Case: Republic vs.

CA and Roridel Olaviano MolinaNature: Petition for Review on CertiorariFacts:

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by r e s p o n d e n t Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage toReynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo weremarried on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila Son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed s i g n s o f " i m m a t u r i t y a n d i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " a s a h u s b a n d a n d a f a t h e r s i n c e h e preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was neverh o n e s t w i t h h i s w i f e i n r e g a r d t o t h e i r f i n a n c e s , r e s u l t i n g i n f r e q u e n t q u a r r e l s between them; that sometime in February 1986 Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intensequarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had s i n c e t h e n abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologicallyi n c a p a b l e o f c o m p l y i n g w i t h e s s e n t i a l m a r i t a l o b l i g a t i o n s a n d w a s a h i g h l y immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a kingt o b e s e r v e d ; a n d t h a t i t w o u l d b e t o t h e c o u p l e ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t t o h a v e t h e i r marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be anincompatible marriage from the start. On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendere d judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse. In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (asp r o v i d e d u n d e r A r t . 3 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e ) a n d m a d e a n i n c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to e s t a b l i s h i n e f f e c t t h e m o s t l i b e r a l d i v o r c e p r o c e d u r e i n t h e w o r l d w h i c h i s anathema to our culture."

Issue: Whether the marriage can be declared void due to p s y c h o l o g i c a l incapacity? Ruling: No. There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is a n incapacity. It appears to the SC to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"

or"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliabled i f f e r e n c e s " a n d " c o n f l i c t i n g p e r s o n a l i t i e s " i n n o w i s e c o n s t i t u t e s p s y c h o l o g i c a l incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilitiesand duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could norg e t a l o n g w i t h e a c h o t h e r . T h e r e h a d b e e n n o s h o w i n g o f t h e g r a v i t y o f t h e p r o b l e m ; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability Guidelines on Psychological Incapacity 1.The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Anydoubt should be resolved in favour of the existence and continuation of the marriageand against its dissolution and nullity.2.The root cause of the psychological incapac ity must be:a . M e d i c a l l y o r c l i n i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d b . A l l e g e d i n t h e c o m p l a i n t c . S u f f i c i e n t l y proven by expertsd.Clearly explained in the decision3.The incapacity must be p r o v e n t o b e e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c e l e b r a t i o n o f t h e marriage4 . S u c h incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically p e r m a n e n t o r incurable5 . S u c h i l l n e s s m u s t b e g r a v e e n o u g h t o b r i n g a b o u t t h e d i s a b i l i t y o f t h e p a r t y t o assume the essential obligations of marriage6.The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by: Art icles 68-71, 220,221and 225 of FC7.Interpretations of National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, must be given great respect by thecourts8.The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor Generalto appear as a counsel of the State Case: Brenda Marcos vs. Wilson MarcosNature: Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts: Brenda and Wilson were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which wassolemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig ; and (2) on May8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at thePresidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila. Out of their marriage,five (5) children were born.

Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on,h e w a s transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during theMarcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other han d, joined the W o m e n ' s Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang P a l a c e , s h e a s a n e s c o r t o f I m e e M a r c o s and he as a Presidential Guard of PresidentFerdinand Marcos. Through t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n s , t h e y b e c a m e a c q u a i n t e d a n d eventually became sweethearts.After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, HuloB l i s s , M a n d a l u y o n g , a h o u s i n g u n i t w h i c h s h e a c q u i r e d f r o m t h e B l i s s D e v e l o p m e n t Corporation when she was still single.A f t e r t h e d o w n f a l l o f P r e s i d e n t Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and thenengaged in different b u s i n e s s v e n t u r e s t h a t d i d n o t h o w e v e r p r o s p e r . A s a w i f e , s h e always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, asthe head of the family and a

