Symbolic Interaction

SYMBOLIC INTERACTION:
A Reader in Social Psychology
THIRD EDITION

Jerome G. Manis

Western Michigan University

Bernard N. Meltzer

Central Michigan University

ALLYN AND BACON, INC. Boston, London, Sydney, Toronto

For Laura Glance Manis and Ida Wasserman Meltzer

Copyright 1978, 1972, 1967 by Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 470 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts 02210. A l l rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, record ing, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

LIBRARY O F CONGRESS C A T A L O G I N G I N P U B L I C A T I O N D A T A Manis, Jerome G . Symbolic interaction. Includes bibliographies and index. 1. Symbolic interactionismAddresses, essays, lectures. 2. Social psychologyAddresses, essays, lectures. I. Meltzer, Bernard N . , joint . II. Title. HM291.M37 1978 301.1 77-25080 ISBN 0-205-06062-5

Contents

Preface to the Third Edition Preface to the Second Edition Preface to the First Edition

ix xi xiii

I N T R O D U C T I O N : Intellectual Antecedents and Basic Propositions o f Symbolic Interactionism 1

PART I. T H E O R Y A N D M E T H O D S 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

11

Bernard N. Meltzer, Mead's Social Psychology 15 M a n f o r d H . K u h n , Major Trends i n Symbolic Interaction T h e o r y in the Past T w e n t y - F i v e Years 27 Bernard N. Meltzer, J o h n W. Petras, & L a r r y T. Reynolds, Varieties of Symbolic Interactionism 41 N o r m a n K . D e n z i n , T h e Research A c t 58 Herbert Blumer, Sociological Analysis and the " V a r i a b l e " 68 H o w a r d S. Becker & Blanche Geer, Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison 76 M a n f o r d H . K u h n & T h o m a s S . M c P a r t l a n d , A n E m p i r i c a l Investigation of Self-Attitudes 83 91 93

S E L E C T E D REFERENCES FOR PART O N E P A R T II. S O C I E T Y 8. 9.

Herbert B l u m e r , Society as Symbolic Interaction 97 J o h n D e w e y , C o m m u n i c a t i o n , Individual and Society

104

vi 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Contents Charles H o r t o n C o o l e y , Primary G r o u p a n d H u m a n Nature T a m o t s u Shibutani, Reference Groups as Perspectives 108 H a n s G e r t h and C. Wright M i l l s , Institutions and Persons 106 116

Barbara Laslett & C a r o l A. B. Warren, L o s i n g Weight: T h e Organizational Promotion of Behavior C h a n g e 119 D a r w i n L . Thomas, D a v i d D . Franks, a n d James M . C a l o n i c o , RoleT a k i n g and Power in Social Psychology 128 E u g e n e A. Weinstein & J u d i t h M. T a n u r , Meanings, Purposes, and Structural Resources in Social Interaction 138 R a l p h H . T u r n e r , T h e Public Perception o f Protest 163 147

S E L E C T E D R E F E R E N C E S FOR PART T W O

P A R T III. S E L F 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Charles H o r t o n C o o l e y , Looking-Glass Self 169

165

E r v i n g G o f f m a n , T h e Presentation of Self to Others 171 G r e g g S. W i l k i n s o n , Psychiatric D i s o r d e r Dramaturgically Considered 178 W i l l i a m L . K o l b , A Critical Evaluation o f Mead's " I " a n d " M e " Concepts 191 J o h n W. K i n c h , Experiments on Factors Related to Self-Concept Change 197 H e l e n Znaniecki L o p a t a , Self-Identity in Marriage and W i d o w hood 202 E. L. Quarantelli & Joseph C o o p e r , Self-Conceptions and Others: A F u r t h e r Test of M e a d i a n Hypotheses 211 E d w i n D. D r i v e r , Self-Conceptions in India and the U n i t e d States: A Cross-Cultural Validation of the T w e n t y Statement Test 222 Charles W. T u c k e r , Some Methodological Problems of K u h n ' s Self Theory 232 240

S E L E C T E D R E F E R E N C E S FOR PART T H R E E

P A R T IV. M I N D 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

243

W i l l i a m L e w i s Troyer, Mead's Social and Functional T h e o r y of Mind 247 J o h n D e w e y , M i n d , Experience, and Behavior W i l l i a m I. T h o m a s , T h e Definition of the Situation 252 254

Robert A. Stebbins, Studying the D e f i n i t i o n of the Situation: T h e o r y a n d F i e l d Research Strategies 258 Joan P. E m e r s o n , " N o t h i n g Unusual Is H a p p e n i n g " 272

Contents 31. 32. 33. 34. H a r o l d Garfinkel, C o m m o n Sense K n o w l e d g e of Social Structures: T h e D o c u m e n t a r y M e t h o d of Interpretation 281 Kurt Goldstein, Speech and T h i n k i n g 296 C. Wright M i l l s , Situated Actions and Vocabularies of M o t i v e J o h n P. Hewitt a n d R a n d a l l Stokes, Disclaimers 319 308 301

vii

SELECTED REFERENCES FOR PART FOUR

PART V. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS A N D APPLICATIONS 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

321

Sheldon Stryker, Symbolic Interaction as an A p p r o a c h to F a m i l y Research 323 Pat C a r l e n , T h e Staging of Magistrates' Justice 331 H o w a r d S. Becker, B e c o m i n g a Marihuana User 337 Teresa E. L e v i t i n , Deviants as A c t i v e Participants in the L a b e l i n g Process: T h e Visibly H a n d i c a p p e d 344 W i l l i a m R. Rosengren, T h e Self in the Emotionally D i s t u r b e d 353 E r v i n g Goffman, T h e M o r a l C a r e e r of the Mental Patient 362 Arlene K a p l a n D a n i e l s , T h e Social Construction of Military Psychiatric Diagnoses 380 391

SELECTED REFERENCES FOR PART FIVE

P A R T VI. APPRAISALS O F S Y M B O L I C I N T E R A C T I O N I S M 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. R a n d a l l C o l l i n s , Interpretive Social Psychology 397 Jonathan H. T u r n e r , Symbolic Interactionism and Social ization 400 John ts Lofland, 402 Interactionist Imagery and Analytic

393

Organ-

Interrup-

Joan H u b e r , Symbolic Interaction as a Pragmatic Perspective: T h e Bias of E m e r g e n t T h e o r y 409 Herbert Blumer, A c t i o n vs. Interaction 419 A l v i n W. G o u l d n e r , Ethnomethodology 423 E d w i n M . Lemert, B e y o n d M e a d : T h e Societal Reaction t o D e viance 426 435

S E L E C T E D R E F E R E N C E S F O R P A R T SIX

CONCLUSION

437

Index

441

Preface to the Third Edition

T h e t h i r d edition of this book, we believe, reflects an important phase in the d e v e l o p m e n t of symbolic interactionisma p e r i o d of assessment of the perspective as w e l l as progress in a p p l y i n g it to n e w topics (see especially the n e w selections in Part Two). In the first e d i t i o n , we sought to b r i n g together some of the most significant contributions to this social psychological perspective. A second e d i t i o n incorporated m o r e current theoretical a n d e m p i r i c a l materials, i n c l u d i n g several f r o m the related viewpoints of ethnomethodology, labeling theory, a n d the dramaturgical approach. O u r present goal has been to clarify the present status of symbolic interactionism by r e v i e w i n g its origins, stating its basic propositions, a d d i n g recent contributions, and presenting criticisms of the perspective. O u r task has been both aided and complicated by the large v o l u m e of published w o r k relevant to this goal.
1

M u c h of the t h i r d e d i t i o n involves major changes f r o m the earlier ones. As in the second edition, more than a t h i r d of the readings are new. We have a d d e d a general introduction, w h i c h briefly presents a r e v i e w of the intellectual antecedents of symbolic interactionism and an o v e r v i e w of its key ideas. T h e introductions to the various parts of the book have been revised, as has the C o n c l u s i o n . T h e Selected References following each Part have been updated. F i n a l l y , we have m a d e an i m p o r tant organizational change in the book by i n c l u d i n g a n e w Part containing appraisals of symbolic interactionism f r o m several theoretical, methodological, and ideological standpoints. This material, in our j u d g m e n t , offers the student a balanced understandi n g of the subject. We h e r e w i t h acknowledge our indebtedness to colleagues w h o carefully rev i e w e d our prospectus for this edition: Charles B o l t o n , P o r t l a n d State U n i v e r s i t y ; D e n n i s Brissett, University of Minnesota at D u l u t h ; C l y d e W. F r a n k l i n , O h i o State U n i v e r s i t y ; J o h n P. H e w i t t , U n i v e r s i t y of Massachusetts; Sheldon Stryker, Indiana U n i v e r s i t y ; a n d W i l l i a m C . Yoels, Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Northwest. W e are also deeply indebeted to Susan Shott for her invaluable assistance in almost every phase of our w o r k , a n d to W i l l i a m J. M e l t z e r , w h o h e l p e d us to evaluate several of the new

Preface to the Third Edition

reading selections. A n d , f i n a l l y , w e are grateful t o G a r y L . F o l v e n , Senior E d i t o r of A l l y n and Bacon, Inc., for his numerous useful recommendations and his amiable perseverance, and to C y n t h i a Hartnett, P r o d u c t i o n E d i t o r , for her proficiency in h a n d l i n g the p r o d u c t i o n of this book. JGM BNM

NOTES 1. Illustrative of recent textbooks, collections of readings, and monographs falling within the symbolic interactionism tradition or related traditions are: Arnold Birenbaum and Edward Sagarin (eds.), People in Places: The Sociology of the Familiar (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973); Niels Winther Braroe, Indian and White: Self-Image and Interaction in a Canadian Plains Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974); Dennis Brisset and Charles Edgley (eds.), Life as Theater: A Dramaturgical Source Book (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1975); Arthur Brittan, Meanings and Situations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973); James B. Cowie and Julian B. Roebuck, An Ethnography of a Chiropractic ClinicDefinitions of a Deviant Situation (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Irwin Deutscher, What We Say I What We Do: Sentiments and Acts (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973); John P. Hewitt, Self and Society: A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., l976); Robert H . Lauer and Warren H . Handel, Social Psychology: The Theory and Application of Symbolic Interactionism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977); Wilfred B. W. Martin, The Negotiated Order of the School (Canada: Macmillan, 1976); Hugh Mehan and Houston Wood, The Reality of Ethnomethodology (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975); Bernard N. Meltzer, John W. Petras, and Larry T. Reynolds, Symbolic Interactionism: Genesis, Varieties and Criticism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); Monica B. Morris, An Excursion into Creative Sociology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); George Psathas (ed.), Phenornenological Sociology: Issues and Applications (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973); Robert A. Stebbins, Teachers and Meaning: Definitions of Classroom Situations (Leiden: E . J. Brill, 1975); and Roy Turner (ed.), Ethnomethodology (Middlesex, England: Penguin Education, 1974).

Preface to the Second Edition

Since the appearance in 1967 of the first e d i t i o n of this book, we have b e e n gratified by the publication of several other textbooks, monographs, a n d anthologies w i t h similar orientations. A g r o w i n g research literature in books a n d professional journals also attests to the significance and viability of symbolic interactionism, as does the diffusion of this perspective w i t h i n the disciplines of sociology and social psychology. C u r r e n t l y , symbolic interactionism can no longer be identified w i t h a f e w i n d i v i d uals at a few major universities. T h e articles in this book are representative of the w o r k of a great n u m b e r of contributors to theory and research. T h e i r efforts, as w e l l as the m a n y m o r e c i t e d in the Selected Bibliography at the close of each Part of the book, are evidence of the widespread prevalence of the symbolic interactionism perspective in A m e r i c a n social psychology. T h e present edition embodies some i m p o r t a n t changes f r o m the earlier one. M o r e than a t h i r d of the selections are n e w , a n d the total n u m b e r of selections has b e e n increased, along w i t h the total n u m b e r of pages in the book. We have retained, however, our emphasis on c u r r e n t , significant, and readable m a t e r i a l s both theoretical a n d e m p i r i c a l . Of greater significance is the inclusion of recent selections f r o m the social psychologies spawned or strongly influenced by symbolic interactionism: ethnomethodology, labeling theory, dramaturgical sociology, a n d the "sociology of the a b s u r d . " These orientations emphasize the active, self-aware nature of h u m a n conduct a n d enjoin those w h o w i s h to understand that conduct, w h e t h e r for scientific or " e v e r y d a y " reasons, to take the standpoint of the actor. D r a w i n g inspiration f r o m existentialism a n d phenomenology, as w e l l as f r o m symbolic interactionism, they n u m b e r a m o n g their major progenitors such diverse names as E d m u n d Husserl and his interpreters, A l f r e d Schutz and M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y ; Jean-Paul Sartre and E d w a r d A . T i r y a k i a n ; E r v i n g Goffman; and E d w i n M . L e m e r t , along w i t h George H e r b e r t M e a d a n d other classical symbolic interactionists. Representative of the n e w e r orientations are the selections in this book by A r l e n e K a p l a n
1 2

xii

Preface to the Second Edition

Daniels (selection 46), H a r o l d G a r f i n k e l (selections 17 and 32), E r v i n g G o f f m a n (selections 20 a n d 45), G e o r g e Psathas (selection 9), and M a r v i n B. Scott a n d Stanford M . L y m a n (selection 36). T h e editors h e r e w i t h acknowledge their special indebtedness to C a r l J. C o u c h , U n i v e r s i t y o f Iowa, and J o h n W . Petras, C e n t r a l M i c h i g a n U n i v e r s i t y , w h o p r e p a r e d intensive evaluations of the first e d i t i o n . T h e i r critical comments a n d suggestions, w h i l e as frequently rejected as accepted by us, i n f o r m e d the present e d i t i o n . We also thank our m a n y other colleagues in the field w h o appraised the earlier e d i t i o n for us a n d w h o made numerous suggestions for the revised e d i t i o n . A n d , finally, w e offer our gratitude t o G a r y L . F o l v e n a n d N a n c y L . M u r p h y o f A l l y n a n d B a c o n , Inc., w h o gave us their painstaking a n d invaluable assistance in various phases of the p r o d u c t i o n of this book. JGM BNM

NOTES 1. Among these are Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969); Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss (eds.), Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1969); Peter McHugh, Defining the Situation: The Organization of Meaning in Social Interaction (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968); Tamotsu Shibutani (ed.). Human Nature and Collective Behavior: Papers in Honor of Herbert Blumer (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970); Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman (eds.), Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction (Waltham: Ginn/Blaisdell, 1970). 2. The following books are representative of these approaches: Hans Peter Dreitzel (ed.), Recent Sociology, No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior (London: Collier-Macmillan, L t d . , 1970); Jack D. Douglas (ed.), Understanding Everyday Life: Toward the Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970); Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967); Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967); Stanford M. Lyman and Marvin B. Scott, A Sociology of the Absurd (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1970); George J. McCall and J. L . Simmons, Identities and Interactions: An Examination of Human Associations in Everyday Life (New York: The Free Press, 1966).

