WAR AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GOALS: QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF WAR ON GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS

Luke Maier* Abstract: Throughout history, wars have harmed human populations by inflicting immediate casualties and reverberating environmental destruction. The international community increasingly recognizes the risks from environmental damage, and as a result mammoth international initiatives have attempted to curb sources of environmental destruction. Yet so far, global environmental progress is unimpressive. To what extent does experiencing war impair nations from contributing to global environmental progress? The research presented here used 10 years of national-level data for 161 nations and 25 wars to quantify the global average causal effect of war on ten indicators of progress toward global environmental policy goals (referred to as environmental progress). The results indicate wars severely damage biodiversity, habitats, and most significantlyenvironmental health conditions. The results also found warfare is increasingly harming ecological vitality. These findings suggest international actors should 1) expand efforts to stabilize environmental health factors in territories that recently experienced war and 2) increase initiatives that foster ecological resilience in conflict-prone states. *** Introduction Warfare has long been recognized for its carnage on natural environments (UNEP, 2010; Westing, 1988). Paradigmatic examples include the acid-seared forests in Vietnam, chemically contaminated swaths of Kosovo, landmine-laden farms in Lebanon, and oil-slicked shorelines of the Iraqi-Iranian war (Austin & Bruch (eds.), 2000). Environmental damage is often an inadvertent side effect of warfare, but destroying environments can be a strategic decision. Scorched-earth tactics enabled one of the final defeats of the unified Roman empire (Gibbon & Smith, 1857, p. 180) and later Russias repulsion of the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions. These tactics persist today, for the Syrian government has burned northern forests to expose dissident hideouts and refugee routes (AP, 2012). In addition to these combat contexts, military activities such as training exercises, fortifying, and weapons manufacturing can also damage environments (Jorgenson, Clark, & Kentor, 2010; Westing, 1988). Conflict-induced environmental damage can harm societies long after the drums of war silence (Partow, 2008). An early example, Easter Islands civilization collapsed when its natural environment failed to recover from micro-socio conflicts (Ponting, 2011). The aftermath of Agent Orange (a pesticide the US used to strategically destroy vegetation in the Vietnam War) still affects inhabitants of Vietnam and US veterans (Hammond & Schecter, 2012; Inst. of Medicine, 2011). The potential of such harms to linger makes preventing or mitigating war-induced environmental damage vital to societal recovery from armed conflict. Fortunately, the overall number of wars (defined here as violent conflicts between identifiable factions that cause >1000 deaths per year) halved between 2000 and 2010 (see Figure 1). During and before that time, diplomatic efforts to improve environmental sustainability were accelerating. Since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, the international community has passed a preponderance of environmental accords seeking to stimulate global environmental progress (EP). These efforts culminated in 2000, when the UN designated environmental sustainability as a Millennium Development Goal. Today, international environmental regimes address myriad issues including biodiversity, Antarctic governance, persistent organic pollutants, trade in endangered species, and climate change.
*Research Assistant at Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University. This paper reflects revisions of the original version, which appeared in-print. 2013 Duke University Undergraduate Publications Board.

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Yet even with war declining and international Figure 1: Number of Wars per Year initiatives mounting, global environmental prosince 2000 15 gress remains sluggish. The Environmental Performance Index (a measure of states national10 level EP) indicates global EP is flatlining, meagerly rising from 50.13 to 53.09 out of 100 index 5 points from 2000-2010 (EPI Dataset, 2012). This 0 and other evidence of lackluster progress cause 2000 2005 2010 scholars to question whether international enviYear ronmental agreements stimulated environmental progress at all (e.g., see discussion in Jabbour et al., 2012). Some attribute governments deprioritization of environmental progress to political economy concerns (Kelemen & Vogel, 2010; Pelletier, 2010) or other issues perceived as relatively more important (Mitchell, 2009, p. 92). Do wars impair nations from contributing to global environmental progress? The research presented here aims to offer a quantitative answer to this question. As of this writing, few (if any) studies relate wars environmental consequences to achievement of policy goals. Most research on the war-environment nexus focuses on small scale conflict (Reuveny, Mihalache-O'Keef, & Quan Li, 2010) or narrow historical case studies (Barbier, 2001; Jarvie, Kannan, Malley, Roule, & Thomson, 2003; McNeill, 2001). If war does damage global EP, we should observe nations experiencing war express significantly lower scores in EP indicators than nations not at war. The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) rates nations progress toward 10 areas of international policy goals, which can be divided into two categories: environmental health and ecological vitality. The environmental health score (EH) assesses the states impact on environmental conditions affecting human health. The ecological vitality score (EV) assesses the states aggregate effect on ecosystem conditions. The theory that wars harm EP generates the hypotheses that war has an average negative causal effect on EH and EV indicators. Each hypothesis is falsified or unsupported if average global EH or EV in warring countries are greater, the same, or insignificantly different than in nonwarring countries. The theory is internally consistent because its predictions have counterfactuals and can only explain the negative outcome that war damages EP. The remainder presents the methods used to test the hypotheses, the results, and their implications. Methods The causal effect of war on EP can be modeled: = E( ) - E( ) where E( ) estimates the average annual EP of warring countries, E( ) estimates the average annual EP of non-warring countries (control group), and is the average causal effect (ACE) of war on global EP. Variables and Value Assignment The independent variable represents if a state is at war. A value of 1 was assigned to states at war in the previous year and 0 was assigned to those not at war in the previous year. For example, Chad experienced war in 2006, so it was considered treated in 2007. Coding war experience only in a post-conflict year assured the causal variable took temporal precedence over observed changes in EP indicators. Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) were used to determine which nations experienced wars during each year from 2000 to 2010. The UCDP compiles information (including territory affected, sides and number of annual deaths) for every observable armed conflict in the world (Themner et al., 2012).
Number of Wars in Study Area

