Survive, Reproduce, and be Moral: Foot and Casebeers Naturalized Ethics Show that Evolutionary Ends are Compatible

with Morality

A thesis presented to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts

Alexa Kovachevich

Advised by Erik Wielenberg

DePauw University May 2012

Kovachevich 1 Philippa Foot and William Casebeer believe Hume and Moore were wrong: ethical facts do not belong to a mysterious and unrelated category separate from other facts; instead, Foot and Casebeer believe moral facts simply are natural facts. In Natural Goodness, Foot closes the supposed gap between our individual moral judgments and the grounds we have for those judgments, arguing against antirealist subjectivist positions that view moral facts as actionguiding, and different from natural facts (Foot 9). She believes knowing we have a reason to do something is reason enough for action, and that the things we have reason to do are objectively grounded in how our life-form operates. In Natural Ethical Facts, Casebeer argues that all our beliefs are revisable in light of experience; there are no analytic truths for values to be reduced to. Thus, he also closes the gap that makes facts about value different from other kinds of facts. Casebeer imagines that uniting the natural with the normative will enrich both our understanding of moral theory and biological science. While Foot and Casebeer have slightly different goals in mind, they both believe that we enhance our understanding of morality when we view moral facts as natural facts. Uniting the moral and the natural is often thought to be problematic because our commonplace ethical values seem to clash with a biological view of human nature. Evolution by natural selection is considered an unforgiving process that pushes individuals into ruthless competition with each other. Selfishness and acting only for ones own benefit are hallmark attributes that natural selection is thought to ascribe to the human character. The worry is something like How could a moral system be established with organisms whose only goal is getting as many copies of their genes into the next generation as possible? A system of morality based on selfish egoists does not seem like a moral theory at all. Thus both Foot and Casebeer struggle to create a system of value that is not based on only evolutionary ends such as gene

Kovachevich 2 propagation. Foots strategy is to deny an evolutionary story and instead establish morality as an essential characteristic, or norm, of a good human life. Being moral is part of what it is to be human and live well as a human being, she argues. While Foot avoids tying her norms to evolutionary ends, she is not able to show that the norms she views as essential are connected to anything but arbitrary statistical averages of how species actually exist. Casebeer is able to avoid Foots pitfall and establish an account where many functions make up a properly functioning human. His functions are neither subjective nor based on pure evolutionary ends. However, his view prescribes that how we should be, that is, the functions that we should have, relate very specifically to our recent evolutionary ancestors. Because our modern moral values do not always coincide with our evolutionary ancestors, Casebeers view is flawed. I believe if evolutionary ends are understood in the proper way, it is not necessary to avoid them. Uniting ethics and evolution looks a lot less scary when we realize acts deemed as biologically selfinterested are not always psychologically self-interested. I argue that we can use evolutionary ends such as survival and reproduction to form a moral system that looks much like the one we have now.

Updating Aristotle Aristotles virtue theory, which he outlines in the Nicomachean Ethics, provides the basis for Foot and Casebeers views. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle sets out to determine what the good consists of, what our actions should aim for. He calls this good eudaimonia and conceives of it as human happiness, flourishing, or the state that characterizes the well-lived life (Crisp xiii). Aristotle believes we may understand eudaimonia if we know the characteristic function of human beings. Just as the goodness of a flute player can be assessed because he has

Kovachevich 3 the characteristic activity of playing the flute, the goodness of a human can be described in relation to the characteristic activity of humans (NE 1.7 1097b27-31). Aristotle argues that the human function is to reason (NE 1.7 1098a3-4). Thus, to reach eudaimonia we must reason well, and reasoning well consists of reasoning in accordance with virtue1 (NE 1.7 1098a21-22). Rational reasoning lines up with virtuous reasoning; a good life for a human, therefore, is a life of activity guided by virtuous reasoning. Foot and Casebeer update these concepts in order to argue that being virtuous is part of what it is to be human or to function properly. Specifically, they utilize the ideas that humans have a characteristic activity, that reasoning well results in virtuous action, and the concept of flourishing. Rather than a single defining function, Foot believes all organisms have natural norms that relate to the life-form of their species and dictate how that organism should be. To be a good organism of that species or life-form is to act in line with the natural norms of your lifeform. Humans have particular norms, one of them being that they should be practically rational. Similar to Aristotles conception of reasoning, part of being practically rational is living virtuously. Thus, acting virtuously is part of what it is to live a good human life, and lack of virtue is a human deficiency. Casebeer believes the ultimate good or eudaimonia is the proper functioning of an organism. What it means to function properly is determined by a soft essentialist concept of human nature, which is similar to Aristotles idea of a characteristic activity. Being virtuous, including knowing how to act virtuously in different situations is part of what it is to function properly. Therefore, Casebeer also argues acting morally is part of what is it to function well as a human being. Foot and Casebeer reach a similar conclusionpart of what it is to be the organisms we are is to act virtuously. However, their theories differ in how they
1

Living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia, but virtuous reasoning is not all eudaimonia is. Aristotle believes one must have certain external goods as well.

Kovachevich 4 conceive of what our human essence or function is: where Foot conceives of natural norms, Casebeer discusses proper function as relating to our recent evolutionary history.

Foots Natural Norms Foots view grounds morality in natural evaluations. She believes that moral judgments are another category of evaluations just like aesthetic or practical assessments, except that moral judgments happen to deal with human behavior (Foot 3). Rather than moral goodness being some overarching universal ideal, Foot believes that we should assess human moral goodness like we would the goodness of a birds beak or dogs bark. She sees symmetry in the basic logical structure between the judgments we make of animals and their characteristics and judgments of human action (27). This symmetry in evaluation stems from Foots idea that a certain form of intrinsic value, which she calls natural goodness, exists in all living things. Natural goodness exists outside of the value that humans ascribe to things (e.g. we value things that are useful), as Foot explains: [F]eatures of plants and animals have what one might call an autonomous, intrinsic, or as I shall say natural goodness (26). Natural goodness depends not on any human perspective but on the relation of an individual organism to the species, or life form to which they belong (27). Foot believes the natural goodness of living things corresponds to certain set of natural norms that an organism of that type should have. Her idea stems from the work of Michael Thompson, who argues that describing something as a living thing, e.g. identifying an organism by saying that is a rabbit implicitly places the organism within its life form (28). By saying that it is a rabbit, we are positing certain norms that an organism must meet if it is to be a rabbit, e.g. that rabbit can hop, and we use these norms to judge if it is a good representation of a

Kovachevich 5 rabbit (28). Thompson believes that by placing an organism within the context of its life form, we are really making a normative statement comparing the individual to a set of norms or characteristics that it should have, e.g. that rabbit should hop (30). Thompsons idea is similar to Aristotles concept of beings that have characteristic activities, although Thompson sees organisms having many activities and attributes rather than one single function (30). Like Aristotles idea that the goodness of a flute player can be judged by how well he plays the flute, Thompson argues that the goodness or defectiveness of certain organisms can be evaluated by how they live up to the natural norms of their life form (30). In her own account, Foot imagines that natural norms work nearly how Thompson describes; however, she adds to Thompsons view the consideration that an organisms natural norms may change over time (29). An organisms norms have a relative stability that corresponds to the organisms habitat at a particular time. She describes the norms as stillsfrom the moving picture of the evolution of species and updates Aristotles view of organisms as fixed, which Thompsons ideas are based on (29). Foot also believes that for a norm to be a natural norm it must be more specific than merely consisting of any thing that is a part of the life form of the organism (30). The behaviors and attributes that establish what it is to be a certain life form relate to an organisms life cycle; for example, they may relate to its reproduction and self-maintenance (31). Foot thus believes that behaviors and attributes that can be seen as playing a part in the life of a living thing are the behaviors and attributes that establish how the life form should act, or its norms (30). Foot describes natural norms, saying: The way an individual should be is determined by what is needed for development, self-maintenance and reproduction (33). Natural norms, therefore, are not just how an organism lives, but how an organism lives when those behaviors and attributes

