CASE #1 HYDRO RESOURCES V.

CA FACTS: This is a petition for review for certiorari of CA's decision affirming the order of RTC of Ecahgue, Isabela. Public Respondent National Irrigation (NIA) and petitioner Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation (Hydro) enter into a contract whereby the latter undertook to construct for the former Magat River Project at Ramon, Isabela. In June 1982, The Provincial Gov't of Isabela, and Municipality of Ramon together with their respective treasurers, as plaintiffs filed a civil case against Hydro before the RTC of Echague, Isabela for collection of taxes over certain real properties which Hydro allegedly acquire, possessed and used with the construction of Magat River. RTC reder its decision and ordered the case be transferred in the municipality of Santiago, Isabela for further proceeding of tax amount to be paid by Hydro. Hydro them filed a 3rd party complaint against NIA for reimbursement and a motion to admit amended answers (for the plaintiff) before the Court where the case was transferred where the latter's 3rd party complaint was admitted however plaintiffs were given 10 days to oppose and 10 days for hydro for reply. Plaintiffs and NIA then filed their reply and answer to the court and ordered them to file their memorandas where parties failed to filed except for Hydro. The court a quo ruled that the recent decision made by RTC of Echague was Final and Executory and dismissed the 3rd party complaint. (hydro). A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by Hydro but it was denied by the same court as well as the motion for consideration on appeal before the CA hence, this petition. ISSUE: whether or not it was proper for the plaintiffs to amend their complaints and pleaded therein in the amount of tax sought to be collected? RULING: in any case for collection for sum of money, stating the amount of tax sought to be collected in a complaint for collection of realty taxes is part of ULTIMATE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE PLAINTIFFS CAUSE OF ACTION, as provided under Sec. 3, Rule 6, of R.O.C. In the instant case, there is failure to state in the complaint the ultimate facts because the amount of tax sought to be collected is not pleaded or alleged. As the complaint did not plead the amount of tax intended to be collected, how could the court a quo ascertain, in the first place, in relation to the amount of the demand, whether it was the proper forum to try the case?The fact that the third party complaint filed by petitioner-defendant against the National Irrigation Administration pleaded the amount P338,750.00 as reimbursible to it by the latter, is of no moment now, as the said third-party complaint was also ordered dismissed in the order of 20 May 1985. Hence, it can be said that the complaint (in chief) was never amended. petitioner-defendant did not move to question the failure of the complaint to plead the amount of tax sought to be collected, the court a quo upon its own motion, may dismiss the complaint for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 3, Rule 17 thereof which provides that the action may be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules.

CASE 16 RAMOS V. LIM FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the decision of the CA. An action for recovery of possession of real property with damages was filed by the Sps. Lim gainst herein pet Rene Ramos. After the respondent, as plaintiff, rested their case, petitioners as defendants then represented by Atty. Dilangalen, commenced presenting their evidences. At the scheduled hearing, Atty. Dilangalen failed to appear and seek for resetting but was denied and submitted the case for decision. 2 weeks later, Atty. Datukon, enter into the picture by filing for the petitioners a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid courts order and explained the reason of Atty. Dilangalen's absence in the previous hearing. Before the trial could act on the motion, Atty. Estaniel field an Entry of Appearance as counsel de parte for the petitioners in substitution of Atty. Datukon and a copies of the pleading were furnished to Atty. Datukon and atty. Dilangalen. Subsequently, petitioners, assited by atty. Estaniel conferred with the respondent for possible amicable settlemen but no settlement was reached. Then the trial court rendered its decision ordered the petitioners to vacate the said premises and demolish their houses. Atty. Datukon was furnished with a copy of the said decision while Atty. Estaniel was not, and on the latter the respondent filed a motion for execution and was also furnished. Atty. Datukon for more than a one month reacted by a MANIFESTATION informing the court that he was no longer the petitioner's counsel and furnished a copy of the same to Atty. Estaniel then undisputed events next transpired. Atty. Estaniel filed a notice of appeal but was denied, he sought for reconsideration but then again denied then later went to CA but also dismissed. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not even if the party's counsel of record was not officially sent a copy of court's decision, he is deemed to have been put on effective official notice when he was furnished by the client's former counsel. RULING: NO Atty. Datukon filed his manifestation for a period of 1 month after he received the decision, therefore the manifestation for withdrawal has not been approved. Hence, he is still the counsel of record. Atty. Estaniel was not officially sent a copy of decision, he was however, not on effective official notice and must be made accountable for his failure to seek within the reglementary period. Since, he is formally endorsed as substituted, having known of the decision he should file a motion for reconsideration or seek for quashal of the motion for execution, but he did not do so, hence he was remiss as counsel for petitioners that became the reason behind the denial of the notice. Should a party to a suit appear by counsel, service of every judgment, order, or pleading subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice or similar papers shall be made upon his counsels or one of them. Accordingly, notices of all kinds and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. While notice to counsel is an effective notice to the client,notice to a client and not to his counsel is not notice in law. (SEC 2, RULE 13, ROC)

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. Vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BRITISH STEEL (ASIA) LTD., FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from a breach of contract before the RTC of Manila. Impleaded as principal defendant therein was Industrial Steel Ltd., with Ferro Trading and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against them. RTC denied the motions to dismiss, as well as the ensuing of the Motion for Reconsideration. ISL then filed its Answer to the complaint. Respondent British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, alleging that the complaint did not contain a single averment that respondent committed any act or is guilty of any omission in violation of petitioners legal rights. Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action against respondent. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that it had filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint together with said Amended Complaint before trial court. The lower court ruled on petitioners Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. It held the action in abeyance until final resolution by the CA on the petition for certiorari. Thereafter, CA grants the writ of certiorari and ordered to dismiss without prejudice the complaint in Civil Case against the respondent. ISSUE: Whether a complaint can still be amended as a matter of right before an Answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court. HELD: Petiton is granted. The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an Answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. The right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 (Rules of Court) will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an Answer. In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its assailed judgment will precisely result in multiple suits, involving the same facts and to which the defendants would likely raise the same, or at least, related defenses. The Supreme Court find no practical advantage in ordering the dismissal of the complaint against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same, when the latter can still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right. The amendment of the complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the action, as this, would in fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition. The amendment should be allowed in the case at bar as matter of right in accordance with the rules. __ G.R. No. 119511 November 24, 1998 WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON USON, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.: What constitutes the status quo ante in the application of an injunctive writ, in the event a complaint's subsequently amended? The Case This is the main question raised in the present Petition for Review seeking to set aside the consolidated January 31, 1994 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR SP No. 26626 and CA-GR SP No. 27300, which dismissed the petitions in this wise:

