G.R. No.

151149

September 7, 2004

GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 8, 2000 Decision2and the November 20, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: "Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right in applying for the patent over the land in question, it appears that his action is already barred by laches because he slept on his alleged right for almost 23 years from the time the original certificate of title has been issued to respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was certified as agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the annulment of patents or titles acquired through fraud is the State; thus, the petitioners action is deemed misplaced as he really does not have any right to assert or protect. What he had during the time he requested for the re-classification of the land was the privilege of applying for the patent over the same upon the lands conversion from forest to agricultural. "WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to cost." 4 The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTCs dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of jurisdiction. The Antecedent Facts The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows: "On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of approximately 18 hectares. Said property is within Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C of Aborlan, Palawan, per BF Map LC No. 1582. "Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, ordered the inspection, investigation and survey of the land subject of the petitioners request for eventual conversion or re classification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead patent. "Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased) and his cousin, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the island but there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by petitioner and [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to the island from time to time to undertake development work, like planting of additional coconut trees. "The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz,

Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner. "In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila, that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. "Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then [l]and investigator of the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey on November 15, 1965. On November 22, a second endorsement was issued by Palawan District Officer Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island for the respondents consisting of five (5) hectares each. On December 10, 1965, Survey Authority No. R III-342-65 was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador to survey ten (10) hectares of Sombrero Island for the respondents. On December 23, 1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area of 4.3 hectares. "Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 19775 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island. "Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. "On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute and that on or about the time of such request, [R]espondents Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous improvements. In addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application for the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey of the island. "According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the respondents insist that they already had their respective occupancy and improvements on the island. Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the petitioner because he said he was acting for himself in developing his own area and not as anybodys caretaker. "Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. "Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time. "In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land."6 Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land. The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the State were matters between the latter and the homestead grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to annul the grant, the homesteaders right thereto stands. Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Respondent Palancas title had been issued. In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion. Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five members with two justices dissenting pursuant to its "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion of the land to the public domain. Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. First, petitioners action was brought 24 years after the issuance of Palancas homestead patent. Under the Public Land Act, such action should have been taken within ten years from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from the submission (Annex "F" of the Complaint) of petitioner himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal steps to assert his right to the property. His action was filed beyond the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the Civil Code. Hence, this Petition.7 Issues In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: "1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition? "2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?" 8 The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. First Issue:

Propriety of Ruling on the Merits This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CAs ruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows: "Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand corrected." 9 That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CAs Resolution on this point has rendered petitioners issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence,10 more so when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case. Second Issue: Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court. Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus: "x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied) On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows: "SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfec ted as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. "A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. "In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. "In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied) The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal.13 In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have be en based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules. To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction" 15 and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.16 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.17 In his Complaint for "Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of Title,"18 petitioner averred: "2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioners] cousin, in connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x fraudulently and in bad faith: 2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre-requisite to the filing of an application for homestead patent in his name and that of his Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that [Petitioner] KATON had previously applied or requested for re-classification and certification of the same land from forest land to agricultural land which request was favorably acted upon and approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic fraud and misrepresentation; xxx xxx xxx

2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island where there was none, the same constituted another clear case of fraud and misrepresentation; "3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having been done fraudulently and in bad faith, are ipso facto null and void and of no effect whatsoever."19 xxx xxx xxx

"x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with natural necessity arise knowing from such act or omission, [Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, trust, interdependence and intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x."20 Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent applications of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the

name of Respondent Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner.21 The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion? The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction. In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.22 In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.23 In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendants name.24 As with an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property.25 Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property through mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff the property or the title thereto.26 In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land in question. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land, 27 that it had never been privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act. 28 This Court has held that a complaint by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent means, and who consequently prays for its annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must be dismissed.29 Neither can petitioners case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action. 30 A private person may not bring an action for reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would again form part of the public domain. 31 Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the public domain even if the title is canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party who may bring action is the government, to which the property will revert.32 A mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance.33 As it is, vested rights over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly claimed only by the applicant, after approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the formers final proof of homestead patent.34 Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter absence of a cause of action,35 a defense raised by respondents in their Answer. 36 Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court37 ordains that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to protect has no cause of action by which to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.38 Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed for being time-barred.39 It is not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was issued to Palanca on February 21, 1977,40 while the Complaint was filed only on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.41 It must likewise be stressed that Palancas title -- which attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Ybanez v. Intermediate Appellate Court42 ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an administrative proceeding

pursuant to a homestead patent, is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration proceeding one year from its issuance; provided, however, that the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case. In Aldovino v. Alunan,43 the Court has held that when the plaintiffs own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,44 we also explained thus: "x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence." 45 (Italics supplied) Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent future litigations. 46 WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155206

