ARANETA VS. GATMAITAN GR Nos.

L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957 Facts: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid. ISSUES: W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80 W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President HELD: YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.

BARTOLOME DY POCO, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION GR. No. L-22313, March 31, 1966 Facts: Appealing from the decision of the CFI of Cebu (in Civil Case No. R-4021), denying his petition to be declared exempted from compliance with the duties of aliens under the Alien Registration Act and/or from securing an Immigrant Certificate of Residence, Bartolome Dy Poco claims that said court erred (1) in holding that the issue of his (petitioners) citizenship cannot properly be passed upon in a declaratory relief proceeding, and (2) in not declaring him exempted from the requirements of the Alien Registration Law. The petition for declaratory judgment was based on the allegations that petitioner-appellant is a Filipino, having been born in 1910 in Cebu City, out of wedlock, of a Filipino mother, Susana Apura, who died in 1928, and a Chinese father, Dy Poco, who died in 1915; that believing himself at first to be a Chinese, petitioner secured alien certificates of registration in 1947 and 1951; that in 1952, petitionerappellant, realizing his mistake, petitioned the Commissioner of Immigration for cancellation of his name from the list of aliens, which petition was denied. On petitioners request for reconsideration of said ruling, the Secretary of Justice, to whom the matter was referred, rendered an opinion (Op. No. 72, s-1965) sustaining the stand of the Commissioner, for the reason that the nationality of the mother and the illegitimate status of petitioner had not been satisfactorily established. Upon being required, subsequently, by the immigration authorities to secure an immigrant certificate of residence, petitioner instituted the present declaratory relief proceeding in the CFI of Cebu. As heretofore stated, in its decision of April 10, 1957, the court dismissed the petition, on the ground that the declaration of citizenship is not a proper subject of a proceeding for declaratory judgment. Petitioner has appealed. Issue: WON declaration of citizenship is not a proper subject of a proceeding for declaratory judgment. Held: As consistently ruled by this Court, the proceeding for declaratory relief is the proper and available remedy to secure such declaration of citizenship. But, even assuming for the sake of argument, that the issue raised in this case can properly be the subject of a declaratory judgment, the dismissal of the petition must still be sustained. Appellants claim to Philippine citizenship, or exemption from compliance with the requirements of the Alien Registration law, as he wants to put it, is based on his alleged illegitimacy or that, even if his parents were legally married, he followed the citizenship of his Filipino mother when the latter became a Filipino again upon the death of her Chinese husband in 1915. However, both the Secretary of Justice and the lower court found these allegations not substantiated by evidence. In other words, these material facts upon which the cause of action was based, were and still are subject to dispute or controversy. Consequently, no declaration based on such questioned facts can be made. It may be observed further that our Rules contain no similar provision. Taking into consideration the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief may be sought only to declare rights, and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason for us to adhere to the rule that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where the judgment would have to be made only after a judicial investigation of disputed facts.

TOMAS B. TADEO vs.THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PANGASINAN, G.R. No. L-16474, January 31, 1962 Facts: On 29 January 1949 the appellees sps. brought an action in the CFI of Pangasinan against the appellant for recovery damages and attorney's fees spent by the former as a result of a fraudulent drafting by the latter of a deed of sale purporting to convey their parcel of land to Bongato and execution thereof by the appellee sps. under the belief that it was a deed of partition of their conjugal partnership property they had asked the appellant to draft. To this complaint the appellant and co-defendant Francisco Bongato filed an answer with counterclaim, as damages for maliciously bringing an unfounded suit calculated to embarass them. After filing the suit in the CFI (civil case No. 10579), the appellee sps. filed a criminal complaint for estafa arising from the same facts alleged in civil case No. 10579, against the appellant (criminal case No. 129). At the preliminary investigation of criminal case, the Justice of the Peace Court, at the behest of the appellant, suspended further proceedings until after civil case No. 10579 of the CFI, which has a direct bearing on criminal case for estafa, shall have been finally decided. On March 1956, upon motion of counsel for the appellees sps. that they were no longer interested in the prosecution of the case, but over the objection of the appellant who asked to be allowed to prove his counterclaim, the CFI dismissed the appellees sps.' complaint and the appellant's counterclaim in civil case, because the latter could prosecute his claim in another action, his counterclaim being permissive only and not compulsory. On 1956 the appellant filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the CFI against the appellees sps. and co-defendant Torralba praying that the deed of quitclaim executed by them on 1948 in favor of Francisco Bongato be declare "the genuine document representing the true intention" of the appellees sps. and that he (the appellant) relieved from civil and criminal liability arising from the part he had taken as lawyer and notary public in the drafting and execution thereof; that the appellees sps. be enjoined from impeaching the genuineness and due execution of said deed of quitclaim; that the appellees sps. and their co-defendant Vicente Torralba, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay the appellant moral and actual damages; that during the pendency of the case a writ issue to attach the appellees sps.' and codefendant's properties to secure the satisfaction of the judgment for damages that the appellant might recover from them; and that the appellant be granted other just and equitable relief. On 22 June 1956 the appellant filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan a MTD criminal case No. 129 on the ground that civil case No. 10579, upon the facts of which criminal case No. 129 for estafa was based, already had been dismissed and the determination of the question of WON the crime of estafa had been committed by the appellant depends upon the outcome of civil case No. D-413 for declaratory judgment filed by the appellant in the CFI. Held: Undoubtedly, the appellees conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 263 have the power and authority to do so. Civil case No. 10579 for damages, brought by the appellees sps. against the appellant was dismissed by the CFI for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiffs therein and not because the fraud constituting their cause of action and the crime of estafa allegedly committed by the appellant in fact had not been committed by him. Criminal case No. 129 for estafa against the appellant was likewise dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court but without prejudice. The pendency of civil case No. D-413 for declaratory judgment, commenced by the appellant against the appellees sps. in the CFI, was one of the reasons given by the Justice of the Peace Court to dismiss criminal case No. 129. However, the appellant not being one of the contracting parties to the deed of sale executed by the appellees sps. but took part only as notary public before whom they acknowledged the execution thereof is not entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or duties thereunder need be declared.1 Another valid and good reason relied upon by the Court in denying the writ prayed for is that the appellant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the appropriate case and at the opportune time, he may set up all defenses available to him and may appeal from an adverse judgment.

JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the CA G.R. No. 137914, December 4, 2002 Facts: Petitioners Lee and Moreno were charged by Neugene Marketing, Inc. (NMI), through its designated trustee, Atty. Reyes, with the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bacolod City where latter issued a resolution absolving the petitioners from criminal liability due to lack of malice on the part of the petitioners in retaining the money of NMI. The appeal by NMI to the DOJ was denied on the ground that the petitioners did not misappropriate corporate funds. NMI then filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On January 4, 1991, the DOJ, through then Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III, ordered the reinvestigation of the case. Upon recommendation of City Prosecutor Augusto C. Rallos on March 9, 1991 to charge the petitioners with estafa, Criminal Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 were filed. The petitioners, on May 1992, filed at the DOJ petitions for reinvestigation of the cases but the same were denied on the ground that the trial court's permission should first be secured before reinvestigation can be conducted in accordance with this Court's ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul.4 Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the trial court on the ground that there was a need for reinvestigation and there was a prejudicial question in a Securities Exchange Commission (SEC, for brevity) case pending before this Court docketed as G. R. No. 112941. The SEC case questions the validity of the dissolution of NMI and the designation of Atty. Reyes as trustee. The case reached CA, where it denied the petition stating that CA do not see how the resolution of the issue in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of petitioners' criminal liability for Estafa. Issue: WON petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will propser.

Held: Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.9 We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not sufficient grounds to qualify as abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The petitioners present factual contentions to absolve them from the criminal charge of estafa. The criminal cases concern corporate funds petitioners allegedly received as payment for plastic bought by Victorias Milling Corporation from NMI. They refused to turn over the money to the trustee after NMI's dissolution on the ground that they were keeping the money for the protection of the corporation itself. Thus, the elements of misappropriation and damage are absent. They argue that there is no proof that, as officers of the corporation, they converted the said amount for their own personal benefit. They likewise claim that they already turned the money over to the majority stockholder of the defunct corporation.