Preface to the First Edition

T h i s book is, we believe, the first attempt to b r i n g together a sizable n u m b e r of previously published contributions to symbolic interactionist t h e o r y , a theory, or orientation, w h i c h has i n f l u e n c e d most A m e r i c a n sociologists specializing in social psychology. T h e historical d e v e l o p m e n t of symbolic interactionism has b e e n traced by several w r i t e r s . Its roots are to be f o u n d in the rationalism of J o h n L o c k e , the foreshadowing of the role-taking process by such "Scottish M o r a l i s t s " as D a v i d H u m e a n d A d a m S m i t h , the idealist epistemology of K a n t , a n d other diverse sources. Its emergence as a distinct perspective in social psychology occurred in the w o r k of J o h n D e w e y , Charles H o r t o n Cooley, James M a r k B a l d w i n , W i l l i a m I . Thomas, F l o r i a n Z n a n i e c k i , a n d , most notably, G e o r g e H e r b e r t M e a d . M e a d , the chief architect of symbolic interactionism, l e c t u r e d at the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago b e t w e e n 1893 a n d 1931, a n d books based u p o n lecture-notes taken by students in his classes w e r e published after his d e a t h i n 1931.
1 2 3 4

Since then, the t w o foremost exponents of the orientation have b e e n H e r b e r t G . B l u m e r a n d the late M a n f o r d H . K u h n . A t the U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o a n d , cur r e n t l y , the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a at B e r k e l e y , B l u m e r has c o n t i n u e d to lead what c a n p r o p e r l y be called the " C h i c a g o s c h o o l " of symbolic interactionism. Stressing the processual character of h u m a n behavior a n d the n e e d for " s y m p a t h e t i c introspec t i o n " in the study of h u m a n behavior, the school includes most of the writers repre sented in this book. K u h n ' s "self t h e o r y , " based at the State U n i v e r s i t y of Iowa, has sought to " o p e r a t i o n a l i z e " symbolic interactionism by r e c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g the self in structural terms, by abandoning such " n o n e m p i r i c a l " concepts as Mead's "I," a n d by d e v e l o p i n g paper-and-pencil measures of the self. T h e organization of the readings in this book is quite simple. Part I introduces the reader to the f u n d a m e n t a l concepts, propositions and methods of symbolic inter actionism; Parts , III, a n d IV organize readings u n d e r rubrics corresponding to the words in the title of M e a d ' s vastly influential book. O u r transposition of the

XIV

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order of these words m o r e accurately reflects the M e a d i a n emphasis upon the priority of society to the rise of i n d i v i d u a l selves and minds. Part V gives attention to readings w h i c h are less concerned w i t h the explication of concepts than w i t h their applications in e x p l o r i n g a w i d e range of topics. F o l l o w i n g each part is a briefly annotated Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y w h i c h suggests additional readings for the interested reader. T h e introductory comments for each part have been kept brief. By selecting material that w o u l d , largely, speak for itself, we have r e d u c e d to a m i n i m u m the n e e d for editorial c o m m e n t . In selecting material for the collection, we were confronted by an embarrassment of riches. O n l y a small p o r t i o n of the works we considered w o r t h w h i l e is i n c l u d e d , because of limitations of space. Conspicuous omissions are the writings of E r n s t Cassirer, K u r t R i e z l e r , Walter C o u t u , and A r n o l d Rose. W h a t we present to the reader, therefore, aims at representativeness, not comprehensiveness. T h e criteria g u i d i n g our selection of items are several. We have sought a judicious blend of "classics" and m o r e recent works, of speculative and research products. We have g i v e n preference to items not readily available to students in m u l t i p l e copies, to items that w o u l d be readable by undergraduate students in m u l t i p l e copies, to items by a n u m b e r of different authors rather than by a few " n a m e " people. In addition, we have t r i e d to avoid fragmentation of selections; articles appear in their entirety, and excerpts f r o m books are self-sufficient units of thought. A w o r d of explanation is needed about our omission of readings f r o m Mead's works. We considered such readings superfluous for the f o l l o w i n g reasons: the extensive citations of his t h i n k i n g in various other selections, the inclusion of a s u m m a r y of his ideas, and the accessibility of his major ideas in college libraries and bookstores. T h i s collection is designed, p r i m a r i l y , for use as supplementary reading in courses in social psychology, especially those in w h i c h intensive attention is g i v e n to symbolic interactionism. O u r hopes for the book stress its stimulation, not of doctrinaire devotion, but of critical assessment of that perspective. We are i n d e b t e d to the various authors, journals, and publishers out of whose materials we constructed this compilation. In a very real sense, the book is the product of their labors. B o t h of us also acknowledge the important role p l a y e d by H e r b e r t B l u m e r ' s courses at the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago in d i r e c t i n g o u r attention and interest to the subject of this book.
5

NOTES 1. A book by Rose compiles thirty-four articles written from the standpoint of symbolic interactionism; however, all but nine of these were written specifically for his book. See Arnold M . Rose (ed.), Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962). 2. The more widely used social psychology textbooks incorporating symbolic interaction theory have been: E. T. Krueger and Walter C. Reckless, Social Psychology (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1930); Walter Coutu, Emergent Human Nature (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L . Strauss, Social Psychology (New York: The Dryden Press, 1949, revised, 1956); Robert E. L. Faris, Social Psychology (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952); Hubert Bonner, Social Psychology (New York: American Book Company, 1953); Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1953); Tamotsu Shibutani, Society and Personality (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961). 3. See, for example, Fay Berger Karpf, American Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-

Preface to the First Edition Hill Book Company, 1932), passim; Floyd Nelson House, The Development of Sociology McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936), Chapter 27; Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), Chapter 14. 4. Of most relevance is Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), edited by Charles W. Morris. 5. Books summarizing Mead's position or including selections from his work abound. See, for example: Grace Chin Lee, George Herbert Mead (New York: King's Crown Press, 1945); Paul E. Pfuetze, The Social Self (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954); Anselm Strauss (ed.), George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964); Andrew J. Reck (ed), Selected Writings: George Herbert Mead (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964).

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Symbolic Interaction

introduction _ _ ^ ^ Intellectual Antecedents and Basic Propositions of Symbolic Interactionism

=
O u r purpose in this introduction is to present, in a brief f o r m , an exposition of two important topics: (1) the major intellectual antecedents of present-day symbolic interactionism, and (2) the basic propositions this perspective puts forward about h u m a n behavior. A knowledge of these topics w i l l prepare the way for a better understanding of the remaining material of this book. As our immediate concern is a preliminary discussion of the principles of symbolic interactionism, we have chosen to sacrifice both depth of treatment and documentation in the interest of brevity a n d readability. At the same time, however, we have sought to avoid a superficial or elliptical presentation.

I N T E L L E C T U A L A N T E C E D E N T S O F SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM A brief exposition cannot trace every source of symbolic interactionism, nor can it f u l l y describe each of the cited sources. Instead, we shall deal o n l y with the most important precursors, confining our comments to those ideas that relate most closely to symbolic interactionism. T h e intellectual antecedents with which we shall be concerned are E u r o p e a n (German idealism, the Scottish Moralists, a n d the theory of evolution), A m e r i c a n (func-

INTRODUCTION tional psychology and pragmatism), and the early symbolic interactionists (Baldwin, James, C o o l e y , D e w e y , and Thomas).

European Roots E m e r g i n g as a distinct perspective around the turn of the present century, symbolic interactionism drew inspiration from several influential intellectual movements of the time, as well as some earlier sources. A m o n g the latter, we must acknowledge the influence of eighteenth-century German idealism as represented by J o h a n n F i c h t e , Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich v o n Schelling. T h e most important idea symbolic interactionism draws from this source is that h u m a n beings "construct" their worlds, their realities. W h i l e eschewing a thoroughgoing subjective idealism, symbolic interactionists h o l d that whatever may actually be "out there," individuals will structure their worlds of reality by what they perceive a n d conceive them to be. T h e Scottish Moralists of the eighteenth c e n t u r y A d a m Ferguson, D a v i d H u m e , Francis H u t c h e s o n , L o r d Karnes (Henry Homes), J o h n M i l l a r , Thomas R e i d , and, most notably, A d a m Smithcomprise a second source of influence. In the writings of this school of philosophers, the concepts of sympathy and the impartial spectator anticipated the symbolic-interactionist concepts of "role-taking" (adopting the standpoint of another) a n d the "generalized other" (the standpoint of others in general), respectively. In addition, A d a m Smith developed views foreshadowing the concepts of "the I" (the spontaneous aspect of self) a n d "the M e " (the internalized standpoint of others). Other influential ideas developed by the Scottish Moralists anticipated the symbolic-interactionist conception of m i n d and self as social products. In the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin's theory of evolution emphasized the view that all behavior, h u m a n and otherwise, is performed in adaptation to the environment. D e n y i n g the occurrence of what sometimes seemed to be random activity, evolutionists considered the behavior of organisms as efforts to cope with their individual environments. Moreover, evolutionary theory conveyed the idea that each organism and its environment fit together in a dialectical relationship, each influencing the nature a n d impact of the other. T h a t is, the way the environment impinges on an organism is shaped, in part, by the nature, past experience, and current activity of the organism itself. Environments differ for different organisms, and at times even for the same organism depending u p o n its activity. T h e converse of this relationship is also true: Organisms can affect their environment, thereby altering its influence upon them. A final important idea drawn f r o m evolutionism comes from H e n r i Bergson's theory of emergent or creative evolution. T h e idea states that, in addition to gradual or step-by-step evolution, abrupt departures from earlier life forms or behavior patterns can and do occur as a result of new combinations of biological or behavioral

INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS AND BASIC PROPOSITIONS components. M a n y symbolic interactionists e m p l o y the concept of emergence in describing the presumed unpredictability of m u c h h u m a n conduct.

American Antecedents T w o currents of thought influential to symbolic interactionism were developed in the U n i t e d States. O n e of them was the school of functional psychology, the chief adherents of which were James R. A n g e l l , J o h n D e w e y , W i l l i a m James, and Charles J u d d . D r a w i n g u p o n evolutionism, functionalists h e l d that thought is adaptive behavior; i.e., that m i n d is not a structure or organ, but a function of the organism serving as a means of adaptation. E q u a l l y significant in its influence was the functional school's conception of all life as active, not merely reactive. By this they meant that organisms do not simply respond to their environments, but rather select stimuli in terms of their ongoing activity. Activity is always present in the organism, and stimuli do not cause activity, but instead are used by the organism in furthering its activity. T h e philosophical system of pragmatism, formulated by J o h n D e w e y , W i l l i a m James, Charles Peirce, and Josiah Royce, provided another major source for the symbolic-interactionist perspective. T h a t D e w e y a n d James are both functional psychologists a n d pragmatists underscores the affinities between these orientations, w h i c h h o l d in c o m m o n the view that a l l organisms play a part in shaping the environments with w h i c h they must cope. This is one of the fundamental ideas of symbolic interactionism. O n e important idea deriving from pragmatism is that the meanings of objects reside in the behavior directed toward them and not in the objects themselves. T h u s , the meaning of " c h a i r " refers to the way this object is to be used. If, as the pragmatists h e l d , the criterion of truth is practical experience, we can readily understand their insistence u p o n such an empirical, practical, adaptation-serving conception of meaning. B u i l d i n g u p o n evolutionary doctrine and functional psychology, pragmatism also put forward a conception of humans as active, creative beings. As such, h u m a n beings can play a role in directing their o w n destinies. A corollary to this idea is the pragmatist view of society as subject to deliberate change by h u m a n effort.