October 28, 2003

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, substituted by his widow ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO, respondent. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated February 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62309 and its Resolution dated September 5, 2002 denying its motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the assailed CA decision and that of the trial court, are as follows: Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from defendant GSIS for (the) period September, 1956 to October, 1957 in the total amount of P3,117,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50365. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages dated September 25, 1956, March 6, 1957, April 4, 1957 and October 15, 1957. On August 14, 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by defendant GSIS submitting a bid price of P5,229,927.84. Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles, however, were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded from the auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. A Certificate of Sale (Annex "F," Records, Vol. I, pp. 23-28) was issued by then Provincial Sheriff Nicanor D. Salaysay. The Certificate of Sale dated August 14, 1974 had been annotated and inscribed in TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50356, with the following notations: "(T)he following lots which form part of this title (TCT No. 26105) are not covered by the mortgage contract due to sale to third parties and donation to the government: 50-H-5-C-9-J-65-H-8, 50-H-5-C-9J-M-7; 50-H-5-C-9-J-65-H-5; 1 lots Nos. 1 to 13, Block No. 1 -6,138 sq.m. 2. Lots Nos. 1 to 11, Block No. 2 4,660 sq.m. 3. Lot No. 15, Block No. 3 487 sq.m. 4. Lot No. 17, Block No. 4 263 sq.m. 5. Lot No. 1, Block No. 7 402 sq.m. 6. Road Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, & 4 2,747 sq.m." In another "NOTE: The following lots in the Antonio Subdivision were already released by the GSIS and therefore are not included in this sale, namely: LOT NO. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13 (Old Plan) Block I; 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 (Old Plan) Block II; 3, 10, 12 and 13 (New Plan) Block I (Old Plan) Block III; 7, 14 and 20 (New Plan) Block III (Old Plan) Block V; 13 and 20 (New Plan) Block IV (Old Plan) Block VI; 1, 2, 3 and 10 (New Plan) Block V (Old Plan) Block VII; 1, 5, 8, 15, 26 and 27 (New Plan) Block VI (Old Plan) Block VIII; 7, 12 and 20 (New Plan) Block VII (Old Plan) Block II; 1, 4 and 6 (New Plan) Block VIII (Old Plan) Block X; 5 (New Plan) Block X (Old Plan) Block ZXII; 6 (New Plan) Block XI (Old Plan) Block XII; 1, Block 9; 12 Block 1; 11 Block 2; 19 Block 1; 10 Block 6; 23 Block 3." And the lots on "ADDITIONAL EXCLUSION FROM PUBLIC SALE" are "LOTS NO. 6 Block 4; 2 Block 2; 5 Block 5; 1, 2 and 3 Block 11, 1, 2, 3 and 4 Block 10; 5 Block 11 (New); 1 Block 3; 5 Block 1; 15 Block 7; 11 Block 9; 13 Block 5; 12 Block 5; 3 Block 10; 6." On November 25, 1975, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership (Annex "G," Records, Vol. I, pp. 29-31) was executed by defendant GSIS over Zuluetas lots, including the lots, which as earlier stated, were already excluded from the foreclosure. On March 6, 1980, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The sold properties were returned to defendant GSIS.

The Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelled the land titles issued to Yorkstown Development Corporation. On July 2, 1980, TCT No. 23552 was issued cancelling TCT No. 21926; TCT No. 23553 cancelled TCT No. 21925; and TCT No. 23554 cancelling TCT No. 21924, all in the name of defendant GSIS.1awphi1.nt After defendant GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown Development Corporation, it began disposing the foreclosed lots including the excluded ones. On April 7, 1990, representative Eduardo Santiago and then plaintiff Antonio Vic Zulueta executed an agreement whereby Zulueta transferred all his rights and interests over the excluded lots. Plaintiff Eduardo Santiagos lawyer, Atty. Wenceslao B. Trinidad, wrote a demand letter dated May 11, 1989 (Annex "H," Records, Vol. I, pp. 32-33) to defendant GSIS asking for the return of the eighty-one (81) excluded lots.2 On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by Eduardo M. Santiago, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, a complaint for reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS. Spouses Alfeo and Nenita Escasa, Manuel III and Sylvia G. Urbano, and Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of Mamerto Gonzales moved to be included as intervenors and filed their respective answers in intervention. Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answer alleging inter alia that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches and that the complaint stated no cause of action. Subsequently, Zulueta was substituted by Santiago as the plaintiff in the complaint a quo. Upon the death of Santiago on March 6, 1996, he was substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, as the plaintiff. After due trial, the RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey to the respondent, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, in substitution of her deceased husband Eduardo, the seventy-eight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale.1awphi1.nt The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant: 1. Ordering defendant to reconvey to plaintiff the seventy-eight (78) lots released and excluded from the foreclosure sale including the additional exclusion from the public sale, namely: a. Lot Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 0, 10, 13, Block I (Old Plan). b. Lot Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, Block II (Old Plan). c. Lot Nos. 3, 10, 12, and 13, Block I (New Plan), Block III (Old Plan), d. Lot Nos. 7, 14 and 20, Block III (New Plan), Block V (Old Plan). e. Lot Nos. 13 and 20, Block IV (New Plan), Block VI (Old Plan). f. Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, Block V (New Plan), Block VII (Old Plan). g. Lot Nos. 1, 5, 8, 15, 26 and 27, Block VI (New Plan), Block VIII (Old Plan). h. Lot Nos. 7 and 12, Block VII (New Plan), Block II (Old Plan). i. Lot Nos. 1, 4 and 6, Block VIII (New Plan), Block X (Old Plan). j. Lot 5, Block X (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan). k. Lot 6, Block XI (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan). l. Lots 2, 5, 12 and 15, Block I. m. Lots 6, 9 and 11, Block 2. n. Lots 1, 5, 6, 7, 16 and 23, Block 3. o. Lot 6, Block 4. p. Lots 5, 12, 13 and 24, Block 5. q. Lots 10 and 16, Block 6. r. Lots 6 and 15, Block 7. s. Lots 13, 24, 28 and 29, Block 8. t. Lots 1, 11, 17 and 22, Block 9. u. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Block 10. v. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 5 (New), Block 11. 2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, if the seventy-eight (78) excluded lots could not be reconveyed, the fair market value of each of said lots. 3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to cancel the land titles covering the excluded lots in the name of defendant or any of its successors-in-interest including all derivative titles therefrom and to issue new land titles in plaintiffs name.

4. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to cancel the Notices of Lis Pendens inscribed in TCT No. PT80342 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; TCT No. 81812 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; and TCT No. PT-84913 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554. 5. Costs of suit.3 The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered the assailed decision affirming that of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of December 17, 1997 of Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED. 4 The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but the same was denied in the assailed CA Resolution of September 5, 2002. The petitioner now comes to this Court alleging that: THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT A) PETITIONER WAS GUILTY OF BAD FAITH WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SUPPORT SUCH CONCLUSION; AND B) THERE WAS NO PRESCRIPTION IN THIS CASE.5 In its petition, the petitioner maintains that it did not act in bad faith when it erroneously included in its certificate of sale, and subsequently consolidated the titles in its name over the seventy-eight lots ("subject lots") that were excluded from the foreclosure sale. There was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or malice be attributed to the petitioner when it erroneously caused the issuance of certificates of title over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale. The petitioner asserts that the action for reconveyance instituted by the respondent had already prescribed after the lapse of ten years from November 25, 1975 when the petitioner consolidated its ownership over the subject lots. According to the petitioner, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property. In this case, when the action was instituted on May 7, 1990, more than fourteen years had already lapsed. Thus, the petitioner contends that the same was already barred by prescription as well as laches. The petitioner likewise takes exception to the holding of the trial court and the CA that it (the petitioner) failed to apprise or return to the Zuluetas, the respondents predecessors -in-interest, the seventy-eight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale because the petitioner had no such obligation under the pertinent loan and mortgage agreement. The petitioners arguments fail to persuade.1awphi1.nt At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said rule, we find no reason to deviate therefrom.6 By assailing the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions of facts in its petition. Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved into the factual issues, we find the petition barren of merit. That the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating ownership and causing the issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale was the uniform ruling of the trial court and appellate court. As declared by the CA: The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the Zuluetas [the respondents predecessors -in-interest] the existence of these lots, in failing to notify or apprise the spouses Zulueta about the excluded lots from the time it consolidated its titles on their foreclosed properties in 1975, in failing to inform them when it entered into a contract of

