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EN BANC [A.M. No. 90-474. October 4, 1991.] CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE ADRIANO R.

VILLAMOR, RTC, BRANCH 16, NAVAL, LEYTE, respondent. SYLLABUS 1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; A JUDGE MUST BE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER OF THE COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL. Respondent shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Rogelio Jocobo, who, he claims, was inefficient in the management of Court records. Respondent forgets, however, that he sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides: "A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel." Also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 is that: "A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. 2. ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE; REASON FOR ITS REQUIREMENT. A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in fact, persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's paycheck, but an instrument by which the Courts can fulfill the Constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy disposition of cases. "The people's faith in the administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial courts which unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberation, could be expected to act with dispatch" (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, Adm. Mat. No. 662-MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 110). 3. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE RECORDS OF CASES INDICATIVE OF INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE. We have to hold respondent inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records of twelve (12) civil and two (2) criminal cases. "A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out" (Longboan v. Polig, Adm. Mat. No. 704-RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 557). 4. ID.; ID.; MUST REFRAIN FROM INFLUENCING IN ANY MANNER THE OUTCOME OF LITIGATION OR DISPUTE PENDING BEFORE ANOTHER COURT. Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04) Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). 5. ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING; MERE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH CHARGES. Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact, is of no moment as Respondent's mere act of interference in a criminal case seals his fate. In administrative 1

proceedings such as this, mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges (The Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, et al., A.M. No. R-97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269). DECISION PER CURIAM p: In an Affidavit-Complaint, dated 7 March 1990, Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing lawyer in Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, charged respondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, with falsification of his monthly Certificates of Service by making it appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for decision within the ninety-day period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5, when actually he had fifteen (15) cases undecided from five (5) years back or from March, 1985. On 7 August 1990, the Court directed Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad to make an on-the-spot audit of the cases pending in the sala of Respondent Judge. On 2 October 1990, Deputy Court Administrator Bernad reported that there were, indeed, eighty seven (87) cases undecided beyond the ninety (90)-day reglementary period as of 3 July 1990, consisting of six (6) criminal cases with prisoners, 36 criminal cases without prisoners, and forty-five (45) civil cases. Worse the records of two (2) criminal cases and twelve (12) civil cases were missing. While the records of six (6) criminal cases were not in the Court but acknowledged by Respondent Judge to have been in his possession. Deputy Court Administrator Bernad also noted the dismal state of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16, which he described as "bereft of any dignity as a court of law" showing "a lack of financial and moral support of the local authorities," and observed that the Municipal Court was even better housed. On 31 October 1990, Complainant further furnished the Court with an Affidavit of Judge Dulcisimo Pitao of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had intervened for the accused in Criminal Case No. 959 then pending with the said Municipal Court. We considered the foregoing as a supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal case. On 23 November 1990, Complainant again brought to the attention of the Court seven (7) additional cases submitted for decision, at the earliest since April 1986, still unresolved by Respondent (p. 44, Rollo), even though the transcripts were ready as early as 1984 in one (1) case. In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more for harassment and vengeance, otherwise, Complainant would not have filed a criminal case against him for Falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code before the Ombudsman, based on the same facts alleged in his Complaint before this Court. Respondent further claimed that he had not violated the 90-day rule since 1 February 1990 when the Court required the adoption of the continuous trial system. He did not deny, however, that before said date, there were other cases not decided within the 90-day rule, including those listed in the Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete. He added that he had no hand in the preparation of his monthly reports of pending cases; that after he had ordered the person-in-charge of preparing the Certificates of Service to explain why she had made it appear that said cases were decided within ninety (90) days from its submission when actually they were not, she stated that he had nothing to do with the preparation of the monthly report except to sign after she had prepared them. prcd On 18 April 1991, acting upon a second Report from Deputy Court Administrator Bernad, the Court resolved: (1) to refer the supplemental charge regarding undue interest in a particular criminal case to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation; (2) to order Respondent to decide with dispatch cases still unresolved beyond the 90-dayperiod; and (3) to inform the Court immediately regarding steps he had taken to retrieve lost records and to personally put his records in order. To date, Respondent has been unheard from on those directives. 2