Early Symbolic Interactionists In the remaining paragraphs of this survey of symbolic interactionism's intellectual ancestors, we shall consider the contributions of five early exponents of this perspective: James M a r k B a l d w i n , W i l l i a m James, Charles H o r t o n C o o l e y , J o h n D e w e y , a n d W . I . T h o m a s . W e shall not deal with
1

- F o r a n e x p a n d e d v e r s i o n o f these p a r a g r a p h s , see C h a p t e r 1 Larry T. Reynolds, Symbolic 1975). Interactionism: Genesis, ? : u t l e d g e & K e g a n Paul,

o f B e r n a r d N . M e l t z e r , J o h n W . Petras, and Criticisms (London and Boston:

Varieties

INTRODUCTION George Herbert M e a d , a contemporary of most of these m e n , w h o is the most significant contributor to the new perspective. H i s omission f r o m the f o l l o w i n g treatment is justified by our inclusion in Part I of a reading that expounds his seminal ideas. At a time w h e n instinctivist explanations of h u m a n behavior h e l d sway, W i l l i a m James maintained the view that instincts are modified a n d inhibited by social learning. T h i s view h e l p e d pave the way for the symbolic-interactionist concept of impulse as a replacement for the instinctivist orientation. James also recognized the crucial importance of other persons in f o r m i n g the i n d i v i d u a l self. F o r h i m , the self was a m u l t i p l e entity, comprising f o u r component selves: a material self, a social self, a spiritual self, a n d pure ego. As for the social self, he h e l d that a h u m a n being has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose o p i n i o n the i n d i v i d u a l cares. James M a r k B a l d w i n modified the Jamesian view of the social self as simply one segment of a larger self, claiming that the total self is an undifferentiated social self. T h i s view rejected James's fragmentation of the self a n d p r o v e d more compatible with the observed unity and continuity of the self-conceptions of individuals. Baldwin's writings also p r o v i d e d the foundation for both Cooley's concept of "the looking-glass s e l f " w h e r e individuals derive feelings about themselves f r o m imagining the reactions of others to t h e m a n d Cooley's m e t h o d of "sympathetic introspection," w h i c h emphasizes adopting the standpoints of social actors as the basis for empathetically understanding their behavior in a given situation. In J o h n D e w e y ' s works, several elements of symbolic interactionism make explicit appearance. He repeatedly emphasized that a stimulus has no fixed quality of its o w n , that the nature of a sensation w i l l d e p e n d u p o n the activity underway at the time. A l o n g with M e a d , D e w e y specified language as the element differentiating humans f r o m other species on the phylogenetic c o n t i n u u m . F o r h i m , linguistic communication constituted the process making h u m a n society possible. D e w e y ' s other contributions to symbolic interactionism have been mentioned in our comments on functional psychology a n d pragmatism, both of w h i c h n u m b e r h i m a m o n g their exponents. H a v i n g studied under D e w e y , Charles H o r t o n C o o l e y carried forward D e w e y ' s important ideas, as w e l l as originating m a n y of his o w n . C o o l e y perceived his major contribution to social-psychological theory to be the theory of the mental nature of h u m a n society, w h i c h regarded society as existing in the minds of the individuals constituting a social unit. Putting it another way: T h e essential nature of society is f o u n d in the social bonds that exist between h u m a n beings through ideas and feelings. L a y i n g the foundation for some of Mead's ideas, C o o l e y c o n c l u d e d f r o m studying his o w n children that the c h i l d develops an awareness of other selves before it develops an awareness of its o w n self. W r i t i n g on the protean concept of h u m a n nature, C o o l e y made some important breakthroughs; rejecting

INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS AND BASIC PROPOSITIONS the long-extant view that h u m a n nature is inborn and nonsocial, he stressed the importance of life in groups, particularly primary groups, in the formation of h u m a n nature. F u r t h e r , he described the intrinsic components of this universal and distinctive h u m a n nature as sympathy (role-taking) and the sentiments involving sympathy. E q u a l l y influential was his emphasis on the pronounced plasticity, or teachability, of h u m a n nature. In a sense, C o o l e y was also symbolic interactionism's first methodologist. H i s insistence on the necessity for sympathetic introspection contended that students of h u m a n conduct must not settle for observations of external behavior but must endeavor to tap the meanings and definitions h e l d by the participants. T w o major ideas constitute W. I. T h o m a s ' contribution to symbolic interactionism. T h e first is his concept of the "definition of the situation," which builds u p o n D e w e y ' s view that the stimuli confronting a person have no fixed quality, and also points out that self-aware conduct entails prior interpretation and deliberation by the actor. T h o m a s ' second influence u p o n symbolic interactionism lies in the fact that he was one of the first social psychologists to extend the principles of that perspective (developed with reference to the socialization of children) to the adult level, directing attention to social conditions that lead individuals to reconceptualize their developed selves. T h i s extension represents the first major demonstration of symbolic interactionism's relevance to behavior in the everyday w o r l d .

BASIC PROPOSITIONS O F S Y M B O L I C I N T E R A C T I O N I S M T h e following paragraphs briefly present seven basic propositions that summarize the main features of modern symbolic interactionism. G i v e n the diversity of orientations within this perspective, not all of these propositions w i l l be acceptable to every symbolic interactionist. Moreover, we make no claim for the exhaustiveness of the summary. O u r intent here is to indicate in broad outline the major substantive and methodological elements constituting the symbolic-interactionist perspective. To specify the f u l l range of symbolic-interactionist concepts and propositions w o u l d take us b e y o n d the scope of this preliminary exposition. T h e introductions and readings in the various Parts of this book fill i n conceptual a n d propositional details omitted from this discussion and thereby clarify all of the propositions. E a c h of the f o l l o w i n g propositions identifies a fundamental element of symbolic interactionism. These elements are listed below. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. the m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t in h u m a n conduct the social sources of humanness society as process the voluntaristic c o m p o n e n t in h u m a n conduct a dialectical conception of m i n d the constructive, emergent nature of h u m a n conduct the necessity of sympathetic introspection

INTRODUCTION 1. Distinctively human behavior and interaction are carried on through the medium of symbols and their meanings. T h i s is the central idea in symbolic interactionism. It entails the recognition that h u m a n beings do not typically respond directly to stimuli, but assign meanings to the stimuli and act on the basis of the meanings. T h u s , while sharing with n o n h u m a n organisms certain kinds of behavior (such as the direct stimulus-response activities called reflexes), humans usually engage in a unique form of behavior involving their interpretation of stimuli and act on the basis of that interpretation. By bringing meaning into the picture, symbolic interactionists add a u n i q u e dimension to h u m a n behavior. T h e meanings of stimuli are socially derived through interaction with others rather than inherent in the stimuli themselves or idiosyncratically assigned by the individual. Such terms as symbols and objects (which w i l l appear frequently in this book) i m p l y the social character of meaning, each involving shared group definitions which comprise the social world of given actors. 2. The individual becomes humanized through interaction with other persons. H u m a n beings become capable of distinctively h u m a n conduct only through association with others. By distinctively h u m a n conduct, we mean the ability to imagine how other persons feel in given situations (what C o o l e y calls h u m a n nature), the use of symbols (thinking, or mind), and the ability to behave toward oneself as toward others (self). We are not born h u m a n , then, but become h u m a n . H u m a n nature, m i n d , and self are not biological givens; rather, they emerge out of the processes of h u m a n interaction. T r u e , a certain k i n d of organism is necessary for humanization to occur, one marked by, among other things, a highly complex central nervous system and a very high degree of plasticity. But our key point is that society is indispensable to the formation of humanness. T h i s proposition expands the conventional view of socialization f r o m the individual's social learning of culture, statuses, and roles, to the symbolic interactionist conception of socialization as comprising humanization, enculturation, and personality formation. T h u s , interaction with others is seen as giving rise to the acquisition of h u m a n nature, thinking, self-direction, and all other attributes that distinguish the behavior of humans from that of other forms of life. 3. Human society is most usefully conceived as consisting of people in interaction. T h i s proposition emphasizes the processual nature of h u m a n society in preference to the more c o m m o n metaphors of social structure, social organization, and social system. These latter terms tend to reify society, thereby i m p l y i n g certain unacceptable views about the relationships between society and the individual. F o r example, many sociologists and social psychologists shift their assumptions radically w h e n they move f r o m studying h u m a n conduct on the individual or interpersonal level to studying it at the group, institutional, or societal level. C o m m o n l y , they grant humans some m o d i c u m of free will on the former level and deny that m o d i c u m

INTRODUCTION O n l y through the use of socially derived symbols in intrapersonal activity duplicating interpersonal activity can the i n d i v i d u a l perform such u n i q u e l y h u m a n functions as abstract and reflective thinking. These modes of thought allow the i n d i v i d u a l to designate objects and events remote in time a n d space, create imaginary phenomena and other abstractions, and thereby learn without having direct experience of the things to be learned. 6. Human beings construct their behavior in the course of its execution. Earlier (proposition 4), we pointed to the active shaping of behavior by humans. T h a t proposition implies, but does not make explicit, the present point. H u m a n behavior is an elaborate process of interpreting, choosing, a n d rejecting possible lines of action. T h i s process cannot be understood in terms of mechanical responses to external stimuli. N o r can it be f u l l y understood in terms of the mere expression of pre-established inclinations or meanings h e l d by the individual. T h e behavior that emerges f r o m the interactions within an individual, according to m a n y symbolic interactionists, is not necessarily a product of past events or experiences. T h a t is, the behavior may be an unpredictable emergent constructed in the thought processes of the actor, or in the course of interaction with others. T h i s proposition directs attention to an important tenet of most humanistic views of conduct: H u m a n beings are, at least in part, participants in creating their o w n destinies. It w o u l d be a mistake to construe this idea as synonymous with the notion that humans have completely free w i l l . T h a t notion is as unpalatable to symbolic interactionists as the notion of thoroughgoing determinism. M u c h more acceptable is a soft determinism, a view of h u m a n conduct as influencedbut not entirely determinedby antecedent events. 7. An understanding of human conduct requires study of the actors' covert behavior. T h i s proposition states the chief methodological implication of symbolic interactionism. Perhaps we can begin to clarify the nature of this implication by briefly contrasting the antithetical views of George Herbert M e a d , exemplar of symbolic interactionism, with those of J o h n B. Watson, founder of the school of behaviorism in psychology. L i k e Watson's radical behaviorism, M e a d ' s approach i n c l u d e d the study of the observable actions of individuals; but, u n l i k e the former, it conceived behavior in terms broad enough to include unobservable activity. M e a d felt the study of unobservable h u m a n behavior was necessary to understand the distinctive character of h u m a n conduct, w h i c h M e a d considered to be a qualitatively different emergent behavior from n o n h u m a n behavior. Watson's behaviorism, on the other h a n d , reduced h u m a n behavior to the mechanisms f o u n d on the n o n h u m a n level. T h u s , while Watson insisted u p o n a strictly "scientific" study of overt behavior, M e a d allowed for an intuitive, verstehende investigation of aspects of h u m a n behavior excluded f r o m Watson's purview. If h u m a n beings act on the basis of their interpretations or meanings, it becomes essential to get at actors' meanings in order to understand a n d explain their conduct. As we pointed out in proposition 6, the inner phase

INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS AND BASIC PROPOSITIONS of h u m a n acts is marked by the richest development of the acts. If follows, then, that no amount of simply observing behavior from the outside will provide an understanding of actors' views of their social w o r l d , and hence, an understanding of their conduct. T h e use of procedures allowing sympathetic introspection is part of the methodology of most symbolic interactionists. T a k e n collectively, the foregoing set of propositions presents images of h u m a n behavior, the social setting within which such behavior occurs, and the relationship between h u m a n behavior and its social setting. These images, however, are set forth in such broad terms as to represent only the irreducible m i n i m u m of symbolic interactionist ideas. B o t h the breadth and high level of abstraction of the propositions make it exceedingly difficult to test the propositions empirically. Nevertheless, as various readings in this book will make abundantly clear, many specific propositions compatible with those presented here have been investigated and verified.

INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS AND BASIC PROPOSITIONS on the latter level. T h a t is, they may assume that individuals define situations a n d act in accordance with those definitions in interpersonal relationships, but they convert these same individuals into mindless robots on the societal or aggregate level. T h e y ignore the fact that the features (structures) of society are maintained a n d changed by the actions of people, a n d are not autonomous, or self-regulating. Symbolic interactionists recognize that individuals act and interact within larger networks of other individuals and groups. Some of the networks are far removed from given individuals in time and space, and yet have an appreciable impact on them. Nonetheless, the organization of any society is a framework within w h i c h social action takes place, not a set of complete determinants of the action. Such structural features as social roles, social classes, a n d the like set conditions for h u m a n behavior a n d interaction, but do not cause or f u l l y determine the behavior and interaction. 4. Human beings are active in shaping their own behavior. T h i s proposition was i m p l i e d in the preceding one. Conventional views of h u m a n behavior tend to assume a deterministic, nonvoluntary character. T h e indiv i d u a l , according to such views, passively reacts in accordance with the inexorable dictates of specific internal and external stimuli or impersonal forces. These views, prevalent today, can be f o u n d to have been h e l d by the first two textbooks published (in 1908) under the title Social Psychology, divergent as the books were on many other matters. E d w a r d A. Ross, a sociologist, viewed the individual as coerced by social processes, while W i l l i a m H. M c D o u g a l l , a psychologist, traced social behavior and institutions to individual "instincts." By contrast, symbolic interactionists generally allow humans some degree of choice in their behavior. G i v e n the ability to select and interpret stimulirather than to respond immediately and directly to whatever stimuli are presentand the ability to interact with themselves (i.e., to engage in thought), humans are capable of forming new meanings a n d new lines of action. T h i s does not mean that h u m a n beings transcend all influences; however, it does draw attention to their activity in m o d i f y i n g these influences and in creating and changing their o w n behavior. T h i s proposition points to the fact that the socialization of h u m a n beings both enmeshes them in society and frees them from society. Individuals with selves are not passive, but can e m p l o y their selves in an interaction w h i c h may result in behavior divergent f r o m group definitions. 5. Consciousness, or thinking, involves interaction with oneself W h e n one thinks, or engages in " m i n d e d " behavior, one necessarily carries on an internal conversation. O n e makes indications of things to oneself, sometimes rehearsing alternative lines of action. T h i s dialectical process involves two components of the self: the I, a spontaneous and impulsive aspect, and the M e , a set of internalized social definitions. In the interplay between these aspects of the self, individuals import into their behavior the same processes that take place d u r i n g a dialogue. C l e a r l y , the h u m a n being is, in the most p r o f o u n d sense, a social being.

