God and Creativity in the Cosmologies of Whitehead and Bhskara Author(s): J.

Bruce Long Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 395-420 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398812 . Accessed: 19/11/2012 16:44
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J. Bruce Long God and creativity in the cosmologies of Whitehead and Bhaskara

This article is the result of a preliminary exploration of the cosmologies of two philosophies of extremely disparate cultural lineages and historical settings. The first is a ninth- or tenth-century Indian philosophy, traditionally known as bhedabhedavdda or the "philosophy of identity-and-difference," formulated in the commentarial writings of Bhaskara1; the other, the twentieth-century 'Philosophy of Organism' or 'Process Philosophy,' articulated in the writings of the Anglo-American philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead. No attempt has been made here to frame a comprehensive survey of either philosophy, but rather to present a critical exposition and comparative analysis of the cosmologies of these two systems of thought as reflected in the conception of God, the world, and the relationship between the two. I intend to illuminate those points in each of the systems at which the views of particular issues are identical, convergent, or divergent. A major portion of the source materials for the discussion of Whitehead's philosophy has been taken from his magnum opus, Process and Reality2, with occasional reference to other works where relevant. With regard to Bhaskara's thought, the unfortunate lack of either a critical edition of the or of a complete English transSanskrit version of the Brahmasuitrabhasya lation of that work has forced me to draw upon a smaller percentage of Bhaskara's magnum opus than in the case of Whitehead.3 Nonetheless, I have been able to consult most of the more relevant portions of Bhaskara's commentary in the form of an unpublished English translation by J. A. B. van Buitenen, and a most erudite exposition of Bhaskara's philosophy by P. N. Srinivasachari.4 My dependence upon the latter study will be evident throughout my article.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGICAL DEPARTURE

If Whitehead's writings were to be adopted as the litmus test for defining the degree of modernity of any given philosophy-a practice, incidentally that has not gone untried-one would discover in Bhaskara's philosophy of bheddbheda many ideational features that reflect a distinctly modern approach to the analysis of philosophical issues. I refer specifically to his rejection of all extreme philosophical perspectives and all one-sided and reductionistic dogmas, in favor of a kind of philosophical cosmopolitianism which could embrace a variety of points of view under a single intellectual umbrella. This is not to say that bhedabhedavddarepresents a genuine and entirely successful philosophical ecumenism (whatever that might be) but merely that, like the Philosophy of Organism, it champions a commodious and flexible intellectual framework within which one can embrace and ultimately reconcile the ideological postures at the two extreme poles (that is,
J. Bruce Long is Director of the Blaisdell Institute, Claremont, California.
PhilosophyEast and West 29, no. 4, October, 1979. ( by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.

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396 Long

pluralistic materialism and monistic idealism) and, by extension, all the other positions in between. To speak more directly to this point, Bhaskara assumes his position between and in critical opposition to both the dualist (dvaita) and the monist or nondualist (advaita) Vedantins.5 From the bheddbhedapoint of view, when these two extreme positions are allowed to stand alone, without the critical ferment of any kind of third, mediational position, they become caught in an unresolvable conflict of their own making, representing as they do a pair of irreconcilable perspectives. While the Advaitin contends that Brahman is the sole Reality, that the world is ultimately false (mithyd) and that the individual soul is nondifferent (advaita) from Brahman, the Dvaitin adopts the equally erroneous view that both Brahman and the world are real, (though they exist at two different [dvaita] levels of reality) and that it is this state of differencecum-relatedness between God and the creatures that makes salvation both possible and necessary. both the dualist and nondualist views In the mind of the bheddbhedavddin, harbor internal contradictions which cannot be resolved by appealing to terms within the respective systems. The contradiction at the heart of Advaita is that if the world were illusory or false, as Sankara contends, then no effective means of release (mukti) could be found, for the simple reason that every avenue of approach to salvation (from the injunctions and prohibitions in scripture, to the teachings of learned pandits and gurus and the practice of meditational introspection) would be inherently and irredeemably false, as well. Furthermore, Advaita, together with all other forms of radical idealism, is forced to fall back upon a realistic position at the empirical level in order to establish a real experiential basis for the momentary and evanescent perceptions of the so-called dreamworld. The dilemma of Dvaita Vedanta and Samrkhyaderives from the untenable distinction between Brahman and the temporal world (vyavahdra). By promoting the idea of ontological dualism, they reduce to absurdity man's hope of returning to his primal origins in the Eternal Absolute because of the ontological disrelatedness of the divine and human orders of existence. For Bhaskara, then, the true nature of Reality in all its diverse modes of manifestation can be accurately reflected only in a philosophy of the 'middle way' (construed in the terms of bheddbhedavdda,not those of Buddhism) which mediates between monism and pluralism. By pursuing this route of coincidentia oppositorum, he is confident that he has avoided the pitfalls of both absolutism (advaita) and relativism (dvaita). Whitehead, likewise, forges his metaphysical system by making a critical assessment of the contributions of his philosophical ancestors. He proceeds by appropriating those ideas which are congruent with his own metaphysical vision and either rejecting or revising those notions which do not jibe with his views. Like his Indian counterpart, Whitehead assumes a critical stance

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between two intellectual lineages which he sees as central to the development of contemporary philosophy: namely, the idealists and rationalists, exemplified by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, on the one side, and such empiricists as Bacon, Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, on the other. Like Bhaskara, he articulates his metaphysical vision within a framework that is sufficiently capacious and flexible to accommodate both of these "extreme" positions, while rejecting those implication which are incompatible with his own understanding of process philosophy. Whitehead employs the analogy of the flight of an airplane to represent the mind of the philosopher ascending from the terrain of 'particular observation', soaring into the atmosphere of 'imaginative generalization' and again, returning to terra firma "for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation." 6 By means of this correlative pursuit of the "analytical observation of components of ... experience" and "the elucidation of immediate experience" through rational analysis and imaginative reconstruction, the philosopher will be better able to interpret the world and human experience by capitalizing on the virtues and avoiding the vices of the other more extreme postures.
II. WHITEHEAD AND BHASKARAAS "PLURALISTIC-MONISTS"

In recognition of Whitehead's appeal to a bipolar conception of the creative process (that is, the fusion of many entities into a single concrete unity and the fragmentation of manifold components into a diffused multiplicity), we are inclined to question Ivor Leclerc's judgment that Whitehead champions a strictly pluralistic cosmology.7 This assertion is rendered doubtful by the fact that Whitehead is severely critical of all expressions of both extreme monism and radical pluralism. He censures monistic philosophies (for example, Spinoza) for their failure to satisfy the criterion of coherence-that is, their inattention to what William James has called "the rich thicket of reality" and their inability to provide a logically coherent account of the world of human experience in all of its variegated manifoldness. This fault is the result of a commitment to the correlative notions that the eternal Absolute alone is real and that the finite, created order is illusory, false or morally debased. In other words, he accuses monists of neglecting the multifariousness of the world and of ignoring the fact that "a multiplicity of modes is a fixed requisite, if the scheme is to retain any direct relevance to the many occasions in the experienced world.8 Finally, he indicts all radical Dualists (for example, Descartes and Locke) for their inability to account for the continuity among the myriad of creative moments, exemplified in the natural order by the strictly patternized movements of the stars and planets and the regular alternation of the seasons and, within the order of human experience, the persistence of memories through time and the enduring features of selfidentification.