On 12 July 1991, Complainant followed up with another letter complaint stating that the seven cases mentioned in his letter of 23 November 1990 remained undecided, adding that five (5) cases handled by him were unresolved since January 1987, not to speak of cases handled by other lawyers. Judging from the Deputy Court Administrator's two Reports, there is validity to Complainant's charge that Respondent had failed to decide cases within the 90day reglementary period notwithstanding "Second Ex-parte Motions to Decide Case" filed by Complainant (Annexes A to L, Complaint), and that Respondent had falsified his Certificates of Service for 2 September 1986, 3 October 1987, 3 October 1988, 3 November 1989, and 1 March 1990 (Annexes N to R, Complaint). Respondent's defense that incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes dissuaded him from deciding those cases for fear of "rendering an injustice" is controverted by his own stenographic reporter who stated that the transcripts in some of those cases were ready as far back as 1984 (Comment, Annex "2"). Respondent, however, shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Rogelio Jocobo, who, he claims, was inefficient in the management of Court records. Respondent forgets, however, that he sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides: "A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel." Also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 is that: "A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity." As we held in Secretary of Justice vs. Legaspi (A.M. No. 997-CFI, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA 234): "Respondent, as the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision, particularly those pending for more than ninety days. As a matter of fact, he is supposed to keep his own record of cases submitted for decision so that he could act on them promptly and without delay, mindful of the mandate in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 296, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 . . . It is expected that he should be more diligent and more vigilant in attending to cases submitted for decision as well as in the preparation of his monthly certificates of service by verifying every now and then whether there are cases pending decision for more than ninety days; because he could be held accountable for any error or falsification in his certificates. Thus, respondent cannot now escape liability for falsification of his certificates of service with the lame excuse that he has no knowledge of those cases pending decision for more than ninety days at the time he submitted his certificates of service. Nor could he give the excuse that his attention was not called to the cases pending decision ninety days because he need not be reminded of his deadlines by a subordinate court employee like the clerk of court. Court employees are not the guardians of a judge's responsibilities." In Nidua vs. Lazaro (A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 581), we maintained: "It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his Court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition, particularly those submitted for decision. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement by Court personnel. Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions." And in Cipriano vs. Judge Villamor (A.M. No. RTJ-88-207, 22 June 1989, en banc, Minute Resolution) we ruled, 3

"The Supreme Court cannot countenance such undue delay of a judge especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the problems of congestion and delay long plaguing our courts. Thus, judges are called upon to exercise the utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their duties. It is a measure of a judge's competence as an administrator that he is capable of delegating to his personnel those tasks which properly pertain to them, maintaining, likewise, their trust and confidence in him." A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in fact, persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's paycheck, but an instrument by which the Courts can fulfill the Constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy disposition of cases. "The people's faith in the administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial courts which unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberation, could be expected to act with dispatch" (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, Adm. Mat. No. 662-MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 110). Additionally, we have to hold respondent inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records of twelve (12) civil and two (2) criminal cases. "A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out" (Longboan vs. Polig, Adm. Mat. No. 704-RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 557). We come now to the supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal case, subject of the Investigative Report submitted on 9 August 1991 by Justice Fermin A. Martin, who found the imputation sufficiently substantiated, and has recommended the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00. From that Report, we gather that on 16 July 1987, Respondent, as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVI, Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, designated Judge Dulcisimo Pitao, of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, as Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, which was then vacant, with the directive to allocate two (2) session days a week in his additional sala. On 19 August 1987, while Judge Pitao was at his residence at Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, he received a note handcarried by a woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of Guillermo Lipango, the accused in Criminal Case No. 959, which had long been pending trial in the 4th MCTC of Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte. The note (Exhibit "A"), written on Respondent's letterhead, reads: "Aug. 19, 1987 "Dear Tete, "The bearer is the wife of Guillermo Lipango who has a long pending theft case. If you have jurisdiction hear and decide. If none, remand it to RTC. "Take care because I learned Big Man Egane is taking much interest because accused is competing with his fishing but only in a small scale. Okay? Thanks. Sincerely, Ading." Sometime later, Judge Pitao sought respondent, as the Executive Judge, regarding his application for leave of absence which had to be coursed through the latter. During their conversation, respondent mentioned the case of "People vs. Lipango," asked Judge Pitao whether the latter had received the note, and again warned the latter about a certain "Big Man Egane," who was backing the

