Escheats REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her husband ROMEO SOLANO,

respondents. G.R. No. 143483 | 2002-01-31 FACTS: 1. Amada Solano is the helper of Elizabeth Hankins for 30 years 2. Amada was her faithful girl Friday and constant companion since no relative is available to tend her needs 3. In recognition, Ms. Hankins executed 2 deeds of donation involving 2 parcels of land in favor of Amada. She allegedly misplaced the deeds and can't be found 4. During the absence of the deed of donation, Republic filed a petition for escheat of the estate of Hankins; Romeo Solano (spouse of Amada) filed for intervention but was denied by court because "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question." 5. It was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties, the LC escheated the estate in favor of Republic of the Philippines 6. Amada claimed she accidentally found the deeds of donation. She filed for petition before CA for the annulment of the LC's decision escheating the property in favor of the Republic 7. CA annulled LC's decision ISSUE: Whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare a parcel of land escheated in favor of the state HELD: YES

We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."[5] Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever."[6] The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? In this regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc. ,[7] is applicable at least

insofar as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested party" in an escheat proceeding In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat . In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former ( underscoring supplied). In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery. A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,[8] "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any

right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality. In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in question."[9] Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength of a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutiny of every piece of evidence and analyze each

case with deliberate precision and unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations, conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions.

Guardianship (Meeting 5)

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G. BELMES, respondent. G.R. No. 132223 | 2001-06-19 FACTS: 1. Bonifacia Vancil filed before RTC Cebu a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie (6yrs old) and Vincent (2 yrs old) (Children of Reeder c. Vancil) 2. Alleged to be minors from Cebu and have an estate made up from proceeds of their father's pension benefits 3. She was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of the children 4. Helen Belmes (natural mother) filed an opposition over the guardianship proceedings claiming she already filed a similar petition in RTC Pagadian City 5. Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One. She claims to be the natuarl mother in actual custody and exercising parental authority over the minors in Zamboanga del Sur; There was improper venue since Bonifacia is a naturalized American citizen 6. Helen was denied by TC and favored Bonifacia 7. CA reversed the RTC order and favored the mother as natural guardian of her minors ISSUE: Who is given a preferential right to be the guardian of the minors HELD: Mother We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:

"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In SagalaEslao vs. Court of Appeals,[4] this Court held: "Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that 'the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,' a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship." Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Petitioner's claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way ofsubstitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx." In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,[5] this Court ruled:

"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent." Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor's guardian, respondent's unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent's) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding. Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

Moreover, we observe that respondent's allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioner's old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU16884[6] filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain. Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran,[7] this Court held: "Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."

LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV), CALAUAG, and FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal Guardian of the Incompetent SOLEDAD RODRIGUEZ, respondents. G.R. No. L-33152 | 1982-01-30 FACTS: 1. Respondent Judge authorized the motion of Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad Rodriguez) the sale of parcels of land to the petitioners 2. After a year and five months from the approval of sale, respondent filed an urgent petition invoking Section 6 Rule 96 of RoC so that they can be examined related to the three lots in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled. 3. Petitioners contend that that the lots are conveyed by deeds of absolute sale which was approved by the guardianship court ISSUE: Whether the guardianship court can order the delivery of a property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed HELD: NO Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. 23 In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the

embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings. In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether or not, on the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the ward Soledad Rodriguez over the three (3) parcels of land in question is clear and undisputable. What is certain here is the fact that the sale of the properties in question were duly approved by the respondent Judge in accordance with the provisions on selling and encumbering of the property of the ward under Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. It must be noted that while the original urgent petition dated May 13, 1968 prayed for examination of petitioners herein regarding the alleged concealing, conveyancing and embezzling of the questioned properties, the amended petition dated March 24, 1969 asked for reconveyance. Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale of the first two lots was actually a loan agreement with right of recovery while that of the third lot was subject to condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated sale. On the other hand, according to petitioners, the sales were all absolute and protected by the Torrens System since new transfer certificate of titles were issued in their name. Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the disputed properties. This, We believe, requires the determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in

dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a separate ordinary action not a guardianship proceedings as held in Cui vs. Piccio, supra. The ruling in Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839, relied upon by private respondent finds no application in the instant case. As differentiated from the case at bar, in Castillo case, the right or title of the ward to the property in dispute was clear and undisputable as the same was donated to her through compromise agreement approved by the court which title had the authority of res judicata. As enunciated above, the right or title of the ward to the properties in question is in dispute and as such should be determined in a separate ordinary action.

JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, Petitioner, vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Paraaque City, Branch 260; and JOYCELYN D. PABLO-GUALBERTO, Respondents. G.R. No. 154994 and G.R. No. 156254 | 2005-06-28 FACTS: 1. Crisanto Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to Jocelyn Gualberto with ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their 4 year old child. He was allegedly taken by her mother from his school and decided to abandon him 2. Evidences were presented including the fact that the mother does not care for the child and very often seen slapping him 3. The lower court awards the custody to the father, Crisanto. Later on the Judge issued an Order reversing the decision and awarding the custody of the child to Jocelyn. 4. The court grants the mother the custody with right of visitation every other weekend 5. CA: Trial court judge was not precluded fomr considering and resolving Joycelyn's Motion to Lift the award of custody pendente lite to Crisanto. It directed that the child be turned over to him until the issue was resolved ISSUE: Whether Art. 213 of the Family Code applies in this case where the minor is 4 years old HELD: YES: No compelling reason / Being a lesbian is not grounds Custody of a Minor Child

When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years old.[30] On the one hand, the mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must be awarded custody of the child. Article 213 of the Family Code[31] provides: "ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. [32] Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:

"Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No

mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."(Italics supplied) The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic need of minor children for their mother's loving care.[33] In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission stressed thus: "The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for 'compelling reasons' for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)

"Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. - The father and the mother shall exercise jointly just and reasonable parental authority and responsibility over their legitimate or adopted children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. "In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or surviving parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over such children, unless in case of the surviving parent's remarriage, the court for justifiable reasons, appoints another person as guardian. "In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so." (Italics supplied)

A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603).[34] Article 17 of the same Code is even more explicit in providing for the child's custody under various circumstances, specifically in case the parents are separated. It clearly mandates that "no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so." The provision is reproduced in its entirety as follows:

The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and 213 of the Family Code. It is unmistakable from the language of these provisions that Article 211[35] was derived from the first sentence of the aforequoted Article 17; Article 212,[36] from the second sentence; and Article 213,[37] save for a few additions, from the third sentence. It should be noted that the Family Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child below seven years should not be separated from the mother.[38] Mandatory Character of Article 213 of the Family Code

In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,[39] the Court held that the use of "shall" in Article 363 of the Civil Code and the observations made by the Code Commission underscore the mandatory character of the word.[40] Holding in that case that it was a mistake to deprive the mother of custody of her two children, both then below the age of seven, the Court stressed: "[Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such a separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court."[41] In like manner, the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6[42] of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory character.[43] Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de facto separation.[44] In the present case, the parents are living separately as a matter of fact. The Best Interest of the Child a Primary Consideration The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."[45] The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom

custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration.[46] Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children's well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.[47] Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; as well as the children's emotional and educational needs Tender-Age Presumption

As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.[48] The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.[49]

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother's immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.[50] But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.[51] To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. [52] To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v. Navarro,[53] wherein the mother was openly living with her brother-in-law, the child's uncle. Under that circumstance, the Court deemed it in the nineyear-old child's best interest to free her "from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which the mother ha[d] placed herself might create in [the child's] moral and social outlook."[54] In Espiritu v. CA,[55] the Court took into account psychological and case study reports on the child, whose feelings of insecurity and anxiety had been traced to strong conflicts with the mother. To the psychologist the child revealed, among other things, that the latter was disturbed upon seeing "her mother hugging and kissing a 'bad' man who lived in their house and worked for her father." The Court held that the "illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already

caused the child emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values x x x." Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child's proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother's alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result. Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge, Helen Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order that she had found the "reason stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling"[56] as to suffice as a ground for separating the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after personally observing the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique opportunity to witness the child's behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry more weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother's custody.