Succinctly put, petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion, or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge in issuing the assailed orders. WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Also assailed is the public respondent's February 28, 1995 Reconsideration 3 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Facts of the Case The undisputed facts, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA) and reiterated by petitioners, are as follows: 4 Records reveal that Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of 19,955 square meters located at Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Verzosa. Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have the mortgage foreclosed. On July 21, 1988, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan set the foreclosure sale on August 17, 1988 at 10:00 A.M. To prevent the Office of the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Fe Uson, on August 12, 1988, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial Sheriff, docketed as Civil Case No. 16590, for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On August 22, 1988, defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On June 8, 1989, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by plaintiff Fe Uson. On June 27, 1989, Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the court. On June 29, 1989, she filed her amended complaint which bears the proper verification. Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure of mortgage. Whereupon, Fe Uson, through counsel, wrote the Provincial Sheriff requesting him to discontinue the foreclosure sale in deference to "the said pending case and to the action to be taken by the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Court. On July 4, 1989, the foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property was sold to Verzosa being the highest bidder. Thereafter, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was approved by Executive Judge Antonio Belen and issued to Verzosa. On September 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson. At this point, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 18898 for certiorari. He alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint was issued with grave abuse of discretion. On June 20, 1990, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan. On July 5, 1990, or after the expiration of the redemption period of one year, the defendant Sheriff issued the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale. Thus, O.C.T. No. 12783 in Fe Uson's name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. 11087 was issued in the name of Wilfredo Verzosa. On July 12, 1990, Verzosa sold the land to Pilar Martinez. As a result, Verzosa's T.C.T. No. 11087 was cancelled and T.C.T. No. 11107 was issued to Martinez. Meantime, on October 16, 1990, or after one year from the filing of Verzosa's petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the said court dismissed the petition, thus sustaining the validity of respondent court's order dated September 5, 1989 admitting Fe Uson's amended complaint. On May 20, 1991, Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional defendants the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Pilar Martinez and praying, among others, the annulment of the latter's title T.C.T. No. 11107.

On August 20, 1991, upon Uson's application for preliminary injunction embodied in her Second Amended Complaint (which was opposed by Verzosa and Martinez), respondent court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist from entering, making constructions and performing any act of possession or ownership over the land in question covered by O.C.T. No. 12783, upon posting by plaintiff Uson of a bond of P10,000.00. Defendant Martinez filed a motion for consideration which was denied on September 18, 1991. On October 30, 1991, after hearing and upon posting of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00 by Uson, respondent Judge issued an order directing defendants Verzosa and Martinez and/or any and other persons acting under their command to desist and cease from entering, intruding and making constructions on the land covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. On November 22, 1991, respondent judge, acting on Verzosa's motion for clarification of the order dated September 18, 1991, issued an order to the effect that the status quo being maintained is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land and that such status quo does not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being the registered owner of T.C.T. No. 11107. It should be noted that the Complaint alleged that Private Respondent Uson mortgaged the property to Verzosa for P25,000, and that the remaining, unpaid balance was P915.75, an amount she was willing to consign to the trial court. 5 Petitioners challenged by certiorari the two orders of the trial court. Because the CA dismissed their petition, petitioners availed themselves of the present recourse. 6 Public Respondent's Ruling In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals held that "the last peaceable uncontested status that preceded the controversy [was] that point . . . when private respondent Fe Uson was the registered owner of the land in dispute mortgaged to petitioner Verzosa. As owner of this property, Fe Uson has every right to protect her rights as such. Clearly, the issuance of the writ would certainly preserve that status quo." 7 In debunking petitioners' theory that the status quo referred to the period when Martinez had already purchased the property from Verzosa, the Court of Appeals held that "the property was registered in her name two years after the start of the controversy, or when private respondent filed her complaint against Verzosa." 8 Thus, the CA sustained the following findings of the trial court: 9 For as long as the instant case (Civil Case No. 16590) remains pending, no act of the defendants subsequent to the filing of this case can make TCT No. 11107 in the name of defendant Pilar Martinez, and the alleged possession of the latter of the property in question, valid and be considered the status quo." Issues Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of the Court: 10 I The Court of Appeals erred in not taking into account or dealing squarely with the nature, effects and proper interpretation and/or application of the doctrine on amendment of pleadings/complaints to the instant case. II The Court of Appeals erred when it concurred with the Respondent judge that the status quo should be reckoned at the time of the filing of the original complaint. III The Court of Appeals erred when it completely disregarded the legal implications and effects of foreclosure, foreclosure sale, expiration of the redemption period, the consolidation of ownership to your petitioner and the sale to Pilar Martinez. IV The Court of Appeals erred when it concurred with the respondent judge in granting an injunction to restrain consummated acts, and in forcing a transfer of possession from Pilar Martinez to private respondent Fe Uson who has not shown her right thereto. The present controversy hinges on two questions. First, is private respondent entitled to an injunctive writ? Second, what is the status quo ante that the said writ seeks to preserve? The Court's Ruling The petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue: Issuance of the Injunctive Writ Petitioners primarily allege that the injunctive writ was wrongfully issued in favor of private respondent, as the latter had a doubtful, unclear and unadjudicated right for recovery of the property which had been mortgaged, foreclosed and sold to a third party. We disagree. An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established: 1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; 3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 11 The foregoing requisites are present in this case. The undisputed owner of the property which was mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa was private respondent who, upon learning of the scheduled foreclosure, immediately filed a Complaint to annul the mortgage, praying that a restraining order be issued to restrain such foreclosure. Private respondent insisted that she had paid her P25,000 debt, except for the remaining unpaid balance of P915.75 which she was willing to consign to the court. In other words, she had title to and possession of the property and she claimed to have paid her obligation, except for the nominal unpaid balance which she was willing to consign judicially. Hence, she had a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title to and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale. Given the above factual allegations, it is clear that private respondent was entitled to the injunctive writ. Second Issue: Status Quo Ante The "status quo" is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ. 12 Petitioners insist that the status quo refers to the point when Pilar Martinez was already the owner of the property, having purchased it from Verzosa. We cannot sustain the petitioners, for Martinez' claim to the property is precisely the bone of contention. Private respondent, the origin owner of the property, filed a Complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the provincial sheriff for the annulment of mortgage and the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent transfer of ownership. Although the Complaint was subsequently amended, the controversy began when the first Complaint was filed. Nevertheless, Petitioner Verzosa and the sheriff proceeded with the foreclosure before the filing of the Amended Complaint. Worse, Verzosa sold the property to Martinez one week later. Now, Verzosa and Martinez claim that the status quo to be preserved refers to the time before the filing of the second Complaint and after Martinez had acquired the property from Verzosa. Petitioners contend that the controversy started only when the Amended Complaint was filed, because the previous Complaints were expunged from the records. Petitioners invoke Ruymann v. Director of Lands, 13 in which the Court ruled that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original. Citing other jurisprudence, such as Waje v. Court of Appeals 14 and Paradise v. Ng, 15 petitioners contend that the original pleading is deemed abandoned when it is amended. The cited cases offer scant support to the thesis of petitioners. In Ruymann, the Court held that "an amendment to a complaint which introduces a new or different cause of action, making a new or different demand, is equivalent to a fresh suit upon a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations continues to run until the amendment is filed." 16 In the said case, a complaint for injunction was amended to include a larger tract of land which had not been included in the original suit. The Court held that "the suit will be deemed to have been commenced upon the date of amendment, in determining whether the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession to the portion of the tract of land not included in the original complaint (Montgomery v. Shaver, 40 Oregon 244)." 17 It is clear therein that the Complaint was amended to include a new or different cause of action or demand; hence, it was as if a new complaint was filed. It follows that when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of action, or demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not on the date of the filing of the amended complaint. In other words, for demands already included in the original complaint, the suit is deemed to have commenced

