Paper No.

08558

A REFINERY APPROACH TO ADDRESS CORROSION UNDER INSULATION & EXTERNAL CORROSION Rob Scanlan, Ricardo Valbuena and Ian Harrison ConocoPhillips, Humber Refinery South Killingholme, North Lincolnshire United Kingdom DN40 3DW Rafael Rengifo ConocoPhillips Trainer Refinery 4101 Post Road Trainer, PA, 19061, USA ABSTRACT Corrosion under Insulation (CUI) and External Corrosion continue to be a major issue for all Petrochemical facilities throughout the world. Over many years, refineries and petrochemical plants have experienced extensive damage due to these mechanisms. As a result, several of the company refineries have been investing in a CUI and External Corrosion inspection program. This paper details the methodology used by two refineries for addressing this damage and lessons learned throughout the implementation. The methodologies used by the two refineries differed at first in that one approach involved an initial cursory inspection of all areas in the refinery and history review of all fixed equipment items followed by a thorough inspection and maintenance refurbishment of equipment selected by this initial inspection. The second approach involved a software based desk top study with no initial inspection. The programs are being managed as a total refurbishment project, which include the identification of lines and vessels operating below 350 degrees F; inspection of vessels and lines, including insulated and painted lines; 100% removal of insulation in areas ranked High and Medium High based on the assessment above; repair where necessary; repaint and finally re-insulate if necessary.

Copyright
Government work published by NACE International with permission of the author(s). The material presented and the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author(s) and are not necessarily endorsed by the Association. Printed in the U.S.A.

The paper also describes the findings from the work carried out so far. At Refinery A which followed the initial cursory inspection approach, 18 vessels have had 100% insulation removal, 200 miles of piping have been visually inspected and 16 miles of piping refurbished. For vessels, 89 areas had lost part or all of the corrosion allowance, 26 areas had undergone weld repairs, 2 tower top heads have been replaced and a further nozzle replaced. On piping, 137 areas were found to have gone through part or all of the corrosion allowance and 61 further pipe sections required replacement. At Refinery B, the areas for inspection were selected using a desk top study. The selection did not include an initial inspection of the entire refinery. The desk top study directed the efforts to discrete areas of the refinery where external conditions of insulation and long range NDEs were then used to decide whether further insulation removal was necessary. The approach at Refinery B has resulted in fewer inspection finds and it is now adjusting the CUI/External Corrosion program based on these finds and the lessons from Refinery A. Keywords: Refining, Corrosion under Insulation, External Corrosion. INTRODUCTION External corrosion and CUI continues to be a major issue for all refineries and petrochemical plants throughout the world. CUI was brought to the awareness of the industry as a damage mechanism in the early 1980s(1,2). Over many years, refineries and petrochemical plants have experienced extensive damage due to these mechanisms and as the refineries and petrochemical sites age, this external damage become more prevalent. To mitigate this damage, most refineries and petrochemical sites are instigating a CUI/External Corrosion Program. This paper details the methodology used by two of these refineries to address this damage. Most CUI/External Corrosion programs follow the same basic steps as noted below: Development of Corrosion Loops or areas with emphasis on CUI and External Corrosion. Completion of an initial inspection of all areas in the refineries to establish scope. A thorough review of the equipment history. Criticality and risk ranking of pieces of equipment based on initial inspection and equipment history review. Amount of insulation removal and inspection coverage in line with the initial inspection and risk ranking. Project approach to assure sustainability for the CUI and External Corrosion Program. This paper also covers several case studies resulting from the work undertaken in the last three years. Novel techniques to prevent CUI and external corrosion such as the use of non-metallic insulation for sealing and cages for personal protection in lieu of insulation are also discussed. Site description Refinery A is located on the south bank of the estuary of the River Humber on the east coast of England, approximately 1.5 km northwest of the town of Immingham and 0.5 km east of the village of Killingholme, See Figure 1. The refinery was constructed between 1966 and 1969 and commissioned in 1970. The current capacity of the refinery is about 225,000 bpd (11.4 million metric tons per year). The