Kovachevich 6 are related to essential features of the organism, such as its development, self-maintenance, and reproduction. Foot explains using birds: a peacocks bright tail, due to its function in the selfmaintenance and reproduction of the peacock, creates a natural norm; peacocks ought to have bright tails for survival and reproduction. However, a random blue spot on the head of a blue tit, which does not affect its life, does not establish a norm (30). Since the peacocks characteristic tail affects its survival and reproduction, we can say that a peacock with a dull tail is defective, whereas a blue tit with a blue spot (although other blue tits do not have this spot) is not defective as the spot does not play a part in the life of the blue tit (30). It is not just the fact that most peacocks have brightly colored tails that make the tail a natural norm for peacocks, but the fact that peacocks need bright tails for self-maintenance and reproduction (33). Foot makes it clear that she does not believe her norms serve as end goals for the organisms (31). Because a peacock should have a bright tail for survival and reproduction, that does not mean its purpose is to have a bright tail for survival and reproduction. Organisms norms are not their ends. With her natural norms Foot only aims to point out behaviors and attributes that organisms, like peacocks, have that are essential to how they live. By attributing a biological element to norms, she wants clarify that she is not saying that organisms should act in a way that gives them the greatest opportunity to replicate their genes (32). The behaviors and attributes that natural norms describe have to relate to what an organism does in its life cycle, but it is not as if the organism should act only in a way that allows it to replicate its genes (32). Foot maintains that the same patterns of natural normativity found in animals and other living organisms are also found in humans (38). She believes that the same goodness attributed to other living organisms can be attributed to humans: [T]here is no change in the meaning of good between the word as it appears in good roots and as it appears in good dispositions of

Kovachevich 7 the human will (39). While she admits that goodness will be more complicated for humans because survival is something more complex for us, she believes that it is still possible to come up with a general account of human natural norms (43). By starting with the concept of human deprivation, Foot believes that we can come up with the necessities of human natural goodness, such as needing the mental capacity for language, or needing the power of an imagination (43). Without these things humans would survive, but would not have all the natural goods that humans should have; in other words, without these capacities we would be deprived (43). Part of human natural goodness is living cooperatively (44). Thus, Foot believes that in order to not be defective, we must play our part in society just like other animals do: As some species of animals need a lookout, or as herds of elephants need an old she-elephant to lead them to a watering hole, so human societies need leaders, explorers, and artists. Failure to perform a special role can here be a defect in a man or woman (44). Along the same lines, Foot argues that natural goodness for humans involves needing love and friendship, and also needing codes of conduct (44). Foot, therefore, believes needing a system of morality for development, selfmaintenance, reproduction, etc. of human beings is a norm for humans. Part of the human life form, and a part which affects our life cycle, is our ability to behave in a certain way, such as refraining from murder (52). Thus, Foot views moral behavior as an essential part of what it is to be a member of the human life form. Furthermore, Foot believes we would care about being moral because we are rational creatures (56). Like Aristotle, Foot believes what separates humans from other animals is our ability to reason (52). As rational creatures we not only have the ability to know that we should do something, but we are able to see why we should perform one action over another (56). Unlike other animals, we can see the good and choose the good knowing that it is good (56).

Kovachevich 8 Foot believes that human rationality is best understood as practical rationality, because it is constrained by how our life form operates (62). What is rational for us to do aligns with human natural goodness. Thus, being practically rational is both part of what it is to be human, and everything that is naturally good for a human to do is also practically rational (63). Since being virtuous is a natural human good, it is also part of our practical rationality to act virtuously (63). Acting morally is both part of what it is to be human and, since we are rational, knowing that acting morally is part of what it is to be a human, is what motivates us to act rationally (62). In Foots view we should be motivated to act virtuously because we realize it will allow us to live good human lives that are not deprived.

Casebeer and Proper Functioning Casebeers view unites Aristotles virtue theory with modern biological science. Casebeer interprets the human aim, or eudaimonia, to be proper functioning (Casebeer 43). He imagines that we have many interworking parts that contribute to our overall state of proper functioning. If all our parts are working, then we are functioning properly as an organism (50). Our different parts, or separate functions, that make up our overall state of proper functioning include our eyes seeing well, our heart pumping blood properly, and acting with the correct moral virtues. Casebeer, therefore, establishes a purely naturalistic account of morality where the correct moral virtues to possess and act in accordance with relate entirely to those that will allow us to function properly (113). Cooperating well with others is just like our heart pumping blood well; they both are part of proper functioning, which puts moral virtues on the same level as working organs.

Kovachevich 9 What it means to function properly, in a holistic sense, as a human being relates all of our individual functions to their recent evolutionary history (52). Quoting Peter Godfrey-Smith, who influenced his theory, Casebeer notes that the successful operation of individual functions is based off how the function worked when it was selected for in the evolutionary timeline: [F]unctions are dispositions and powers which explain the recent maintenance of a trait in a selective context (52). Thus, in order to flourish, or function properly as a human, all of our individual functions should be working in accordance to how they would have when our recent human ancestors evolved. While Casebeer relates our individual functions to a larger evolutionary timeline, he makes clear that this relation does not entail that individual functions should be defined by their working toward a purely evolutionary end, such as gene propagation (51). He does not equate proper human functioning to merely reproducing because he has a richer conception of what it means for a human to function well (66). Instead, he adopts an approach to function that defines our functions in an intermediate space, in between pure end goals and immediate or proximate functions (52). The basic structure of Casebeers approach comes from Larry Wrights etiological approach to function. Wrights idea relates a things functions to its realization of that function: if Xs function is Z, e.g. the function of scissors is to cut, then X is there because it does Z, or scissors exist to cut (49-50). Casebeer adds an evolutionary element to this concept of function. In Casebeers evolutionary etiological approach, the function of X is to Z just in case X contributes to survival and reproduction by doing Z, e.g. the hearts function is to pump blood because that is what the heart does to contribute to survival and reproduction. Casebeer believes this evolutionary etiological conception of function has more explanatory power than the end, or distal account, as well as an immediate proximate account. Distal functions only leave us with