upon the filing of such original complaint. In short, for purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original, complaint is deemed abandoned and superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause of action or demand. Hence, it has been held that "an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally alleged relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint but before service of amendment." 18 It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading. 19 The Court in Republic v. Marsman 20 elucidated: While in the procedural sense, especially in relation to the possible necessity of and time for the filing of responsive and other corresponding pleadings, an amended complaint is deemed filed only as of the date of its admission, . . ., the selfevident proposition [is] that for practical reasons and to avoid the complications that may arise from undue delays in the admission thereof, such an amended complaint must be considered as filed, for the purpose of such a substantive matter as prescription, on the date it is actually filed with the court, regardless of when it is ultimately formally admitted by the court. After all, the only purpose of requiring leave of and formal admission by the court of an amended pleading after issues have already been joined as to the original ones is to prevent the injection of other issues which ought either to be considered as barred already or made the subject of another proceeding, if they are not anyway indispensable for the resolution of the original ones and no unnecessary multiplicity of suits would result; so, when the court ultimately admits the amendment, the legal effect, for substantive purposes, of such admission retroacts as a rule to the date of its actual filing. In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action or demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter to implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa. In the same vein, Waje and Paradise do not apply because the Amended Complaints therein alleged new causes of action. Similarly unavailing is petitioners' contention that the injunctive writ was applied retroactively and, hence, violative of Ruymann and other subsequent cases. To repeat, Ruymann was wrongly applied by petitioners. There being no new issues introduced in the Amended Complaint herein, the present suit is deemed to have commenced on the date of the filing of the original Complaint. Hence, the CA was correct in upholding the trial court that the status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of the original Complaint. Finally, petitioners assert that Respondent Court violated the well-entrenched doctrine that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. As earlier noted, despite the fact that Pilar Martinez already had title to and possession of the disputed property, the CA affirmed the order of the trial court enjoining her from "entering, intruding and making construction and/or performing any act of ownership or possession and any activity over the land . . .; " Petitioners cite the following ruling in Reyes v. Harty: 21 It is a universal principle of the law that an injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done. It is undisputed proof in this case, presented by the plaintiffs themselves, that, at the time this [case] was tried, the plaintiffs had been completely dispossessed, the defendant being in full and complete possession of the lands in question . . . . Again, the case cited by petitioner is incongruous with the factual milieu of the present controversy. In that case, the party praying for an injunctive writ had been completely dispossessed of the land in question prior to the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, private respondent was still the owner and was in possession of the property at the time the original Complaint was filed. The rule is that a court should not by means of preliminary injunction transfer the property in litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts ownership thereto. 22 When private respondent filed the original Complaint, she had title to and possession of the property and was asserting ownership thereto. Where the acts have been performed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, the general rule is that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. However, "where the acts are performed after the injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed to perform the acts sought to be restrained and then be heard to assert in the suit that the injunction will not lie because he has performed these acts before final hearing has been had, but after the beginning of the action. A defendant thus acts at his peril." 23 It has been held that "[t]he general rule of law is that, where a defendant completes, after the beginning of an action, the act thereby sought to be restrained, and before the issue of any final order or decree, the court has the power to, and may, compel, by a mandatory injunction, the restoration of the former condition of things and thereby prevent the giving of an advantage by reason of the wrongful act. And where

a defendant does an act thus sought to be restrained, he proceeds at his peril, and the court in which the action is pending may compel a restoration of the former status or grant to the plaintiff such relief as may be proper." 24 In this case, an action was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with the mortgage sale, yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still pending. Such conduct is reprehensible. "If one in the face of a pending suit for injunction, does the thing sought to be enjoined, he cannot thus outwit equity and the court, but must restore the status quo. . . . Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril." 25 Hence, in proceeding with the mortgage sale and subsequently selling the property to Pilar Martinez, Petitioner Verzosa was acting at his peril. Clearly, the Respondent Court did not err in sustaining the Decision of the lower court that the status quo to be maintained was the situation when title to and possession of the property were still with Private Respondent Uson. The precise ruling of the appellate court is aptly reproduced hereunder: When the present Civil Case No. 16590 was commenced on August 12, 1988, the property in dispute was still covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 12783, in the name of plaintiff Fe Giron Uson, and there is no dispute that the possession of the said property was still with the plaintiff. That is the status quo sought to be maintained in the questioned preliminary injunction. It is, therefore, incorrect for defendant Wilfredo P. Verzosa to claim that the status quo refers to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11107 in the name of Pilar Martinez, which is precisely what is sought to be annul[l]ed in the present case, and that the possessor of the property is defendant Pilar Martinez who may possibly have entered into the property while the present case has long been pending, and by virtue of the purported sale of the same to her by defendant Verzosa, whose claim of ownership thereof is, in turn, based on the sheriff's sale which is also the very subject matter of the present case for annulment. 26 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Case no. 14 GR. No. 72572 Dec. 19, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of private respondent Mangampo. Private respondent had been working as warehouseman-cashier at petitioner's sales office in Daet, Camarines Norte for about six (6) months. The application was anchored on private respondent's alleged violation of company rules and the Labor Code consisting of "misapproriation of company funds deposited in their custody." Private respondent was placed on preventive suspension and the application therefore, leading to termination, was received by said respondent. An opposition was filed by private respondent. Respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Fulleros, to whom the case was assigned, required the parties to submit their position papers. Private respondent complied by filing his position paper registering his opposition to the application for want of evidence to prove his responsibility. Due to petitioners counsel failure to appear in a scheduled hearing, private respondent prompted to orally move for the adoption of his position paper as direct testimony and to declare the petitioner in default. Both prayers were granted by the healing officer. Petitioner was later allowed to file its position paper which served as direct testimony. Petitioner justified private respondent's termination by contending that he breached the trust and confidence reposed in him. Petitioner further moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the application for clearance to terminate which it had earlier filed was a "mere report." It was claimed that clearance to terminate was applicable only to employees with at least one (1) year of service, hence private respondent should file another complaint that would be the basis of a resolution by the commission with respect to his termination. A report was submitted by the hearing officer to Executive Labor Arbiter Fulleros recommending the reinstatement of private respondent. After petitioner received the said decision of the labor arbiter on July 18, 1984, it appealed to respondent commission, reiterating its position that the termination of private respondent's service by reason of loss of trust and confidence was warranted. Respondent Mangampo moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Respondent Commission dismissed the appeal. MR was filed by petitioner however it was denied by the commission. ISSUE: Whether the respondent commission erred in ruling that the appeal was filed out of time. RULING: The court finds that petitioner's present recourse is devoid of merit and cannot justify the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Under Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, where the filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and

