C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y

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AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN
July 2013

Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises

IN TRANSITION IN TRANSITION

A Global Review (2012-2013) of Improvised Explosive Devices & Mine/Explosive Remnants of War Hazards in Afghanistan
Security & Force Protection Desk Officer francois.vanloven@cimicweb.org

Francois Van Loven

This document provides a summary and analysis of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Mine/Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) incidents and trends in Afghanistan. The analytical scope covers 2012 through first quarter 2013 although it also references older data. The report studies the IED & Mine/ERW issues in Afghanistan via three main criteria: the frequency of insurgent attacks; the volume of IED occurrences and the IED humancasualty rates in the country. The report demonstrates that over the years insurgent and IED-laying activities have been concentrated in the southern, eastern and south-eastern regions of Afghanistan. The report also shows clear correlations between the regional IED attacks volumes with the local casualty rates. Related information is available at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.

Introduction
his report studies the trends involving Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Mine/Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) in Afghanistan. The goal of the report is to provide an IED and Mine/ERW regional risk assessment in the country drawing from data collected during 2012 through the first quarter of 2013. The document focuses extensively on the IED issue, and briefly considers the Mine/ERW field. In order to understand the IED and Mine/ERW situation in Afghanistan, the document focuses on three main categories thereby enabling a comprehensive picture of the situation while allowing comparison among these criteria. The first section considers operating patterns and level of activities by the insurgency in Afghanistan in order to provide background knowledge on the operational context. The second section focuses on the volume of IED-laying activities and attacks (occurrences). The third section provides an analysis of the human-casualty rates in Afghanistan (victims) caused by IEDs in the country. The last section offers a short overview on the Mine/ERW hazards in Afghanistan. This report draws from numerous sources, approaching the IED issue from different perspectives focusing on insurgent IED-related attacks.

The Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) is an information and knowledge management organisation focused on improving civil-military interaction, facilitating information sharing and enhancing situational awareness through the CimicWeb portal and our weekly and monthly publications. CFC products are based upon and link to open-source information from a wide variety of organisations, research centres and media sources. However, the CFC does not endorse and cannot necessarily guarantee the accuracy or objectivity of these sources. CFC publications are

independently produced by Desk Officers and do not reflect NATO or ISAF policies or positions of any other organisation.

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Methodology
The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) has been tracking the frequency of insurgent activities and related casualty rates in the country for years. However, it should be noted that ISAF ceased releasing data on Afghanistan insurgent attacks in January 2013 when ISAF data could no longer be verified as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) began assuming most military operations in Afghanistan, says Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).1 The same applies to the US military, adds The New York Times (NYT). While no longer publicly releasing data, ISAF and US troops continue to be key actors in Afghanistan, deeply involved in the conflict. The international coalition remains a valuable source of IEDrelated information; however, the recent change in ISAF and US data collection and dissemination of insurgent activities (and IEDs) presents challenges in the analysis and mapping of IED attacks and casualty rates in the country. In considering these challenges, other sources of information are required to overcome the lack of data. As a result, the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) has expanded IED information collection to include statistics from the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO). In order to approach the IED issue from a broader perspective, the first section of the report provides an assessment on insurgent general activities and operating patterns in Afghanistan from 2012-2013 based on the data made available by the ANSO. Presenting a context in which insurgents (and the other actors) operate in Afghanistan provides insight into insurgent operating patterns in the country. It also sheds light on the general level of risk in the country. IEDs are the most used tool by insurgents in Afghanistan, as highlighted by NATOs Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT). As such, understanding insurgent operational patterns allows for better comprehension of IEDs. The use of ANSOs data is justified for several reasons. ANSO is an independent NGO providing analysis and advice to humanitarians since 2002. In particular, ANSO supports the operations of more than 250 organisations worldwide, by providing them with high quality information regarding the status of a specific conflict and the corresponding risks to the humanitarian sector. With regard to its work in Afghanistan, ANSO is well respected, according to The New York Times, adding that ANSOs data often corroborates ISAFs findings. Alongside military and international agencies, NGOs play a key role in Afghan conflict resolution activities. As a result, NGO-provided data can buttress security actor data on the conflict situation. Finally, NGOs are an important and relevant prism to study IED attack rates in Afghanistan. Indeed, NGOs are highly vulnerable to insurgent and IED attacks, as Afghanistan remains the most dangerous country to humanitarian agencies, says IRIN. In order to focus the scope of analysis and to obtain data on IEDs, other sources and material must be further considered. The second section of the report draws from various sources which specifically provide assessments on IED threat trends in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, often times these sources provide different information which might vary in timeframes, IED classifications and data collection approaches. In general, sources tend to study IED threats using two primary perspectives. The first analyses the volume of IED occurrences during a certain period while the second considers the rate of casualties and fatalities caused by IED explosions. Although some sources combine both, this reports second section splits the approach: volume of IED (occurrences) and casualties / fatalities rate (victims).