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The dependent variable represents a states score on enviTable 1: Number of Observations ronmental performance indicators for each year, and the values Unit N were drawn from the EPI Dataset (2012). The EPI annually EH (Non-warring) 1679 rates 232 states and territories 3 EH and 7 EV indicators on a EH (Warring) 80 continuous scale of 0-100 based on how much progress they EV (Non-warring) 1385 made that year toward international environmental policy goals. EV (Warring) 56 The index determines scores based on quantitative measures (such as atmospheric SO2 concentrations and child mortality rates). The indicator values assumed by states spanned most of the variable range. The 10 subset indicators use different scoring scales, but the model was still applicable. The UCDP and EPI data are the most comprehensive datasets available for violent conflict and EP, respectively, and they are highly compatible in covariation analysis because both are annualized, national-level data. Overall, the data comprised 10 years (from 2000-2010) of observations of 161 nations and 25 armed conflicts. Only small island nations, small city-states, and nations without data were excluded. Small island nations and city-states represent a large numeric portion of the worlds states, but they represent very little of the worlds population and state-controlled land area. Including micro-states would have skewed the results away from representing global average land area because the data units equally represent all states regardless of size. Table 1 summarizes the sample sizes for each test. Causality Considerations The most likely confounding variable that could have caused both war and low EP is economic strife. Economic issues such as inequality and poverty have been found to cause environmental degradation (Stern, Common, & Barbier, 1996) and political instability (Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, & Swagel, 1996). To test the possibility that economic conditions caused co-variation of war and EP, regression coefficients were calculated for the relationship of GDP per capita and EH and EV. Additional confounding influences could have included government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and peace-time rule of law. To ensure these variables were not causing the observed correlation, the World Banks Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset was used to test the strength of correlation among these factors and EP. If they did not co-vary with EP, then regardless of their covariation with war, these confounding variables could not have caused correlation between war and EP. Furthermore, the dependent and independent variables were unlikely to be endogenously related. Although some environmental conditions can cause instability and conflict (for overview, see Renner, 2006; Myers 1993; Ponting, 2011), the causal effect of environmental conditions on conflict mostly manifests in conflicts incurring between 25-1000 deaths per year (Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998). These smaller scale conflicts were excluded from the analysis here, and thus the probability is low that reverse causality influenced the model. Results Average Causal Effect Results The results found wars exert a strongly negative influence on all environmental health indicators and some ecological vitality indicators. Table 2 lists the aggregated results for the EP categories ( ), and Table 3 lists the results for the 10 EP indicators ( ) in the EH and EV categories.

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The ACE of war on the EH indicators was strongly negative throughout their confidence intervals. Overall, the ACE of war on the EH category was between -24.71 and -27.39. The EV ACE results were not as consistently negative, though overall the ACE results for 4 of the 7 EV indicators were negative throughout the confidence intervals. Of the EV indicators, war impacted the biodiversity and habitat indicator the most, having an ACE between -13.63 and 25.69. Another significant finding was that the ACE of war on EV is becoming much more negative over time (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: ACE of War on EV over Time 15.00 ACE of War on EV 10.00 5.00 0.00 2000 -5.00 -10.00 -15.00 Year 2005 2010

Table 2: Causal Effect of War on EH, EV, and Overall EP EP Indicator Environmental Health (EH) Ecological Vitality (EV) Environmental Performance (EP) E( ) 32.57 44.21 43.21 E( ) 58.63 46.76 52.23 (ME, CI=95%) -26.05 (1.34) -2.58 (.62) -9.03 (.51)