PART one

Theory and Methods

F r o m our exposition of its basic propositions, it should be clear that symbolic interactionism constitutes both a theoretical perspective within social psychology a n d a methodological orientation. Its concern with the inner, or phenomenological aspects of h u m a n behavior has both substantive and research implications. T h e term symbolic interactionism directs our attention to the most f u n d a m e n t a l proposition of this perspective: Distinctively h u m a n behavior and interaction is carried out through the m e d i u m of symbols a n d their meaning. T h i s proposition guides the theoretical and research focus of symbolic interactionism, while differentiating it from other perspectives in social psychology. A brief consideration of two opposing frames of reference in the study of h u m a n behavior can be of h e l p in clarifying the symbolic-interactionist position. Some social psychologists, impressed with the dramatic achievements of the natural sciences, have sought to a p p l y similar concepts and techniques to the study of h u m a n beings. A notable example is the reinforcement theorists, who emphasize operant conditioning and behavior modification. T h e i r focus is on observables, the overt responses of organisms. F r o m the study of rats, chickens, a n d other animals, they have shown the efficacy of rewards, or positive reinforcers, in shaping behavior. A i m i n g at "objective" knowledge, operant-oriented researchers contend that such terms as thinking, or m i n d , are subjective, a n d therefore inappropriate for science. T h e y insist that the behavior of the h u m a n animal can be studied with the same concepts, the same techniques, a n d the same degree of success as in the study of other animals. T h e reinforcement (or behaviorist) approach to h u m a n behavior is based u p o n a positivist conception of science. A basic premise of the positivist viewpoint in social psychology is monismthe contention that the behavior of all organisms is essentially similar, and that conclusions obtained from

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PART I Theory and Methods the study of animal behavior can also explain h u m a n conduct. A second premise is elementarism, the assumption that complex actions can be understood by analyzing their various components, such as stimuli, responses, operants, etc. T h i r d is associationism, the idea that the identifiable elements of complex behavior are mechanistically, or automatically, linked together as in stimulus-response couplets. C l o s e l y related is a fourth premise, determinism, which views these elements of animal and h u m a n action as sequential and invariable. An example of this premise is the assertion that responses are the automatic and universal consequence of reinforcing stimuli. Rejecting such premises are the various cognitive approaches to behavior (i.e., those stressing mental processes). In the gestalt perspective, for example, cognition is viewed as a unitary experience that cannot be explained by an analysis of its constituent parts. What humans perceive is organized wholes, not sets of separate stimuli. Moreover, our perceptions, gestaltists h o l d , are inextricably interwoven with our thoughts and feelings. We may, accordingly, interpret an action by a friend very differently from the same action by a complete stranger. Phenomenologists stress the distinctive character of h u m a n actions a n d relationships. W h i l e positivists are most concerned with the objectivity of their methods and data, phenomenologists focus on the subjective experiences of people as the necessary component of social-psychological knowledge. A propos of this point is the seventh basic proposition of symbolic interactionism: An understanding of h u m a n conduct requires study of the actors' covert behavior. As can be seen, phenomenological approaches to h u m a n behavior are in direct conflict with behaviorist approacheshuman behavior is considered to be qualitatively different from n o n h u m a n behavior and, therefore, requires its o w n specialized concepts, theories, and research methods. A second premise of phenomenological theory, similar to the gestalt perspective, is that h u m a n behavior is best conceived in holistic terms, i.e., that h u m a n thoughts, feelings, and actions are meaningfully interrelated into wholes that are more than the sum of their parts. T h e third phenomenological premise is voluntarism, i.e., that h u m a n conduct is guided by interpretation and intention rather than mechanical, automatic reactions to stimuli. As h u m a n action and interaction are voluntaristic, or intentional, they are h e l d to be, to some extent, emergent and unpredictable. T h e f o l l o w i n g selections present some of the fundamental concepts and propositions h e l d in c o m m o n by symbolic interactionists. In addition, they indicate some of the divergent views on how the validity of such theoretical materials can be tested. These views range from a demand for a phenomenological methodology that stresses "feeling one's way inside the experience of the actor" to one that comes somewhat closer to the positivist method. George Herbert M e a d is responsible for laying the foundation of the symbolic-interactionist perspective. D u r i n g nearly four decades as a

PART I Theory and Methods philosopher at the University of C h i c a g o , M e a d formulated and taught his theory. H i s approach, w h i c h he called social behaviorism, is summarized in the article by Bernard N. Meltzer. We hope that this resume of Mead's assumptions and concepts w i l l encourage the reader to delve into his major work, Mind, Self and Society. T h e contributions of self-defined symbolic interactionists, as well as nonadherents to symbolic interactionism, serve as the basis for M a n f o r d H. K u h n ' s excellent, detailed article integrating their achievements. U n f o r t u nately, his efforts to bridge the gap between these differing camps has not been f o l l o w e d up by his successorsone of the major shortcomings of symbolic interactionism. Underscoring the diversity of viewpoints within symbolic interactionism, the selection b y Bernard N . M e l t z e r , J o h n W . Petras, and Larry T . Reynolds analyzes the ideas of two leading symbolic interactionists and of two leaders of closely related offshoots. At the University of Chicago, Herbert B l u m e r became the Chicago school's foremost spokesman, elaborating a strong phenomenological view of h u m a n and group activity. M e a n w h i l e , M a n f o r d K u h n at the University of Iowa adopted a somewhat more positivist position, one w h i c h provides a major share of the research selections in this book. T h e offshoots, the dramaturgical approach developed by E r v i n g G o f f m a n , and ethnomethodology initiated by H a r o l d Garfinkel, are amplified in later articles by themselves and by their adherents and critics. A l l four of these orientations share the substantive view that h u m a n beings construct their realities in a process of interaction with other h u m a n beings. A n d each accepts, to some degree, the methodological necessity of "getting inside" the actors in order to understand their realities. A l t h o u g h the first three articles focus primarily on substantive theory, the following readings were selected for their methodological emphasis. A central feature of symbolic interactionism is its implication for empirical inquiry. On the premise that "each theory demands a special view of methods," N o r m a n K. D e n z i n formulates seven methodological principles congruent with the theory. Blumer's article questions the applicability of conventional methods of variable analysis. H i s criticisms need to be viewed in conjunction with both his theoretical and broader methodological contributions, such as the leading article in Part II a n d the first chapter of his recent book, Symbolic Interaction. T a k e n together, the two writings suggest that the nature of humans both requires and provides certain essential tools for the study of themselves and their society. T w o articles exemplify the research techniques of C h i c a g o and Iowa researchers. H o w a r d S. Becker and Blanche Geer discuss the distinctive features o f participant observation, while M a n f o r d H . K u h n and T h o m a s S. M c P a r t l a n d introduce the T w e n t y Statements Test. Later sections, particularly Part V, illustrate the research methods of contemporary symbolic interactionists. Currently, symbolic interactionism can no longer be identified

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PART I Theory and Methods with a few individuals at a few major universities. T h e articles in this and later sections represent the work of a great n u m b e r of theorists and researchers. T h e i r efforts, as well as the many more cited in the bibliographies at the close of each part, evidence the widespread prevalence of the symbolicinteractionist perspective in A m e r i c a n social psychology. T h e selections in Part I tend to be of broader scope and higher abstraction than those in other Parts of this book, where the selections w i l l focus more sharply on the explication and empirical testing of important concepts in symbolic-interactionist theory. T h e reader is advised to refer back to Part I from time to time to place the later materials in context.

Bernard N. Meltzer

Mead's Social Psychology

A.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

W h i l e Mead's system of Social Psychology is given its fullest exposition in Mind, Self and Society, each of three other books (as w e l l as a few articles) r o u n d out the complete p i c t u r e . It should be p o i n t e d out at this j u n c t u r e that M e a d himself published no full-length systematic statement of his theory. A l l four of the books beari n g his authorship are posthumously collected a n d edited works. T h e y comprise a loose accumulation of his lecture notes, fragmentary m a n u scripts, a n d tentative drafts of u n p u b l i s h e d essays. Since the chief a i m of his editors has b e e n c o m pletenessrather than organizationthe books consist, in considerable part, of alternative f o r m u lations, h i g h l y repetitive materials, a n d sketchily developed ideas. Nevertheless, a brief description of these v o l umes is in order, since they constitute the m a jor source-materials c o n c e r n i n g Mead's social psychology. Philosophy of the Present(1932) contains the P a u l Carus F o u n d a t i o n lectures d e l i v e r e d by M e a d in 1930, a year before his death. These lectures present a philosophy of history f r o m the pragmatist's point of v i e w . M o r e o v e r , this v o l u m e presents his ideas on the analogous developments of social experience a n d of scientific hypotheses. Mind, Self and Society (1934) is chiefly a c o l lection of lectures d e l i v e r e d to his classes in Social Psychology at the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago.
B e r n a r d N . M e l t z e r , " M e a d ' s S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y . " F r o m The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead, pp. 10-31,1964, Center f o r S o c i o l o g i c a l R e s e a r c h , W e s t e r n M i c h i g a n U n i v e r s i t y .

Movements of Thought in the 19th Century (1936) is largely a collection of lectures d e l i v e r e d to his classes in the H i s t o r y of Ideas. Philosophy of the Act (1938), a c c o r d i n g to P a u l S c h i l p p , represents a fairly systematic statement of the philosophy of pragmatism. This "systematic" statement I f o u n d (as d i d G. S. Lee) to be m a d e up of essays and miscellaneous fragments, w h i c h are technical a n d repetitious, obscure a n d difficult. A final observation regarding the content of these books should be made: Mead's orientation is generally philosophical. Rather t h a n marshali n g his o w n e m p i r i c a l evidence, he uses the findings of various sciences a n d employs frequent apt a n d insightful illustrations f r o m everyday life. These illustrations usually are not used to p r o v e points, but rather to serve as data to be a n a l y z e d in terms of his scheme. Before l a u n c h i n g u p o n a presentation of Mead's social-psychological theories, it m i g h t be wise to explain his designation of his v i e w p o i n t as that o f "Social B e h a v i o r i s m . " B y this t e r m M e a d means to refer to the description of behavior at the distinctively h u m a n level. Thus, for social behaviorism, the basic d a t u m is the social act. As we shall later see, the study of social acts entails conc e r n w i t h the covert aspects of behavior. F u r t h e r , the concept of the "social act" i m p l i e s that h u m a n conduct a n d experience has a fundam e n t a l social dimensionthat the social context is an inescapable element in distinctively h u m a n actions. L i k e Watsonian radical behaviorism, Mead's social b e h a v i o r i s m starts w i t h the observable ac-

16 tions of individuals; but unlike the former, social behaviorism conceives behavior i n b r o a d e n o u g h terms to include covert activity. This i n c l u s i o n is d e e m e d necessary to understanding the distinctive character o f h u m a n conduct, w h i c h M e a d considers a qualitatively different emergent f r o m i n f r a h u m a n behavior. Watson's behaviorism, on the other h a n d , reduces h u m a n behavior to the v e r y same mechanisms as are f o u n d on the infrah u m a n level. As a corollary, Watson sees the social d i m e n s i o n of h u m a n behavior as m e r e l y a sort o f external influence u p o n the i n d i v i d u a l . M e a d , by contrast, views generically h u m a n behavior as social behavior, h u m a n acts as social acts. F o r M e a d , b o t h the content and the v e r y existence of distinctively h u m a n behavior are accountable only on a social basis. (These distinctions should become more clear in the course of this report.) It can readily be i n f e r r e d f r o m this brief explanation of Mead's usage of the t e r m "social beh a v i o r i s m " that, before we can explore the nature a n d f u n c t i o n o f the m i n d w h i c h M e a d considers a u n i q u e l y h u m a n attributesupporting theories of society, and selfanother u n i q u e l y h u m a n att r i b u t e r e q u i r e elaboration. H e n c e , the natural, logical order of Mead's t h i n k i n g seems to have been society, self, and m i n d r a t h e r than " M i n d , Self, a n d Society."

PART I Theory and Methods society remains essentially v a l i d as one ascends the scale of a n i m a l life, u n t i l we arrive at the human level. In the case of h u m a n association, the situation is fundamentally different. H u m a n cooperation is not brought about by mere physiological factors. T h e v e r y diversity of the patterns of h u m a n group life makes it quite clear that h u m a n cooperative life cannot be explained in the same terms as the cooperative life of insects and the l o w e r animals. T h e fact that h u m a n patterns are not stabilized a n d cannot be explained in biological terms l e d M e a d to seek another basis of explanation of h u m a n association. Such cooperation can only be brought about by some process w h e r e i n : (a) each acting i n d i v i d u a l ascertains the intention of the acts of others, and then (b) makes his o w n response on the basis of that intention. W h a t this means is that, in order for h u m a n beings to cooperate, there must be present some sort of mechan i s m whereby^ each acting i n d i v i d u a l : (a) c a n come to understand the lines of action of others, and (b) can guide his o w n behavior to fit in w i t h those lines of action. H u m a n behavior is not a matter of responding directly to the activities of others. Rather, it involves responding to the intentions of others, i.e., to the future, i n t e n d e d behavior of othersnot m e r e l y to their present actions. We can better understand the character of this distinctively h u m a n mode of interaction bet w e e n individuals by contrasting it w i t h the infrah u m a n "conversation of gestures." F o r example w h e n a m o t h e r h e n clucks, her chicks w i l l respond by r u n n i n g to her. This does not i m p l y however, that the h e n clucks in order to guide the chicks, i.e., w i t h the intention of g u i d i n g t h e m . C l u c k i n g is a natural sign or signalrather than a significant (meaningful) symbolas it is not m e a n i n g f u l to the h e n . That is, the h e n (according to Mead) does not take the role, or v i e w p o i n t , of the chicks toward its o w n gesture and respond to it, in imagination, as they do. T h e h e n does not envision the response of the chicks to her c l u c k i n g . Thus, hens and chicks do not share the same experience. L e t us take another illustration by M e a d : T w o hostile dogs, in the pre-fight stage, m a y go through an elaborate conversation of gestures

B. C O N T E N T OF MEAD'S SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1. Society A c c o r d i n g to M e a d , all group life is essentially a matter of cooperative behavior. M e a d makes a distinction, however, b e t w e e n i n f r a h u m a n society and h u m a n society. Insectswhose society most closely approximates the complexity of h u m a n social lifeact together in certain ways because of their biological make-up. Thus, their cooperative behavior is physiologically d e t e r m i n e d . This is shown by many facts, a m o n g w h i c h is the fact of the fixity, the stability, of the relationships of insect-society members to one another. Insects, according to the evidence, go on for countless generations without any difference in their patterns of association. This p i c t u r e of i n f r a h u m a n

