torts & damages A2010 - 94 prof.

casis xxx xxx xxx"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts andt r a d e s s h a l l b e l i a b l e f o r d a m a g e s c a u s e d b y t h e i r pupils and students or apprentices, so long as theyremain in their custody." HELD Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable. Ratio: A s r e g a r d s t h e p r i n c i p a l , W e h o l d t h a t h e cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Reasoning: This is in line with the Courts ruling in Amadora vs. C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , w h e r e i n t h i s C o u r t t h o r o u g h l y discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of theCivil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of anacademic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to saythat in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-c h a r g e o f t h e c h i l d r e n f o r b e i n g n e g l i g e n t i n h i s s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r t h e m a n d h i s f a i l u r e t o t a k e t h e necessary precautions to prevent any injury on theirpersons. Reasoning: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manuallaborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to e l e v e n t o m a k e a n e x c a v a t i o n n e a r t h e o n e t o n concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardoustask;(2) required the children to remain inside the pit evenafter they had finished digging, knowing that the hugeblock was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to theperilous area;( 3 ) o r d e r e d t h e m t o l e v e l t h e s o i l a r o u n d t h e e x c a v a t i o n w h e n i t w a s s o a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e h u g e stone was at the brink of falling;( 4 ) w e n t t o a p l a c e w h e r e h e w o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o check on the children's safety; and (5) left the childrenc l o s e t o t h e e x c a v a t i o n , a n o b v i o u s l y a t t r a c t i v e nuisance.(6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it isevident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degreeof care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself.A minor should not be held to the same degree of careas an adult, but his conduct should be judged accordingt o t h e a v e r a g e c o n d u c t o f p e r s o n s o f h i s a g e a n d experience. The standard of conduct to which a childmust conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age,capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience underthe same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with recklessimprudence. DISPOSITION

Granted. SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of theBCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro, astudent of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977, ataround 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF. BCF isboth an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP.Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos(ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President andC h a i r m a n o f t h e B o a r d o f B C F ) , J e s u s S a l v o s a (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio( D e a n o f t h e C o l l e g e o f E d u c a t i o n a n d E x e c u t i v e Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants.After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) s e n t e n c i n g d e f e n d a n t s J i m m y B . A b o n , B e n j a m i n Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointlyand severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro; (2) absolving the other defendants;and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for l a c k o f m e r i t . ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with JimmyB. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B.Abon. HELD NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been"at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF,when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code beheld solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Ratio: Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of artsand trades are hable for "damages caused by theirpupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liabilityis that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in locoparentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the[student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 ' s o l o n g a s ( t h e s t u d e n t s ) r e m a i n i n t h e i r c u s t o d y means the protective and supervisory custody that theschool and its heads and teachers exercise over thep u p i l s a n d s t u d e n t s f o r a s l o n g a s t h e y a r e at attendance in the school , including recess time." Reasoning: a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by theCA. According to the CA, while it is true that Abon wasnot attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident

, which was at about 8 o'clock inthe evening; but considering that Abon was employedas an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTCunit, he must have been attending night classes and t h e r e f o r e t h a t h o u r i n t h e e v e n i n g w a s j u s t a b o u t dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The timeinterval is safely within the "recess time" that the trialcourt spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra . In line with the case of Palisoc , 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in thephrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activitieswhere the student still remains within call of his mentorand is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted.R e c e s s b y i t s n a t u r e d o e s n o t i n c l u d e d i s m i s s a l . Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in thepremises of a school without more does not constitute" a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l " o r b e i n g i n t h e " p r o t e c t i v e a n d supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated inthe law.b. Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in thearmory with definite instructions from his superior, theROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro. S T . F R A N C I S H I G H S C H O O L v CA(Castillo/Cadiz) 194 SCRA 340Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS torts & damages A2010 - 95 prof. casis Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St.Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Quezon. His parents didnt allow him to go dueto short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. However,h e w a s p e r s u a d e d b y h i s t e a c h e r s t o g o a n d l a t e r drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher.-his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS,r e p r e s e n t e d b y i t s p r i n c i p a l , I l l u m i n , a n d s e v e r a l teachers for damages incurred from the death of theirson, contending that it occurred due to petitioners failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family. The TC found against the teachers as theyh a d f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e d i l i g e n c e b y n o t t e s t i n g t h e waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. Also, the male teachers