sale of the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation in 1980 as well as when the said sale was revoked by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos during the same year demonstrated a clear effort on its part to defraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject properties. Even if titles over the lots had been issued in the name of the defendant-appellant, still it could not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion over them because indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system does not attach to titles secured by fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendant-appellant in the form of concealment of the existence of said lots and failure to return the same to the real owners after their exclusion from the foreclosure sale made defendant-appellant holders in bad faith. It is well-settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.7 The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and the CA. The petitioner is not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a government financial institution and, like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands.8 The Courts ruling in Rural Bank of Compostela v. CA9 is apropos: Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands, than private individuals, for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of land registration statute, Act [No.] 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same character and description. 10 Due diligence required of banks extend even to persons, or institutions like the petitioner, regularly engaged in the business of lending money secured by real estate mortgages.11 In this case, the petitioner executed an affidavit in consolidating its ownership and causing the issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale. By so doing, the petitioner acted in gross and evident bad faith. It cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the subject lots were excluded from the sale at public auction. At the least, its act constituted gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Further, as found by the CA, the petitioners acts of concealing the existence of these lots, its failure to return them to the Zuluetas and even its attempt to sell them to a third party is proof of the petitioners intent to defraud the Zuluetas and appropriate for itself the subject lots. On the issue of prescription, generally, an action for reconveyance of real property based on fraud prescribes in four years from the discovery of fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property is a constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom.12 On the other hand, Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.13 The petitioners defense of prescription is untenable. As held by the CA, the general rule that the discovery of fr aud is deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real property because it is "considered a constructive notice to all persons" does not apply in this case. The CA correctly cited the cases of Adille v. Court of Appeals 14and Samonte v. Court of Appeals,15 where this Court reckoned the prescriptive period for the filing of the action for reconveyance based on implied trust from the actual discovery of fraud. In ruling that the action had not yet prescribed despite the fact that more than ten years had lapsed between the date of registration and the institution of the action for reconveyance, the Court in Adille ratiocinated: It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

For the same reason, we cannot dismiss private respondents claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955. While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years, reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, we, as we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this case. We note the petitioners sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name [alone]." Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the petitioners act of defraudation. According to the respondent Court of Appeals, they "came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of the litigation." Hence, prescription is not a bar.16 The above ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Samonte. In this case, as established by the CA, the respondent actually discovered the fraudulent act of the petitioner only in 1989: ... [T]he prescriptive period of the action is to be reckoned from the time plaintiff-appellee (then Eduardo M. Santiago) had actually discovered the fraudulent act of defendant-appellant which was, as borne out by the records, only in 1989. Plaintiff-appellee Eduardo M. Santiago categorically testified (TSN of July 11, 1995, pp. 14-15) that he came to know that there were 91 excluded lots in Antonio Village which were foreclosed by the GSIS and included in its consolidation of ownership in 1975 when, in 1989, he and Antonio Vic Zulueta discussed it and he was given by Zulueta a special power of attorney to represent him to recover the subject properties from GSIS. The complaint for reconveyance was filed barely a year from the discovery of the fraud.17 Following the Courts pronouncements in Adille and Samonte, the institution of the action for reconveyance in the court a quo in 1990 was thus well within the prescriptive period. Having acted in bad faith in securing titles over the subject lots, the petitioner is a holder in bad faith of certificates of title over the subject lots. The petitioner is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds.18 Contrary to its claim, the petitioner unarguably had the legal duty to return the subject lots to the Zuluetas. The petitioners attempts to justify its omission by insisting that it had no such duty under the mortgage contract is obviously clutching at straw. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.1a\^/phi1.net The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2002 and Resolution dated September 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62309 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 154599