exports are the full range of refinery products, including LPG, dimethyl ether, gasoline (petrol), aviation kerosene, fuel oil, heating oil and petroleum coke. An aerial picture of the refinery is provided in Figure 2, with an arrow showing north, the prevailing winds are from the south west. The photo indicates the critical processing units of concern due to the cooling tower drift area as shown by the shaded area in the schematic. The refinery location is deemed as a mix of marine and rural due to its location. Refinery B is located in Trainer, Pennsylvania, approximately 10 miles south of the Philadelphia airport on the Delaware River, and 3 miles north of the Delaware State line. The refinery currently has a crude oil processing capacity of 185 MBPD (9.4 million metric tons per year) and started operations in 1910. The Refinery has been operated by several owners in the last 97 years and has undergone several major revamps. Refinery B makes a large range of products which include reformulated gasoline and low-sulfur diesel for the local markets. Refined products are distributed to customers in Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey via pipelines. An aerial picture of the refinery is provided in Figure 3. METHODOLOGY As part of corporate efforts to improve mechanical integrity, a set of required standards has been under implementation since 2002 throughout the downstream organization. One of the key standards developed was a CUI and External Corrosion Required Standard. Each refinery was required to developed and execute its own CUI and External Corrosion program for piping and vessels following this standard. Piping Assessment Methodology At Refinery A, the external condition of the piping was not known in sufficient detail to allow the effective use of RBI software tools. Piping and painting/insulation condition and history over the 30year life of the plant were questionable. As a result, the refinery prioritized the areas of the refinery using the consequence model from the API580 document (A-E). The likelihood of failure was based on the following sources of data: An initial cursory inspection of all the areas in the refinery looking for evidence of external corrosion or CUI or areas potentially affected by CUI following the API RP 574 (Inspection Practices for Piping System Components) section 6.3.3 (e.g. areas exposed to mist overspray from cooling water towers; areas exposed to steam vents; areas with damaged or missing insulation; damaged paint; caulking which has hardened, separated or is missing; etc.). An External Visual Inspection (EVI) from grade of all the Oil Movement and Storage (OM&S) piping grouped and prioritised by consequence. This survey included bunds (tank restraining walls), bridges and ground level piperack. Specialist techniques like Electromagnetic Acoustic Transducer (EMAT) and Guided Wave Ultrasonic were used as screening tools for pipe supports, bund penetrations and bridges. An extensive initial inspection of pipe racks was performed using a Rope Access (Rope Climbing) technique, further details of the rope access process can be found in Appendix 1.

EMAT was again used as a screening tool for pipe supports where excessive corrosion was found by the rope access survey. Areas of concern selected by the Inspectors, senior operators and maintenance leaders as identified from years of walk rounds in their units. History and assessments from the painting and insulation specialist and the corrosion engineer. Armed with this input, the corrosion engineer and inspectors at Refinery A selected and ranked the piping most susceptible to CUI and External Corrosion, see Table 1. The piping selected included whole or sections of process units and pipe-rack sections within a unit or between units as well as bridges requiring lifting and bunds requiring excavation. Vessel Assessment Methodology Again the external condition of the vessels was not known in sufficient detail to allow the effective use of RBI software tools. The likelihood of failure was based on the following sources of data: All insulated vessels or sections of vessels or towers operating below 350 degrees Fahrenheit were selected for an initial review. A review of inspection data for these vessels was performed to determine potential susceptibility. Further information provided by the unit Inspectors, senior operators and maintenance leaders about their vessels of concern as identified from years of walk rounds in their units. Using this information the corrosion engineer and inspectors again ranked the vessels on its susceptibility to CUI, see Table 2. Refinery B based its CUI and External Corrosion implementation program on a desktop study process flow with no initial inspection to verify the general assumptions. The process involved selecting some insulated vessels and piping with an operating temperature under 350F. The selection did not include an initial inspection of the entire refinery. The desk top study directed the efforts to discrete areas of the refinery where external conditions of insulation and long range NDEs were then used to decide whether further insulation removal was necessary. This initial desk study proved not to be successful in finding CUI/External corrosion damage and midway through the program, a field based approach similar to Refinery A was adopted. Refinery B is now in the initial stages of this new approach. Refurbishment Methodology A total refurbishment is being applied to the piping and vessels ranked as High and Medium High based on the above assessment methodology. On insulated piping this involves 100% insulation removal. Painted lines are also inspected in piperacks, especially at pipe supports. Lines are lifted to inspect contact points at supports, following operational contingency plans in case of any loss of containment. Any repairs where necessary are performed and the lines repainted and finally re-insulated if necessary. For painted lines at pipe supports, bonded pads (See figure 5) are installed to extend the life of the piping.