good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her.He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflictp h y s i c a l h a r m o n t h e i r c h i l d r e n f o r a s l i g h t m i s t a k e a n d w a s s o s e v e r e i n t h e w a y h e chastised them. Thus, for several time s during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens.While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morningbefore going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, sheconcentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of thePhilippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction c ompany, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation. The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had abitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay intheir house anym ore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and evenon her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and theirchildren left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the MandaluyongMedical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions.Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him atthe Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, hegot mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them witha samurai and even [beat] her driver.A t t h e t i m e o f t h e f i l i n g o f t h i s c a s e , s h e a n d t h e i r c h i l d r e n w e r e r e n t i n g a h o u s e i n Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described theirf a t h e r a s c r u e l a n d p h y s i c a l l y a b u s i v e t o t h e m . T h e a p p e l l e e s u b m i t t e d h e r s e l f t o psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while the appellanton the other hand, did not.RTC the marriage is void CA reversed the decision of RTC not psychological incapacity because there is a needfor an examination Issue: Whether the personal medical or psychological examination o f respondent is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity?Whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- includingthe testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and thes o c i a l w o r k e r - - w a s e n o u g h t o s u s t a i n a f i n d i n g t h a t r e s p o n d e n t w a s psychologically incapacitated? Ruling: No. It is not a requirement and the totality of the evidence she presented doesnot show such incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not req uirethat a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact,t h e r o o t c a u s e m a y b e " m e d i c a l l y or clinically i d e n t i f i e d . " W h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i s t h e presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's

psychological condition.F o r i n d e e d , i f t h e t o t a l i t y o f e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i s e n o u g h t o s u s t a i n a f i n d i n g o f psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned neednot be resorted to. (Also look for Molina Doctrine) No, it is not enough. Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failedto provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and a b a n d o n m e n t , t h e t o t a l i t y o f h i s a c t s d o e s n o t l e a d t o a c o n c l u s i o n o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his joband was not gainfully employed fo r a period of more than six years. It was during thisperiod that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.Petition is denied.

Arroyo vs arroyo Facts: Spouses were united in bonds of wedlock by their marriage in 1910 Not until 1920 when the wife went away from the common home with the intentionof living separately with her husband After efforts made by the husband for his wife to comeback to them, it initiatedhim to compel his wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him Defendant wife admitted that she had left her husband without his consent Wife prayed for affirmative relief consisting of (1) decree of separation, (2)liquidation of conjugal partnership, (3) allowance for counsel fees and separatemaintenance Lower court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant Issue: w/n plaintiff husband can compel his wife to return to the conjugalhome?Held: it is not within the province of the court to attempt to compel one of the spouses tocohabit with and render conjugal rights to the other, although husband is without adoubt entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself w/osufficient cause and that is she is admonished that it is her duty to return act of living together is a mere voluntary act of the spouses if one of the spouses leaves the conjugal home, the other spouse cannot go tocourt and seek for an order to compel such spouse to return a writ of habeas corpus will not even issue to compel a spouse to live together withthe other Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda35 Phil. 252 Facts:Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They establishedtheir residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her

parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the de fendant, onemonth after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to performunchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter rejectthe said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated andprovoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce thedefendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreatingher, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge inthe home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint ag ainst her husband forsupport outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objectsthat the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.Issue:Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugaldomicile.Ruling:Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a newrelation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon theagreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines andprescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the obj ect of amarriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of theparties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or bymaintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option givenby law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade orterminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leavethe conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separatemaintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

Tamargo vs. CA209 SCRA 518 Facts:Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages wasfiled with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer'sadopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura hadfiled a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedingsbefore the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spousesBundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoingpetition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adoptingp a r e n t s , n a m e l y t h e s p o u s e s S a b a s a n d F e l i s a R a p i s u r a , w e r e indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted tothe adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoptionwas filed.Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had notceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petitionfor adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling thatrespondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.Issue:Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant petition.Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time.Ruling:SC granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be givento the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adoptedchild. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental au thority hadbeen retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden themwith liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and whichthey could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.

