Heidegger and Aristotle. Philosophy as Praxis by Michael Bowler Review by: Pierre Mauboussin The Review of Metaphysics, Vol.

62, No. 4 (Jun., 2009), pp. 912-914 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40387772 . Accessed: 01/02/2013 09:33
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AND STAFF BRANDONZIMMERMAN on "the or intellect). Baracchi notesthat Aristotle's insistence (intuition of praxis and poiesis is suspectin lightof the mutualexclusivity intheethical ofthelanguage oftekhn discourse" pervasiveness (p. 181). thereis a she claims,is itself a kindof making.Furthermore Ethics, close relation betweentekhn and phusis. Not onlyis demonstration that are notdemonstrable, butAristotle underscores based on principles of epistm. the importance of conviction and trust in his explication Firstphilosophy is not to be confused withepistm(science): it is and entailsa ethical. Nous is intrinsically nondiscursive, nonlinear, certain immediacy. Baracchi stresses that nous involves both it constitutes theultimate intellectual and sensible perception. "Indeed, limit oflogos,that which inassimilable to logos"(p. 195). In her remains examination of phronsis, to being Baracchishows thatin addition relatedto the virtuesof character, intimately phronsisinvolvesa With theoretical moment. sophiawe reachthe genuinely contemplative culmination ofAristotle's Ethics. It is theunionofnous and epistm, butalso involves theconvergence ofperception and trust.Sophia is at once rooted in ethos butalso is concerned with thegoodas such. In an Baracchisuccinctly statesthemainthesisof her footnote, illuminating or book: "In sum,thepointis notwhether reason(prudence) practical but that 'theoretical' is priorin Aristotle's discourse, reason,wisdom, theoretical is inherently andthepractical wisdom, practical, knowledge, is pervasively and moving forthe litup by intuitive theoretical, insight sake ofit"(p. 212). I havegiven thebarest account oftheriches ofthistext.Equally only of are her discussions thesoul,friendship, logos, illuminating happiness, and the of the science of justice,teleology, meaning beingqua being. Whether or notone agreeswithherreadings of specific passages,one sensesthroughout bothhercare and mastery oftherelevant texts(not inAristotle butalso in Plato). Baracchi's Aristotle is a thinker who only is deeply groundedin the human condition,in the ethos that characterizes of our everyday lives,but who resistsany suggestion To be we for a strive wisdom anthropocentrism. fully human, grounded inpractice we seekto comprehend where ofthecosmosand themystery ourplacewithin thiscosmos. Thisgenuinely book is thought-provoking not only for studentsof Aristotle but for anyone concernedwith practical philosophy,first philosophy,ethics, and the human - Richard condition. J.Bernstein, NewSchool forSocial Research.

BOWLER, Michael. Heideggerand Aristotle.Philosophyas Praxis. Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy. London:Continuum International 2008. 171 pp. Cloth, 65.00-Bowler Publishing Group, situates as a response to theNeo-Kantian Heidegger's problem thought of grounding the sciences in the broad overviewhe gives of the

