G.R. No.

L-21015

March 24, 1924

MIGUELA CARRILLO, for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of ADRIANA CARRILLO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUSTINIANO JAOJOCO and MARCOS JAOJOCO, defendants-appellees. Crispin Oben and Gibbs & McDonough for appellant. Salinas & Salinas for appellees. AVANCEA, J.: On the evening of December 9, 1918, Adriana Carrillo executed a document of sale of eleven parcels of land, with one-half of the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Ulong-Tubig, municipality of Carmona, Province of Cavite, containing an area of 330,409 square meters, in favor of Marcos Jaojoco for the price of P4,000 which the seller admitted having received. Nine days afterwards Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the Court of First Instance and later on died; and proceeding having been instituted for the administrator and settlement of her estate, her sister Miguela Carrillo was appointed judicial administratrix of said estate. In her capacity as such administratrix, Miguela Carrillo now brings this action for the annulment of said contract of sale executed by Adriana Carrillo on December 9, 1918, against Marcos Jaojoco, the purchaser, and his father Justiniano Jaojoco. The defendants were absolved from the complaint, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff has attempted to prove that prior to the year 1918 and specially in the year 1917, Adriana Carrillo performed acts which indicated that she was mentally deranged. We have made a thorough examination of the character of those acts, and believe that they do not necessarily show that Adriana Carrillo was mentally insane. The same thing can be said as to her having entered the "Hospital de San Lazaro" and the "Hospicio de San Jose," in the absence of an affirmative showing to her motive for entering said institutions, for while it is true that insane persons are confined in those institutions, yet there also enter persons who are not insane. Against the inference that from said acts the plaintiff pretends to draw, in order to assert the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo in that time, there is in the record evidence of acts while more clearly and more convincingly show that she must not have been mentally incapacitated before the execution of the document sought to be annulled in this action. In January, 1917, her husband having died, she was appointed judicial administratrix of the latter's estate, and to his end she took the oath of office, gave the proper bond discharged her functions in the same manner and with the same diligence as any other person of knowingly sound mind would have done. Documents, were introduced which show complex and numerous acts of administration performed personally by said Adriana Carrillo, such as the disposition of various and considerable amounts of money in transactions made with different persons, the correctness of said acts never having been, nor can it be, put in question. We have given special attention to the fact of Adriana Carrillo having executed contracts of lease, appeared in court in the testate proceeding in which she was administratrix, and in fact continued acting as such administratrix of the estate of her husband until August, 1917, when for the purpose of taking vacation, she requested to be relieved from the office. On November 13, 1918, Adriana Carrillo entered the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios" by reason of having had an access of cerebral hemorrhage with hemiplegia, and there she was attended by Doctor Ocampo until she left on the 18th of December of the same year very much better off although not completely cured. Asked about the mental incapacity of Adriana Carrillo during her treatment, Doctor Ocampo answered that he did not pay attention to it, but that he could affirm that the answers she gave him were responsive to the questions put to her, and that the hemiplegia did not affect her head but only one-half of the body. After leaving the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios" on December 8, 1918, Adriana Carrillo called at the office of the notary public, Mr. Ramos Salinas, and there executed the contract of sale in question on the 9th of that month. The notary, Mr. Salinas, who authorized the document, testified that on that day he has been for some time with Adriana Carrillo, waiting for one of the witnesses to the document, and he did not notice anything abnormal in her countenance, which on the contrary, appeared to him dignified, answering correctly all the questions he made to her without inconsistencies or failure of memory, for which reason, says this witness, he was surprised when afterwards he learned that the mental capacity of Adriana Carrillo was in question. It must be noted that the principal witness for the plaintiff and the most interested party in the case, being the plaintiff herself, was the surety of Adriana Carrillo when the latter was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her