Kovachevich 10 the concept that our ultimate function is to reproduce, and in an immediate view of functions the function of something can be whatever you want it to be (52). Casebeer uses human eyes as an example: while eyes may contribute to reproduction, their etiological function is to see and act as light receptors (52). Thus, Casebeer situates the functions of our individual parts (which make up our holistic proper functioning) so that they relate to survival and reproduction, but are not defined just by how they contribute to survival and reproductionthey encompass more than distal ends. In other words, the parts that comprise us function in a way that is not exclusively related to our gene propagation. In order to understand the etiological functions in relation to our holistic proper functioning, that is, in order to understand how our eyes should see, or how we should interact with others, we must look to our recent evolutionary history. Since these parts make up proper functioning as a whole, and since proper functioning relates to our recent evolutionary history, we must look to the recent past to evaluate our individual functions. Our eyes function is to see, and seeing well relates to how Homo sapiens saw when we evolved (141). Another example may be that our function is live with others, and living well with others relates to how we lived in small groups when we were evolving. Casebeer provides an example of a man named John to illustrate his idea of proper functioning: because of his job, John moves every few years to a different state; he must decide if he should spend his time making many shallow friends, or if he should try to make a few close friends that will remain his friends despite relocation (141). According to Casebeer, in order to solve this dilemma about what John should do, we must look at what will allow John to function properly, as Casebeer describes, [W]e would establish the modern-history function of some biological and mental capacities that mediate sociability (141). One of our individual functions relates to friendships and being social, and how we acted in our

Kovachevich 11 recent past shows how John should answer his friendship dilemma. Casebeer notes evidence from archaeology and evolutionary psychology that points to the fact that in our recent past, we were in contact with a small group of close relatives and kin (141). Thus, we had a small social world, which probably enabled us to develop deep friendships (141). Due to this fact, our function will be best fulfilled by a few deep relationships, and John should focus on a smaller number of deep relationships rather than many shallow ones (141). Casebeers conception of how we should be, or what our proper function is, is structured but not completely fixed. Thus he allows that John may be the type of person who does not need extremely deep interactions. Casebeer works with what he calls a soft-essentialist view of human nature (151). He does not believe there is only one way humans are meant to be, but does believe that the functions we should have are constrained by how we evolved (140). Casebeer explains that our essential nature will constrain the space of possible functions so that there is only so much variation that can possibly occur (47). He imagines that the majority of humans would have functions that were quite similar: [M]odern-history proper functions for human beings as a group may overlap dramatically among conspecifics butnot be exactly the same across all members of our species (151). Casebeer admits that his theory allows for some variation in what it means to function properly among human beings, but argues that the variability will not be radical or widespread (153). Our evolutionary history will confine the variation of what it is to function as a human being. Thus, John most likely needs a significant friend, if not several deep relationships. Because his view of human nature is so closely linked with evolution, Casebeer provides a way that his system of natural ethics is not entirely egoistic. Casebeer argues that most of our functions are only fulfilled by working closely with others (60). Casebeer explains that because

Kovachevich 12 of how we evolved, part of being human is working with others in order to function well: [W]e maximize our own well-functioning by entering into relationships wherein we help them function well (60). Casebeer believes doing what is best for you will also be best for others. To illustrate his point, he describes a dilemma where you can either buy a journal or help a homeless man. Casebeer explains that you cannot ignore the homeless man because ignoring him damages your ability to function properly holistically, specifically your ability to feel empathy and enter into relationships with others (63-64). Following this same line of thought, this does not mean you should give the man everything you own, as that will not allow you to function properly either. The correct response is somewhere in between and will allow you to function properly and help the homeless man, which, in turn, will allow him to function properly (64). Casebeer supplements his evolutionary concept of functions with a connectionist approach to our cognition and how we form moral judgments (74). Casebeer argues that a completely biological concept of judgment is possible if we take the connectionist approach because judgment turns out to be the ability to interact well with the demands of the environment (74). Judging involves making normative comparisons, and by interacting with our environment, we learn and are able to modify how we judge (82). We strengthen different connections in our brains as we interact with the environment (84). Casebeer argues that learning and judging are one and the same: [T]o learn is just to modify the process by which you judge (82). Because we have this ability to learn and we live in an environment that makes demands on us, through repeated encounters with our environment, we are able to test different judgments and learn what works best (85). While our environment constrains the possible judgments we can make, we are robust moral agents with rich modeling systems for moral judgments, and thus we are able to explore the available space our judgments may take (92-93). Casebeer views moral theories as

Kovachevich 13 tools that we test out and evaluate in relation to how well they allow us to function properly (138-39). He gives the example of lying, noting that if there ever was a case where lying enhanced proper functioning, then lying would be part of human proper functioning (136). Casebeer sees white lies, which are commonly viewed as morally permissible, as an example of such a situation (136). Thus, Casebeer establishes our moral skills as completely in tune with and modified by what defines our proper functioning (113). Our virtues and moral skills are produced in the same way as the skills we use to find food; they are completely based in our natural world.

Benefits of a Naturalized Ethics Grounding ethics in the natural using an Aristotelian backdrop, as Foot and Casebeer do, is especially appealing because if these theories work, they solve some long-discussed problems in ethics. The simple idea that moral facts are natural facts has great explanatory power to argue against anti-realist positions such as J. L. Mackies Argument from Relativity, and the Argument from Queerness. Most interestingly, claiming realism about morality through naturalizing Aristotelian virtue theory allows both Foot and Casebeer to establish objective moral values that are relative in how they relate to changes in the environment. Unlike other ethical theories, grounding value in the natural allows for variation in moral values and objectivity. In addition, if Foots argument succeeds, it would be particularly successful in defining a clear motivation for acting virtuously, which is often problematic for character-based virtue theories. If Casebeer succeeds, his theory would effectively unify the often-thought amoral biological sciences with ethics and provide a more coherent view of both ethics and science.

Kovachevich 14 In Mackies Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, he proposes two noteworthy challenges to objective morality: relativity and queerness. On the basis of these arguments Mackie believes that ethics must be invented; however, Foot and Casebeers theories provide a way out, allowing for relativity and dispelling queerness. The argument from relativity presents widespread moral disagreement as a major problem for moral realism. Mackie argues that the extent of the disagreement is best explained by peoples adherence to and participation in different ways of life (Mackie 36). Rather than viewing the disagreement as stemming from extensive misinterpretation of objective values, the more plausible explanation, Mackie thinks, is that objective values do not really exist; people just live in different ways (37). In Mackies second argument, the argument from queerness, he argues that if objective moral facts existed, they would be unlike anything else we know: If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe (38). Mackie believes that this queerness stems from the fact that when value is assigned to some property, that property has a special to-be-pursuedness built into it: [S]omethings being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it, (40). Mackie explains that objective morals, if they existed, would have a selfmotivating property as part of their essence, which would make them radically different, and metaphysically queer. If the facts are unlike anything we know, then they are also epistemologically queer, and we would need a special faculty in order to know about them. However, we have no special faculty, and, therefore, Mackie concludes that knowledge of objective morals is unattainable. Both Foot and Casebeers theories handle relativity in a unique way as they allow that some relativity may exist even though morality is objective. Casebeer notes that different

Kovachevich 15 environments place different demands on organisms (Casebeer 40). Because he views morals as functions that fulfill proper function, and proper function relates to how we evolved, it follows that the subtly different environments we live in would have created slightly different notions of proper function (Casebeer 153). Thus, depending on the particular environment, we will have to use different functional virtues to best flourish in that specific environment (Casebeer 47). While there will be room for variation, the functions will remain objective because they have to do with the organisms relation to the environment rather than what the organism wants to do. The variation stems from how the organism best interacts with its environment, which is not subjective, but rather is defined by Casebeers objective etiological approach to function, or how our recent ancestors lived (40). Furthermore, Casebeer believes that the variation will not be so radical as to destroy the possibility of a shared moral system. He believes that most of our functions will overlap, at least within a species. Casebeer sees variation in proper functioning as a better explanation for variation in morality because this is what we should expect given the non-fixed nature of experience and the variability of life as lived (Casebeer 40). Because our moral functions will respond to environmental differences, our morals have the possibility to be slightly different. Foots natural norms share a similar relationship to the environment as Casebeers functions, and while Foot does not challenge Mackie directly, her sketch of natural norms provides a rebuttal to Mackies worry. When first describing the norms, Foot points out that they have a relative stability, (Foot 29). She notes that the norms are completely time sensitive: They tell how a kind of plant or animal, considered at a particular time, and in its natural habitat, develops, (Foot 29). Foot, therefore, believes that norms, including norms about morality, are relative to a particular organism at a particular time and place. However, because