January 21, 2004

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents. DECISION DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the nullification of Manila City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002,1 and respondent City Mayors Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, 2 dated 15 August 2002 , for being patently contrary to law. The antecedents are as follows: Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. Section 493 of that law provides that "[t]he liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors." All other matters not provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.3 On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization.4 Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said Constitution and By-Laws states: All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the "Liga Election Code" or such other rules as may be promulgated by the National Liga Executive Board in conformity with the provisions of existing laws. By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code.5 Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga Election Code states: 1.2 Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial, Metropolitan, HUC/ICC Chapters. There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held. The incumbent Liga chapter president concerned duly assisted by the proper government agency, office or department, e.g. Provincial/City/NCR/Regional Director, shall convene all the duly elected Component City/Municipal Chapter Presidents and all the current elected Punong Barangays (for HUC/ICC) of the respective chapters in any public place within its area of jurisdiction for the purpose of reorganizing and electing the officers and directors of the provincial, metropolitan or HUC/ICC Liga chapters. Said president duly assisted by the government officer aforementioned, shall notify, in writing, all the above concerned at least fifteen (15) days before the scheduled election meeting on the exact date, time, place and requirements of the said meeting. The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002,6 setting on 21 October 2002 the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila, together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters. lawphi1.net On 28 June 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the barangay elections. Section 3 (A) and (B) of the assailed ordinance read:

SEC. 3. Representation Chapters. Every Barangay shall be represented in the said Liga Chapters by the Punong Barangayor, in his absence or incapacity, by the kagawad duly elected for the purpose among its members. A. District Chapter All elected Barangay Chairman in each District shall elect from among themselves the President, Vice-President and five (5) members of the Board. B. City Chapter The District Chapter representatives shall automatically become members of the Board and they shall elect from among themselves a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor and create other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to respondent City Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for his signature and approval. On 16 July 2002, upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to the Office of the City Mayor, still unnumbered and yet to be officially released, the Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council. 7 Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed city ordinance and issued on 15 August 2002 Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, to implement the ordinance. Hence, on 27 August 2002, the Liga filed the instant petition raising the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ENACTED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002 PURPOSELY TO GOVERN THE ELECTIONS OF THE MANILA CHAPTER OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS AND WHICH PROVIDES A DIFFERENT MANNER OF ELECTING ITS OFFICERS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID CHAPTERS ELECTIONS, AND THE ELECTIONS OF ALL OTHER CHAPTERS OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS FOR THAT MATTER, ARE BY LAW MANDATED TO BE GOVERNED BY THE LIGA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS AND THE LIGA ELECTION CODE. II WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE ISSUED EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 011 TO IMPLEMENT THE QUESTIONED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002. In support of its petition, the Liga argues that City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, and Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, contradict the Liga Election Code and are therefore invalid. There exists neither rhyme nor reason, not to mention the absence of legal basis, for the Manila City Council to encroach upon, or even assume, the functions of the Liga by prescribing, through legislation, the manner of conducting the Liga elections other than what has been provided for by the Liga Constitution and By-laws and the Liga Election Code. Accordingly, the subject ordinance is an ultra vires act of the respondents and, as such, should be declared null and void. As for its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the petitioner cites as reason therefor the fact that under Section 5 of the assailed city ordinance, the Manila District Chapter elections would be held thirty days after the regular barangay elections. Hence, it argued that the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction would be imperative to prevent the implementation of the ordinance and executive order. On 12 September 2002, Barangay Chairman Arnel Pea, in his capacity as a member of the Liga ng mga Barangay in the City Chapter of Manila, filed a Complaint in Intervention with Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining

Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.8 He supports the position of the Liga and prays for the declaration of the questioned ordinance and executive order, as well as the elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay pursuant thereto, to be null and void. The assailed ordinance prescribing for an "indirect manner of election" amended, in effect, the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides for the election of the Liga officers at large. It also violated and curtailed the rights of the petitioner and intervenor, as well as the other 896 Barangay Chairmen in the City of Manila, to vote and be voted upon in a direct election. On 25 October 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment. 9 It supports the petition of the Liga, arguing that the assailed city ordinance and executive order are clearly inconsistent with the express public policy enunciated in R.A. No. 7160. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. Thus, the enactments in question, which are local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of law. On the issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the hierarchy-of-courts rule, the OSG posits that technical rules of procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition. While Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction over cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the present petition, however, calls for the relaxation of this rule. Section 496 (should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily intended that the Liga ng mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians for the immediate ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government administration. Thus, the immediate resolution of this petition is a must. On the other hand, the respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order and pray for the dismissal of the present petition on the following grounds: (1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2) the petition should not be entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions or petitions questioning the subject ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and (4) the act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli. The respondents maintain that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available to one aggrieved by the decision of a tribunal, officer, or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The City Council and City Mayor of Manila are not the "board" and "officer" contemplated in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because both do not exercise judicial functions. The enactment of the subject ordinance and issuance of the questioned executive order are legislative and executive functions, respectively, and thus, do not fall within the ambit of "judicial functions." They are both within the prerogatives, powers, and authority of the City Council and City Mayor of Manila, respectively. Furthermore, the petition failed to show with certainty that the respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot claim that it has no other recourse in addressing its grievance other than this petition for certiorari. As a matter of fact, there are two cases pending before Branches 33 and 51 of the RTC of Manila (one is for mandamus; the other, for declaratory relief) and three in the Court of Appeals (one is for prohibition; the two other cases, for quo warranto), which are all akin to the present petition in the sense that the relief being sought therein is the declaration of the invalidity of the subject ordinance. Clearly, the petitioner may ask the RTC or the Court of Appeals the relief being prayed for before this Court. Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove discernible compelling reasons attending the present petition that would warrant cognizance of the present petition by this Court. Besides, according to the respondents, the petitioner has transgressed the proscription against forum-shopping in filing the instant suit. Although the parties in the other pending cases and in this petition are different individuals or entities, they represent the same interest. With regard to petitioner's prayer for temporary restraining order and/ or preliminary injunction in its petition, the respondents maintain that the same had become moot and academic in view of the elections of officers of the City Liga ng mga Barangay on 15 September 2002 and their subsequent assumption to their respective offices. 10Since the acts to be enjoined are now fait accompli, this petition for certiorari with an application for provisional remedies must necessarily fail. Thus, where the records show that during the pendency of the case certain events or circumstances had taken place that render the case moot and academic, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed. After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for certiorari.

First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.11 Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." 12 Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. 13 The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie. Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.14Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied). As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.15

Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus,quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma:16 This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor0 will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdi ction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Cour ts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,17 the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 18 Petitioners reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre19 is misplaced because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the President of the Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local government units. We reiterated therein that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is coequal with Congress. We hesitate to rule that the petitioner and the intervenor are guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.20 In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the parties in this case and in the alleged other pending cases are different individuals or entities; thus, forum-shopping cannot be said to exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five petitions are indeed pending before the RTC of Manila and the Court of Appeals, we can only guess the causes of action and issues raised before those courts, considering that the respondents failed to furnish this Court with copies of the said petitions. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 139791. December 12, 2003] MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI, respondent. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution[2] dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40504, entitled Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation. The factual antecedents as borne by the records are: Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing in the Philippines. On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued atP860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum of P729,830.00. Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit shall substantially be completed and delivered to the respondent within fifteen (15) months from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that (S)hould there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner). Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned to the Philippines sometime in April, 1990. In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-President, Mr. Mario G. Zavalla, informed respondent of the substantial completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990. Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990, respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities. Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building administrator advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to move in on August 22, 1990. On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City, a complaint against the former for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-3440. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, respondents cause of action has been limited to his claim for damages. On December 18, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision[3] finding the petitioner liable for payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its obligation to the respondent. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff Eddy Ng Kok Wei the following: 1. 2. 3. One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4.

