Baksh v.

CA Facts: petitioner Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited Marilous parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she did. However, his attitude towards her changed, he maltreatreated her and even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. During the confrontation with the barangay captain, Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement, saying that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the allegations. The RTC ruled in favor of Marilou. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Issue: WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. WON Marilou is in pari delicto with the petitioner. Held: No. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong, Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of criminal or moral seduction. The SC is of the opinion, and so hold, that where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulll that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioners fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellants part that made plaintiffs parents agree to their daughters living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. Bellis v. Bellis

Facts: Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas, died a resident of Texas. Before his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in which he directed that a certain amount be given to his first wife and three illegitimate children the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives. After his death, the executor of the will satisfied the respective legacies of his first wife and the 3 illegitimate children with the amounts indicated in the will. In the project of partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. Two of Amos illegitimate children filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Their respective motions for reconsideration were denied. Issues: Which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law. Held: The Texas law should apply. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. The Congress specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for it has been held in one case that a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of

successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered. Llorente v. CA

Facts: Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy. He later on married Paula. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and was granted United States citizenship. Upon the liberation of the Philippines. Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. Lorenzo returned to the United States and obtained a divorce which later on became final. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia. They lived together for 25 years as husband and wife and had 3 children. Lorenzo executed a will wherein he bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. Lorenzo filed with the RTC a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. At first it was denied but the will was later admitted for probate finding that it was duly executed. Before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor contending (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. The trial court gave due course to Paulas petition. Alicia filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. She then appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of RTC with modifications declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Alicia to the CA but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Issues: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

Held: The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Trial Court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased. The SC ruled that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction citing the landmark case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law as provided by the nationality principle embodied in Section 15 of the Civil Code which states that:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines , even though living abroad. Art. 16 of the same Code also provides that xxx However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration , whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Since the will was probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law the only questions left are whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo. These issues are best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.