husband in 1917. It cannot be understood, if Adriana Carrillo was in that time mentally incapacitated, why Miguela Carrillo, the plaintiff, who knew it, consented to be a surety for her. It must likewise be noted that the other witnesses of the plaintiff, who testified to the incapacity of Adriana Carrillo, also made transactions with her precisely at the time, when according to them, she was mentally incapacitated. In view of all of this, which is proven by documents and the testimonies of witnesses completely disinterested in the case, it cannot be held that on December 9, 1918, when Adriana Carrillo signed the document, she was mentally incapacitated. The fact that nine days after the execution of the contract, Adriana Carrillo was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract. After all, this can perfectly be explained by saying that her disease became aggravated subsequently. Our conclusion is that prior to the execution of the document in question the usual state of Adriana Carrillo was that of being mentally capable, and consequently the burden of proof that she was mentally incapacitated at a specified time is upon him who affirms said incapacity. If no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, her capacity must be presumed. Attention is also called to the disproportion between the price of the sale and the real value of the land sold. The evidence, however, rather shows that the price of P4,000 paid for the land, which contained an area of 33 hectares, represents it real value, for its is little more than P100 per hectare, which is approximately the value of other lands of the same nature in the vicinity. But even supposing that there is such a disproportion, it alone is not sufficient to justify the conclusion that Adriana Carrillo was mentally incapacitated for having made the sale under such conditions. Marcos Jaojoco is a nephew of Adriana Carrillo, and Justiniano Jaojoco her brother-in-law, and both defendants, who are father and son, had Adriana Carrillo in charge, took her to the "Hospital de San Juan de Dios," and cared for her during the time she was there, and for such acts they may have won her gratitude. Under these circumstances there is nothing illegal, or even reprehensible, and much less strange in Adriana Carrillo's having taken into account those services rendered her by the defendants and reciprocated thereof by a favorable transaction. Having no ascendants and descendents, she could, in consideration of all the these circumstances, have even given as a donation, or left by will, these lands to the defendants. The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered. Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472 March 13, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant. William J. Rohde for appellant. Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee. TRENT, J.:

The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide, in one for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs in each case. From this judgment he appealed. The two cases have been submitted to this court together. The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to the commission of the crimes. they also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that he refused into the house and saw the appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by the appellant; that there "were seven, including the small boys and girls who were cut by him;" that he did not know of any disagreement between the appellant and the two deceased; that on the morning before she was killed that the appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach." The witness further stated that the appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family his wife and child." Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin capture the appellant; that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he had felt pains in the head and the stomach;" that at the moment he was cutting those people " he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache and stomach trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he looked very sad at the time, but I saw him run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he must have been crazy because he cut me." Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant, testified that he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head is not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back he does without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say anything at all;" that when the appellant returns from work he does not say a word; and that about every other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts." The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds on her hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other." The witness stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not. There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one witness testified that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family." That witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing. Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must have been crazy because he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the word "crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.

The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse which would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant might be sufficient to cause the person to cry out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are you doing to me; you are beast," and yet such conduct could not be sufficient to show that the person was insane at the time the deeds were committed. In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for an assault with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition which would involved no guilt." The supreme court on appeal in this decision distinguished between passion and insanity as follows: But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far as to make them reckless, the fact that they have become at last too infuriated to keep them from mischief is merely the result of not applying restraint in season. There would be no safety for society if people could with impunity lash themselves into fury, and then to desperate acts of violence. That condition which springs from undisciplined and unbridled passion is clearly within legal as well as moral censure and punishment. (People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.) In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued with an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible for the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives as these.' " The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the subject of anger and emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the following concise statement: Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind. In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was convicted of the crime of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising any question as to the actual commission of the alleged acts, or the allegation that the accused committed them, confined himself to the statement, in behalf of his client, that on the night of the crime the defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind and that in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts, wounding his wife and the other members of her family, without any motives whatever. In the decision in that case this court stated: In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proven. Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal actions, we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262, 265): But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the accused is sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact. (State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and nothing more appears, this presumption, without other proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to support a conviction and as the State must prove every element of the crime charged "beyond a reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such proof. This presumption however may be

overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the accused that the criminal intent did not exist at the time the act was committed. This being exceptional is a defense, and like other defenses must be made out by the party claiming the benefit of it. "The positive existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall work a dispensation to the prisoner in the case of established homicide is a fact to be proved as it s affirmed by him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob., 506.) What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient merely to allege insanity to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to make not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the first place the presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be offered. In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus): One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequences of his insanity. The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant. Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur. Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

intimidacion yacio con Rufina Barbuco, una sordomuda de 14 anos de edad, contra la voluntad de la misma.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library En la comision del delito ha concurrido la circunstancia agravante de morada.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley. Upon that complaint the defendant was duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, was tried found guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, with the aggravating circumstance of morada, and sentenced by the Honorable Conrado Carballo, judge, to be imprisoned for a period of eighteen years of reclusion temporal, to indemnity the offended party in the amount of P1,000, to acknowledge the offspring, should there be any, and to pay the costs of the action, including those of the preliminary investigation. From that sentence the defendant appealed, and in this court contends that the lower court committed an error in holding that the accused was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The appeal presents a question of fact only.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In support of said assignment of error the attorney for the appellant in his brief filed in this court, after a preliminary statement of facts, said: "The foregoing is the result of a desperate effort to find something on the record favorable to the accused. Altho personally the writer is more or less satisfied that a wrong has been committed upon the person of the deaf and dumb girl, Rufina Barbuco, still he does not desire to substitute his own opinion to that of this Honorable Court and it is for the purpose of submitting some legal aspects of the case in behalf of the accused-appellant that the foregoing brief have been written." chanrobles virtual law library In the course of the decision of the lower court the judge made the following findings of fact:

G.R. No. L-29564 October 25, 1928 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FIDEL SASOTA, DefendantAppellant. Jesus G. Barrera for appellant. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. JOHNSON, J.: The defendant was charged with the crime of rape. It is alleged that the crime was committed upon the 9th day of November, 1926. A complaint was presented in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Dasmarinas, Province of Cavite, on the 18th day of November, 1926. The defendant was arrested and given a preliminary hearing before said justice of the peace. At the close of the preliminary hearing the justice of the peace found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged, and held him for trial in the Court of First Instance. Later the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Cavite presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance, which alleged: Que en o hacia el 9 de noviembre de 1926, en el Municipio de Dasmarias, Provincia de Cavite, Islas Filipinas, el acusado arriba nombrado, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente mediante fuerza, violencia e Son pruebas de la acusacion en esta causa que alla por el dia 9 de novimbre de 1926, Rufina Barbuco, que es una sordomuda, acompaada de su hermana Severa Barbuco, una nia de unos 6 o 7 aos de edad, se hallaban solas en su casa en Dasmarias, Cavite; que estando alli, a eso del mediodia, subio a ella el aqui acusado Fidel Sasota queien, en primer lugar, dio unas naranjas a Severa y depues a Rufina Barbuco, pero que esta no quiso aceptar al principio, pero despues a insistencias del acusado, recibio por fin y las tiro al suelo; que entonces dicho acusado la cogio, la beso, la toco los pechos y la echo al suelo, y estando asi, el acusado desabrocho su pantalon y se puso encima de Rufina para yacer con ella en esto Rufina lloraba y gritaba. En esta parte de su testimonio de Severa, al decir que su hermana Rufina grito quiso dar a entender que su hermana produjo un sonido inarticulado en la garganta igual que el que producen los que estan privados de la voz. Sigue declarando Severa diciendo que su hermana, estando debajo del acusado, pataleo y hacia seas a Severa para que le diera un bolo que la testigo noha podido encontrar; que durante todo este interregno de tiempo, acerto aescuchar por alli una tal Tasia, que viene a ser Constancia Ceilon, testigo de la defensa, y que sta dijo al acusado: "No hagas eso a la nia porque su padre se va a enfadar," pero el acusado le dijo que se callara, pues de lo contrario el le acusaria a su padre, y entonces ella se marcho; pero que despues de que el acusado hubo terminado de satisfacer sus torpes deseos, se levanto y se marcho, y Rufina, habiendo podido coger un bolo, trato de perseguir a dicho acusado Fidel, pero que no le alcanzo; que despues de llegar el padre de Rufina, esta y Severa le contaron lo que habia pasado. Severa ha demostrado al Juzgado los hechos propios de su edad, que no sabe escribir, pero el mismo candor y la misma inocencia de la nia han impresionado al Juzgado cuando relato todos los actos ejecutados por el acusado y las seas que su hermana le habia hecho, llegando hasta el extremo de establecer ella, como una cosa muy natural, de que mientras el aqui acusado yacia con su hermana Rufina, ella estaba a un metro y medio de distancia viendoles.

