Dr.

Howard Curzer Professor of Philosophy Philosophy An Aristotelian Critique of the Traditional Family Virtue ethics has been criticized for having nothing to say about contemporary moral issues. Now I maintain, on the contrary, that virtue ethics can address contemporary moral issues by evaluating social practices and institutions. To illustrate, I develop an Aristotelian critique of the traditional family, demonstrating two different virtue ethics techniques. I show that the roles of dominant male breadwinner and subordinate female homemaker within the traditional family demand, select for, produce, and exacerbate Aristotelian moral vices. Good traditional husbands and wives lack or lose the virtues of appropriate ambition, pride, justice, liberality, temperance, friendliness, good temper, and courage. They are not good people. Thus, the roles of traditional husband and wife are immoral roles. The traditional family is a corrupt institution. And Aristotelian virtue ethics can address contemporary moral issues.

American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 47, Number 2, April 2010

An Aristotelian Critique of the Traditional Family

Howard J. Curzer

irtue ethics has been criticized for having little or nothing to say about contemporary moral issues. However, virtue ethics can address contemporary moral issues by evaluating social practices and institutions.1 Nor is virtue ethics limited to the politically conservative uses to which some theorists (following Alasdair MacIntyre) have put it. Indeed, virtue ethics can be a powerful engine for social progress. To illustrate, this paper will develop an Aristotelian critique of the white, middle-class, heterosexual American traditional family. The papers critique will have the fringe benefit of providing a basis for criticizing the choice of those who voluntarily opt for such families. Many people who lionize or demonize the traditional family have in mind an amalgam of idealized versions of different sorts of families from several different historical periods, so a historical sketch may provide some perspective. In the eighteenth century the typical white, middle-class, heterosexual, American family worked together on the family farm or business (which was not separate from the household) and participated together in the social, intellectual, and political life of their community. Both husband and wife shared substantially in domestic as well as nondomestic matters. He was ultimately in charge because men were thought to be more rational and therefore better able to

make plans, perceive moral truths, and control their passions. In the nineteenth century many such families migrated to the cities where the husband took a job in industry that required him to spend long hours away from home, struggling in a harsh, urban jungle, and so he relinquished most domestic tasks. Meanwhile, the wife retreated from the public world of work and political activity and took over responsibility for making the home into a refuge from the cutthroat world, a place where the husband could recharge his physical, emotional, and moral batteries. The general perception was that industrialization and urbanization reduced the husband to a brutish breadwinner, while the uncorrupted, unworldly wife angelically ministered to the physical and psychological needs of others. Poverty and lack of housing during the Great Depression revived the extended family in which all members struggled and saved together under the authority of the household elder.2 But this revival was a matter of necessity, not choice. Many found this extended family constraining and took the first opportunity to escape from it. The 1950s saw a reaction against the multigenerational, urban, thrifty family of the Depression years. People left their elders, moved to the suburbs, and engaged in a frenzy of consumer spending during the unprecedented prosperity following World War II. Although the patriarchal

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authority and public-private split remained, the 1950s white, middle-class, heterosexual, American family was not merely a reprise of the Victorian family. Instead of raising children, civilizing husbands, and merely keeping house, the 1950s wives tried be chauffeurs for their children, sex objects for their husbands, and virtuosos of domesticity, driving themselves to tranquilizers, alcohol, and therapy in the process. Meanwhile, 1950s husbands, for the first time, were expected to ground their identity and gain their satisfaction substantially through their family roles. In this paper the traditional family will mean the white, middle-class, heterosexual, suburban, American family of the 1950s, even though it is untraditional in many ways. simplification, verging on a caricature of the traditional family.3 But my description caricatures a real and widespread institution. The traditional family may be rare in some circles or in some regions of the country, but it is alive and well throughout most of the United States. Perhaps more importantly, the traditional family is clearly celebrated by many people. Some ordinary folks, academics, and politicians treat it as an ideal and use it as a basis for their own behavior, for value judgments, and for legislation. So a critique of the traditional family would be worthwhile even if it were actually a rare, or even fictional, institution. Those now urging a return to the traditional family and family values seem to focus on two morally dubious aspects of the traditional family: the gendered division of labor which arose in the nineteenth century, and the gendered division of power which was already in place in the eighteenth century. Sociologist David Popenoe says, for example, the traditional nuclear family [is based upon] a sharp division of labor ... with the female as full-time housewife and the male as primary provider and ultimate authority.4 This paper will, therefore, focus upon these two aspects, even though the traditional family has many other morally dubious features. Indeed, this paper will not present a complete list of thorough criticisms of even these two aspects of the traditional family. My critique will be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Moreover, this papers criticisms of the traditional family do not themselves imply that a morally better alternative is a live option for our society. Although reducing the gendered division of labor and power would probably be a significant improvement, the traditional family might turn out to be the best achievable family relationship. The following criticisms of the traditional family are not, for the most part, new criticisms (although there will be a few surprises).