CONCEPCION V. VDA, DE DAFFON vs. CA G.R. No. 129017, August 20, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Concepcion Villamor was married to the late Amado Daffon, with whom she begot one son, Joselito Daffon. Joselito married Lourdes Osmea, and they bore six children, namely, Aileen, Joselito Jr., Ana Vanesa, Leila, Julius and Suzette. Amado passed away on January 21, 1982. His son, Joselito, died on October 25, 1990. On January 21, 1994, respondents Lourdes Osmea Vda. De Daffon, together with her six minor children, instituted an action for partition against petitioner Concepcion Villamor Vda. de Daffon, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. DNA-281 of the RTC of Danao City, Branch 25.1 Respondents alleged that Amado left several real and personal properties which formed part of his conjugal partnership with petitioner. Joselito being a forced heir of Amado was entitled to at least one half of Amado's estate, consisting of his share in the said conjugal properties. However, the said properties were never partitioned between petitioner and Joselito. After Joselito's death, petitioner's behavior towards respondents, her daughter-in-law and grandchildren, changed. She claimed absolute ownership over all the properties and deprived them of the fruits thereof. Thus, respondents prayed that the conjugal properties of Amado Daffon and petitioner be partitioned and that the one-half share of Amado be further partitioned between petitioner, on one hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito Daffon, on the other hand. Petitioner filed a MTD on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; and (3) waiver, abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation.2 The trial court denied the MTD. The CA rendered the assailed decision denying due course and dismissing the petition for certiorari. Issue: WON certiorari may be granted.

Held: Petitioner argues that the order which denied the MTD is an interlocutory order which is not appealable. Hence, it may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari. However, for certiorari to lie, it must be convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law; or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.21 In the case at bar, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's MTD. Thus, the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari. We are indeed distressed by the circumstances under which the instant case reached this Court. Instead of filing an answer and meeting the issues head-on, petitioner and her counsel chose to elevate the incident of the denial of the MTD to the higher courts. In doing so, they effectively delayed the resolution of the case and the adjudication of the respective rights of the parties by the court below. What makes this case more reprehensible is that petitioner abused the legal process to delay her own grandchildren's expectancy to share in the estate left by their father and grandfather. If there is any merit in her claim of absolute ownership over the contested properties, she could have just allowed the case to be fully tried, during which she should have proved her case with competent proof. While litigants may utilize all available means to defend themselves, the legal strategies they employ should not amount to machinations which frustrate and prejudice the rights of others. Moreover, frivolous appeals, such as the one filed in this case, are not countenanced in this jurisdiction.

CONCHITA VDA. DE SALUDES vs. PAJARILLO and Judge VICENTE BAUTISTA G.R. No. L-1121, July 29, 1947 Facts: Conchita Vda. de Saludes, herein petitioner and appellant, brought an action in the CFI of Manila on November 12, 1945, to annul a deed of sale a house and lot executed by her in favor of the herein respondent and appellee, Gregorio Pajarillo. During the pendency of the suit, respondent Pajarillo filed an action for ejectment in the municipal court of Manila against petitioner Saludes to compel her to vacate said house and lot. Petitioner Saludes filed in that case a MTD upon the ground that there was another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause and that the court had no jurisdiction over the case. Judge Vicente Bautista, without acting upon said motion for dismissal, and without a trial upon the merits, rendered judgment ordering the defendant Saludes to vacate said premises, pay the rentals. Saludes filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial mainly upon the ground that the judgment was a patent nullity there having been no trial on the merits wherein both parties could introduce their evidence. Issue: WON certiorari may prosper. Held: Although a municipal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, the procedure therein should be orderly and not so summary as to disregard important measures provided by the rules to safeguard the vital interests of justice. The court is bound to act on the motion, and in the event of a denial the defendant is given the other right to answer the complaint and plead all defenses and counterclaims he may have The court has no authority to hold the trial before defendant had an opportunity to plead, and has no power to limit such trial to a mere questioning of the parties as to what their stand on the case is, particularly when the questioning is made at a time when a MTD is being heard, the parties having no idea at the moment that the trial of the case is already being held and confined to such interrogatory. We believe and so hold that such procedure is irregular and arbitrary, conducive to confusion and injustice, and is null and void. Respondent contends that certiorari was improper because an appeal from the decision of the municipal court was available. This contention is untenable. An appeal under the circumstances was not an adequate remedy there being an order of execution issued by the municipal court.

LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL & TIBAYAN vs. CA and ERLANDO A. ABRENICA G.R. No. 143706 April 5, 2002 Facts: Petitioners Tungol and Tibayan and respondent Erlando A. Abrenica are the registered partners in the Law Firm. Petitioners Tungol and Tibayan filed before the SEC a complaint for accounting, return and transfer of partnership funds with damages and application for issuance of preliminary attachment against their partner, respondent Abrenica. Petitioners, plaintiffs therein, claim that a real estate transaction entered into by the herein respondent Abrenica, defendant therein, was a law partnership transaction. Following several hearings SEC Officer Roberto O. Sencio, Jr. issued an Order which granted the preliminary attachment of respondent Abrenica's assets. After filing of a bond, a writ was issued. The writ directed that sufficient assets of respondent Abrenica be attached to cover for P4,524,000.00 alleged to be partnership profits unaccounted and unremitted by respondent Abrenica. Respondent Abrenica filed an Omnibus Motion for the inhibition and the reconsideration of the Order dated which granted the application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Hearing Officer Sencio voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. 9 Thereafter, Officer Panel composed of SEC Hearing Officers Atas, Amboy and Lobigas issued an Omnibus Order dated June 14, 1999 which denied the motion for reconsideration. On 1999, Abrenica filed a petition for certiorari with the SEC en banc contending that Hearing Officer Sencio and the Hearing Panel acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in granting the petitioners' application for issuance of a writ of preliminary On September 17, 1999, the SEC issued an Order12 which discharged the attachment made on the personal properties of respondent Abrenica, as the current market value of the house and lot levied by is P6,750,000.00 which is more than sufficient to cover the P4,520,000.00 claim. Dissatisfied with the Orders of the SEC, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The petitioners further that the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated September 28, 1999, since (a) the said order has not yet become final and executory, thereby denying petitioners right to due process, and (b) the matter of execution is within the jurisdiction of the SEC SICD Hearing Panel not the SEC en banc. Issue: WON certiorari is the proper remedy.

Held: What respondent Abrenica alleged in his petition before the SEC en banc was that the Hearing Officer/Panel acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in the issuance of the Orders dated February 1999 and June 1999. Those orders are but resolutions on incidental matters which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. Thus, they are interlocutory orders since there leaves something else to be done by the Hearing Officer/Panel with respect to the merits of the case. Ordinarily, the remedy against an interlocutory order is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavourable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. However, where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal, the special civil action of certiorari may exceptionally be allowed. It is elementary that a special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Therefore, the SEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it addressed a non-jurisdictional issue in a special civil action for certiorari. It sought to correct an error in the enforcement of the writ of attachment, an error of judgment which is clearly a factual issue involving appraisal and evaluation of evidence. Erroneous factual findings amount to no more than errors in the exercise of jurisdiction which are beyond the ambit of the sole office of a writ of certiorari. Notwithstanding our conclusions, respondent Abrenica is still not left without any remedy. He can still raise the issue of excessive attachment before the Hearing Officer/Panel, where he may properly offer his evidence to support his allegations of excessive attachment and where the petitioners may also be adequately heard on their objections thereto.

Vda. De Sayman v. CA G.R. No. 25596, April 28, 1983 Facts: A vessel owned by private respondent Carlos A. Go Thong & Company capsized while entering the mouth of the river in Caraga, Davao, resulting in the loss of the lives of five passengers. Petitioners Clara E. Vda. de Sayman, et al. in G.R. No. L-29479, and petitioners Potenciana Vda. de Odo, et al. in G.R. No. L-29716, filed separate civil actions in the CFI of Davao for recovery of damages against the owner of the vessel for breach of contract. The two cases were jointly heard and a decision was rendered by the trial court therein holding the private respondent liable to the petitioners in the total sum of P53,715.00. Private respondent received copy of the decision of the trial court on September 30, 1964. It filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Upon such denial, private respondent filed a record on appeal. The petitioners objected to the said record on appeal in view of the omission of certain pleadings therein. The trial court sustained the objections of the petitioners and ordered the private respondent to redraft or amend its record on appeal. The private respondent subsequently filed a petition for relief, to which the petitioners filed their answer. The petition for relief was denied by the trial court in its order of June 16, 1965. The private respondent immediately filed a notice of appeal from said order. Before the records were elevated to the CA, the respondent filed a motion to adopt the record on appeal it filed with respect to the main case, and to amend the same by incorporating therein the record on appeal with respect to the denial of the petition for relief. The subject-matter of the instant proceeding is the writ of execution issued by the trial court to enforce its judgment after the same became final and executory, but during the pendency of a petition for relief from the same. The said order of execution was brought to the respondent CA on a petition for certiorari. In a decision of said court promulgated on December 14, 1965, the writ of execution issued by the trial court was annulled and set aside. The said decision of the CA is the subject of the petition for certiorari in the instant proceeding. The petitioners assail the decision of the respondent CA on three (3) principal grounds, namely, (1) the petition for certiorari in the CA should not have been entertained inasmuch as the private respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order of execution in the trial court; and (2) the CA erred in holding that the mere filing of the petition for relief will justify the stay of execution of the judgment complained of. Issue: WON the contention of the petitioners are correct.