Establecio ademas de una manera positiva, a repreguntas del Juzgado, que cuando el acusado se levanto, tenia desabrochado el pantalon y vio el miembro viril del acusado y el vello que cubria las partes pudendas del mismo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library ... El mejor testigo de cargo en este asunto es la propia ofendida, que es una sordomuda como ha quedado demostrado ante el Juzgado. Se intento utilizar el servicio de Lutgardo Mendoza, instructor en la escuela de sordomudos de Manila, pero el hecho es que dicho instructor utilizo, para conversar con Rufina Barbuco, los signos convencionales usados ordinariamente cuando uno quiere hablar con un sordomudo. El Juzgado ha podido apreciar en todo su valor la extension y alcane tanto de las preguntas hechas a Rufina como las contestaciones dadas por ella a las mismas, habindo demostrado de una manera indubitable, grafica y palpablemente al Juzgado el atropello de que ella era objeto, dando a entendar claramente por medio de seas como Fidel Sasota, utilizando sus fuerzas, la tumbo al suelo, mintras ella pugnaba contra el mismo, y pudo introducir su miembro viril en las partes pudendas de ella, indicando ademas, por medio de sus gestos y la expresion de la caa, el dolor que le causaba el acceso, y demonstrando de una u otra manera los hechos ocurridos como corroborando en todo lo possible a su hermana Severra Barbuco. El testimonio del doctro Aonuevo confirma el Exhibit A que es un certificado medico de las lesiones encontrdas por el mismo en la vulva de Rufina Barbuco y el hallazgo en la membrana himen de dicha Rufina, que estaba rota, y ademas establecio que el 16 de noviembre, cuando examino a Rufina, introdujo su especulum en la parte genital de ella y dicha Rufina sintio dolor por la introduccion de dicho instrimento. El Exhibit B es un certificado de baustismo que demuestra, segun la dcelaracion del propio padre de Rufina, que Rufina Barbuco es soltera de 15 aos de edad. An examination of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause clearly supports the foregoing findings of facts by the lower court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is intimated that the testimony of the offended person, who is deaf and dumb, should not have been accepted at its full value. We have carefully examined the testimony of the offended person during the trial, and find no reason nor justification for discrediting her statement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of People vs. De Leon (50 Phil., 539) this court affirmed the sentence of the lower court, convicting the appellant of the crime of rape committed upon the person of Cecilia Galang, who was also a deaf and dumb person. The sentence of convicting was based entirely on the testimony of said Cecilia Galang.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Formerly deaf and dumb persons were considered incompetent witnesses. That theory, however, has been entirely dispelled. Experience and observation have shown conclusively that the mere fact that a person is deaf and dumb is not sufficient to justify the finding that he is incompetent as a witness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Mr. Jones, in his valuable work on Evidence, says: Although it was formerly presumed that persons deaf and dumb from birth were idiots, and therefore incompetent, within the meaning of this rule, no such presumption now exists. Taylor, in his work on Evidence, gives an instance in which a cause was decided solely on the testimony of witnesses who were deaf and dumb. When such a witness is produced, the court may ascertain whether he has the requisite intelligence; and the judge will allow the witness to adopt such mode of communicating his ideas, whether by signs or writing, as, under the circumstances, may be deemed most satisfactory. The mode of taking the examination is a matter for the exercise of the sound discretion of the court, which must determine, in the first place, the necessity for an interpreter, and in the next place, the best method of arriving at the knowledge of the witness and of imparting that knowledge to the jury;

