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TO: Dan Marcus

FR: Warren Bass
CC: Mike Hurley
ON: March 30,2004
RE: Card press interviews

A few questions present themselves from Card's interviews done around the release of
Clarke's book:

1. Who asked for domestic defensive steps during the summer 2001 threat spike?
Card and White House officials have been insisting that it was both Rice and Card
who tasked Clarke to involve additional domestic agencies. But in her February 7
interview, Rice told us that she asked Clarke to call domestic agencies into the
CSG on July 5—and made no mention of Card. Moreover, Clarke has told us the
idea of pulling domestic agencies into the CSG was his—something Card
vigorously disputes. Clarke has been telling the press that DCI Tenet called him
around June 21 to complain that the new administration needed to be lit up to take
the threat seriously—something Clarke offers to buttress his case that the White
House was insufficiently involved.
2. Card has been saying that Clarke wanted to brief the president on cybersecurity,
not on al Qaeda. Clarke told us he wanted to give the president the same sort of
briefing that he gave Vice President Cheney, Powell, Rice, and Hadley. Why has
Card been saying this?
3. Card implied on CBS that President Bush himself was pushing for a tougher al
Qaeda policy early in the administration: "In fact, one of the first things he did
was to direct his national security adviser to put together a plan to make sure that
we could fight terror." I don't think we've heard that before, and there's certainly
no mention of such a presidential tasking in the documents—which one thinks
that any bureaucrat worth their salt would mention. Card may be conflating the
winter/spring 2001 decision to hold the policy review with the president's
reported May 2001 "swatting flies" remark. Why is Card saying that President
Bush directed Rice early in the administration to assemble a plan? What evidence
does he have to back this claim up?
4. Card says that a "firewall"—between FBI and CIA andJsetweeTTFBI HQ and FBI
field offices—hampered White House^eQmpreh^iston of the domestic al Qaeda
network. He does not say whether thisjs-^retFQgpective judgment or one made at
the time. If they worried aboutjntePsharing before~9744=rand especially during
the summer 2001 threat-spike—did they do anything about it? If they didn't worry
about it, should they have?
5. Clarke saysj
that Ridge
o
oppoSedthe
rr ^^"~\
creation of^^-^DHS-because it would be too
expensive and too hard to integrate^witiiojheragencies. Clarke said that Ridge
had to clear major statements and actit5niswith Card. DHS now denies that Ridge
opposed the department's creatidn; DHS saysltttoesniLhave to go through more
clearance than other departments. Who's right?
6. Card says he saw about 51 reports on al Qaeda beforfe 9/1 l^Where'd he get that
number from? Does that track with whatVe^knoV about/FOBs?^

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Card says one report discussed possible al Qaeda hijackings abroad, leading to
worldwide notifications to tighten airport security. Do we know about the sending
of such worldwide alerts? I've never heard of this, but Team 7 may know. Also, if
they were worried about hijackings abroad, wasn't it logical to err on the side of
caution and also worry about hijackings at home?
Card also has a series of ad hominem attacks impugning Clarke's motives, but
I'm not sure we need to swing at that. (For the record, he offers some faint praise
for Clarke's smarts but accuses him of hogging the spotlight and whoring his
book.)

Here's the key clips, in chronological order:

Boston Globe, March 30, 2004

Card makes the index of Clarke's book only once. It is in a reference by Tom Ridge,
assistant to the president for homeland security, who "soon found that he could do
nothing without first clearing it" with the White House chief of staff. While that is
negative in the context of the book, by Washington standards it is probably a positive
reference, connoting the power to be an obstacle.

It could explain Card's generally mild assessment of Clarke, the White House
antiterrorism adviser whose criticism of the Bush administration is dominating the
national news: "I know him, talked to him from time to time. He is very smart,
hardworking, a real character," said Card, who fielded a few questions before unveiling a
plaque at the Union Oyster House declaring this charming, 250-year old Boston
restaurant to be a National Historic Landmark.

