You are on page 1of 7

LEGAL WRITING

TAMPIS, DORIS MORIEL B. I-B

Midterm Project
Criteria for Grading: English Narration of Facts Logic/Arguments Bibliography _____ _____ _____ _____ Needs Improvement on: Grammar and Sentence Structure _____ Flow of Paragraphs Conciseness _____ _____

Whenever you put a man in the Supreme Court, he ceases to be your friend this is a famous quotation from Harry Truman, the 33rd President of the United States of America, which finds its application on the current situation of our Government regarding the Impeachment Trial against our Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Renato Corona is the 23rd and current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. He was then appointed to the Court as Associate Justice on the 9th day of April, 2002 by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. On May 12, 2010, two days after the 2010 elections and a month before Arroyo's term expired, Corona was appointed as the Chief Justice, succeeding Reynato Puno who had reached the mandatory age of retirement. This appointment was not able to escape the eyes of the critics of both President GMA and Chief Justice Corona for allegedly being in violation of the Constitution under Section 15 of Article VII (Executive Department) which states that two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. In addition to such controversy as to the supposed midnight appointment made by President GMA, the refusal of the newly-elected President Aquino to take his oath of office to Corona as the Chief Justice intensified the issue of the invalidity of such appointment. Due to his belief that CJ Corona is an ally of President GMA, he repudiates to recognize CJ Corona as the Chief Justice. In relation to this matter, various queries are arising about the partiality of CJ Corona in the decisions being upheld by the Supreme Court in the cases which involves the Arroyo administration. Moreover, according to the survey released by Pulse Asia, Chief Justice Renato Corona is the least approved and least trusted top national official after receiving the lowest approval (38%) and trust (29%) ratings among the five top officials included in the poll. Despite the continuous struggle in building unity among the branches of the government, there is nothing but failure which resulted to the biggest news that led us to the impeachment trial we are having now. It was on the 12th day of December, 2011, in just a matter of hours, when members of the majority coalition at the House of Representatives agreed to directly send to the Senate the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Renato Corona, whose impartiality is being questioned by no less than President Benigno Aquino III. As chairperson of the House justice panel, Iloilo Rep. Niel Tupas Jr. prepared the case and said that a total of 176 members of the majority signed the complaint during a caucus. According to Rep. Niel Tupas Jr., the figure is more than the required number for the case to be transmitted directly to the Senate because under House rules, an impeachment complaint has to be approved by one-third of all House membersin this case, 95

lawmakersfor it to be able to be transmitted straight to the Senate for trial. In the verified complaint entitled In the Matter of the Impeachment of Renato C. Corona as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, an action for impeachment is brought in accordance with the provisions of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, on the grounds of: (a) Betrayal of Public Trust; (b) Culpable Violation of the Constitution; and (c) Graft and Corruption. Included in the verified complaint are the (8) articles of impeachment stating the particular allegations made against the Chief Justice. Among these, attention and analysis will be given to Article I stating that Respondent betrayed the Public Trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court Justice which continued to his dubious appointment as a midnight Chief Justice and up to the present. Since the issue here is the midnight appointment made by President GMA before her term expires, let us first define it. Midnight Appointment is an appointment to a political office made during the last hours of the term of office of the person in whom the right of making such appointment is vested. As provided in Section 9 under Article VIII (Judicial Department), The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. So it is clearly established that President GMA is solely vested with the right to choose among the nominees conferred by the Judicial and Bar Council. As presented by the prosecution in the complaint, Section 15 under Article VII of the 1987 Constitution clearly prohibits the President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term. The exception is the temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. In the case of In Re Appointments: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court, the Supreme Court rules that this provision bars the appointment of members of the judiciary. It was held that the appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required by law to fill up vacancies in the courts within the same time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