Held: 1. It is true that as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration should precede recourse to certiorari in order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error that it may have committed. The said requirements is not absolute and may be dispensed with in instances where the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no useful purpose, such as when the motion for reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the motion (Fortitch Cildran vs. Cildran, 19 SCRA 502), or where the error is patent for the order is void ( Iligan Electric Light Company vs. Public Service Commission 10 SCRA 46; Matute vs. CA, 26 SCRA 768; Locsin vs. Limaco, 26 SCRA 816); or where the relief is extremely urgent, as in cases where execution had already been ordered ( Suco vs. Vda de Leary, 12 SCRA 326); or where the issue raised is one purely of law ( Central Bank vs Cloribel 44 SCRA 307). In the case at bar, the question of whether a writ of execution may issue under the circumstances obtaining is purely one of law, and the need for urgent relief therefrom is patent from the fact that the trial court had already issued a writ for the execution of the judgment complained of in the petition for relief. Moreover, it is not completely accurate to claim that the trial court was deprived of a chance to correct its error by the failure to file a motion for the reconsideration of the questioned order. As pointed out by the private respondent, it filed a motion for the reconsideration of the first order of execution dated April 8, 1965. A second opportunity to consider the objection of the private respondent to the writ of execution was granted by the trial court in connection with the petition for relief on May 30, 1965 in which the private respondent had prayed for a stay of the execution of judgment. 2. In determining WON the denial of the petition for relief filed in the trial court shall be sustained or reversed, as the case maybe, the appellate court must be apprised of the merit of the case of the party that assails such denial. The consideration of the merit of such appeal is not intended to be an empty exercise of determining WON the appellant had been the victim of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence which resulted in prejudice to his rights. There is a necessity of finding out whether granting him the relief prayed for would not be a useless ceremony and sheer waste of time. There is no point in allowing the petitioners herein to appeal the decision rendered by the trial court if, after all, the said decision does not merit a reversal or at least a modification. In the language of the rule, they should be able to show that the judgment that they complain of is "not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law." This may only be done if the record of the main case is elevated to the appellate court.

JOSE O. VERA, ET AL. vs. JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946 Facts: The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election. Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution. Issues: 1. WON Comelec has the jurisdiction to determine WON votes cast in the said provinces are valid. 2. WON writ of prohibition may be issued. Held: 1. The SC refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts. The case is therefore dismissed. 2. Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law, prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section 2, Rules of Court.) As the respondents do not exercise such kind of functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.

ONE HEART SPORTING CLUBET AL. vs. CA G.R. Nos. L-53790 and L-53972, October 23, 1981 NOTE: PD No. 449, or Cockfighting Law of the Philippines" was promulgated by the President of the Philippines, requiring among others that cockpits "shall be constructed and operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in the zoning law or ordinance and in the absence of such law or ordinance, no cockpits shall be constructed within or near existing residential or commercial areas, hospitals, school buildings, churches or other public buildings." P.D. 449 gave owners, lessees or operators of cockpits then in existence which do not conform to the requirement three (3) years from the date of the effectivity of said decree to comply therewith. Facts: Dipolog Coliseum, Inc., was a duly registered corporation operating a cockpit in Dipolog City, the 3-year period expired, P.D. 1140 was promulgated extending "for another year the period within which owners, lessees and operators of cockpits shall conform to the provisions of Cockpit Law of 1974, with respect to cockpit sites and their construction" to expire on May 9, 1978. On May 10, 1978, petitioner One Heart Sporting applied for a permit to construct and operate a new cockpit at an appropriate site in Dipolog City. A mayor's permit was granted and approved. The Sporting Club was incorporated with the SEC and the sports complex built by the Sporting Club was inaugurated and subsequently commenced its operation. Respondent officially and formally requested the City Mayor of Dipolog City to allow it to resume cockpit operations in view of the extension granted by P.D. 1535. The City Mayor granted the request but the PC Provincial Command denied private respondent's application for a business permit for the reason that there was already an existing authorized cockpit in Dipolog City at the time, which is the Sporting Club, and the City can operate only one (1) cockpit at a time pursuant to Sec. 5 (b) of P.D. 1535. Due to this denial, private respondent instituted Civil Case and the lower court in its order dismissed the complaint and granted damages in favor of the Sporting Club.Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction before the CA. CA, promulgated its decision allowing private respondent Dipolog Coliseum, Inc. to resume the operation of its cockpit and to transfer its cockpit to an appropriate location prior to June 11, 1980, stating that Considering that DIPOLOG COLISEUM has the right to continue the operation of its cockpit up to June 11, 1980, such legal right cannot be defeated by the existence of the SPORTING CLUB although established in good faith in ignorance of PD 1535. Technically, SPORTING CLUB should have stopped its project upon the promulgation of PD 1535 on June 11, 1978. The Sporting Club sought to reconsider the decision of the CA but before the latter could rule on the motion for reconsideration, the Sporting Club filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order Issues: 1. WON private respondent is entitled to the extension granted by P.D. 1535. 2. WON this court has jurisdiction to entertain the special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. 3. WON private respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedy before coming to the courts. HELD: 1. P.D. 1535 clearly intended to grant an extension to cockpits which are still located within the prohibited area to relocate the same in an appropriate site. P.D. 1535 would be a dead law if not applied to private respondent and others similarly situated, because legally, there would be no longer any cockpits existing in the country who failed to relocate its site on May 9, 1978 or if cockpits were still in existence within the prohibited area on said date, they would be operating illegally. The better view is to hold that private respondent's cockpit was still legally in existence when P.D. 1535 took effect. To hold otherwise would lead to a situation where there would be no cockpits that could avail of the extension granted by P.D. 1535. 2. Petitioners also allege that the case involves purely questions of law, namely, and consequently, respondent court cannot be possibly acting in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This court is not persuaded. It appears that after the parties have submitted their respective memoranda before the CA, counsel for petitioners filed a motion before the respondent court praying that the entire records be elevated to it from the court a quo to enable the former to have a clearer and better understanding of the facts and issues involved. We have already ruled that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. We frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. 3. Accordingly, when the PC Provincial Commander denied private respondent's application to operate its cockpit, it should have appealed to the PC Regional Commander or to the Chief of PC. The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where question in dispute is purely a legal one. 6 In the present case, the specific question submitted for resolution before the court a quo is WON P.D. 1535 intended to grant Dipolog Coliseum, Inc. an extension in the operation of its cockpit. The question being purely legal, there was no need for private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies and its action in seeking judicial redress is therefore justified.

CAESAR v GARRIDO G.R. No. L-30705 | March 25, 1929 | Street, J. FACTS: The Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) in one precinct nullified 135 votes for petitioner Caesar since the latter was not enlisted as an enrolled voter in the municipality. Hence, defendant Garrido was proclaimed elected as president in municipality over petitioner Caesar. Petitioner filed an election protest saying he was a qualified elector in the municipality and a registered candidate who received votes. Defendant filed MTD since petitioner was not eligible to run for office. MTD was dismissed by CFI since allegation that petitioner was qualified elector and registered candidate was enough for eligibility; besides, ineligibility of a candidate is not proper defense in election protest. Defendant answered via special defense that petitioner had not been a resident for 6 months-1 year in the municipality; hence, he cant be a qualified voter. CFI denied and judicially declared petitioner as duly elected over defendant. Hence, defendant appealed. ISSUES: 1. WON ineligibility of the contestant a valid defense in an election contest. 2. WON BEI can discard the votes for a candidate since he was not an enrolled voter in the municipality, even if he was a registered candidate. 3. WON quo warranto proceeding is proper. HELD: 1. NO. Election contest raises only the question as to the number of votes received by opposing candidates. When a person, alleged to be ineligible, is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right thereto is to be tried in an action of quo warranto, which must be filed within two weeks after the proclamation of the election of such person. The contestant has never been proclaimed at all and will not be proclaimed until the courts decision is published. The issue of ineligibility is premature. Another reason is, if person who received a majority of votes in an election is ineligible, the office is declared vacant and a new election has to fill the vacancy. If we should accept the defense of ineligibility and dismiss the contest for that reason, the contestee would be in office though he received fewer votes than the contestant. 2. NO. A candidate to be eligible for municipal office must have the general qualifications pertaining to voters; he need not be actually enrolled in the voters list. (Yra v. Abano). The certificate of registration of a candidate for municipal office is conclusive to the BEI as regards the candidates right to be voted. Question of eligibility must not concern the BEI. 3. It is to be observed that the proceeding in the nature of quo warranto to try the question of the eligibility of a candidate is to be instituted within the two weeks after the proclamation of the person whose right to office is challenged. In the proceeding now before us the contestant has never been proclaimed at all and will not be proclaimed, in the sense of the law, until the decision of this court is published. The issue of ineligibility which is attempted to be raised in the answer is premature.

