June 2012 | pp.

81-102

Plotinus on the World-Maker

Euree Song
This article aims to explore Plotinus concept of the world-maker, which plays a pivotal role in his anti-Gnostic controversy and his demythologizing reading of Platos Timaeus. It attempts to elucidate how Plotinus interprets Platos mythical figure of the Demiurge, the divine Craftsman, and in what way he incorporates this interpretation into his cosmology. It is shown that Plotinus provides us with a threefold world-maker of Intelligence, Reason, and Nature, mirroring a three-leveled activity of theria, praxis, and poisis, although he reserves the title Demiurge for divine Intelligence. It is also clarified how Plotinus adapts and integrates the Aristotelian Intelligence, the Platonic World-Soul, and the Stoic Nature into his own concept of world-maker.

In Plotinus conception of emanation, according to which the world flows out from Soul and Soul in turn flows from Intelligence and Intelligence from the One, there seems to be no place for Platos Demiurge, a divine Craftsman who fashions the world out of given materials after a preestablished model.1 Should the world not be made at all, there would be no world-maker. In fact, in Plotinus monistic approach to the origin of the world, the outflowing principle of all things, the One or the Good, eclipses the demiurgic god inherited from Plato. Besides, Plotinus rejects the artisanal image of a calculating, contriving, and toiling god. Has, then, the figure of Demiurge become in Plotinus Neoplatonism just a vestigial organ in the body of Platonic thought,2 or, even worse, a troubling swelling only to be got rid of? However, in Plotinus Enneads, the Demiurge
1

The systematic problem of an artisanal production of the world in Plotinus philosophy has been observed and discussed by OMeara, Gnosticism, 36872; OMeara, Plotinus, 7276; and Opsomer, Craftsman, 6869. Gerson, Plotinus, 56.

2012 by the Institute of Humanities, Seoul National University

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does not lead a mere shadowy existence. Remarkably, he emerges in Plotinus anti-Gnostic controversy as the main figure. Plotinus vehemently attacks the Gnostic false Demiurge who is supposed to be a bad and ignorant world-maker, and reproaches the Gnostics for misunderstanding and abusing Platos conception of world-making. In this article, I attempt to elucidate how Plotinus interprets Platos conception of world-making, including the Demiurge and in what way he incorporates this interpretation in his own vision of the world. First, I briefly present Plotinus critique of the Gnostic myth of the worldmaker, while trying to discern assumptions underlying his critique. I then undertake to uncover the identity of the true Demiurge conceived by Plotinus and to explore how the Plotinian Demiurge makes the world. Next, I take into account the World-Soul, to which a demiurgic function is assigned, whereby its two powers, Reason and Nature, turn out to be responsible for the cosmic politics and economy. Finally, it is shown that Plotinus provides us with a threefold world-maker of Intelligence, Reason and Nature, mirroring a three-leveled activity of theria, praxis and poisis, although he reserves the title Demiurge for divine Intelligence.

1. Myths of the World-Maker

In his Vita Plotini (Life of Plotinus; hereafter VP), Porphyry tells us that in Plotinus time (the third century CE) there were many Christians sectarians who deceived themselves and, deceiving others, alleged that Plato had not penetrated to the depth of intelligible reality (VP 16), which led Plotinus to write an ardent polemic entitled Against the Gnostics.3 In the middle of the controversy stands a divine Craftsman (dmiourgos) who figures as the world-maker in Platos Timaeus and subsequently in numerous Gnostic myths, as another title of the previously mentioned work indicates, namely, Against Those Who Say that the Universe and Its Craftsman Are Bad (VP 24). According to the Gnostic myth that Plotinus confronts in this treatise,
3 Enn. II 9 [33] (= Book 9 of the second Ennead, chronologically the 33th treatise). As Harder convincingly argues in his article Eine neue Schrift Plotins, this treatise is part of the so-called Grossschrift embracing Enn. III 8 [30], V 8 [31], V 5 [32], and II 9 [33]. For a detailed study on the Gnostics in the Life of Plotinus, see Puech, Plotin, and Tardieu, Les gnostiques.

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the universe is in fact a bad product fashioned by an ignorant Demiurge, or a fallen demiurgic soul.4 Plotinus, being a faithful Platonist, endeavors to defend the goodness of our universe and that of its Craftsman, as proclaimed in Platos Timaeus. He criticizes the Gnostics, claiming that they do not know who Platos Craftsman is. In addition, he accuses them of falsifying (katapseudontai) Platos account of the world-crafting (dmiourgia) and, further, of debasing Platos thought as if they had understood the intelligible nature but he had not (VP 16). Thus not only the orthodoxy of Platonism but also the authority of the Master are at stake. How, then, does Plotinus interpret Platos story about the worldmaking to rehabilitate his Master? Who is the divine Craftsman according to his interpretation? And how does he craft the world? To answer these questions, it is useful to consider basic features of the false Craftsman that Plotinus singles out for criticism. First of all, Plotinus disapproves of the notion of a discursively thinking (dianooumenon) Demiurge. Hence there is no room for the Demiurge to plan or deliberate about what he is going to do.5 Related to this, he excludes any purposeful or intentional action of the Demiurge. For this reason, he ridicules the idea that the Demiurge crafted the world in order to be honored, thereby contending that the Gnostics simply transfer to the divine Craftsman what is true of human craftsmen such as sculptors.6 Likewise, he declines to ascribe to the demiurgic god moral failure, repentance, vainglory, arrogance, and all those emotions that are all too human. In general, he does not allow any change in the divine nature of the Demiurge, let alone human caprice. Plotinus worry about the capricious Demiurge seems to be fueled by the fact that it does not fit into his concept of the eternal world. In fact, he does not agree with people assuming a beginning of that which always is, namely, a temporal beginning of the world.7 From this perspective, he challenges the Gnostic doctrine of the fallen demiurgic soul, according to which a soul made the world as the result of her fall. He asks: But
4 5