who were to watch overthe kids were not even in the area as they went off d r i n k i n g . T h e T C d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e a g a i n s t t h e principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former hadn o t consented to the picnic which was not s c h o o l s a n c t i o n e d , a n d a s t h e l a t t e r h a d h e r o w n c l a s s t o supervise then and was not actually invited.-Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of theliability of St. Francis HS and the Illumin, the CA held that both are liable under Article 2176 taken togetherw i t h t h e 1 st ,4 th , and 5 th paragraphs of Article 2180. They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnta n e x t r a - c u r r i c u l a r a c t i v i t y o f t h e H S . F r o m t h e evidence, it was shown that the principal had known of t h e p i c n i c f r o m i t s p l a n n i n g s t a g e a n d m e r e l y acquiesced to the holding of the event. As such, underArticle 2180, both are jointly and severally liable w/ theteachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumptionof negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. Francis and the principal). Petitioners contend that thevictims parents failed to prove by evidence that theydidnt give their son consent to join the picnic. TheCourt finds this immaterial to the determination of theexistence of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers whoarrived after the drowning were absolved from liabilityas they had satisfactorily explained their lateness andt h u s c o u l d n o t b e s a i d t o h a v e p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e negligence attributed to the other teachers. Hence thispetition. ISSUE ( 1 ) W O N t h e r e w a s n e g l i g e n c e a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e defendants(2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable(3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages isproper HELD ( 1 ) N O . P e t i t i o n e r s a r e n e i t h e r g u i l t y o f t h e i r o w n negligence or the negligence of people under them. Atthe outset, it should be noted that the victims parentsallowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination.- M e r e k n o w l e d g e b y I l l u m i n o f t h e p l a n n i n g o f t h e picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. If the CAs findings are to be upheld, employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailedto Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions arecommitted while they are not in the performance of their duties.-No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s o v e r t h r o w n b y p r o o f t h a t t h e y exercised diligence of a good father of the family. Infact, 2 P.E. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming.L i f e s a v e r s w e r e b r o u g h t i n t h e e v e n t o f s u c h a n accident. The records also show that the 2 P.E. teachersdid all that was humanly possible to save the victim.(2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180, particularlyp a r 4 . F o r a n e m p l o y e r t o b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r t h e negligence of his employee, the act or omission whichcaused damage or prejudice must have occurred whilean employee was in the performance of his assignedtask. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in actualperformance of their duties

as the picnic was a purelyprivate affair and not a school sanctioned activity.(3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they hadexercised the diligence required of them, no moral orexemplary damages under Art. 2177 may be awardedin favor of respondent spouses. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decisionis SET ASID E PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729Padilla, J.: Feb. 4, 1992 FACTS -Carlitos Bautista, enrolled in the 3 rd year commercec o u r s e o f P S B A , w a s s t a b b e d a n d k i l l e d w h i l e o n c a m p u s b y assailants who were from outside theschools academic community. T h i s p r o m p t e d h i s parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ JudgeOrdonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA a n d i t s c o r p o r a t e officers, alleging n e g l i g e n c e , recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack of thevictim.-PSBA sought to dismiss the case, alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180, there wasno cause of action since academic institutions are notsubject to the said provision.- A m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s a n d a s u b s e q u e n t M F R w e r e d e n i e d b y t h e T C , y i e l d i n g t h e s a m e r e s u l t s u p o n appeal with the CA. Hence this petition. ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO. Because the circumstances of the present caseevince a contractual relation between the parties, therules on quasi-delict do not really govern; but the courthas repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may stillexist even when there is a contract.-Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad: the mere factthat a person is bound to another by contract does notrelieve him from extracontractual liability to suchperson. When such a contractual relation exists theobligor may break the contract under such conditionsthat the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed betweenthe parties-Using the test in Cangco , a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBAs liability; hence, anyfinding of negligence would generally give rise to abreach of contractual obligation only.-When an academic institution accepts a student forenrollment, a contract is established between them, resulting in a bilateral obligation. The school is obligedto provide the student with an education, along with asafe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. In turn, the student abides by theschools academic requirements and observes its rulesa n d r e g u l a t i o n s . H o w e v e r , a s c h o o l c a n n o t b e a n insurer for its students against all risks; one can onlyexpect it to employ the degree of diligence required bythe nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.- In the case at bar a