THE CITY OF MANILA vs.CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919 FACTS: Plaintiff sought to expropriate a part of a private cemetery devoted for public use to make an extension of Rizal Avenue. Defendants contend that expropriation is not necessary because it will disturb the remains of the dead. Moreover, adjoining and adjacent lots were offered to the city free of charge for the planned public improvement. ISSUE: WON a private property devoted for public use can still be expropriated. HELD: Yes, private property devoted for public use is still subject to expropriation, provided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to the delegate. In addition, there must be a necessity for the expropriation. In the case at bar, evidence shows that there is no proof of the need of converting the cemetery.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005 Facts: The NAIA 3 was conceived, designed and constructed to serve as the countrys show window to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies. Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it has not yet been operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the country, not to mention its deplorable discredit in the international community. On the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO,1 the contracts which the Government had with the contractor were voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The second case now before the Court involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built. Issues and Decisions: In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows: (1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases. (2) RA No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just compensation. (3) Applying RA No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law. (4) Applying RA No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the implementation of the NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the conditions above-stated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority encompasses "the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport. (5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged to comply with "law and equity" as ordained in Again and the standard set under Implementing Rules of RA No. 8974 which is the "replacement cost method" as the standard of valuation of structures and improvements. (6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing the commissioners for the purpose of determining just compensation. The provisions on commissioners under Rule 67 shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with RA No. 8974, its Implementing Rules, or the rulings of the Court in Agan. (7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision. (8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of these orders should be modified to conform with law and the pronouncements made by the Court herein.

FELIX DE VILLA vs. CESARIO A. FABRICANTE, ET AL. G.R. No. L-13063, April 30, 1959 Facts: Defendants failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, they were declared in default, and forthwith, plaintiff presented his evidence. Thereupon, the trial court rendered decision ordering Fabricante to pay the plaintiff P16,666.66 w/ interest and, upon his failure to pay the same within the period of 90 days, to have the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-29 (50) sold for the satisfaction of the judgment. With regard to the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15, the foreclosure of the mortgage was not decreed it appearing that the property had been sold to the sps. Jose Jacob and Cecilia Baduria and they were not made parties defendant in the case. From this decision, plaintiff appealed to the CA, but because the amount involved is more than P50,000.00, the case was certified to us under Section 17 of Republic Act. No. 296. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in holding that only Cesario A. Fabricante is liable to pay the mortgage debt and not his wife who is exempt from liability. The trial court said: "Only the defendant Cesario A. Fabricante is liable for the payment of this amount because it does not appear that the other defendant Maria G. de Fabricante had authorized Cesario A. Fabricante to contract the debt also in her name. Issues: 1. WON the SPA grants authority to conract obligation. 2. WON the loan should be paid in present currency or in accordance with Ballantyne Scal of Values. 3. WON the TC was correct in not deciding to the foreclosure as necessary parties were not impleaded. Held: 1. The deed shows that the authority was limited to the execution of the mortgage insofar as the property of the wife is concerned. There is a difference between authority to mortgage and authority to contract obligation. Since the power of attorney was not presented as evidence, the trial court was correct in presuming that the power was merely limited to a grant of authority to mortgage unless the contrary is shown. It thus appears from the contract that the appellee can only repay the loan within two years after the lapse of four years from date thereof, or from April 19, 1948 to April 19, 1950. This period falls after the liberation of the Philippines, and following the ruling laid down by this Court in a long line of decisions, the loan shall be paid in accordance with the currency then prevailing on the date of maturity. The loan should therefore be paid in accordance with the present currency, and not in accordance with the Ballantyne Scale of Values as erroneously applied by the trial court. This means that the appellee should pay to plaintiff the sum of P150,000.00 according to the present legal tender, plus 6 per cent interest thereon from the filing of the complaint. With regard to the compounding of interest as stipulated in the contract, we consider it unreasonable and so it should be disregarded. Evidently, appellee has been persuaded to enter into this onerous stipulation in view of his financial precarious situation. It appears that the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15 in the name of Maria G. Fabricante had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof a new one was issued in the name of Jose Jacob and Cecilia Baduria because the property was sold to the latter during the period of the mortgage. The encumbrance was however annotated on the back of the new certificate of title. Nevertheless, 3. SC agree with the trial court that said purchasers are necessary parties to this action. When this foreclosure case was instituted, only the mortgagor was included, while the subsequent purchasers were not made parties defendants. For this reason, the trial court found that the foreclosure of the mortgage insofar as said parcel is concerned cannot be decreed in view of the non-inclusion of said purchasers. This is clear from Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of the Court which provides that "All persons having or claiming an interest in the premises subordinate in the right to that of the holder of the mortgage . . . shall be made defendants in the action." And this Court has held that if the mortgaged property is sold to another person, the mortgage debtor, as well as the person to whom it is sold, must both be made defendants.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918 Facts: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco EspanolFilipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. Issues: 1. WON the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action. 2. WON process of law was observed. Held: 1. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world. 2..Important in observance of due process is the opportunity to be heard. In a foreclosure case, some notification of the proceedingsto the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made is essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for: (1)publication (2)personal notice thru mail, if his residence is known. Hence, the right to due process has not been infringed. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual noticeto the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

CORDOVA V. CORDOVA L-9936, Jan. 14,1958 HELD: As a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. While the right of action to demand partition does not prescribe, acquisitive prescription may set in where one of the co-owners openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the ownership. Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of good faith. Possession in good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

RAFAEL BARICAN and ARACELI ALEJO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DBP G.R. No. 79906 June 20, 1988 Facts: Sps. Antonio Regondola and Dominga Zabat obtained a loan from the respondent bank. As security for the payment of the loan, the Regondolas and the respondent bank entered into a contract of real estate mortgage. For failure of the Regondolas to fulful the terms of the contract, the respondent bank extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage. The mortgaged property covered by TCT No. 57677 was then sold at a public auction sale conducted by the Sheriff. The respondent bank was declared the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was registered on October 7, 1980. The Regondola sps. failed to redeem the property within the one-year period of redemption. Hence a new one (TCT No. 117068) was issued in favor of the private respondent. On 1984, the respondent bank sold the property to Nicanor Reyes. On 1985, the bank filed with the lower court a petition for issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent bank. However, before the writ of possession could be implemented, petitioner-sps. Barican and Alejo opposed the writ of possession claiming that they are the real owners and actual possessors of the foreclosed property as evidenced by a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage they executed with sps. Regondolas. The petitioner-sps. disclosed that they had actually filed a complaint for declaration of ownership over the forclosed property and damages with preliminary injunction On October 16, 1985, the lower court issued an order to stay the writ of possession. Upon appeal the questioned March 21, 1986 order was set aside by the CA. The appellate court ordered the lower court to issue the writ of possession in favor of the respondent bank. Issue: WON the pendency of Civil Case No. C-11232 for ownership of the foreclosed property is a bar or legal impediment to the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent bank, the highest bidder in the auction sale of the said foreclosed property. Held: Under these circumstances, the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of mortgage case ceases to be ministerial. The well-settled rule is that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property is entitled to a writ of possession and that upon an ex-parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the court to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. However, the rule is not an unqualified one. There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriffs sale of real property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the one-year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriffs final certificate of sale. There is neither legal ground nor reason of public policy precluding the court from ordering the sheriff in this case to yield Possession of the property purchased at public auction where it appears that the judgment debtor is the one in possession thereof and no rights of third persons are involved (Emphasis supplied) There is no question that "it is ministerial upon the Court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property ... But under the circumstances in the instant case, the Court cannot just ignore the claims of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11232 who are in possession that they are the owners of the property in question without first ventilating this issue in a proper hearing of the case on its merits. Likewise, the mind of the Court cannot rest at ease after finding that why did the DBP take five years, after the property mortgaged was foreclosed on October 10, 1980, to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession only on August 16, 1985? When Nicanor Reyes bought the property on October 28, 1984, why did the DBP not place Reyes in physical possession of the property? And why did Reyes not take possession of the property? And considering further that the DBP knew that Rafael Barican and his wife are in possession of the property, which is deduced from the argument of counsel for DBP that the Baricans are possessors in bad faith, why then did the DBP not file a complaint of ejectment against them?