Enn. II 9 [33] 6.1924. The textual basis of the Gnostic notion of a discursively thinking Demiurge is Platos Timaeus 39e79.
6 7

Enn. II 9 [33] ch. 4 & 10-12.

Enn. II 9 [33] 8.15.

Enn. II 9 [33] 4.14; 11.22.

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when did it fall? If it was from eternity, it remains fallen according to their account. If it began to fall, why did it not begin before?8 Given the eternity of the world, it is surely idle to ask why the divine Craftsman made the world, as if he had at some point changed his mind and decided to make the world. But it seems also difficult to make sense of world-making. How can something eternal be made? Plotinus concept of the eternal world, along with his anti-anthropomorphic theology, show that he does not take Platos tale literally and sides with the interpreters advocating a metaphorical or allegorical reading of the Timaeus.9 Plotinus explicitly says that Platos mythical exposition in the Timaeus generates and makes the things which exist in the nature of the whole, bringing out in succession for purposes of demonstration (eis deixin) what are always coming into being and always existing there.10 Here it is worth mentioning his characterization of the function of mythic narrative:
But myths, if they are really going to be myths, must separate in time the things of which they tell, and set apart from each other many realities which are together, but distinct in rank and powers . . . ; the myths, when they have taught us as well as they can, allow the man who has understood them to put together again that which they have separated.11

This passage suggests that the narrative form of myth is a tool for teaching (didaskalias charin), to use Xenocrates formulation,12 namely, a teaching tool serving to explicate a complex hierarchical relation of things. From this view of myth, it results for Plotinus are that Platos story about the world-making is a pedagogical device to illustrate the principles which allow us to understand the make-up of our world, and which, once properly demythologized, provide us with a cosmology explaining the perpetual order of the universe.13 Yet how far should the story be
8 9

Since Antiquity, interpreters have been divided over how far to take the myth literally or allegorically. For the controversy between a literal and metaphorical reading of the Timaeus, see Zeyl, Timaeus, xxxxiv; Brisson, Le Mme et lautre, 71106.
10 11

Enn. II 9 [33] 4.67.

12

Enn. III 5 [50] 9.2429. The translations of Enn. are Armstrongs throughout, with slight modifications if needed. The italics are mine. Xenocrates, frag. 154.8; 156.3. Xenocrates is reported to hold such a position. For Xenocrates interpretation on

Enn. IV 8 [6] 4.4042.

13

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demythologized? Who or what is then the unmasked Demiurge? What role does he play in Platonic cosmology as interpreted by Plotinus?

2. Demiurgic Intelligence
Before we plunge into the rough sea of Plotinus Enneads to find the worldmaker, lets begin with a brief sketch of the section of the Timaeus in which the divine Craftsman comes on the scene. Starting from the assumption that everything that becomes must of necessity become by the agency of some cause, Timaeus introduces our Craftsman as a cause (aition)14 of becoming of the universe (28a5b1).15 A little later he calls this demiurgic cause the maker (poits) and father of the universe (28c34). Plato goes on to say, in a highly anthropomorphizing way, that this world-maker was good and free from any grudge (phtonos) and wishes everything to be like him (29e13). He then calls this benevolent worldmaker the god (ho theos)16 and declares that the god, wishing (boultheis) all to be good and nothing bad, as far as possible, brings the disorderly mass to order (taxis), while thinking that this will be entirely better (30a26). Unlike the Judeo-Christian-Islamic Creator God, the demiurgic god does not make the world from nothing.17 He is given the stuffs to work on. And he fashions the world after an intelligible model, namely, the complete Animal (31b1). As a copy, our world is an animal, a living organism, too.18 The world is finally described as a product crafted by Intelligence (nous)
Platos Timaeus, see Baltes, , 1822.

14

15

There has been much reluctance and hesitance to translate the term aition and its cognate aitia as cause. Basically, an aition/aitia is an answer to the question dia ti (why, by what). It is worth mentioning Chrysippus distinction between the aition, the item blamed or held responsible for the happening, and the aitia, which is the explanation of the aition. Cf. M. Frede, Original Notion of Cause, 22223; Annas, Aristotle on Inefficient Causes, 313, 31923. A demiurgic god is mentioned also in Platos Politicus 273b1, Republic 530a6, and Sophist 265c4. Cf. Galen, De usu partium II 154162. Cf. Sedley, Creationism, 24041. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 29a6.