For High and Medium Ranked Vessels, the vessels are fully scaffold and stripped and a full visual and ultrasonic survey undertaken. The top 2 ft of fireproofing where applicable is also removed to determine if the vessel is experiencing any corrosion under fireproofing. The vessel is shot blasted, painted and re-insulated on completion of the inspection. To prevent future ingress of water, all attachments and the top head of vessels are sealed using non-metallic cladding, see Figure 4. CASE STUDIES FROM CUI/EXTERNAL CORROSION PROGRAM The case studies below are examples of some of the findings from the CUI/External Corrosion Program from both refineries. The case studies cover examples of both vessels and piping with a brief description of what was found and the lessons learnt. Further information on the case studies together with photos can be found in the tables at the end of the paper. Refinery A Case Study 1 - FCC Feed Drum The FCC feed drum operates at 380F (193C) which is above the recommended temperature for CUI. The lifting lugs had been left on the vessel at installation and not totally encapsulated in cladding. Severe corrosion was experienced behind the lifting lug which acted as a heat sink, lowering the temperature locally. The CUI products forced the lifting lug away from the vessel causing a throughwall crack on the top head. Lifting lugs need to be removed at installation. If you do have to keep them, then fully encapsulate the lifting lugs in cladding. Refinery A Case Study 2 - Sour Water Stripper Tower The Sour Water Stripper Tower operates at 255F (107C) at the bottom and 180F (82C) at the top. Sections of an insulation support ring had virtually corroded through; the shell was also showing losses of 3-4mm. A section of tower just below the top head experienced severe CUI. An area approximately 8 around the circumference and 1 high was showing the exposed internal stainless steel cladding. Regular inspection of cladding integrity is required. Top head cladding was in an extremely poor condition. Refinery A Case Study 3 - Amine Knockout Drum The amine knock out drum operates at about 80F (27C). Severe through wall corrosion of the skirt with up to 10mm loss had occurred due to corrosion under fireproofing. Continued inspection of Fireproofing is required for all applicable vessels. Refinery A Case Study 4 - AEU Recovery Column The recovery column operates at 180F (82C) at the top of the tower. Extensive CUI occurred at the vacuum rings at the top of the vessel as the rings were not water shedding. The remaining thickness was as low as 2mm at various locations. Consideration for vacuum ring supports should be made during design stage, these supports should be drilled where possible. Refinery A Case Study 5 - AEU Extractor Tower The recovery column operates at approximately 180F (82C), severe CUI occurred at transportation support bands which were discovered during a full insulation strip. Up to 10mm loss occurred at two

circumferential bands up to 60% around the tower circumference, the band was 6-8" in height. It is recommended to remove all transportation attachments at commissioning. These two bands were not evident on the original construction drawings and were only found by a full insulation strip. Refinery A Case Study 6 - H.D.A Purge Tower The top of the tower operates at approximately 320F (160C). CUI on the top surface of the manway was not noticeable with the insulation in place using external inspection. Nozzle UT inspection gave a thickness of 9.7mm. Internal UT scan from internal surface of manway to external flange found CUI and gave a minimum thickness of 5.8mm. Nozzle inspection using UT scanning from the ID is more effective at finding CUI. Refinery A Case Study 7 - 3 Benzene Export Line A digital radiography inspection point noted some thinning, this was followed up by partial removal of asbestos insulation, the pipe was found to be suffering from CUI at the 12 oclock position with a remaining wall thickness of 1mm. The area was prone to flooding and therefore insulated lines should not sit in water. Refinery A Case Study 8 Vent on 12 Naptha Line An insulated unused vent line with a pressure gauge was found during the EVI program. The insulation was removed to reveal severe CUI with a remaining thickness down to 0.56mm. Always remove unnecessary insulation. Refinery A Case Study 9 - 3 Hydrogen High Pressure Line This high pressure hydrogen line sat on structural support and was partially buried by fireproofing. Contact point corrosion was down to 1.75mm; the line was lifted and radiographed. It is prudent not to let process lines sit in fireproofing, which is a moisture trap and only allows limited visual inspection. Refinery A Case Study 10 14 Refinery Nitrogen Supply EVI survey indicated major external corrosion at a water run off point from a road bridge. Corrosion products were removed to give a minimum thickness remaining of 2.7mm at the contact point. Considerations need to be given to water run off locations from bridges and to provide protection to inaccessible lines. Refinery A Case Study 11 - Virgin Distillate Run Down Lines Severe corrosion was found at contact supports within a ground level piperack which is subject to flooding. The Naptha feed line failed with several other lines subject to severe external corrosion. Areas of flooding need to be controlled and access for underside inspection needs to be provided. Refinery A Case Study 12 - 1 Instrument Analyzer for 6 Sour Vent Gas Severe CUI of the analyzer piping was found to have a minimum thickness of 0.74mm. Prior to the find, new insulation had been installed over the old insulation without refurbishment, therefore hiding the area
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of concern to visual inspection. Inspection of instrument piping should be included in any inspection plan and old insulation should not have new installed over the existing. Refinery A Case Study 13 - LPG Jetty Flushing Line External corrosion occurred at a pipe support contact point on the Jetty on the LPG flushing line. Heavy corrosion at the support contact point had resulted in completely corroding through the wear pad (3mm thick). The measured pipe wall thickness remaining next to the wear pad was 2.9mm. Previously welded supports added to the line were not re-painted leading to excessive corrosion. Refinery A Case Study 14 6 Hydrogen Export Line Heavy external corrosion down to 1.5mm was found at a contact point where the line was sat in fireproofing, which acted as a moisture trap. This example was found by Guided Wave Ultrasonics. Extra protection is required at all line support contact points, do not fireproof support contact points. Refinery A Case Study 15 - 12 Blending Storage Diesel Line in Bund External corrosion found within wrapped area that was buried in the soil bund. An initial partial dig gave a UT thickness of 5.7mm; however wrapping was in poor condition. Complete bund excavation and wrapping removal indicated a remaining wall thickness of 2mm. The section of line was replaced prior to the bund replacement. Underground wrap systems breakdown over time. At this location the wrap not reinstated and an underground paint was used. Refinery B Case Study 16 - Diesel Treater Tank PV-1407 A small leak was detected at the bottom of the Diesel Treater Tank PV-1407. The metal jacket or cladding was new. The insulation was in extremely poor condition when the cladding was removed. This revealed a general corrosion attack with a thick corrosion products scale. The vessel was replaced and a Root Cause Analysis initiated. Poor coating application and cladding over damaged insulation were noted as potential causes. Refinery B Case Study 17 - FCC Fractionator Top Reflux Out of Overhead Accumulator Piping Circuit A pinhole leak was detected at a support contact point, where a pack of cables created an environment for debris and rust to accumulate. The corrosion attack observed was local and very severe at the 6 oclock position contact point. The piping section was replaced and a contact point bonded pad was installed. Refinery B Case Study 18 - Tank Farm Distillate Line A pinhole leak was detected at a soil to air interface adjacent to a road crossing. The corrosion attack observed was severe and local to the soil to air interface on both sides of the road crossing where the coating/wrapping was in poor condition. The piping was replaced and the soil to air wrapped to current refinery standards. Visual inspection of soil to air interface should always include some soil removal to assess the coating/wrapping condition.

