminal Case No. 80006. Here, the accused traversed the prosecution's contentions in the Rejoinder, thus:

1. Under applicable and specific provisions of Philippine law, the two-year period of prescription commencing on September 3, 1963 ended on September 2, 1965 ...; 2. The filing (of) proceedings in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila did not interrupt the prescriptive period. In Criminal Case No. 80007, Hon. Jesus De Veyra granted the motion to quash by an order dated October 7, 1965. 8 Pertinent portion of his order reads: . . . . And now to the main issue - whether the crime has prescribed. In the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, the Prosecution, in its insistence on the theory of a continuing crime, admits that the two-year prescriptive period should run from September 3, 1963. This case was filed on September 3, 1965 -one day too late. Article 13, CCP provides that year shall mean a period of 365 days. This had been applied to criminal cases (People v. del Rosario, 51 O.G., 2686). 1964 was a leap year so that when this case was filed, it was filed one day too late. The Motion to Quash is, therefore, granted and this case dismissed on the ground that the crime has already prescribed. (Emphasis supplied.) The prosecution appealed the above order to this Court on October 15, 1965. 9 Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 80006, the motion to quash was not resolved until December 23, 1965. On this date, Hon. Placido Ramos denied the motion to quash, and set the arraignment of the accused on January 12, 1966, thus Wherefore, finding the information to have been filed well within the statutory period of two years from the date of the last offense committed by the accused the Court denies the motion to quash. The arraignment of the accused is hereby set on January 12, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. The trial court refused to accept the prosecution's view that the prescriptive period should run from September 3, held instead, that the same should commence on September 4, 1963. xxx xxx xxx The evidence shows that on September 4, 1963, the Manila Police by virtue of a search warrant procured by the offended party, seized, among other articles, 69 copies of General Science Today for Philippine Schools, First Year, by Gilman, Van Houten and Cornista and one copy of the same textbook for Second Year (Exhibit 5). The evidence likewise shows that on September 3, 1963, the National Book Store, run and managed by the accused, sold one said textbook, Exhibit 'D' and Exhibit '2'. The mere

possession by the accused on September 4, 1963 of several copies of this textbook which is the textbook alleged to be spurious and pirated, indicates that said accused was distributing or selling said textbook on September 4, 1963 . . . This being the case, it follows of necessity that the period of prescription commenced to run from September 4, 1963 and two years from this date, by excluding the first and including the last, would expire on September 4, 1965 and hence, the action, which was instituted on September 3, 1965 is well within the prescriptive period. xxx xxx xxx Furthermore, the trial court ignored the accused's theory on leap year: Even if the last sale of said textbook could be considered to have taken place on September 3, 1963, Exhibits 'D' and '2', the Court is also of the opinion that the two-year period would expire September 3, 1965. The argument that inasmuch as 1964 is a leap year the two-year period must contain 731 days, as contemplated by Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, is, in the opinion of the Court, without merits for this particular legal provision that a year is understood to be of 365 days each is applicable only in determining the number of days a year must legally contain but not for the purpose of ascertaining the period of prescription based on years. In the computation of the period of prescription, a year should be construed as the calendar year comprising the whole period from January 1 to December 31, regardless of the number of days it contains. Consequently, in this particular case, if it is considered that the last sale took place on September 3, 1963, the two-year period, following the rule exclude thefirst-and-include-the-last, will expire on September 3, 1965. The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 10 Two more pleadings were filed, 11 after which, the trial court finally denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, 12 and reset the arraignment of the accused on February 24, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. The accused thus filed with this Court this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, 13 with the following prayer: (a) Forthwith issue, upon filing by petitioner of a bond in such amount as this Honorable Court may fix, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining, enjoining and prohibiting respondents from further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006 of the Court of First instance of Manila, Branch III, daring the pendency of this Action: (b) After due hearing, to render judgment in favor of petitioner and against respondents (1) Annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge of December 23, 1965 (Annex 'G')