16

17 18

In this respect, it is no wonder that the maker of the world-animal is called father. Here is a procreation model at work.

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(47e4), a product that is intelligently designed to manifest harmony, beauty, and goodness.19 From this description, Platos divine Craftsman emerges as a cause (aition) responsible for the good order of the world. He represents a kind of principle explaining how the world is ordered for the good. Indeed, he embodies a cause that is somehow productive of the world-order. In this light, the Platonic world-maker turns out to be the maker of order (kosmos). The world is, in turn, supposed to be a work of Intelligence. This suggests strongly that the divine Craftsman personifies Intelligence as the cause of the cosmic order.20 Now, an attentive reader of Plato can hardly overlook how this sort of Intelligence is prefigured in the Phaedo. In the well-known autobiographical digression of the dialogue, Socrates tells of his abortive expectation for the Anaxagorean Intelligence, which is claimed to be the ordering principle (diakosmn) and cause of all things (97c14). He expects that Intelligence orders all things and puts each other one of them where it is best for it to be (97c46). It is not so difficult to imagine a perfectly intelligent agent, who manages to arrange and coordinate all things to bring about the best possible outcome by virtue of his knowledge of what is best. It is important that Socrates links Intelligence to the choice (hairesis) of what is best (99a5b1). This shows that the Intelligence that he envisages is not only equipped with the knowledge of the good, but also motivated by that knowledge. Hence, the Socratic or reformed Anaxagorean Intelligence, conceived as the ordering cause of the world, operates intentionally, pursuing a goal. As a consequence, the world ordered by such an ordering cause exhibits a goal-directed structure.21 What Socrates needs is an ordering cause fitting the teleological world-order. Such a cause seems to be found in the guise of the divine Craftsman.22
19

For an underlying teleological conception of the world, see D. Frede, Philosophical Economy, 5455.

20 For this interpretation, see Halfwassen, Demiurg; Menn, Plato on God as Nous; Karfik, Que fait et qui est le dmiurge? 21 22

There are other interpretations on the identity of the Demiurge. For an overview of ancient and modern interpretations, see Karfik, Beseelung, 13035; Brisson, Le Mme et lautre, 55106.

Cf. Lennox, Platos Unnatural Teleology, 119f.

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It is, therefore, no accident that Plotinus identifies the true Craftsman and maker of the universe with Intelligence.23 But what sort of Intelligence? As we have seen in his anti-Gnostic polemic, Plotinus refuses to attribute to the divine Craftsman any purposeful activity. He also excludes discursive thinking. Nonetheless, he holds that the Craftsman is an ordering principle (to kosmoun) of the world.24 Yet how can a purposeless Intelligence order and arrange all things for the best? What use is Intelligence, if not for thinking? Plotinus concept of the demiurgic Intelligence seems to be in conflict with Platos conception of the teleological world-order. On closer inspection, however, it turns out that Plotinus is by no means willing to renounce Platos teleological vision of the world, although he attempts to adjust it to his concept of the perfect intelligence, and to his view of the eternal world with no temporal beginning and end. He sticks to the overall goodness of the universe advocated by Plato.25 In support of his Platonic teleology, he does not hesitate to use Aristotles teleological notion that nature does nothing in vain.26 To be sure, Plotinus Intelligence does not think discursively, yet this is not because it is short on intelligence but because it does not need to do so. Being a perfect intelligence, it already knows what it wants to know.27 Intelligence is, therefore, above reasoning (logismos). Based on this concept of Intelligence, Plotinus claims that the arrangement of the world by Intelligence is such that, if anyone could reason as well as possible, he would be astonished to see that reasoning could not have found another way to make it.28 Besides, Plotinus advances a concept of the intentional structure of the world involving no actual intention of its maker.29 To make this plausible,
23 24 25

Enn. V 9 [5] 3.2526.

26

Enn. IV 8 [6] 6.1618: For there was certainly nothing which hindered anything whatever from having a share in the nature of good, as far as each thing was able to participate in it. Enn. IV 8 [6] 5.31; Cf. Enn. I 4 [46] 16.27.

Enn. IV 4 [28] 10.13.

For the distinction between discursive and non-discursive thinking in Plotinus, see Emilsson, Plotinus on Intellect, 176ff.
27 28 29

Cf. Aristotles natural teleology in Physics II 8, 199b26f.

Enn. III 2 [47] 14.15.