ISAF actually admitted that its report of a seven per cent decline in Taliban attacks during 2012 was wrong and that there actually had not been any decline in Taliban attacks, adds RFE/RL.

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From a methodological perspective, the separate focus on the volume of IED occurrences and the casualty rate is justified for several reasons. While these criteria are widely used by mainstream civilian and military sources studying IEDs, they are also the most relevant, allowing complementary and comparative analysis in order to build a comprehensive IED-related risk assessment in a certain area. Indeed, a high level of IED occurrences does not automatically imply a high rate of casualties. To the contrary, a limited level of occurrences is not always correlated a low rate of casualties, as one attack might claim numerous victims. Regarding casualties, the analytical scope focuses on three main categories of actors which are the most exposed to IED threat in Afghanistan, experiencing huge IED casualty rates: the international coalition (ISAF), the Afghan population and the humanitarian NGOs operating in Afghanistan.2 This section uses each of those IED-victims categories to explore the rate of casualties. It also considers the region in which the IED-related casualty rates are the highest for each category, hence allowing risks assessment for the whole country or by regions.

Section 1: Terrorism and Insurgency: International, Regional and Local Operational Context South-Asia Region: Terrorist Attacks Volumes and IED General Trends
The NATOs Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) reports 9723 various terrorist attacks across Afghanistan in 2012, which killed 1,999 people and wounded 2,756 others. In 2012, COE-DAT found Afghanistan was the worlds third most frequently attacked country by terrorists (amounting 13 per cent of all world attacks) and the second most attacked in the Asian region (27 per cent of attacks) 4 in 2012. In Asia, Pakistan had the highest rate of civilian casualties in 2012 although Afghanistan experienced the most significant and deadliest single attack in the region. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were the most prevalently used terrorist technique utilised in 2012, at the international or regional level (Asia).5 In the first quarter 2013, the COE-DAT logged 195 terrorist attacks across Afghanistan which killed 311 people and injured 373 others.6 During that period, the 2012 trends have remained consistent as Afghanistan is still the worlds third most frequently hit country. Likewise, IEDs have remained the principal tool used by terrorists for staging attacks in the world and in Asia. 7 The COE-DAT does not provide the rates and the location of IED attacks inside Afghanistan in 2012 or numbers of IED casualties at the national or regional level. Afghanistan: Insurgency Activities and Operational Context in 2012

Since the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been gradually taking over security from the international coalition, the Afghan forces have been increasingly involved in military operations and consequently more exposed to IED attacks, hence claiming a sharp increase in casualties among the ANSF ranks, says The New York Times. Therefore, the ANSF represent another relevant IED victim category which could be used for analysing the human impact and the casualty rate caused by IEDs. However, the report is not covering this category for two reasons. First, the entire security handover to the ANSF is still quite recent, limiting the scope of the analysis. Second, public data shedding light on the ANSF IED-related casualty are available in limited release and access, since most data were provided by ISAF. 3 Out of the 7, 294 attacks reported worldwide, across 75 countries. Thirteen per cent of the worldwide attacks took place in Afghanistan. 4 The COE-DAT reported a total of 3,539 attacks in Asia in 2012. Terrorist attacks in Asia amounted to 49 per cent of the total world attacks in 2012. Terror-related attacks in Afghanistan represented 27 per cent of all attacks carried-out in Asia. 5 In 2012, 2, 451 IED attacks were reported out of a total of 7, 294 attacks worldwide (34 per cent). In Asia, 1, 186 IED attacks were reported out of a total of 3, 539 regional attacks (33 per cent). Those numbers do not include suicide attacks or Person Born-IED (PBIED) and Vehicle-Born-IED (VBIED) which are ranked separately. 6 Out a total of 1,537 attacks reported across 34 countries. Thirteen per cent of the worldwide attacks took place in Afghanistan.

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Figure I: Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) Attack Volumes per Province in 2012

Source: Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), 2012 Q4 Incident Rate Map [from ANSO Q4 2012 Report] , 04 February 2013