Meltzer snarling, g r o w l i n g , baring fangs, w a l k i n g stiff-leggedly around one another, etc.). T h e dogs are ad justing themselves to one another by responding to one another's gestures. (A gesture is that por tion of an act w h i c h represents the entire act; it is the i n i t i a l , overt phase of the act, w h i c h epitomizes it, e.g., shaking one's fist at someone.) N o w , in the case of the dogs the response to a gesture is dictated by pre-established tendencies to respond in certain ways. E a c h gesture leads to a direct, immediate, automatic, and unreflect i n g response by the recipient of the gesture (the other dog). N e i t h e r dog responds to the intention of the gestures. F u r t h e r , each dog does not make his gestures w i t h the intent of e l i c i t i n g certain responses in the other dog. Thus, animal interac tion is d e v o i d of conscious, deliberate m e a n i n g . To summarize: Gestures, at the n o n - h u m a n or non-linguistic level, do not carry the connota tion of conscious m e a n i n g or intent, but serve merely as cues for the appropriate responses of others. Gestural c o m m u n i c a t i o n takes place i m mediately, without any i n t e r r u p t i o n of the act, w i t h o u t the mediation of a definition or m e a n i n g . E a c h organism adjusts " i n s t i n c t i v e l y " to the other; it does not stop and figure out w h i c h re sponse it w i l l give. Its behavior is, largely, a series of direct automatic responses to stimuli. H u m a n beings, on the other h a n d , respond to one another on the basis of the intentions or meanings of gestures. This renders the gesture symbolic, i.e., the gesture becomes a s y m b o l to be i n t e r p r e t e d ; it become something w h i c h , in the imaginations of the participants, stands for the entire act. Thus, i n d i v i d u a l A begins to act, i.e., makes a gesture: for example, he draws back an a r m . I n d i v i d u a l (who perceives the gesture) c o m pletes, or fills i n , the act in his imagination; i.e., imaginatively projects the gesture into the fu ture: " H e w i l l strike m e . " In other words, per ceives what the gesture stands for, thus getting its m e a n i n g . In contrast to the direct responses of the chicks and the dogs, the h u m a n b e i n g i n serts an interpretation b e t w e e n the gesture of an other and his response to it. H u m a n behavior i n volves responses to interpreted s t i m u l i .
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We see, then, that people respond to one an other on the basis of imaginative activity. In o r d e r to engage in concerted behavior, however, each participating i n d i v i d u a l must be able to attach the same m e a n i n g to the same gesture. Unless interacting individuals interpret gestures simi larly, unless they fill out the i m a g i n e d p o r t i o n in the same way, there can be no cooperative action. This is another way of saying what has by n o w become a truism in sociology and social psychol ogy: H u m a n society rests u p o n a basis of con sensus, i.e., the sharing of meanings in the f o r m of c o m m o n understandings and expectations. In the case of the h u m a n being, each person has the ability to respond to his o w n gestures; and thus, it is possible to have the same m e a n i n g for the gestures as other persons. (For example: As I say " c h a i r , " I present to myself the same image as to my hearer; moreover, the same image as w h e n someone else says "chair.") This ability to stimulate oneself as one stimulates another, a n d to respond to oneself as another does, M e a d as cribes largely to man's vocal-auditory m e c h a n i s m . (The ability to hear oneself implies at least the potentiality for responding to oneself.) W h e n a gesture has a shared, c o m m o n m e a n i n g , w h e n it i s i n other w o r d s a linguistic element, we can designate it as a "significant s y m b o l . " (Take the words, " O p e n the w i n d o w " : the pattern of action s y m b o l i z e d by these words must be in the m i n d of the speaker as w e l l as the listener. E a c h must respond, in imagination, to the words in the same way. T h e speaker must have an image of the listener r e s p o n d i n g to his words by o p e n i n g the w i n d o w , and the listener must have an image of his o p e n i n g the window.) T h e imaginative c o m p l e t i o n of an a c t w h i c h M e a d calls " m e a n i n g " and w h i c h represents m e n tal activitynecessarily takes place t h r o u g h roletaking. To complete imaginatively the total act

s i g n stands f o r s o m e t h i n g else b e c a u s e o f t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s p r e s ent at a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same t i m e a n d place w i t h that " s o m e t h i n g else." A s y m b o l , on the other h a n d , stands for s o m e t h i n g else b e c a u s e its users h a v e a g r e e d t o l e t i t s t a n d f o r t h a t " s o m e t h i n g e l s e . " T h u s , signs a r e d i r e c t l y a n d i n t r i n s i c a l l y l i n k e d w i t h p r e s e n t o r p r o x i m a t e situations; w h i l e symbols, h a v i n g a r b i t r a r y a n d conventional, rather than intrinsic, meanings, transcend t h e i m m e d i a t e s i t u a t i o n . ( W e s h a l l r e t u r n t o this i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i n o u r discussion o f " m i n d . " ) O n l y symbols, o f course, i n v o l v e interpretation, self-stimulation a n d shared m e a n i n g .

T h e f o r e g o i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s c a n also b e e x p r e s s e d i n t e r m s o f

the differences b e t w e e n "signs," or "signals," a n d symbols. A


w h i c h a gesture stands for, the i n d i v i d u a l must put himself in the position of the other person, must identify w i t h h i m . T h e earliest beginnings of role-taking occur w h e n an already established act of another i n d i v i d u a l is stopped short of c o m p l e t i o n , thereby r e q u i r i n g the observing i n d i v i d u a l to fill i n , or complete, the activity imagina tively. (For example, a c r y i n g infant m a y have an image of its mother c o m i n g to stop its crying.) As M e a d points out, then, the relation of h u m a n beings to one another arises f r o m the devel o p e d ability of the h u m a n b e i n g to respond to his o w n gestures. This ability enables different h u m a n beings to respond in the same w a y to the same gesture, thereby sharing one another's experience. This latter point is of great importance. Be h a v i o r is v i e w e d as " s o c i a l " not simply w h e n it is a response to others, but rather w h e n it has i n c o r p o r a t e d in it the behavior of others. T h e h u m a n b e i n g responds to himself as other persons respond to h i m , and in so d o i n g he imaginatively shares the conduct of others. T h a t is, in i m a g i n i n g their response he shares that response.
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PART I Theory and Methods (Such c o m m u n i c a t i o n necessarily involves roletaking.) It is only by taking the role of others that the i n d i v i d u a l can come to see himself as an ob ject. T h e standpoint of others provides a p l a t f o r m for getting outside oneself and thus v i e w i n g one self. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of the self is concurrent w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t of the ability to take roles. T h e crucial i m p o r t a n c e of language in this process must be underscored. It is t h r o u g h lan guage (significant symbols) that the c h i l d acquires the meanings a n d definitions of those a r o u n d h i m . By l e a r n i n g the symbols of his groups, he comes to internalize their definitions of events or things, i n c l u d i n g their definitions of his o w n conduct. It is quite e v i d e n t that, rather than assuming the existence of selves and explaining society thereby, M e a d starts out f r o m the prior existence of society as the context w i t h i n w h i c h selves arise. This v i e w contrasts w i t h the nominalistic position of the Social C o n t r a c t theorists and of various i n d i vidualistic psychologies. Genesis of the Self T h e relationship be t w e e n role-playing and various stages in the de v e l o p m e n t of the self is described below: 1. Preparatory Stage (not explicitly n a m e d by M e a d , but inferable f r o m various fragmentary essays). This stage is one of meaningless i m i t a tion by the infant (for example, " r e a d i n g " the newspaper). T h e c h i l d does certain things that others near it do w i t h o u t any understanding of what he is d o i n g . Such i m i t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , i m p l i e s that the c h i l d is i n c i p i e n t l y t a k i n g the roles of those a r o u n d it, i.e., is on the verge of p u t t i n g itself in the position of others a n d acting like them. 2. Play Stage. I n this stage the actual p l a y i n g of roles occurs. T h e c h i l d plays m o t h e r , teacher, storekeeper, postman, streetcar conductor, M r . Jones, etc. W h a t is of central i m p o r t a n c e in such play-acting is that it places the c h i l d in the position w h e r e it is able to act back t o w a r d itself in such roles as " m o t h e r " or " t e a c h e r . " In this stage, then, the c h i l d first begins to f o r m a self, that is, to direct activity t o w a r d itself a n d it does so by taking the roles of others. This is clearly i n d i c a t e d by use of the t h i r d person in r e f e r r i n g to oneself instead of the first person: " J o h n wants . . . ," " J o h n is a b a d boy."

2. Self To state that the h u m a n b e i n g can respond to his o w n gestures necessarily implies that he possesses a self. In r e f e r r i n g to the h u m a n b e i n g as h a v i n g a self, M e a d s i m p l y means that such an i n d i v i d u a l may act socially t o w a r d himself, just as t o w a r d others. He may praise, blame, or en courage himself; he may b e c o m e disgusted w i t h himself, m a y seek to p u n i s h himself, and so forth. Thus, the h u m a n b e i n g m a y become the object of his o w n actions. T h e self is f o r m e d in the same w a y as other objectsthrough the " d e f i n i t i o n s " m a d e by others. T h e m e c h a n i s m w h e r e b y the i n d i v i d u a l be comes able to v i e w himself as an object is that of role-taking, i n v o l v i n g the process of c o m m u n i cation, especially by vocal gestures or speech.

T o a n y o n e w h o has t a k e n e v e n o n e c o u r s e i n s o c i o l o g y i t i s

p r o b a b l y s u p e r f l u o u s t o stress t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f s y m b o l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y l a n g u a g e , in the acquisition of all other e l e m e n t s of c u l ture. T h e process of socialization is essentially a process of s y m bolic interaction.

Meltzer H o w e v e r , in this stage the young child's configuration of roles is unstable; the c h i l d passes f r o m one role to another in u n o r g a n i z e d , inconsistent fashion. He has, as yet, no unitary standpoint f r o m w h i c h to v i e w himself, and hence, he has no unified conception of himself. In other words, the c h i l d forms a n u m b e r of separate and discrete object of itself, d e p e n d i n g on the roles in w h i c h it acts t o w a r d itself. 3. Game Stage, This is the " c o m p l e t i n g " stage of the self. In time, the c h i l d finds himself in situations w h e r e i n he must take a n u m b e r of roles simultaneously. That is, he must respond to the expectations of several people at the same time. This sort of situation is exemplified by the game of baseballto use Mead's o w n illustration. E a c h player must visualize the i n tentions and expectations of several other players. In such situations the c h i l d must take the roles of groups of individuals as over against particular roles. T h e c h i l d becomes enabled to do this by abstracting a " c o m p o s i t e " role out of the concrete roles of particular persons. In the course of his association w i t h others, then, he builds up a generalized other, a generalized role or standpoint f r o m w h i c h he views himself a n d his behavior. This generalized other represents, then, the set of standpoints w h i c h are c o m m o n to the group. H a v i n g achieved this generalized standpoint, the i n d i v i d u a l can conduct himself in a n organized, consistent m a n n e r . H e can v i e w himself f r o m a consistent standpoint. This means, then, that the i n d i v i d u a l can transcend the local and present expectations and definitions w i t h w h i c h h e comes i n contact. A n illustration of this point w o u l d be the E n g l i s h m a n w h o "dresses for d i n n e r " in the wilds of A f r i c a . Thus, through having a g e n e r a l i z e d other, the i n d i v i d u a l becomes e m a n c i p a t e d f r o m the pressures of the peculiarities of the i m m e d i a t e situation. He can act w i t h a certain amount of consistency in a variety of situations because he acts in accordance w i t h a generalized set of expectations and definitions that he has internalized. The "I"and the "Me. " T h e self is essentially a social process w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l i n v o l v i n g two analytically distinguishable phases: T h e " I " and the " M e . " T h e " I " is the impulsive tendency of the i n d i v i d u a l . It is the initial, spontaneous, u n o r g a n i z e d

19 aspect of h u m a n experience. Thus, it represents the u n d i r e c t e d tendencies of the i n d i v i d u a l . T h e " M e " represents the incorporated other w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . Thus, it comprises the organized set of attitudes and definitions, u n derstandings and expectationsor simply m e a n i n g s c o m m o n to the group. In any g i v e n situation, the " M e " comprises the generalized other and, often, some particular other. E v e r y act begins i n the f o r m o f a n " I " a n d usually ends in the f o r m of the " M e . " F o r the " I " represents the initiation of the act p r i o r to its c o m i n g under control of the definitions or expectations of others (the " M e " ) . T h e " I " thus gives propulsion w h i l e the " M e " gives direction to the act. H u m a n behavior, then, can be v i e w e d as a perpetual series of initiations of acts by the " I " and of acting-back-upon the act (that is, guidance of the act) by the " M e . " T h e act is a resultant of this interplay. T h e " I , " b e i n g spontaneous and propulsive, offers the potentiality for new, creative activity. T h e " M e , " b e i n g regulatory, disposes the i n d i v i d ual to both goal-directed activity and conformity. In the operation of these aspects of the self, we have the basis for, on the one hand, social c o n t r o l and, on the other, novelty and innovation. We are thus p r o v i d e d w i t h a basis for understanding the mutuality of the relationship b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l and society.
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At first glance, Mead's " I " and " M e " may appear to bear a

c l o s e affinity w i t h F r e u d ' s c o n c e p t s o f I d , E g o , a n d S u p e r e g o . T h e r e s e m b l a n c e is, f o r t h e m o s t p a r t , m o r e a p p a r e n t t h a n r e a l . W h i l e the S u p e r e g o is h e l d to be harshly frustrating a n d repressive o f the instinctual, libidinous, a n d aggressive Id, the " M e " is held to provide necessary directionoften of a gratifying n a t u r e t o the otherwise u n d i r e c t e d impulses constituting the " I . " P u t t i n g the matter in figurative terms: F r e u d views the Id a n d the Superego as l o c k e d in combat u p o n the battleground o f t h e E g o ; M e a d sees t h e " I " a n d " M e " e n g a g e d i n c l o s e c o l l a b o ration. T h i s difference in perspective m a y derive f r o m different preoccupations: F r e u d was p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t e n s i o n , behavior; M e a d was p r i m a r i l y c o n anxiety, a n d " a b n o r m a l "

cerned with behavior generically. I t i s t r u e , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , that t h e I d , E g o , a n d S u p e r egoparticularly as m o d i f i e d by such neo-Freudians as K a r e n H o m e y , E r i c h F r o m m , and H. S. Sullivanconverge at a few points w i t h the " I " a n d " M e . " T h i s i s especially e v i d e n t i n the emphasis o f both the Superego and " M e " concepts u p o n the internalization of the n o r m s of significant others t h r o u g h the process of identification, or role-taking. I n c i d e n t a l l y , i t s h o u l d b e n o t e d that b o t h sets o f c o n c e p t s r e f e r t o p r o c e s s e s o f b e h a v i o r , not t o c o n c r e t e e n t i t i e s o r s t r u c tures. S e e , also, t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f " m i n d " w h i c h f o l l o w s .