finding is yet to be made as to w h e t h e r t h e c o n t r a c t w a s b r e a c h e d d u e t o P S B A s negligence in providing proper security measures. At this stage, the proceedings have yet to commence onthe substance of the private respondents complaintand the record is bereft of all material facts which onlythe TC can determine. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedingsconsistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners. SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 torts & damages A2010 - 96 prof. casis FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992 NATURE Civil complaint for damages FACTS - On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff MaximoSoliman, Jr., a s t u d e n t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t R e p u b l i c Central Colleges (RCC), was in the campus premises thereof, the defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was thenin the premises of said school performing his duties assecurity guard under the employment of defendant R.L.Security Agency, Inc., without any provocation, shot theplaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was confined in ahospital, and as per doctor's opinion, he may not be a b l e t o a t t e n d t o h i s r e g u l a r c l a s s e s a n d w i l l b e incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for ad u r a t i o n o f f r o m t h r e e t o f o u r m o n t h s . P e t i t i o n e r , represented by his guardian, filed a civil complaint ford a m a g e s a g a i n s t R C C , R L S e c u r i t y A g e n c y a n d Solomon,- RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that thecomplaint stated no cause of action against it. It arguedthat it is free from any liability for the injuries sustainedby petitioner student for the reason that it was not theemployer of the security guard Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Itfurther argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of theCivil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and tradesliable for damages caused by their pupils and studentsor apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomonwas not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.- Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCs motion to dismiss. Petitioners MFR was denied, Hence,this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180,as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the CivilCode2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basisin law, for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1. NO - U n d e r A r t . 2 1 8 0 , t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o r e s p o n d f o r damage inflicted by one against another by fault or n e g l i g e n c e e x i s t s n o t o n l y f o r o n e ' s o w n a c t o r omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person forwhom one is by law responsible. Among the personsheld vicariously responsible for acts or omissions

of another person are the following:xxx xxx xxxEmployers shall be liable for the damages caused bytheir employees and household helper, acting withinthe scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.xxx xxx xxxLastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts andt r a d e s s h a l l b e l i a b l e f o r d a m a g e s c a u s e d b y t h e i r pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.- The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis forholding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman, Jr. RCCwas not the employer of Solomon. The employer of Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while theschool was the client of the latter. It is settled thatwhere the security agency, as here, recruits, hires andassigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, t h e a g e n c y i s t h e e m p l o y e r o f s u c h guards orwatchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful a c t s committed by the security guards attaches to theemployer agency, and not to the clients of sucha g e n c y . There being no e m p l o y e r - e m p l o y e e relationship between RCC and Solomon, petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for theacts of Solomon.- Since there is no question that Solomon was not apupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, hebeing in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposingliability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.- The relevant portions of the other Articles of the CivilCode invoked by petitioner are as follows: Art. 349 . The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:xxx xxx xxx(2) Teachers and professors;xxx xxx xxx(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard toapprentices;xxx xxx xxx Art. 350 . The persons named in the preceding articleshall exercise reasonable supervision over the conductof the child.xxx xxx xxx Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil,p r o f e s s o r a n d s t u d e n t a r e f i x e d b y g o v e r n m e n t regulations and those of each school or institution. Inno case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. T h e t e a c h e r o r p r o f e s s o r s h a l l cultivate the bestpotentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil o r student."- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the owner andpresident of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages forthe death of Palisoc, a student of that Institute, whichresulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon, anotherstudent of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7thparagraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in theinstant case.- Persons exercising substitute parental authority aremade responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substituteparental authority. In the instant case, Solomon whocommitted allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury topetitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of theRepublic Central Colleges; the school had no substituteparental authority over Solomon.2. YES

- In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article2 1 8 0 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e w a s n o t a p p l i c a b l e w h e r e a student had been injured by one who was an outsideror by one over whom the school did not exercise anycustody or control or supervision. At the same time,however, the court stressed that an implied contractmay be held to be established between a school whichaccepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, andt h e s t u d e n t s w h o a r e e n r o l l e d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , which contract results in obligations for both parties. Itheld: When an academic institution accepts studentsfor enrollment, there is established a contract betweenthem, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties areb o u n d t o c o m p l y w i t h . F o r i t s p a r t , t h e s c h o o l undertakes to provide the student with an educationthat would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenantsto abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learningmust also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of p r o v i d i n g t h e i r s t u d e n t s w i t h a n a t m o s p h e r e t h a t promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertakingof imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student canabsorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematicsor explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the airor where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the schoolmust ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintainpeace and order within the campus premises and toprevent the breakdown thereof.- I t w a s a l s o p o i n t e d o u t i n s a i d c a s e t h a t : " I n t h e circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between s c h o o l a n d Bautista had been breached thru theformer's negligence in providing proper securitym e a s u r e s . T h i s w o u l d b e f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t tod e t e r m i n e . And, even if there be a finding o f negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would notbe relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence torts & damages A2010 - 97 prof. casis b e c o m e s m a t e r i a l o n l y b e c a u s e o f t h e c o n t r a c t u a l relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, acontractual relation is a condition sine qua non to theschool's liability. The negligence of the school cannot e x i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e c o n t r a c t , u n l e s s t h e negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.- I n t h e P S B A c a s e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a d d e n i e d t h e school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, andboth the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court'sorder. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted themotion to dismiss filed by RCC, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and couldhave been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious orallegedly tortious in character may at the same time c o n s t i t u t e b r e a c h o f a c o n t r a c t u a l o r o t h e r l e g a l obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious errorwhen he supposed that petitioner