denying petitioner's motion to quash, and of January 20, 1966 (Annex 'K') denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration; (2) Ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Criminal Case No. 80006 aforesaid; and (3) Making the writ of preliminary injunction hereafter La be issued permanent and final. This Court on February 11, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the trial Court from further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 80006. 14 Also on the same date, the two cases, G.R. No. L-25265 and G.R. No. L-25644, were consolidated. 1. In G.R. No. L-25265, the appeal, then Solicitor General Arturo Alafriz filed a four-page brief dated December 21, 1965 15 wherein he recommended affirmance of the order of 'Judge De Veyra quashing the information, and the dismissal of the appeal, for the simple reason that "the order appealed from is in accordance with law." Accused, now appellee Ramos, filed a brief dated January 21, 1966 16 reiterating her previous allegations in the lower court. The Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., the offended party, filed a motion to intervene in this appeal, on the following grounds: a) That the Solicitor General, instead of prosecuting the appeal, recommended its dismissal b) That, to protect its interest, it is necessary that the movant be allowed to intervene and to submit memorandum to sustain its view that the criminal action against the accused had not yet prescribed. 17 Over the opposition of the accused-appellee, this Court granted the same. 18 Accordingly, the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc. filed its Memorandum 19 wherein it alleged that the trial court erred I. IN ACTING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH WITHOUT REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE PLEA OF PRESCRIPTION. II. IN NOT APPLYING TO THIS CASE THE FOUR-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN ACT NO. 3326. III. IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE MANILA CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERRUPTED PRESCRIPTION. IV. IN NOT CONSIDERING FEBRUARY 28 AND 29, 1964, AS ONE DAY FOR PURPOSES OF PRESCRIPTION. Accused-appellee, Ramos, filed a Reply Memorandum 20 refuting intervenor's assignment of errors. Subsequent pleadings 21 focused on whether

February 28, and 29 of a leap year should be counted as one day or separate days in computing the period of prescription. 2. In G.R. No. L-25644-the special civil action the issues raised in the foregoing assignment of errors were relied upon in respondent People's Answer. 22 And, following respondent Judge Ramos' reasoning, it was contended that the period of prescription should start from September 4, 1963, and not September 3, 1963, as originally proposed by the prosecution. Furthermore, as an affirmative defense, it was alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus since Judge Ramos did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the information. Respondent contended that the "(P)etitioner's remedy is to appeal the judgment of conviction rendered after a trial on the merits. " This allegation was opposed by petitioner Ramos; 23 she insisted that she had a cause of action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus. Respondent People filed a Reply Memorandum 24 disputing petitioner's allegations. We are, thus, faced with conflicting orders of two different Branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila-one holding that the crime has prescribed, the other that it has not. 1. Now to resolve the preliminary issues: a. On the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. We find for petitioner. As We had occasion to hold in Quizon vs. Baltazar, 76 SCRA 559: As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari and prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the offense charged therein has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. As to mandamus, We are incline to agree with respondent's allegation that "petitioner has no cause of action for mandamus which is a writ intended to control the exercise of a purely ministerial function. To quash an information is not a ministerial function," 25 However, mandamus as a remedy is a superfluity here, considering that petitioner can obtain full relief thru certiorari and prohibition. b. On the applicability of the four-year prescriptive period provided in Act No. 3326. 26 The same is not applicable. Said Act provides: Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)........... (b)

after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; ... (Emphasis supplied.) Act No. 3326 applies only if the special act does not provide for its own prescriptive period. It has no application here, where the Copyright Law provides for its own prescriptive period, viz: Section 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under this Act shall be originally cognizable by the Courts of First Instance of the Philippines and shall prescribe after two years from the time the cause of action arose. 2. Now on the main issue of prescription. The question to be resolved is the proper computation of the twoyear period of prescription from September 3, 1963. Resolution of this issue hinges, in turn, on whether February 28, and 29 of a leap year, 1964, should be counted as one day, as proposed by the prosecution; or as separate days, as alleged by the defense. This issue which was in 1965 still undetermined is now a settled matter. It was held in 1969 in Namarco vs. Tuazon27 that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as separate days in computing periods of prescription. Thus, this Court, speaking thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that where the prescriptive period was supposed to commence on December 21, 1955, the filing of the action on December 21, 1965, was done after the tenyear period has lapsed since 1960 and 1964 were both leap years and the case was thus filed two (2) days too late. Since this case was filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed one day too late; considering that the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965 the year 1964 being a leap year. In explaining the rationale for its holding, the Court took pains to trace the antecedent decisional and statutory bases for its conclusion, thus Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a 'natural' month or 'solar' month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of said Code, 'whenever months are referred to in the law. it shall be understood that months are of 30 days,' not the 'natural', 'solar' or 'calendar' months, unless they are 'designated by name,' in which case, 'they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have.' This concept was, later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which 'month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month.' With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (RA 386) we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular

30-month and not the solar or civil month with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil Code merely mentioned 'months, days or nights,' ours has added thereto the term 'years' and explicitly ordains in Article 13 that it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days. 28 With respect to the opinion of some members of the Court that Article 13 of the Civil Code is unrealistic, the Court adverted to the proper remedy thus Although some justices of the Supreme Court are inclined to think that Article 13 of the Civil Code defining 'years' to mean 365 days is not realistic, the remedy is not judicial legislation. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree. 29 Finally, there is no merit in the allegation that the reckoning of the prescriptive period should start from September 4, 1963. This was the date when the police authorities discovered several pirated books in accused's store. But the accused was charged, in both Criminal Cases Nos. 80006 and 80007, with having allegedly sold anddistributed spurious and pirated copies of the textbook in question, not of illegal possession of the same. The prosecution's claim that the preliminary investigation proceedings in the Manila City Fiscal's Office and in the prosecution Division of the Department of Justice interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, is also without merit. We held in People vs. Tayco 30 that the running of the period of prescription is interrupted not by the act of the offended party in reporting the offense to the final but the filing of the complaint or information in court. WHEREFORE, the order dated October 7, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XIV in Criminal Case No. 80007 dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, is AFFIRMED. The order dated December 23, 1965 of the same court, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. 80006, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is DISMISSED, on the ground that the crime charged therein had already prescribed. Without pronouncement as to costs. VELAYO VS SHELL CO 100 Phil 168 Torts and Damages Obligations arising from human relations Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell and CAL offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of

preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted. Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALIs assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice. ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law. HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

10

SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JAMANDRE INDUSTRIES, INC. and TIRSO JAMANDRE,respondents. DECISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.: In this petition for review by certiorari, SEA Commercial Company, Inc. (SEACOM) assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 31263 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 122391, in favor of Jamandre Industries, Inc. (JII) et al., the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, ordering the plaintiff: 1) To pay defendant the sum of P66,156.15 (minus 18,843.85) with legal interest thereon, from the date of the filing of the counterclaim until fully paid; 2) To pay defendant P2,000.00 exemplary damages; as moral and

eighty-five thousand four hundred fifteen and 61/100 pesos (P85,415.61). The trial court rendered its decision on January 24, 1990 ordering JII to pay SEACOM the amount of Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Three and 85/100 (P18,843.85) representing its outstanding obligation. The trial court likewise granted JIIs counterclaim for unrealized profits, and for moral and exemplary damages and attorney fees as above quoted. SEACOM appealed the decision on the counterclaim. The Court of Appeals held that while there exists no agency relationship between SEACOM and JII, SEACOM is liable for damages and unrealized profits to JII. This Court, however, is convinced that with or without the existence of an agency relationship between appellant SEACOM and appellee JII and notwithstanding the error committed by the lower court in finding that an agency relationship existed between appellant and defendant corporation the former is liable for the unrealized profits which the latter could have gained had not appellant unjustly stepped in and in bad faith unethically intervened. It should be emphasized that the very purpose of the dealership agreement is for SEACOM to have JII as its dealer to sell its products in the provinces of Capiz and Iloilo. In view of this agreement, the second assigned error that the lower court erred in holding that appellant learned of the FSDC transaction from defendant JII is clearly immaterial and devoid of merit. The fact that the dealership is on a nonexclusive basis does not entitle appellant SEACOM to join the fray as against its dealer. To do so, is to violate the norms of conduct enjoined by Art. 19 of the Civil Code. By virtue of such agreement, the competition in the market as regards the sale of farm equipment shall be between JII, as the dealer of SEACOM and other companies, not as against SEACOM itself. However, SEACOM, not satisfied with the presence of its dealer JII in the market, joined the competition even as the against the latter and, therefore, changed the scenario of the competition thereby rendering inutile the dealership agreement which they entered into the manifest prejudice of JII. Hence, the trial court was correct when it applied Art. 19 of the Civil Code in the case at bar in that appellant SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries, thereby depriving appellee JII of the opportunity to gain a clear profit of P85,000.00. and affirmed the judgment appealed from in toto. Hence this petition for review on certiorari, which submits the following reasons for the allowance thereof: THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN

3) To pay attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and 4) To pay the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED. SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural machinery, products and equipment. On September 20, 1966, SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement whereby SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo[1] Tirso Jamandre executed a suretyship agreement binding himself jointly and severally with JII to pay for all obligations of JII to SEACOM[2]. The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a nonexclusive basis[3]. In the course of the business relationship arising from the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest and attorneys fees. JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for damages representing unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System Development Corporation (FSDC) twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi power tillers. In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in 1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of farmers to be financed by said corporation, which fact JII allegedly made known to petitioner, but the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold twenty one (21) units of said tractors, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of