complainant therein and that he (Judge Pitao) better acquit the accused (Tsn., 15 July 1991, pp. 13-14). On 25 August 1988, after hearing the case, Judge Pitao rendered his decision convicting the accused, Guillermo Lipango, of the crime of Theft (Exhibit "C") "because the evidence against the accused was very strong" (ibid., p. 14). On 16 November 1988, when Judge Pitao went to the boarding house of Respondent to invite the latter to a birthday party, and while they were walking together, Judge Pitao confided to Respondent that he had convicted Lipango "because he could not in conscience acquit him" (ibid., p. 17). Irked, Respondent directed Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former's Court (ibid., p. 18). On 23 November 1988, the records of Criminal Case No. 959 were elevated to the RTC, Leyte, Branch XVI, over which Respondent presides, but the case was actually docketed thereat on 5 December 1988. From 1 to 3 December 1988, Judge Pitao attended the National Convention of Lawyers in Cebu City. Upon his return, he learned that Judge Meljohn de la Pea had been designated as Acting Judge of the 4th MCTC Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, and that his designation had been revoked effective 30 November 1988 (ibid., pp. 18-19). LibLex On 9 December 1988, Respondent promulgated his decision acquitting accusedappellant Guillermo Lipango of the crime charged (Exhibit "F"). This, despite the fact that the records of the case disclosed that no notice had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable them to submit their respective memoranda. For his part, Respondent opted to rely on his six (6)-page Comment, dated 19 December 1990 (Exh. H, pp. 78-83, Rollo), as his testimony-in-chief. As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice, said Comment contains nothing more than a denial of the charge of falsification and an attribution of ill motive to the Complainant. He then determined that Respondent is deemed not to have denied: "1) that he sent the handwritten note dated August 19, 1987 (Exhibit "A") to Judge Dulcisimo Pitao through the wife of the accused Guillermo Lipango; 2) that when Judge Pitao brought his application for leave of absence to respondent as Executive Judge, respondent took up the matter of the note he sent and the theft case against accused Guillermo Lipango which was pending trial before Judge Pitao and even hurried the remark "better acquit him;" and, 3) that he decided the appealed criminal case and acquitted the appellant Guillermo Lipango although the record of the case disclosed that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the parties to submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines." Accordingly, the Investigating Justice came up with the following apt observations and findings: "In sending his handwritten note (Exhibit "A") to Judge Pitao, and through the wife of the accused Guillermo Lipango, respondent failed to exercise due care. It is true that the contents of the letter may not have directly exhorted the addressee to decide the case in favor of one party but to have the wife of the very accused deliver the letter to the municipal judge who will decide the case and over whom he (respondent) exercised supervision and wielded a degree of moral ascendancy as Executive Judge was simply a big letdown in the required circumspection and high ideals expected of a judge. It is a truism that a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Aleza vs. Reyes, 131 SCRA 445, 453). Moreover, respondent Judge, while cautioning Judge Pitao to watch out and exercise care in handling the case supposedly on account of the interest of persons not parties to the case, made a side remark for the acquittal of the accused. Such a statement, which was not denied, was highly improper and was apt to create the impression that he was for the exoneration of the accused 5

Guillermo Lipango. It tended to influence the trial judge who was going to decide the case and thus did violence to the lofty principle that "the office of a judge exists for one solemn end: to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially" (Gonzales-Austria vs. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634, 646)." Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04) Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). On this point Impao vs. Makilala (A.M. No. MTJ-88-184, 13 October 1989 178 SCRA 541) expounds: "It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety [Lugue vs. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; . . .]. As held by this Court in the case of De la Paz vs. Inutan, Adm. Mat. No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 540: . . . The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, specially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the people before nobody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow." The Investigating Justice gave one final and pointed observation on respondent's culpability, thus: "The clincher though came when respondent Judge decided the same case which was appealed to his branch although he knew that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the prosecution and the defense to submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines. Respondent's excuse was that under the rules, it was (and still is) the duty of the clerk of court to notify the parties of the fact that the original record of the case, together with the transcripts and exhibits, had been received (Rule 21, paragraph c, Interim Rules and Guidelines). Respondent overlooked, however, that the same rule provides that the RTC judge shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs, as may have been filed (paragraph D, Rule 21, ibid)." Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact, is of no moment as Respondent's mere act of interference in a criminal case seals his fate. In administrative proceedings such as this, mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges (The Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, et al., A.M. No. R-97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269). Upon the facts and the evidence, we can not but hold respondent guilty (1) of having made untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross inefficiency in connection with missing records in his Sala, and of utter indifferences to the directives of this Court; and (2) of serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over which he exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated condition of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16, also betrays a lack of management capabilities desired of a Presiding Judge and an insensitiveness to the needs of a Court of Justice worthy of its name. All told, we find him unfit to continue with his membership in the Bench. LibLex WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or 6