The map (Figure I) illustrates Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) attack rates per province in 2012. Throughout last year, Afghanistan consistently experienced high attack volumes across most provinces in the south - where Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, Ghazni and Paktika accounted for five of the eight highest AOG attack rates in the country, says ANSO in its 2012 AOG attack volumes overview. Across many parts of the country, AOG attacks generally rose in rural districts while decreasing in urban centres, as AOG took firmer control of rural districts while the ANSF attempted to better control urban population centres. AOG actively shifted their operational focus to the east, where they seemed to focus on reinforcing their position and maintaining a second regional stronghold in preparation for the post-transition period. AOGinitiated incident volumes in Kunar remained the highest in the country (1,303) while neighbouring Nangarhar demonstrated the largest actual increase (167 AOG-initiated incidents) for a thirty per cent increase over 2011. Analysis revealed that the AOG offensive concentrated on enhancing their operational tempo in rural areas along the infiltration corridors in the south-western flank of Nangarhar as well as in the strategically important areas adjacent to the Kabul Torkham highway where AOG conducted shaping operations8 and also benefitted from entrenchment in local communities. In eastern Afghanistan, increased AOG activity also spilled over into Laghman which saw the second highest actual increase in AOG attacks (+148). AOG instituted a coherent focus on rural districts and an aggressive intimidation campaign in and around the provincial capital. Additionally, AOG expansion was evident in Kapisa (with a 48 per cent increase in attackvolume over 2011). Although vacated by the French military contingents in 2012 and transitioned to the

According to the US Center for Amy Lessons Learned, a shaping operation is an operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Shaping operations establish conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, population (including local leaders), and terrain. () The concept of operations describes how shaping operations contribute to the decisive operation's success, often in terms of the purpose.

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ANSF, the south-eastern flank of the province has remained a pivotal AOG stronghold on the cross-road between north, east and central. The majority of northern provinces saw decreases in AOG activities as AOG halted its footprint expansion, with Baghlan and Faryab as outliers. While Baghan (88 per cent increase) absorbed much of the AOG activity that had been previously focused in Kunduz, the insurgency launched a third operational front along the axis connecting Faryab to Badghis via Ghormarch and southwards in Herat/Farah. Although Afghanistan has seen a 25 per cent decrease of insurgent attacks in 2012 (compared to 2011), the provincial dynamics and the locally collected data reveal that less attacks by the insurgency does not translate to reduced freedom of movement for these groups. For instance, AOG networks have migrated from Helmand to the neighbouring provinces of Farah and Uruzgan. Consequently, both provinces have recorded increased AGO attack volumes.

Insurgency Activities and Operational Context in 2013

The first quarter of 2013 (Q1 2013) marked intensified conflict activity. Statistics show an increase of 47 per cent of insurgent activities compared to the same period last year (first quarter of 2012 Q1 2012) (see Figure II). So far, 2013 has been the second most violent year in Afghanistan (after 2011). Border provinces in south, east and west regions have driven the country-wide escalation in attack activity. In the east, Nangarhar (+81 per cent) and Laghman (+250 per cent) have reached gain margins of over 100 attacks over Q1 2012. Of the entire AfPak border belt, only Khost noted a significant actual decrease (-50 per cent). The surrounding provinces of Wardak, Logar and Paktya are rated moderately insecure due to unimpeded AOG access combined with a high likelihood of intensified conflict as the ISAF regional-exit approaches. The attack rates in Ghazni (+127 per cent), Helmand (+100 per cent) and Kandahar (+17 per cent) have led to the growth in activity volume in the south, where 6 out of 7 provinces are ranked as highly insecure or above, leaving Nimroz as slightly more accessible. In Helmand and Ghazni, the insurgency has been emboldened by an aggressive ISAF posture ahead of their final fighting campaign; before the 2014 withdrawal and the full security hand over. The entire border axis in the West (Farah to Faryab) constitutes the most tangible example of AOG successfully filling a gap created by the international coalition withdrawal. The four western provinces averaged a 72 per cent growth rate on Q1 2012, all of them also exceeding the volumes recorded at Q1 2011 the countrys most violent year to date. In the Nnorth, Kunduz is the only province rated moderately insecure due to the high volume of ISAF offensive operations (airstrikes in particular), growing AOG attack rates, and the projection of force by local militias. While the attacks rate have sharply increased in Q1 2013, ANSOs assessment shows that the south and east regions of Afghanistan remain the most volatile. Considering that IEDs remain the primary attack vector used by the insurgency, the southern and eastern regions are most likely vulnerable to IED attacks.

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However, this assessment does not factor in IED threats. It only enables indirect, comparative and deductive assumptions, based on the comparison between the volume of insurgency activities and the likelihood of IED attacks. Considering that IEDs are seemingly insurgents favourite offensive tools, the question is whether data can directly verify if IED attacks volumes are the highest in areas most affected by the insurgency. By directly focusing on the IED situation in the country, the next sections shed more light on the potential correlation between regional insurgent volumes of activity with the local IED level of risks.

Section II: Afghanistan IED National Trends by Volume (Occurrences)

This section focuses on the volume of recent or past IED, attacks in Afghanistan (occurrences), without considering the number of attack-related victims. Based on various sources and available data, this section sheds light on the likelihood of IED attacks across Afghanistan.