P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and

Cost of suit. SO ORDERED. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999, affirmed in toto the trial courts award of damages in favor of the respondent. Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated August 5, 1999. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery of the condominium unit to respondent. On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)][4] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: xxx C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. x x x. Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.[5] While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.[6] Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction. On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Time and again, we have ruled that the factual findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[7] Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions. The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[8] These exceptions are not present here. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 133365. September 16, 2003] PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. JOSE M. PANLILIO, respondent. DECISION CORONA, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January 15, 1998 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which ruled that: xxx Consequently, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-635 with Civil Case No. 94-1634. x x x We also leave it to the respondent Judge to decide whether he will return Civil Case No. 96-635 to Branch 146 or keep it in his docket but should he opt for the latter, he should act on it as a separate case from Civil Case No. 94-1634. WHEREFORE, the petition is partially granted and the assailed Orders dated July 23, 1996 and September 17, 1996, allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-635 with Civil Case No. 94-1634 and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, respectively, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, with the consequent complete severance of the two (2) cases.[2] The facts follow: On April 27, 1994, petitioner Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida G. Galvez. Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1634. On October 24, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment [3] by default in favor of Platinum and ordered PATC and Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03 with legal interest, P 50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit. On February 10, 1995, a writ of execution was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon and sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo. On June 2, 1995, private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634. Panlilio claimed that, in October 1992, Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5 million. On June 9, 1995, the trial court denied Panlilios motion for intervention: Submitted for resolution is Jose M. Panlilios Motion for Intervention dated May 31, 1995. This Court has to deny the motion because (1) a decision had already been rendered in this case and that the only matters at issue is the propriety of the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties; and, (3) the Intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action. [4] On January 29, 1996, the trial court declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the conduct thereof. On May 3, 1996, Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of preliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365. The case was raffled to Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City[5]. In the meantime, Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634, this time by incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634. On June 13, 1996, Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno

later issued an order, dated July 23, 1996, allowing the consolidation of the two cases and setting for hearing Pa nlilios application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the July 23, 1996 order of Judge Diokno but its motion was denied. On January 31, 1997, Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, the July 23, 1996 order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634. In a decision dated January 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket and decide it as a separate case. Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, praying that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati. However, the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on April 2, 1998. In the instant petition, Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62, has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 96365. It argues that, when Judge Dioknos July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of the two cases was annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over Civil Case No . 96-365 was likewise extinguished. We disagree. Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. [6] In general, jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[7] Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the correctness of its decisions. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96 -365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order. Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case. We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge Diokno of Branch 62 the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Branch 146 or to decide the same as a separate case in his own sala. Moreover, we find the instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge Diokno decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn would have had one petition less in its docket. The unfounded fear that Civil Case No. 96-365 would unduly delay the final resolution of Civil Case No. 94-1634, if the former were retained by Branch 62, made Platinum act with haste. In so doing, it wasted the precious time not only of the parties but also of this Court. All told, nothing legally prevents the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, from proceeding with Civil Case No. 96-365. Should it decide to retain the case, it is hereby directed to resolve the same with dispatch. WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. THIRD DIVISION

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 162059 Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA,* NACHURA, and REYES, JJ.

SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. January 22, 2008 x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds? MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan? The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration. The Antecedents Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.[2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). [3] One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. [4] President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.[5] The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.[6] On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. [7] The Information reads: The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime ofEstafa, defined and

penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows: That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall, and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied) Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. [8] It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. [10] Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent. She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11] The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.[13] According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the general powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.[14] Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.[15] It ratiocinated: The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case. It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office. Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (A) x x x (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: xxxx (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied) It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions. Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law? A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation. It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within

the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case. [16] On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[17] The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18] Issue Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ISHAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[19] In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government. Our Ruling The petition cannot be granted. Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.[20] Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.[22] In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court ,[23] the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus: As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal. This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule. In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same. In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case. In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint. In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same. In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24] We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended. We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.[25] She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of authorities.[27]

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. [28] Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. [29] P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30] P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNPofficer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned. Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.[31] Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.[32] R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote: Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word close personal relation shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer. (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa. Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.[34] The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. [35] In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.[36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum . Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office. In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981). Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3). The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read: with greater firmness in Bondoc v.

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that: A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it ( Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881). In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.[42] Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,[43] We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.[44] Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.[45] By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. [46] At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.[47] Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.[48] The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.[50] The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office. According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. [51] More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.[53] In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x. (Underscoring supplied) Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this ground. Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on the merits. It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on. We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00). Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case. [54] A lawyer owes candor, fairness and honesty to the Court. As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent. The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.[56] We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness. [57] The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.[58] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175482 ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governors residence. Issues: 1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts. 2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act. Held: The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a position with a salary grade 27 or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22. The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code andAdministrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if the act was not one relative to the granting of licenses and concessions. The provision was meant to include officers with such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity. Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did not preclude application. The act employs the phrase private party, which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was proper. AGA N VS. PIATCPO Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored thepossibility of investing in the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to thegovernment for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO).The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in 1997 tofranchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition of theobligations given to the concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract with several service providers. Theworkers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.

Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments for being contrary to the constitution. Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon. Theamendments present new terms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void. The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by theconcession agreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from them.