20 Implications of Selfhood. S o m e of the m a j o r implications o f selfhood i n h u m a n behavior are as follows: 1. T h e possession of a self makes of the i n d i v i d u a l a society in miniature. That is, he m a y engage in interaction w i t h himself just as two or m o r e different individuals might. In the course of this interaction, he can c o m e to v i e w himself in a n e w way, thereby b r i n g i n g about changes i n himself. 2. T h e ability to act toward oneself makes possible an i n n e r experience w h i c h n e e d not reach overt expression. That is, the i n d i v i d u a l , by v i r tue of h a v i n g a self, is thereby e n d o w e d w i t h the possibility of h a v i n g a m e n t a l life: He can m a k e indications to h i m s e l f w h i c h constitutes mind. 3. T h e i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a self is thereby enabled to direct and control his behavior. Instead of b e i n g subject to all impulses and s t i m u l i d i rectly p l a y i n g u p o n h i m , the i n d i v i d u a l can check, guide, and organize his behavior. He is, then, not a m e r e passive agent. A l l three of these implications of selfhood m a y be s u m m a r i z e d by the statement that the self a n d the m i n d (mental activity) are t w i n emergents in the social process.

PART I Theory and Methods as a box-like container in the head, or as some k i n d of fixed, ever-present entity. M i n d is seen as a process, w h i c h manifests itself w h e n e v e r the i n d i v i d u a l is interacting w i t h himself by using significant symbols. M e a d begins his discussion of the m i n d w i t h a consideration of the relation of the organism to its e n v i r o n m e n t . He points out that the central p r i n c i p l e in all organic behavior is that of c o n t i n u ous adjustment, or adaptation, to an e n v i r o n i n g field. We cannot r e g a r d the e n v i r o n m e n t as havi n g a fixed character for all organisms, as b e i n g the same for all organisms. A l l behavior involves selective attention and p e r c e p t i o n . T h e organism accepts certain events in its field, or v i c i n i t y , as stimuli and rejects or overlooks certain others as irrelevant to its needs. (For example, an a n i m a l battling for life ignores food.) B o m b a r d e d constantly by s t i m u l i , the organism selects those stimu l i or aspects of its field w h i c h p e r t a i n to, are functional to, the acts in w h i c h the organism is engaged. Thus, the organism has a h a n d in determ i n i n g the nature of its e n v i r o n m e n t . W h a t this means, then, is that M e a d , along w i t h D e w e y , regards all life as o n g o i n g activity, a n d views stimu l i n o t as initiators of activitybut as elements selected by the organism in the furtherance of that activity. P e r c e p t i o n is thus an activity that involves selective attention to certain aspects of a situation, rather than a m e r e matter of something c o m i n g into the individual's nervous system a n d l e a v i n g an impression. V i s u a l p e r c e p t i o n , e.g., is m o r e than a matter of just o p e n i n g one's eyes a n d res p o n d i n g to what falls on the retina. T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the e n v i r o n m e n t by the biologic i n d i v i d u a l (infrahumans a n d the unsoc i a l i z e d infant) is not a cognitive relationship. It is selective, but does not involve consciousness, in the sense of reflective intelligence. At the distinctively h u m a n l e v e l , on the other h a n d , there is a hesitancy, an i n h i b i t i o n of overt conduct, w h i c h is not i n v o l v e d in the selective attention of a n i m a l behavior. In this p e r i o d of i n h i b i t i o n , m i n d is present. H u m a n behavior involves i n h i b i t i n g a n act a n d t r y i n g out the v a r y i n g approaches in imagination. In contrast, as we have seen, the acts of the

3. Mind Development of Mind. As in the instance of his consideration of the self, M e a d rejects individualistic psychologies, i n w h i c h the social process (society, social interaction) is v i e w e d as presupposing, and being a p r o d u c t of, m i n d . In d i r e c t contrast is his v i e w that m i n d presupposes, a n d is a product of, the social process. M i n d is seen by M e a d as d e v e l o p i n g correlatively w i t h the self, constituting (in a v e r y i m p o r t a n t sense) the self in action. Mead's hypothesis r e g a r d i n g m i n d (as regardi n g the self) is that the m e n t a l emerges out of the organic life of m a n t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e m i n d is present only at certain points in h u m a n behavior, viz., w h e n significant symbols are b e i n g used by the i n d i v i d u a l . This v i e w dispenses w i t h the substantive n o t i o n of m i n d as existing

Meltzer oiologic i n d i v i d u a l are relatively i m m e d i a t e , d i rect, and made up of innate or habitual ways of reacting. In other words, the unsocialized organism lacks consciousness of m e a n i n g . This b e i n g the case, the organism has no means for the abstract analysis of its field w h e n n e w situations are met, a n d hence no means for the reorganization of action-tendencies in the light of that analysis.
4

21
execution. Thus, to quote a w e l l - k n o w n example, the intelligence of the detective as over against the intelligence of the b l o o d h o u n d lies in the capacity of the f o r m e r to isolate a n d indicate (to himself and to others) what the particular characters are w h i c h w i l l call out the response of appreh e n d i n g the fugitive c r i m i n a l . T h e m i n d i s social i n both o r i g i n a n d f u n c t i o n . It arises in the social process of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h r o u g h association w i t h the m e m b e r s of his groups, the i n d i v i d u a l comes to internalize the definitions transmitted to h i m through linguistic symbols, learns to assume the perspectives of others, a n d thereby acquires the ability to think. W h e n the m i n d has risen in this process, it operates to m a i n t a i n a n d adjust the i n d i v i d u a l in his society; and it enables the society to persist. T h e persistence of a h u m a n society depends, as we have seen, u p o n consensus; and consensus necessarily entails m i n d e d behavior. T h e m i n d is social in function in the sense that the i n d i v i d u a l continually indicates to h i m s e l f in the role of others and controls his activity w i t h reference to the definitions p r o v i d e d by others. In order to carry on thought, he must have some standpoint f r o m w h i c h to converse w i t h himself. He gets this standpoint by i m p o r t i n g into himself the roles of others. By " t a k i n g the role of the o t h e r , " as I earlier p o i n t e d out, we can see ourselves as others see us, a n d arouse in ourselves the responses that we call out in others. It is this conversation w i t h ourselves, b e t w e e n the representation of the other (in the f o r m of the " M e " ) a n d our impulses (in the f o r m of the "I") that constitutes the m i n d . Thus, what the i n d i v i d u a l actually does in m i n d e d behavior is to carry on an internal conversation. By addressing himself f r o m the standpoint of the generalized other, the i n d i v i d u a l has a universe of discourse, a system of c o m m o n symbols a n d meanings, w i t h w h i c h to address himself. These are presupposed as the context for m i n d e d behavior. M e a d holds, then, that m e n t a l activity is a peculiar type of activity that goes on in the experience of the person. T h e activity is that of the person responding to himself, of i n d i c a t i n g things to himself.

M i n d e d behavior (in Mead's sense) arises around problems. It represents, to repeat an i m portant point, a temporary i n h i b i t i o n of action w h e r e i n the i n d i v i d u a l is a t t e m p t i n g to p r e v i s i o n the future. It consists of presenting to oneself, tentatively and in advance of overt behavior, the different possibilities or alternatives of future action w i t h reference to a g i v e n situation. T h e future is, thus, present in terms of images of prospective lines of action f r o m w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l can m a k e a selection. T h e m e n t a l process is, then, one of delaying, organizing, and selecting a response to the stimuli of the e n v i r o n m e n t . This implies that the i n d i v i d u a l constructs his act, rather than responding i n p r e d e t e r m i n e d ways. M i n d makes it possible for the i n d i v i d u a l p u r posively to control and organize his responses. Needless to say, this v i e w contradicts the stimulus-response conception of h u m a n behavior. W h e n the act of an a n i m a l is c h e c k e d , it may engage in overt trial and error or r a n d o m activity. In the case of b l o c k e d h u m a n acts, the trial and error m a y be carried on covertly, i m p l i c i t l y . Consequences can b e imaginatively " t r i e d o u t " in advance. This is what is p r i m a r i l y meant by " m i n d , " "reflective t h i n k i n g , " o r "abstract thinking." W h a t this involves is the ability to indicate elements of the field or situation, abstract t h e m f r o m the situation, and r e c o m b i n e t h e m so that procedures can be considered in advance of their
T h e reader s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e here, in a n e w guise, our earlier

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n signs a n d s y m b o l s . S i g n s h a v e " i n t r i n s i c " m e a n i n g s w h i c h i n d u c e direct reactions; symbols have arbitrary meanings w h i c h require interpretations by the actor p r i o r to his r e s p o n s e o r a c t i o n . T h e f o r m e r , i t w i l l b e r e c a l l e d , a r e " t i e d t o " the i m m e d i a t e situation, w h i l e the latter " t r a n s c e n d " the i m m e d i a t e s i t u a t i o n . T h u s , s y m b o l s m a y r e f e r t o past o r f u t u r e e v e n t s , t o h y p o t h e t i c a l situations, t o n o n e x i s t e n t o r i m a g i n a r y objects, a n d so forth.

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To repeat, m i n d originates in the social process, in association w i t h others. T h e r e is little doubt that h u m a n beings l i v e d together in groups before m i n d ever evolved. B u t there e m e r g e d , because of certain biological developments, the point w h e r e h u m a n beings w e r e able to respond to their o w n acts and gestures. It was at this point that m i n d , or m i n d e d behavior, emerged. Similarly, m i n d comes into existence for the i n d i v i d u a l at the point w h e r e the i n d i v i d u a l is capable of r e s p o n d i n g to his o w n behavior, i.e., w h e r e he can designate things to himself. S u m m a r i z i n g this brief treatment of m i n d , m e n t a l activity, or reflective t h i n k i n g , we may say that it is a matter of m a k i n g indications of meanings to oneself as to others. This is another w a y of saying that m i n d is the process of using significant symbols. F o r t h i n k i n g goes on w h e n an i n d i v i d u a l uses a symbol to call out in himself the responses w h i c h others w o u l d make. M i n d , then, is symbolic behavior. As such, m i n d is an e m e r g e n t f r o m non-symbolic behavior and is fundamentally irreducible to the stimulus-response mechanisms w h i c h characterize the latter f o r m of behavior.
5

PART I

Theory and Methods

w a r d w h i c h it acts, its make-up and on-going activity d e t e r m i n i n g the kinds of stimuli it w i l l select. F u r t h e r , the qualities w h i c h are possessed by the objects t o w a r d w h i c h the a n i m a l acts arise f r o m the k i n d of experiences that the animal has w i t h the objects. (To illustrate, grass is not the same p h e n o m e n o n for a cat and for a cow.) T h e e n v i r o n m e n t and its qualities, then, are always functional to the structure of the animal. As one passes on to the h u m a n level, the relation of the i n d i v i d u a l to the w o r l d becomes markedly more c o m p l i c a t e d . This is so because the h u m a n b e i n g is capable of f o r m i n g objects. A n i mals, lacking symbols, see stimuli, such as patches of colornot objects. An object has to be detached, p o i n t e d out, " i m a g e d " to oneself. T h e h u m a n being's e n v i r o n m e n t is constituted largely by objects. N o w , let us look at the relation of the i n d i v i d ual to objects. An object represents a p l a n of action. That is, an object doesn't exist for the i n d i v i d u a l in some pre-established f o r m . P e r c e p t i o n of any object has telescoped in it a series of experiences w h i c h one w o u l d have if he c a r r i e d out the p l a n of action t o w a r d that object. T h e object has no qualities for the i n d i v i d u a l , aside f r o m those w h i c h w o u l d result f r o m his c a r r y i n g out a p l a n of action. In this respect, the object is constituted by one's activities w i t h reference to it. (For example, chalk is the sum of qualities w h i c h are p e r c e i v e d as a result of one's actions: a h a r d , smooth, w h i t e w r i t i n g implement.) T h e objects w h i c h constitute the "effective e n v i r o n m e n t , " the individual's experienced e n v i ronment, are established by the individual's activities. To the extent that his activity varies, his e n v i r o n m e n t varies. In other words, objects change as activities toward t h e m change. (Chalk, for instance, may become a missile.) Objects, w h i c h are constituted by the activities of the h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , are largely shared objects. T h e y stand for c o m m o n patterns of activity of individuals. This is true, M e a d points out, by v i r t u e of the fact that objects arise, and are present in experience, only in the process of b e i n g indicated to oneself (and, hence, explicitly or i m plicitly, to others). In other words, the perspective from w h i c h one indicates an object implicates def-