Figure III: Executed IED Attacks in 2012

Source: ISAF , ISAF Monthly Data Trends through December 2012, April 2013

Although ISAF9 ceased releasing data on insurgent attacks in 2013, the data covering 2012 is available (see Figure III). ISAF cautions that 2012 data may be partially inaccurate, says RFE/RL. According to ISAF, IEDs remained the primary offensive means used by the insurgency in Afghanistan in 2012. In addition, the overall number of IED attacks in 2012 decreased by eighteen per cent compared to 2011. However, these numbers only offer an overview. They do not allow assessment on IED occurrences by province and do not specify the number of ISAF fatalities caused by IED attacks (globally or per province). While ISAF numbers may be partially inaccurate, their assessment corroborates the ANSOs assessment on the insurgency volume of activities, showing a decrease of 25 per cent in their activities in 2012.

Based on the data extracted from the Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database

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The German Armed Forces Counter-IED Centre (C-IED Centre)10 recently published a study mapping and the IED threat trends for Afghanistan beginning in 2008 through January 2013. (See Figure IV). The C-IED Centre also monitors the level of IED-related casualties since 2008 which will be covered in detail in Section III of this report. Additionally, the C-IED Centre provides a regional risk assessment, using data since 2008, detailing the volume of IED occurrences by province. Although the C-IED Centres analytical scope is broader, the C-IED Centres estimates seem to corroborate the ISAF and the ANSOs assessments to a certain degree. The Centre shows a slight decrease of IED occurrences in 2012 compared to 2011 (see Figure IV). This assessment does not cover the first months of 2013, which, according to ANSO, witnessed a sharp increase in insurgents activities. The southeast regions of Afghanistan remain the most targeted by IED occurrences, according to this mapping. In particular, the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah, Zabul, Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Nurestan and Kunar seem the most volatile from an IED perspective. Compared to the ANSO assessment on insurgents attacks, a correlation appears here between the level of insurgents presence and actions in some specific areas with the registered volume of IED occurrences.

Figure IV: IED Trend in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2013

Source: Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Centre Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command, Counter-IED in Afghanistan from a German perspective. Lessons learned and best practices, April 2013

10

Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command (BwJFOCOM)

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Figure V: IED Mapping in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2013

Source: Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Centre Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command, Counter-IED in Afghanistan from a German perspective. Lessons learned and best practices, April 2013

Figure VI: IED Threat Mapping in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2009

Source: The Guardian, Afghanistan the War Logs Afghanistan IED attacks 2004 2009, 26 July 2010

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In 2010, The Guardian published a six-year interactive assessment covering IED occurrences volume and the related number of fatalities (civilians and coalition) in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2009 (see Figure VI). The Guardian map displaying all the logged IED attacks in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2009 covers only roadside bombs and excludes person- or vehicle-born suicide bombs (PBIEDs or VBIED) and hoaxes (counted as IED incidents in official figures). The report only includes IED explosions or IED ambushes, where an explosion is combined with an ambush by insurgents. Although The Guardian product falls outside the dates considered in this report and are slightly outdated, the interactive map allows a multidimensional and comprehensive overview, mapping the number of occurrences by province coupled with the level of ISAF and civilian fatalities. While the timeframe differs slightly from the map produced by the German C-IED Centre, the data provided by The Guardian seems to corroborate the mapping of the German C-IED Centre and the ANSOs recent analysis, showing a much higher concentration of IED attacks in southeast Afghanistan between 2004 through 2009.

Section III: Afghanistan: IED National Trends by Casualty Rate (Victims)

This section focuses on the rates of casualties, including fatalities and injured people, from IED attacks in Afghanistan and will only consider the rate of casualties, separate from the volume of IED attacks. It covers three main categories of actors experiencing IED casualty rates within Afghanistan: the international coalition (ISAF), the Afghan population and the humanitarian NGOs operating in Afghanistan.

ISAF Fatalities: General overview and IED-Related Figures VII & VIII: ISAF Fatalities Overview since 2011 (Graphic & Map)

Source: iCasualties, Operation Enduring Freedom / Afghanistan, Coalition Military Fatalities By Year, 10 June 2013

According to iCasualties, (see Figures VII, VIII) the international military coalition lost 3,334 personnel since 2001, including 402 losses in 2012 (12 per cent of the total) and 85 up toJune 2013 (2.5 per cent of the total). 11 Out of these reported fatalities, the NATO coalition lost 2,702 personnel in hostile actions (excluding accidental deaths) since 2001. Most fatalities occurred in the southern and eastern areas of Afghanistan. Since 2001, the international coalition has lost 1,368 personnel in IED attacks in Afghanistan12, which represents 51
11

Up to 10 June 2013, including hostile and non-hostile fatalities. The international coalition suffered 2, 702 csualties from hostile attacks from 2001 to 10 June 2013. 12 As of 10 June 2013

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per cent of the total fatalities caused by hostile actions the country, says iCasualties (see Figures IX, X). In 2012, the coalition suffered 132 casualties from IED attacks (out of 312 total casualties from hostile activities) representing 42 per cent of the countrys total fatalities. From January to June 2013, the coalition reported 31 deaths related to IED attacks (out of a total of 67 losses in hostile actions)13, amounting 46 per cent of the total hostile fatalities.