DISCUSSION Refinery A has been undertaking its CUI/External Corrosion Program for the past 3 years; the findings from the program are detailed in Table 3. At the time of writing this paper, Refinery A had inspected and refurbished 18 vessels involving 100% insulation removal, refurbished 16 miles of piping in 5 piperack systems and inspected and assessed approximately 200 miles of piping. The refinery has classed a find as where part or all of the corrosion allowance has been lost due to CUI or external corrosion. The assessment process undertaken for vessels proved to be accurate at Refinery A. Of the 18 vessels inspected, CUI to some degree was found on 16 vessels, i.e. an 89% hit rate. On these 16 vessels, 89 areas have lost part or all of the corrosion allowance, 26 further areas have undergone weld repairs, 2 tower top heads and a nozzle have also been replaced. The CUI/External Corrosion Program on piping was less accurate. The total number of pipes inspected/refurbished as part of the CUI/External Corrosion Control program is approximately 1800. This has yielded 137 finds and 61 pipe replacements for an inspection hit rate of 11% for the High and Medium High risk ranked piping systems. The finding hit rate was less than expected for piping ranked Medium High and High. The piping of concern was 37 years old and exposed to the mist from the cooling towers. More damage at the 6 oclock position was expected between supports. However, 48% of these finds occurred at contact points on pipe supports, 14% at field welds where the coating had broken down and 34% at other locations e.g. through earth bunds, bridges etc. The desk top methodology used by Refinery B did not find any significant CUI/External corrosion. The corrosion found them as it manifested in the form of leaks. Since the start of the program, Refinery B experienced 5 CUI/External failures. Each failure instigated a Root Cause Analyses (RCA) investigation, these RCA findings revealed coating damage and design flaws as a major contributor to the failure. The failures experienced reinforced the need for a revised CUI/Program with more initial inspections to validate assumptions (similar to Refinery A) and with 100% insulation removals on critical piping systems and vessels deemed High or Medium High following the initial inspection. Some of the major findings and lessons from the CUI/External Corrosion Program from Refinery A and Refinery B regarding the assessment procedures and site work are detailed below; a section of novel repair methods is also included. Lessons Learned - Assessment Procedures: Desk top RBI software assessments based on assumptions are not effective in prioritizing for CUI or external corrosion. The CUI prioritization and ranking requires detailed field data and knowledge of inspection and maintenance history. Visual inspection of the external condition of insulated equipment alone and without consideration of operational and maintenance history is not effective. (See Case Study 12). Effective CUI and External Corrosion management requires the development and implementation of work processes to assure sustainability. Large site implementations such as the ones described in this paper require the full backing of management to again ensure sustainability and continued funding.