It should be evident that M e a d avoids both the behavioristic fallacy of r e d u c t i o n and the i n d i vidualistic fallacy of taking for granted the phen o m e n o n that is to be explained. Objects. R e t u r n i n g to Mead's discussion of the organism-in-environment, we can n o w give m o r e explicit attention to his treatment of objects. As we have seen, we cannot regard the e n v i r o n m e n t as h a v i n g a fixed character for all organisms. T h e e n v i r o n m e n t is a function of the animal's o w n character, being greatly d e t e r m i n e d by the makeup of the animal. E a c h animal largely selects its o w n e n v i r o n m e n t . It selects out the stimuli to5

A g r o w i n g n u m b e r of linguists, semanticists, a n d students of

s p e e c h disorders are b e c o m i n g aware of the central role of s y m b o l s i n t h e content, a s w e l l a s t h e p r o c e s s o f t h o u g h t . E d w a r d Sapir a n d B e n j a m i n W h o r f have formulated "the principle of linguistic relativity," w h i c h holds that the structure of a lang u a g e i n f l u e n c e s t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e users o f t h e l a n g u a g e will perceive, study and comprehend, are and act t o w a r d reality. Wendell Johnson, i n the f i e l d o f semantics, a n d K u r t G o l d s t e i n , i n the of aphasia, the thought. representative in which theory clearly investigators structure foreshadows who have perception these derecognized velopments. way symbols

Mead's

Meltzer .r.itions by others. Needless to say, these defininons i n v o l v e language, or significant symbols. T h e - d i v i d u a l acquires a commonality of perspective - others by learning the symbols by w h i c h they designate aspects of the w o r l d .
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4. T h e A c t A l l h u m a n activity other than reflex and ha bitual action is built up in the process of its execu tion; i.e., behavior is constructed as it goes along, far decisions must be made at several points. T h e r.gnificance of this fact is that people actrather man m e r e l y react. F o r M e a d , the unit of study is "the act," -.vhich comprises both overt and covert aspects :f h u m a n action. W i t h i n the act, all the separated litegories of the traditional, orthodox psycholo gies find a place. A t t e n t i o n , perception, imagina tion, reasoning, emotion, and so forth, are seen is parts of the actrather than as m o r e or less extrinsic influences u p o n it. H u m a n behavior presents itself in the f o r m of acts, rather than of concatenations of m i n u t e responses. T h e act, then, encompasses the total process i n v o l v e d in h u m a n activity. It is v i e w e d as a c o m plete span of action: Its initial point is an impulse and its t e r m i n a l point some objective w h i c h gives release to the impulse. In between, the i n d i v i d u a l is in the process of constructing, organizing his rjehavior. It is d u r i n g this p e r i o d that the act u n dergoes its most significant phase of development. In the case of h u m a n behavior, this p e r i o d is m a r k e d by the play of images of possible goals or lines of action u p o n the impulse, thus d i r e c t i n g the activity to its consummation. In p o i n t i n g out that the act begins w i t h an impulse, M e a d means that organisms experience
!

disturbances of e q u i l i b r i u m . In the case of the lower animals, their biological make-up channel izes the impulse t o w a r d appropriate goals. In the case of the h u m a n being, the m e r e presence of an impulse leads to n o t h i n g but m e r e r a n d o m , unorganized activity. This is most clearlybut definitely not exclusivelyseen in the instance of the behavior of infants. U n t i l the defining ac tions of others set up goals for it, the h u m a n i n fant's behavior is u n c h a n n e l i z e d . It is the f u n c t i o n of images to direct, organize and construct this activity. T h e presence in behavior of images i m plies, of course, a process of indicating to oneself, or m i n d . T h e act may have a short span (e.g., attending a particular class m e e t i n g , or starting a n e w page of notes) or may involve the major p o r t i o n of a person's life (e.g., t r y i n g to achieve a successful career). M o r e o v e r , acts are parts of an interlacing of previous acts, a n d are built up, one u p o n an other. This is in contradistinction to the v i e w that behavior is a series of discrete stimulus-response bonds. C o n c e i v i n g h u m a n behavior in terms of acts, we become aware of the necessity for v i e w i n g any particular act w i t h i n its psychosocial context.
7

U s i n g the concept of the act, M e a d sets up classes of actsthe automatic act, the b l o c k e d act, the i n c o m p l e t e act, and the retrospective a c t and analyzes t h e m in terms of his frame of refer ence. Space does not p e r m i t presentation of these i n t r i g u i n g analyses.
7

T h e r e a d e r m a y h a v e n o t e d that this d i s c u s s i o n m a k e s n o ex

plicit r e f e r e n c e t o the p r o b l e m o f m o t i v a t i o n . M e a d h a d little t o say r e g a r d i n g m o t i v e s . A d h e r e n t s t o his g e n e r a l o r i e n t a t i o n have t e n d e d either to r e g a r d motives as implicit in the concept o f object ("a p l a n o f a c t i o n " ) o r t o c o n s i d e r t h e m " m e r e " v e r b a l labels o f f e r e d i n s u p p o s e d e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n s o f o n e s e l f or of others. In my judgment, a conception of motivation can be formu l a t e d that is b o t h useful a n d consistent w i t h M e a d ' s theories. M o t i v a t i o n c a n refer to "a process of d e f i n i n g (symbolically,

T h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n this v i e w o f l e a r n i n g a n d t h e n e o - b e h a v -

o f course) t h e g o a l o f a n a c t . " T h u s , w h i l e b o t h h u m a n a n d infrahuman behavior m a y be viewed as goal-directed, only hu m a n b e h a v i o r w o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d " m o t i v a t e d . " Just a s " m o t i v e " w o u l d be restricted to the h u m a n level, " d r i v e " m i g h t serve a c o m p a r a b l e f u n c t i o n on the i n f r a h u m a n level. T h i s w o u l d n o t i m p l y that m o t i v e s l i e b a c k of, o r " c a u s e , " h u m a n acts. B a t h e r , h u m a n acts a r e i n c o n s t a n t p r o c e s s o f c o n struction, a n d the goal-definitions by individuals u n d e r g o con stant r e f o r m u l a t i o n . I m e a n t o d e s i g n a t e b y " m o t i v e , " h o w e v e r , t h e d e f i n i t i o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l m a k e s , at any given w o u l d b e socially d e r i v e d . time, of t h e o b j e c t i v e s o f his o w n s p e c i f i c acts. S u c h d e f i n i t i o n s , o b v i o u s l y ,

::ristic " l e a r n i n g t h e o r y " o f C l a r k H u l l a n d other psychologists s h o u l d b e c l e a r l y e v i d e n t . B a s i c a l l y , l e a r n i n g theorists a t t e m p t r e d u c e h u m a n l e a r n i n g to the m e c h a n i s m s f o u n d in i n f r a h u n a n learning. T h i s is reflected in their t e n d e n c y to ignore the role of linguistic symbols in h u m a n b e h a v i o r , their c o n c e p t u a l i zation of h u m a n activity in terms of stimulus-response couplets, z n d their v i e w of learning as equivalent w i t h c o n d i t i o n i n g . (For in excellent critique of learning theory f r o m the symbolic interi c t i o n i s t s t a n d p o i n t , see: M a n f o r d H . K u h n , " K i n s e y ' s V i e w o f H u m a n Behavior," 125. Social Problems, 1 (April 1954), p p . 119-

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C. S U M M A R Y At several points in this report the reader must have been aware of the extremely closely i n t e r w o v e n character of Mead's various concepts. In the discussions of society, of self, and of m i n d , certain ideas seemed to r e q u i r e frequent (and, perhaps, repetitious) statement. A brief summary of Mead's position may h e l p to r e v e a l m o r e meani n g f u l l y the way in w h i c h his key concepts interlock and logically i m p l y one another. T h e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l is b o r n into a society c h a r a c t e r i z e d by symbolic interaction. T h e use of significant symbols by those a r o u n d h i m enables h i m to pass f r o m the conversation of gestureswhich involves direct, u n m e a n i n g f u l response to the overt acts of othersto the occasional taking of the roles of others. This roletaking enables h i m to share the perspectives of others. C o n c u r r e n t w i t h role-taking, t h e self develops, i.e., the capacity to act t o w a r d oneself A c t i o n t o w a r d oneself comes to take the f o r m of v i e w i n g oneself f r o m the standpoint, or perspective, of the generalized other (the composite representative of others, of society, w i t h i n the i n dividual), w h i c h implies d e f i n i n g one's behavior in terms of the expectations of others. In the process of such v i e w i n g of oneself, the i n d i v i d u a l must carry o n symbolic interaction w i t h himself, i n v o l v i n g an internal conversation b e t w e e n his i m pulsive aspect (the "I") a n d the i n c o r p o r a t e d perspectives of others (the " M e " ) . T h e mind, or m e n t a l activity, is present in behavior w h e n e v e r such symbolic interaction goes o n w h e t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l is m e r e l y " t h i n k i n g " (in the everyday sense of the word) or is also interacting w i t h another i n d i v i d u a l . (In b o t h cases the i n d i v i d u a l must indicate things to himself.) M e n t a l activity necessarily involves meanings, w h i c h usually attach to, a n d define, objects. T h e m e a n i n g of a n object or event is simply an image of the pattern of action w h i c h defines the object or event. That is, the c o m p l e t i o n in one's i m a g i n a t i o n of an act, or the m e n t a l picture of the actions a n d experiences s y m b o l i z e d by an object, defines the act or the object. In the unit of study that M e a d calls " t h e act, " a l l of the foregoing processes are usually entailed. T h e c o n c l u d i n g point to be m a d e in this s u m m a r y is the same as the point w i t h w h i c h I began: M e a d ' s concepts i n t e r t w i n e a n d m u t u a l l y

PART I Theory and Methods i m p l y one another. To d r i v e h o m e this important point, I must emphasize that h u m a n society (characterized by symbolic interaction) b o t h precedes the rise of i n d i v i d u a l selves and m i n d s , a n d is m a i n t a i n e d by the rise of i n d i v i d u a l selves and minds. This means, then, that symbolic interaction is b o t h the m e d i u m for the d e v e l o p m e n t of h u m a n beings a n d the process by w h i c h h u m a n beings associate as h u m a n beings. F i n a l l y , it should be clearly e v i d e n t by n o w that any distinctively h u m a n act necessarily involves: symbolic interaction, role-taking, meani n g , m i n d , a n d self. W h e r e one of these concepts is i n v o l v e d , the others are, also, necessarily i n v o l v e d . H e r e we see, unmistakably, the organic unity of Mead's position.

D. CRITIQUE In c r i t i c i z i n g Mead's social psychology, it should be borne in m i n d that he gave his position no extended systematic w r i t e - u p ; that most of the published m a t e r i a l w h i c h forms the basis of our k n o w l e d g e of that position was not originally i n t e n d e d for p u b l i c a t i o n , at least not in the f o r m in w h i c h it has b e e n p r i n t e d ; and that the various alternative statements of that position that appear in his posthumous works sometimes carry conflicti n g particulars. Still, we can evaluate only on the basis of the available, published materials. 1. M a n y of M e a d ' s major concepts are somewhat vague and " f u z z y , " necessitating a n " i n t u i t i v e " grasp of their m e a n i n g . This vagueness stems, I believe, p r i m a r i l y f r o m two sources: (1) the fragm e n t a r y a n d alternative formulations of his ideas; and (2) his e m e r g e n t v i e w of h u m a n conduct, w h i c h inescapably entangles h i m i n the necessity of striking a balance b e t w e e n the continuity of i n f r a h u m a n a n d h u m a n behavior, o n the one h a n d , and the n o v e l t y of h u m a n behavior, on the other. (a) F o r example, the exact nature of " i m p u l ses" is not clearly specified. W h e t h e r impulses are biological in character, or can also be socially der i v e d , is not clear f r o m Mead's exposition. H o w ever, the contexts in w h i c h the t e r m sometimes appears suggest that the latter i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w o u l d be m o r e v a l i d and useful.