Kovachevich 16 these norms relate to the life form of the individual, they are not subjectively based. She goes on to say that norms are relative to an organisms habitat: [T]he way a life form functionscomes about in a species of a certain conformation, belonging in a certain kind of habitat (Foot 33). Foot sees norms as representative of a particular instance, or snapshot, of an organism in relation to its place in time, evolutionary history, and habitat. While she never explicitly says that different norms may exist at the same time for the same life form, her commitment to the norms relativity in relation to time and habitat speaks to this idea. Furthermore, like Casebeer, it is clear that Foot believes variation would not preclude a general set of norms because, while there may be different ways to fulfill human natural goodness, Foot maintains that there are certain general things humans must have to live good human lives (40). Foot and Casebeer are also able to handle the argument from queerness because they ground ethics in natural facts. Casebeer views moral facts as functional facts about how we should interact with our environment (48). There is no such thing as uniquely moral skills because they are learned and modified in the same way as skills about health, and skills about finding food (Casebeer 113). Moral facts are not epistemologically queer because Casebeer believes moral knowledge may be gained in a similar way to scientific knowledge (48). Repeated interactions with our environment will allow us to learn how to behave in accordance with virtue so that we may function properly (84). Morals are also not metaphysically queer in that they do not have a self-motivating property. As Casebeer explains, his functional Aristotelian approach allows motivation to stem not from the function itself, but from the environment: Functions obtain between organisms and the environment, and so the motivational aspect of a value is not to be found in the environmentbut rather within the organism (48). In other words, moral facts are not strange because they stem from the natural environment and our relation to it.

Kovachevich 17 Foot also grounds moral facts in natural facts so that they are not metaphysically queer. In her view, moral facts about how we should act correspond to natural norms, which are really just facts about how our life form operates. Foot even describes moral facts as natural facts which are not strange in any way: [T]he grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in facts about human lifein my view, therefore, a moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about [evaluations] (24). Moral facts are facts about how individuals relate to their life form, how they should live given what kind of organisms they are. Foot tackles Mackies worry that moral facts are strange because they have a motivational quality built into them with her concept of practical rationality. Humans have the ability to reason, which allows us to see what is good for us to do and choose to do what is good because it is good. Our rationality corresponds to what we should do and also motivates us do to those things, because we should want to do what it is rational for us to do (Foot 62). Our practical rationality should motivate us to act virtuously because virtuous action will allow us to live as we should, and it is rational to try to want to live this way. Thus, Foot provides a clear motivating factor for acting morally that exists outside of moral facts. In this way, Foots practical rationality seems to allow that we could know moral facts just like we know any other facts about how we should live. Just as we know that we need to eat, we can know that we need to cooperate with others. In addition to solving Mackies worries, if Foot and Casebeers theories work, they would be successful in solving some of the general problems that arise with theories of virtue ethics. Such problems Foot and Casebeer solve include providing a way to ground or justify virtues that virtue theories often lack, having the ability to deal with cultural relativity while retaining a moral system, and being able to provide a clear action-guidance even without a set of

Kovachevich 18 explicit principles2. Both views share something like the idea that we should be guided to act in way that allows us to live successfully as humans, or as Casebeer puts it, to function properly. How we are, or how our ancestors were, determines how we should be. Foots view in particular is especially successful in its ability to account for motivation to act virtuously. While many ethical theories can establish a moral code humans may have, it is another problem to describe why people would care about following such a code. With her concept of practical rationality, Foot gives humans a reason to want to act virtuouslybecause it is rational. A particular benefit of Casebeers view would be its ability to unify areas of human knowledge that are often thought to be incompatible. His view would allow us to understand ethics from a scientific perspective, and even to study morality as a science. Rather than viewing humans as immoral and selfish from a biological perspective, Casebeers view would allow us to incorporate our ethical beliefs into a scientific picture of ourselves.

Problems with the Views There are many benefits to taking an Aristotelian approach to naturalized ethics, and Casebeers and Foots theories present particularly successful versions of such an approach. However, both Foot and Casebeer run into trouble when they attempt to unite Aristotle with modern biology. Both Foot and Casebeers views rely on the Aristotelian concept that organisms have something essential or characteristic about them, which defines their function. Foot believes that organisms have a set of norms that relate to their characteristic life form, and Casebeer purports that organisms have functions that relate to how their recent ancestors lived. Each

Information about general worries for virtue theories from: Hursthouse, Rosalind. Virtue Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 8 March 2012. Stanford University. Web. 1 April 2012.

Kovachevich 19 believes that how an organism is, either in relation to its life form or recent ancestors, is how it should be. An evolutionary story allows Foots norms and Casebeers functions not be fixed in the antiquated and unrealistic way Aristotles functions are. However, bringing evolution into the mix causes problems for Casebeer and Foot. In order to incorporate evolution into an ethical framework, Casebeer and Foot attempt to deny that the functions and norms they describe, which depend on an evolutionary picture, relate to the end goals of evolution. Foots norms and Casebeers functions define how an organism should be, including what moral actions to perform. These concepts are powerful because they clearly tie the natural to the normative while allowing for differences in belief and change over time, and they gain their strength from such an evolutionary picture. An evolutionary framework also brings with it certain aspects that are thought to be immoral, including its overall aim, reproductive success. Thus, while Casebeer and Foot want to tie their norms to an evolutionary picture, they also want to deny that their norms and functions share the same aim as evolution. For example, on Casebeers view there may be a human function relating to cooperating with others, so that in order to function properly, we should work with others. If this function exists purely because it helps us have reproductive success, the worry arises that an organism only cooperates out of selfish motives, and thus the moral function to cooperate is not moral at all. Evolutionary ends such as survival and reproduction are not thought of as a good starting place for morality; therefore, Casebeer and Foot both employ strategies to refrain from tying their norms only to an end such as reproductive success. Foots strategy is to omit an evolutionary explanation from her norms all together. She describes organisms essential characteristics or norms as relating to self-maintenance and reproduction, but not promoting these ends. Because it does not matter if her norms affect the outcome of the individual, in either

Kovachevich 20 its survival or reproduction, her norms are consequently arbitrarily based on statistical averages. The have no other foundation other than the way the organism currently exists. Casebeer, on the other hand, includes evolutionary goals in his theory, and is able to pick up where Foot leaves off. He believes functions will be determined by an organisms recent evolutionary history. Thus, the functions are not based on the ultimate end goals of evolution but more immediate responses to the environment. While his etiological approach to function saves him from claiming evolutionary ends, his view falters because our moral system today does not match how our recent ancestors lived, and thus our evolutionary past does not guarantee a mutualistic morality. Foots omission of an evolutionary story for her norms makes them arbitrarily based on averages, while Casebeers inclusion of an evolutionary story forces him into a system of morality that is extremely different from the ones that we actually have.