other papers with the court are made by sending them by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt shall be considered as the date of filing. Thus, such date of filing is determinable from two sources, that is, from the post office stamp on the envelope or from the registry receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the timeliness of the filing of the pleadings. If the date stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former may be accepted as the date of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope or registry receipt and the dates appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal where they are presented. The Court hold that respondent commission correctly relied on the date appearing in the post office stamp on the mailing envelope and in consequently holding that petitioner's appeal was time-barred. Of compelling significance is the fact that the date stamped on the mailing envelope containing the copy of petitioner's appeal which was furnished to private respondent bears the same date. The decision having become final and executory, the dismissal of the appeal without determining the merits of the case was proper. But, even if the appeal was seasonably filed, it is irremissible that petitioner's application for clearance to terminate private respondent's services must fail. Not only is there no showing of grave abuse of discretion but petitioner also failed to support its claim that such termination was warranted. The dismissal of petitioner's appeal is AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued by us is lifted. The decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter, is hereby modified. LUXURIA HOMES, INC., and/or AIDA M. POSADAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JAMES BUILDER CONSTRUCTION and/or JAIME T. BRAVO, respondents. As culled from the record, the facts are as follows: Petitioner Aida M. Posadas and her two (2) minor children co-owned a 1.6 hectare property which was occupied by squatters. Petitioner Posadas entered into negotiations with private respondent Jaime T. Bravo regarding the development of the said property into a residential subdivision. She authorized private respondent to negotiate with the squatters to leave the said property, respondent Bravo started negotiations with the squatters. Meanwhile, petitioner Posadas and her two (2) children, through a Deed of Assignment, assigned the said property to petitioner Luxuria Homes, Inc., Respondent Bravo signed as one of the witnesses to the execution of the Deed of Assignment and the Articles of Incorporation of petitioner Luxuria Homes, Inc. The harmonious and congenial relationship of petitioner Posadas and respondent Bravo turned sour when the former supposedly could not accept the management contracts to develop the 1.6 hectare property into a residential subdivision, the latter was proposing. In retaliation, respondent Bravo demanded payment for services rendered in connection with the development of the land. Petitioner Posadas refused to pay the amount demanded. Thus, private respondents James Builder Construction and Jaime T. Bravo instituted a complaint for specific performance before the trial court against petitioners Posadas and Luxuria Homes, Inc. Private respondents alleged therein that petitioner Posadas asked to prepare a site development plan and an architectural design for a contract price of P450,000.00 for which they were partially paid the amount of P25,000.00, leaving a balance of P425,000.00. trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Thereafter, trial court declared petitioner Posadas in default and allowed the private respondents to present their evidence ex-parte it ordered petitioner Posadas, jointly and in solidum with petitioner. ISSUE Were private respondents able to present ex-parte sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations in their complaint and entitle them to their prayers? HELD In this case, respondent alleged that the agreed price for the preparation of the site development plan is P500,000.00 and that the preparation of the architectural designs is for P450,000, or a total of P950,000.00 for the two contracts. In his complaint however, respondent Bravo alleged that he was asked "to prepare the site development plan and the architectural designs . . . for a contract price of P450,000.00 . . . " 8 The discrepancy or inconsistency was never reconciled and clarified. We reiterate that we cannot award an amount higher than what was claimed in the complaint. Consequently for the preparation of both the architectural design and site development plan, respondent is entitled to the amount of P450,000.00 less partial payments made in the amount of P25,000.00. In Policarpio v. RTC of Quezon City, 9 it was held

that a court is bereft of jurisdiction to award, in a judgment by default, a relief other than that specifically prayed for in the complaint. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of respondent Honorable Court of Appeals and its Resolution are MODIFIED ordering PETITIONER AIDA M. POSADAS to pay PRIVATE RESPONDENTS the amount of P435,000.00 as balance for the preparation of the architectural design, site development plan and survey. All other claims of respondents are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. G.R. No. 119511 November 24, 1998 WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON USON, respondents. Main Controversy: What constitutes the status quo ante in the application of an injunctive writ, in the event a complaint's subsequently amended? Facts of the Case: Private respondent Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of 19,955 square meters located at Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo Verzosa amounting only to P25,000. Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation with the balance of only P915.75 to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have the mortgage foreclosed. On July 21, 1988, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan set the foreclosure sale prompting private respondent Fe Uson filed with the Regional Trial Court Lingayen, Pangasinan, a complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial Sheriff for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was not personally verified by plaintiff Fe Uson. Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC.She filed her amended complaint which bears the proper verification. Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure of mortgage. The foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property was sold to Verzosa being the highest bidder. Thereafter, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was approved by Executive Judge Antonio Belen and issued to Verzosa. RTC issued an order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson. At this point, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. He alleged that the said order, admitting the amended complaint was issued with grave abuse of discretion. For the meantime the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan. Thus, O.C.T. No. 12783 in Fe Uson's name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. 11087 was issued in the name of Wilfredo Verzosa. He sold the land to Pilar Martinez. As a result, Verzosa's T.C.T. No. 11087 was cancelled and T.C.T. No. 11107 was issued to Martinez. After one year from the filing of Verzosa's petition for certiorari, the CA dismissed the petition, thus sustaining the validity of RTCs order admitting Fe Uson's amended complaint. Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional defendants the Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Pilar Martinez and praying, among others, the annulment of the latter's title T.C.T. No. 11107. Upon Uson's application for preliminary injunction embodied in her Second Amended Complaint (which was opposed by Verzosa and Martinez), respondent court issued an order directing the latter to cease and desist from entering, making constructions and performing any act of possession or ownership over the land in question. Respondent judge, acting on Verzosa's motion for clarification of the order, issued an order to the effect that the status quo being maintained is the possession of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land and that such status quo does not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being the registered owner of T.C.T. No. 11107. It should be noted that the Complaint alleged that Private Respondent Uson mortgaged the property to Verzosa for P25,000, and that the remaining, unpaid balance was P915.75, an amount she was willing to consign to the trial court. Petitioners challenged by certiorari the two orders of the trial court. Because the CA dismissed their petition, petitioners availed themselves of the present recourse. ISSUES: 1. Is private respondent entitled to an injunctive writ? 2. What is the status quo ante that the said writ seeks to preserve? The Court's Ruling First Issue: Issuance of the Injunctive Writ SC disagree with the petitioners primarily allegations that the injunctive writ was wrongfully issued in favor of private respondent, as the latter had a doubtful, unclear and unadjudicated right for recovery of the property which had been mortgaged, foreclosed and sold to a third party. An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established: 1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; 3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 11