but this discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily or to the injury of the litigants. Where error is predicated on the action of the trial court in taking the testimony of the deafmutes through an interpreter by signs, instead of through written questions and answers, the appellate court, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, will presume that the trial court adopted the better method of taking the testimony. (Vol. 4, Jones on Evidence, section 719.) Mr. Wigmore, in his very valuable work on Evidence, speaking of the competency of deaf and dumb persons, says: At the time when unscientific ideas prevailed concerning mental derangement and defect, the deafand-dumb were so far treated as idiots that they were presumed to be incapable of testifying, until the contrary was shown. Today this presumption has disappeared.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1854, Jewett, J., in People vs. McGee, 1 Den. 21: "(The woman) was of sense sufficient to have intelligence conveyed to her and to communicate intelligence to T. by signs and motions. . . . . If she had sufficient reason to have intelligence conveyed to her by T. and to communicate facts to the understanding of T., although she was not able to talk or write, she could have been sworn and testified through him by signs."chanrobles virtual law library No doubt it may sometimes be wise to examine into the capacity of such persons; but ordinarily the only question will be as to the possibility of communicating with them by some certain system of signs. So far as such persons are shown to be mentally defective, the principles applicable to lunatics will govern. (Vol. 1, Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 498, p. 918.) Some criticism has been made with reference to the admission of the testimony of Severa Barbuco on account of her tender years. She is a young girl of 7 years of age, and the sister of the offended person. She was the only witness present at the time of the commission of the crime described in the complaint. Her testimony was positive, direct and clear. She seemed to have more than the ordinary intelligence of a child of her age. The trial judge questioned her very carefully concerning her intelligence and her understanding of the nature of an oath. The judge was satisfied that she fully understood the nature of an oath and that her testimony was competent and etitled to credit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This court, speaking of the competency of children as witnesses, in the case of United States vs. Buncad (25 Phil., 530, 531), said: That the testimony of an 8-year-old boy was properly admitted, it appearing that the trial judge after a careful examination of his mental capacity was of opinion that this is an unusually intelligent child for his age, who gave his evidence in a straightforward and unembarrassed manner and was on the whole as satisfactory as the average witness who appears in his court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The question of the capacity or incapacity of a child to testify in this jurisdiction rests primarily with the trial judge, and his decision in that regard will not be disturbed on review unless it clearly appears from the record that it was erroneous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library There is no rule in this jurisdiction which disqualifies a child from serving as a witness, nor is there any rule defining any particular age as conclusive of incapacity. In each instance the possession or lack of intelligence of a child offered as a witness is to be determined by such examination as the trial judge deems necessary for that purpose.