11

ACCORDANCE WITH CONSIDERING THAT: A

LAW

AND

JURISPRUDENCE,

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES AND UNREALIZED PROFITS TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO AGENCY RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THEM. B THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER ACTED IN BAD FAITH AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORPORATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID RULING IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. C THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NON-EXCLUSIVITY CLAUSE IN THE DEALERSHIP AGREEMENT EXECUTED BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORPORATION PRECLUDES THE PETITIONER FROM COMPETING WITH THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORPORATION. D THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO UNREALIZED PROFITS, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.[4] Petitioner SEACOM disputes the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that despite the fact that no agency relationship existed between the parties, the SEACOM is still liable in damages and unrealized profits for the reason that it acted in bad faith. Petitioner SEACOM invokes the non-exclusivity clause in the dealership agreement and claims that the transaction with FSDC was concluded pursuant to a public bidding and not on the basis of alleged information it received from private respondent Tirso Jamandre. Moreover, petitioner SEACOM claims that it did not underprice its products during the public bidding wherein both SEACOM and JII participated. Petitioner also disputes the award of moral damages to JII which is a corporation, in the absence of any evidence that the said corporation had a good reputation which was debased. Private respondents in their comment, contends that the four assigned errors raise mixed questions of fact and law and are therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which may take cognizance of only questions of law. The assigned errors were also refuted to secure affirmance of the appealed decision. JII maintains that the bidding set by FSDC on March 24, 1997 was scheduled after the demonstration conducted by JII, and after JII informed SEACOM about the preference of the farmers to buy

Mitsubishi tillers. JII further rebuts the SEACOMs contention that the transaction with FSDC was pursuant to a public bidding with full disclosure to the public and private respondent JII considering that JII had nothing to do with the list of 37 bidders and cannot be bound by the listing made by SEACOMs employee; moreover, JII did not participate in the bidding not having been informed about it. Furthermore, the price at which SEACOM sold to FSDC was lower than the price it gave to JII. Also, even if the dealership agreement was not exclusive, it was breached when petitioner in bad faith sold directly to FSDC with whom JII had previously offered the subject farm equipment. With respect to the awards of moral and exemplary damages, JII seeks an affirmation of the ruling of the Court of Appeals justifying the awards. SEACOM filed Reply defending the jurisdiction of this Court over the instant petition since the decision of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts. SEACOM insists that FSDCs purchase was made pursuant to a public bidding, and even if SEACOM did not participate thereon, JII would not necessarily have closed the deal since thirty seven (37) bidders participated. SEACOM contends that no evidence was presented to prove that the bidding was a fraudulent scheme of SEACOM and FSDC. SEACOM further controverts JIIs contention that JII did not take part in the bidding as Tirso Jamandre was one of the bidders and that SEACOM underpriced its products to entice FSDC to buy directly from it. In fine, JII is not entitled to the award of unrealized profits and damages. In its Rejoinder, private respondents insist that there is an agency relationship, citing the evidence showing that credit memos and not cash vouchers were issued to JII by SEACOM for every delivery from November 26, 1976 to December 24, 1978. Private respondents maintain that SEACOM torpedoed the emerging deal between JII and FSDC after being informed about it by JII by dealing directly with FSDC at a lower price and after betraying JII, SEACOM would cover up the deceit by conniving with FSDC to post up a sham public bidding. SEACOMs sur-rejoinder contains basically a reiteration of its contention in previous pleadings. Additionally, it is contended that private respondents are barred from questioning in their Rejoinder, the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no agency relationship between the parties since this matter was not raised as error in their comment. The core issue is whether SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries to FSDC. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held affirmatively; the trial court found that JII was an agent of SEACOM and the act of SEACOM in dealing directly with FSDC was unfair and unjust to its agent,

12

and that there was fraud in the transaction between FSDC and SEACOM to the prejudice of JII. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no agency relationship between the parties but SEACOM is nevertheless liable in damages for having acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer in the sale of the farm machineries to FSDC. Both courts invoke as basis for the award Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: "Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the classical theory that he who uses a right injures no one. The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.[5] Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.[6] If mere fault or negligence in ones acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of affairs.[7] While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle[8], the cardinal law on human conduct expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability.[9] The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[10] The issue whether JII is entitled to recovery on its counterclaim for unrealized profit in the twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi power tillers sold by SEACOM to FSDC was resolved by the trial court in favor of JII on the basis of documentary evidence[11] showing that (1) JII has informed SEACOM as early as February 1977 of the promotions undertaken by JII for the sale of 24 contracted units to FSDC and in connection therewith, requested a 50% discount to make the price competitive, and to increase the warranty period for eight months to one year. In said letter Jamandre clarified that they were not amenable to SEACOMs offering directly to FSDC and to be only g iven the