The foregoing requisites are present in this case. The undisputed owner of the property which was mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa was private respondent who, upon learning of the scheduled foreclosure, immediately filed a Complaint to annul the mortgage, praying that a restraining order be issued to restrain such foreclosure. Private respondent insisted that she had paid her P25,000 debt, except for the remaining unpaid balance of P915.75 which she was willing to consign to the court. In other words, she had title to and possession of the property and she claimed to have paid her obligation, except for the nominal unpaid balance which she was willing to consign judicially. Hence, she had a clear and unmistakable right to protect her title to and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale. Given the above factual allegations, it is clear that private respondent was entitled to the injunctive writ. Second Issue: Status Quo Ante The "status quo" is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ. Petitioners insist that the status quo refers to the point when Pilar Martinez was already the owner of the property, having purchased it from Verzosa. SC cannot sustain the petitioners, for Martinez' claim to the property is precisely the bone of contention. Private respondent, the origin owner of the property, filed a Complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the provincial sheriff for the annulment of mortgage and the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent the foreclosure of the property and the subsequent transfer of ownership. Although the Complaint was subsequently amended, the controversy began when the first Complaint was filed. Nevertheless, Petitioner Verzosa and the sheriff proceeded with the foreclosure before the filing of the Amended Complaint. Worse, Verzosa sold the property to Martinez one week later. Now, Verzosa and Martinez claim that the status quo to be preserved refers to the time before the filing of the second Complaint and after Martinez had acquired the property from Verzosa. An action by the complainant Fe Uson was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with the mortgage sale, yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still pending. Such conduct is reprehensible. "If one in the face of a pending suit for injunction, does the thing sought to be enjoined, he cannot thus outwit equity and the court, but must restore the status quo. . . . Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril." Hence, in proceeding with the mortgage sale and subsequently selling the property to Pilar Martinez, Petitioner Verzosa was acting at his peril. Clearly, the Respondent CA did not err in sustaining the Decision of the lower court that the status quo to be maintained was the situation when title to and possession of the property were still with Private Respondent Uson. When the present Civil Case was commenced on August 12, 1988, the property in dispute was still covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 12783, in the name of plaintiff Fe Giron Uson, and there is no dispute that the possession of the said property was still with the plaintiff. That is the status quo sought to be maintained in the questioned preliminary injunction. It is, therefore, incorrect for defendant Wilfredo P. Verzosa to claim that the status quo refers to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11107 in the name of Pilar Martinez, which is precisely what is sought to be annulled in the present case, and that the possessor of the property is defendant Pilar Martinez who may possibly have entered into the property while the present case has long been pending, and by virtue of the purported sale of the same to her by defendant Verzosa, whose claim of ownership thereof is, in turn, based on the sheriff's sale which is also the very subject matter of the present case for annulment. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. CASE NO. 10: METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Manila Branch 39, RAYCOR AIRCONTROL SYSTEM, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,* respondent. FACTS: Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metropolitan) in whose favor a deed of chattel mortgage was executed by Good Earth Emporium, Inc. (GEE) over certain air conditioning units installed in the GEE building, filed a complaint for replevin against Uniwide Sales, Inc. (Uniwide) and the BPI Investment Corporation and several other banks collectively called BPI-Consortium, for the recovery of the possession of the air-conditioning units or in the event they may not be recovered, for the defendants which acquired the GEE building in an auction sale, (to) be required, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the unpaid obligations on the units. Plaintiff Metrobank alleged that the air-conditioning units were installed on a loan of P4,900,000.00 it extended to Good Earth Emporium & Supermarket, Inc. in its building located at Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, after the land and building had been foreclosed and purchased on June 3, 1983 at public auction by the defendants, except Uniwide, and in order to secure repayment of the loan, a deed of chattel mortgage was constituted over the personal properties listed in the deed which included the airconditioning units. The loan proceeds were used by GEE to finance the acquisition of airconditioning equipment from Reycor Air Control System, Inc. under an Agreement of Sale. Raycor filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging' it has a direct and immediate interest on the subject matter of the

litigation such that it will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment' and attached the 'Intervention Complaint'. There was no opposition to the motion and the intervention complaint was admitted by the lower court per its order dated August 8, 1986. Metrobank on November 19, 1986, filed its Answer To The Intervention Complaint The lower court set the case for trial on the merits on September 15, 1987 but before the date of the trial, on September 7, 1987, plaintiff Metrobank and the defendants Uniwide and BPI Consortium, filed a motion for postponement of the scheduled hearing on September 15, 1987 and asked for thirty (30) days from September 15 within which to submit a compromise agreement. On March 15, 1988, plaintiff Metrobank and defendants BPI Consortium filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint and on March 18, 1988, the lower court issued the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. On February 9, 1989, plaintiff Metrobank filed a motion for extension for 15 days or until February 24, 1988 within which to file its answer to the amended complaint in intervention and the intervenor on February 17, 1989 filed an opposition to Metrobank's motion and at the same time moved that Metrobank be declared in default on the amended complaint in intervention. The respondent court granted Metrobank's motion and on February 18, 1989, Metrobank filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint in Intervention with Counterclaim. On April 14, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals contending that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in allowing, per its order of June 2, 1988, the intervention suit to survive despite the dismissal of the main action and also in admitting, per its order of January 11, 1989, the amended complaint in intervention. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the intervention suit to survive despite the dismissal of the main action? HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition. SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the lower court was innocent of any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders complained of. The contention of petitioner that the order of the lower court, dated June 2, 1988, has the effect of allowing the intervention suit to prosper despite the dismissal of the main action obviously cannot be upheld. There is here no final dismissal of the main case. The aforementioned order of the lower court has the effect not only of allowing the intervention suit to proceed but also of vacating its previous order of dismissal. The reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of the intervenor is proper. The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to dismiss the case, without notice to and consent of the intervenor, has the effect of putting to rest only the respective claims of the said original parties inter se but the same cannot in any way affect the claim of private respondent which was allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the original parties. A resume of pertinent rulings on the matter would be in order. Intervention is defined as "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings." Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, may intervene in such action, and when he has become a party thereto it is error for the court to dismiss the action, including the intervention suit on the basis of an agreement between the original parties to the action. Any settlement made by the plaintiff and the defendant is necessarily ineffective unless the intervenor is a party to it. It has even been held that the simple fact that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff s action does not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor. An intervenor has the right to claim the benefit of the original suit and to prosecute it to judgment. The right cannot be defeated by dismissal of the suit by the plaintiff after the filing of the petition and notice thereof to the other parties. The trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs action does not require dismissal of the action of the intervenor. The intervenor in a pending case is entitled to be heard like any other party. A claim in intervention that seeks affirmative relief prevents a plaintiff from taking a voluntary dismissal of the main action. Where a complaint in intervention was filed before plaintiff's action had been expressly dismissed, the intervenor's complaint was not subject to dismissal on the ground that no action was pending, since dismissal of plaintiffs action did not affect the rights of the intervenor or affect the dismissal of intervenor's complaint. 1An intervenor's petition showing it to be entitled to affirmative relief will be preserved and heard regardless of the disposition of the principal action. In the case at bar, a reading of the amended complaint in intervention shows that it merely supplements an incomplete allegation of the cause of action stated in the original complaint so as to submit the real matter in dispute. On the issue regarding the propriety of the intervention, suffice it to state that petitioner's failure to interpose a timely