CUI/External Corrosion finds and leaks should be documented, tracked and trended to determine the need and pace of new inspections and refurbishments. Lessons Learned - Site work 100% insulation removal was required when inspecting vessels deemed as having a High or Medium High susceptibility to CUI since damage was not always at the expected locations. One vessel had transportation rings hidden beneath the insulation that formed a water trap causing CUI. On another vessel CUI was found underneath the Fireproofing. See Case Studies 3 and 5. Vessel inspection found that 90% of the CUI damage occurred at attachments and breaks in the metal cladding. Severe CUI leading to replacement was also found around the top heads on two vessels. See Case Studies 2 and 4. During the visual inspection of piperacks using rope access, the corrosion found at Refinery A was around pipe supports where debris and water was able to collect. EMAT was implemented using rope access trained personnel as a follow up to evaluate the worst support contact points. The accuracy of this technique was validated several times in the field by physically lifting the pipes and inspecting visually and with pit gages. The rope access inspection had other benefits in that it was able to highlight areas of immediate concern needing immediate refurbishment or repair. The rope access technique also provided a further safety benefit by having the opportunity to remove unattached debris within the pipe rack such as loose nuts and bolts, gaskets, and scaffold clips. Quality control of all the steps in the refurbishment program is critical for the future integrity of the vessels or piping. Some of these steps include the quality assurance of blasting, inspection, painting, insulation and addition of support pads. Novel Repair Methods Whilst undertaking full inspection of the vessel, the opportunity to blast and paint should be undertaken. Current best practice is a thermally sprayed aluminum coating (TSA) (3). One development undertaken at Refinery A is that all attachments and the top head of vessels are sealed using non-metallic cladding to reduce the possibility of water ingress. See Figure 4. When the pipes were lifted for blasting and painting as part of the pipe refurbishment project, support pads were fitted to increase the future life of the piping system, See Figure 5. At the initial stages of the CUI/External Corrosion Program, a survey was performed on piping with Insulation for Personnel Protection (Ip) at Refinery A. Initial results indicated that 6% of Ip locations had CUI. As a result, all Ip is being replaced with perforated cladding See Figure 6. CONCLUSIONS The CUI risk ranking process of vessels and piping requires detailed field data and knowledge of their inspection and maintenance history. Full vessel insulation removal using the vessel assessment process produced a CUI hit rate of 89% for the 18 vessels inspected, with 89 areas having lost part or all of the corrosion allowance, 26 further areas have undergone weld repairs, 2 tower top heads and a nozzle have also been replaced.

The CUI/External Corrosion Control program produced 61 pipe replacements and a hit rate of 11% for the High and Medium High risk ranked piping systems. The finding hit rate was less than expected for piping ranked Medium High and High. The piping of concern was 37 years old and exposed to the mist from the cooling tower. More damage at the 6 oclock position was expected between supports. However, the majority of these finds occurred at contact points on pipe supports or at field welds. Close visual inspection of the piperacks via rope access provided many benefits, these included;

Quick collection of field data on which the piping refurbishment priority of the piperacks was based. It also highlighted areas of immediate concern which could not be performed with a visual inspection from the ground. These allowed for their immediate refurbishment or repair. Provided an added safety benefit of having the opportunity to identify and remove potential falling objects from piperacks.

EMAT was found to be very good for screening and evaluating pipe support contact points, but the technique is very operator dependant. Trials with the latest Guided Wave Ultrasonic Techniques are looking promising, especially for screening of pipelines with limited access i.e. bunds, bridges etc. The accuracy of the technique should improve after more field experience.

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Figure 1 A Schematic Locating Refinery A and its Crude import via the Monobouy .

Prevailing Wind From South West

N
Figure 2 An aerial photo of refinery A indicating the areas of concern from the cooling tower drift due to the prevailing winds from the south west.
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Figure 3 An aerial photo of Refinery B.

Refinery A - CUI Piping Project

Div A D C BB BE C BB BB BE BB BE A A C BB B BB C BB BE C C A B BB B BE BE C/BB PR UP UP PR PR PR PR PR UP UP PR PR PR PR UP UP PR PR PR UP UP UP UP UP UP UP UP PR PR Unit Coke Drums Piperack - Trial Section IPC piping LPG Bullet Piping HAD-AEU Piperack ALKY Piperack - All Sections CTU-FCC Piperack - Cooling Towers Section No.2 CRU Unit Piperack Sulphur & SWS Piperack ALKY Unit Piping HAD-AEU Unit Piping PRU Unit Piperack Coke Drums Piperack - Section 2 Coke Drums Piperack - Section 3 & 4 CTU-FCC Piperack - FCC to Utilities Section CAT POLY & Merox Unit Piping Sulphur & SWS Unit Piping CPU Piperack Piperack Utilitiies Piperack Ave B Aromatics Butamer Unit Piping Utilities Area 51 Tank Farm Piping - LPG Rail Loading NO 1 CRU NO 2 CRU Unit Piping VRU PRU Unit Piping Butamer Piperack Piperack Ave C - Utilities to AEU CUI Priority 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Year Planned 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009

Table 1 A listing of the piping systems requiring refurbishment following the risk analysis performed.

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Refinery A - CUI Vessel Work Scope

Vessel W7050 W3631 W574 D3309 D7402 D5423 W534 W533 W531 W-573 D-3622 D-3623 W4701 W308 W-575 W6301 D421A D454 D455 D583 W4441 W535 D306 D308 D5402 D5408 Vessel Name New SWS Alky Isostripper Benzene Tower W305 Ovhd Drum Amine knockout Drum CPU Reactor Stripper Column Raffinate Splitter Extractor SGP Butane Drier SGP Butane Drier Aromatics Extr Rank 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 Year Planned 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2007 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008

No 2 Reformer Stab. Butane Drier Propane Drier Propane Drier W575 Ovhd Accum. Recovery column

Table 2 A listing of the vessels requiring refurbishment following the risk analysis performed.