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398 Long

When viewing Whitehead's metaphysics at a glance, it becomes apparent that a distinction must be made between the quantitative and qualitative features of the system. While the philosophy of organism affirms a quantitative monism by the insistence that there is only one actual entity (or genre of entity) in the universe, it, at the same time, reflects a qualitativepluralism, by its insistence that each actual occasion comes into a state of concrescence by bringing into full realization its own subjective (that is, axiological) aim.9 This twofold nature of all actual entities is represented in two mutually complementary doctrines: the Ontological Principle and the Principle of Relativity. Whitehead presents the essential meaning of both principles in the assertion that: 'Actual entities'-also termed 'actual occasions'-are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, though there are gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent.10 Whitehead joins Spinoza in holding that the manifold phenomena constituting the finite order of existence are all modifications of a single universal "substance" (or "relatedness of actual entities," in Whiteheadian terms) but rejects the implication that the ultimate principle alone is real and the phenomenal world is illusory. He sides with Descartes in holding the world to be dual in nature, in that it is to be construed as both transient and eternal, physical and mental, subjective and objective, while, at the same time rejecting the implications of Absolute Dualism that all entities in the universe are distinguishable into two separate ontological categories: cogens res and extensa res." By implication, it follows from this that the philosophy of organism subscribes, at one and the same time, to a quantativemonism and a qualitative dualism, which, taken together, may ultimately issue into a qualifiedpluralism. 2 I will conclude this section with a single quotation from Bhaskara's commentary to demonstrate that he is in complete agreement with the Philosophy of Organism regarding the question of the relationship between the one and the many. As Bhaskara states the matter: "Diversity in so far as it is effect, identity in so far as it is cause, just as there is identity in so far as a thing is gold and difference in so far as it is an earring, etc."
III. CREATION AS A PROCESS OF 'EMERGENT EVOLUTION'

There is no question but that the concept of creation or, more accurately, "creativity," is the keystone of the Philosophy of Organism. I am prepared to argue that the related notion of "cosmic evolution" or "creative emanation"

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forms the core of Bhaskara's bhedabhedavada,as well. Both thinkers employ the doctrine of creativity as an apologetic for a position that might be described as 'critical realism' or 'causal immanentalism' in defending themselves against the extreme expressions of monism and pluralism. As previously indicated, they reject the assumption of both uncritical realism and idealism. Reality is to be understood as neither purely subjective nor purely objective in nature; not completely dependent upon either the internal quality of human modes of consciousness or upon a state of externally existing objects in divorcement from any and all states of consciousness. Bhaskara himself maintains: Whether something is true or false [real or unreal] does not depend on whether someone knows it or not. For it is not by human beings that entities are made so that they may exist by man's grace. Those who have eyes do truly see the totality of visually perceptible objects which are there to see. If they were not there, nothing would be seen.13 He reinforces this claim by asserting (contra Safikara) that the subject-object relationship endures even in the state of meditation. 14 It follows logically from this principle that the existence or nonexistence of any particular entity, event, or existential state of affairs is not to be determined by appealing solely to scripture, inference, or intuitive apprehension but to "experience through observation" within the realm of common experience. The perception of the world by means of empirical observation yields knowledge that causes and effects are both different and nondifferent, continuous and discontinuous. "Difference is a property of non-difference, as for instance the non-difference of the ocean-which is called difference in so far as ocean consists of waves, etc." 15 Consequently, every entity in the phenomenal realm stands in relation to all other entities and to the 'primordial entity' (that is, Brahman or God) in a state of both unity and nonunity. In recognition of the centrality of the conception of creation in both philosophies, I will submit the idea to a detailed analysis before proceeding to consider a number of subsidiary issues which emerge from the primary concept of creativity. For Whitehead, creation is not to be conceived as a solitary primordial event which propelled the cosmos into existence in an instant, as it were, but rather as an extensive (and, perhaps, endless) process of the perpetual arising and perishing of concrete actualities or actual entities along an "extensive continuum." Each single concrescent event which coagulates momentarily with other 'causally relevant' events to constitute the world in each temporal juncture, is represented as the transition of the world from the disjunctive many into the conjunctive one, from perpetual fluxuation of manifold forms into a momentary permanence of a single form, the instantaneous integration of a multiple complex of entities into a unified actuality. 16 This organismic view of creation differs significantly from that of Vedanta,

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represented in all three major schools, in at least one respect. While Bhaskara, like Whitehead, envisions creation (srsti) as a process of creative evolution, he sees this process as occurring not by "the transition of the world from the disjunctive many into the conjunctive one," but from the totally and eternally conjunctive one to the fragmented many. Creation is, for Sankara an apparent and for Bhaskara a real, projection of the eternal essence of the One into the diversified forms of the many (ndmarupa).The One transforms itself into the Many while remaining one and whole. God is Brahman or Isvara who emanates his own internal spirit into the multifarious universe, even as the spider weaves its web out of the vital juices within its own body.17 The boundless reservior of potentiality becomes the variegated universe and having created the universe, enters into and supports everything in that world.18 Therefore, Brahman is the sole source of creative power and the solitary creative agency in the universe. In the strictest sense, then, one could say of Brahman (as Whitehead says of God in his 'consequent' or derivative nature) that God's nature is "consequent upon the creative advance of the world." 19 The Whiteheadian picture of creation appears to diverge from Bhaskara's at a number of other crucial points. He conceives of God as the creator of the world in a far more circumscribed or derivative sense than does Bhaskara. God is creator only to the extent that he functions as "the timeless source of all order," 20 "the foundation of order and the goal towards novelty," 21 "the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects,"22 "the initial phase of the 'subjective aim'," and "the organ of novelty aiming at intensification," 23 "the principle of concretion," 24 and "the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality ... not before all creation but with all creation."25 Stated simply, God provides the conceptual basis and the appetitive drive for the progression of the world toward novel forms of concrescence. But, God's own nature comes to full realization only by merging his "conceptual appetition" with the physical prehensions within the finite world. He completes his own being by channelizing 'the turmoil of the intermediate world' into more fully integrated and more widely harmonized forms of existence. In conformity with the idea that God and the world are coparticipants in the creative process, Whitehead declares that God "does not create the world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty and
goodness."
26

Bhaskara's conception of God and his relationship with the universe is set forth in considerable detail in his commentary on the four statements in the Brahmasutra which he regards as the central pillars of his own bheddbheda position, and by extension, of Vedanta, as a whole. Those statements appear at 1.4.24-26, II.1.14, and II.1.27.27 The commentary on BS 1.4.24 declares that Brahman possesses two natures