Figures IX & X: ISAF IED-Related Fatalities by Year

Source: iCasualties, Operation Enduring Freedom / Afghanistan, Coalition IED Fatalities by Year, 19 June 2013

ISAF Fatalities: IED Fatalities by Provinces in 2012 and 2013

According to iCasualties, ISAF recorded the highest rates of fatalities in the south and east regions of Afghanistan. IEDs remain the major cause of ISAF fatalities, responsible for 51 per cent ISAF fatalities since 2001. The rate remains consistent in 2012 and 2013, even if the IED-related ISAF fatalities rate seemed to decrease since 2009. Although the current numbers for 2013 are high (46 per cent ISAF fatalities are IEDcaused), it is too early to make conclusions for 2013. At the regional level, the NATO coalition suffered from the highest IED-related casualties in Helmand province since 2012, accounting for 32 per cent of the total IED related fatalities since 2012. The second most impacted province is Kandahar (23 per cent), followed by Wardak (6 per cent), Khost (5 per cent), Paktia (4 per cent), Kunar (3 per cent), Logar (3 per cent), Paktitka (2 per cent) and Uruzgan (1 per cent). In order to assess the rate of IED-related ISAF fatalities by province, Figure XI extracts iCasualties general data and looks at the number of IED-related ISAF fatalities for each Afghan province across 2012 and 2013.14 This approach allows for the assessing of IED-risk by province, focusing on the local level of fatalities rate (see Figure XII). This assessment should be read in parallel with the IED attack volumes (occurrences) by province. The following numbers include all types of IED attacks, including Person-Borne-IED (PBIED)15 or Vehicle-Borne-IED (VBIED)16. These last two categories are not covered in the graphic (Figures IX and X) provided above (standard static IEDs only included).
13 14

As of 19 June 2013 As of 10 June 2013 15 Suicide-bomber 16 Car bomb

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Figure XI: ISAF IED-Related Fatalities by Province across 2012 and 2013
Province Afghanistan Eastern Afghanistan Northern Afghanistan Southern Afghanistan Western Afghanistan Badakshan Badghis Baghlan Balkh Bamiyan Farah Faryab Ghazni Ghowr Helmand Herat Jowzjan Kabul Kandahar Kapisa Khost Kunar Kunduz Laghman Logar Nangarhar Nimroz Nuristan Paktia Paktika Panjshir Parwan Samangan Swat Takhar Uruzgan Wardak Zabul GRAND TOTAL 2012 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 10 0 41 0 0 0 31 4 10 6 0 0 5 0 0 0 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 1 138 201317 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 17 0 0 3 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 44 Total 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 13 0 58 0 0 3 42 4 10 6 0 0 5 0 0 0 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 4 182 Remark

PBIEDs only

Including 11 PBIEDs in 2013

Including 2 VBIEDs Including 1 PBIED in 2012 Including 3 PBIEDs in 2012 Including 3 PBIEDs in 2012

Including 2 PBIEDs in 2012

Including 23 PIEDs / 2 VBIEDs

Source: iCasualties, Operation Enduring Freedom / Afghanistan, Extracts from ISAF Fatalities Spreadsheet, 19 June 2013

From a comparative perspective, these findings correspond to the German C-IED Centres assessment, which highlights a progressive decrease in IED-related ISAF fatalities since 2008, although the study does not cover 2013. The decrease in 2012 may be linked to the decrease of insurgent operations in 2012, as reported by ANSO, or the decrease of IED attacks volume in 2012, as highlighted by the German C-IED Centre. At the regional level, the registered rates of IED-related ISAF fatalities seem to be consistent with the volume of insurgent activities provided by ANSO and the German C-IED Centre. In South and eastern Afghanistan, where the insurgency is the most active and relies on IEDs, the rates of ISAF IED-related fatalities are the highest.

17

As of 10 June 2013

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Afghan Population Casualties: General Overview

IEDs not only target coalition members, they are also the leading cause of conflict-related deaths of women and children in 2012 followed by ground engagements, notes the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Therefore, IED-caused civilian casualties can also shed light on the IED threat levels and trends in Afghanistan (see Figure XIII).

