Dimaporo v.

Mitra FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress. Grounds may be termed to be shortened: Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest Voluntary renunciation of office ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another government position HELD: No. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935 Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity. If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.

Lozada vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-59068 January 27, 1983) FACTS: Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot filed a representative suit for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which reads: (2) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term. Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon City, Metro Manila, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while petitioner Romeo B. Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are "... deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and desirous to uphold the constitutional mandate and rule of law ...; that they have filed the instant petition on their own and in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of profound and general interest. " The respondent COMELEC, represented by counsel, opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners has legal standing to file the suit Jurisdiction of the SC over COMELEC HELD: DISMISSED As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly its ministerial duty under the constitutional provision above cited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public funds. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensible element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it ina form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XI IC Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:

Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof. There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is not alleged that the COMELEC was asked by petitioners to perform its alleged duty under the Constitution to call a special election, and that COMELEC has issued an order or resolution denying such petition.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966 Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965. Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

LIGOT VS MATHAY (G.R. NO. L-34676) FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum. ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit. HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.

Martinez vs Morfe Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor. For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative. Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest. HELD: There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity. ***According to Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution: The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. EXEMPTION: They can be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang Facts: Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961. Issue: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication Held: The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the phrase speech or debate in Congress as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question. The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Osmena, Jr. vs. Pendatun Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior. Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmenasparliamentary privilege of speech Held: Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of theHouse of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmenas conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.

Adaza v Pacana, G.R. No. 68159, March 18, 1985 Facts: Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected Governor of Misamis Oriental during the1980 elections. His Vice-Governor, herein respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., was likewise qualified and assumed office during their oath on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. Pacana and Adaza filed their certificates of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections on March 27, 1984 and April 27, 1984 respectively. Petitioner won and took his oath as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 9184 and respondent likewise took over the vacancy as Governor and took his oath of office on July 25,1984.Petitioner contends Pacanas unlawful occupancy of the Governors office, hence this petition for prohibition with a writ of parliamentary injunction and/or restraining order was filed before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Homobono Adaza can exercise and discharge his functions as Mambatas Pambansa and Provincial Governor simultaneously. Ruling: No. Under Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, a Member of the National Assembly (now Batasan Pambansa) shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. Petitioner Adaza, being a public officer is subject to the regulations and conditions as the law may impose and cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Upon taking his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa, petitioner subsequently operated to vacate his former post and he can no longer continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions which makes respondent to reassume the position of Vice-Governor and later on take oath of office as Governor for the unexpired term in lawful accordance with the Local Government Code.

Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International PipeIndustries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counselbefore any administrative body, and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares. Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholderof IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before anadministrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

Avelino vs Cuenco On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case. HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court. Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution? There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. **Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session? The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional

majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949) Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum. The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed. Justice Feria: (Concurring) Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

Alejandrino v Quezon Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby,declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino. Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered. Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments. In view of the propriety of mandamus Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House Members On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has

purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature. In view of effects of punishment Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. In view of no remedy Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the allconclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power.

MABANAG VS LOPEZ VITO (G.R. NO. L-1123) FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress. HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. **Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez Facts of the Case: Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609. Issue of the Case: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee. Held: No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction and between the terms urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of urea formaldehyde and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.

Morales vs Subido Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelors degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads: Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. HELD: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Astorga v. Villegas G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bills due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.

Bondoc vs. Pineda Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for theposition of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in DavaoDel Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents. En Banc Doctrine: citizenship Date: July 30, 1991 Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr. Facts: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari. Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed. Ratio: The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong

Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948. Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education. Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject. The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read: SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. 2. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father

would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest.

Coseteng v. Mitra (Digest) G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990 1. Facts: The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. Then, House , upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments (CA). Upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the 12th CA member, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House. A year later, the LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House affiliated with it the House committees, including the House representation in the CA, had to be reorganized to conform with the new political alignments. Petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the CA and HRET. Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen. After the reorganization, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. Hence the petition of for Extraordinary legal writs by Coseteng to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation on following grounds: the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House; the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their respective political parties or coalitions; the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the minority was clearly invalid; and that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House. Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA as a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority . Respondents contention was that: (1) that the legality of the reorganization of the CA is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition "as a form of a political party" ISSUE: W/N the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution YES. 1. The Court held that the petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, (which it does not), but because the revision of the House representation in the CA is based on proportional representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of

2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

a. b. c. d.

7. 8.

2.

3.

4.

the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the CA should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties, as they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party) in accordance with the Constitution. The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one from the minority is unassailable. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen. The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.

Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the Commission on Appointments(CA) is as follows: LDP7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC2.5; LAKAS-NUCD1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional halfmembership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18 Held: The respondents claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with therequirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up themembership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membershipin unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum.

Demetria vs Alba Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional. HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan ISSUE: W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities HELD: On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is strictly a legislative function or solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as

local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE Facts: Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5. The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them. Issues: Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process. Ruling: The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed. Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute or without limitation.

Sarmiento v. Mison Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs. Issue: Whether the appointments of Mison et. al. in unconstitutional? Held: No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President toappoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration ofsubjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution,the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of horse- trading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successiveamendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in like manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent orconfirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to theinterpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in

said secondsentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word alone after theword President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. Thisredundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After theeffectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of theCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: Facts: Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court. Issue:Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen or has qualified. Held: YES. To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective association and federation . xxxx Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution. The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB. The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the

succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same. Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions

Dela Cruz v Paras G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983 Fernando, CJ: Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. 3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. 4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs. 2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. 3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel

petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. 4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991 FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education. ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990 GR 87636 -EN BANC Facts: December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the president December 29, 1988 President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general provision. February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution decided to contest the constitutionality of the veto of the president of SEC 55 only. April 11, 1989 this petition was filed January 19, 1990 filed motion for leave to file and to admit supplemental petition same issues but included SEC 16 of House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA 6831) SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in the GAB thereby violation CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459) SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and the reason for veto remains the same with the additional legal basis of violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670 that authorizes the president and the heads of depts. To use saving to augment any item of appropriations in the exec branch of government (page 460) ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is unconstitutional. HELD: The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the line-veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.) The provisions are inappropriate because o They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations o Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill o It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the legislative the subject matter of the provisions should be dealt with in separate and complete legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT passed in that manner they attempt hide it in the GAB If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SHOULD resort to their constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1) DECISION: Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.

BENGZON VS DRILON FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law. This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force. When is it allowed? The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. 3 ways how a bill becomes a law. 1. When the President signs it 2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of each House; and 3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have been presented to him.

TAADA v. TUVERA Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President. Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Held: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (6 AIV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Judgment: Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect. Impt Point: It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one manMarcosare in fact laws of genl application & provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers. The generality of law (CC A14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was a ssailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to

compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

Neri v. Senate Facts: On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the PRC. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SRBC cited Neri for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be answered falls under executive privilege. HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. 1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And 3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority BANAT vs. COMELEC Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution. However, therecommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECsnational board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Issues: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections? Held: (1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. (3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.