The Incompetent, CARMEN CANIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents. G.R. No. 110427 | 1997-02-24 FACTS: 1. Carmen Caniza was declared incompetent by judgment of RTC QC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo Evangelista. It was due to advanced age and physical infirmities. AE was appointed as legal guardian of her person and estate 2. Caniza owns a house and lot in QC and AE commenced a suit to eject the spouses from the premises. 3. MetroTC rendered in favor of Caniza but later on reversed by QCRTC 4. ISSUE: Whether the guardian has authority to bring an action against the spouses; Whether the guardian may continue to represent Caniza after its death May a guardian represent a case filed on behalf of the incompetent even after death HELD: NO but actions not purely personal may survive As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial

guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit. While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, 39 the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs , the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court 40 of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.: 41 Sec. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. 42 That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.

TRUSTEES SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. G.R. No. 149240 | 2002-07-11 THE FUNDS contributed to the Social Security System (SSS) are not only imbued with public interest, they are part and parcel of the fruits of the workers' labors pooled into one enormous trust fund under the administration of the System designed to insure against the vicissitudes and hazards of their working lives. In a very real sense, the trust funds are the workers' property which they could turn to when necessity beckons and are thus more personal to them than the taxes they pay. It is therefore only fair and proper that charges against the trust fund be strictly scrutinized for every lawful and judicious opportunity to keep it intact and viable in the interest of enhancing the welfare of their true and ultimate beneficiaries. FACTS: 1. Case of contesting the P5,000 contract signing bonus of each official and employee of SSS. 2. The gratuity emanated from the collective negotiation agreement (CNA) between Social Security Commission (SSC) in behalf of SSS and Alert Concerned Employees for Better SSS (ACCESS) 3. SSS allocated P15,000,000 in the budgetary appropriation of SSS 4. Department of Budget and Management (DBM) declared the signing contract bonus distributed among its personnel is illegal. SSS Corporate Auditor disallowed fund release related to the issue 5. ISSUE: Whether the funds of SSS is held in trust by the government HELD: YES

This Court has been very consistent in characterizing the funds being administered by SSS as a trust fund for the welfare and benefit of workers and employees in the private sector.[37] In United Christian Missionary v. Social Security Commission[38] we were unequivocal in declaring the funds contributed to the Social Security System by compulsion of law as funds belonging to the members which were merely held in trust by the government, and resolutely imposed the duty upon the trustee to desist from any and all acts which would diminish the property rights of owners and beneficiaries of the trust fund. Consistent with this declaration, it would indeed be very reasonable to construe the authority of the SSC to provide for the compensation of SSS personnel in accordance with the established rules governing the remuneration of trustees x x x x the modern rule is to give the trustee a reasonable remuneration for his skill and industry x x x x In deciding what is a reasonable compensation for a trustee the court will consider the amount of income and capital received and disbursed, the pay customarily given to agents or servants for similar work, the success or failure of the work of the trustee, any unusual skill which the trustee had and used, the amount of risk and responsibility, the time consumed, the character of the work done (whether routine or of unusual difficulty) and any other factors which prove the worth of the trustee's services to the cestuis x x x x The court has power to make extraordinary compensation allowances, but will not do so unless the trustee can prove that he has performed work beyond the ordinary duties of his office and has engaged in especially arduous work.[39] On the basis of the foregoing pronouncement, we do not find the signing bonus to be a truly reasonable compensation. The gratuity was of course the SSC's gesture of good will and benevolence for

the conclusion of collective negotiations between SSC and ACCESS, as the CNA would itself state, but for what objective? Agitation and propaganda which are so commonly practiced in private sector labormanagement relations have no place in the bureaucracy and that only a peaceful collective negotiation which is concluded within a reasonable time must be the standard for interaction in the public sector. This desired conduct among civil servants should not come, we must stress, with a price tag which is what the signing bonus appears to be.