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and Natorpand the attempts of Rickert philosophies by Husserland to escape (in oppositeways) the Neo-Kantian framework Dilthey by lifeas it is actually Bowlershowshow specific experienced. capturing in Heidegger's and criticisms formulations lectures from the Freiburg relate the and Marburg to themes of as periods philosophy an idealtask in Rickert, ofa phenomenology Husserl's oftheenvironing development formulation of science as a project world,Natorp'sHeidegger-like of the human sciences in a and Dilthey'sgrounding (Vorwurf), of the connectedness nonnaturalistic of the reliving (Zusammenhang) is historically constituted. Bowlerarguesthat worldin whichmeaning hisontology to address thisproblematic intended byshowing Heidegger theNeo-Kantian idealof ofDaseinbetter howtheanalytic accomplishes as validsciencebecauseofitsnonobjectifying philosophy understanding to showhow to theworld.Bowlerconcludes ofourrelation byseeking of philosophy as a nonobjectifying task led understanding Heidegger's thatphilosophy notonlyexamines to think praxis as world Heidegger ofitsown,distinct to ofpraxis conscious a kind butis itself relationship of as life. BowlerarguesthatHeidegger's philosophy understanding basis in Aristotle's notionof praxis shows not onlyan unmistakable oflifego well existenzial butalso howHeidegger's categories phronesis ofhuman account Aristotle's being. beyond categorical he in Bowler's overviewis the connection interest Of particular in the way Neo-Kantianism outlinesbetween Baden and Marburg notionof a science guidedby a Kantian Rickert's practicalideal of of has implicit parallels in Natorp'sunderstanding validity perfect is the or taskwithan objective scienceas a project goal. Also notable influence ofHusserl's thewell-known Logical deemphasizes wayBowler in favor of on consideringHusserl's Heidegger Investigations and willing attitudes ofvaluing ofnonobjective ofnotions development as outmay havebeendeveloped which Bowler inIdeas II, themes points is attestedin Heidegger's earlyas 1908,but whose earlyinfluence Bowler also and Spirit." on "Nature 1916lecture to Husserl's references of to Dilthey's notionof metaphysics ties Heidegger's understanding life worldview thattriesto hypostatize as a preeminent philosophy in lifealways ofmeaning constitution whilethehistorical conceptually, as of philosophy Bowler'sunderstanding its grasp. Finally, overflows with the of Dasein the earlier to tries analysis unify Heidegger's praxis later Heidegger'sattemptto account for a sense of being (and ofbeings. andthebeing ofworld theaccount beyond philosophy) remains ofpraxis Bowlerdevelops thenotion maddeningly However, is neededaboveall in disentangling whenspecificity Heidegger's vague, to Aristotle phronesis. For example,Bowler relationship regarding definition of man as thatAristotle's summarizes argument Heidegger's ofechon to human zoon echon being appliestheobjective category logon thatAristotle's own notionof hexis escapes the even while noting that the assertions. Given ofcategorical conceptualizations objectifying accountof action Aristotle's forcomprehending termhexis is critical and phronesisin theNicomachean appearsto Ethics,Bowlersimply

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AND STAFF BRANDONZIMMERMAN without ofAristotle a very smallpartofHeidegger's criticisms compress of Similar difficulties sufficient the relevant texts from both. analysis ofpraxis orlifeor experience uses to existwith thenotions that Bowler thewholebook:in whatsense can all six philosophers be said to unify have similar notions ofpraxis exceptin an equivocalway? A strong ofthisequivocation indication is thewayRickert as virtually disappears thebook progresses, whileEmilLask receives no morethantwoscant references. The secondchapter on Husserl makesa quitebroadclaim that Heidegger'sanalysis of being-in-the-world was significantly influenced but trying to distinguish who influenced whom by Husserl, here is extremely in bothphilological terms. difficult and conceptual Thebrief ofretention andprotention on discussion ofHusserl's concepts of the ego with the page 38 confusesthe objectiveintentionality of innertime consciousness. There are lastlysome intentionality 2 (where with notes 55-62 forchapter problems endnotes, especially 6, wherenotes12 and 13 they appearoff by one) and againin chapter makean incorrectly formatted reference to note5. obviously forthe worth thebook is definitely Despitethesecriticisms, reading scholarbecause of the breadth of ground coveredand the Heidegger to go freshness of some of the interpretation. Bowleralso attempts to reformulation works a beyond essay simply interpreting Heidegger's of Heidegger'sunderstanding of philosophy, worthyof something and the (relatively) of the undertaking respectbothforthe difficulty - Pierre Mauboussin, expressionhe bringsto the topic. jargon-free III. Chicago,

Lee. A Thingof this World: A Historyof Continental AntiBRAVER, Realism. Topicsin Historical 111.: Northwestern Philosophy. Evanston, - Lee Universit Press.2007. xxi + 590no. Cloth. $79.95: oaoer. $34.95 Braver wantsto see a lotmorearguing The place in philosophy. taking withphilosophy he claims,"is notthatwe are arguing problem today, witheach other, but thatwe aren't, thatwe have notyetrisento the of courseto the lack of pointof disagreeing" (p. 7). He is referring and hencethemutual between theanalytic dialogue, misunderstanding, and continental traditions in philosophy. that Braver claims, however, thetwocampsshareat leastone significant thread their through running works:whatBravercalls "anti-realism." it as the idea Braverdefines with Kantthat in "themind . . . organizes actively experience originating rather thanpassively an independent constructing knowledge, reflecting meansto achievehisgoalofpreparing theground reality" (p. 3). Braver fora meaningful and profitable between thetwotraditions by dialogue a "commensurable so as to make continental reworking vocabulary" morereadily to analytic thegreater thought thinkers; partof intelligible thebookis dedicated to tracing in continental thehistory ofanti-realism
V . . / . . I

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