Foots Averages Foots task with her norms is to ground them objectively in the natural so that they consist of more than desires, but she must also not allow them to be trapped by evolutionary ends. Her norms must relate to something outside the individual organism, but they cannot be said to relate entirely to supporting reproductive success. Trying to meet both these requirements leaves Foots norms empty, and shows that she has no ground for them other than how organisms typically are, which is ethically insignificant. Foots norms, therefore, are problematic because they seem to be only related to averages (what organisms typically do) rather than what they actually should do. Foot is careful to relate her norms to evolution, but she makes it explicit that her norms do not support evolution only, or reproductive success only. In fact, her norms are not required to

Kovachevich 21 support the success of the organism at all. When describing natural norms, Foot carefully modifies Michael Thompsons norms to include a relation to the life cycle of the organism (Foot 30). Recall Foots blue tit example: a spot on a blue tits head does not create a natural norm because it does not relate to the birds self-maintenance or reproduction (30). In a more direct statement, Foot declares that norms are determined by their relation ends, which seem like evolutionary ends: The way an individual should be is determined by what is needed for development, self-maintenance, and reproduction (33). However, she makes it clear that pure evolutionary ends are not what she has in mind. Foot explains that by saying a peacock should use its bright tail to attract mates for reproduction, she is not subsequently saying that a peacocks purpose is to reproduce when he uses his bright tail to attract mates (31). Similarly, when a mother cares for her children, an action that directly benefits her reproductive success, we cannot say that her purpose in caring is reproductive success. Foot wants to separate the actions relation to survival and reproduction from the organisms goal in performing the action. While this is a noble goal, her norms imply that part of what it is to be a certain organism is to attempt to fulfill the norms, and part of fulfilling the norms relates to survival and reproduction. Thus, Foot ends up implying the very goal that she wishes to avoidan organism must exercise its norms for survival and reproduction. Foot creates a connection between the norm and the function the norm plays in the life of the organism. Take the peacock example that Foot uses. An extension of her example might read: Part of what it is to be a peacock is to use bright tails to attract mates. Because bright tails contribute to the self-maintenance and reproduction of peacocks, peacocks should have bright tails in order be successful peacocks. A peacock with a dull tail is defective. A good peacock has a bright tail.

Kovachevich 22 Foot is not just making an observation that peacocks have this attribute of using their tails to attract mates for reproduction. Instead, she says that peacocks need to have this property of using their tails to attract mates for reproduction. When Foot declares that peacocks need to have their tails to attract mates for reproduction, she implies support for not just the tail, but the act of using the tail in a particular way. She implies that having the tail is not the only part of the norm, but having the tail for reproduction is also part of the natural norm. If a peacock needs a tail for reproduction, then, it seems part of what it is to be a peacock is to at least try to reproduce using the tail. A similar example is that of a deer that runs fast. From Foots view, it is not true that because deer tend to be able to run fast, that they should run fast. Foot believes that it is the fact that deer need to be fast for survival that means they should run fast. Thus, part of what it is to be a deer is to run fast for survival, or at least to try. Foots norms are more than just descriptions of behaviors and characteristics that relate to an organisms life form. Although she tries to stay away from the connection, her norms create expectations about how an organism should behave to support its survival and reproduction. Without intending to, Foot attaches survival and reproduction to her norms. Because she also declares that the success of an organism in survival and reproduction is unimportant, her norms have no foundation. She explicitly denies the thing her norms are based on, and, therefore, the only other explanation is that they are based arbitrarily on statistical averages of the characteristics that the majority of organisms have. In chapter three Foot declares that the success of the organism does not matter to the norms. She says that the deer does not have to survive for it to count as good. For example, it could be shot by a hunter while running away. As long as it is running quickly, it still counts as a good deer (42). In order to be a good deer, its success does not matter; it only has to have been a fast deer in relation to the deer life form. She

Kovachevich 23 further explains that the deer does not have to have use its speed; as long as it was potentially fast, it was still a good deer (42). Foot believes that the outcome of the behavior makes no difference to the evaluation. Foot has created a contradiction. She claims that the results of an organisms action do not matter, but maintains that in order for an organism to be a good organism, it is not enough for it to merely have a particular attributeit must use that attribute for a certain goal. Her reasoning comes out with an illustrative example: at one point she says it is not enough for the peacock to merely possess a bright tail, but he should posses a tail for survival and reproduction. Later she claims that it does not matter if the peacock uses its tail for survival and reproduction; the organism only has to have had it for survival and reproduction. If the peacock only needs to possess the tail and not use it, it seems that any characteristic could act as a norm. Anything that relates to an organisms survival and reproduction may be thought of as a norm. Thus, is unclear where norms get their objectivity from in Foots view. For example, why is quickness in deer a norm while using camouflage is not? Consider a slow deer. This deer would be defective according to Foots natural norms. Now, even if the deer were able to use a different technique for survivalsay it learned to camouflage itself by rolling in the mudand it lived the same amount of time as a good deer, it would still count as a defective deer. The camouflage behavior is certainly a behavior that effects the deers survival; in fact, it supports the deers survival just as the quickness did. Now it seems the only reason this would be a defective deer is that it does things unlike the majority of other deer. Foots norms then were never based on anything more than averages, or what the majority does. Her mistake is in implicitly connecting the norms to an end goal but then explicitly denying one. In implicitly connecting the norms to survival or reproduction, she guarantees that

Kovachevich 24 the norms are related to a larger matter. However, because she tries to argue that success does not matter, she contradicts herself. If success does not matter, why does it matter that organisms do certain things in certain ways? If surviving successfully does not matter, why must the deer be a fast deer (if his quickness is a function of his survival)? The only answer Foot can give is that most deer are fast; however, this fact is based on statistical average and is ethically irrelevant. This same flaw is present in Foots treatment of human norms. For example, a human norm may be that humans should be omnivores for survival. Eating both plants and other animals is crucial to our survival as there are certain proteins we get from meat. Being an omnivore in order to get the proper nutrients to survive is part of what a human is, one could say, just as having a bright tail for reproduction is part of what it is to be a peacock. Nevertheless, some humans make the choice not to eat meat. Foot has to say that these humans are defective humans. Even if vegetarians get the same nutrition from supplements as meat eaters do from meat, vegetarians are defective humans, since being an omnivore is part of what a human is, what a human ought to be. All this shows again is that Foots natural norms are based on what the majority does, or what is average. Practical rationality comes into play when dealing with humans in Foots view, and must be taken into account in the vegetarian example, as it complicates the picture I just drew. Foot might object that vegetarians act against practical rationality. Being rational is what separates humans from other animals Foot explains, because we can see something is good and choose it knowing it is good (55). We can do something and understand why we are doing it. Our rationality is constrained by our natural norms, such as needing to eat meat. Since we know we should eat meat, that knowledge should give us motivation to eat meat. However, it is difficult to claim that in this case humans are acting against practical rationality even if there is a natural