instrumentality of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his personal record. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. EN BANC [A.M. Nos. RTJ 90-474 & RTJ 90-606. February 7, 1992.] CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, RTC, BRANCH 16, NAVAL, LEYTE, respondent. SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; CONSTRUED. The referral of the case to the Court of Appeals in our Resolution of 9 May 1991 specifically required the "presentation of evidence to establish the genuineness of Respondent's letter to Judge Pitao and the taking of testimony of the latter in connection with the affidavit of the latter" (p. 91, Rollo). Further, in the hearings before Justice Martin, Judge Pitao testified with respect to his said Affidavit, with every opportunity given Respondent to cross-examine him. Respondent can not justifiably claim, therefore, that he was denied due process. After all, due process requires nothing more and nothing less than the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play (See Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]). 2. JUDICIAL ETHICS; VIOLATION OF CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. It will be recalled that in this Court's referral Resolution to the Court of Appeals, we had required the presentation of evidence to establish the genuineness of that note to Judge Pitao in connection with the criminal case entitled "People v. Lipango" pending before the latter. The Investigating Justice having found this to have been sufficiently established, we found Respondent guilty of "serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over which he exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct." He had shown undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over which he exercised jurisdiction, which is the heavier infraction that can not be countenanced for being in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). 3. REMEDIAL LAW; INTERIM RULES AND GUIDELINES; CLERK OF COURT REQUIRED TO SEND NOTICE TO PARTIES; REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR FILING BRIEFS AND/OR MEMORANDA NOT BEGIN TO RUN ABSENT SUCH NOTICE. "(c) Upon receipt of the original record, or of the record on appeal, and the transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of court of the regional trial court shall notify the parties of such fact."(d) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt by the parties of the notice referred to in the preceding paragraph, they may submit memoranda and/or briefs, or be required by the regional trial court to do so. After the submission of such memoranda and/or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the regional trial court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs, as may have been filed." The provision is clear, that the RTC shall decide the case after the submission of memoranda and/or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. No notice having been sent, no period could have expired because it had not begun to run. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM p: Before the Court is Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of our Per Curiam Decision promulgated on 04 October 1991, wherein we decreed:

"WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. "Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his personal record." The foregoing disposition was premised on our findings that: "Upon the facts and the evidence, we can not but hold respondent guilty (1) of having made untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross inefficiency in connection with missing records in his Sala, and of utter indifference to the directives of this Court; and (2) of serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over which he exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated condition of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16, also betrays a lack of management capabilities desired of a Presiding Judge and an insensitiveness to the needs of a Court of justice worthy of its name. All told, we find him unfit to continue with his membership in the Bench." LexLib Prefatorily, Respondent submits that "although the caption of the decision of this Court, dated October 4, 1991, shows that it is only for RTJ-90-474, the narration of the facts, discussion, findings and conclusion shows that it is, in reality, a decision on two (2) cases filed against the respondent, namely, RTJ-90-474 and RTJ-90-606." That is so. The issue in RTJ-90-606 for Serious Misconduct was raised by Complainant as a supplemental charge in RTJ-90-474, which we referred to the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation, and the resolution of which we included in our Per Curiam Decision above referred to. A joint judgment must, therefore, be deemed to have been promulgated in the two cases, which are considered consolidated. Now, for the specific points that Respondent raises in his Motion for Reconsideration. In A.M. No. RTJ 90-474 1. With respect to the fifteen (15) cases which Complainant listed as having been unresolved by Respondent within the 90-day period, Respondent claims that except for four (4) of the listed cases, all have been decided. Respondent also maintains that he had complied with this Court's directive of 9 May 1991, reiterated on 6 August 1991, in his Compliance, dated 11 September 1991, but that it was received by this Court only on 3 October 1991, a day before the Decision of this Court. 2. Regarding the eighty-six (86) unresolved cases as reported by Deputy Court Administrator Bernad, Respondent maintains that upon his appointment on 1 February 1983, he had inherited 332 pending cases "most of which had barely started" and that "he was actually servicing Branch 11 also which had at that time no Judge." Additionally, he avers that the stenographic notes were not complete in those cases; that he has an uncooperative, hostile and belligerent Clerk of Court; and that he "lacked financial and moral support from the local government which made it extremely difficult to function more effectively." 3. Insofar as the missing Court records are concerned, Respondent claims that they "were never really lost although they could not at that moment be located because of the sad state of the clerk of court's office," . . . "compounded by the incompetence and lack of cooperation, if not unconcern, of the Clerk of Court." 4. Respondent admits that he has erred but avers that the penalty is too harsh for the offense. He claims that he has "only been guilty of negligence and not deliberate misconduct. And he has since taken remedial measures and mended his ways."

Respondent then pleads that we "consider the mitigating circumstances in his favor and to be more lenient and merciful to him," as this Court has been in the cases that he has cited. In A.M. No. RTJ-90-606 1. As initially stated, the issue in this case of undue interest in a pending criminal case was included as a supplemental charge in A.M. No. RTJ-90-474 and referred to Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by him at which Complainant and his witnesses and Respondent himself appeared in support of their respective positions. Respondent, however, invites this Court's attention "to a critical procedural miscommunication which respondent believes is a denial of his right to due process, and if given due course would have tilted the preponderance of evidence to his side." He refers to the fact that when he adopted his Comment as his testimony-in-chief during the hearings in the Court of Appeals, what was considered was his Comment in A.M. No. RTJ-90-474 alone; and that when he submitted his Comment in A.M. No. RTJ-90-606, he had not seen MCTC Judge Pitao's Affidavit relative to the undue influence Respondent is said to have exerted on him in connection with a pending criminal case in his (Judge Pitao's) Court, for which reason he could make no reference thereto. Respondent, however, has not been prejudiced thereby. There was no element of surprise insofar as he was concerned. In the Court's Resolution of 22 January 1991, we already noted that Affidavit. Respondent made no request to be furnished with a copy thereof. Again, the referral of the case to the Court of Appeals in our Resolution of 9 May 1991 specifically required the "presentation of evidence to establish the genuineness of Respondent's letter to Judge Pitao and the taking of testimony of the latter in connection with the affidavit of the latter" (p. 91, Rollo). Further, in the hearings before Justice Martin, Judge Pitao testified with respect to his said Affidavit, with every opportunity given Respondent to cross-examine him. Respondent can not justifiably claim, therefore, that he was denied due process. After all, due process requires nothing more and nothing less than the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play (See Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]). 2. In respect of Respondent's handwritten note to Judge Pitao relating to a criminal case before the latter's Sala, it will be recalled that in this Court's referral Resolution to the Court of Appeals, we had required the presentation of evidence to establish the genuineness of that note to Judge Pitao in connection with the criminal case entitled "People v. Lipango" pending before the latter. The Investigating Justice having found this to have been sufficiently established, we found Respondent guilty of "serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over which he exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct." LibLex In his Motion for Reconsideration, Respondent does not deny the authenticity of the note. He avers, however, that "he believed in good faith that there was nothing wrong in his having written the note. His intentions were good and honest." Quoting Justice Martin, Jr., Respondent maintains that the former's Report specifically stated that the contents of the letter did not directly exhort the addressee to decide the case in favor of one party. We can give Respondent the benefit of the doubt that "he never admitted having made personal follow-ups of the case with Judge Pitao nor having made a remark that he "better acquit him." However, as Judge Pitao testified, during the hearings before Justice Martin, Jr., in response to questions propounded by Respondent himself: "Q. In fact you can not find any line or word in that note Exh. 'A' which is immoral or unethical or illegal. "A. In my own personal knowledge of evaluating the note, it implies, the note was an implied influence on your part. 9