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he appeals to a concept of virtualthus unrealintention:

And further, [consider it] also like this: we affirm that each and every thing in the universe, and this universe here itself, is as it would have been if the intention (prohairesis) of its maker had willed it, and its state is as if this maker, proceeding regularly in his reasonings with foresight, had made it according to his providence (pronoia).30

In this passage, Plotinus is suggesting that the world is ordered in such a way that it appears as if its maker had intended it. No real intention or will of the world-maker is required. This approach amounts to reshaping the traditional conception of divine providence, according to which gods personally care for the world. Plotinus adheres to the providential order of the world, without thereby admitting that the world-maker consciously cares for the world. In this place, we might wonder what, then, the worldmaker does. Doubt arises as to whether the world-maker plays any role as an active agency in the arrangement of the world. Plotinus insistence on the changelessness of Intelligence deepens our doubt. Intelligence is said to rest and stand still. Additionally, it contains in itself immobile principles (i.e., the intelligible models of the sensible entities). In fact, demiurgic Intelligence is identified with the so-called intelligible cosmos, which is in its turn equated with the living Model.31 In this way, the divine Craftsman and his ideal Model converge.32 Just as the Model in the Timaeus always remains the same and changeless (28a67), so does Plotinus Model. On the basis of this static notion of Intelligence, Plotinus develops an intriguing concept of divine providence, whereby providence is described in terms of the structure of the whole being, not in terms of the foreseeing activity: So that if someone calls a state of affairs providence (pronoia), he must understand it in this way, that Intelligence (nous) is there standing still before (pro) this universe, and this universe here is from and according

30 31

For the history of the concept of the intelligible cosmos, see Runia, Brief History of the Term Kosmos.
32

Enn. VI 8 [39] 17.14.

For Plotinus identification of the Intelligence and the intelligible cosmos, see Emilsson, Plotinus on Intellect, 14144, 16570.

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to Intelligence.33 It should be underlined that the word before (pro) is not to be taken in a temporal sense. Plotinus explicitly states that Intelligence is before this cosmos not in the sense that is prior in time, but in the sense that it is prior in nature, and that the cause of the cosmos as a kind of archetype and model, whereas the cosmos is an image of it and existing by means of it and everlastingly coming into existence.34 The upshot is that divine providence refers to a causal dependence of our cosmos upon its intelligible archetype, the true and first cosmos.35 Plotinus justifies this concept through his basic assumption of the eternity of the world.36 It is remarkable that Intelligence is introduced here as the model of the world, rather than as an ordering agency. Plotinus treats Intelligence as a paradigmatic cause responsible for the formal aspect of the sensible things. This treatment can be explained by the fact that he identifies Intelligence with the Model. Yet the meaning of this identification still puzzles. Does Plotinus thereby mean to replace Intelligence with the intelligible model, or reduce the former to the latter so that the cause of the cosmos is only intelligible, but not intelligent? Does he relinquish the idea of Intelligence as the active agency as a consequence of the static notion of Intelligence? Lets take a closer look at Plotinus Intelligence standing still as a model. Certainly, it stands motionless and changeless, but this does not mean that it is entirely inactive. In reality, it is an active model leading an intellectual life. It thinks and knows.37 It knows all the intelligible models inhabiting the intelligible cosmos, i.e., Intelligence itself. In this way, it knows itself. Thus, its self-knowledge implies the knowledge of the world, insofar as it knows its intelligible principles. In conclusion, Plotinus Intelligence is not
33 Enn. VI 8 [39] 17.1012. This concept is derived from an etymological analysis (as a sort of wordplay). 34 35 36

Enn. III 2 [47] 1.2226. In the Timaeus (28b3), the universe is given the name cosmos. Enn. III 2 [47] 1.2728.

Enn. III 2 [47] 1.1523: If, then, we said that after a certain time the cosmos, which did not previously exist, came into being, we should in our discussion lay down that providence in the universe was the same as we said it was in partial things, a foreseeing and reasoning of God about how this universe might come into existence, and how things might be as good as possible. But since we affirm that this cosmos is everlasting and has never existed, we should be right and consistent in saying that providence for the universe is its being according to Intelligence, and that Intelligence is before it.
37

Enn. III 2 [47] 1.31.

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at all reduced to an intelligible object but remains a full-fledged intelligent subject. A further aspect of the Plotinian Intelligence deserves our attention. It dedicates itself entirely to knowledge. Thus it stands still, absorbed in its contemplation, and does nothing other. The allegedly inactive Intelligence in Plotinus turns out to be a contemplative intelligence (nous thertikos) concentrating on its theoretical activity. In this connection, Plotinus emphatically says that Intelligence cannot do other things. He argues that only something which is not altogether in a good state can do something to improve its state. This implies that Intelligence already dwells in its best state and has no reason to busy itself with other things. Plotinus praises such Intelligence as a blessed being (makarion): For altogether blessed beings, it is alone enough to stay still in themselves and be what they are; restless activity (polypragmonein) is unsafe for those who in it violently move themselves out of themselves.38 Despite his admiration of the contemplative life, Plotinus obviously does not want his divine Intelligence to be an egoistic theorist. He attributes to Intelligence a sort of benevolent power, which could not stand still as if it had drawn a line around itself in selfish jealousy.39 This ungrudging character of Intelligence evokes Platos generous Demiurge in the Timaeus (29e13). Thus, Plotinus seems to maintain that Intelligence exercises beneficial influence on the world. In the same vein, he says that our beautiful world itself is a revelation (deixis) of the power and goodness of its maker.40 But he is reluctant to ascribe toil and travail to his blessed world-maker.41 Finally, he declares that Intelligence is blessed in such a ) it accomplishes great way that in not doing or making ( works and in remaining in itself makes no small things.42 Hence we are left with a paradox of the making without making of the world-maker. The crucial question can be put as follows: How can contemplative Intelligence be also productive of the world-order? Concerning this question, we have a famous precedent. Aristotles divine Intelligence
38 39 40 41 42

Enn. III 2 [47] 1.4144. Enn. IV 8 [6] 6.1213. Enn. IV 8 [6] 6.2326.