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or exists in two modes of being: the causal form (karanarupa)and the effected form (kdryarupa). According to scriptural testimony, "He [the Supreme] desired: may I become many, may I be born".28 After having performed sarvam) and entered into and austerity or meditation, he created all this (idamt pervaded everything and, in so doing, created the universe in two levels of existence: what is manifest (sat) and what is not manifest (tyat), what is named (niruktam) and what is unnamed (aniruktam), what is supported what is invested with and what is not supported (anilayanamn), (nilayanamn) and what is lacking in intelligence (avijidnarm,that is, intelligence (vijcdnanm) stones and the like), what is true or real (satyami)and what is untrue or unreal (anrtamt). In his commentary on BS 1.4.25, Bhaskara presents a lengthy exposition of the doctrine of immanent causality, or the creative permeation of the finite by the Infinite. Brahman is both the efficient or operative (nimittakdrana)and the material cause (updddnakdrana)of the universe.29 No being or principle can dissolve and reabsorb the world which has not previously formed or projected it into being in accordance with the doctrine of satkdryavdda.In addition, the effects can be reabsorbed by their material cause alone, since two things of dissimilar substance would be utterly incompatible and mutually repulsive. In customary Veddntinfashion, Bhaskara appeals to scripture for textual support for this doctrine: "All of these beings arise out of Space (dkdsdt eva samutpadyanta) [that is, Brahman], and they return (pratyastam) to Space.... Hence Space is the ultimate goal of the world." 30 According to BS 1.4.26, the Supreme sent forth (s.rjyante)the world into being, "on account of self-reflexive action [or "action by the Self related to Itself,"], by means of a real transformation" [dtmakrteh parinadmdt].31 Another text (Taittirlya Upanisad 2.7) states that "that Self transformed itself into its own Self" [dtminam svayam akuruta], thus indicating that Brahman is the source and support of the entire universe marked by distinctions (visesas). On this basis, Bhaskara rejects Safikara's notion of superimposition (adhyasa), together with the corollary that the world is nothing more than a phantasmagoric display of ephemeral impressions (maya) and false cognitions (avidyd-s) which vanishes with the eradication of false apperceptions. He argues that a world which does not exist before and during normal experience cannot cease to exist with the transition to a supranormal sphere of consciousness. He even goes so far as to insist that the subject-object relationship endures in the state of contemplation.32 He, therefore, indicts Safikara for adopting the Mahayana doctrine that the world is devoid of substantial and enduring entities and is, therefore, to be viewed as a parade of illusory and evanescent events.33 In this light, he contends that scriptural testimony unambigously rejects Safikara's claim that avidyd is illusory, unreal and beginningless. Rather, counters Bhaskara, it is the real, though contingent and transitory basis of our world of common experience.34 Nor, again, are the causal

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conditions (upadhis) which objectify the qualities of the eternal soul unreal or illusory. They are merely adventitious (aupddhika)or contingent (agantuka).35 Bhaskara, together with Yadavaprakasa, Srikantha and other spokesmen for the bheddbhedapersuasion, interprets the term parinama to mean that Brahman literally modified or transformed itself (svayam) into the world of the actual (sat) and the beyond (tyat), and so on. By means of this selfdifferentiating deed (or process), Brahman became the world of living entities. Hence, Brahman is the seed of the universe (jagadblja) and the universe is the fruition (phala) of this primordial germ. BS II. 1.14 asserts that Brahman, though perfectly unified in his causal form (kdranarupa),possesses the potential for manifold creation in his effected form (karyarupa). Even as a tree which presents itself to the observer as an integrated organism, nonetheless, is composed of many branches, so also Brahman, though one in its causal or unmanifested (avyakta) state, is capable of transforming himself into multiple modes of phenomenal existence.36 Therefore, unity and diversity, identity and difference are both true characterizations of Reality. Or, to return to the analogy of the tree, when a tree is regarded as a single composite object, it manifests itself as a unified form; when viewed as a composite of manifold parts, it appears as multifaceted. By extrapolation, God and the world are neither wholly identical to nor wholly different from each other; or, to reverse the frame of reference, they are both identical to and different from one another, depending upon the mode of consciousness through which their relationship is apprehended. Finally, Bhaskara appeals to BS II.1.27 in support of his doctrine of "real transformation" (parindmavdda)in contradistinction to Sankara's position of "apparent modification" (vivartavdda).This sutra, along with CU VI. 2 and TU II. 7, states that Brahman self-differentiates his internal essence into the phenomenal world, without thereby sacrificing or diminishing his primordial unity. This assertion stands in marked contrast to those in BS II.1.26 and supportive statement in BAU 11.4.12; III.8.8, 9.26; MU 11.1.2; and SU VI.19, which Safikara marshals in support of his conviction that the world is a merely apparent conglomeration of names-and-forms. Sankara objects to the kind of position represented by the pari.ndma doctrine on the basis of the assumption that if the whole of Brahman were to be transmuted into the world, then Brahman would cease to exist upon the sublation of the illusory world with the advent of right knowledge (prajtda,vijndna). If, on the other hand, the contention were affirmed that only a portion (amsa) of Brahman were to be so altered, then it would follow that Brahman would have been divided into facets-a wholly unacceptable notion, given the belief in the ultimate unity of Brahman shared by all Vedantins. Either way, the various scriptural passages which declare Brahman to be impartite (niskala), indivisible (acchedya), and free from all blemishes (niranjana) would be contravened.

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Bhaskara's objection to Safikara's Advaita stance is essentially identical to Whitehead's case against all forms of Absolute Monism. Namely, a monistic view of the universe fails to provide a coherent explanation for the manifold nature of the world of experience. According to Bhaskara himself, any unequivocal affirmation of the essential impartiteness of Brahman abrogates the possibility of providing a basis for the interpretation of common experience, the reality of which is confirmed by both scripture (sruti) and sense perception (pratyaksa). He bases his objection to the maydvdda idea on the argument that if the cognition of Being (sat = Brahman) be nondifferent from the knowledge of being (and, hence, likewise the knower and the act of knowing) then it would follow that Being as such could not be apprehended, since there would be no apprehender and no distinctive means of apprehension. He maintains: "If as the Advaitins claim the cause alone is real, the effect unreal, the question arises, how can the practical operations of the means of knowledge, perception, and so on exist? Or, how can the sdstras of injunctions and prohibitions be meaningful? Or, how can knowledge of Brahman arise from a sdstra of release which itself is untrue?"37 Consequently the champions of the view of "Being-only" (obviously a reference to Safikara) are bereft of any basis for verifying the reality of the necessary factors in every act of knowing and resultant knowledge. act of cognition-knower, Therefore, the Advaitin claim that the falseness of the world is proved by scriptural authority is untenable, "since knowledge [of the injunctions which promote the lower vidyds]that arises in the student would [itself] be false. The statement 'That art Thou' consists in sounds and therefore, would be nonexistent." 38 The fundamental differences between the Advaitin and the bheddbhedavddin positions are exemplified in the differences in the types of metaphors employed by the principal spokesmen of the two schools. Safikara appeals to the analogy of the lump of clay and the earthenware pots as a basis for affirming the identity between the raw material and the various products fashioned from it. For him, clay alone is real; vessels are illusory or false products of clay, the reality of which is based upon conventional designations for the thing [see CU VI. 2]. For his part, Bhaskara appeals to the analogies of the one ocean and many waves, the single fire that ejects a multiplicity of sparks, the tree with many branches, and the single spider which spins a web composed of numerous separate but interconnected filaments. For Bhaskara, both ocean and waves, tree and branches, and so on are true, perceived from different visual and conceptual perspectives.
BETWEEN THE TWO COSMOLOGIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IV. PARALLELS

Thus far, we have restricted ourselves to sketching the broad features of these cosmologies with regard to the notions of God and creativity. These generalized characterizations can be more cogently delineated by submitting a select