usual overriding commission as we have considerable investments on this transaction. (2) In response, the general sales manager of SEACOM declined to give the requested 50% discount and offered a less 30% less 10% up to end March xxx on cash before delivery basis, granted the requested extension of the warranty period and stated that we are glad to note that you have quite a number of units pending with the FSDC. The trial court ruled that with said information, SEACOM dealt directly with FSDC and offered its units at a lower price, leaving FSDC no choice but to accept the said offer of (SEACOM). In affirming the judgment of the of the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that by virtue of the dealership agreement the competition in the market as regards the sale of farm equipment shall be between JII, as the dealer of SEACOM, and other companies, not as against SEACOM itself, the Court stated: However, SEACOM not satisfied with the presence of its dealer JII in the market, joined the competition even as against the latter, and thereby changed the scenario of the competition thereby rendering inutile the dealership agreement which they entered into to the manifest prejudice of JII. Hence the trial court trial court was correct when it applied Art. 19 of the Civil Code in the case at bar in that appellant SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries, thereby depriving appellee JII of the opportunity to gain a clear profit of P85,000.00. We find no cogent reason to overturn the factual finding of the two courts that SEACOM joined the bidding for the sale of the farm equipment after it was informed that JII was already promoting the sales of said equipment to the FSDC. Moreover, the conclusion of the trial court that the SEACOM offered FSDC a lower price than the price offered by JII to FSDC is supported by the evidence: the price offered by JII to FSDC is P27,167 per unit[12] but the prices at which SEACOM sold to FSDC were at P22,867.00 for Model CT 83-2, P21,093.50 for model CT 83-E, and P18,979.25 for model CT 534. The fact that SEACOM may have offered to JII, in lieu of a requested 50% discount, a discount effectively translating to 37% of the list price and actually sold to FSDC at 35% less than the list price[13] does not detract from the fact that by participating in the bidding of FSDC, it actually competed with its own dealer who had earlier conducted demonstrations and promoted its own products for the sale of the very same equipment, Exh. N for the plaintiff confirms that both SEACOM and Jamandre participated in the bidding.[14] However, the SEACOM was awarded the contract directly from Manila.[15] The testimony of Tirso Jamandre that JII was the sole representative of SEACOM in the local demonstrations to convince the farmers and cooperative officers to accept the Mitsubishi brand of

13

equipment in preference unrebutted by SEACOM.

to

other

brands,

was

Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was established. By appointing as a dealer of its agricultural equipment, SEACOM recognized the role and undertaking of JII to promote and sell said equipment. Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act as a middleman to sell SEACOMs products, in its area of operations, i.e. Iloilo and Capiz provinces, to the exclusion of other places,[16] to send its men to Manila for training on repair, servicing and installation of the items to be handled by it, and to comply with other personnel and vehicle requirements intended for the benefit of the dealership.[17] After being informed of the demonstrations JII had conducted to promote the sales of SEACOM equipment, including the operations at JIIs expense conducted for five months, and the approval of its facilities (service and parts) by FSDC,[18] SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said equipment at a lower price, placing itself in direct competition with its own dealer. The actuations of SEACOM are tainted by bad faith. Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis,[19] SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code abovequoted. This provision, together with the succeeding article on human relation, was intended to embody certain basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.[20] What is sought to be written into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.[21] We accordingly resolve to affirm the award for unrealized profits. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court failed to specify to which the two appellees the award for moral and exemplary damages is granted. However, in view of the fact that moral damages are not as a general rule granted to a corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who testified on his feeling very aggrieved and on his mental anguish and sleepless nights thinking of how SEACOM dealt with us behind (our) backs,[22] the award should go to defendant Jamandre, President of JII. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of P2,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages shall be paid to defendant Tirso Jamandre. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

ABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. CA [301 SCRA 572 (Jan 21 1999)] Power of the Board of Directors Delegation to Executive Committee Facts: In 1990, ABS CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. Said agreement contained a stipulation that ABS shall have the right of first refusal to the next 24 Viva films for TV telecast, provided that such right shall be exercised by ABS from the actual offer in writing. Hence, through this agreement, Viva offered ABS a list of 36 films from which ABS may exercise its right of first refusal. ABS however, through VP Concio, did not accept the list since she could only tick off 10 films. This rejection was embodied in a letter. In 1992, Viva again approached ABS with a list consisting of 52 original films where Viva proposed to sell these airing rights for P60M. Vivas Vic del Rosario and ABS general manager Eugenio Lopez III met at the Tamarind Grill to discuss this package proposal. What transcribed at that meeting was subject to conflicting versions. According to Lopez, he and del Rosario agreed that ABS was granted exclusive film rights to 14 films for P36M, and that this was put in writing in a napkin, signed by Lopez and given to del Rosario. On the other hand, del Rosario denied the existence of the napkin in which Lopez wrote something, and insisted that what he and Lopez discussed was Vivas film package of the 52 original films for P60M stated above, and that Lopez refused said offer, allegedly signifying his intent to send a counter proposal. When the counter proposal arrived, Vivas BoD rejected it, hence, he sold the rights to the 52 original films to RBS. Thus, ABS filed before RTC a complaint for specific performance with prayer for TRO against RBS and Viva. RTC issued the TRO enjoining the airing of the films subject of controversy. After hearing, RTC rendered its decision in favor of RBS and Viva contending that there was no meeting of minds on the price and terms of the offer. The agreement between Lopez and del Rosario was subject to Viva BoD approval, and since this was rejected by the board, then, there was no basis for ABS demand that a contract was entered into between them. That the 1990 Agreement with the right of first refusal was already exercised by Ms. Concio when it rejected the offer, and such 1990 Agreement was an entirely new contract other than the 1992 alleged agreement at the Tamarind Grill. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition for certiorari with SC. Lopez claims that it had not fully exercised its right of first refusal over 24 films since it only chose 10. He insists that SC give credence to his testimony that he and del Rosario discussed the airing of the remaining 14 films under the right of first refusal agreement in Tamarind Grill where there was a contract written in the alleged napkin. Issue: Whether or not there was a perfected contract between Lopez and del Rosario.

14

Held: NO. A contract is a meeting of minds between 2 persons whereby one binds himself to give something or to render some service to another for a consideration. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties (2) object certain which is the subject of the contract (3) cause of the obligation, which is established. Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected upon mere meeting of the minds. Once there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter, consideration, and terms of payment, a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To convert the offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal, constitutes a counter offer and is a rejection of the original offer. Consequently, when something is desired which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent because any modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer. In the case at bar, when del Rosario met with Lopez at the Tamarind Grill, the package of 52 films was Vivas offer to enter into a new Exhibition Agreement. But ABS, through its counter proposal sent to Viva, actually made a counter offer. Clearly, there was no acceptance. The acceptance should be unqualified. When Vivas BoD rejected the counter proposal, then no contract could have been executed. Assuming arguendo that del Rosario did enter into a contract with Lopez at Tamarind Grill, this acceptance did not bind Viva since there was no proof whatsoever that del Rosario had specific authority to do so. Under the Corporation Code, unless otherwise provided by said law, corporate powers, such as the power to enter into contracts, are exercised by the BoD. However, the board may delegate such powers to either an executive committee or officials or contracted managers. The delegation, except for the executive committee, must be for specific purposes. Delegation to officers makes the latter agents of the corporation, and accordingly, the general rules of agency ad to the binding effects of their acts would apply. For such officers to be deemed fully clothed by the corporation to exercise a power of the Board, the latter must specially authorize them to do so. That del Rosario did not have the authority to accept ABS counter offer was best evidenced by his submission of the counter proposal to Vivas BoD for the latters approval . In any event, there was no meeting of the minds between del Rosario and Lopez. The contention of Lopez that their meeting in Tamarind Grill was a continuation of their right of first refusal agreement over the remaining 14 films is untenable. ABS right of first refusal had already been exercised when Ms. Concio wrote to Viva choosing only 10 out of the 36 films offered by del Rosario. It already refused the 26 films.