Afghan Population Casualties: IED Attacks General Overview Figure XII: UNAMA Trends on Civilian Casualties by Parties to the Afghan Conflict

Source: UNAMA, Annual Report 2012 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2013

In 2012, the armed conflict in Afghanistan continued to exact a huge toll on Afghan civilians. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 7,559 civilian casualties (2,754 civilian deaths and 4,805 injuries) from armed conflict in 2012. UNAMA also highlights that insurgents have increasingly targeted civilians throughout the country. UNAMA documented 6,131 civilian casualties (2,179 civilian deaths and 3,952 injuries) by the insurgency in 2012, an increase of 9 per cent compared to 2011. Of the total civilian casualties in 2012, 81 per cent were attributed to the insurgency also known as the AntiGovernment Element (AGE). Of the 6,131 civilian casualties caused by insurgents in 2012, UNAMA recorded a 108 per cent increase in civilian casualties from targeted killings and a rise in casualties from the indiscriminate use of IEDs. Insurgents use pressure plate IEDs (PPIEDs) which are victim-activated and other IED tactics involving suicide and complex attacks (combined attacks involving use of explosive and firearms), in areas populated by civilians.

Figure XIII: UNAMA Charts on Civilian Casualties by Tactic-Insurgency

Source: UNAMA, Annual Report 2012 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2013

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Insurgency IED capability remained the biggest conflict-related threat to the lives of Afghan children, women and men in 2012. UNAMA documented 782 IED incidents (more than two IEDs per day causing civilian casualties in 2012) which resulted in 2,531 civilian casualties (868 civilian deaths and 1,663 injuries) constituting 34 per cent of all civilian casualties (7,559), and 38 per cent of all civilian casualties attributed to the insurgency (6,131). Overall, civilian casualties from IEDs increased by 3 per cent in 2012 compared with 2011. As a matter of comparison, ISAFs assessment disclosed that IEDs were responsible for 70 per cent of the civilian casualties caused by insurgent hostile attacks in 2012. Likewise, the German C-IED Centre reports that local Afghan civilians suffered from the highest rates of IED-originated casualties from 2008 to 2013, exceeding the rates for ISAF and the ANSF. The rate of civilian casualties through this period has remained constant.

Figure XIV: UNAMA Charts on Insurgency Civilian Fatalities by Tactics

Source: UNAMA, Annual Report 2012 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2013

UNAMA observed that the majority of known IEDs used by Anti-Government Elements (AGE) were victimoperated IEDs (VOIEDs), with PPIEDs being most common (see Figure XV). , In 2012, insurgents detonated IEDs in commonly used public areas such as roads, markets, government offices, public gathering places, including bazaars, in and around schools, shops and bus stations. AGE placed IEDs - particularly those equipped with a pressure-plate trigger, on transit routes ranging from small footpaths to highways and killed and injured civilians whether they were on foot, riding a bicycle, in buses, taxis or in private cars. In most cases of civilian casualties caused by IEDs, the device appeared not to have a specific military objective: insurgents simply used IEDs in an indiscriminate way. For example, UNAMA confirmed 298 incidents causing 913 civilian casualties (393 deaths and 520 injuries) PPIEDs which had been planted on roads routinely used by civilians. This is a huge increase compared to 2011 when UNAMA documented 74 killed and 67 injured by this tactic. 18

18

In 2012, UNAMA documented additional 1,507 civilian casualties (328 killed and 1,179 injured) from 73 incidents of suicide and complex attacks (compared with 90 incidents in 2011 which resulted in 1,653 civilian casualties). This 9 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from suicide and complex attacks does not include civilian casualties from targeted killings in which the

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Afghan Population Casualties: IED Attacks Regional Overview Figure XV: UNAMA Chart on IED Civilian Casualties

Source: UNAMA, Annual Report 2012 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, February 2013

The districts located in the southern and south-eastern regions of Afghanistan experience the highest concentration of IED incidents and casualties, reports UNAMA. UNAMA illustrates here the volume of incidents (occurrences) with the rate of civilian casualties at the local level (see Figure XVI). In Helmand, Kandahar and Khost provinces, IEDs accounted for 957 civilian casualties in 2012. In comparison, in 2011 IEDs in these provinces accounted for 858 civilian casualties. These numbers represent a 12 per cent rise in casualties resulting from IEDs. According to September 2012 ISAF public data , the five districts with the highest IED activity and casualty incidents are Nahr-e-Saraj, Khost, Zheray, Kandahar and Panjwayi districts of Helmand, Khost and Kandahar provinces. ANSO reports that he largest concentration of civilian fatalities occurred in the South (46 per cent) where IED activity was the most intensive (Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan). This trend indicates that most urban centres and key access routes are conflict-affected areas. The east reported the second largest proportion of the fatalities (19 per cent) followed by the north (13 per cent), central (12 per cent) and west (10 per cent).