Enn. V 8 [31] 7.2425.

Enn. III 2 [47] 1.4345.

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in Metaphysics is on the one hand a contemplating agent, and on the other a moving cause responsible for the world-order. Thus, the way in which it moves the world might be instructive to us. It is well known that the Aristotelian Intelligence moves while being unmoved. This Unmoved Mover moves the cosmos as the object of desire and the object of thought (to orekton kai to noton: Metaphysics 1072a26). Indeed, Plotinus seems to take up this concept of the Unmoved Mover when he presents Intelligence as an object of contemplation and emulation for souls.43 Intelligence moves the world through the intermediary of souls, particularly the soul of the world. Inspired by Intelligence and according to the intelligible models that they see in Intelligence, souls order this world. In this way, Plotinus demiurgic God concedes the ordering task of the world to souls as his Stellvertreter.44

3. The Kingly Rule of Soul

According to Plotinus, it belongs to the very nature of soul to govern and care for the body.45 Hence not only the soul of the world,46 but also other souls, of individuals, govern and care for bodily nature. But the care of the particular soul for the particular body is subordinated to the universal care of the World-Soul for the body of the world as a whole.47 Plotinus presents the World-Soul as the ruling principle (to hgemonoun) of the world and calls it Zeus.48 As the ruler of the world, the World-Soul sets all things in it in order and administers and governs them.49
43 A similar approach is taken by Alcinous (Didaskalikos 10, 2). Cf. Dillon, Alcinous, 102 03. 44 45

46 According to Plotinus, the World-Soul is also an individual soul. Cf. Enn. II 9 [33] 18.1417; IV 3 [27] 1017. 47

Enn. III 2 [47] 7.2325. Plotinus refers in Enn. IV 3 [27] 7.12 to Phaedrus 246b6: All soul cares for all that is soulless.

Enn. V 8 [31] 13.

48 49

Enn. III 3 [48] 2.3f. Related to this, it is worth mentioning that Plotinus compares the World-Soul to the general in military commands giving the lead so that his subordinators work in unity with him. For this image of the cosmic general, see also Aristotle, Metaphysics 1075a13f.; pseudo-Aristotle, De mundo 399b3f. Enn. IV 4 [28] 10.1517. Enn. IV 4 [28] 9.1ff. Cf. Phaedrus 24e46.

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In fact, Zeus stands in the Plotinian theology for the ordering principle (to kosmoun), which turns out to be double, namely, the divine Craftsman and the World-Soul.50 In this connection, it is worth mentioning that Proclus ascribes to Plotinus a theory of double Demiurge, according to which there is one Demiurge in the intelligible cosmos and another in this cosmos. Proclus identifies the latter, i.e., the encosmic Demiruge, with the ruler of the world.51 Since Plotinus reserves the title Demiurge for divine intelligence that is identified with the intelligible cosmos, there is no double Demiurge for Plotinus, but just one. Strictly speaking, Proclus is wrong. But he seems to be on the right track. Indeed, the Plotinian WorldSoul, which corresponds to the encosmic ruler of the world in Proclus interpretation, was assigned to exercise demiurgic functions and can, therefore, be called Demiurge in a larger sense. It is striking that Plotinus characterizes the care of the World-Soul as a rule without act (apragmn), in contrast to the care of the particular soul laboring for itself (autourgos).52 He explains this difference between the universal care and the particular care by referring to the bodily condition. While the particular body, due to its deficiency, requires a great deal of care from the soul, the body of the world, being perfect and self-sufficient, just needs a brief command and stands under the royal supervision of the World-Soul. Thus, the kingly rule of the World-Soul is without toil and trouble. This characterization of the rule of the World-Soul refers in my interpretation to the kingly or political art discussed in Platos Statesman (258e4261a1).53 Dividing knowledge and art (techn) into the practical
50

Enn. IV 8 [6] 2.1229. Plotinus World-Soul evokes the god of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De mundo, who does not take upon himself the toil of a creature that works and labors for itself (397b1315). Cf. OMeara, Gnosticism, 367 n. 8; Opsomer, Demiurges, 59.
52 53

Cf. Proclus, In Tim I, 305.1626: o , , , o o , o o .[...] , o o o . 51

Enn. IV 4 [28] 10.12. In Enn. IV 4 [28] 9.23; 10.1517, he identifies Zeus with a kingly soul and a kingly intelligence in Platos Philebus (30d12). He probably has the World-Soul and its intelligence in mind.

For this interpretation see my forthcoming article, The Ethics of Descent in Plotinus.