HEIRS OF CATALINO JARDIN vs. HEIRS OF SIXTO HALLASGO, HALLASGO G.R. No. L-55225, September 30, 1982 Facts: The sps. Braulio Jardin and Maura Hallasgo were survived by their 2 children named Catalino and Galo and by Sixto Hallasgo, apparently Maura's child by her first husband. In 1920, Catalino, Galo and Sixto partitioned in a private document the following properties inherited from the Jardin sps.. Galo later ceded to Catalino his share of 495 square meters in the lot at the poblacion of Jasaan in exchange for Catalino's one-half share of the riceland in Barrio Sagpolon (No. 6). Catalino became the owner of 990 square meters of the poblacion lot. Galo became the sole owner of the riceland at Sagpolon. In 1963, Sixto was allowed by Catalino's children to use as a garden an area of 350 square meters which is a part of the 990 square meters owned by them. However, in 1964 Sixto fraudulently and without the knowledge of Catalino's children (Sixto's nephews and nieces) included said portion in the cadastral survey of his share of the poblacion lot. Sixto and his children refused to reconvey the said 350-square-meter portion to Catalino's children. Allegedly taking advantage of the minority of the children of Catalino and Galo, who both died after the war, Sixto occupied the parcels of land adjudicated to Galo and Catalino in the 1920 deed of partition including the house of strong materials. Sixto used those lands after the death of Galo and Catalino and did not give to their heirs any share of the harvests. It was only in the early part of 1973 that the children of Galo and Catalino came to know of the 1920 deed of partition which was shown to them by Corazon Hallasgo during a confrontation in the provincial commander's office at Camp Alagar when they sought to recover the said portion of 350 square meters from the Hallasgos. On that occasion, the children of Galo and Catalino came to know that the shares of Galo and Catalino in that partition allegedly had been in the possession of Sixto and his children "for a long time". In spite of earnest efforts, Sixto's heirsrefused to settle the case amicably with the heirs of Galo and Catalino. The heirs of Galo and Catalino prayed in their 1973 complaint that Sixto's heirs be ordered to reconvey to them the lands allocated to their parents in the 1920 partition and the portion of 350 square meters in the poblacion lot appropriated by Sixto. Defendants Hallasgo filed a MTD. The trial court in a minute order dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, citing Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857. The plaintiffs appealed. Issue: 1. WON there is co-ownership. 2. WON their action had prescribed. Held: We find these contentions to be flimsy and untenable. 1. The only lands held in co-ownership under the 1920 partition were the Camposanto cornland planted to 7- gantas and the Calabugon riceland planted to six gantas (Nos. 2 and 8). But it was not alleged with particularity when Sixto repudiated the coownership as to those lands and claimed them as his own. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shag be obliged to remain in the co-ownership" and that "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned". It also provides that "no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership." 2. While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common ( actio communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae ) does not prescribe, the co-ownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a co-owner. In such a case, the action for partition does not lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner is anaccion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession. That action may be barred by prescription. In the instant case, as the partition was made in 1920 and the plaintiffs did not specify when Sixto Hallasgo repudiated the co-ownership of the lands in Composanto and Calabugon, the trial court assumed that prescription started to run even before the Civil Code took effect, Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a period of ten years was the maximum period for acquisitive and extinctive prescription. Hence, the trial court concluded that the 1973 action was barred by prescription.

SPOUSES ABRIN vs. HON. VICENTE R. CAMPOS, and SPOUSES GUEVARRA G.R. No. 52740 November 12, 1991 Facts: On April 24,1978, spouses Abrin filed an action for reconveyance with damages against the Guevarra. Petitioners alleged, among others, that they are the owners of the land subject matter of the controversy; that in connection with another CAR case, they hired the services of defendant Guevarras' son, who is a lawyer, to recover the aforesaid land from one Ellorenco and Opinia; that in connection with the said case, they needed the sum of P10,000.00 and incurred expenses totalling P21,200.00 which amount was advanced by the Guevarra spouses; that because of the amount advanced by the Guevarras, a contract denominated as "Farm Partnership with Promise to Reconvey" was executed by the parties, providing, among others, that the Abrins shall personally till and cultivate the land in question which was also used as security for the payment of the money advanced by the Guevarras with the understanding that the Abrins can redeem the land and that a portion of the harvest and/or other crops produced in the land shall be applied as part of the redemption price; that the document was written in the English language and prepared by the son of the Guevarras who is a lawyer; that the signatures of the Abrin spouses on the document were fraudulently obtained because they are ignorant and could hardly read or write and Notary Public Rufo Paras did not translate and explain its contents to the Abrin spouses so that they entered into a voidable contract with unconscionable provisions; that in an effort to redeem the land, the Abrin spouses paid the amount of P4,140.00 in cash and delivered to the Guevarras for the crop years 1970 to 1977 a total of 966 cavans of palay valued at P19,320.00, thereby paying the sum of P23,460.00 which is more than the amount of the redemption price stipulated in Annex "A"; that despite repeated demands by the Abrin spouses for the execution of the deed of reconveyance, the Guevarra spouses who secured TCT No. 31747 over the subject parcel of land in their names, refused to execute the said document. By way of relief, the Abrin spouses prayed, among others, that the Guevarra spouses be ordered to execute the deed of reconveyance and to pay to the former exemplary and moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00, plus costs. On July 11, 1978, the Guevarra spouses filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the issue allegedly raised in the complaint is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Despite the opposition filed by the Abrin spouses, the trial court, dismissed the case without prejudice. The motion for reconsideration of the Abrin spouses was likewise denied in the trial court's order dated February 22, 1979, Hence, the instant petition. Issue: WON the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 for lack of jurisdiction. Held: Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the Court which has jurisdiction over the case, is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his complaint. To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, the Court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction vis-a-vis the averments of the complaint. The defenses asserted in the answer or MTD are not to be considered in resolving the issue of jurisdiction, otherwise the question of jurisdiction could depend entirely upon the defendant. In the case at bar, the complaint is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land which had been fraudulently titled in the name of defendants. Such averments, the truth of which is hypothetically admitted for the purpose of resolving the MTD filed by the Guevarra spouses, certainly falls within the jurisdiction of the then CFI pursuant to Section 44(b) of the Judiciary Act of 1940 as it is an action which involves the title to or possession of the property subject matter of the controversy. The defense interposed by the Guevarra spouses to the effect that the Abrin spouses are their tenants and the dispute is within the jurisdiction of the then Court of Agrarian Relations should have been disregarded by the trial court. Said defense of tenancy could be properly considered only if the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on the issue of jurisdiction raised in the answer and reiterated in the MTD or after the trial on the merits.

ALICIA T. KAW vs. JUDGE CASIANO P. ANUNCIACION JR. A.M. No. MTJ-93-811 March 1, 1995 Facts: It appears that for more than 20 years, George Kaw had leased from Margarita Manalo a unit of a building located at Tondo, Manila where he conducted his business under the name "Pocket Saver's Mart and Bakeshop." IMC sent a letter to Kaw, informing him of its acquisition of the building and demanding that Kaw vacate the premises.,the latest of which was made on February 15, 1990. As Kaw refused to leave, IMC filed on May 2, 1990 an ejectment suit. The summons, with a copy of the complaint, was served on Kaw on May 9, 1990, ordering him to file his answer within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days. Kaw nonetheless filed a motion for extension of 15 days from May 18, 1990 within which to file his answer on the around that he had not yet engaged the services of an attorney. On June 1, 1990, he filed, through counsel, another motion for extension of ten (10) days to file his answer. Respondent judge did not act on the two motions. On June 1, 1990; he rendered a decision ordering Kaw to vacate the premises and to pay IMC P1,500.00 a month beginning April 1989 until he (Kaw) had actually vacated the premises; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs. His decision was affirmed by the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 90-53638 and later by the CA. Kaw alleges that she and her husband received the respondent judge's decision on June 7, 1990 and that immediately, the following day, they were served a copy of the writ of execution by respondent sheriff and evicted from the premises. Their personal properties, consisting of tools and equipment used in business were levied upon and later sold at an auction sale. KAWs CLAIM (issues): 1. That respondent judge gravely abused his discretion by unilaterally fixing the monthly rentals at P1,500.00 despite the fact that IMC failed to specify the amount of damages in the form of reasonable rentals in its complaint. She claimed that the judge did this to make it appear that the amount involved was less than P20,000.00 and thereby bring the case within the Rule on Summary Procedure and 2. The writ of execution was improper because under Rule on Summary Procedure, the decision of the MeTC was still appealable to the RTC and that it was the latter court's decision, if adverse to them, which was immediately executory. The judge did not act on their Motion to extend time. 3. That IMC's "Ex Parte Motion for Execution" was granted by respondent judge on the same day (June 7, 1990) that it was filed without notice JUDGEs DEFENSE: 1. That motions for extension of time to file an answer are prohibited pleadings under the Rule on Summary Procedure; 2. That writ of execution on was pursuant to Rule 70, 8 which provides that a decision rendered by an inferior court in an unlawful detainer case is immediately executory;. 3. That he had nothing to do with the manner in which the writ was enforced by the deputy sheriff; and that complainant should be grateful that he had fixed the monthly rental at P1,500.00 because then she and her husband could easily stop execution of the decision by filing a supersedeas bond in a small amount. Held: 1. On fixing of the monthly rental at P1,500.00. We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge in fixing the rentals at P1,500.00 a month. This question was already decided by the CA in the appeal brought by complainant's husband and should now be considered closed. The MTC fixed the rent of P1,500.00. The complaint demanded the ejectment of defendant and payment of rent eleven months in arrears or a total of P19,500.00. The Rules on Summary Procedure in unlawful detainer cases is applicable to cases where the unpaid rentals sought to be recovered does not exceed P20,000.00. The case at bar still falls within the limit fixed by the said Rules for the MTC to exercise jurisdiction. The amount of damages in the form of rentals alleged in complaints for unlawful detainer cases is immaterial in determining the docket fees because the fee is a straight fee of P100.00. (2) The inaction on George Kaw's motions for extension to file answer. This, too, has no merit. Complainant does not dispute the fact that the summons, A motion for extension is in fact a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. (3) Issuance of the writ of execution. The respondent judge liable for issuing an order of execution when no prior notice of the motion for execution had been given to complainant's husband. The record shows that IMC filed an "Ex Parte Motion for Execution" on June 7, 1990 and that the same day respondent judge granted it. This Court later affirmed, holding that in an ejectment case the adverse party is entitled to notice before execution can be ordered. Pursuant to said section 8 of Rule 72 [now Rule 70] of the Rules of Court, the writ of execution may only be issued by the court in ejectment cases after notice to the adverse party and if the rents have not been paid or deposited by him. Indeed, that the MeTC's decision in ejectment cases is immediately executory does not mean that notice of the motion for execution to the adverse party is unnecessary.

JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO vs. CATALINO DELA VICTORIA and FRANCISCA O. DELA VICTORIA G.R. No. L-31822 July 31, 1972 Facts: On 2 May 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against defendant-petitioner with the CFI of Davao for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages. Subsequently. they filed another case against for forcible entry over the same parcel of land. Defendant-petitioner filed MTD for dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry but the court denied the said motion "for the reason that there is no identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for and for the further reason that it does not appear that any judgment which would be rendered on the other action will amount to res adjudicata in the herein case." 7 The same court order set the case for hearing on 12 December 1968. On 12 December 1968, defendant-petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the forcible entry case and the City Court set the reception of plaintiffs-respondents' evidence for the following day. The same court rendered its decision ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs; to pay ... P500.00 a month as rental and the same to commence from March, 1968 until possession thereof shall be delivered to the plaintiffs; and to pay the costs. Defendant-petitioner appealed to the CFI. In the meantime, plaintiffs-respondents moved for the issuance of an order for the immediate execution of the City Court decision of 16 January 1969. The same time granted the immediate execution of the City Court judgment. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, and his appeal dismissed, defendant filed the herein petition. Claim of petitioner (issues): 1. WON the court acquire jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the verification of the corresponding complaint being void; 2. WON the court erred in dismissing the complaint for forcible entry filed a month after an action for recovery of possession and quieting of title had been filed by respondents against petitioner over the same cause of action, the same subject matter and the same parties; 3. WON the court erred in granting the issuance of immediate execution before resolving the issue of the pendency of another action between the same parties over the same subject matter. 4. Erred in dismissing the appeal of petitioner who has been declared in default, without considering that a legal issue on the ruling of the inferior court denying the MTD is raised. Held: 1. Even if the court should find the verification insufficient, that insufficiency would not render the complaint for forcible entry, or the whole proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in several decisions that the requirement regarding verification is not jurisdictional, but merely formal. Moreover, the Court has consistently held that the reglementary phrase "true of his own knowledge" is not a talismanic formula, the use of which would insure the granting of a petition and non-use whereof would result in a decree of dismissal. It has ruled absence of verification not to be fatally defective in meritorious cases'. What is important is that the object of the Rule, to insure good faith and veracity in the material averments of the petition, be complied with, so that the court may properly act on the case. Here, the petition has complied with the requirement in form and in substance. Villasanta in effect certified of his own knowledge to the truth of the petition as a whole, but with reference to the averments in paragraph 8 of the petition as to respondents' acts of intrusion and coercion at the concession area on 15 August 1969, specifically submitted with the petition the affidavits of on-scene witnesses Cone and two other company officials attesting thereto of their own knowledge. It will also be noted that defendant-petitioner raises the question of jurisdiction for the first time in this appeal, hence, he is now barred by laches. 2. We can not assent to the proposition that the MTD should have been granted by the Municipal Court of origin, and sustained on appeal by the CFI, for the reason that the question of ownership was necessarily involved in the action for forcible entry (not for unlawful detainer), as is proved by the admitted pendency of the prior suit for quieting of title in the CFI. While the fact that triggered both actions was appellant Quimpo's forcible invasion of respondent's titled property in March of 1968, on the pretext that the part of respondent's land forcibly entered and occupied by him was part of the area covered by his pasture permit from the Bureau of Forestry, still the causes of action in the two cases are distinct from each other. In the action to quiet title the question involved is whether the pasture permit could include property for which O.C.T. No. P-2385 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao province had been previously issued to appellees de la Victoria. But in the forcible entry case, the issue is whether, assuming that Quimpo's pasture permit were valid, he had the right to forcibly eject the prior occupants, who were appellees de la Victoria, even destroying their improvements. In other words, in the quieting of title case, the Court must decide who had the better right. In the Municipal court, the issue was, in effect, whether an owner can take the law in his own hands. That he can not do so seems incontestable: it is not so much a question of possession as it is one of law and order. To require appellees de la Victoria to acquiesce to the high-handed conduct of appellant Quimpo, and to submit to his tour de force, until the superiority of their Torrens Title is finally adjudged, after God knows how many years, is undoubtedly against all justice and equity. 3. Section 8, Rule 70, of Revised Rules of Court not only authorizes but also requires the immediate execution of a judgment in plaintiff's favor. The said provision, taken in relation to that of section 10 of the same Rules, is mandatory, 15 the only exception being when the delay is due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence. The purpose of the law is to prevent further damages to him caused by the loss of his possession. 17 However, defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting his appeal and filing a supersedeas bond; and (b) by depositing from time to time, with the Court First Instance, during the pendency of the appeal, the amount or rents or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property as fixed by the justice of peace or municipal court in its judgment. 18 While defendant-petitioner perfected the appeal, he did not file a supersedeas bond and deposit the monthly rentals of P500.00 monthly fixed by the City Court. In the absent thereof, he can not be heard to complain against the immediate execution of the judgment which is legally sanctioned.

CO TIAC vs. Judge FELIPE NATIVIDAD, JOAQUIN GARCIA, Sheriff of City of Manila, and DOMINGO LAO G.R. No. L-1457 January 28, 1948 Facts: Domingo Lao brought an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer of a warehouseto be located at 528 Elcano Street, Manila, alleging that the property had been leased prior to Co Fiac. However. Co Tiac, without giving any notice to the plaintiff, left the premises, and his whereabouts were unknown at the time of the filling of the complaint; that in the same month, the defendant, without obtaining the prior permission of the plaintiff, began to live in the said premises, telling the plaintiff that he was Co Tiac's relative; that the defendant, notwithstanding repeated demands, refused to vacate the premises. There are other allegations, under a second and a third cause of action, which have no bearing on the case. On July 24, 1945, Judge Vicente Bautista of the MTC gave judgment for the plaintiff. Subsequently the sheriff made a return on the writ of execution, informing the court that the warehouse at No. 528 was occupied by another person and was not the subject of litigation. The sheriff further informed the court that the building involved in the suit was No. 534, which, he said, was occupied by one Co Tiac, and that Co Kay, according to his information, resided on Villalobos Street. Consequently, on the 18th of September, counsel for Domingo Lao moved to correct the order of execution by changing the number of the building from 528 to 534. On the 21st the Hon. Alfonso Felix, Judge, amended the judgment in the manner requested, saying that there was no question as to the identity of the property in litigation and that the confusion in numbers was only a clerical error. Co Tiac, the present petitioner, through counsel filed "Urgent Motion to Quash Execution," asserting that he had been the lessee and occupant of the bodega for a period of ten years, having leased it from Mrs. Ignacia Lao as coadministratrix of the estate of the deceased Albina de los Santos. Co Tiac also assailed the legality of the amendment of the judgment which, he averred, was made "after the lapse of over five (5) months from the date the decision already became final." He finally alleged "that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest and has no capacity whatsoever to file this suit." On October 5, Judge Felix appointed the deputy clerk of Branch VII of the CFI, to receive the evidence which the parties might present and to submit such evidence to the court for proper action, evidence which, the court said, was necessary before the motion of Co Tiac to quash might be acted upon. The court set October 11, 1946, for the taking of such evidence. Because of objections to the appointment of a commissioner and a renewal of the petition for execution filed in the midst of the hearing, the taking of evidence was not finished on October 11. On the 19th of October, the court denied the objections of the execution creditor and ordered the reception of evidence continued on October 26 "to determine whether Co Tiac is a squatter or not." Andres Concepcion, the deputy clerk, submitted on December 4, 1946, all the evidence, oral and documentary, taken by him and the matter was argued orally before Judge Felix on December 26. After that hearing, Judge Felix was appointed to the CA apparently before he could decide the incident just mentioned. For this reason, the respondent Judge, Judge Natividad, as the new Judge of the Seventh Branch, reset the matter for January 18. On the 30th, Judge Natividad denied the motion to quash the execution, on the ground that "the movant, Co Tiac, is not a party in this case, either as plaintiff, or as defendant, or as intervenor." The court expressed "the opinion that said movant has no personality to intervene in this case at this stage of the proceedings and to ask for the quashing of the writ issued for the execution of the judgment rendered therein, which is now final and executory." Issue: WON the judge exceed his jurisdiction or abuse his discretion in entering the order. HELD: One who is not party to a case may not move for a stay or vacation of execution the error if any committed by His Honor on this score, in our opinion, unimportant and not reversible. The denial of the motion to quash was legal and proper for another reason. In as much as this was a possessory action Co Kay was rightly sued as defendant, and Co Tiac's omission from the complaint did not render the judgment or execution ineffective. As a general rule, every person who has participated in the acts complained of is a proper party defendant, provided he remains in possession of the property, because, since the proceeding is to recover possession, there is no doubt that it is not maintainable against the person not in possession when it has commenced, even though he was guilty of a forcible entry, and although at some time prior to the beginning of the proceeding and after he made the entry he might have been a proper and even necessary party defendant. The best test by which to determine who should be parties defendants, therefore, is to inquire who were guilty, either in person or by agents, of the acts amounting to forcible entry, and who remain in possession, so that the judgment in favor of the plaintiff may not be sufficient to afford him complete relief unless they are removed from the premises. It has previously been pointed out that the capacity in which an entry was made or possession held is immaterial in so far as the liability of the possessor is concerned, whether he is an agent, lessor, lessee, owner, or corporation. Corpus Juris (Vol. 26, p. 836), citing Leao vs. Leao, 12 Phil., 508, among American decisions, says: Except as otherwise provided by statute, an action of forcible entry and detainer maybe maintained only against one in possession at the commencement of action, and not against one who does not in fact hold the land. Forcible entry or unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. The circumstances disclosed by the allegations and exhibits give warrant to the charge that the petitioner absconded or concealed his whereabouts in the belief that by so doing he could frustrate the anticipated action for eviction. He put forward his brother or partner to fight the case out, and when the fight was all over for Co Kay, whose efforts has earned for him more than one and one-half valuable years of possession, Co Kay disappeared from the scene and Co Tiac emerged, resurrected from the grave to take up the cudgels. What is more, he would not start where his partner and kin left off; he would have all the issues fought over again. Unluckily for the petitioner, law and justice can not be circumvented and outwitted so easily. In view of what has been said, it matters not in our judgment, that the respondent judge did not look into the status of the petitioner whether he was a lessee or a squatter as Judge Felix has proposed to do. This question seems to us immaterial. Having absented himself or concealed his identity, he cannot be heard to complain that he was not included in the action. A party will not be allowed to take undue advantage of a situation created by his own fault, especially if it is deliberate, to the detriment of his opponent.

ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC vs. CA, former Fourth Division and CHAVES, INC. G.R. No. 128743 November 29, 1999 Facts: Private respondent Angel Chaves, Inc. is the owner of a commercial building in Cagayan de Oro which he leased to several business establishments. On January 15, 1991, private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as Civil Case No. 13040. Thereafter, private respondent made a demand upon the lessees to pay the increased rent or, otherwise, vacate the premises. The failure of the lessees to comply with the demand of private respondent led to the filing of the suit for unlawful detainer. On July 23, 1992, the MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against three defendants, including petitioner, but ordered the ejectment of the fourth defendant Alfred Co. On appeal, the RTC, Branch 23, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, reversed the MTCC and ordered the four defendants ejected from the premises. Vicente Manzano, brother of Constancio Manzano, then filed a petition for review of the RTC decision with the CA alleging that Constancio Manzano had died in the meantime and informing it of his status as administrator of the estate. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed beyond the reglamentary period. The dismissal was subsequently affirmed by this Court in a resolution issued on September 26, 1994 in G.R. No. 116933. As such, respondent filed with the MTCC a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution specifically against Constancio Manzano and petitioner Oro Cam Enterprises. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that it was never impleaded nor included as party-defendant in the ejectment case. It appears that petitioner later filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The application for preliminary injunction, being meritorious, is hereby GRANTED, and, accordingly, respondents, their agents or representatives or all persons acting on their behalf, are hereby ordered during the pendency of this case to cease and desist and refrain from issuing, implementing, enforcing or carrying out any writ of execution. Issues: 1. WON, the CA erred in holding that [petitioner] Oro Cam Enterprises Inc. is privy to the contract of lease between [private respondent] and defendant Constancio Manzano. 2. WON the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in declaring null and void the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction as an interlocutory order issued by the RTC. Held: 1. The petition is without merit. It is noteworthy that the existence of the lease agreement was never denied in the answer filed on behalf of Constancio Manzano and petitioner. What the answer questioned was amount of monthly rentals. Throughout the proceedings in the MTCC, RTC, and in this Court in G.R. No. 116933, petitioner never questioned the jurisdiction of the court over it. Only when the order of ejectment was sought to be executed did petitioner raise this argument. The judicial admission of Oro Cam that it paid the monthly rentals to Constancio Manzano, the undisputed lessee of herein petitioner, indubitably shows, without need of any further presentation of evidence, that it is privy with defendant Manzano insofar as the leasing of the premises in question is concerned. Petitioner is thus estopped from asserting that the MTCC had not acquired jurisdiction over it. It did not question the failure of private respondent to implead it as a party defendant. On the contrary, evidence clearly showed that petitioner had knowledge of the existence and the pendency of the unlawful detainer suit filed against Constancio Manzano. It would be unjust to private respondent to allow petitioner to put in issue at this late stage the jurisdiction of the court over it. In This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. 2. The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. 9 In the instant case, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 13040, in spite of the fact that the right of petitioner to occupy the leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be inexistent. Having no clear legal right, petitioner's plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court. The order granting the writ of preliminary injunction was thus clearly erroneous and must be set aside. However, while certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court, the SC allows certiorari as a mode of redress where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. Petitioner would be made to suffer unnecessary waste of time before it could proceed with the ejectment of its lessees and all persons, including private respondent Oro Cam claiming under them if we opt to dismiss the petition and ignore the patently erroneous granting of the writ of preliminary injunction and unduly impose upon petitioner the burden of going through the proceedings with respondent court which had evidently taken a patently erroneous view against herein petitioner's valid stand. 10

MUNOZ V. CA GR No. 102693, September 23, 1992

HELD: 1. Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner's possession of the controverted portion was by mere tolerance since that fact was never alleged in the former's basic complaint, and this argument was raised in her later pleadings more as an afterthought. Also, it would be absurd to argue that private respondent tolerated a state of affairs of which she was not even then aware. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession (inception) which is later sought to be recovered. 2. From the above-quoted allegations taken in tandem with the textbook distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, it is clear that the complaint makes out a case for forcible entry, as opposed to unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, to wit: First, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, whereas, in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession. Second, in forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property under his contract with the plaintiff; third, in forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to vacate the premises, but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.