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number of central doctrines to a closer comparative analysis. In support of our conviction that no comparative study can yield an adequate view of its subject that does not attend to both the similarities and dissimilarities between the systems under investigation, we shall attempt to illuminate those features which these philosophies share in common, as well as those facets that are unique to each of them. A. The One and the Many According to Bhaskara, the Absolute or Brahman is one in its causal state (karanarupa) but multiple in its effected state (kdryarupa). The bheddbhedavddin expression of this notion is that God, though existing as the sole unchanging Reality in the universe, transforms (parinama) himself into the world of substances and attributes or the experiencing subjects (bhoktr) and the experienced objects (bhogya). The Whiteheadian formulation of this idea is that God is at once immanent and transcendent, actual and potential, universal and particular.39 His 'conceptual' nature (in Bhaskara, his causal nature) is changeless by virtue of its existence in a state of complete satisfaction; but his 'consequent' nature (for Bhaskara, his effected nature) is derived from the creative emergence of the temporal world.40 With regard to his primordial nature, God is neither in nor of the world, but is totally separate from and oblivious to it. But, with regard to his derivative nature, he is both in and of the world, completely involved in every formative aspect of its creative process. To quote Whitehead in this regard: God is primordially one, namely he is the primordial unity of relevance of the many potential forms; in the process he acquires a consequent multiplicity, which the primordial character absorbs into its own unity. The World is primordially many, namely, the many actual occasions with their physical finitude; in the process it acquires a consequent unity, which is a novel occasion and is absorbed into the multiplicity of the primordial character. Thus God is to be conceived as one and as many in the converse sense in which the World is to be conceived as many and as one.41 However, it must be observed that this transformation of primordial unity into phenomenal multiplicity is executed by God without diminishing or otherwise altering the integrity of his essential unity. So conceived, God is the ontological principle which manifests itself in the world as the cosmic process, as a unity-in-diversity or identity-in-diversity. [Consult the two charts on pages 22 and 23 for a skeletal representation of the twofold nature of God in the two cosmologies. The terms placed in parentheses on the Whiteheadian chart indicate that each creative value contains its antithetical value in potential.] This contention that God is bimodal in nature, finds conformation, for Bhaskara, in scripture, regarding the illustration of the fig tree (nyagrodha) [see CU VI. 12. 1-3]. As he says, "Modification (vikara) is defined as the projection of power (viksepasakti) by Him who does not thereby lose his own

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BIMODAL NATURE OF BRAHMAN IN BHASKARA'S BHEDABHEDA VADA Effected State (karyarupa) Causal State (karaarrupa) Causal principle of creativity Primordial perfect unity Absolute reality (paramarthika) Real-in-and-itself Infinite (ananta) Formless or unlimited (amurta) Permanent and eternal (nitya) Natural (svabhdvika) Pure substance (avyakta) Intrinsically real (nisprapanca) Ground of all modifications Self-existent (dtmodbhava) World of manifold effects Self-generated multiplicity Conditioned or relative reality (vydvahdrika) Real-in-and-through-the-other Finite (ddyantavdn) Formalized or delimited (murtavdn) Impermanent and transitory (anitya) Adventitious (aupddhika) Substance marked by attributes (abhivyakta) Actualized by extrinsic forces (prapanca) Modifications expressive of the universal ground Existent by virtue of limiting conditions (upddhis)

nature, just as the modification of a spider and as in a piece of cloth."42 According to the latter analogy, individual threads may be interwoven with other threads to form a fabric, without ceasing to be individual threads. Later on, in the same section of his commentary, Bhaskara argues that even as the mind gives rise to diverse qualities (such as desire, wrath, greed, bewilderment, and so on), while it itself remains unaffected by the various modifications, so it is with Brahman and the manifold modifications constituting the world. B. God as Immanent Creativity Both Bhaskara and Whitehead reject the idea that cosmic creativity is executed by a wholly transcendent divine agent. Phrased in bheddbhedavddin terms, the idea of a traitless Absolute Being (nirguna-brahman) who is, nevertheless, unique and ultimately Real, stands in contradiction to both the canons of logical discourse and the dictates of common human experience. The primary motivation behind Bhaskara's polemic against Sankara is his commitment to demonstrating that saguna-brahmanor Isvara is the universal principle of creativity. It is He who evolves the temporal world out of his own eternal essence without sacrificing the integrity of his primordial unity to his effected multiplicity. His most telling argument against the Advaitins is the

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ANTINOMIES IN WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPTION OF RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND WORLD Primordial f Th ld f Derivative God The W World Primordial Derivative Permanence (fluency) Perfect unity (phenomenal multiplicity) Unlimited potentiality (limited actuality) Conceptual appetition (physical enjoyment) Principle of everlastingness (process of temporal concrescence) Foundation of cosmic order (reservoir of creative disorder) Primordial basis of creativity (emergent creativity) Passive transcendence (active immanence) Conceptual priority (physical posteriority) Causal principle (effected actualities) Perfect freedom (determined actuality) Primordial datum for the world Realm of final satisfaction (efficacious means) Fluency (permanence) Differentiated multiplicity (momentary unity) Limited actuality (unlimited potentiality) Physical enjoyment (conceptual appetition) Process of temporal concrescence (principle of everlastingness) Creative ambiguity or limited disorder (principle of cosmic order) Product of divine creativity (principle of self-creation) Active immanence (passive transcendence) Physical priority (conceptual posteriority) Effected actualities (causal principle) Determined actuality (perfect freedom) Physical datum for God Efficacious means (realm of final satisfaction)

doctrine of causal immanence. According to this doctrine, Brahman is not only the primal ground of being which emanates the manifold universe out of its own perfectly unified nature, the causally efficacious power which activates the constitutive elements, and the raw materials which constitute the cosmos, but the final product of his own creativity. Hence, the world is to be viewed as real, but transitory. Bhaskara, like Whitehead, rejects the implication of philosophical monism that transitoriness and unreality are coterminous concepts. He declares in this regard: "Therefore, the cognition of difference is not nescience, nor false. The phenomenal world is a really existing entity, because it has an existent being for its essence."43 Affirmatively stated, Reality is

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characterized by both continuity and discontinuity, of both 'eternal objects' and 'novel entities'. Because of his integral and pervasive involvement in the creative process, God actually undergoes the suffering and rebirth of individual selves (Bhaskara) or the successive moments of concrescence in the life of the subject-superject (Whitehead). He is that being who knows, understands, and cares about the multitudinous travails under which the entire creation continually groans in progressing toward higher and higher states of actuality. He is that "tender care that nothing be lost" and that "judgment of tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved." This same idea is reflected in Bhaskara's doctrine of immanent causality (satkaryavdda). Brahman for him, is a "super-personality devoid of all name and form, but possessed of infinite metaphysical, moral and spiritual perfections ... [assuming] a form to enable the self to transcend itself [with] the divine purpose ... mainly realized in transfiguring the self and removing its finiteness."44 Brahman creates the manifold universe (ndmarupaloka)through the projection of its inherent power (sakti) under the guiding constraint of the 'limiting conditions' (upddhis) and, thereby, enters into, pervades, supports and directs every phase of the cosmic process. He does this with proper regard for the "moral and spiritual requirements of each individual soul."45 Like Whitehead's God, Bhaskara's Brahman is a being who "knows, understands, and cares." C. Creation as a Web of Causal Relationships According to both of these philosophies, there is no such thing as a supra- or extrarelational experience or entity. All reality is relational or contextual in character. "All actual entities are prehensions which are relations," says Whitehead. No thing or complex of things can be conceived in complete abstraction from an environing network of causal relationships which constitute the fabric of the universe.46 According to the principle of relativity, a pure abstraction or a state of complete ontological isolation (such as the state of sacciddnanda ascribed to nirguna-brahman),is a contradiction in terms. Whitehead declares: "There is nothing which floats into the world from nowhere. Everything in the actual world is referable to some actual entity47; "... every actual entity is present in every other actual entity" 48; and, "... the potentiality for being an element in a real concrescence of many entities into one actuality, is the one general metaphysical character attaining to all entities, actual and non-actual, and that every item in its universe is involved in each concrescence." 49 In Bhaskara's terms, "The infinite is not a negation of the finite but is its positive affirmation and fulfillment." 50 Thus, according to both thinkers, the creative process must be viewed as a complex system of intertwining causal forces, in which every ingredient exercises varying degrees of formative