Caveats
Since an institution may be moral in some circumstances and immoral in others, moral judgment must be sensitive to context. This paper takes no stand on whether the traditional family was right for people of the 1950s. Instead, the paper argues that the traditional family is an immoral institution for today. Some see the traditional family through the lens of nostalgia; others see it distorted by bitterness and pain. In this paper the traditional family will mean neither the idealized, Father Knows Best family nor some nightmarish inversion of this ideal. Without denying the existence of either wonderful or horrible families, this paper will focus on typical traditional families. Note that these families are not now, and never were, typical families. Black families, impoverished families, rich families, and homosexual families are excluded not because they are unimportant; they simply are not this papers target, for it is the traditional family rather than these others that is sometimes held up as a paradigm. Unfortunately, a nuanced depiction of the traditional family is beyond the scope of this paper, so the target will have to be a severe

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The novelty of my approach consists rather in showing how these criticisms can be derived from an Aristotelian virtue ethics. Rather than providing new results about the traditional family, the present paper provides new weapons to the critical arsenal. Why aim new weapons at an old target? To test the accuracy of the weapons. The fact that my approach captures familiar criticisms of the traditional family is some evidence of the trustworthiness of my approach. This paper will argue that the traditional family generates and sustains certain bad character traits, but the traditional family does not do so all by itself. It is only one contributory cause among many within our society. The family might seem to be an unpromising institution for Aristotelian virtue ethics to address, since Aristotles discussion of the family is quite sexist by todays standards. But this paper will ignore much of what Aristotle says and use only some strands of his thought. For example, accepted are Aristotles list of virtues and his doctrine of the mean, but not his deprecation of women. Accepted are Aristotles view of the relationship between virtue simplicitare and role virtue as well as his belief that the family is a sort of friendship, but not his willingness to exploit natural slaves within households to create the leisure time necessary for philosophy. Mine is an Aristotelian account, but not Aristotles account.

General Approach
A good citizen, says Aristotle, is a person who has the character traits conducive to making an appropriate contribution to the goal of the state. These character traits are the virtues of a citizen. Since different states have different goals, a person who is a good citizen in one state might be a poor citizen in another. For example, a person who vigilantly watches the state for violations of human rights may be a good citizen of a democratic, open society but a bad

citizen of a totalitarian dictatorship (Politics 1276b3035). Aristotle also says that the virtues of a person, the moral virtues, are the virtues of citizens of good states. Good citizens of good states are good people; good citizens of bad states are bad people (Politics 1288a3739).5 Thus, the moral virtues can be used as touchstones for evaluating states (although Aristotle himself does not use the moral virtues in this way). The more a good person and a good citizen differ, the more corrupt the state. A good sailor, says Aristotle, is a person who has the character traits conducive to performing the function of a sailor, to doing well what a sailor should do (Politics 1276b2027). These character traits are the virtues of a sailor. Of course, one could go on to define the virtues of a nurse, a neighbor, a nun, and various other roles within society. Since different roles have different goals, the virtues of different roles may differ from each other and from the moral virtues that constitute the character of a good person. Some role virtues might be moral vices and vice versa. The injustice that is a virtue for a good thief is a moral vice, for example. Thus, the moral virtues can be used as touchstones for evaluating roles, just as they can be used to evaluate states. For any role, X, within a society, the more a good X and a good person differ, the more corrupt is the role X. Aristotle says that it is impossible for a person occupying the role of farmer or the role of menial, mechanical worker (banausos) to acquire or maintain the moral virtues. Farmers and menial workers cannot be good people (Politics 1278a1721). Aristotles reason is not that farmers and menial workers are somehow naturally inferior (Politics 1260a36b2). Instead, Aristotle thinks they are unable to be virtuous both because these roles have goals inimical to virtue and so require vices (Politics 1341b818), and because these roles squeeze out the leisure necessary