GAMBOA'S INC vs. CA, YATCO, JIMENEZ, et. al. G.R. No. L-23634 July 29, 1976 Facts: Respondent Progressive Development Corporation was the owner of the offices leased to petitioner. Respondent Progressive instituted Civil Case No. 9586 to eject the petitioner and to recover overdue rentals presided over by respondent City Judge Damian Jimenez, now deceased. On April 25, 1962, judgment was rendered as follows: (1) That the defendant will pay the plaintiff beginning May, 1962 the sum, of P1,700.00 instead of P850.00 only, the P850.00 of which to be applied to the back rentals amounting to P8,590.00 up to and including April, 1962 until fully paid; (2) That the plaintiffs counsel waives the right to collect attorney's fee; (3) That in case of failure on the part of the defendant to pay one [1] installment due, an immediate execution shall issue upon motion of the plaintiff's counsel; and (4) That the defendant will pay the costs of this action: As of July 12, 1962, the petitioner had paid only the sum of P1,000.00, in violation of the terms of the judgment. Upon application by the respondent Progressive Development Corporation, respondent City Judge Damian Jimenez, issued a writ directing the ejectment of the petitioner from the premises. This writ of execution, however, remained unenforced due to repeated requests from the attorney of respondent Progressive Development Corporation, and was returned unsatisfied by the respondent City Sheriff to the court of origin. Petitioner continued in possession of the premises and paid the accrued rentals in installments so that by November 20, 1963, the rentals in arrears under the judgment were fully paid . On December 5, 1963, respondent Progressive Development Corporation sold the premises to respondent Francisco M. Villanueva. On December 12, 1963, the respondent Progressive Development Corporation applied for an alias writ of execution, which application was granted by respondent City Judge Damian Jimenez (Annex F of the Petition). The alias writ of execution specifically directed respondent City Sheriff to cause the ejectment of petitioner and to levy upon the personal properties of the latter to satisfy the amount of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P7,740.00) representing the unpaid rentals due from petitioner under the judgment of April 25, 1962. Later on, respondent City Judge Jimenez restrained the respondent City Sheriff from executing the decision, which restraint was however lifted on January 8, 1964. On January 10, 1964, by virtue of the alias writ of execution, respondent City Sheriff turned over the possession of the premises to the respondent Progressive Development Corporation, which in turn transferred its possession to respondent Francisco Villanueva. The next day, petitioner herein filed a petition for certiorari and Preliminary injunction and prohibitory injunction before respondent Judge Yatco of the CFI of QC and secured a preliminary injunction. On January 16, 1964, respondent Progressive Development Corporation moved to quash the preliminary injunction thus issued. On February 8 of the same year, respondent Judge Nicasio Yatco lifted the preliminary injunction On February 18, 1964, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction with respondent CA, and on February 20, 1964, respondent CA issued the summons and writs prayer for. On July 24, 1964, respondent CA rendered its decision, the petition is dismissed, and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved. Issue: WON the judgment upon which the alias writ of execution has been fully paid and completely satisfied in fact. Therefore, petitioner argues, there is no more judgment to speak of and nothing else to execute. Held: A writ of execution must conform with the judgment and if it is different from or exceeds the terms of the judgment, it is a nullity The judgment, upon which the alias writ of execution in question was issued, simply states that "in case of failure on the part of the defendant (petitioner herein) to pay one installment due, an immediate execution shall issue upon motion of the plaintiff's (respondent Progressive Development Corporation herein) counsel." There is no doubt at all that the rentals under the judgment were fully paid by petitioner as early as, November 30, 1963. Payment thereof was acknowledged by respondent Progressive Development Corporation when it issued a memorandum signed by its counsel requesting the withdrawal of its security guard detailed at petitioner's offices, "as full payment of the unpaid rental has been made already." If the judgment has been completely satisfied, as indeed it has been, then, respondent Judge Damian Jimenez clearly exceeded his authority when he issued the alias writ of execution of December 12, 1963. The writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law" (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1952 Ed., p. 809; cited in Villoria vs. Piccio supra). There is no denying the fact that petitioner continued to possess and enjoy the leased offices for almost two years from April 25, 1962, up to the time it was illegally thrown out of the premises in January, 1964. Hence, the. fact that the lessee continued enjoying the premises for more than fifteen days did not amount to an implied renewal as this renewal is predicated on the condition that no notice to vacate has previously been given. The notice to vacate obviated non-renewal, for the latter is merged in the former The peaceful enjoyment of petitioner was arrested by the notices to vacate the premises, for respondent Progressive Development Corporation has unqualifiedly expressed its decision of terminating the contract of lease. Because there was no implied renewal of the lease contract as heretofore stated, petitioner is not entitled to recover possession of the premises. Respondent Progressive Development Corporation may institute a separate action for the recovery of the alleged unpaid rentals during the period when the petitioner was in possession of the premises until it was ousted from the premises.

VDA. DE SALAZAR vs. CA, PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO and EMERENCIANA NEPOMUCENO G.R. No. 121510 November 23, 1995 Facts: The defendant in an ejectment case dies before the rendition by the trial court of its decision therein.

Issue: WON the trial court's failure to effectuate a substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment render such judgment jurisdictionally infirm? Held:. The need for substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process accruing to every party in any proceeding. The rationale underlying this requirement in case a party dies during the pendency of proceedings of a nature not extinguished by such death, is that the exercise of judicial power to hear and determine a cause implicitly presupposes in the trial court, amongst other essentials, jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. That jurisdiction was inevitably impaired upon the death of the protestee pending the proceedings below such that unless and until a legal representative is for him duly named and within the jurisdiction of the trial court, no adjudication in the cause could have been accorded any validity or binding effect upon any party, in representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court which is the very essence of the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process. We are not unaware of several cases 10 where we have ruled that a party having died in an action that survives, the trial held by the court without appearance of the deceased's legal representative or substitution of heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial, are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. Such had been the general rule established not because the rule on substitution of heirs and that on appointment of a legal representative are jurisdictional requirements per se but because non-compliance therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. For the case to continue, the real party in interest must be substituted for the deceased. The real party in interest is the one who would be affected by the judgment. In the instant case, the heirs are the proper substitutes. Substitution gives them the opportunity to continue the defense for the deceased. Substitution is important because such opportunity to defend is a requirement to comply with due process. Such substitution consists of making the proper changes in the caption of the case which may be called the formal aspect of it. Such substitution also includes the process of letting the substitutes know that they shall be bound by any judgment in the case and that they should therefore actively participate in the defense of the deceased. This part may be called the substantive aspect. This is the heart of the procedural rule because this substantive aspect is the one that truly embodies and gives effect to the purpose of the rule. Such is the situation in the case at bench because the only inference that could be deduced from the following facts was that there was active participation of the heirs in the defense of the deceased after his death. Consequently, we rule that, as in the case at bench, the defendant in an ejectment case having died before the rendition by the trial court of its decision therein, its failure to effectuate a formal substitution of heirs before its rendition of judgment, does not invalidate such judgment where the heirs themselves appeared before the trial court, participated in the proceedings therein, and presented evidence in defense of deceased defendant, it undeniably being evident that the heirs themselves sought their day in court and exercised their right to due process. There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party, which death did not extinguish the deceased's civil personality.

ARMANDO ANG vs. HON. JUDGE CASTRO, HON. JUDGE JOSE P. ARRO G.R. No. L-66371 May 15, 1985 FACTS: In the supplemenal petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Armando Ang seeks to set aside the order, dated February 9, 1984, of respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the RTC Quezon City, denying his appeal from an order holding him in contempt of court. Petitioner likewise asks this Court: (1) to order respondent judge Castro to forward the records of Civil Case No. Q-35466 to the Intermediate Appellate Court; (2) to enjoin him from enforcing his order for the arrest of petitioner; (3) to restrain respondent Assistant Fiscal Narciso 'I'. Atienza of Quezon City from conducting preliminary investigation on the libel charge filed against him by respondent judge; and, (4) to prohibit respondent Judge Jose P. Arro of the RTC of Rizal, Branch CIII, Quezon City from proceeding and or conducting a hearing on the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner in Criminal Case No. Q-31587. In November 1983, petitioner, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, lodged with this Court an administrative complaint against respondent judge for ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in Civil Case No. Q-35466 and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case. On December 23, 1983, upon learning of the administrative case filed against him by petitioner, judge ordered petitioner to appear before him on December 29, 1983 at 8:30 in the morning, and to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards the court and towards him. Judge found petitioner guilty of contempt of court, sentenced him to suffer five (5) days imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite notice, to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against him. On February 3, 1984, petitioner filed his notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction in the contempt charge but the same was denied by the respondent judge in an Order. Meantime, in view of the fact that said Armando Ang has remained in hiding and has been eluding the officers of the law in serving the original warrant for his arrest, let an alias warrant be issued for his arrest so that he can serve his sentence of five (5) days imprisonment. Held: Upon a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, The court found that the alleged malicious imputations were not uttered in the presence or so near respondent Judge Jose P. Castro as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before him; rather, they were contained in the pleadings and/or letters-complaint filed by petitioner before the Office of the Presidential Assistant on legal Affairs and before this Court in the aforementioned administrative case filed by petitioner against him. The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Records show that the libel case had already been instituted in court when the restraining order was issued by The Court. Nonetheless, considering the privileged character of petitioner's communication to the Chief Justice barring a prosecution for libel, it is proper that the injunction against respondent RTC, Branch CIII, Quezon City, from proceeding with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q31587, be made permanent pursuant to the restraining order and established doctrine against the use of the strong arm of the law as an instrument of arbitrary and oppressive prosecution. Respondent trial judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the libel case and the temporary restraining order issued on February 20, 1984 enjoining respondent Judge Jose P. Castro from enforcing or carrying out the warrant of arrest issued in Civil Case No. Q-35466 is made permanent.

LIPATA V. TUTAAN ISSUE: Won the contempt power is validly exercised. HELD: This Court has been and continues to be committed to the authoritative doctrine that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle. However, it is well-settled that "the power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. This Court has been and continues to be committed to the authoritative doctrine that the power to punish for contempt should be sparingly used and should be exercised on the preservative, and not on the vindictive, principle.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SEVERINO LISTANA, SR.. G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003 Facts: Private respondent Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of 246.0561 ha. in Sorsogon to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but Listana refused to sell at that price, so the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in an administrative proceeding determined the just compensation of the land at P10,956,963.25 and ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A writ of execution was issued by PARAD to that effect but it was apparently not complied with by LBP so a Motion for Contempt was filed by Listana with the PARAD against petitioner LBP. PARAD granted the Motion for Contempt and cited for indirect contempt and ordered the arrest of ALEX A. LORAYES, the Manager of LBP. LBP obtained a preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon enjoining DARAB from enforcing the arrest order against Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC. Consequently, petitioner LBP filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the order for the arrest of petitioner's manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid.

Ruling: The arrest order issued by PARAD against Lorayes was not valid because the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were themselves invalid. Said proceedings were invalid for the following reasons: 1. the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. 2. neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent?s "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.