objection when the motion for leave to intervene was filed by private respondent bars the former from belatedly questioning the validity of the same on appeal. Case no. 3 FACTS: Petitioner entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land. Petitioner issued to Dr. Roque a check by way of "reservation payment." Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property. Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check for "downpayment" to Dr. Roque. The annotations, however, were never made because of the untimely demise of Dr. Felipe C. Roque. The death of Dr. Roque constrained petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr. Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. In a letter, respondent advised petitioner "to desist from any attempt to enforce the aforementioned contract of lease and memorandum of agreement". Respondent filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Efren P. Roque alleged that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents, Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter into the assailed agreements with petitioner. The donation was made in a public instrument duly acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary public and duly accepted on the same day by respondent before the notary public in the same instrument of donation. The title to the property, however, remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the name of respondent sixteen years later, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father the mere administration of the property. Respondent came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner only after retiring to the Philippines upon the death of his father. The trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement. While it shared the view expressed by the trial court that a deed of donation would have to be registered in order to bind third persons, the appellate court, however, concluded that petitioner was not a lessee in good faith having had prior knowledge of the donation in favor of respondent, and that such actual knowledge had the effect of registration insofar as petitioner was concerned. The appellate court based its findings largely on the testimony of Veredigno Atienza during cross-examination. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is barred by laches and estoppel from denying the contracts. RULING: The Court cannot accept petitioner's argument that respondent is guilty of laches. Laches, in its real sense, is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. Respondent learned of the contracts only in February 1994 after the death of his father, and in the same year, during November, he assailed the validity of the agreements. Hardly, could respondent then be said to have neglected to assert his case for an unreasonable length of time. Neither is respondent estopped from repudiating the contracts. The essential elements of estoppel in pais, in relation to the party sought to be estopped, are: 1) a clear conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or, at least, calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; 2) an intent or, at least, an expectation, that this conduct shall influence, or be acted upon by, the other party; and 3) the knowledge, actual or constructive, by him of the real facts. With respect to the party claiming the estoppel, the conditions he must satisfy are: 1) lack of knowledge or of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; 2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and 3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change his position or status calculated to cause him injury or prejudice. 12 It has not been shown that respondent intended to conceal the actual facts concerning the property; more importantly, petitioner has been shown not to be totally unaware of the real ownership of the subject property. Altogether, there is no cogent reason to reverse the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision. Case #12 G.R. No. L-23233 September 28, 1967 LUIS ENGUERRA, plaintiff -appellant, vs. ANTONIO DOLOSA, defendant-appellee. Facts Plaintiff Enguerra was chief baker for the De Lux Bakery and Grocery, in Sorsogon, from June 18, 1959 to October 8, 1961. He filed, with the MTC of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint for Recovery of Sum of money amounting to P4,056.00

against his employer the defendant Antonio Dolosa. The court having later dismissed said complaint, Enguerra appealed to the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1800. Soon thereafter Enguerra filed, with the same Court of First Instance, another complaint against Dolosa, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1804, to recover termination pay, underpayment of wages, different kinds of damages and attorneys fees. Respondent Dolosa filed a Motion for Extension and on February 6, 1963 said motion granted 30 days extension. But only on March 8,1963 that he filed a motion to dismiss, upon the ground that said pending case No. 1800 is an action between the same parties for the same cause of action, and that the complaint in case No. 1804 violates "the rule against splitting a cause of action. Subsequently, Enguerra sought to have Dolosa declared in default, upon the ground that his motion to dismiss has been filed one (1) day late, and that it was merely pro forma, because of which it did not suspend the running of the period to file his answer. The CFI granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion to declare Dolosa in default. A MR having been denied, Enguerra interposed the present appeal, directly to the Supreme Court, alleging that the lower court had erred (a) in not declaring Dolosa in default; and (b) in dismissing the complaint herein. ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent declared in default, upon the ground that his motion to dismiss has been filed one day late? 2. Whether respondent motion is merely a proforma motion? 3. Whether the two cases has the same causes of action. RULING: 1st Issue: Respondent not in default Plaintiff Enguerra maintains that the extension of 30 days granted in the order of February 6, 1963, expired on March 7, 1963, because the order stated that said period should be "counted from today," which, Enguerra maintains, should be understood to mean from February 6 to March 7, 1963 Rule 28 of the Rules of Court provides: "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday." This rule adopts the exclude-the-first and include-the-last day method for computing any period of time. Therefore, excluding the day when the order granting their petition for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration was entered by the Court (Feb 6) and including the day the respondents mailed their motion for reconsideration (March 8), only 30 days had elapsed. Hence, the respondents' motion for reconsideration was filed within the extension of time granted by the Court. No reason had been advanced, and we find none, to depart from this view, which is in line with the spirit and the letter of our laws and the Rules of Court, and is, accordingly, reiterated. 2nd Issue: Not merely a pro forma motion As regards the second procedural ground of the objection to the motion to dismiss, it should be noted that a motion is said to be pro forma when it is apparent therefrom that the movant has not endeavored to make it reasonably persuasive or convincing, his purpose being merely to gain time or to delay the proceedings. In the case at bar, the motion explicitly states "that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, namely: Luis Enguerra vs. Antonio Dolosa Civil Case No. 1800, now pending before this Honorable Court;" and "that the filing of the above entitled case is a violation of the rule against splitting a cause of action." Therefore said motion, manifestly, is not pro forma and its presentation suspended the running of the period for the filing of defendant's answer. 3rd Issue: The same cause of action Both cases being admittedly between the same parties. In this connection, it should be noted that the basis of the complaints in both cases is the same, namely: that Enguerra's rights as Dolosa's chief baker, have been violated by the latter. The alleged violations may have several aspects yet, the cause of action the spring from which the right to sue emanates was only one and the same breach of their contract of employment, without which none of the claims made by plaintiff would have no leg to stand on. Insofar as the cause of action therefore is concerned materially at variance from that which exists between said underpayment of wages for the day given and the similar underpayment of wages for the next day. Indeed, if one month later, the aggrieved laborer should decide to sue the employer for breach of contract, it is obvious that the former cannot file a complaint for some effects of such breach, and another complaint for its other effects. He must include in the complaint his claim for the underpayment for the aforementioned two (2) days, both being overdue at the time of the commencement of the action. Similarly, if underpayment of the minimum wage for a given day or month were coupled with failure or refusal to pay overtime, for the same day or month, a complaint filed thereafter should include both, underpayment of wages and overtime pay. In other words, Courts should not sanction a complaint for one, and another action for the other. Hence, in his own complaint herein, plaintiff has, in fact, included his claims for alleged underpayment of wages, overtime, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, under one cause of action. He is in estoppel, therefore, to deny that the cause of action asserted in both cases is one and the same. At any rate, it is clear that the overtime claimed in the present case is the very object of Case No. 1800. Moreover, it is well settled that damages incidental to a cause of action cannot be made the subject of a suit independent from the principal cause.