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and the cognitive part, and the latter in turn into the purely theoretical (to kritikon ) and the directive part (to epitaktikon ), which involves commanding and guiding actions, Plato classifies kingship or statesmanship as a directive art. The directive art is then described as an architectonic art directing other arts and distinguished from a mere handicraft.54 Plato finally defines the political art as an expertise that controls all of arts, and laws, and cares for every aspect of things in the city, and weaves everything together in the most correct way (305e26). Plotinus seems to ascribe to the World-Soul exactly this kind of political expertise. Thus, it is no accident that he takes up the weaver motif in the discussion of the ruler of the world as follows:
But the reason of the universe is more like the reason which establishes the order and law of a city, which knows already what the citizens are going to do and why they are going to do it, and legislates with regard to all this, and weaves together by means of laws all their experiences and arts and the honor or dishonor that their acts merit, so that all that happens in the city moves as if automatically into a harmonious order.55

In this passage, we encounter a crucial feature of the rule of the world. It is by means of laws that the weaver of the universe produces a unified political textile from all different strands in the city. Accordingly, the world is not ruled by any arbitrary despot reigning over and above the law. Rather, the ruler of the world is nothing other than a reason ordaining and enforcing the law of the universe. This law-giving and law-guarding reason rules the world not randomly, but according to established rational principles. The law of the universe installs regularity in the course of things and warrants thereby the stability of the structure of the world. Not only this. It ultimately serves to establish an overall harmonious order in the world. We observe here a teleological approach still at work. The order of the world is, thus, not the result of an accident or coincidence, although one might have the impression that all things here occur automatically,56
54 Aristotle uses the expression architectonic art in the Nicomachean Ethics (I, 2, 1904a2628) exactly to describe the political art. He equally makes the distinction between an architect and a manual worker in the Metaphysics A 981a30b2 and the Physics II 194b17. 55 56

Enn. IV 4 [28] 39.1117.

For the concept of to automaton, see Aristotle, Physics II 46. Cf. Sedley, Creationism,

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but a product of a rational plan or design, eternally revealed. This concept of lawful ordering matches well with the aforementioned notion of the universal care of the World-Soul. In the Plotinian world conceived as a city of good laws, the divine ruler exerts no particular care in the sense of intervening personally for particular persons. In this connection, Plotinus clearly rejects the traditional concept of a divine providence dispensed by arbitrary and manipulable gods, as is implicit in the following passage: Here it would not be right for a god to fight in person for the unwarlike; the law says that those who fight bravely, not those who pray, are come safe out of wars; for, in just the same way, it is not those who pray but those who care for (epimeloumenous) their land who are to get in a harvest, and those who do not care for their health are not to be healthy.57 There is a further important aspect of the lawful ordering of the world. As quoted above, the reason of the world also weaves the honor and dishonor that the citizens acts merit into its political fabric. This suggests that the law of the universe operates with the principle of justice, a principle which consists of giving to each according to merit (kat axian).58 This in turn implies that the order of the world established by the law of the universe is fundamentally moral. In this connection, Plotinus resumes Platos assumption of the transmigration of souls, referring to the decree of Adrasteia (the Inescapable) in the Phaedrus (248c2), which is supposed to regulate the reincarnation of the soul by assigning to each soul its due body according to its merits or demerits.59 According to this assumption, wrongdoers eventually pay the penalty, if not in this life, then in the next. As an immortal being, the soul has no escape from divine justice. In this respect, Plotinus says that this world-order is truly Adrasteia and truly Justice and wonderful Wisdom, transferring three divine attributes to the order of the world itself.60 In addition, he presents the world-order as a work of a
18694.
57

58 59

Enn. III 2 [47] 8.3640. For Plotinus conception of divine providence, see Song, Aufstieg, 11119. Cf. Plato, Definitiones 411e2.

Enn. IV 8 [6] ch. 5; IV 3 [27] 24.611. Cf. Plato speaks of laws of fate in the Timaeus (41e23).
60

Enn. III 2 [47] 13.1617.

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wonderful art (techn thaumast) and the making of the world-order as a sort of wonder-making (thaumatourgia).61 Now, we should pay attention to the fact that Plotinus describes this wonder-making of the divine law as something natural. He says that the inevitable rule and justice are set in a natural principle (en physei) governing the incarnation of the soul.62 He then argues that there is no need of anyone63 to send a particular soul into this or that particular body at a particular time because the descent of the soul occurs in a natural way, like the sprouting of beards or horns, as it were automatically.64 Furthermore, Plotinus holds that the law involving incarnation is not merely imposed from outside, but rather is present in those beings subject to it and works from within. He explains that the law makes itself a sort of weight in them and implants a longing, a birth pang of desire to come there where the law within them, as it were, calls them to come.65 According to this description, law mobilizes the internal impulse of souls so that they accomplish the law themselves. Therefore, the law does not need any external force (ischys) for its accomplishment.66 In Plotinus view, not merely incarnation but the government of the world in general occurs naturally. He illuminatingly explains that the governor of the world does not governs the world like a doctor, who works from outside and treats his patient part by part and is often perplexed and deliberates what to do, but like nature working from inside, without need of deliberation (bouleusis).67 Plotinus seems to take up the Aristotelian distinction between craft and nature in the Physics (II 192b833).68 According to Aristotle, in craft the moving cause is external to the matter (as, for example, in medicine the doctor is external to his patient), whereas nature is an internal moving cause. However, Aristotle does not
61 62 63

Enn. III 2 [47] 13.20; 30. Enn. IV 3 [27] 13.12.