xxx xxx xxx "Q I was influencing you to what? "A. I believe that you want the accused to be acquitted." (TSN, July 15, 1991, pp. 31-33). There is also the additional fact that after Judge Pitao had decided the criminal case and convicted the accused, on appeal, Respondent decided it in record time of sixteen (16) days and acquitted the accused, compared to the many other cases in his docket which had taken years for him to resolve despite several Motions for the early resolution thereof. That decision in the appealed criminal case was rendered despite the fact that no notice had yet been sent by the Branch Clerk of Court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable them to submit memoranda as required by Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines. This provides: "(a) All cases decided by metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts may be appealed to the regional trial court exercising jurisdiction over the area to which they pertain. "(b) Within five (5) days from the perfection of the appeal, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court to transmit the original record, or the record on appeal as the case may be, to the appropriate regional trial court. "(c) Upon receipt of the original record, or of the record on appeal, and the transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of court of the regional trial court shall notify the parties of such fact." (d) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt by the parties of the notice referred to in the preceding paragraph, they may submit memoranda and/or briefs, or be required by the regional trial court to do so. After the submission of such memoranda and/or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same, the regional trial court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs, as may have been filed." Respondent would now blame his Clerk of Court for not having sent said notice to the parties. The provision is clear, however, that the RTC shall decide the case after the submission of memoranda and/or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. No notice having been sent, no period could have expired because it had not begun to run. Clearly, Respondent himself was also wanting in compliance with the Rules. There is also evidence on record that if said notice had not been sent to the parties by the office of the Clerk of Court of Respondent's Branch, it was because upon receipt of the records from the MCTC of Biliran, it was not immediately docketed. As testified to by the Clerk of Court, one Antonio Superable immediately intercepted the records/folder of the case, upon Respondent's behest, when it was received at the office of the Clerk of Court on November 23, 1988 even before it could be entered in the Court's docket. That is the reason why the case was entered only on 5 December 1988 when the folder was released by Respondent to the Office of the Clerk of Court, but already with a notice of promulgation set for 9 December 1988. So that, even if Respondent vehemently denies any interest in the case, the above considerations render that claim dubious. LibLex Overall, therefore, while it may be conceded (1) that the greater part of the missing records had been duly accounted for; (2) that the unavailability of the records may be attributable, in part, to the negligence of the personnel-in-charge and the fact that the Judge's chambers and the office of the Clerk of Court are housed in separate building; (3) that Respondent had, in fact, complied with the directives of this Court, although it is to be noted that it took two Resolutions, that of 9 May 1991 and 6 August 1991, before Respondent submitted his Compliance on 11 September 1991, and that even in his Compliance in A.M. No. RTJ-90606, he was remiss in signing his Comment despite requirement therefor thereby necessitating the imposition of a reprimand from this Court; (4) that he has tried 10

his best to decide cases unresolved within the 90-day period, although the Court notes that, contrary to what he claims that they were mostly inherited cases, the Report of the Deputy Court Administrator shows that there were only (2) "inherited cases tried and submitted for decision before the predecessors of Judge Villamor;" (Report, DCA Bernad, p. 88, Rollo); and (5) that since 1 February 1990 he has not violated the 90-day rule for deciding cases, although, in actuality, this rule has been in effect since the Judiciary Act of 1948, the fact remains that he had made untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service and can not lay the blame on his personnel, for it was incumbent upon him to have verified the correctness thereof; and (6) that he had shown undue interest in a pending criminal case before a lower Court over which he exercised jurisdiction, which is the heavier infraction that can not be countenanced for being in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Nonetheless, heeding Respondent's plea for compassion and mercy he may enjoy the benefits that he has earned during the period of his government service. His name in the dispositive portion of the Per Curiam Decision also has to be modified by deleting the term "Jr." from his name. ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of this Court's Decision of 04 October 1991 is hereby amended to read as follows: "WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. He may, however, enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he has earned during the period of his government service (Amendments underlined). "Let the copy of this Decision be spread in his personal record." SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

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