What does Card mean by calling Clarke "a real character"? "He was kind of a different
person," answered Card. "When he and I would meet, he did not talk that much about
terrorism. He talked about cyber security with me." Added Card, without further
explanation, "I did prompt him to meet with interagency officials to talk about terrorist
threats. Condi and I challenged him to meet with the FAA, the Coast Guard," said Card,
referring to Condoleezza Rice, the president's national security adviser who is being
criticized for refusing to testify before the 9/11 commission.

"If he had any information about terrorist plans . . . I did not know about it. He had an
obligation to come forward. If he did not ring every bell, he was irresponsible."

Card, a former Holbrook state representative, said he had not yet read Clarke's book, "but
some of the excerpts I have heard about reflect fiction, not fact." Pressed for a specific
example, he cited the book's allegation that LNG tankers brought Al Qaeda terrorists to
America via Boston Harbor. "I never heard of that until today," said Card.

Baltimore Sun, March 29, 2004

Rice said she and White House chief of staff Andrew Card initiated actions to guard
against terrorism inside the United States during the summer of 2001, when U.S.

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intelligence picked up a "spike" of terror threats.

Clarke said the initiative came from him. "I told her I was going to do it. And I had
already been doing it two weeks before, because on June 21,1 believe it was, [CIA
Director] George Tenet called me and said, 'I don't think we're getting the message
through.'"

Boston Globe, March 27, 2004

"I've known Dick Clarke for a long time. He's a smart, competent, hard-working
individual who is a real character. I mean, the guy's a little strange," Card said. "But I
found that his book has more fiction than fact in it. I participated in the same meetings he
suggests, and I did not have the same observations that he had. He also talks about
meetings that I don't think ever existed. It's unfortunate, but that's the reality of a free
press."

Good Morning America, March 25, 2004

ANDREW CARD, WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF on Clarke: "He was frustrated
and disappointed. He had aspired to be in positions that he did not get offered."

ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT ABC TV 7:00 PM MARCH 24, 2004

ANDREW CARD [White House chief of staff]: I think he's taken an opportunity to sell a
book and take advantage of the publicity that conies with a 9/11 Commission hearing,
and in the heightened political season. And I'm disappointed in Dick Clarke.

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS TV 7:00 PM MARCH 24,2004

ANDREW CARD [White House Chief of Staff]: What he is reporting does not reflect the
reality that I know to be true. And I've spent a lot of time with the president. I've been in
almost every one of his intelligence briefings. What he alleges is not the fact.

LOU DOBBS TONIGHT CNN TV 6:00 PM MARCH 24, 2004:

John King: Let me give you a bit of the history Condoleezza Rice gave us a short time
ago. She said an July 5, 2001, a little more than two months before the September 11
attacks, she came out of a briefing with the president in which he was told that the threat
level spike had been up quite dramatic. Now, those threats said were against U.S.
^interests overseas andagainst Israel as.

But she said she and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card decided as a precaution to
call Richard Clarke into her office and instruct him to put all domestic agencies,
including the Federal Aviation Administration, the FBI, the Coast Guard and others on a
ler alert, to tell them there was a possibility of al Qaeda attacks here in the United
Lthe^intelligence suggested those attacks would be overseas.

CNN March 24,2004 - 07:30 ET

CARD: Dick Clarke is just flat-out wrong. The president, when he first took office,
understood the terrorist concerns. He made directions to Condi Rice very early in the
administration to take a look at the terrorist counter-efforts that were in the books and left

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over from the Clinton administration. He felt that they were not robust enough. He asked
her to make them more robust. He did not want to have a strategy of just swatting flies.
He wanted to be able to have a robust response.

He actually recognized that the Taliban regime was a safe haven for the al Qaeda
network, and he wanted to eliminate the Taliban regime and deny the al Qaeda network
safe haven in Afghanistan. So, I think he had a proper understanding.