Plotinus alludes to the Demiurge in the Timaeus, who is said to have sown the immortal part of the human soul (41c8; 41e4; 42d46). Cf. Enn. IV 6 [8] 1.4647.
64 65 66 67 68

Enn. IV 3 [27] 13.3032. Enn. IV 4 [28] 11.12.

Enn. IV 3 [27] 13.517.

Enn. IV 3 [27] 13.2526.

For a detailed discussion of the distinction between craft and nature, see Sedley, Creationism, 17681.

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merely contrast craft with nature, but also points out that nature functions analogously to craft. He draws attention to the special case of the selfcuring doctor and claims that nature is like him (199b3032). In fact, Plotinus regards the world as a single organism which as a whole has a nature, i.e., an internal moving cause, while one nature rules other natures. The governing principle of the world is internal to the world.69 Thus, the government of the world can be conceived as a natural process. Nevertheless, Plotinus does not deny the craftsmanship of the governor of the world, although divine craft is not to be understood in terms of familiar human craft. To be sure, the governor of the world, unlike a human governor, does not deliberate. This, however, does not mean that the divine governor lacks craft or rationality. Indeed, the governor of the world is a reason, namely, a perfect reason, which does not need deliberation because it already knows. Plotinus ascribes to the world-reason practical wisdom (phronsis).70 Under this aspect, the worldreason appears, I suggest, as a sort of practical intelligence (nous praktikos). Accordingly, the world-reason is fully master of the situation and in no way in doubt and perplexity and, consequently, rules the world effortlessly.71 From this, Plotinus concludes that the government of the universe is no burden (dyskolon) for the governor of the world, as some have believed.72 In this way, the world-reason produces the moral order of the world, and in this sense is a world-maker.

4. The Craftsmanship of Nature

As we have seen, Plotinus assigns demiurgic functions to soul, notably to the World-Soul and its reason, although he reserves the title Demiurge for Intelligence. Now, the demiurgy of the World-Soul is not confined to the government of the world; it also involves the production of the body. The production of the world-body might be the first thing associated with
69 70 71

Plotinus view fits the portrait of the World-Soul in the Timaeus, which leads a blissful life (34b8; 36e4).
72

Enn. IV 4 [28] 11.23.

Enn. IV 4 [28] 10.1911; 25.

Enn. IV 4 [28] 12.3941. Plotinus seems to have Aristotle and the Epicureans in mind.

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the notion of world-making, but constitutes in Plotinus the last and lowest level of world-making. This last demiurgic task is delegated to nature (physis), which is identified with the forming power of the World-Soul or with the lower soul of the world. Plotinus calls this nature the ultimate maker (poits eschatos).73 To recapitulate, Plotinus provides us a threeleveled world-maker, Intelligence, Reason, and Nature, mirroring a threeleveled activity, theria, praxis, and posis.74 With view to the question of how nature makes the world, it is of great importance that Plotinus speaks of the crafting (dmiourgia) of nature.75 With this, he credits nature with an inherent craft. Despite this notion of crafting nature, he is reluctant to compare nature to an ordinary human craftsman, as the following passage shows:
Well, then, it is clear, I suppose, to everyone that there are no hands or feet, and no instrument either acquired or of natural growth, but there is need of matter on which nature can work and which it forms (eneidopoiei). But we must also exclude levering (to mochleuein) from the natural making (ek ts physiks poises). For what kind of thrusting or levering can produce this rich variety of colors and shapes of every kind? For the waxmodelerspeople have actually looked at them and thought that natures craftsmanship was like theirscannot make colors unless they bring colors from elsewhere to the things they make.76

Plotinus rejection of the artisanal mode of world-making evokes the Aristotelian and the Epicurean criticisms of the divine Craftsman in Platos Timaeus.77 In De philosophia (fragment 18), Aristotle is reported to have convicted of grave ungodliness those who thought that the great visible god, i.e., the cosmos, is no better than the work of mans hands. The Epicurean spokesman in Ciceros De natura deorum (1.820) mocks
73 74

Enn. III 8 [30] 2.78. Cf. Enn. V 8 [31] 2.31. Similarly, Plato advances the view that the so-called works of nature in reality come to be through a divine Craftsman (Sophist 265c).
75 76 77

In my view, Plotinus is making use of Aristotles threefold division of human activity implicated in his threefold division of science in Metaphysics E 1025b1828.

Enn. II 3 [52] 18.15.

The following discussion is much indebted to Baltes, , 2532; OMeara, Gnosticism, 36567. See also Armstrong, Plotinus III, 362 n. 2; Opsomer, Craftsman, 89 n. 76; Runia, King, 98.

Enn. III 8 [30] 2.19.