This court, in the course of its decision in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145, 148), referring particularly to the competency, as a witness, of the offended party, a girl 7 years of age, said: During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of Olivia, on the ground that because of her tender years her testimony should not be given credit. The lower court, after carefully examining her with reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath, held that she had sufficient intelligence and discernment to justify the court in accepting her testimony with full faith and credit. With the conclusion of the lower court, after reading her declaration, we fully concur. Believing that we have answered all of the objections to the conclusions of the lower court, and finding as we do that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause was not only competent but sufficient to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, we agree with the recommendation of the Attorney-General that the sentence appealed from be affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A thorough examination of the record fails to disclose any reason of justification for a revocation or modification of the sentence appealed from. The lower court, however, failed to impose the accessory penalties provided for by law. Therefore, the sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the only modification that the accessory penalties provided for by law be imposed upon the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the appellant be sentenced, under the provisions of article 438, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, to be imprisoned for a period of eighteen years of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended person in the amount of P1,000, to acknowledge the offspring, should there be any, to suffer the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs, including the costs of the Court of First Instance as well as those incurred in the preliminary examination. It is so ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Avancena, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Sumulong, Lavides and Mabanag for appellants. Pablo C. Payawal for appellees. No appearance for applicants and claimants. ROMUALDEZ, J.: The litigation as presented in this appeal refers to lots Nos. 773 and 810, of the above entitled case adjudicated by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as follows: One-half of lot No. 773 to Manuel Libunao, and the other half to the conjugal partnership of said Libunao and his wife Lucia Evangelista; two-thirds of lots No. 810, to the conjugal partnership of Teodora Evangelista and Pedro C. Blas, subject to the right of Manuel Libunao and his wife Lucia Evangelista to repurchase the same for P13,892 within the period of five years from May 23, 1928, and the other third to Maria Gabriel. These adjudications were made in separate decisions, which have now been appealed, the appellants assigning the following alleged errors as committed by the court, below: 1. The trial court erred in holding that a partition of the estate left by the deceased spouses Toribio Di?o and Emeteria Ballesteros had already been made. 2. The trial court erred in holding that the failure of Fulgencia and Jose Di?o by themselves or by their predecessors to register any claim or action until they presented their claims in these cadastral proceedings is evident proof that they have no right to the lands in question. 3. The trial court erred in not holding that the state of dependence of claimants Fulgencia and Jose Di?o, who were born deafmutes, has prevented the running of any prescriptive period against them. 4. The trial court erred in dismissing the claims of Fulgencia and Jose Di?o to both lots Nos. 773 and 810. While the appellees contend that two lots in question, Nos. 773 and 810, belonged to Ciriaco Libunao

G.R. No. L-31354, Director of Lands v. Abelardo et al.

and Tomasa Di?o, from whom they were inherited by their children Manuel, Delfin, and Ines, and that the latter partitioned the inheritance in such a way that Manuel acquired from his brother Delfin the latters portion of the lots in question, the appellants allege that these lots belonged to Emeteria

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, applicant, vs. FELIX ABELARDO, ET AL., claimants. MANUEL LIBUNAO, ET AL., claimants-appellees. MAGDALENA DINO, ET AL., claimants-appellants.

Ballesteros, wife of Toribio Di?o, grandparents of said Manuel, Delfin, and Ines, surnamed Libunao, as well as of the appellants Clemencia or Fulgencia, and Jose, surnamed Di?o, and that the property of said predecessors pray that the two lots here in question be adjudicated to them. In support of their respective allegations, the parties presented parol evidence. The appellees, in addition, presented documentary evidence.