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influence upon all the other forces and entities, according to the "principle of intensive relevance." 51 D. Interpenetrationof Universalsand Particulars Both the Philosophy of Organism and bheddbhedavddablur the traditional distinction between universals and particulars. According to these two systems, these categories pertain to two levels of reality which interpenetrate and participate in each other's nature. Thus every so-called 'universal' is particular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-called 'particular' is universal in the sense of entering into the constitutions of other actual entities.52 Of primary importance at this juncture is the principle of "graded relevance," according to which each actual entity is both the product of a synthesis of other actual occasions and the potentially relevant precondition for the formation of all other actual entities in the universe. As Whitehead asserts, an entity, once actualized, becomes a "potential" for all subsequent actualities. Hence, "the entire universe of actual entities enters into the realization of each 'individual' entity, and every actual entity is present in every other actual entity."53 This idea finds idiomatic expression in the notion that the whole is contained, microcosmically, in each of its constitutive parts and each of the parts is present, macrocosmically, in the whole. According to the ontological principle, apart from a reference to one or more actual entities, nothing is real; each actual entity comes into concrescence somewhere within the spatial-temporal continuum. At the same time, each actual entity emerges as the result of a synthesis of the "net deposits" (that is, those residual effects of other actual occasions which exist in closest proximity to a concrescent entity and, for that reason, provide the greatest degree of 'relevance' for its emergence) of all other actual entities in the universe and in so doing transcends its own finite occasion to embrace the whole which contributed crucially to its birth in the first place. In this sense, says Whitehead: "it [the actual entity] is everywhere throughout the continuum; for its constitution includes the objectifications of the actual world and, thereby, includes the continuum.... Thus the continuum is present in each actual entity and each actual entity pervades the continuum." 54 Hence, even as the whole is always more than the sum of its parts, for both Bhaskara and Whitehead, because of the eternal presence of God's primordial nature in every concrescent situation, even so, each part is more than each preceding whole, because of the fact that in becoming a 'novel entity', the 'many' is augmented by one.55 Formulated according to the concept of creativity, the emergence of novel entities is at once, "the highest generality at the base of actuality" and the universal principle which enters into the formation of each and every particular.56 Bhaskara echoes this notion by appealing to the doctrine of the selfdifferentiation (parinamavdda) of Brahman. By transforming its perfect Unity

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into an abundance of differentiated forms, the universal is actively and organically present within each particular. Since each particular is nothing but a finite and evanescent expression or embodiment of the universal and since each entity contributes to the life of the Divine in its effected mode of existence, each particular is the universal within each microsegment of the temporal-spatial continuum (vydvahdra).In his customary fashion, Bhaskara asserts: "For it cannot be demonstrated by any means that a certain thing is only different or only non-different. Every thing is non-different in so far as it is a universal-being, knowable, substantive, etcetera, and the same thing is different in so far as it is a particular, because as a particular it is defined from other things by its individual characteristics."57 He argues that evidence yielded by sense experience, logical inference, and scriptural testimony confirms the validity of the dualistic-cum-nondualistic view of the world. Since pure Being (that is, sacciddnandaor Brahman) can neither be grasped directly by the sense organs nor experienced in abstraction from actually existing entities, the monists who "babble" about Being or Brahman being the sole reality are victims of self-delusionment and should seek the services of a physician. Were either of the earlier mentioned modes of cognition possible, then complete confusion would result-"a blind man could see color, the deaf man could hear sound." Therefore, it must be recognized that because a particular substance or substantive entity can be apprehended only through a dualistic mode of perception, that object is to be viewed as the temporalspatial locus of the features defining its membership in a class. It follows from this that all entities are both generic and specific, both universal and
particular. 58

E. Interdependencebetween God and the World Phrased in the language of traditional theism, this same idea could be stated in the following manner: God and the world, the infinite Ground of Being and the finite realm of beings, exist in a relationship of mutual interdependence. Srinivasachari summarizes the cosmology of Bhaskara in terms that are equally applicable to the Philosophy of Organism: Time and space are the stuff of reality, the divine nature fulfils itself through contingency and the eternal is in and more than endless duration. In this way the opposites like transcendency and immanence, mechanism and finalism are reconciled in a pervading identity and purpose. God is as necessary to the world as the world is necessary to God.59 (Italics mine.) The categories of "process," "relativity," and "contingency" apply to God just as readily and fittingly as they do to the world. God is as inconceivable without the world to serve as the object of his creative actions, as the world is nothing without God to serve as the primordial and everlasting agent of cosmic creativity. God's "being" is constituted by and realized through his

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"becoming" within the realm of contingent things. His nature, insofar as it still aspires toward completion within the temporal-spatial order, requires a physical reaction from the world. For this reason, God demands the creative presence of and stimulative response from all the other actual entities within the finite world, as radically as they require his creative support and judgment of 'loving care.' The reality of a supreme being "is founded on the infinitude of its conceptual appetition and its form of process is derived from the fusion of this appetition from the data received from the world-process."60 In recognition of the fact that the Whole and each of its constituent parts are intertwined in the composition of the phenomenal world, Whitehead concludes that "the doctrine [of the Laws of Nature] involves the negation of 'absolute being'. It presupposes the essential interdependence of things."61 Since God is the chief exemplification of all metaphysical principles, the interdependence of God and the world must necessarily be taken as a natural corollary of the principle. F. God as Immanent and Transcendent Whitehead and Bhaskara declare in unison that God's nature is to be conceived in conformity with a bimodal pattern. Whitehead's notion of the "conceptual" nature of God correlates roughly with Bhaskara's idea of the "causal" nature and, likewise, the 'consequent' nature correlates with the 'effected' nature. According to Whitehead's reformulation of the Platonic cosmology in conformity with the requirements of modern European thought, temporal entities come into being by the ingression of eternal things which are potential contributors to the realization of every actuality. The realm of eternal objects and that of finite actual entities are connected by an agency of mediation which partakes of both eternality and temporality, transcendent potentiality and immanent actuality. That mediating principle is the bimodal God of Process Philosophy. Further, God is "the divine element in the world, by which the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization." As the basis for the "ideal realization of potentialities in a primordial actual entity," God is "the metaphysical stability whereby the actual process exemplifies general principles of metaphysics and attains the ends proper to specific types of emergent order." 62 Hence, any depiction of the generation of an actual entity must include everything from God to the most trivial object or event. It should be recognized at the same time, that "there is a specific difference between the nature of God and that of any occasion." 63 God himself is an actual entity immanent within the world process and transcendent to every finite epoch-a being, at once temporal and eternal, the basis of all concretion and the most extensive form of abstraction.64 Srinivasachari interprets Bhaskara's position in much the same manner, by

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declaring that God is "absolute or the true infinite that is the informing spirit in all things." In other words, God is "the infinite [that] is revealed in and through the finite and the finite in and through the infinite and yet the infinite is more real than the finite self and all the finite selves taken together. Brahman has infinite perfections and though it evolves itself into the universe, it still exceeds its content...." 65 For both Whitehead and Bhaskara, then, God is not merely an abstract or a universal ideal, existing prior to the initiation of the cosmic process and wholly transcendent to its progressive operations. In his primordial or causal nature, He is the absolute and eternal Creative Potentiality for the concrete manifestation of actuality. In his 'consequent' or effected nature, He is the elan vital that shapes, invigorates, and directs the life course of all finite creatures. There is one crucial distinction in the two conceptions of God that must be taken into account. Bhaskara could, without hesitation, accept Whitehead's assertion that God "is something individual for its own sake" and the one absolutely unique 'entity' in all the universe, that exists transcendent to the universe. It is questionable, however, whether he could accept the idea that "every actual entity, including God, is a creature transcended by creativity which it qualifies," or that just as God in his infinite being and power transcends the world, even so that ever-changing world transcends God. If, for Bhaskara, God is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, then there can be no question of God's being transcended by the world process or any part of it. By inverting Whitehead's valuation of God, we could say that Brahman is the one and only exception to every metaphysical category that obtains in the cosmic process. On the other hand, given the element of relativity that is at the heart of Bhaskara's theology, there does not seem to be any logical reason why God, in his effected nature, could not be said to be transcended by each novel life form that emerges from his causal nature. One might enquire of Bhaskara in this regard, why, if God projects his eternal changeless nature into the finite universe, it could not be said that He is transcended by the emergent world order, insofar as his effected nature has not yet achieved full consummation? On Whitehead's side of the ledger, the question could be raised, why, given the fact that "there is a specific difference between the nature of God and that of any actual occasion," 66 in that God alone prehends every augmentation of the world "everlastingly," it could not be concluded that he transcends all other actual entities in a unique and preeminent fashion?67 The point is, given their common commitment to the philosophy of 'both ... and,' if they were to shift the values of their respective systems to one side or the other, in order to emphasize first the universal and later the particular dimensions of the world, there is no obvious reason why their views could not be rendered compatible, if not synonymous on all issues.