Case no.19 (July 3, 2013) Lafarge v Continential Cement Corporation, Lim and Mariano (Case Digest) GR no. 155173 Nov 23, 2004 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Facts: Petitioner Lafarge in behalf of Petitioner Luzon Continental Land Corporation (LCLC) agreed to purchase the cement business of Respondent Continental Cement Corporation where they entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA). Petitioner aware of respondent pending case with the Supreme Court (Asset Privatization Trust (APT) v. Court of Appeals and Continental Cement Corporation. In anticipation of the liability SC might adjudge against CONTINENTAL, the parties, under Clause 2 (c) of the SPA, allegedly agreed to retain from the purchase price a portion of the contract price in the amount ofP117,020,846.84 -- the equivalent of US$2,799,140. This amount was to be deposited in an interest-bearing account in the First National City Bank of New York (Citibank) for payment to APT, the petitioner in Asset Privatization Trust V. CA. Petitioner refused to apply the sum to the payment to APT, despite decision in APT vs CONTINENTAL, in favor of CONTINENTAL and the repeated instructions of CONTINENTAL. Respondent Continental filed a Complaint with Application for Preliminary Attachment against Petitioner Lafarge before the RTC. Respondent Continental filed a complaint on the fear that nonpayment to APT (Asset Privatization Trust) by the petitioner would result in the foreclosure, not just of its properties covered by the SPA with Lafarge but of several other properties as well. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that it violated the prohibition on forum-shopping where the respondent filed an earlier same complaint in the International Chamber of Commerce and now before the RTC. Also, Petitioner filed Answer and Compulsory Counterclaims ad Cautelam to avoid being in default and without prejudice to the outcome of their appeal that both Respondent Lim (president) and Mariano (corporate secretary) be held jointly and solidarily liable with Respondent CONTINENTAL. Trial court denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and their counterclaims. Issue: May defendants in CIVIL CASES implead in their counterclaims PERSONS WHO WERE NOT PARTIES to the original complaints? Ruling: Yes. The prerogative of bringing in new parties to the action at any stage before judgment is intended to accord complete relief to all of them in a single action and to avert a duplicity and even a multiplicity of suits thereby. Such inclusion is based on the allegations of fraud and bad faith on the part of the corporate officer or stockholder. These allegations may warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, so that the said individual may not seek refuge therein, but may be held individually and personally liable for his or her actions. Section 6 Rule 3. Permissive Joinder of Parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. Section 7 Rule 3.Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. ------------------------Implead (Impleader is a procedural device before trial in which one party joins a third party into a lawsuit because that third party is liable) Case no 20

Solar Team Entertainment v. Ricafort 293 SCRA 661 FACTS: Petitioner, as plaintiff, filed before the RTC in Paranaque a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for a writ of replevin against herein private respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0304 and was assigned to public respondent Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort. Private respondents, as defendants, filed their Answer (with Counterclaims). A copy thereof was furnished counsel for petitioner by registered mail; however, the pleading did not contain any written explanation as to why service was not made personally upon petitioner- plaintiff. Petitioner filed a motion to expunge the Answer (with Counterclaims) and to declare herein private respondents in default, alleging therein that the latter did not observe the mandate of the aforementioned Section 11, especially since the office of defendants counsel is just a stone throw away from the office of petitioners counsel, with an estimate distance of about 200 meters more or less. Petitioner further alleged that the post office was about ten (10) times farther from the office of d efendents counsel. Public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an order denying, for lack of merit, petitioners motion to expunge the Answer (with Counterclaims) and to declare private respondents in default. ISSUE: W/N Judge Bautista-Ricafort committed GAD when she admitted private respondents' "Answer (with Counterclaims)" notwithstanding violation of Section 11, Rule 13. HELD: No. Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. Personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice. case no 5 [G.R. No. 113564. June 20, 2001] INOCENCIA YU DINO and her HUSBAND doing business under the trade name "CANDY CLAIRE FASHION GARMENTS", petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMAN SIO, doing business under the name "UNIVERSAL TOY MASTER MANUFACTURING", respondents. D E C I S I O N* PUNO, J.: Though people say, "better late than never", the law frowns upon those who assert their rights past the eleventh hour. For failing to timely institute their action, the petitioners are forever barred from claiming a sum of money from the respondent. This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the amended decision of the respondent court dated January 24, 1994 reversing its April 30, 1993 decision and dismissing the plaintiff-petitioners' Complaint on the ground of prescription. The following undisputed facts gave rise to the case at bar: Petitioners spouses Dino, doing business under the trade name "Candy Claire Fashion Garment" are engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling shirts.[1] Respondent Sio is part owner and general manager of a manufacturing corporation doing business under the trade name "Universal Toy Master Manufacturing."[2] Petitioners and respondent Sio entered into a contract whereby the latter would manufacture for the petitioners 20,000 pieces of vinyl frogs and 20,000 pieces of vinyl mooseheads at P7.00 per piece in accordance with the sample approved by the petitioners. These frogs and mooseheads were to be attached to the shirts petitioners would manufacture and

sell.[3] Respondent Sio delivered in several installments the 40,000 pieces of frogs and mooseheads. The last delivery was made on September 28, 1988. Petitioner fully paid the agreed price.[4] Subsequently, petitioners returned to respondent 29,772 pieces of frogs and mooseheads for failing to comply with the approved sample.[5] The return was made on different dates: the initial one on December 12, 1988 consisting of 1,720 pieces,[6] the second on January 11, 1989,[7] and the last on January 17, 1989.[8] Petitioners then demanded from the respondent a refund of the purchase price of the returned goods in the amount of P208,404.00. As respondent Sio refused to pay,[9] petitioners filed on July 24, 1989 an action for collection of a sum of money in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38. "Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding ten articles shall be barred after six months from the delivery of the thing sold." RTC: ruled in favor of candy claire fashion garments CA: sustained RTCs decision but reversed on motion for reconsideration on the ground of prescription. Issue: WON prescription is deemed waived for failure to raise it on appeal. Held. no, it is not deemed waived This Court's application of the Osorio and Gicano doctrines to the case at bar is confirmed and now enshrined in Rule 9, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz: "Section 1. Defense and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded whether in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim." case no 5 [G.R. No. 113564. June 20, 2001] INOCENCIA YU DINO and her HUSBAND doing business under the trade name "CANDY CLAIRE FASHION GARMENTS", petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMAN SIO, doing business under the name "UNIVERSAL TOY MASTER MANUFACTURING", respondents. D E C I S I O N* PUNO, J.: Though people say, "better late than never", the law frowns upon those who assert their rights past the eleventh hour. For failing to timely institute their action, the petitioners are forever barred from claiming a sum of money from the respondent. This is a petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the amended decision of the respondent court dated January 24, 1994 reversing its April 30, 1993 decision and dismissing the plaintiff-petitioners' Complaint on the ground of prescription. The following undisputed facts gave rise to the case at bar: Petitioners spouses Dino, doing business under the trade name "Candy Claire Fashion Garment" are engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling shirts.[1] Respondent Sio is part owner and general manager of a manufacturing corporation doing business under the trade name "Universal Toy Master Manufacturing."[2] Petitioners and respondent Sio entered into a contract whereby the latter would manufacture for the petitioners 20,000 pieces of vinyl frogs and 20,000 pieces of vinyl mooseheads at P7.00 per piece in accordance with the sample approved by the petitioners. These frogs and mooseheads were to be attached to the shirts petitioners would manufacture and sell.[3]

