PESIGAN vs. ANGELES, G.R. No.

L-64279, April 30, 1984 FACTS: Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette. HELD: Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

Government vs. Frank, G.R. No. 2935, March 23, 1909

FACTS: In Chicago, Ill., USA, Frank entered into an employment contract as stenographer with the Government. The contract is to be performed in the Philippines. However, upon arrival in the Philippines, Frank left the service. Government thus sued him for the breach. Frank raised the defense of minority, contending that by Philippine laws, he does not have legal capacity to enter into contracts. ISSUE: Whether or not Frank has legal capacity to enter into contracts HELD: It is not disputed that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question, the defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. The plaintiff (defendant) being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract is made, he cannot implead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced.

GENERAL RULE: No foreign law may or should interfere with the operation and application of Philippine laws.

EXCEPTIONS:

When the Philippine Legislature has, by law, given its consent to the extension of a specific foreign law to the Philippines (e.g. COGSA) When Congress enacts a law adopting or copying a specific foreign statute When State enters into a treaty or convention When parties themselves stipulate that foreign law governs their relationship Borrowing Statute - a statute which directs the court of the forum to apply the foreign statute to the pending claims based on a foreign law When Philippine conflict of laws rule refer to foreign law as applicable law (e.g. nationality principle)

G.R. No. L-42226, July 26, 1935

FACTS:

Meaning of "newspaper of general circulation"

Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing. They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, they questioned whether Ing Katipunan, the newspaper where the notice was published was a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by the law. ISSUEs:

HELD:

Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation

The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing. The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAO G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees. Facts: Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married before a Catholic chaplain and planned to elope.The elopement did not materialize because Vicentas mother discovered such marriage. Her parents asked the advice of one Father Reynes and subsequently agreed to recelebrate the marriage. However, Vicenta refused to proceed with the ceremony because a letter from the students of san Carlos College disclosed that Pastor and their matchmaker, Pacita Noel had an amorous relationship. Vicenta left for the States, acquired a foreign divorce and married an American, Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She sought for a divorce from Tenchavez in 1950 and sought ecclesiastical release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954. Escano claims that state recognition should be accorded the Church's disavowal of her marriage with Tenchavez.. Escano argued that her second marriage deserves the laws recognition and protection over the other.es the laws recognition and protection over the other since it fits concept of a marriage as a social institution because publicly contracted, recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and blessed by three children. She also contends that the court has no jurisdiction over her. Husband filed complaint: Vs. Parents: for having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband and alienating her affections Vs. Roman Catholic Church: for having decreed annulment Parents filed counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages. Issue WON marriage between Tenchavez and Escano still subsists in lieu of the divorce WON there is an action for alienation of affections against parents

Held NO Ratio: 1. No proof of malice 2. Parents themselves suggested that the marriage be celebrated again 3. Also, Vicenta appeared to have acted independently and being of age, she was entitled to 4. judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves: With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot be applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicentas refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her de nial of consortium and her desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, 45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive: filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society.

G.R. No. L-63915

Taada, L. M. et al vs. Hon. J.C. Tuvera et al G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 En Banc

Facts: Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished Executive Issuances such as; Presidential Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders, general orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders. In defense, respondents stated that the petitioners have no legal personality in the case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the Rules of Court which lays-out the requirement for filing for a Writ of Mandamus. Petitioners contended that the issue touches the public and thereby does not require any special circumstance to institute an action. On the other hand, respondents stated that publication of the mentioned issuances is not a sine qua non requirement as the Law provides its own affectivity date as stated in Art. 2 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.

Ruling: The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish the Executive Issuances of general application, and further stated that failure for publication would render the Issuances no binding force and effect. It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim known as ignorantia legis non excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make create injustice as would it would punish the citizen for transgression of the law which he had no notice. The court declared that Presidential issuances with general application without publication would be inoperative and null and void. However, some justices in their concurring opinions made a qualification stating that publication is not an absolute requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated that, publication is needed but it must not only confined in the Official Gazette because it would make those other laws not published in the Official Gazette bereft of any binding force or effect.

People vs Que Po Lay Case Digest G.R. No. L-6791

Facts: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20. The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange failed to sell to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. He appeals basing on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect.

Issues: Whether there was a need for a publication of the said circular to make it effective?

Whether the respondent is guilty of violating the said Circular 20?

Held: The Court agrees that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect.

Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. The Court further contends that appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000

Facts: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and havi ng an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate but before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that Lorenzos will would encroach her legitime. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition. The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1). Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? Held: The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the tr ial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing. The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining. Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzos Will by calling to the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that Am erican law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is no such thing as American law for the whole nation of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state. As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines. The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

Resolution Cunanan, et. al 18 March1954 FACTS OF THE CASE: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 9 72 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (194672%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%). Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)

4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. HELD: Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)