Kovachevich 25 norm related to eating meat. Because we have practical rationality, we can create our own evaluations, as Brook Sadler points out in her review of Foots Natural Goodness. Because humans are practically rational, we are both the evaluators of our norms and the ones being evaluated (Sadler 3). Sadler believes this allows us to choose what to value. Her example addresses the deaf. That humans should hear to help them survive and reproduce may be a natural norm for human, as humans need to hear in order to live lives that are not deprived. Sadler resists this idea. For humans, she says, there is no general account of norms that can be provided. There is no such thing as a set of species-given norms for humans (Sadler 7). Sadler argues that we create the norms; we are not created or restricted by them. Thus, humans can value not-hearing, for example. Sadler notes the existence of a debate in the deaf community about whether or not to use hearing aids to fix or correct hearing to support this view. Additionally, Sadler argues that nothing will be a universal defect: Humans are so remarkably resilient, capable of valuing so many different ways of living, that most alleged defects will be found by some to be rich (Sadler 8). Sadler hits on an important point from the beginning of Foots argument. Foot begins with Thompsons idea that when we say something is an organism, we place it in a normative way within its species. Inherent in Thompsons remark is that humans are the evaluators. As Sadler says, if we are the evaluators, an implication of practical rationality is that, to a certain extent, we can value what we want to. Thus, in the end, Foot fails to provide an explanation of where natural norms come from. We are left with only statistical averages or individual choice, both of which are ethically irrelevant, and a substandard ground for objective morality. In trying to avoid attaching her norms to only evolutionary goals, while still grounding them so they are not completely subjective, Foot creates a picture where natural norms contain

Kovachevich 26 survival and reproduction. Because she will not connect norms to their success in survival and reproduction, and yet still relates them to it, Foot puts her norms in a place where they can only be attributed to statistical averages and are not morally significant.

Casebeers Recent Evolutionary History Casebeer avoids making the same mistake as Foot, noting early in the development of his theory that he needs to avoid both relating his functions purely to end evolutionary goals, as well as avoid relating them to immediate descriptions. Similar to Sadlers point that Foots view allows us to define our own norms, Casebeer notes that a proximate or immediate conception of function would allow us to make up the functions for any of our characteristics, including our moral functions. Casebeer explains that on an immediate account our concept of function would be undefined: Flippantly, we could say: Whats the function of my eye? I dont know. What do you want it to be? (Casebeer 52). This sort of view is what Casebeer avoids with his etiological approach to function. His etiological functions fall between evolutionary ends and immediate meaningless functions. The individual function of an organisms parts relates to how the part contributes to survival and reproduction, but is not defined as survival and reproduction (Casebeer 53). For example, while my ears may contribute to survival and reproduction, their function is to receive vibrations of airwaves. According to Casebeers conception of function, it is not as if my ears only end is to allow me to survive and reproduce. More generally we can speak of my ears function to hear as a very real part of what my ears do. Casebeers etiological functions legitimize the functions we commonly describe our characteristics as having. While they may have been selected because they contribute to reproduction, what these traits realize encompasses more than just reproduction, as Casebeer notes, [A]ppeals to the replication of

Kovachevich 27 genes do not do full justice to the range of functions encompassed in the biological kind Homo sapiens (66). Thus, Casebeer successfully avoids Foots problem that her norms were based on nothing ethically significant, as he grounds his view in an evolutionary functional account of what it means to function properly as human being. While Casebeers theory is initially promising, his view runs into problems when he describes particular examples. He is unable to apply his approach practically. The examples reveal that relating our proper functioning to our recent evolutionary history is problematic because the evolutionary environment of our recent ancestors is radically different from today, and our modern morals do not always align our proper functioning as defined by recent history. They also reveal that our social nature will not be enough to bridge individual egoistic moral values available from evolution with an other-regarding moral system, as Casebeer believes. Casebeers view succeeds in demonstrating how close evolution gets us to a moral system we could be satisfied with, but does not describe that system. Before describing the problems that are revealed when Casebeer applies his approach, I bring up one worry for Casebeer, which I will only mention, as it warrants a much fuller discussion that is beyond the scope of this paper. The worry is that there is something seriously wrong with Casebeers concept of evolutionary etiological functions. In an attempt to separate the evolutionary ends from what it means to function properly, Casebeer imagines we have individual functions that relate to survival and reproduction but that encompass more than just survival and reproduction. The eye example illustrates this point. While eyes may contribute to survival and reproduction, their function is to see. On a commonsense view of function, it makes sense to say the function of our eyes is to see. However, biologically speaking, our ability to see stems from the contribution sight makes to gene propagation. There is a sense in which our eyes

Kovachevich 28 function is to see; however, this function stems from survival and reproduction in the end. Casebeer does not think it is useful to focus on the end function; I argue, though, that the end function is the one actual function of eyesto see for survival and reproduction. To say the eyes function is to see is to leave off the reason they see. While it is not irrational to speak like this, this thinking just disregards part of the explanation. Casebeers argument for leaving off end functions is that it is not very fruitful or useful, and would be a bad analysis of any particular character-driven function (52). This reasoning does not constitute a good argument for why we should ignore end functions other than that the etiological concept of function allows Casebeers moral theory to work. The debate about function is complicated, and although I suspect etiological functions may collapse into functions about reproduction, I admit in some sense it does seem that we really have these intermediate etiological functions. Although a full-fledged discussion of proper function remains beyond the scope of this work, if our only true biological function is gene propagation, it will be problematic for Casebeers view. Later I will argue that survival and reproduction, if understood in the proper way, will get us close to a moral theory we could accept. Nevertheless, independent of the debate about proper function, other problems remain for Casebeers view. The first major problem with Casebeers view is that he relates proper functioning to our recent evolutionary ancestors but does not take into account that our modern moral system requires different behavior than how proper function would have us behave. In Casebeers view, how we should function properly as human beings is defined by how our recent evolutionary ancestors lived, and what individual functions they had (Casebeer 52). Recall Casebeers example of John, the man who moves around constantly for work and must decide whether to cultivate a few long-term relationships or many shallow ones (141). To answer this

Kovachevich 29 dilemma Casebeer looks to our recent evolutionary history. Citing evidence from evolutionary psychology, Casebeer makes a case for the limited deep connections as our recent ancestors lived in relatively small groups (141). Casebeer even goes so far as to provide other ways John can work to function well in relation to his recent history, including select a mate who is similar to you as to reduce jealously and infidelity (142). These concepts are based off psychologist David Busss concept of evolutionary mismatch. Our modern environment is different from the one Homo sapiens evolved in, and thus we find ourselves not entirely equipped to handle certain modern situations. In the specific example Casebeer chooses, that of friendship, what we think John ought to do today matches up to what John should do to function properly as our ancestors did, but this is not always the case. One great evolutionary mismatch we deal with daily is the increased size of our in-group. In our recent past we knew very few people in comparison to the numbers we encounter each week today. We evolved to help those in our in-group, but today our in-group may include thousands. Unlike the friendship case, our modern moral system does not dictate the same behaviors that our recent ancestors would tell us to adopt. If we only helped those in our small in-groups consisting of close relatives, it would be difficult to find help getting directions in a large city. For a more specific example, think about what our modern moral obligation would say if we were standing on subway platform and saw a baby fall onto the tracks. Despite the danger, and despite the fact that the baby is not in your in-group and you may never see it again, we would typically think it is morally right to try to save the baby if you can. In a modern history approach to this case, on the other hand, there would be absolutely no moral obligation to try to save the baby. Hostility toward out-group members is the environment we evolved in. Therefore, an implication of Casebeers view, which relates proper function to our recent ancestors, is that we should only care about our small, familial in-group. Conclusions such