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G. The Worldas the Offspringof Divine Sport Another seminal notion that informs the writings of Whitehead and Bhaskara, is the idea that God creates, sustains, and directs the course of the universe, either for no reason at all other than his own delight or for purely altruistic motives, that is, in promotion of the welfare of his creatures. Insofar as He is complete and self-sufficient in his primordial nature, there is no hedonistic gain that God seeks to realize through his creativity. No less an authority on Vedanta than Safikara declares that "the activity of the Lord [saguna-Brahmanor Isvara] ... may be viewed to be mere sport out of His spontaneity without any extraneous motive." 68 notion of divine indifference with Bhaskara articulates the bheddbhedavddin regard to self-aggrandizing values, by appealing to the same philosophical idiom of divine playfulness or creative spontaneity (svabhdva,devalihd).69To the objection raised by an opponent that the Supreme Deity does not actively create because it is completely satisfied and perfect within its own nature and, hence, devoid of any purposefulness with regard to that order, Bhaskara replies: As follows from the use of the particle tu, this proposition is overruled. He has no purpose in acting; but there is 'exclusiveness of sport.' Sport is that behavior which is essentially play. 'Exclusiveness' of that means: that there is only that sport. Just as in this world kings, etc. who have nothing left to desire do act for sport, similarly the Lord, though having no desires left, is established as engaging in creation with reference to the karman of creatures. And no blame can be imputed to his nature.70 Even as the same rain falls upofi the just and the unjust and upon both radiantly blossoming plants and parasitic weeds, even so the love of God operates in all alike, its form of expression determined only by the moral 71 requirements (karman) of each individual self. Bhaskara rejects the implication which many of his detractors have drawn from the doctrine of brahmall7d.Namely, that God, like his creatures, is vulnerable to the whims of preference and taste, that He favors some creatures while disfavoring others in a spirit of reckless capriciousness. The safeguard against this accusation is Brahman's ever-watchful care to provide such benefits for each creature as is required by his karman. Hence, the physical, moral, social, and spiritual variety among the creatures is due wholly to their karman and not to any preferential treatment on God's part. Nor, on the other hand, should it be concluded that the doctrine of brahmalild implies that the universe was created devoid of purpose and meaning. Not so, says Bhaskara, for "the creation has as its purpose the provision of the basis for experience and knowledge to the conscient dtmans."72 Therefore, while God does not project the world into being out of a self-serving motive, he does so to provide the creatures with the means to

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augment and purify their knowledge of their divine source in god and, thereby, to transcend their finite existential condition. According to Charles Hartshorne, this Vedantin concept of devalild (or, "The Dance of Siva" as Natardja, in theistic terms) seems entirely commensurate with the intentions of Process Philosophy.73 He has elaborated this point by stating that, during any given cosmic epoch, God makes an arbitrary decision as to what world is to be created. He is constrained, so to speak, only by his requirement of a world, that is, some world or other, though not necessarily the existing world. He created this particular world for no discernible reason but rather by means of his divine spontaneity, for the sake of his own delight and for the promotion of his own self-expression." Whitehead himself appears to have had the same notion in mind when he speaks of God's indifference toward the creation, preservation, or destruction of any particular entity or value. He contends that the primordial strivings expressive of God's purpose move toward greater and greater intensities of experience, without regard to or preference for any specific thing. God is "indifferent alike to preservation and novelty." He aims rather for "depth of satisfaction," in pursuance of the fulfillment of his own being. His purpose in promoting the creative advance of the universe is the "evocation of intensities".74 Furthermore, "His unity of conceptual operations is a free creative act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things. It is deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass." 7 H. The Summum Bonum of Human Existence Concerning the question of the final objective of human life and the ultimate end toward which the universe is progressing, the thinking of Whitehead and Bhaskara take somewhat divergent courses. But the differences which at first blush may appear to be fundamental and irreconciliable, on further consideration, may turn out to be nothing more than a difference in emphasis and not a difference in ideological content. We hasten to add, however, that the divergencies in accent, though subtle in nature and degree, should not be dismissed out of hand. For they may signify the qualitative disparity in the respective estimates of the capacity of the human mind to determine its own destiny. We turn now to a delineation of the continuities and discontinuities between the two systems regarding the question of the final goal of life, before concluding with a general summary of our findings. According to Bhaskara, the supreme goal of life is the achievement of liberation (mukti) through the realization of the essential identity of every finite object with the eternal Brahman. This state of perfect freedom is achieved by transcendence of the limiting conditions (upddhis) and the dissociation of the natural essence (svabhdvika)from the adventitious factors (aupddhika)in his own nature. Like Hegel, Bhaskara defined freedom as selfdetermination. The fully realized person gains perfect liberation because he is

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no longer constrained or prodded by the promptings of a higher will that is distinct from his own. Furthermore, this freedom is realized in and through the natural order, though it does not come to full fruition until after death. The eternal nature of God is not antagonistic to the temporal process. The eternal realizes itself through the temporal. To quote Srinivasachari again: The universe is not a mere fact but an eternal act, in which the end is immediately divined. Time, therefore, does not vanish in the absolute, but enters into it and gets transfigured. The freed self does not become a mere static absolute, but realizes whatever it wills in the world of relativity.76 Although the self becomes one with the absolute, the world process continues and the Brahmanized self realizes its divine nature in its cosmic functioning. Thus, Bhaskara (like Whitehead) is intensely concerned to delineate the "shape" of the creative process; for to understand the nature of creation-the identity of its source and origin, the operative and material agency of its actualization and the means of its annihilation, is to grasp all that is to be known about the world and its grounding in God. The apprehension of the nature of the universe and so on is achieved by meditating on the cosmogonic process in reverse-from phenomenal diversity back to noumenal unity, from the world of manifold effects to the primordial causal principle. The question must be addressed whether mukti involves complete dissolution of the empirical self or, perhaps, a higher and more unified form of relationship which transcends the states of unity and diversity as conceived in the world of ordinary cognitive discourse. Bhaskara, once again, adopts the view of the "middle may" by rejecting both the Advaita of Saikara (which holds that avibhdga is the state of perfect and unqualified unity in which the finite self is totally submerged in the impartite Supreme Self) and the Visistddvaitaposition, later given systematic exposition by Ramanuja (which holds that avibhaga entails the preservation of the features of the finite personality but now in pure, undivided ecstatic communion with God). Bhaskara sees the doctrines of absolute identity and absolute distinctness as standing in blatent contradiction to the truth of bheddbheda.This truth must be taken to hold good for the state of mukti, as it does for the state of samsara. He is opposed to eternal distinction (svarupabheda)on the one hand and to dissolution of all distinctions in absolute nonduality (aikya) on the other. No analogy taken from commonsense experience can adequately depict the paradoxical nature of the experience of the supernal bliss achieved by unity-in-diversity within Brahman. In contrast to Safikara's characterization of the experience ofjnadna-mukti as the instantaneous and total evaporation of the illusory world and the submergence of the finite jiva into the infinite self, Bhaskara conceives of the spiritual life as the gradual expansion of the finite consciousness by means of the progressive realization of the essential identity of the finite self with the infinite self and the ultimate achievement of ekFbhava."Mukti is not the abolition of consciousness nor its aloneness; it is