could have no causeof action other than one based on Article 2180 of theCivil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have,in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to proveacts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC. Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to t r e a t t h e c o m m e n t o f r e s p o n d e n t Colleges as itsanswer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the O r d e r granting the motion to dismiss the case.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings. ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS PARDO, February 6, 2002 NATURE A p p e a l v i a c e r t i o r a r i f r o m C A d e c i a n d r e s o l u t i o n denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR)-Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel II(then 15, driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then inp o s s e s s i o n a n d w a s d r i v i n g t h e j e e p , G r a n d s o n o f Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and othercompanions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle.It was found out that the steering wheel guide wasdetached. Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II,his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva.- T C : a b s o l v e d V i l l a n u e v a a n d J a m e s D a n i e l I I , h e l d parents and school liable-CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding thatschool was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehiclewithout a teacher accompanying them. ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Marys Academy)W O N S t . M a r y s A c a d e m y s h o u l d b e h e l d l i a b l e f o r death of Sherwin Carpitanos, and therefore, liable for damages HELDNO. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between ther e m o t e c a u s e a n d t h e i n j u r y , t h e r e i n t e r v e n e d t h e negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be shownthat the injury for which recovery is sought must bethe legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury mustbe a direct and natural sequence of events, unbrokenby intervening efficient causes. Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that thenegligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.-The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.Respondents did not present any evidence to show t h a t t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e a c c i d e n t w a s t h e negligence of the school authorities, or the recklessd r i v i n g o f J a m e s D a n i e l I I s o r e l i a n c e o n A 2 1 9 i s unfounded.-There was no evidence that petitioner school allowedt h e m i n o r J a m e s D a n i e l I I t o d r i v e t h e j e e p o f respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanuevawas in possession and in control of the jeep, and was infact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep.- L i a b i l i t y f o r t h e a c c i d e n t , w h e t h e r c a u s e d b y

t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f t h e m i n o r d r i v e r o r m e c h a n i c a l detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. Thenegligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only aremote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligenceo f t h e m i n o r s p a r e n t s o r t h e d e t a c h m e n t o f t h e steering wheel guide of the jeep.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of thesteering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondentV i l l a n u e v a w a s a n e v e n t o v e r w h i c h p e t i t i o n e r S t . Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not beheld liable for the death resulting from such accident.It is not the school, but the registered owner of thevehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES andSETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18]and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liabilityof defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy,Dipolog City. No costs. SO ORDERED. P H I L R A B B I T B U S L I N E S V P H I L - A M FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231AQUINO; March 25, 1975 NATURE Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGANfiled a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICANF O R W A R D E R S , I n c . , i t s m a n a g e r B A L I N G I T a n d t h e driver, PINEDA.- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK, owned by Phil-Am, along the natl highway atSto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS d r i v e n by Pangalangan, owned by Phil R a b b i t . P a n g a l a n g a n s u f f e r e d i n j u r i e s a n d t h e b u s w a s damaged a n d c o u l d n o t b e u s e d f o r 7 9 d a y s . T h i s deprived the company of earnings of about P8,600.- Among the defenses interposed by the defendantswas that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed onthe ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him.- CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on theg r o u n d t h a t h e w a s n o t t h e m a n a g e r o f a n establishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC.- In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because outof its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingitand his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that theveil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as oneand the same civil personality. But this was not allegedin their complaint.* ISSUE W O N t h e t e r m s " e m p l o y e r s " a n d " o w n e r s a n d managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD

NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of E s t a b l i s h m e n t s : A r t . 2 1 8 0 uses the term

torts & damages A2010 - 98 prof. casis "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) tomean "employer. - Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, notortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,in connection with the vehicular accident because he h i m s e l f m a y b e regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.* T h i s i s s u e w a s n o t r a i s e d i n t h e l o w e r c o u r t s o i t would be unfair to allow them to do so now. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed inthe trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has ap e r s o n a l i t y s e p a r a t e a n d d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t o f t h e Balingit spouses. Dispositive L o w e r c o u r t s o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l i s AFFIRMED. PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562DAVIDE; June 17, 1997 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No. 373 was an action against hereinpetitioners for d a m a g e s i n s t i t u t e d b y t h e h e i r s o f Ramon A. Acuesta-Private respondents alleged that the petitioners wereguilty of gross negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and regulations, abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondents Version -In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00 oclock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in hiseasy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street-On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco ServiceEnterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No.

4025driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine.-The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St.and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street.-As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby thebus continued on its running motion and it occurred atthe time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding onhis bicycle was directly in front of the said bus.-As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced bythe said functioning engine, thereby the subject busbumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by thesaid bus. Petitioners Version -Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City,w a r m e d u p t h e e n g i n e o f t h e b u s a n d m a d e a f e w rounds within the city proper of Calbayog.-While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising a l o n g G o m e z S t r e e t , t h e v i c t i m , w h o w a s b i k i n g t o w a r d s t h e s a m e d i r e c t i o n a s t h e b u s , s u d d e n l y overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road.-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even asManilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, thevictim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus.- P e t i t i o n e r s a l l e g e d t h a t P h i l t r a n c o e x e r c i s e d t h e diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including petitionerManilhig who had excellent record as a driver and hadundergone months of rigid training before he was hired.-Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligenceof the victim in overtaking two tricycles, without takingprecautions such as seeing first that the road was clear,which caused the death of the victim ** Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents-Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and denied MFR-Hence, this appeal ISSUE W O N p e t i t i o n e r P h i l t r a n c o i s s o l i d a r i l y l i a b l e w i t h Manilhig for damages HELD Yes.-Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 14 and 2180 15 of the Civil (limited to that involved in the outline) 14 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, therebeing fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Suchfault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation betweenthe parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 15 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable notonly for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.xxxxxxxxx The

owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewiseresponsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of thebranches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.xxxxxxxxxEmployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees andhousehold helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, eventhough the former are not engaged in any business or industry.xxxxxxxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the personsherein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a goodfather of a family to prevent damage Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco, respectively.We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, likepetitioner Philtranco, for damages arising fromthe tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct ,and joint and several or solidary with the driver.As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damagesis satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from itsemployee who committed the fault or negligence whichgave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for thedamage caused by his dependents or employees mayrecover from the latter what he has paid or delivered insatisfaction of the claim. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ Dec. 21, 1999. Davide Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, RomeoSo Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle aroundFuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter- clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) butwithout any protective helmet or goggles. He was alsoonly carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] managerof Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registeredowner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the saidcompany car out of a parking lot but instead of going a r o u n d t h e O s m e a r o t u n d a h e m a d e a s h o r t c u t against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez andthe pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicleand brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospitaland later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Vasquez diedat the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad s i g n e d a n a c k n o w l e d g m e n t o f R e s p o n s i b l e P a r t y (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospitalbills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.

torts & damages A2010 - 99 prof. casis After the police authorities had conducted theinvestigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filedagainst Abad but which was subsequently dismissed forfailure to prosecute. So, the present action for damageswas commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez,against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex IndustrialCorporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospitalintervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liablefor the death resulting from the negligent operation bya managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. Thenegligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance.Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries andsubsequent death caused by ABAD.Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances w h e r e t h e e m p l o y e r i s n o t e n g a g e d i n b u s i n e s s o r i n d u s t r y . S i n c e i t i s e n g a g e d i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore notc o v e r e d by said provision. Instead, the f o u r t h paragraph should apply. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business ori n d u s t r y " f o u n d i n t h e f i f t h p a r a g r a p h s h o u l d b e interpreted to mean that