External Corrosion/Corrosion Under Insulation Find

Program Piping Vessels Grit Blast & Paint 137 89 Weld Repairs 0 26 Replacement 61 3 Total 198 118 316

Note: Finds Are Defined As Where The Corrosion Allowance (3mm) Has Been Lost

Table 3 A listing of the corrosion finds from the CUI / External Corrosion project being undertaken at Refinery A.

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Figure 4 Non metal cladding used to seal the top head and attachments to prevent future water ingress

Figure 5 The figures indicate piping in a piperack that has been refurbished, with pads added.

Figure 6 . Perforated cladding which has been used to replace insulation for personnel protection.

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Table 4 - Refinery A Case Study 1 - FCC Feed Drum

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: FCC Feed Drum 12.7mm 1985 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel Crack 21 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail The FCC feed drum operates at 193C (380F) which is above the temperature for CUI. The lifting lugs had been left on the vessel at installation and not totally encapsulated in cladding. Severe corrosion was experienced behind the lifting lug which acted as a heat sink, lowering the temperature locally to below 300F (149C). The CUI products forced the lifting lug away from the vessel causing a through wall crack on the top head. Action Taken Lifting lugs were removed and the vessel repaired. Full paint coating and insulation re-instated. Lessons Learned / Design Change Remove lifting lugs at installation. If you do have to keep them, then fully encapsulate the lifting lugs in cladding.

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Table 5 - Refinery A Case Study 2 - Sour Water Stripper Tower

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: Sour Water Stripper Tower 12.7mm 1985 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: CS with SS cladding Thinning 21 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail Sour Water Stripper Tower - Tower operates at 255F (107C) at the bottom and 180F (82C) at the top. Picture 1 Section of lower support ring which has virtually corroded through (22mm), shell was also showing losses of 3-4mm. Picture 2 - Section of tower just below top head experienced severe CUI. Picture indicates 2-3 inches of corrosion products (10mm thick). On the left hand side of the picture is the exposed internal SS cladding. Action Taken Support ring cut out and replaced, Shell of tower overlayed. Top of tower replaced. Lessons Learned / Design Change Regular inspection of Cladding integrity is required. Top head cladding was in an extremely poor condition.

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Table 6 - Refinery A Case Study 3 - Amine Knockout Drum

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: Amine Knockout Drum 10mm 1978 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel 10mm 28 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail Knock out drum operates at about 80F (27C). Severe corrosion of skirt, up to 10mm loss, full wall thickness metal loss. Action Taken Vessel was repaired, overplated and re-fireproofed. Lessons Learned / Design Change Continued inspection of Fireproofing is required.

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Table 7 - Refinery A Case Study 4 - AEU Recovery Column

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: AEU Recovery Column 11.1mm 1966 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel CUI 41 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail The recovery column operates at 180F (82C) at the top of the tower. Picture 1 indicates 40mm of scale above the 3 rd vacuum ring from the top of the tower. The rings were not water shedding. The second picture shows the metal loss with the scale removed. The remaining thickness was as low as 2mm at various locations. Action Taken Temporary plates were bonded around the shell above the stiffening ring. New top section for tower ordered for replacement in April 08. Lessons Learned / Design Change Consideration for vacuum ring supports should be made during design stage, these supports should be drilled where possible.

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Table 8 - Refinery A Case Study 5 - AEU Extractor Tower

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: AEU Extractor Tower 19.1mm 1968 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon steel CUI 39 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail The Extractor Tower operates at approximately 180F (82C). Severe CUI was found at the transportation support bands. Support bands discovered during full insulation strip. Up to 10mm loss at two circumferential bands, 60% around the tower circumference, bands were 6-8" in height. Action Taken Weld overlayed the tower back to 19mm at first opportunity. Lessons Learned / Design Change Remove all transportation attachments at commissioning. These two bands were hidden by insulation and were not evident on the original construction drawings and were only found by a full insulation strip.

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Table 9 - Refinery A Case Study 6 - H.D.A Purge Tower

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: H.D.A 10mm 1982 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon steel CUI 25 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail Top of tower operates at approximately 320F (160C). CUI on top surface of top manway not noticeable with insulation in place from external inspection. Nozzle UT inspection gave a thickness of 9.7mm. Internal UT inspection of manway (i.e. scan from internal surface to external flange) found CUI and gave a minimum thickness of 5.8mm. Pictures show CUI with an approximate loss of 4mm. Action Taken Insulation removed and area grit blasted. Inspected indicated loss on shell up to 1.5mm. Area painted and insulation replaced. Lessons Learned / Design Change Nozzle inspection using UT scanning from the ID is more effective at finding CUI.