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for virtue (Politics 1328b391329a2) and generally degrade the mind and body (Politics 1337b815). While dissenting from Aristotles specific claims about farmers and menial workers, I propose to accept his general point that certain roles hinder the acquisition of virtue and destroy already existing virtue. To pick an extreme example, it would be difficult to remain a virtuous person while working as a professional torturer. Presumably, a role that blocks and breaks down moral virtue is a corrupt role even if it does not actually require the absence of virtue. This is a second way in which the moral virtues can be used as touchstones for evaluating roles. The critique of roles is, by extension, a critique of the institutions within which these roles are embedded. Insofar as the virtues of certain roles are incompatible with the virtues that characterize the good person, not only these roles, but also their associated institutions, are corrupt. Similarly, insofar as certain roles tend to impede and erode the moral virtues, both they and their institutions are corrupt. This paper will show that the roles of traditional husband and wife require, select for, produce, and worsen Aristotelian moral vices because of the gendered division of labor and power within the traditional family. Thus, the roles of traditional husband and wife are corrupt roles, and the traditional family is a corrupt institution. Interpretations of Aristotles account of happiness (the good human life) vary, but one widely shared view is that for Aristotle, happiness consists in the appropriate exercise of all essential human abilities together with sufficient external goods such as wealth and friendship over a lifetime. Since the essential human abilities constitute human nature, and their appropriate exercise constitutes virtuous activity, happiness is living the virtuous life. Together, Aristotles accounts of appropriate ambition and happiness imply that one should strive to acquire appropriate amounts and types of honor through the development and use of all of the abilities that constitute human nature. In particular, people can be deficient in ambition not only by aiming at too little honor, but also by insufficient use of the essential human abilities.6 Although the notion of essential human abilities or human nature may sound old-fashioned in the postexistentialist world, the belief that one should exercise all of ones constitutive or important abilities is widely shared. Children are taught to work up to your potential lest they be underachievers, and army recruiting posters urge people to Be all that you can be! Similarly, seeking honor may sound quaint, but seeking praise or credit or respect is widely encouraged. Thus, Aristotles accounts of happiness and honor are not anachronistic today. Is the traditional family is conducive to Aristotelian happiness? As many have observed, the traditional family brings substantial legal, economic, social, and ideological pressure to bear on husband and wife to ensure that they stay in their own spheres and out of each others spheres. It hinders traditional wives from engaging in (let alone seeking honor through) productive work and political activity. And it keeps husbands from the important spheres of child care and housework. For example, according to the ideology of the traditional family, wives who seek work outside the home

Appropriate Ambition (Philotimia)

Each Aristotelian virtue governs a different sphere of human life usually (though not always) involving different passions, desires, and types of objects. Aristotle describes the virtue of appropriate ambition as a desire for an appropriate amount of the appropriate sort of honor. One should desire neither more honor than one deserves nor less, but just the right amount of the right sort of honor from the right people (NE 1125b78).

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sphere of courage, too, the traditional family is flawed, for it tends to produce and require opposite vices in husband and wife.21 To many readers this will not be news. The main point of this paper has been to demonstrate that Aristotelian virtue ethics is able to address a contemporary moral issue at all. More precisely, this paper may be viewed as an experiment, a test of whether certain Aristotelian assumptions yield a plausible critique of the traditional family. Insofar as the critique has been successful, the decision to accept Aristotles list of virtues, his account of role virtue, etc., will have been vindicated. Moreover, this paper has exhibited two different, though related, virtue ethics techniques for evaluating roles, and hence institutions. These two tools (by themselves or in conjunction with others) should enable enterprising Aristotelians to address other moral issues, too.

Conclusion
This paper has shown that the traditional American family is bad because it requires immoral character traits and because it corrodes the characters of both husbands and wives. The roles of dominant male breadwinner and subordinate female homemaker demand, select for, produce, and exacerbate Aristotelian moral vices in several spheres. Good traditional husbands and wives lack or lose the virtues of appropriate ambition, pride, justice, liberality, temperance, friendliness, good temper, and courage. They are not good people.22 Thus, the roles of traditional husband and wife are immoral roles. The traditional American family is a corrupt institution.