It is a proven and undisputed fact that after the death of Emeteria Ballesteros, which took place in 1899, Ciriaco Libunao, the father of the appellee Manuel Libunao, and afterwards, his children, are the ones who possessed those lands until 1910, when Delfin Libunao sold his portion to Manuel Libunao, and the latter, in turn, in 1920, sold part of lot No. 810 to the spouses Pedro Blas and Teodora Evangelista, and later, Ines Libunao also sold her portion of said lot No. 810 to Maria Gabriel. After said conveyances, the spouses Pedro Blas and Teodora Evangelista and Maria Gabriel have possessed the portions purchased by each of them. Manuel Libunao has been in possession of the remainder of these lots up to the present time. The appellees allege, and have introduced evidence to the effect, that lot No. 773 once belonged to Teodora Pineda, great-grandmother of the appellee Manuel Libunao, and that she donated the land to Tomasa Di?o, wife of Ciriaco Libunao, these spouses being the parents of said litigant Manuel Libunao; that lot No. 810 was acquired by his father by purchase from Maximina, Francisca, and Perfecto, surnamed Macapagal Through the documents which constitute Exhibit A-4 (pages 24 to 37, of documentary evidence); Manuel Libunao adds that after the death of his mother Tomasa Di?o, and when his father contracted a second marriage with Antonia de Leon, he delivered to him the possession of the lot No. 810, because he, Manuel Libunao, was the eldest child; that these lands were mortgaged to the spouse Gerardo Diaz and Petrona Encarnado, from whom they were redeemed about the year 1906 (Exhibits A-5 and A, pages, 38 and 1, respectively, of the documentary evidence) by Ciriaco Libunao and his children, among the latter the herein appellee Manuel Libunao; that in the year 1910, said father and children by his first marriage, perhaps in order to avoid possible difficulties arising from the said Ciriaco Libunaos second marriage, agreed to partition the property left by the deceased Tomasa Di?o, wife and mother, respectively, and they executed the deed Exhibit B, pages 5-9 of the documentary evidence; that these lots have been assessed in the name of Manuel Libunao form the year 1906, there having been presented in support thereof, tax declarations Exhibits A-3 and X-1 (pages 23 and 40 of the documentary evidence). These facts are, in our opinion, sufficiently proved, and it appears therefrom that Ciriaco Libunao and his children have possessed and still possess, and are making use of these lands, as the true owners since the time of the Spanish Government. Celedonia Flores, witness for the appellants, testified that Emeteria Ballesteros was the one who had these lands tilled, and after her death, Esteban Di?o, husband of said witness, had them tilled; that after Esteban Di?os death, Ciriaco Libunao, her concu?ado and father of the appellee Manuel Libunao, proposed to till them himself, as she, the witness, was a woman, and so said Ciriaco Libunao came

into possession of the land; that the latter took the documents from her; that the appellants Clemencia and Jose Di?o whenever they were in needs always appealed to their cousins Libunao, and if they failed to do anything, they went to Celedonia Flores and her relatives; that the Libunaos sometimes gave said appellants as ganta, sometimes two gantas, and even at times a cavan of unhulled rice. This testimony, in our opinion, preponderates the evidence presented by the appellees. Julian Ignacio, another witness for the appellants, assets that it was Emeteria Ballesteros who started to till the lands and which, upon her death, passed to the possession of Ciriaco Libunao; that the appellants were given support, but not a share in the crops. We italicize these last words because they show that Libunaos possession of the lands in litigation was exclusive. And we arrive at this conclusion, inasmuch as, even supposing that the evidence of the appellees in regard to the ownership of the lands did not preponderate (we believe it does), there is still the prescription in their favor inasmuch as the continued possession by the appellees of the land in question, which is exclusive as has been seen, not only because it so appears from the evidence of the appellees, but also because the appellants own witness, Julian Ignacio, testified to that effect, operates as an extinguishment of any right which the appellants may have had to said lands, unless there is another legal reason to prevent this conclusion. And this possible reason is merely the alleged incapacity of the appellants, due to their being deafmutes. Such a physical condition is no obstacle to the running of the prescriptive period; since it has been proved in this case that it was not accompanied by mental deficiency or any other legal incapacity. Being a deaf-mute is not by itself alone, without the concurrence of any of the incapacities recognized by law, considered included among the exceptions which in matters of prescription, are granted to incapacitated persons, in connection with the running of the prescriptive periods. The old doctrine that a deaf-mute was presumed to be an idiot no longer prevails, and such persons are now held capable of entering into contracts if shown to have sufficient mental capacity. (Alexier vs. Matzke, 151 Mich., 36.) Where one was born deaf and dumb, but had his intellectual faculties, though these were not improved by the modern system of education for persons of that class: Held, that he was not within the exception of the statute of limitations, which only exception of is non compos mentis. (38 N. C. Ire. Eq., 535.[[1]]) Finding no merit in the assignment of errors, the judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered. Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.