Kovachevich 30 as this show that Casebeers attempts to describe proper functioning as how we evolved are misguided. Casebeer critic Richard Joyce takes his critique of Casebeers proper functioning even further, noting that Casebeers conception of proper function is devoid of value. Casebeer attempts to unite functions like pumping blood with functions like promise-keeping, seeing them as one and the same, contributing to proper functioning. Joyce believes the way Casebeer conceives of function makes it valueless (Joyce 171). Saying some heart is a good heart, Joyce believes, is the same as saying an assassin is a good assassinit has to do with how the function is fulfilled, but is not moral. The heart must pump blood whether it wants to or not, and cannot be reprimanded for its failure to pump blood (171). A hammers function is to pound nails, but if it is used as a doorstop, it is not doing anything wrong (172). Similarly, our gluteus maximums evolved so that we could throw objects, but if we never throw any objects, and thus do not act in accordance with our recent evolutionary ancestors, we are not doing anything wrong, we are only failing to meet the requirements for proper functioning (172). Joyce points out that failure to exercise a modern history function does not lead to moral consequences: you are merely failing to meet your needs; you are not doing something morally wrong (172). Thus, not only does our modern environment have different moral standards from our recent ancestors, as Joyce points out, but also it is difficult to derive a moral sense from the concept of functioning properly. The other significant problem in Casebeers view is found in the way he depends on humans being social animals to account for why we would contribute to the functioning of others. Casebeers ideas are based off the principle that The acts that are best for others are also best for oneself (Casebeer 61). Casebeer imagines that in supporting your own proper functioning you will support the proper functioning of those around you. Casebeer gives the

Kovachevich 31 example of the homeless man that you may or may not choose to help. Choosing to ignore the man negatively affects your ability to function properly because it makes you less empathetic and less likely to be able to enter into deep relationships in the future (63). On the other hand, it is not part of your proper functioning that you should give the man everything you own (64). The correct response is somewhere in between. In this example, your proper functioning does line up with the proper functioning of the homeless man, but it is easy to come up with examples where individual functions clash with the functions of those around you. Consider a modified John example. Say John has the opportunity to take a new position that will allow him to stop moving around so much for work. The position that will keep him stationary is not something that he wants to do. John is much better off and happier in the old position. John also has a family that he continually has to uproot; his kids have to find new friends, etc. In this situation what would satisfy Johns proper functioning is keeping his old job; however, what would satisfy his familys proper functioning would be to take the new position. In this case what is best for John is not best for others, as Casebeer describes. Other examples like this abound, which points to the fact that individual proper function does not coincide with everyone elses proper function. Casebeers theory cannot unite individual egoistic proper function with the type of mutualistic moral system we want. In Casebeers view our proper functioning relates directly to what our evolutionary ancestors did; however, it is clear that the system of morality we could derive from this concept is not similar to the one we want. Furthermore, as Joyce argues, proper functioning relates to a failure to meet your needs, not necessarily to moral rights and wrongs. Lastly, Casebeers conception that what is good for our proper functioning is good for everyones is flawed. While

Kovachevich 32 his view may succeed in incorporating evolution, the picture of morality he creates is unsatisfactory.

Evolutionary End Goals and the Prospect for Morality In naturalizing ethics, Foot and Casebeer must decide how to incorporate evolution, which is commonly thought of as immoral or amoral, into a system of objective morality. This problem arises not only with Foot and Casebeers neo-Aristotelian theories, but exists generally for any system of realist ethics that includes evolution. Survival of the fittest is the idea most commonly associated with natural selection, and even those trained in evolutionary biology commonly speak of natural selection as a process that produces selfish organisms. Thus in order to naturalized ethics Foot and Casebeer attempt to deny that their theories relate directly to the scary end goal of evolution: gene propagation. If their moral theories somehow rested on organisms only goal being gene propagation it is difficult to see how such a system would be moral at all. However the end goal of evolution is only threatening to morality if it is misunderstood. Saying organisms have an evolutionary end does not mean the same thing as saying gene propagation is their only goal, and it also does not make gene propagation a conscious goal. Worries about the ability to incorporate evolution into ethical theories stem from a mistake of assigning value to a process that is inherently devoid of value. Evolution is actually neutral in value, and ethical worries that arise from evolution wrongly join the biological concept of selfinterest with a psychological motivation to be self-interested. If understood in the correct way, I believe the end goal of evolution in not incompatible with morality at all. While Foot and Casebeer have trouble because they try to avoid them, I believe evolutionary ends do not need to

Kovachevich 33 be avoided. A system or morality that takes into account our evolutionary ends is similar to the moral system we have today. There is no goal in evolution, but biologists tend to view organisms as gene-machines, because the process of natural selection works on genetic material in such a way that the material that is able to make the most copies of itself, is the material that is most likely to survive in the next generation. While it is not completely inaccurate to see humans as working to propagate our genes, the gene machine concept is often misunderstood and misused. Evolution by natural selection does not actually assign any value, immoral or otherwise to us. While it is commonplace to animate genes and speak of them as copying themselves or attribute properties to them like selfishness, these must only be seen as devices used to help us understand a thoroughly neutral process. Natural selection is merely a process of replication and to see this clearly I think it is most helpful to think of natural selection in its most basic form, that of the original RNA replicators that scientists theorize were at the start of natural selection. In a primordial soup of floating RNA proteins, some proteins linked together in chains. At some point a chain formed that was able to replicate itself perhaps because its parts had affinities for parts of the same type (Dawkins 15). As the soup filled with copies of the original replicator mistakes must have been made so that different version of the replicator existed (14). Replicators that held together in their chains for the longest amount of time would have grown in numbers in the soup because they would have had more time to replicate (17). Additionally, other characteristics such as frequency of replication would have allowed certain replicators to grow in numbers (17). This sort of process, where factors such as longevity and fecundity allow some replicators to be greater in number is natural selection. Stripped of context it is clear to see that it is a process of pure replication, devoid of value. A neutral process of replication is the sort of process biologists

Kovachevich 34 believes we are a part of. Thus although biologist used concepts such as selfish genes, one immediate point that I want to make is that natural selection is not valueless in some negative sort of way, it is actually devoid of value, or neutral with respect to value. Thinking of organisms as gene machines that only work to propagate their genetic material is not entirely inaccurate, however believing that this makes us immoral is totally wrong. In order for gene propagation to be seen as generating immoral creatures, it must be taken to be an organisms conscious goal, but natural selection is not something we aim for. As Dawkins says evolution is something that happens to us: although evolution may seem, in some vague sense, a good thing, especially since we are the product of it, nothing actually wants to evolve. Evolution is something that happensin spite of [us], (Dawkins 17). While we may be gene machines in a certain sense, it is not as if we want to be gene machines. Our biological goals must be separated from our psychological goals as human beings. Thus while it is not inaccurate to say that we work in a way that allows us to propagate our genetic material, it is wholly inaccurate to ascribe these biological traits to the conscious goals, desires, or moral motivations of human beings. Similarly, our status as gene machines does not make us entirely selfish, as is commonly thought. This idea also stems from the mistaken belief that evolution makes gene propagation a conscious goal. Evolution does not give us a goal, yet some argue that our actions are totally self-interested. Again, there is an important distinction to be drawn. What worries people about evolution, morally speaking, is that they think all of our actions will be psychologically selfinterested if we buy the biological picture of ourselves. However evolution does not give us psychological self-interest. Biologically we can say we are doing something that will allow our genes to be passed on, but that does not relate to why we do the thing psychologically. For