Table 3: Causal Effect of War on EP Indicators Category EH EP Indicator Environmental burden of disease Air Pollution (effects on humans) Water (effects on humans) Air Pollution (effects on ecosystem) Water (effects on ecosystem) Biodiversity & Habitat Agriculture Forestry Fisheries Climate Change E( ) 32.79 40.74 22.26 43.81 28.1 36.93 40.6 67.53 30.72 57.34 E( ) 58.32 67.31 49.67 38.77 37.08 56.59 49.94 73.81 29.87 44.34 -25.53 -26.57 -27.41 5.04 -8.98 -19.66 -9.34 -6.28 0.85 13 (ME, CI=95%) (5.70) (4.38) (3.84) (4.78) (5.02) (6.03) (7.30) (5.24) (3.49) (6.09)

Exclusion of Confounding Influences GDP per capita hardly correlated with either EH ( =.03) or EV ( =.006). In fact, GDP per capita weakly increased as EV decreased, which could be because rising industrial and higher-GDP nations could be more exploitative of natural resources (Stern, 2004). Furthermore, EH and EV did not correlate to government effectiveness ( =.009; =.008), regulatory quality ( =.003; =.000003), or rule

EV

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of law ( =.001; =.001). This indicates economic and governance conditions did not confound the model, though some uncertainty about third variables will always persist. Conclusion The results strongly support the conclusion that recent warfare damages nations progress toward international environmental policy goals. War caused negative impacts on 7 of the 10 environmental progress indicators, and 4 of the indicators expressed drastic damage. The environmental burden of disease, air pollution, and drinking water access were substantially worse (-25.53/100 ME=.5.70; -26.57/100 ME=.4.38; and -27.41/100 ME=.3.84, respectively) in nations that recently experienced war. This could be an artifact of wartime targeting of human welfare determinants, which can include environmental conditions. In addition to environmental health impacts, war severely decreased affected nations biodiversity and habitat vitality (-19.66 /100 ME=6.03). The acute vulnerability of biodiversity and habitats to land degradationa basal feature of warfarecould explain this indicators sensitivity to war. Even when weighted with the less affected indicators, the overall effect of war on environmental progress was notably negative (-9.01 ME=.51). The models estimate of global ACE is valid because it established correlation between war and low EP indicators, temporal precedence, and conditional independence from three possible confounding variables. The estimator likely had little bias because it used many observations from a representative sample of nations. The breadth of the sampling did cause the model to be inefficient (though not inaccurate). Also, although the diversity of nations in the sample compromised unit homogeneity and barred the results from representing state-specific effects, these limitations in concreteness were less relevant to the purpose of this research. In the context of international strategy, breadth of explanation is more germane than state-level explanatory power, because broad strategic purviews underlie region-specific conclusions and policy initiatives. The findings imply two main conclusions. First, wartime humanitarian assistance should increase its attention to environmental influences on disease burden, air pollution, and safe access to drinking water. These EH challenges could stem from war-associated damage to infrastructure, such as hospitals and water systems. The finding that war severely impacts all EH indicators supports the need to direct more resources to stabilizing EH factors during and immediately after wartime. Though ecological damage can affect human livelihood in the medium and long terms, declines in environmental health have immediate, direct consequences on societies. Thus, addressing EH consequences of war should receive greater priority in humanitarian assistance. Second, initiatives supporting ecological resilience in conflict-prone areas should increase. Though the wars of the past 10 years have not had dramatic consequences on ecological vitality, this trend is reversing; ecological damage increasingly accompanies war. Possible explanations of this trend include the increasing severity of conflicts (despite a lower number of conflicts overall) and expanding military use of environmentally destructive technologies. The recent plunge of the biodiversity and habitat EV indicator in waraffected nations suggests the most sensitive elements of ecological communities (often habitats and species richness) might be harbingers of a worsening trend. Thus, initiatives that enhance ecological resilience in conflict-prone regions are necessary to reduce future war-related ecological damage. Overall, the research presented here has fourfold value. First, it indicates war impairs affected nations from contributing to global environmental progress. Additionally, the results provide global context to future region- or state-specific analysis of the war-environment nexus. The conclusions also help inform assistance and development initiatives, as well as our collective understanding of the characteristic impacts that shape the face of war. The sooner the damages of war are understood, the sooner they can be mitigated.

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Themner, Lotta, Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Wallensteen, Peter, Eriksson, Mikael, Sollenberg, Margareta, & Strand, Hvard. (2012). Armed Conflict, 1946-2012. Retrieved from: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ UNEP. (2010). Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts of Armed Conflict in Africa. In P. Saundry (Ed.). Washington, DC: UNEP. Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2010. (2011). (Vol. Eighth Biennial Update): The National Academies Press. Westing, Arthur H. (1988). The Military Sector vis--vis the Environment. Journal of Peace Research, 25(3), 257-264. doi: 10.1177/002234338802500305

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