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Table 10 - Refinery A Case Study 7 - 3 Benzene Export Line

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: 3 Benzene Export Line 5.5mm 1969 Assumed Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel CUI 38 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail Thinning found while conducting digital radiography of nearby bend, this was followed up by partial removal of asbestos insulation, the pipe was found to be suffering from CUI at the 12 oclock position with a remaining wall thickness of 1mm. The area was prone to flooding. Action Taken The line was Furmanite clamped; Guided wave inspection of line back to pump was performed. Awaiting asbestos insulation removal for full inspection. Lessons Learned / Design Change Do not allow insulated lines to sit in water.

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Table 11 - Refinery A Case Study 8 Vent on 12 Naptha Line

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: Vent on 12 Naptha line 3.9mm 1969 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel CUI 38 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail An insulated unused vent line with a pressure gauge was found during the EVI program. The insulation was removed to reveal severe CUI with a remaining thickness down to 0.56mm. Action Taken Vent and pressure gauge replaced. Lessons Learned / Design Change Remove unnecessary insulation.

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Table 12 - Refinery A Case Study 9 - 3 Hydrogen High Pressure Line

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: 3 Hydrogen High Pressure Line 6mm 1969 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel CUI 38 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail This line sat on a structural support and was partially buried by fireproofing. Contact point corrosion was down to 1.75mm, line lifted and radiographed. Action Taken Unit shut down and line replaced. Lessons Learned / Design Change Do not let process lines sit in fireproofing, this traps moisture and limits visual inspection.

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Table 13 - Refinery A Case Study 10 14 Refinery Nitrogen Supply

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: 14 Refinery Nitrogen Supply 7.9mm 1969 Assumed Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel Contact point 38 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail EVI survey indicated major external corrosion at a water run off point from a road bridge. Corrosion products were removed to give a minimum thickness remaining of 2.7mm at the contact point. Action Taken Line has been replaced. All lines under bridge refurbished and painted with underground spec paint, and pipe contact support pads added. Lessons Learned / Design Change Change water run off from bridge and provide better protection to inaccessible lines.

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Table 14 - Refinery A Case Study 11 - Virgin Distillate Run Down Lines

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: Distillate rundown 6mm 1969 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon steel Contact point 38 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail Severe corrosion found at contact supports within a ground level piperack which is subject to flooding. The Naptha feed line failed with several other lines subject to severe external corrosion. Action Taken Failed line replaced, one other line clamped and three other lines underwent guided wave UT and were found to be acceptable until next opportunity, when they will be replaced. Lessons Learned / Design Change Control areas of flooding and provide access for underside inspection.

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Table 15 - Refinery A Case Study 12 1 Instrument Analyzer for 6 Sour Vent Gas
Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: 1 Instrument Analyzer for 6 Sour Vent Gas 4.5mm 1976 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel CUI 30 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail Severe CUI of analyser piping circuit to main line. Minimum thickness of analyser piping was 0.74mm. Prior to find, new insulation had been installed over old insulation without refurbishment, therefore hiding area of concern to visual inspection. Action Taken Analyser piping was Furmanite clamped and then structurally clamped to main 6 line. Line is planned for replacement. Lessons Learned / Design Change Inspection of analyser piping should be included in any inspection plan. Do not apply new insulation over old insulation without prior inspection.

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Table 16 - Refinery A Case Study 13 - LPG Jetty Flushing Line

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: LPG Jetty Flushing Line 6mm 1984 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel Contact point 23 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail External corrosion occurred at a pipe support contact point on the Jetty on the LPG flushing line. Heavy corrosion at the support contact point had resulted in completely corroding through the wear pad (3mm thick), the measured pipe wall thickness remaining was 2.9mm. Action Taken. Line depressured and corrosion products removed to assess support location. Severely corroded section was replaced. Full line was lifted, blasted and painted. Nine more wear pad areas required remedial work. Lessons Learned / Design Change Previously welded supports added to line were not re-painted leading to excessive corrosion.

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Table 18- Refinery A Case Study 14 6 Hydrogen Export Line

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: 6 Hydrogen Export Line 7.1mm 1985 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon steel Contact point 22 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail. Heavy external corrosion down to 1.5mm was found, worst location at contact point where the line was sat in fireproofing, which acted as a moisture trap. Found by Guided wave Ultrasonics. Action Taken. Line taken out of service and replaced with a contact point bonded pad. Lessons Learned / Design Change. Extra protection is required at all line support contact points, do not fireproof lines.

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Table 17- Refinery A Case Study 15 - 12 Blending Storage Diesel Line in Bund
Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: 12 Blending storage Diesel Line in Bund 6.3mm 1969 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon Steel CUI 38 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail External corrosion found within wrapped area that was buried in the soil bund. Initial partial dig gave a UT thickness of 5.7mm; however wrapping was in poor condition. Complete bund excavation and wrapping removal indicated a remaining wall thickness of 2mm. Action Taken. Replaced the section of line prior to the bund replacement. . Lessons Learned / Design Change. Underground wrap systems breakdown over time. Wrap not reinstated, an underground paint specification was used .