GOOD MORNING AMERICA (07:00 AM ET) - ABC, March 24, 2004 Wednesday
ANDREW CARD, WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF: I can tell you that the
intelligence reports that I saw during the time preceding 9/11 did not indicate the kind of
attack that happened on 9/11. We did have, I think I saw some 51 reports on al Qaeda
during the, the eight months prior to the attack. None of them indicated an attack on the
United States of the nature of 9/11.1 do remember one report talking about the potential
of al Qaeda and hijacking planes, but it was not seen as something that would relate to the
domestic homeland, it was more a threat expected around the world, and there were lots
of notifications sent around the world to tighten up airports, tighten up security around
planes and to tighten up security at US facilities around the world.

Well, the president from the day he took office was concerned about terrorist attacks on
the United States. He did spend a lot of time talking with the CIA director and, and Dick
Clarke was not in all of the meetings, but he was just in a handful of meetings. And he
actually focused more on cyber security than he did on the terrorist attacks.

But the, the, the president paid an awful lot of attention to terrorism. One of the first
directives that came out of the National Security Council at the president's direction dealt
with eliminating the Taliban regime and having a more robust response to the al Qaeda
network than the previous administration had. When we took office, we accepted the plan
that the previous administration had and the president said it wasn't strong enough and he
wanted to make it more robust. And that plan was presented to the president and, and it
was issued. Post-9/11, the president has done everything he can to secure the homeland.
He does not want to have another attack and he's doing everything he can to make sure
there will not be one.

The Early Show (7:00 AM ET) - CBS, March 24,2004 Wednesday

Mr. ANDREW CARD (White House Chief of Staff): The president, when he took office,
did understand the threat from al-Qaida and the threat from terrorists. In fact, one of the
first things he did was to direct his national security adviser to put together a plan to
make sure that we could fight terror. And the first major policy—or document that came
out of the National Security Council talked about going after the Taliban regime, to
eliminate al-Qaida as a threat to the country.

CHEN: Card says he does not believe 9/11 could have been prevented.

CNN, AMERICAN MORNING 07:00, March 24,2004 Wednesday

ANDREW CARD, WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF: [Clarke's] primary focus near

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the end of his tenure was cyber security. And the briefing that he had with the president
and that he pushed so hard to get, related to cyber security, not the terrorist concerns.

CNN LIVE TODAY 10:00, March 24, 2004 Wednesday

CARD: I believe that the firewall had not have been there, there would have been a better
understanding of the al Qaeda network that was already in the United States. And it
wasn't just a firewall between the CIA and the FBI. It was also kind of a firewall between
regional offices of the FBI and the Washington office.

Today (7:00 AM ET) - NBC, March 24, 2004 Wednesday

CARD: I served with Dick Clarke. I know him pretty well. I know that he's very
competent and very able, but the reflections in his book and what we hear in the media
today are not the reality that I experienced working with him. The primary focus that he
suggested we should pay attention to is cyber-security. And, in fact, the briefing that he
demanded to have with the president dealt with cyber-security, not with the al-Qaeda
network and terrorist attacks.

New York Times, March 23, 2004

Clarke also said that Tom Ridge, the president's first domestic security adviser and head
of the Department of Homeland Security, opposed the creation of his own department on
the grounds, accurate ones in Clarke's view, that it would be too costly and difficult to
integrate with other agencies. Clarke said that Ridge had to clear major statements and
actions with Andrew Card Jr., the president's chief of staff.

In an interview on Sunday night, Brian Roehrkasse, a spokesman for the department,

denied that Ridge had opposed its creation and said that the department did not have to go
through any more clearance with the White House than other cabinet departments.

NEWS FROM CNN 12:00, March 22, 2004 Monday

SEAN MCCORMACK, DEPUTY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY: In fact, it
was Dr. Rice and chief of staff Andy Card, who, during the height of the threat spike in
June and July of 2001, called in Mr. Clarke to ask him to take a look at what should be
done domestically to harden up and button up the homeland. It wasn't Mr. Clarke that
made those suggestions.

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