NGO Casualties: General Overview

The casualty rate pertaining to the NGOs operating in Afghanistan is a relevant grouping to study when considering IED-attacks rates, as Afghanistan remains the most dangerous country to humanitarian agencies, says IRIN. Although, it should be noted that violence against NGOs remains seasonal, circumstantial and collateral in nature rather than suggesting any systemic or routine target, adds ANSO (see Figures XVI, XVIII).

primary tactic was a suicide device or PBIED. For UNAMA, suicide attacks ranged in type from those carried out by single individuals either wearing vests or driving vehicles charged with explosives, to multiple suicide bombers that initiated complex attacks involving large numbers of fighters.

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Figures XVI & XVII: AGO Attack Types in 2012; NGO Fatalities by Incident Types in 2012

Source: Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), 2012 Q4 Incident Rate Map [from ANSO Q4 2012 Report], 04 February 2013

According to ANSO, 2012 witnessed a total of 74 individuals NGOs directly involved in 164 security incidents, of which 56 per cent (91 cases) were attributed to AOG. The data also shows an increase in AOG kinetic attacks impacting NGOs (indirect fire, small arms fire (SAF), RPG, IEDs and arson combined with SAF, from 39 cases in 2011 to 45 this year). It is indicative that 54 per cent of kinetic attacks were assessed as purely collateral. The related casualties for 2012 are highlighted here above (see Figure XVIII). The first quarter of 2013 has marked an increased level of NGO exposure to the conflict, not dissimilar to the levels witnessed during 2011, assesses ANSO (see Figures XIX, XX). AOG attacks on NGOs spiked from the fiveyear low, recorded in the first quarter last year (2012) with nine incidents, to slightly above the levels seen in 2011 (20 in Q1 2013 v 18 in Q1 2011). All nine humanitarian casualties in 2013, from six distinct cases, resulted from AOG violence, though in two thirds of the cases they are considered collateral or accidental, says ANSO. In 2013, VOIEDs in rural areas and suicide attacks on high-profile government or Afghan security targets in population centres are the leading cause of NGO deaths and injuries. In 2012, targeted IED NGO strikes rose by 78 per cent while IED incidents accidentally involving NGO increased by 70 per cent. The data indicates that classic static AOG IEDs impacted NGOs more frequently in 2012 than in 2011(see Figure XXI). This occurred despite the country-wide 25 per cent decline in the use of IEDs by AOG in 2011. Casualties in road-side IED blasts decreased though in 2012. NGO casualties from IEDs remained predominantly collateral. Four suicide strikes, including two VBIED attacks in Wardak, all targeting high profile security targets, created the single largest number of NGO casualties which slightly declined as well in 2011.

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Figures XVIII & XIX: AGO Attack Types in 2013; NGO Fatalities by Regions in 2013

Source: Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), ANSO quarterly data report 2013, April 2013

NGO Casualties: IED Regional Rates

The ANSO map compares the provincial distribution of IED attacks on NGOs in 2012 (all types) with the general occurrence of IED detonations against all targets by all authors (including AOG and criminal). The data confirms that NGOs were most vulnerable in areas which combined high IED frequency with a robust NGO presence. Ten out of 19 cases occurred in Nangarhar (mainly roadside devices) and Khost (facilitybased), which ranked respectively fourth and fifth in regards to overall IED detonations in 2012.19 The mapping of major NGO incidents in the first quarter 2013 highlights the overlap of the intensified conflict activity in the East and parts of the Central with the dense NGO population in the same areas. The breakdown of NGO casualties reinforces the assessment that the core risks in these two regions remain linked to AOG attacks. Serious NGO incidents have also grown in the South20, as it is typical in the region, although the overall volume remained low (mainly due to a light NGO footprint).

19

The availability of AGO IED resources in the two provinces also provides explanation for the prevalence of criminal IED strikes on NGOs there; commonly displaying a convergence of criminal and political interests. 20 From two at Q1 2011 and one at Q1 2012 to five this quarter

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Figure XX: IED Detonations Involving NGOs in 2012

Source: Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), 2012 Q4 Incident Rate Map [from ANSO Q4 2012 Report] , 04 February 2013

Figure XXI: IED Detonations Involving NGOs in 2013

Source: Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), ANSO quarterly data report 2013, April 2013

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Section IV: Mine Awareness and ERW/UXO Threats

IEDs are not the only threat in Afghanistan. Mines, Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) also pose risks to the local population and to the military or civilian actors operating in Afghanistan.