Manzano vs. SanchezA.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

F a c t s : Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in SanGabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. However, h e r h u s b a n d c o n t r a c t e d another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When r e s p o n d e n t Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage c o n t r a c t c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a t b o t h c o n t r a c t i n g parties were "separated."Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao hedid not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together ashusband and wife for seven years already without the b e n e f i t o f m a r r i a g e , a s m a n i f e s t e d i n t h e i r j o i n t a f f i d a v i t . According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marrya g a i n ; o t h e r w i s e , h e ( M a n z a n o ) c o u l d b e c h a r g e d w i t h b i g a m y . H e t h e n p r a y e d t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t b e d i s m i s s e d for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.A f t e r a n e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e C o m p l a i n t a n d t h e C o m m e n t , t h e C o u r t A d m i n i s t r a t o r r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t r e s p o n d e n t Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that ar e p e t i t i o n o f t h e s a m e o r s i m i l a r a c t w o u l d b e d e a l t w i t h m o r e severely.I s s u e s : 1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code.2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.R u l i n g : Forthisprovisiononlegalratificationofmaritalcohabitationtoapply,thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur: 1. Themanandwomanmusthavebeenlivingtogetherashusbandandwifeforatleastfiveyearsbeforethemarriage; 2. Thepartiesmusthavenolegalimpedimenttomarryeachother; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the partiesmustbepresentatthetimeofmarriage; 4. Thepartiesmustexecuteanaffidavitstatingthattheyhavelivedtogetherforatleastfiveyearsandarewithoutlegalimpedimenttomarryeachother;and 5. Thesolemnizingofficermustexecuteaswornstatementthathehadascertainedthequalificationsofthepartiesandthathehadfoundnolegalimpedimenttotheir marriage. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavitsexecuted on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expresslystated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make thesubsequent marriage null and void. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating thatthey had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstratedgross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage

Andal vs. Macaraig89 Phil 165 F a c t s : Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the CIFof Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur.The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas and thatEmiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in

question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former. T h e l o w e r c o u r t r e n d e r e d j u d g m e n t i n favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimateson of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only q u e s t i o n o f l a w a r e i n v o l v e d . Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in hishouse to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak thathe could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live int h e h o u s e o f M a r i a ' s f a t h e r . F e l i x a n d M a r i a h a d s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e and treated each other as husband and wife.Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even atte nd his funeral. Maria Dueas gave b i r t h t o a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. I s s u e : W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano. R u l i n g : Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. It is already seen that Emiliano and his wife were livingtogether, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn thanthat the issue is legitimate. It is also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof

PT&Tvs.NLRC272 SCRA 596 F a c t s : Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specificallyas a Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee whos having a maternity leave. U n d e r t h e a g r e e m e n t s h e s i g n e d , her employment was to immediately terminate upon the expiration of the a g r e e d period. Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods, this time as a replacement to an e m p l o y e e w h o w e n t o n l e a v e . T h e r e l i e v e r status was then formally completed until she was asked again to joinPT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the job application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that she was single a l t h o u g h s h e h a d c o n t r a c t e d m a r r i a g e a f e w m o n t h s e a r l i e r . G r a c e h a s also made the same representation on her two successive reliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&Th a v i n g d i s c o v e r e d t h e d i s c r e p a n c y s e n t G r a c e a m e m o r a n d u m requiring her to explain the said discrepancy andshe was reminded about the companys poli cy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply, shestated that she wasnt aware of such policy at that time and all a l o n g s h e h a d n t d e l i b e r a t e l y h i d d e n h e r t r u e c i v i l status. However, PT&T remained unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Gr ace and thus she was dismissed fromt h e c o m p a n y . G r a c e c o n t e s t e d b y i n i t i a t i n g a c o m p l a i n t f o r i l l e g a l dismissal and with a claim for non -payment of cost of living allowances.Issue:Whether or not PT&T is liable against Graces illegal dismissal due to certa in company policy. R u l i n g : Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of private individuals o r corporations. Wheres a company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage, the S u p r e m e C o u r t i n v a l i d a t e d s u c h p o l i c y a s i t n o t o n l y

runs afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the f u n d a m e n t a l p o l i c y o f t h e S t a t e t o w a r d m a r r i a g e . The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the very essence, idealsa n d p u r p o s e o f marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Graces illegal dismissal and the latter shall claim for damages

Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals

[GR 128448, 1 February 2001] Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur Facts: Spouses Alejandro and Lilia Mirasol are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-1974, they produced 70,501.08 piculs of sugar, 25,662.36 of which were assigned for export. The following crop year, their acreage planted to the same crop was lower, yielding 65,100 piculs of sugar, with 23,696.40 piculs marked for export. The Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme, the Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the Mirasols' attorney-in-fact to negotiate and to sell the latter's sugar in both domestic and export markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. Exercising his law-making powers under Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree 579 in November, 1974. The decree authorized the Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export to the United States and to other foreign markets. The price and quantity was determined by the Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of Trade and Industry, and finally, by the Office of the President. The decree further authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. Finally, the decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national government, after commissions, overhead expenses and liabilities had been deducted. The

government offices and entities tasked by existing laws and administrative regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the purchase price of export sugar in crop years 1973-1974 and 19741975 at P180.00 per picul. PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols for crop years 1975-1976 and 19761977. These crop loans and similar obligations were secured by real estate mortgages over several properties of the Mirasols and chattel mortgages over standing crops. Believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough to pay their obligations, the Mirasols asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar. PNB ignored the request. Meanwhile, the Mirasols continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their current accounts with said bank. PNB then asked Mirasols to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result of these demands for payment, the Mirasols on 4 August 1977, conveyed to PNB real properties valued at P1,410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid overdrawn account of P1,513,347.78. On 10 August 1982, the balance of outstanding sugar crop and other loans owed by the Mirasols to PNB stood at P15,964,252.93. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle said due and demandable accounts. PNB then proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. After applying the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged realties, PNB still had a deficiency claim of P12,551,252.93. The Mirasols continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar for crop years 19731974 and 1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations with the bank. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under PD 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes. On 9 August 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for

accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Civil Case 14725). On 16 June 1987, the complaint was amended to implead PHILEX as party-defendant. After trial on the merits, the trial court decided in favor of the Mirasols (1) declaring PD 579 and all circulars, as well as policies, orders and other issuances issued in furtherance thereof, unconstitutional and therefore, NULL and VOID being in gross violation of the Bill of Rights; (2) Ordering PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the whole amount corresponding to the residue of the unliquidated actual cost price of 25,662 piculs in export sugar for crop year 1973-1974 at an average price of P300.00 per picul, deducting therefrom however, the amount of P180.00 already paid in advance plus the allowable deductions in service fees and other charges; (3) and also, for PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the whole amount corresponding to the unpaid actual price of 14,596 piculs of export sugar for crop year 1974-1975 at an average rate of P214.14 per picul minus however, the sum of P180.00 per picul already paid by PNB and PHILEX in advance and the allowable deduction in service fees and other charges; and (4) directing PNB and PHILEX to pay, jointly and severally, the Mirasols the sum of P50,000.00 in moral damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the litigation. The same was, however, modified by a Resolution of the trial court dated 14 May 1992, which adding the following paragraph: "This decision should however, be interpreted without prejudice to whatever benefits that may have accrued in favor of the plaintiffs with the passage and approval of Republic Act 7202 otherwise known as the 'Sugar Restitution Law,' authorizing the restitution of losses suffered by the plaintiffs from Crop year 1974-1975 to Crop year 1984-1985 occasioned by the actuations of government-owned and controlled agencies." The Mirasols then filed an appeal with the appellate court (CA-GR CV 38607), faulting the trial court for not nullifying the dacion en pago and the

mortgage contracts, as well as the foreclosure of their mortgaged properties, and the trial court's failure to award them the full money claims and damages sought from both PNB and PHILEX. On 22 July 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court (1) declaring the dacion en pago and the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties valid; (2) ordering the PNB to render an accounting of the sugar account of the Mirasol[s] specifically stating the indebtedness of the latter to the former and the proceeds of Mirasols' 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 sugar production sold pursuant to and in accordance with PD 579 and the issuances therefrom; (3) ordering the PNB to recompute in accordance with RA 7202 Mirasols' indebtedness to it crediting to the latter payments already made as well as the auction price of their foreclosed real estate and stipulated value of their properties ceded to PNB in the dacion en pago; and (4) whatever the result of the recomputation of Mirasols' account, the outstanding balance or the excess payment shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of RA 7202. On 28 August 1996, the Mirasols moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied on 23 January 1997. The Mirasols filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court. Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. Furthermore, BP 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or treaties with the Constitution. However, Rule 64, Section 3 (Notice to Solicitor

General) of the Rules of Court provides that "in any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question." The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. The mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. Herein, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case 14725. Nor did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file any pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned presidential decrees.