Respondent Sio delivered in several installments the 40,000 pieces of frogs and mooseheads. The last delivery was made on September 28, 1988. Petitioner fully paid the agreed price.[4] Subsequently, petitioners returned to respondent 29,772 pieces of frogs and mooseheads for failing to comply with the approved sample.[5] The return was made on different dates: the initial one on December 12, 1988 consisting of 1,720 pieces,[6] the second on January 11, 1989,[7] and the last on January 17, 1989.[8] Petitioners then demanded from the respondent a refund of the purchase price of the returned goods in the amount of P208,404.00. As respondent Sio refused to pay,[9] petitioners filed on July 24, 1989 an action for collection of a sum of money in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38. "Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding ten articles shall be barred after six months from the delivery of the thing sold." RTC: ruled in favor of candy claire fashion garments CA: sustained RTCs decision but reversed on motion for reconsideration on the ground of prescription. Issue: WON prescription is deemed waived for failure to raise it on appeal. Held. no, it is not deemed waived This Court's application of the Osorio and Gicano doctrines to the case at bar is confirmed and now enshrined in Rule 9, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz: "Section 1. Defense and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded whether in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim." _________ Case 15 BARITUA vs MERCADER Facts The original complaint was filed against JB Lines, Inc. [Petitioner JB Lines, Inc.] filed a motion to dismiss complaint, to strike out false-impertinent matters therefrom, and/or for bill of particulars on the primary grounds that [respondents] failed to implead Jose Baritua as an indispensable party and that the cause of action is a suit against a wrong and non-existent party. [Respondents] filed an opposition to the said motion and an amended complaint. The trial court denied the aforesaid motion and admitted the amended complaint of [respondents] impleading Jose Baritua and alleged the following: Dominador Mercader is a businessman mainly engaged in the buy and sell of dry goods in Laoang, N. Samar. He buys his goods from Manila and brings them to Laoang, Northern Samar for sale at his store located in the said locality. Dominador Mercader boarded petitioners bus. He was not able to reach his destination considering while he was on board [petitioners] bus no. 142 with Plate No. 484 EU, the said bus fell into the river as a result of which the late Dominador Mercader died. Heirs ask for compensatory damages for the death of Dominador Mercader, For the loss of earnings, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages. RTC and CA affirm decision. Issue: Petitioners contend that since the correct amounts of docket and other lawful fees were not paid by respondents, then the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it passed sub si lencio on the trial courts failure to rule frontally on their plea for a bill of particulars. Held: Petitioners contend that since the correct amounts of docket and other lawful fees were not paid by respondents, then the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

The Court, in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. Generally, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for its retroactive application. Once the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The trial court cannot be ousted therefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The Manchester ruling, which became final in 1987, has no retroactive application and cannot be invoked in the subject Complaint filed in 1984. The Court explicitly declared: To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. Held second issue The RTC gave him ten days from March 12, 1985 within which to do so. He, however, filed the aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court. Moreover, such motion was already moot and academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed their answer and several other pleadings to the amended Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, provides: Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired.

G.R. No. L-43575 July 31, 1978 MARCIANO LAMCO, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ALVARO J. BARRETO ENTERPRISES, respondents. Facts: Petitioner Marciano Lamco was employed by respondent firm Alvaro J. Barreto Enterprises on April 16, 1974 as its furniture designer-production supervisor with a monthly salary of P800.00. Working six (6) days a week, On December 5, 1974, petitioner suffered a stroke and was rushed to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital for emergency treatment. Later, he was transferred to the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where he was confined from December 7, 1974 to January 25, 1975. When recovered, petitioner sought to resume working with the respondent firm but was refused on the ground that the pressure of his work and position Might induce a recurrence of his illness. On March 7, 1975, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits against respondent firm before the Workmen's Compensation Section, Regional Office No. 4 in Manila. In an Employer's Report filed on May 13, 1975, respondent firm denied liability on the claim, alleging lack of employer-employee relationship at the time petitioner suffered his stroke on December 5, 1974. It was insisted that petitioner resigned from his work effective November 9, 1974 pursuant to his letter of resignation dated October 30, 1974. In a decision dated October 28, 1975, the Acting Referee allowed petitioner's claim for compensation but denied reimbursement of medical expenses, petitioner not having shown any receipt nor proof therefor. Respondent firm's motion for reconsideration having been denied, the case was elevated to the respondent Commission

for review. On January 22, 1976, the Commission rendered the appealed decision, the dispositive portion of which states: ACCORDINGLY, the decision rendered on October 28, 1975 is hereby REVERSED and the claim is dismissed for lack of employer-employee relationship. On April 23, 1976 or two days after the expiration of the extension of time granted to petitioner within which he may file his petition for review, petitioner filed before this Court the present petition, lacking however the proper verification for not being subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. By resolution dated July 16, 1976, the Court proceeded to treat the petition as a special civil action. Issue: whether the petitioner Marciano Lamco has properly perfected his appeal to this Court, not having filed any notice of appeal with the Commission, nor a properly verified petition for review before the expiration of the extension of time granted by the Court for the filing thereof. Held: Neither is petitioner's failure to file the petition within the extended time granted by the Court a jurisdictional defect which will ipso facto cause the petition's dismissal. Rule 11, section 7 allows the filing of a pleading after the time fixed by these rules depending on the court's discretion. Thus, it is within the ambit of the Court's authority to act on the petition despite its being filed out of time, especially so where good reasons for the delay had been interposed by petitioner. Considering this to be workmen's compensation case, it is the Court's considered view that there is reason not to insist on strict observance of the provisions of the Rules. Appropriately applicable are the words of Chief Justice Moran, "Rules of pleadings are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. When these issues are already clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. What is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to off on procedural points." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, pp. 300-301, 1970 ed., citing Co Tiamco v. Diaz, et al., 75 Phil. 672). WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Commission dated January 22, 1976 is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered reinstating the Acting Referee's decision dated October 28, 1975. __ Lim Tanhu vs Ramolete Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425 FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime." According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children. Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits. Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.

ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the company of the latt ers share. HELD: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay. An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised not to interfere with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the exparteproceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.