it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry tobe liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.A distinction must be made between the two p r o v i s i o n s t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t i s a p p l i c a b l e . B o t h provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, too w n e r s a n d m a n a g e r s o f a n e s t a b l i s h m e n t o r enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers ingeneral, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of e m p l o y e e s c o m m i t t e d e i t h e r i n t h e s e r v i c e o f t h e branches or on the occasion of their functions, whilethe fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assignedtask. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged ina business or industry, are covered so long as theywere acting within the scope of their assigned task,even though committed neither in the service of thebranches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office,title or designation but which, nevertheless, are stillwithin the call of duty.This court has applied the fifthparagraph to cases where the employer was engagedin a business or industry such as truck operators and b a n k s . T h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , b e faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business o r i n d u s t r y , a n e m p l o y e r i s l i a b l e f o r t h e t o r t s committed by e m p l o y e e s w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h i s assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish theemployer-employee relationship; once this is done, theplaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that t h e e m p l o y e e w a s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h i s a s s i g n e d t a s k w h e n t h e t o r t c o m p l a i n e d o f w a s committed. It is only then that the employer may find itnecessary to interpose the defense of due diligence inthe selection and supervision of the employee.It is undisputed that ABAD was a ProductionManager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tortoccurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, whichthe court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals areentitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as w h e n the conclusion is grounded on s p e c u l a t i o n s , surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain in thepresent case to warrant review by this Court of thefinding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD wasdriving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.O n t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r t h e p r i v a t e respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD w a s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h i s a s s i g n e d t a s k s , ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testifiedt h a t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n c i d e n t , h e w a s d r i v i n g a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where hehad some snacks and had a chat with his friends afterh a v i n g d o n e o v e r t i m e w o r k f o r t h e p e t i t i o n e r . N o absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whetherat a given moment, an employee is engaged in hise m p l o y e r ' s b u s i n e s s i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a m o t o r vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer becauseof the employee's action or inaction; but rather, theresult

varies with each state of facts. The court a quoand the Court of Appeals were one in holding that thedriving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of thetime and circumstances. The SC does not agree. Themere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at thetime of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient toc h a r g e p e t i t i o n e r w i t h l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e n e g l i g e n t operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he wasoperating the vehicle within the course or scope of hise m p l o y m e n t . I t u s e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s i n A m e r i c a n Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuriesinflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I . O p e r a t i o n o f E m p l o y e r ' s M o t o r Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a placewhere he intends to eat or in returning to work from ameal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his e m p l o y m e n t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f e v i d e n c e o f s o m e special business benefit to the employer. Evidence thatb y u s i n g t h e e m p l o y e r ' s v e h i c l e t o g o t o a n d f r o m meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his timeoff and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is actingwithin the scope of his employment while so driving thevehicle. I I . O p e r a t i o n o f E m p l o y e r ' s V e h i c l e i n Going to or from Work In the same vein, traveling to and from the p l a c e o f w o r k i s o r d i n a r i l y a p e r s o n a l p r o b l e m o r concern of the employee, and not a part of his servicesto his employer. Hence, in the absence of some specialb e n e f i t t o t h e e m p l o y e r o t h e r t h a n t h e m e r e performance of the services available at the p l a c e where he is needed, the employee is not acting withinthe scope of his employment even though he uses hisemployer's motor vehicle. 14 cda The employer may, however, be liable whereh e d e r i v e s s o m e s p e c i a l b e n e f i t f r o m h a v i n g t h e employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employeeat work earlier and, presumably, spending more time athis actual duties. Where the employee's duties requirehim to circulate in a general area with no fixed place orhours of work, or to go to and from his home to variousoutside places of work, and his employer furnishes himw i t h a v e h i c l e t o u s e i n h i s w o r k , t h e c o u r t s h a v e frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it canbe found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However,even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work inhis employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for hisn e g l i g e n c e w h e r e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , t h e employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. I I I . U s e o f E m p l o y e r ' s V e h i c l e O u t s i d e Regular Working Hours

Leave a Comment

Submit Characters: 400 BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas) for a2010 Torts Digests Download or Print 3,014 Reads

Uploaded by Fritz Tarronas Follow TIP Press Ctrl-F to quickly search anywhere in the document. Sections

NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of Workingmen and Galang) BARREDO V GARCIA ELCANO V HILL CINCO V CANONOY BAKSH V CA (Gonzales) CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa) GARCIA V FLORIDO SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur] TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC TAYAG V ALCANTARA AQUINO [concur] PEOPLE V LIGON