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Table 19 - Refinery B Case Study 16 Diesel Treater Tank PV-1407

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: Diesel Treater Tank PV1407 X.X mm 1952 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon steel CUI 55 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail. Severe corrosion detected at the bottom of the vessel, no sign of insulation deterioration was observed in the vessel and the insulation metal jacket looked in very good condition. Corrosion attack observed was generalized severe corrosion with thick corrosion product scale. The insulation under the metal jacket was in poor condition. Action Taken. Vessel replacement, Root Cause Analysis. Lessons Learned / Design Change. The metal jacket or cladding was new. The insulation was in extremely poor condition when the cladding was removed. This revealed a general corrosion attack with a thick corrosion products scale. The vessel was replaced and a Root Cause Analysis initiated. Poor coating application and cladding over damaged insulation were noted as potential causes.

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Table 19 - Refinery B Case Study 17 FCC Fractionator Top Reflux Out of Overhead Accumulator Piping Circuit
Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: FCC Fractionator Top Reflux X.X mm 1949 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon steel Contact Point 58 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail. A pinhole leak was detected at a support contact point, where a pack of cables created room for debris and rust accumulation. Corrosion attack observed was severe with very localized pitting corrosion at the contact point (6:00) Action Taken. Piping section replaced with a contact point bonded pad. Lessons Learned / Design Change GUL is not always the best technique for contact point inspection because of the very localized nature of this attack.

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Table 20 - Refinery B Case Study 18 Tank Farm Distillate Line

Duty: Wall Thickness: Commissioning Date: Photograph: Tank Farm Distillate Line X.X mm 1977 Material: Damage mechanism: Period of Metal Loss: Carbon steel Soil to Air Interface 30 years

Description of Corrosion Mechanism or Detail. A pinhole leak was detected at a soil to air interface at the sides of a road crossing. The corrosion observed was severe with very localized pitting corrosion at the soil to air interface on both the sides of the road crossing, where the coating/wrapping was in poor condition. Action Taken. Piping section replaced and coating repaired as per ConocoPhillips Refining Engineering Practices Lessons Learned / Design Change. GUL is not the best technique for soil to air interfaces inspection because of the very localized nature of this attack and attenuation produced by the coating and buried conditions

REFERENCES

1. 2.

3.

Meeting on Corrosion under Insulation November 1980. James Richardson A review of the European meeting on Corrosion under Lagging held in England, November 1980, ASTM 880 Corrosion of Metals under Thermal Insulation Ed. Pollock/Barnhart, pp42-59 EFC WP13 and WP15 Corrosion under Insulation (CUI) Guidelines European Federation of Corrosion (EFC) 2007.

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APPENDICES Visual Inspection of Pipe work located within the Unit Piperacks Introduction An external Visual Inspection was carried out on the piping systems within the Unit pipe racks by ConocoPhillips and Oceaneering Inspection personnel. Objectives The objective of the inspection was to inspect all the piping systems within the unit to determine the external integrity of the piping and to address any immediate problems with a view to making any recommendations for any further inspections, which may be required. Method Fall arrest trained inspection personnel were used to visually inspect all the pipe work within the confines of the pipe rack. Any areas of concern were assigned a severity rating, reported and photographed. The adopted system to identify the pipe work and its position is explained further in the Guidelines for Inspection of Pipe racks. The inspection addressed the following items: Insulation Pipe Supports Corrosion Mechanical Damage Paint Work

The method used to apply a severity rating system is explained in the Guidelines for Inspection of Pipe racks. Results Any areas of immediate concern were followed up at the time of the inspection. Photographs were taken of any areas that were rated 4 or above. Any item with a severity rating of 3 or above was assigned a tag number which is referenced on the report and has been tagged on-site to help identification. Areas of concern at pipe supports and were pipes sit on concrete support beams were identified to allow further inspection using the Emat Inspection System, the results of which were reported separately. Recommendations Insulation - Any area with a severity rating of 3 or above indicates that the insulation has been compromised and may allow water ingress, which may lead to corrosion (CUI). Therefore, the insulation in these areas needs to be removed to allow further inspection.

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Pipe Supports - Areas of concern which have been identified have now been scheduled for further inspection by Emat. Paintwork - Any area with a severity rating of 3 or above indicates that the paintwork has broken down sufficiently so that it does not provide the protection that was intended. Therefore, the pipe work needs cleaning and preparing to carry out remedial paintwork. Corrosion or Mechanical Damage Any Corrosion or Mechanical damage with a severity rating of 4 or above will require further inspection. These areas will need access providing. In order to assist with the identification of the areas recommended for further work each item of concern has been assigned a tag number which is included in the report and a yellow tag has been attached to the area of the pipe on site. For guidance examples of severity 4 and 5 ratings for each category are provided below; Assessment Examples Insulation Severity 4 Severity 5

Pipe Supports Severity 4 Severity 5

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Paintwork Severity 4 Severity 5

Corrosion or Mechanical Damage Severity 4 Severity 5

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