RELLOSA GR #

vs. 138964 Aug 9,

PELLOSIS 2001

FACTS: Respondents were lessees of a panel of land owned by Marta Reyes located at San Pascual St., Malate, Manila. After the demise of Marta, Victor Reyes, her son, inherited the land. Victor informed the respondents that they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. In 1989, without the knowledge of respondents, the land was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure title to the property in her name. On May 25, 1989, Cynthia Ortega filed petition for condemnation of the structures on the land. The office of building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents on November 27, 1989. Copies were received by respondents on December 7, 1989 and on December 12, the day respondents filed an appeal contesting the order, petitioners proceeded with the demolition of the house. Respondents filed case before Manila RTC which was dismissed. On appeal, CA reversed the decision and ordered petitioners to pay respondents for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. ISSUE: Whether the CA ruling in favor of respondents tenable. RULING: The court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision. A right to power, privilege or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law or recognized as a result of long usage constitute of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another. The decision of CA was MODIFIED by reducing the awards for exemplary and moral damages to P20,000 to each respondent. The decision of the appellate court is affirmed. CASES ON PREJUDICIAL QUESTION MERCED V. DIAZ [109 P 156 (1960)] Where the husband files a civil case for annulment of the second marriage on the ground of lack of consent, and the second wife subsequently files a criminal case for bigamy against him, the civil case for annulment is a prejudicial question to be determined before the criminal case can proceed. Consent is an essential element of a valid marriage. Without consent, the marriage is void. But the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case, and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect

15

that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

G.R. No. L-15315 ABUNDIO vs. HON. CLEMENTINO AL., respondents.

August 26, 1960 MERCED, petitioner, V. DIEZ, ETC. ET

sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that plaintiff was engaged to marry Eufrocina Tan, but plaintiff, upon being confronted with such discovery, showed her a letter which he wrote breaking off his engagement with Tan. As a counterclaim defendant asks P50,000 as moral damages for the deceit, fraud and insidious machinations committed upon her by plaintiff. On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R5387 defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu. On April 7, 1958 the Assistant City Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. V-6520, charging Merced with bigamy for the second marriage. The information reads. The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of Cebu accuses Abundio Merced of the crime of bigamy, committed as follows: That on or about the 21st day of August, 1957, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Abundio Merced, being previously united in lawful marriage with Eufrocina Tan, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously contract a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. (Annex "2".) Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of Civil Case No. R- 5387. Reason alleged for the motion is that the Civil Action involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the accused. After an opposition thereto was filed by the assistant provincial fiscal, the court granted the motion. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal, the order was set aside and another entered denying the motion of accused for suspension of the criminal proceedings, which last order is the one sough herein to be annulled. The court held in its last order that inasmuch as by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil., 50 Off. Gaz. [10], 4767, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not necessary, there is no need in this case to decide the nullity of the second marriage, or to determine and declare the existence of the grounds for annulling the same, but that said grounds should be used as a defense in the criminal action. A motion to reconsider the second order of the court having been denied, petition herein was filed. When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was filed, the petitioner secured from this Court a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding further in the criminal case.

Pedro A. Bandoquillo Fulvio Pelaez for respondents. LABRADOR, J.:

for

petitioner.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V. Diez, from proceeding further in the Criminal Case No. V6520, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Abundio Merced until after final termination of Civil Case No. R5387, for the annulment of the marriage of petitioner Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also pending in same court. The record disclose the following proceedings in the court a quo: On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as Civil Case No. R-5387. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced, threatened and intimated him into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for over five years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage license; that he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her relatives into entering the marriage with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A. Conde; that immediately after the celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant and never lived with her; that the defendant wrote him on October 29, 1957, admitting that he was forced into the marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to have the marriage annulled, but he refused to go for fear he may be forced into living with the defendant. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2,000. On March 3, 1958, Elizabeth Ceasar filed her answer to the complaint. In her answer, she denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan; that sometime in July, 1957, plaintiff asked her mother to intercede on their behalf to secure her father's consent to their marriage as plaintiff could not concentrate on his studies without marrying Elizabeth, but that her mother advised him to finish his studies first; that

16

Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy. The definition and the elements of a prejudicial question have been set forth by us as follows: Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which (question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another Tribunal (Cuestion prejudicial, es 3o 3 la que surge en un pleito o causa cuya resolucion sean antecedente logico de la cuestion-objeto del pleito o causa y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o jurisdiccion. Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. In an action for bigamy for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must be first decided before the action for bigamy can proceed, hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357; 50 Off. Gaz., No. 10, 4863). In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. This was the ruling of this Court in People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil., 246, where we said: It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to have been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, can not be considered as such, according to Mohameddan rites, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the information. (People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246). One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity can not ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action

for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured. We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which must be determined before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action can proceed. We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy. Spanish jurisprudence, from which the principle of prejudicial question has been taken, requires that the essential element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by another court. This requirement of a different court is demanded in Spanish jurisprudence because Spanish courts are divided according to their jurisdictions, some courts being exclusively of civil jurisdiction, others of criminal jurisdiction. In the Philippines, where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy. Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of the marriage in the civil action for annulment is a prejudicial question, insofar as the criminal action for bigamy is concerned, is supported by Mr. Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion in De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207 thus: La regla general es que cuando hay una cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre un mismo delito u ofensa, la segunda debe verse antes que la primera, por la razon de que las formas de un juicio criminal son las mas a proposito para la averiguacion de un delito, y no las de un juicio civil. Esta regla tiene, sin embargo, una excepcion, y es la que se refiere a una cueston civil prejudicial. Una cuestion civil es de caracter prejudicial y debe resolverse antes que una cuestion criminal, cuando versa sonbre un hecho distinto y separado del delito, pero tan intimamente ligado a el que determina la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado. Por ejemplo, una accion criminal por bigamia.