Notes
1. Others have undertaken this project. See P. Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and M. Slote, Morals From Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 2. The Depression and World War II also fragmented some families. Many people abandoned their families to seek jobs elsewhere, the divorce rate rose, etc. But this paper focuses on intact families. 3. For a more accurate, detailed description of the traditional family, see S. Coontz, The Way We Really Are (New York, Basic Books, 1997), pp. 3351; S. Coontz, The Way We Never Were (New York, Basic Books, 1992); C. Degler, The Emergence of the Modern American Family, The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective, 3rd ed., ed. M. Gordon (New York: St. Martins Press, 1983), pp. 6179; J. Demos, Past, Present, and Personal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); C.Lasch, Social Pathologists and the Socialization of Reproduction, The American Family in SocialHistorical Perspective, 3rd ed., ed. M. Gordon (New York: St. Martins Press, 1983), pp. 8094; S. Mintz and S. Kellogg, Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life (New York: Macmillan, 1988); and A. Skolnick, The Intimate Environment, 6th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 99159. 4. D. Popenoe, Disturbing the Nest: Family Change and Decline in Modern Societies (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1989), p. 1. 5. Bad citizens of good states are bad people, but it does not follow that bad citizens of bad states are good people. 6. It might be argued that the exercise of the essential human abilities is not governed solely by appropriate ambition, but instead is diffused throughout the rest of the virtues. Perhaps part of temperance is desiring the appropriate exercise of ones senses, for example. After all, self-realization depends

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upon the successful exercise of all of the virtues. This would not affect the papers main point, which is that the exercise of the essential human abilities is both necessary for flourishing and inhibited by the traditional family. 7. Here I am, of course, deviating dramatically from Aristotles own view. 8. B. Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: Dell, 1963). 9. People with Aristotelian pride also have great virtue. They are moral saints; they go above and beyond the call of duty. This aspect of Aristotelian pride plays no role in the present paper, however. 10. Typical wives may not have actually performed this civilizing function, but it was widely thought to be part of their role in the family. 11. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). 12. Arneson defends this view against Okins equal split proposal. See R. Arneson, Feminism and Family Justice, Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 11 (1997), pp. 313330; and S. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 171. 13. Aristotle does not mention the vice of insufficient desire in his discussion of justice, but he does mention that the unduly humble man ... robs himself of what he deserves (NE 1125a1920). Insufficient desire is actually a common trait that keeps people content with their unjust lot. 14. A defense of the claim that self-sacrifice is a moral vice is beyond the scope of this paper. However, one need not be an AynRandian or even an Aristotelian to acknowledge that regularly placing the interests of others ahead of ones own is a character flaw, typically stemming from insufficient self-respect. See T. Hill, Servility and Self-Respect, in his Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 418, for a Kantian defense of this thesis. 15. This is an oversimplification. Major purchases such as house and car fall within the husbands purview. They seem to be in the public arena. Moreover, the traditional wife often has an income. Nevertheless, his purchases are perceived as extra, exceptional, not really shopping, and her income is perceived as extra, exceptional, outside of her real role. 16. F. Engels, Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State, in Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, vol. 26, trans. A. West (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990), pp. 178179. 17. Since the traditional wife is unjustly treated, some resentment is justified on the part of the wife and some extra compensation is called for on the part of the husband, but here I am delineating the tendency to ignore the husbands contribution completely rather than recognizing its inadequacy. 18. Coontz, The Way We Never Were, pp. 5657. 19. Aristotle observes that inequalities of power and wealth corrupt the character of both the haves and the have nots in various ways and thus undermine the state (Politics 1295b134). Unfortunately, Aristotle does not apply this observation to the family. 20. He may be wrong. Morbidity, mortality, and overall unhappiness of divorced men jumps while that of divorced women drops. This is not widely appreciated, however. 21. I am grateful to Anne Epstein for helping me apply the virtue of courage to the traditional family. 22. Traditional families, like corrupt states, may contain good people, of course. But these people cannot be good traditional husbands or wives.