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not communion with a personal god nor the absolute identity with the which results from indeterminate. But it is oneness with Brahman (ekFbhdva) the abolition of the idea of duality (bhinnatva)."77 In a word, mukti is the spiritual liberation which results from the identification with and dependence upon God but without the dissolution of the element of difference that is demanded by Advaita. It is "the security of this absolute dependence on the absolute will of God and not the attainment of the absolute itself. It is 78 sdvadhika and not niravadhika-aisvarya." Whitehead's most extensive discussion of the summum bonum toward which the created order seems to be tending, is to be found in the concluding 79 chapter of Adventuresof Ideas, entitled "Peace." It is also in this particular discussion of the ideal goal of human life that the Philosophy of Organism verges most closely with the philosophy of bheddbheda. According to Whitehead, viewing the concrescent process in the widest possible context, everything is discovered to be responding to an irresistible urge toward peace, a condition defined as the 'Harmony of Harmonies'. This urge, which lurks on the edge of consciousness, incites progression beyond the contemporaneous state of the world toward larger and larger realms of actualization. It is a search for the maximization of order and equilibrium among the many constitutive occasions within the actual universe and the realization of this maximum order without suffering a dimunition of sensitive awareness, of vigorous activity and of a commitment to the enrichment of life. From a universal perspective, the vigorous and often ruthless struggle of the multitudinous centers of life-power to actualize their own inherent possibilities, ultimately issues into a steady movement toward a larger, more enduring and more peaceful state of amity among the competing members of the worldorder. This is a state where opposition among competitors, ultimately, gives ways to a complementarity of functions and, perhaps, a final general state of harmony. This quest for peace, harmony, and proper proportion among things elevates the individual beyond the level of consciousness where the preservation of the privacy and integrity of the individual personality is the primary motivation of all activity. It moves the individual beyond the narrow boundaries of finite selfhood to embrace the totality of the universe, to the end that "a wider sweep of conscious interest" comes to the fore. This enterprise is fostered by "a trust in the efficacy of Beauty," or the perfection of Harmony which is the achievement of projected ideals in thought and deed, combined with the adventurous search for novel perfections. It is the weaving of the universal ideal upon the expressions of individuality and the coordination of "the generality of harmony and the importance of the
individual." 80

The achievement of such a state provides for "the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience" by removing all tendencies

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toward mutual inhibition among the various prehensions. This dissipation of all causes of reciprocal hindrance "results in the enlargement and enrichment of the mode of consciousness and the confirmation of "selfcontrol at its widest-at the width where the 'self' has been lost and interest has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality." 81 In conformity with Plato's ideal of 'universal harmony', Whitehead feels compelled to stop short of Bhaskara's ideal of complete and enduring union of the finite personality with the infinite 'preter-personal' Brahman. It must be said, nonetheless, that he has laid the groundwork in the chapter on "Peace" for the development of a program of spiritual discipline of the sort promoted His notions of the urge toward harmony "lurking on the by bheddbhedavdda. edge of consciousness," "the subsidence of turbulence which inhibits," "the grasping of infinitude," which "carries with it a surpassing of personality," "self-control at its widest," "the extreme ecstasy of Peace," all resonate deeply with the description of the goals of the spiritual life in the philosophy of bheddbheda.Whitehead's declaration that "the suffering attains its end in a Harmony of Harmonies,"82 suggests the same state of existence as that described by Bhaskara as one in which "This dtman [which is fully united with Brahman]has no need to create, for his desires are fulfilled ... his desires and thoughts [are] perfectly efficient and his nature is therefore one of incomparable bliss," 83 We must be on our guard, however, against insensitivity to the differences between the conceptions of the final goal of life in the two philosophies. Leaving aside within this context the more troublesome issues pertaining to the basis for an authentically unitary experience of God, we press the argument that for Whitehead, in contrast to Bhaskara, the optimum intensity of experience to which one could aspire, is the achievement of a relationship of camaraderie or communion rather than union with God. We must recall that, for Whitehead, God remains "the great companion-the fellow-sufferer who understands," 84 not the Eternal universal Ground of Being into which all things are merged as the termination of the cosmic epoch. Indeed, as John Cobb has observed, "in Whiteheadian terms, ontological union with God is impossible."85 For all their existential proximity and experiential relatedness, human beings and God belong to two separate and nonfusable orders of existence. At no point does Whitehead give serious consideration to the possibility of a complete merger between the creatures and their Creator, either through solitary unitive experiences or by a total cosmic amalgamation of the world at the 'end of time'. In reflecting on experiences that are described in mystical literature as 'ecstatic selftranscendence' or 'unio mystica', Cobb concludes that "experientially speaking, it may well be understood as an experience of union with God, even though, philosophically speaking, actual identity must be denied."86 Given the ontological distinctness of God and the universe, communion with God is

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the most satisfactory experience toward which a person can aspire. To pine after a more intimate relationship with God, is to confuse two orders of existence which must be kept distinct. To fail to keep them separate, is to fall victim to an extreme monism, or, in Whiteheadian terms, misplaced concreteness-the bete noire of Process Philosophy.
V. CONCLUSION

It is at this juncture, where the definition of the final destiny to which each actual entity or Jiva comes or can hope to come, in its relationship to the Absolute, that a clear distinction between the thinking of Bhaskara and Whitehead assumes paramount importance. Both assert that God or the Absolute possesses two natures-the one passive, unified, and self-sufficient, the other, vigorously active, multiform and, as yet, unfulfilled. They agree that the Absolute and the world stand together in a relation of difference-andnondifference and that the only adequate conception of Reality rests on the proposition that God is as dependent upon the world for the satisfaction of his subjective aims, as is the world dependent upon him for its subjective satisfaction. In the end, however, we have begun to sense (especially with the discussion of their concepts of eschatology) that the vector qualities of the two philosophies diverge rather significantly. Each system appears to 'tilt' slightly to one extreme or the other. Bhaskara finally surrenders to the allurements of a mystical monism which many another Indian sage has found irresistible; Whitehead, for his part, opts for a kind of functional pluralism. It would appear that, despite the numerous points at which these two philosophical visions converge, the Vedantin enterprise begins at the point where Whitehead's metaphysical analysis comes to consummation. Or, to phrase the same contention in Kantian terms, whereas Whiteheadian religion, for all its excursions into the realms of intuitive experience and Godconsciousness, remains, in the end, a "religion within the limits of reason" and thus, a rational religion; the religion of Bhaskara, for all its forays into the terrain of rational argumentation and dialectical disputation, remains a "religion beyond the limits of reason."