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the Demiurge by asking, What tools and levers and derricks? and also ridicules the idea that the world would almost have been made by hand. The Epicurean gods are famously free from the burdens and toils of worldmaking. In these criticisms, Platos story is taken literally. Almost all the Platonists, by contrast, and already Platos own pupils in the Academy, refused such a literal approach. Plotinus asserts that his Demiurge, namely, Intelligence, does not make the world as craftsmen do now, using their hands and tools.78 He further ascribes to his divine Craftsman an effortless craftsmanship.79 In his effort to distance the divine Craftsman from our vulgar craftsmen, he goes so far as to say that the world is made in every way after the manner of nature, rather than as the crafts make; for the crafts are later than nature and the world.80 Yet he insists that nature itself crafts. What is, then, the point of speaking of crafting nature, when natures craft is totally different from our familiar craft? We can approach this question by searching for a concept that can bind nature and craft together. We can find, in fact, such a concept in Plotinus, namely, wisdom (sophia). He states that some wisdom makes all the things which have come into being, whether they are products of craft or nature, and everywhere it is a wisdom which is in charge of their making.81 He is suggesting that it is due to some wisdom that craft and nature both can make things. From this perspective, he speaks of natural wisdom (sophia physik), that is, the wisdom responsible for natural production.82 He links this natural wisdom to the rational formative principle that lies in nature, while alluding to the Stoic concept of seminal principles (spermatikoi logoi), a sort of blueprint of natural beings.83 From this we can infer that natural wisdom refers to the inner rationality of nature working and developing from inside natural beings. This means that nature is a productive power that is rationally and teleologically programmed, not a blind spontaneous and fortuitous agency yielding outcomes by accident. As a result, the
78 79 80 81 82 83

Enn. V 8 [31] 7.1012. Enn. V 8 [31] 7.25. Enn. II 9 [33], 12.1718. Cf. Alexander Aphrodisias, De anima 3.1516 Bruns.

Enn. V 8 [31] 5.12. Enn. V 8 [31] 5.5.

Enn. V 8 [31] 5.911.

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physical world consists of things rationally designed, which in turn are orchestrated from a global perspective. This is, in my view, the lesson of the artisanal model of the world-making that Plotinus wants to preserve. Now, Plotinus claims that nature has its inner rationality or wisdom not from itself, but from something different. Although it is a rational principle, nature is, say, a vague vestige of other, clearer rational principles. Its wisdom comes in the end from divine Intelligence, which is identified with wisdom itself.84 This absolute wisdom is the original world-maker in Plotinus. Hence this world is for Plotinus not a temporary appearance resulting from the sudden fall of Sophia, as the Gnostics believe, but a permanent manifestation of the eternal wisdom itself. In Plotinus non-literal reading of Platos Timaeus, the Demiurge is a personificationor, more correctly, a deificationof wisdom manifested in the order of the world, not only in the natural but also in the moral order. Indeed, Plotinus assumes Intelligence as a transcendent cause inspiring or informing the soul (in the function of reason or nature) in making the world from inside. This connection between the transcendent cause and the world through the immanent cause is the demythologized meaning of divine providence. It is worth noticing that the transcendent and the immanent cause both are conceived as divine. No wonder Plotinus connects the notion of divinity with the ideal of perfection. For this reason, his divine Intelligence is far from a deliberating and toiling handicraftsman, and his divine World-Soul rules and makes effortlessly without itself laboring. More importantly, he holds that the perfect being is productive, in giving and sharing the good.85 Despite his confidence in the good upholding the world, Plotinus does not overlook the imperfections or defects of the things and evils in various forms haunting the world. In his theory of divine providence, he struggles with this gloomy aspect of the world, in which he sees the reason the Gnostics fabricated their myth of the bad world and its bad maker.86 In defense of the providential order of the world and the lord of providence, he appeals to an idea of cosmic dramaturgy, according to which the world has a plan like the plot of a drama (dramtos logos) containing many battles
84 85 86

This evokes the famous dictum bonum est diffusivum sui. Enn. III 2 [47] 1.510.

Enn. V 8 [31] 4.39.

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in itself, although it is a beautiful work as a whole.87 Here, the world is regarded as a poetical work (poima). In this way, the maker of the world becomes a poet ( poits).88 He also compares the world-order with the harmonious melody resulting from conflicting sounds that all spring from a single source.89 We can see here that Plotinus theory of providence heavily relies on a poetic or artistic vision. This is probably because the order of the world as a whole is not a subject accessible to human reason without the aid of imagination. Certainly, prudence teaches us that the realization of the good in the world is a subject so elusive to our reason that it can be treated only in the form of a myth and without any claim to truth.90 But the love of truth drives philosophers like Plotinus to demythologize the myth, in the hope that the good of the world is not just a myth but a truth. In the same hope, they not only interpret myths or metaphors, but also create. In this respect, Plotinus also is a poet of the world, envisaging the good and beautiful world despite all its shortcomings.
Kyung Hee University

KEYWORDS | cosmology, craft, Demiurge, Gnosticism, Intelligence, Nature, providence, teleology, wisdom, world-maker

A Korean version of this article was presented at the Korean Society for Ancient Philosophy meeting (Seoul, October 2011) and published in Chol Hak Sa Sang: Journal of Philosophical Ideas, no. 42 (2011): 336.

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87 88 89 90

Enn. III 2 [47] 16.36.

Enn. III 2 [47] 16.4042.

Enn. III 2 [47] 16.32 f.; 17.50.

For this kind of sober attitude, see Solmsen, Nature as Craftsman, 485.

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