I. JURISDICTION 1. Lourdes L. Eristingcol vs. CA March 20, 2009 NACHURA, J.

FACTS: Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village (Village), Makati City. The respondents, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre were the former president and chairman of the board of governors (Board), construction committee chairman and village manager of the Urdaneta Village Association Inc. (UVAI), respectively, an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village. Eristingcol filed this action against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre, founded on the allegations that in compliance with the National Building Code and after UVAIs approval of her building plans and acceptance of the construction bond and architects fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house on her lot with concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway; that for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and Regulations (CRR) UVAI imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her property. The petition prays for declaration of nullity of UVAIs Construction Rules and for damages. A day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a temporary settlement whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an undertaking which allowed Eristingcols workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI. Thereafter, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that it is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving homeowners associations, pursuant to E.O. No. 535, Series of 1979, as amended by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986. RTC: UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre may not assail its jurisdiction after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs therein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcols workers from entering the village. CA: reversed the RTCs Decision and dismissed Eristingcols complaint for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcols complaint. HELD: Based on the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint, it is the HLURB, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case. RATIO: 1) In determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute and is, in fact, admitted by Eristingcol in her complaint. 2) Ostensibly, Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. The allegations in Eristingcols complaint reveals that the nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAIs Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAIs Construction Rules. Significantly, Eristingcol does not assail the height restriction of UVAIs Construction Rules, as she has readily complied therewith. 3) Compared with Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Sps. Gaston In ruling that the subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint of respondent- spouses Gaston for declaration of nullity of a board resolution issued by Sta. Clara Homeowners

Association (SCHA) was vested in the regular courts, the SC stressed the absence of relationship and the consequent lack of privity of contract between the parties. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
The Complaint does not allege that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the SCHA. In point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case is wellestablished. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable. The crux of Eristingcols complaint is UVAIs supposed arbitrary implementation of its construction rules against Eristingcol, a member thereof. 4) The controversy which arose between the parties partook of the nature of an intracorporate dispute. E.O. No. 535, which amended R.A. No. 580 creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions over homeowners associations originally vested with the SEC. By virtue thereof, the HIGC likewise assumed the SE Cs original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations. Thereafter, with the advent of R.A. No. 8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners associations, were transferred to the HLURB.
5) Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. does not apply in this case

- The defendants appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in compliance with, a subpoena issued by that court in connection with Eristingcols application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). - On defendants supposed agreement to sign the Undertaking allowing Eristingcols workers, contractors, and suppliers to enter and exit the village, this temporary settlement cannot be equated with full acceptance of the RTCs authority, as what actually transpired in Tijam. - The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an objection to the courts jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case. In that case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first timefifteen years after the action was commenced in the CFI. Indeed, in several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred by laches from invoking the CFIs lack of jurisdiction. - The TRO hearing was held on February 9, 1999, a day after the filing of the complaint. On even date, the parties reached a temporary settlement reflected in the Undertaking. Fifteen days thereafter, defendants, including Limjoco, filed a Motion to Dismiss. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events cannot be characterized as laches as would bar defendants from questioning the RTCs jurisdiction.

2. Duero vs. CA January 4, 2002 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Gabriel Duero asserts that sometime in 1988 Bernardo Eradel entered and occupied Dueros land. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. When Duero informed Eradel that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, Eradel remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land. On June 16, 1995, Duero filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorneys Fees.

Duero presented his evidence ex parte and on May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor; Eradel was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the subject lot to Dueno. On June 10, 1996, Eradel filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. Said motion for new trial was denied. Meanwhile, in an administrative case between Duero and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office of the Regional Director of the DENR in Davao City. On July 24, 1996, Eradel filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded. On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, Eradel alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Duero filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February 27, 1997. On March 12, 1997, Eradel filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. CA: gave due course to the petition. The CA held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction and that Eradel is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC when the latter filed his Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. ISSUE: Whether Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. HELD: No. RATIO: 1) While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction, notably, estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice. 2) Eradel questions the jurisdiction of RTC on legal grounds. It was Duero who filed the complaint against Eradel before the RTC believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Eradel, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, Eradel was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that he had a better right than Duero over the land because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land. But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTCs lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that Eradel raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of private respondents motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution. Under these circumstances, Eradel could not be said to be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.

3) The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal . The CA did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if Eradel actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances. 4) In Javier vs. Court of Appeals, the SC held:
The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same.

Indeed, the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a lawless thing. Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become final and executory, hence, appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the CA was in order.