Kovachevich 35 example a mother caring for its child may be seen as biologically self-interested; the mother is literally helping to perpetuate her genes. Some see this fact about gene perpetuation as ruling out any moral aspect that may be pulled out of in the situation. For example they think we could never say that the mother is doing something morally right by taking care of a helpless child, because what she is really doing is self-interested; she is perpetuating her own genes. What I want to highlight with this example is the difference between evolutionary self-interest, and psychological self-interest. While biologically speaking the mother may be helping to pass on her genetic material this idea does not need to be the motivation she has to take care of her child. In fact it would be very strange if it was. Evolution happens to us, how it works is not automatically something we value. There is a difference here between what our biology says about us, and what we mean when we say motivation. The mother is not motivated by a psychologically self-interested goal even if she is helping her genes. There is no reason our evolutionary goal would correspond to our psychological goals, as we do not have to value the process that is working on us. Evolution will work in such a way so that our psychological motivations support our genetic success, but as this example shows evolution then will often require us to have non-selfish psychological motivations. What would benefit us evolutionarily speaking is to not to act in psychologically self-interested ways. Not being psychologically self-interested will allow us to take care of our children, which is evolutionarily beneficial. Thus instead of perpetuating self-interest, biological motivations can be seen as supporting moral psychological motivations. Confusing biological ends with psychological motivations causes evolution and ethics to seem incompatible. It is certainly fears about self-interest that keep Foot and Casebeer from attributing end evolutionary goals to their theories of norms and functions. Casebeer argues that

Kovachevich 36 thinking of functions in relation to end evolutionary goals in simply not useful: If we gravitate to the distal, super-historically laden conception of function, then the only content we can squeeze out of function is that the ultimate function is to reproduce, (Casebeer 52). Casebeer believes that if our ultimate function is to reproduce it would not allow us to have the useful character-driven functions that give us morals (52). He is correct in thinking that only if we take our only conscious function to be reproduction. We can still base our morality on a system where we have a process that pushes us to reproduce because our psychologically conscious goals differ from how this process works on us. Similarly Foot worries about self-interest invading naturalized ethics. In one section of Natural Goodness, Foot explicitly states that natural norms should not be seen as purposes: Where something that Ss do is, in this sense, purposive we should beware of slipping over into saying of an individual S that it has this purpose when it does this thing, (Foot 31). Foots worry is that by saying that peacocks have bright tails for survival and reproduction we might accidentally make the mistake of saying that the peacocks end purpose is to survive and reproduce when it uses the tail. She makes it clear that her norms rely on the life form of the species not merely what the organism does to achieve genetic success (32). Like Casebeer, Foot worries that establishing virtues as moral norms that have the end purpose of survival and reproduction will not allow us to have morality. Her assumption although is based on the idea that our end goal is our only goal and that achieving genetic success depends our psychological self-interested. I have tried to show that we can separate evolutionary self-interested form psychological self-interest, and that our genetic success actually depends on us not acting psychologically self-interested.

Kovachevich 37 Both Foot and Casebeer utilize the Aristotelian concept that there are certain beings with characteristic activities in order to argue that how we should act relates to our life form or essential character rather than our biological one. Casebeer utilizes what he calls a soft essentialist view of human nature and Foot speaks of the life-form of the organism. Both these ideas reflect the Aristotle an approach that there is some sort of ideal form we have or way we are supposed to be in order to live a good human life, or to live how humans live. This essential character, which can be amended by evolution but is not something evolution directly created allows Foot and Casebeer to establish systems of moral realism. While these concepts allow Foot and Casebeer to avoid evolutionary ends, they also create flaws in the theories. I do not think we need to rely on a characteristic activity or some essential ideal (even if that ideal is amendable by evolution, like Foot and Casebeer propose). I think we can form a system of morality from our evolutionary ends if we understand that our conscious goal will not be reproductive success and if we remember that evolution happens to us. The initial worry that uniting evolutionary ends such as survival and reproduction with ethics would not give us a moral system is not such a worry at all. I believe properly understanding end evolutionary goals shows that what is evolutionarily advantageous will often not correspond to psychologically self-motivated principles. We can get a system of morality from evolution that is not based on conscious evolutionary goals, but instead psychologically motivations that produce feelings often opposite of our biological goals. Take rape for example. Rape can be seen as evolutionarily advantageous as it allows ones genes to be based into the next generation, but it is also something we typically see as morally wrong. I hold that our evolutionary ends line up with our moral beliefs because we are social animals that live in groups, and we have repercussions for actions like rape. While it may be

Kovachevich 38 evolutionarily advantageous to rape this does not mean much to us, because it is actually disadvantageous for humans to be motivated by the idea that rape will allow us to get our genes into the next generation. Thus our lack of psychological motivation to rape, or our moral belief that it is wrong, exists because it actually is disadvantageous for us because of the sort of organisms we are and the environment we live in. If our psychological motivation corresponded directly to what was evolutionary advantageous it would land us in prison. Because no human is isolated and there are repercussions for our actions, it is actually not advantageous to be psychologically motivated by biological self-interest, and thus it is not actually advantageous for us to rape in the social context in which we live. Rape is a dramatic example, but it illustrates that a moral system based on evolutionary ends produces morals similar to those we think we have today. Some moral realists may object to the moral system I propose because in my system our psychological motivations, what we think of as morals stem from evolution. However what my view shows is that we can have a robust moral system stemming from evolution and facts about the environment that is not selfish. While our psychological motivations will often help us perpetuate our genes I do not believe it sullies our morals. In my view it actually is morally wrong to rape because as humans living in the environment we live in it is disadvantageous to rape. Our moral system exists outside of us even though it depends on evolutionary facts about us.

Conclusion Grounding moral facts in natural facts, Philippa Foot and William Casebeer update Aristotelian virtue theory. Their views successfully deal with the common moral problems of

Kovachevich 39 queerness and relativity. Foot establishes a system of moral norms about how we should live that correspond to the way our human life form is. In an effort not to tie her norms directly to reproductive success, she ends up grounding her norms only in ethically irrelevant statistical averages. Casebeers functional account of ethics that bases what we should do on our recent evolutionary ancestors succeeds in avoiding both evolutionary ends and statistical averages. However because he ties his view to our recent past, he is forced into a picture of morality that is drastically different than the one we have today. I argue that evolution is commonly misunderstood as immoral. When we view ends in their proper place, that is, not as conscious ultimate goals, we can achieve a picture of morality that is similar to the one we have today. The moral system I imagine is based on the fact that we are social creatures and that what is biologically advantageous for us to do is usually not related to psychological self-interest. More often, what is biologically advantageous is best achieved by non-self-interested psychological motives.

Kovachevich 40 Works Cited Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print. Casebeer, William D. Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003. Print. Crisp, Roger. Introduction. Nicomachean Ethics. By Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. vii xxxv. Print. Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Print. Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Print. Joyce, Richard. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006. Print. Mackie, J. L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. Print. Sadler, Brook J. Review of Natural Goodness. Animal Ethics. 5.2 (2004): 125-131. Web.

I owe a special thanks to Erik Wielenberg for serving as my advisor on this thesis. His help, including our long discussions of Foot and Casebeer, as well as the comments that he provided on earlier drafts, has been indispensible to me. I thank him for his eagerness to help and his support.