Country Overview, Clearing Actions and Leading Actors

Afghanistan is one of the most mined countries in the world, with of up to 640,000 mines laid since 1979, estimates HALO Trust, a world leading NGO for demining operations21. Afghanistan was heavily mined by Soviet forces during the ten year occupation from 1979 to 1989, explains HALO Trust. Mine-laying continued during the 1992-1996 civil war which followed the Soviet withdrawal and most recently during the conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance (before 2001). All the armed parties involved in the earlier Afghan conflicts laid landmines to protect their main supply routes (particularly the road north from Kabul to the old Soviet border), their airfields, military posts around key towns, and the actual front lines. The geography of the conflict meant that different factions frequently mined the same areas at different times. In 2002, the Government of Afghanistan entrusted interim responsibility for mine action to the United Nations, via a coordination body managed by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). In January 2008, through the modality of an InterMinisterial Board (IMB) for Mine Action, the Afghan Government designated the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) under the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) to work jointly with the UN coordination body, Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA). Within the framework of the UN Action Program, mine action stakeholders have implemented a plan to clear the remaining known hazardous areas affecting 1,814 communities over the next ten years in Afghanistan. The first two years of this plan cover the period of April 2013 to March 2015 and details activities to be implemented and resources needed to complete 93 clearance projects (see Figure XXIII).

Current Situation: Overview and 2013 Casualties Figure XXII: MACCA Mine/ERW/UXO Clearing Achievements as for March 2013

Source: Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), Fast Facts 4th Quarter January to March 2013, April 2013

21

For instance, Halo Trust is the largest actor involved in demining in Afghanistan.

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According to the MACCA records for 2012, 140 Afghans were killed or injured by ERW, representing a significant decrease from a quarterly average of 507 casualties recorded in 2001. In May 2013, there were 28 casualties due to Mine/ERW recorded in Afghanistan (data as of 11 June 2013).From a regional perspective, the comparison between the levels of IED risk to the levels of Mine/ERW threat in Afghanistan is of notable interest. Earlier sections of this report demonstrate that the highest IED risk concentration was most prevalent in the south, east and south eastern regions, showing a convergence in those regions between the high volume of occurrences with a high rate of human casualties (all categories of victim considered).With regard to Mine/ERW hazards, the regional mapping published by MACCA reveals a contrast. Mine/ERW risks are the highest in the central Afghanistan provinces, followed by the northeast, the north, the southeast, the south, the west and the east which registers the lowest level of hazards. While Mine/ERW and IED hazards are not directly correlated, it is evident that these activities appear to mirror the other. As such, where the level of insurgent and IED-laying activities are the highest, the level of Mine/ERW hazards are the lowest as in the case of the south, east and southeast.

Figure XXIII: Mine/ERW Contamination Status of Afghan Districts as of 31 March 2013

Source: Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), Newsletter May 2013, June 2013

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Figure XXIV: Regional Mine/ERW Situation Based on Hazards and Area Sqm (as of March 2013)

Source: Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), Newsletter May 2013, June 2013

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Conclusion
The studied IED sources and materials reveal certain risk trends in Afghanistan. IEDs remain the most widespread warfare tactic used by insurgents in the country and for the most part are regionally correlated with the level of insurgent activities countrywide. While the report separately considers the volume of IED attacks from the rate of casualties, there is a strong regional correlation between the levels of IED attack volume with the rate of casualties. IEDs appear to be the main inflictors of casualties in all the covered victim categories with the level of Mine/ERW hazards contrasting with the level of IED risks. Insurgent and IED-laying activities are highest in the southern, eastern and south-eastern regions of Afghanistan in what appears to be a lasting trend. These regions continue to witness the highest volumes of IED attacks which cause the highest casualty rates among the ISAF ranks, the local population and humanitarians. Closer examination reveals that the civilian population is likely the most vulnerable to IED hazards. Although the UNAMA asserts that civilians are increasingly targeted by IED attacks, the German C-IED Centre suggests that civilian casualties have remained stable since 2008 while acknowledging civilians as the most targeted population. Regarding ISAF, IEDs remain the primary source of fatalities although this trend has decreased since 2009. In closing, Mine/ERW hazards remain the highest in the central and north regions contrasting with the IED risks which are the lowest in those areas although there is not clear correlation which might explain this observation. This report also intends to provide individuals who plan to operate in Afghanistan in the near future with an assessment of the level of IED risks and the level of the IED concentration in the country. From the reports findings, it is clear that anyone operating in Afghanistan should expect a high likelihood of IED attacks in the southern, eastern and south-eastern regions, requiring extra caution and a high level of awareness while staying in those areas. This trend is likely to remain sustainable in the future, as the volume of insurgent attack and activities is high and will likely remain as such considering the transition context in the country, witnessing the withdrawal of the international coalition and the preparation of the forthcoming Afghan Presidential election.

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