PADILLA V CA (Vergara) CRUZ V CA (UMALI) PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO MALCOLM, [dissent] FORES V MIRANDA M.H. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent] FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al) PSBA V CA SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park) PICART V SMITH JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR) MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in part] YLARDE V AQUINO CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION UNITED STATES V PINEDA BPI V CA E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R & LIGHT CO. US V BAGGAY AMEDO V RIO MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION LAYUGAN V IAC

RAMOS V CA BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas) D.M. CONSUNJI V CA MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO BERNARDO V LEGASPI BERNAL V HOUSE ROMUALDEZ [ dissent] PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN) GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS) RAKES V ATLANTIC PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA (ROMMELS MARKETING CORP.) PADILLA [dissent] HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V CHATTO SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO AQUINO [ concur] NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL) AFIALDA V HISOLE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA (LUIS ET AL) RAMOS V PEPSI COLA METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA (CUSTODIA) KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES) ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO) BATACLAN V MEDINA FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao) URBANO V IAC PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES)

QUEZON CITY V DACARA GABETO V. ARANETA FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA) SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL DISPOSITION MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND MONTESIANO) PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC (DIONISIO) GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA. DE CALIBO and kids) ANURAN V BUO CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L.C.DIAZ AND CO.) ENGADA V CA VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47 AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY GILCHRIST v CUDDY SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No. 120554 GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989 WORCESTER v OCAMPO CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD CAEDO V YU KHE THAI SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO SALEN V. BALCE FUELLAS V. CADANO GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ

RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) YLARDE vs. AQUINO GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29 SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO) ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(Castillo/Cadiz) PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA) SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ FILAMER V IAC NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.) MERRITT v GOVERNMENT ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL MENDOZA V. DE LEON FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA ARANETA v JOYA LIM v DE LEON ABERCA V VER MHP GARMENTS, INC. vs. CA MARCIA V CA (PAJE)

ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC MVRS V ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL VITUG [concur] CARPIO [dissent] AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent] SALTA V DE VEYRA PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon Mills & Anacleto Chi) CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES CORPUS V PAJE MADEJA V CARO DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD) VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA) GLOBE MACKAY V CA ALBENSON V CA AMONOY V GUTIERREZ UE V JADER GARCIANO V CA BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS DODGE PHILS) BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA (MARASIGAN) RUIZ V SECRETARY WASSMER V VELEZ TANJANCO V SANTOS BAKSH V CA BUNAG V CA (CIRILO) CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ QUIMIGUING V ICAO

PE V PE QUE V IAC (NICOLAS) DRILON V CA (ADAZA) ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO) MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP) PATRICIO V LEVISTE GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO CARPIO V VALMONTE QUISABA V STA. INES MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME AQUINO [dissent] AMARO V SUMANGUIT ST. LOUIS REALTY V ARAMIL CONCEPCION V CA CUSTODIO V CA ALGARRA V SANDEJAS PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION) INTEGRATED PACKING V CA DBP V CA (CUBA) FUENTES V CA TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION PNOC V CA RAMOS V CA (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. HOSAKA) GATCHALIAN V DELIM VICTORY LINER V HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDAN QUIRANTE V IAC CRISMINA GARMENTS V CA

CERRANO V TAN KIERULF V CA (PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS) VISAYAN SAWMILL V CA COMPAIA MARITIMA V ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION MIRANDA-RIBAYA V BAUTISTA DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP) RAAGAS v TRAYA ENERVIDA v DELA TORRE PEOPLE V BUGAYONG FRANCISCO V GSIS EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS INC V CA (LO) MIJARES V CA (METRO DRUG INC) DE LA PEA V CA (TAN) J MARKETING V SIA COMETA V CA (MACLI-ING ET AL) INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY V BONDAD TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC V NLRC PEOPLE V PIRAME ARCONA V CA (PEOPLE) PNB V CA (FLORES) FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO) PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V CA (PANTEJO) VALENZUELA V CA SUMALPONG V CA (PEOPLE) LOPEZ V PAN AM WORLD AIRWAYS PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA (SPS CHUA) STREBEL V FIGUERAS

ABS-CBN V CA (REPUBLIC BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA FILMS) NPC v PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC VENTANILLA V CENTENO ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY V CFI AND MILLAN PEOPLE V GOPIO ARMOVIT V CA (NORTHWEST AIRLINES) FRANCISCO V FERRER PLENO V CA (PHILIPPINE PAPER PRODUCTS INC ET AL) PEOPLE V SINGH PEOPLE V PLAZO PNB V CA DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP.)

179 p. a2010 Torts Digests