However, the Supreme Court recently decided the case of De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council reversing the Valenzuela ruling and held that the Constitutional prohibition singularly does not apply to the Supreme Court, implying that it applies only to the executive department and all other courts lower than the Supreme Court. The prosecution pointed out that despite the obviously negative and confidence-shattering impact that a midnight appointment by an outgoing President would have on the people's faith in the Supreme Court and the judicial system, Respondent eagerly, shamelessly, and without even a hint of self-restraint and delicadeza, accepted his midnight appointment as Chief Justice by then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Finally, Corona is also biased for Arroyo in politically significant cases from the time he was still a Justice to his eventual appointment to the Courts top post. Having established the arguments of the prosecution and conducting my own examination about the issue presented, I finally arrived at my own perspective and opinion regarding the midnight appointment of Chief Justice Renato Corona. According to the prosecution such appointment constitutes a betrayal of the public trust as explained in Article I of the Impeachment Complaint. I disagree. I. Coronas appointment was not unconstitutional since it was based on the March 2010 Supreme Court decision (De Castro v. JBC, et al) which ruled that members of the SC are not included in the election ban on appointments. As provided in Article 8 of the New Civil Code, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. And being the recent jurisprudence regarding the interpretations of Section 15 of Article VII and Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII, the Courts ruling in De Castro v. JBC shall be followed. It was held that had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC

ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. II. Corona is not being partial to Arroyo as contrary to allegations made regarding the voting record of Respondent which shows that he has consistently sided with the administration in politically-significant cases. It was further alleged that Corona lodged a high 78 percent in favor of Arroyo in the decisions made by the Supreme Court. It is clearly stated in Section 4 under Article VIII (Judicial Department) that cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. This means that Court decisions are collegial in nature and that the Chief Justice casts just one vote, merely insubstantial to constitute as majority in the voting of the Supreme Court. His votes are not consistently pro-Arroyo and if in such circumstances that his opinions were on the side of the Arroyo administration as assumed by the prosecution, they were made in consideration of the applicable laws and supported by sufficient and relevant evidences. III. That Corona was Arroyos trusted aide before his appointment to the court is not a relevant issue, because it is not uncommon for SC justices to have worked as professionals with close ties to the president who appointed them. It is but natural when a President or any appointing officer selects individuals who had a working relationship with them, because it is during these times that the appointing officer can assess the qualifications and fitness of the individual for the position. And even assuming that the prosecution has a point in this issue, we cannot disregard the functions of the Judicial and Bar Council in the selection and assessment process for the nominees. Chief Justice Corona, being considered as one of the nominees, is duly qualified for the position in the Supreme Court. If the professional relationship between the President and the appointed Chief Justice would always be an issue, then there would be no credibility anymore on the independence of the Supreme Court. As what President Truman said, Whenever you put a man in the Supreme Court, he ceases to be your friend. We should presume integrity in our Justices to maintain the authority of the Highest Court of the Land.

IV. The prosecutors are asking the Senate impeachment court to review SC decisions, which is not allowed under the principle of separation of powers. It is a basic principle in Constitutional Law that operates to maintain the legislative powers to the legislative department, executive powers to the executive department, and those which are judicial in character to the judiciary. Through this allocation of powers, the person entrusted shall not be permitted to encroach upon the power confided to the others, but that each shall, by the law of its creation, be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other. There must be independence and equity of the several departments. The separation of powers however should not be interpreted as complete separation and absolute exclusion. The doctrine carries that although the three branches are not subject to the control by either of the others and each is supreme within its own sphere, they are still equal and coordinate. Equal because they all derive their powers from the same common sovereign through the constitution. And coordinate because they cannot simply ignore the acts done by other departments as nugatory and not binding. In conclusion, it is still up to the Senate as the Impeachment Court to decide on the merits of the case presented by both parties. The trial is in progress, it is too early to determine which side presented more reasonable and reliable evidences and propositions. Whatever will be the finale for this impeachment trial, I just hope that it is justice that will still prevail. Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. Martin Luther King, Jr.

References: http://www.chanrobles.com/index.php/component/content/article/35/62impeachment-complaint-against-chief-justice-renato-c-corona-full-text http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/191002.htm http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/nov1998/98_5_01_sc.htm http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/241451/news/nation/house-majorityoks-impeach-case-vs-corona-for-senate-trial http://globalbalita.com/2012/the-corona-trial-a-summary/ http://www.batasnatin.com/attachments/1607_Utopia%20Consti.pdf http://www.topix.com/forum/world/philippines/TSAR7K2LBK51U67PI http://politicsandgovernance.blogspot.com/2010/06/doctrine-of-separation-ofpowers.html

You might also like