NOTES 1. This writer has also been known traditionally as Bhattabhaskara and Bhaskaracarya. The bibliography of writings on the bheddbhedasystem is far from vast due to the relative neglect of the study of this philosophy by modern scholars, both Indian and Western. This paucity of scholarly works on Bhaskara is due, in large part, to the lack of a critical edition of the Sanskrit text and of a translation of the extant text into any one of the European languages. There exists only a highly corrupted Sanskrit text of Bhaskara's Brahmasitrabhasya, edited by V. P. Dvivedin (Benares: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 20, 1915ff.). The short list of titles which follows will assist the reader in finding his way into the modest bodies of writings that are currently available: S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge University Press,

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1932), II, pp. 198ff.; Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Bhaskara the Vedantin," Philosophy East and West, 17, (1967): 61-67; M. Hiriyanna, "Bhaskara's View of Error," Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute 1 (1943-1944): 39-44; A. Sastri. "A Critique of Bhaskara's Doctrine of Simultaneous Difference and Non-Difference," Calcutta Review 65 (1937): 41-46; B. N. K. Sharma, "Bhaskara-a Forgotten Commentator on the Gita," Indian Historical Quarterly 9 (1933): 663-667; C. Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1960), pp. 340-341; M. L. Sircar, "The Philosophy of Bhaskara," Philosophical Quarterly (Amalner) 3 (1927): 107-139; P. N. Srinivasachari, "The Philosophy of Bhaskara," Journal of the University of Madras 1 (1928): 114-124; P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Bheddbheda (Adyar Library and Research Center, 1972); J. Tarkavedantatirtha, "The World as a Real Modification of the Absolute (Bhaskara's Theory of Brahmaparinamavada)," Our Heritage 1 (1953): 309-318. 2. All references in this article to Process and Reality carry two different paginations. The first number refers to the 1969 edition, published by The Free Press; the second number, placed in brackets, refers to the appropriate page in the first edition, published by The Macmillan Company in 1929. Hereafter this work will be cited as PR. 3. According to the National Union Catalogue, the single extant copy of the Sanskrit text of the Brahmasutrabhdsya by Bhaskara is in the South Asia Collection at the University of Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, in searching for the volume, I discovered that it has apparently been lost. For this reason, I have been forced to depend entirely upon the relevant portions of an unpublished English translation by J. A. B. van Buitenen. I am most grateful for his generosity in making this text available to me. 4. See reference under note 1. 5. The most relevant portions of Bhaskara's Brahmastutrabhdsya to the discussion of his cosmology are: 1.1.4; 1.13.30; 1.4.20-21; 1.4.25-26; 2.1.14; and 2.1.27. 6. PR, p. 7 [7]. 7. Whitehead's Metaphysics. An Introductory Exposition (New York: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 55-56. 8. PR, p. 9 [10]. 9. I am grateful to David Griffin of the Claremont School of Theology for calling my attention to this important distinction in Whitehead's philosophy and for his generosity in providing numerous other critical comments on various troublesome issues encountered in the preparation of this article. 10. PR, p. 23 [27-28]. 11. Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 190. Whitehead apparently wishes to distinguish between a 'vicious' and a 'benign' dualism by identifying the former as devoid of the element of self-reflexive criticism and the latter as including such a critical element. 12. PR, p. 130 [168]. 13. BSbh. 1.4.22. 14. BSbh. 1.1.3. 15. Ibid., 2.1.18. 16. PR, p. 25 [31]. 17. See BAU II.1.20; 11.4.10;MaitrlUpan. VI.32; Mundaka Upan. 1.1.7. 18. Consult BAU 1.4.7; Chdnd.Upan. VI.2.3; Tait. Upan. 11.6;Ait. Upan. I.1. 19. PR, p. 407 [524]. 20. PR, p. 37 [47]. 21. PR, p. 38 [48]. 22. PR, p. 83 [104]. 23. PR, p. 106 [134]. 24. PR, p. 406 [523]. 25. PR, p. 405 [521]. 26. PR, p. 408 [526]. 27. Among the many English translations of this text that are readily available, see S. Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Sutra. The Philosophy of the Spiritual Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960); Swami Gambhirananda, Brahma-sutra-bhdsya (Calcutta: of Sarikardcdrya

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Advaita Ashrama, 1966, 1972); George Thibaut, The Veddnta Sutras of Bddardyana (Oxford, 1890, 1896; New York: Dover Publications, 1962). 28. Chdnd. Upan. VI.2.3; Tait. Upan. 11.6:so 'kdmayatabahu sydm prajdyeyeti. 29. BSbh. 1.1.2. 30. Chdnd. Upan. 1.9.1. Akdsa or ether is defined in various schools of Indian philosophy as a subtle, ethereal, and nonquantifiable 'fluid' substance, which is believed to pervade the universe and to serve as an invisible vehicle of all living forms. Sound (sabda) is supposed to be its primary quality and from the Upanisadson, it is equated with the unmanifested (avyakta) Brahman as the imperceptible essence of the universe. Compare BAU 3.2.13. 31. Both Sankara and Bhaskara draw upon Tait. Upan 11.1 for the scriptural source of this doctrine, where a kind of "Great Chain of Being" is traced from the self or dtman in unbroken succession through space, air, fire, water, earth, plants, and food to the person (purusa). His indictment against Saikara's doctrine of illusion (mdydvdda),reads as follows: mahdydnikabauddmdydvddamt hagdthitamn vydvarnayantolokan vydmohayanti. 32. BSbh. 1.1.3. 33. See BSbh. 1.1.4; 1.4.22; 2.1.14. 34. yasydh kdryamt idamt krtsnamt vyavahdrdya kalpate nirvaktamt sa na sakyeti vacanamt vacandrthanm. 35. na caupddhikanm kartrtvam aparamartham: BSbh. 2.3.40. 36. Consult BrahmasutraII.1.24. 37. BSbh. 2.1.14. 38. Ibid. 39. PR, p. 112 [143]. 40. Ibid., p. 407 [524]. 41. Ibid., p. 411 [529-30]. Compare p. 407 [524]. 42. BSbh. 2.1.19. 43. Ibid., 2.1.14. 44. Ibid., 2.1.14. See also Srinivasachari, ibid., p. 65. 45. BSbh. 2.1.33, 34. 46. AI, p. 157; PR, pp. 39 [50], 41 [53], 107 [136]. 47. PR, p. 60 [73]. 48. Ibid., p. 65 [79]. 49. Ibid., p. 27 [33]. 50. Srinivasachari, ibid., p. 28. 51. PR, p. 38 [48], 65 [79]. 52. Ibid., p. 62 [76]. 53. Ibid., p. 65 [79]. 54. Ibid., p. 83 [105]. 55. Ibid., p. 26 [32]. 56. Ibid., p. 37 [46]. 57. BSbh. 1.1.4. 58. Srinivasachari, ibid., p. 50. 59. Ibid., p. 50. 60. Modes of Thought (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 128. 61. AI,p. 11. 62. PR, p. 53 [63-64]. 63. Ibid., p. 130 [168]. 64. MT, p. 128; PR, p. 410-411 [528]. 65. Srinivasachari, ibid., p. 68. 66. PR, p. 130 [168]. 67. PR, p. 106 [135], 260 [340]. 68. BrahmastitrabhasyaII.1.33. 69. BSbh. 2.1.32-34. 70. BSbh. 2.1.33. 71. Srinivasachari, ibid., pp. 44-45.

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72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

BSbh. 2.1.14. Communicated to me in private conversation. PR, pp. 125 [159], 137 [177], 172 [224]; MT, p. 128. PR, p. 405 [523]. Op. cit., p. 132. Srinivasachari, ibid., p. 138. Ibid., p. 135. New York: The Free Press, 1967. Al, chapter XVII. Ibid., p. 285. Ibid., p. 296. BSbh. 1.3.30, translated by D. H. H. Ingalls, op. cit., p. 63. PR, p. 413 [532]. A ChristianNatural Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 233ff. Ibid., p. 234.

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