17

The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs. Mabanag also sustains the theory that when a civil action is pending in court, in which a validity of a document claimed to be false and fictitious is in issue, the fiscal may not prosecute the person who allegedly executed the false document because the issue of the validity of the instrument is sub judice and the prosecuting officer should be ordered to suspend the criminal action until the prejudicial question has been finally determined. Thus the Court said" Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del Fiscal y su deber perseguir los delitos no deben ser controlados ni coartados por los tribunales; pero no hay duda que esa facultad puede ser regulada para que no se abuse de ella. Cuando un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal se desvia de la ley y entorpece la recta administracion de justicia procesando a una persona por hechos constituvos de delito que se encuentran subjudice y de los cuales se propone una cuestion prejudicial administrativa, es deber de los tribunales llamarle la atencion y obligarle que suspenda toda accion criminal hasta que la cuestion prejudicial administrativa se haya decidido finalmente. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207.) The case of People vs. Mendoza, supra, upon which the trial court and the respondents rely, presents a different sets of facts from the case at bar. So is the ruling therein as contained in the syllabus. In the case of People vs. Mendoza, Mendoza was charged with and convicted of bigamy for a marriage with one Carmencita Panlilio, contracted in August, 1949. Mendoza was married for the first time in 1946 with Josefa de Asis; then married for the second time with Olga Lema; and then married for the third time to Panlilio in 1949. On February 2, 1943, Josefa de Asis died. The court citing the provisions of Article 29 of the marriage law, held that the second marriage of the appellant Mendoza with Lema was operation of law null and void, because at the time of the second marriage in 1941, appellant's former wife Josefa de Asis was still living. This marriage of appellant with Lema being null and void at the time the appellant contracted the said marriage, the impediment of the second marriage did not exist. Hence the appellant was acquitted of bigamy for the 1949 marriage because his previous marriage with Lema in 1941, by operation of law, was void ab initio. In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. For the foregoing considerations, the petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and prohibition is hereby

granted. The order of the court denying the petition of the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from prosecuting the case for bigamy, criminal case no. V6520, entitled People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby set aside and the preliminary injunction issued by this court to that effect is hereby made permanent. So Ordered. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. L-14534 MERARDO L. vs. THE HON. AGUSTIN AL., respondents.

February 28, 1962 ZAPANTA, petitioner, P. MONTESA, ETC., ET

Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G. Soriano for respondents. DIZON, J.: This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant. On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on July 7 of the same year. 1wph1.t On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that the

18

determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action. We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court. In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur. LANDICHO V. RELOVA Facts: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira

Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal. Issue: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question. Ruling: Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue. "The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held

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as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy." G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968

Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964. In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964. Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ." 2 This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. FERNANDO, J.: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the negative. We sustain him. The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said thirdparty defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal. Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit.

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in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed." To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ." The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the thirdparty complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With costs.1wph1.t

Tenebro vs Court of Appeals November 11, 2010 Bigamy Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the

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Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1 On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads: That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapulapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage. CONTRARY TO LAW. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6 During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his

brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9 On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11 After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12 Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the

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ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14 Petitioners defense must fail on both counts. First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16 To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows: Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours). This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity. Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy. The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that,

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since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21 This argument is not impressed with merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license,

and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27 In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be

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entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, G.R. No. 172060 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, - versus PERALTA, BERSAMIN,* ABAD, and VILLARAMA,

City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City). On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pretrial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel ) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The Decision of the Trial Court The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled: WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED. SO ORDERED.[4] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City. The Decision of the Court of Appeals In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own

JR.,** JJ.

MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated: OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. September 13, 2010 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. The Antecedent Facts The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

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spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision. The Issue The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner. The Ruling of this Court The petition has no merit. Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides: Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not Question in Criminal Case for Parricide

Prejudicial

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as: x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11] The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.[16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were

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married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.[19] In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. SO ORDERED.

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