7. City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia et.al Jun28 CLEMENCIA B. VDA. DE VILLONGCO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. HON.

FLORENCIO MORENO, in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Public Works and Communications FACTS: Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants occupied the property and built their houses.2.Having discovered, plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant written permits, each labeled as lease contract to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.3.After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals and vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary Schools expansion.4.Despite the demand, defendants refused to vacate the said property. Hence, this case was filed for recovery of possession.5.The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 appropriating P100k for the construction of additional building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School.6.Defendants appealed. ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff Certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board which recites the amount of P100k had been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the construction of additional building of the said school. But then the decision under review, the trial court revised his views. He then declared that there was a need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document. Because of the courts contradictory stance, defendants brought this case on appeal. However, the elimination of the certification as evidence would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because he was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the construction of additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. Further defendants entry to the said property is illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits. The city mayor doesnt have the authority to issue permits. The permits issued are null and void.

8. G.R. No. L-26053 CITY vs. GERARDO GARCIA Facts:

February 21, 1967 OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. There after the City of Manila issued lease permits to the defendants. Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this school's expansion. The city engineer, pursuant to mayors order, directed the squatters to leave the p remise. However, the defendants refused to vacate. Issue: Whether the City of Manila has valid rights to recovery of possession Held: The decision was affirmed with cost against the defendants. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. 9. G.R. No. L-2832 November 24, 1906

REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic administrator of this vacant bishopric and legal representative of the general interests of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva Caceres, plaintiff-appellee, vs. P. VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Parochial Church of Lagonoy, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF LAGONOY, defendants-appellants. Facts: The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church on the 5th of July, 1901. He administered it as such under the orders of his superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery. There after, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of the property which he had received and which was retained by him, and for other relief. Issue: Whether defendant Ramirez is the lawful owner of the church, convent and cemetery and not the Roman Catholic church Held: The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain, it is not intended to say that the Government and had no power over it. It may be that by virtue 0f that power of emminent domain which is necessarily resides in every government, it might have appropriated this church and other churches, and private property of individuals. But nothing of this kind was ever attempted in the Philippines. It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building consecrated. It was then in the full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That these rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8, provides, among other things, as tbllows: And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds or provinces municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, or whatsoever nationality such individuals may be. It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Neither the Government of the United States, nor the Government of these Islands, has ever attempted in any way to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had in this building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has been caused by private individuals acting without any authority from the Government. 10. G.R. No. L-17635 March 30, 1963

EDUARDO SANCHEZ, GREGORIO NUEZ, SULPICIO BANAAG, LINO BASA and RODOLPO FERNANDEZ,petitioners-appellants, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF ASINGAN, Province of Pangasinan, respondent-appellee. Facts: The defendant municipality is the owner of a triangular strip of land. With the knowledge and implied consent of the municipality the appellants constructed temporary stores and buildings of light material. New local administration took over after the elections of November 1959 the municipal council passed a resolution notifying the occupants of the land that the same was needed for certain public purposes, such as parking space, expansion of school grounds, widening of the road and waiting area for pedestrians. Appellants were therefore advised to vacate, however, instead of moving the appellants filed petition for prohibition which was subsequently dismissed. Issue: Whether the property belongs to Province of Pangasinan and the appellants are entitled to reimbursement as consequence of ejectment. Held: Appellants' first contention here is that the land in question belongs to the Province of Pangasinan and therefore appellee has no right to order their ejectment. The premise of the contention is incorrect, for the clear and specific finding of the courta quo is that the said land is owned by the Municipality of Asingan. This is a factual conclusion that is no longer open to review in the present appeal. The additional

statement by the court "that it is part of the broad shoulder of the provincial road" does not make the land provincial property, such statement being merely descriptive of its location and not indicative of its ownership.. The next issue raised by appellants is with reference to the sum of P1,178.20 paid by them as rents from 1952 to 1959. They claim the right to be reimbursed in case they should be ejected, and cite the case of Rojas v. Municipality of Cavite, 30 Phil. 607, where this Court, after declaring null and void the lease of a public plaza belonging to the said municipality and ordering the lessee to vacate the same, ordered the municipality to reimburse the rentals collected. It should be noted that while the property involved in that case was clearly devoted to public use, and therefore outside the commerce of man, and could not under any circumstance have been the object of a valid contract of lease, appellee's position herein is that the land in question is patrimonial character, not being included in any of the categories of municipal properties for public use enumerated in Article 424 of the Civil Code, namely: "municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades and public works for public service in said municipality." There is indeed nothing in the decision appealed from or in the briefs of the parties to show that the land was devoted to any of those purposes when appellants began their occupancy. Consequently, the implied agreement of lease with them was not null and void, although terminable upon the notice as appellee herein elected to terminate it. That being so, there is no ground on which reimbursement of the rents may be ordered. 11. G.R. No. L-16925 July 24, 1962

FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband ANGEL SANCHEZ, CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband VICTORIANO SALVADOR, GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, RAFAEL TRIAS, TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband RAMON PORTUGAL,defendants-appellants. Facts: The lots not fully paid for at the time of the death of Miguel Trias, which lots were, by provision of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120), subsequently transferred to the widow's name and later paid for by her out of the proceeds of the fruits of the lands purchased, and for which titles were issued in the name of the widow, belong to the latter as her exclusive paraphernal properties, and are not conjugal properties of her deceased husband and herself. Issue: Whether the contention of the widow is correct Held: The motion is denied and judgment rendered final. Upon the issuance of a certificate of sale to the husband of a lot in a friar lands estate, purchased by the Government from the friars, the land becomes the property of the husband and the wife, and the fact that the certificate of sale is thereafter transferred to the wife does not change the status of the property so purchased as conjugal property of the deceased husband and wife. The reason for this ruling is the provision of the Civil Code to the effect that properties acquired by husband and wife are conjugal properties. (Art. 1401, Civil Code of Spain). The provision of the Friar Lands Act to the effect that upon

the death of the husband the certificate of sale is transferred to the name of the wife is merely an administrative device designed to facilitate the documentation of the transaction and the collection of installments; it does not produce the effect of destroying the character as conjugal property of the lands purchased. Hence, the issuance of the title, after completion of the installments, in the name of the widow does not make the friar lands purchased her own paraphernal property. The said lands, notwithstanding a certificate of sale, continue to be the conjugal property of her deceased husband and herself. 12. Province of Zamboanga G.R. No. L-2440. March 28, 1964 Bengzon, J: Doctrine: In the case of state properties, properties for public service are of public dominion; this is not so in the case of provinces, cities, etc., said properties for public service are patrimonial since they are not for public use. Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the said Act also provided that Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. Subsequently, Republic Act 286 was approved. creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province. Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. The Auditor General, apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. The Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog. Issue: Whether all the properties concerned are patrimonial properties. Held: There are two conflicting applicable laws in the case at bar. Applying the New Civil Code, if the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in Del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga

its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Under the said law, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase public works for public service for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. Under the aforementioned law, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites a total of 24 lots since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. The records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question. But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province then and its successors-in-interest are not really deprived of the benefits thereof. But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. The fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. In fine, the Court ordered herein defendant Zamboanga City to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter. Secondly, the defendants were ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiffs 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.