25
(b) Similarly, the i n t e r t w i n e d concepts of " m e a n i n g " and of " m i n d " are not consistently e m p l o y e d . At times, these terms are used generically, a p p l y i n g to both i n f r a h u m a n and h u m a n levels of behavior, and at times specifically, apply i n g only at the l e v e l of self-conscious h u m a n conduct. Fortunately, the context of each usage usu ally provides a key to Mead's i n t e n d e d meanings. (c) C o i n c i d e n t w i t h Mead's v a r y i n g referents of " m i n d " and of " m e a n i n g , " we find his vacilla tion b e t w e e n a restriction of role-taking ability to the h u m a n level (in symbolic interaction) and his granting of that ability to i n f r a h u m a n animals (in the conversation of gestures). A g a i n , we are fortunate in h a v i n g his distinction b e t w e e n selfconscious role-playing and u n w i t t i n g role-playing. T h e reader of M e a d must bear in m i n d that the latter type of " r o l e - p l a y i n g " is not what M e a d usually has in m i n d w h e n he employs the concept. (d) T h e concept of the " I , " as W i l l i a m K o l b indicates, represents a vaguely defined residual category. M e a d clearly specifies the nature of the " M e , " but in effect, labels the " I " as s i m p l y the n o t - M e aspect of the self. As in the case of the v e r y closely related concept of " i m p u l s e , " M e a d does not indicate the limits of the " I . " F r o m his discussion, the " I " w o u l d seem, h o w e v e r a n d this is an inferenceto i n c l u d e e v e r y t h i n g f r o m biological urges to the effects of i n d i v i d u a l varia tions in life-history patterns. S t i l l , as Barnes and B e c k e r point out, the " I " serves the v e r y useful purpose of evading a complete collective, or socio logical, d e t e r m i n i s m of h u m a n conduct. T h e ambiguity of the concept of the " I " also reveals itself in the various discussions in the sec ondary literature on Mead's treatment of habitual behavior. F o r some writers, habitual acts repre sent manifestations of the operation of the " I " alone; for others, of the " M e " alone; and for still others, a fusion of the " I " a n d the " M e . " (e) T h e concept of " s e l f " also lacks clear, u n ambiguous definition in Mead's w o r k . A certain amount of confusion enters the p i c t u r e w h e n the self is defined in terms of "the individual's v i e w i n g himself as an object." This confusion is not at all dissipated by Mead's tendency to vary b e t w e e n , on the one h a n d , synonymous usages of " s e l f " and "self-consciousness" and on the other h a n d , slightly different usages of these two terms. (f) Mead's concept of the "generalized o t h e r " needs sharpening. He oversimplifies the concept by assuming, apparently, a single, u n i v e r sal generalized other for the members of each societyrather than a variety of generalized oth ers (even for the same individuals), at different levels of generality. T h e inadequacy of this con cept is clearly shown in his characterization of the c r i m i n a l as one w h o "has not taken on the attitude of the generalized other t o w a r d p r o p erty, (and w h o therefore) lacks a completely de veloped self." Such a characterization overlooks, of course, the sociogenic elements in c r i m e causation.
8

(g) A final case of vagueness of conceptualiza tion that we shall consider relates to Mead's us ages of "object" and " i m a g e . " B o t h of these are described as "telescoped acts," and both are used at times interchangeably and at times slightly dif ferently. It is probably safe to infer that images are the m e n t a l representations of objects, i.e., that images are the imaginative projections of the acts w h i c h define objects. O t h e r sources of ambiguity lie in Mead's vary i n g uses of the concepts of " a t t i t u d e , " "gesture," and " s y m b o l " ; his vacillation between, on the one h a n d , ascribing objects and images to the infrah u m a n l e v e l of behavior and, on the other h a n d , d e n y i n g t h e m to that level; etc. A l l of these ambiguities a n d inconsistencies reflect chiefly the confusion e n g e n d e r e d by publication of all the alternative formulations of Mead's i d e a s the early formulations along w i t h the later. T h e thoughtful a n d assiduous reader of M e a d , however, should be able to abstract out some sin gle, fairly consistent statement of Mead's position. 2. A second series of adverse criticisms centers around certain b r o a d substantive omissions in Mead's theory. (a) Mead's position, as B l u m e r states, consti tutes a p u r e l y analytical scheme, w h i c h lacks con tent. T h a t is, he presents an analysis of h u m a n conduct in terms of the mechanisms of develop m e n t of such conduct, but indicates few i n g r e d i C u r r e n t w o r k o n " r e f e r e n c e g r o u p s " has s e r v e d t o r e m e d y

this d e f i c i e n c y . T r u e , s e v e r a l c o m p e t i n g d e f i n i t i o n s o f this c o n c e p t are extant. I h a v e i n m i n d , h o w e v e r , the c o n c e p t i o n o f r e f e r e n c e g r o u p s a s c o l l e c t i o n s o f " s i g n i f i c a n t o t h e r s , " t h a t is, of persons w i t h w h o m a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l identifies a n d w h o , t h e r e f o r e , h a v e a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e u p o n his p e r s o n a l i t y .

26
ents of that conduct. In c o n c e r n i n g himself w h o l l y w i t h process but not content, w i t h the " h o w " but not the " w h y " of conduct, he provides no basis for explaining specific behaviors. F o r example, he gives no clues as to w h y one object rather than another w i l l be formed by an i n d i v i d u a l or group. Thus, his scheme, as it stands, has no explanatory value w i t h reference to such matters as the rise of particular popular heroes, or the high valuation of money, or the m y t h of Santa Claus. (b) Related to this " e r r o r " of omission is Mead's virtual ignoring of the role of affective elements in the rise of the self and in social interaction generally. T h e importance of the sentiments and emotions manifested in personal relationships are given no recognition in Mead's position. This lack is suppliedperhaps, oversupp l i e d i n Cooley's work. (c) N o t h i n g in Mead's theory enables a clear stand on the matter of the nature (or e v e n existence) of the unconscious, or subconscious, and the related mechanisms of adjustment. 3. Mead's position can also be c r i t i c i z e d f r o m a t h i r d and final general standpoint, that of methodology. (a) First of all, Mead's theory, for the most part, does not seem to be highly researchable. As yet, little truly significant research has been c o n d u c t e d chiefly in terms of his frame of reference. Recent efforts to measure self-conceptions may help to remedy this deficiency. (b) M e a d , himself, gives no explicit formulation as to how his analytical scheme can be used in research. He makes no specific r e c o m m e n d a tions as to the techniques appropriate to the study of h u m a n behavior. (c) As I indicated earlier in this report, M e a d presents no systematic evidence for his position. Nevertheless, many social psychologists find his theory highly congruent w i t h the experiences of everyday lifesomething w h i c h cannot be as readily said for a n u m b e r of c o m p e t i n g positions.

PART I Theory and Methods ence to the w o r k of other adherents of the S y m bolic Interactionist approach. A m o n g the m o r e eminent sociologists and social psychologists influe n c e d by his v i e w p o i n t are: Cooley, Thomas, Park, Burgess, E. Faris, and B l u m e r . Some of the textbooks w h i c h incorporate his position are: in sociology, those by Park and Burgess, D a w s o n and Gettys, Francis M e r r i l l , Kingsley Davis; i n social psychology, L i n d e s m i t h and Strauss, M . Sherif, T . N e w c o m b , W a l t e r C o u t u , and H u b e r t B o n n e r . In addition, the recent interests in " r o l e t h e o r y , " "reference-group t h e o r y , " and "self-theory" represent, basically, derivatives of Symbolic Interactionism. Mead's substantive contribution has conv e r g e d w i t h , or at least has found some parallels i n , certain methodological positions i n m o d e r n sociology and social psychology. Such positions are those in w h i c h study of the inner, subjective part of the act is d e e m e d indispensable. Methodologies of this sort are i n d i c a t e d by (1) Thomas's concept of " d e f i n i t i o n of the situation," (2) Cooley's " s y m pathetic i n t r o s p e c t i o n , " (3) Weber's "Verstehen, " (4) Znaniecki's " h u m a n i s t i c coefficient," (5) M a c Iver's " d y n a m i c assessment," (6) Sorokin's "logicom e a n i n g f u l analysis," and other references to the covert aspects of h u m a n conduct. Mead's m o r e specific contributions can be only briefly listed in this report: 1. He c o n t r i b u t e d to the increasing acceptance of the v i e w that h u m a n conduct is c a r r i e d on p r i m a r i l y by the defining of situations in w h i c h one acts; that is, the v i e w that distinctively h u m a n behavior is behavior in terms of what situations symbolize. This is the essence of the Symbolic Interactionist viewpoint. 2. A d o p t i n g a distinctly sociological perspective, he h e l p e d direct attention to the fact that m i n d and self are not biologically given, but are social emergents. 3. He delineated the way in w h i c h language serves as a m e c h a n i s m for the appearance of m i n d and self. 4. His concept of the " s e l f " explains h o w the dev e l o p m e n t , or socialization, of the h u m a n bei n g both enmeshes the i n d i v i d u a l in society and frees h i m f r o m society. F o r the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a self is not passive, but can e m p l o y his self in an interaction w h i c h may result in selections divergent f r o m group definitions. 5. An extremely provocative conception of the

E. POSITIVE C O N T R I B U T I O N T h e extent of Mead's c o n t r i b u t i o n to social psychology can be only roughly gauged by refer-

Kuhn nature of the h u m a n m i n d is p r o v i d e d by h i m : He views m i n d , or the m e n t a l , as an i m p o r t a tion w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l of the social process, i.e., of the process of social interaction. H i s concept of the " a c t " points out the tendency for individuals to construct their behavior in the course of activity a n d , thus, to "carve o u t " their objects, their environments. W h a t this means is that h u m a n beings are not passive puppets who respond mechanically to stimuli. T h e y are, rather, active participants in a highly organized society, and what they perceive is functional in their ongoing activity. This theoretical position implies the i m p o r t a n c e of acq u i r e d predispositions (interests, values, etc.) and of the social context of behavior. It points to the influential significance of the group settings in w h i c h perceptions occur, and also places the m e a n i n g of what is p e r c e i v e d in the

27
context of the ongoing activities of persons. This leads directly into the next c o n t r i b u t i o n by M e a d . 7. He described h o w the members of a h u m a n group develop and f o r m a c o m m o n w o r l d , i.e., c o m m o n objects, c o m m o n understandings and expectations. 8. He i l l u m i n a t e d the character of social interaction by showing that h u m a n beings share one another's behavior instead of m e r e l y respondi n g to each other's overt, external behavior as do i n f r a h u m a n organisms. As a c o n c l u d i n g and overall evaluation of M e a d as a contributor to social psychology, I can do no better than to repeat D e w e y ' s oft-quoted appraisal: " H i s was a seminal m i n d of the first order."

Manford H. Kuhn

Major Trends in Symbolic Interaction Theory in the Past Twenty-Five Years

T h e year 1937 lies v i r t u a l l y in the m i d d l e of a four-year p e r i o d w h i c h saw the publication of Mind, Self, and Society; Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century; a n d The Philosophy
Manford ist H. Kuhn, in the "Major Past Trends in Symbolic Years," The InteractionSociological

Theory

Twenty-five

of the Act. It w o u l d represent the greatest naivete to suggest that thus the year 1937 represented the i n t r o d u c t i o n of symbolic interactionism. We are all aware of the long d e v e l o p m e n t : f r o m James, B a l d w i n , and Cooley to Thomas, Faris, D e w e y , B l u m e r , and Y o u n g . E v e n the Tardean i m i t a t i o n and suggestion w h i c h underlay
1

Quarterly, v o l . 5 ( W i n t e r 1964), p p . 6 1 - 8 4 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r mission. Paper read before the Midwest Sociological Society at its
1

G e o r g e H . M e a d , Mind, Self and Society; e d . w i t h a n I n t r o d u c M o r r i s (Chicago: U n i v . o f C h i c a g o Press, in by the Nineteenth Century; ed. Movements of Thought ed.

t w e n t y - f i f t h a n n i v e r s a r y m e e t i n g s , D e s M o i n e s , I o w a , A p r i l 12 14, 1962. ( T h e p a p e r was p r e p a r e d for o r a l p r e s e n t a t i o n . F o o t notes h a v e b e e n a d d e d . W h e r e additional i n f o r m a t i o n is g i v e n w h i c h w a s n o t i m p l i e d o r s u g g e s t e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l text, this has b e e n clearly i n d i c a t e d T h e E d i t o r . )

tion by Charles W. 1934);

b y M e r r i t t H . M o o r e ( C h i c a g o : U n i v . of C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1936); The Philosophy of the Act, C h a r l e s W. Morris (Chicago: U n i v . of C h i c a g o Press, 1938).

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Ross's Social Psychology c o n t r i b u t e d a good deal o r d i n a r i l y not credited t o h i m i n the d e v e l o p m e n t of interaction theory. N o r is it the fact that M e a d represents the fullest d e v e l o p m e n t of the orientat i o n that makes so significant the posthumous p u b l i c a t i o n of his works (for w h i c h we may conv e n i e n t l y take 1937 as an a n c h o r i n g point). M e a d ' s ideas had b e e n k n o w n for a v e r y l o n g t i m e . He h a d taught U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago students f r o m 1893 to 1931. H i s notions w e r e b r u i t e d about in classes and seminars w h e r e v e r there w e r e professors c o n d u c t i n g t h e m w h o h a d studi e d at the U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o n o t least in the great heartland i n c l u d e d in the M i d w e s t of our society. Some of Mead's students h a d published their versions of his ideas or quotations f r o m some of his philosophical p a p e r s K i m b a l l Young's Source Book in Social Psychology of a decade earl i e r contained a paper by M e a d , a n d his Social Psychology bore the strong i m p r i n t of M e a d i a n interactionism.
2 3

PART I Theory and Methods that is, to be correct; there is m u c h debate over orthodoxy, a n d w h a t e v e r intellectual powers there may be, are m o r e devoted to casuistry and c r i t i c i s m than to i n q u i r y a n d creativity. T h e m n e m i c effort f r e e d f r o m its task of r e m e m b e r i n g " h o w it goes" is somehow transformed into energy for i m a g i n a t i o n on the one h a n d a n d for the d r u d g e r y of testing and justification on the other. This is w h a t was made possible by the belated p u b l i c a t i o n of the three books by Mead. M e a d h a d not b e e n the only one of the symbolic interactionists w h o h a d failed to publish. T h e year 1937 was the one in w h i c h some of the papers of E l l s w o r t h Faris appeared u n d e r the title, The Nature of Human Nature. H e r e , too, was a belated p u b l i c a t i o n w h i c h , i n its s p r i n k l i n g and scatter, speaks m o r e for what Faris n e v e r publisheda r o u n d e d theoretical conception of his social psychology. Thomas's theoretical f o r m ulations w e r e similarly scarce, scattered a n d i n c o m p l e t e h o w e v e r influential. W h i l e D e w e y p u b l i s h e d v o l u m i n o u s l y , his chief f o r m u l a t i o n of symbolic interaction theory is, in my v i e w , his Experience and Nature w h i c h d i d not appear u n t i l late a n d w h i c h is w r i t t e n in such a f o r b i d d i n g G e r m a n i c version of the E n g l i s h language that m a n y sociologists a n d social psychologists have not r e a d i t e v e n y e t . B l u m e r , the y o u n g and p r o m i s i n g heir apparent, has published relatively little and has n o w h e r e gathered together a r o u n d e d version of his point of v i e w .
5 6

N o , the significance of the p u b l i c a t i o n of M e a d ' s books is that it e n d e d w h a t must be t e r m e d the l o n g era of the " o r a l t r a d i t i o n , " the era in w h i c h most of the g e r m i n a t i n g ideas h a d b e e n passed about by w o r d of m o u t h . (It should be n o t e d parenthetically that M e a d h a d p u b l i s h e d earlier a considerable n u m b e r of papers, but they w e r e m a i n l y in journals d e v o t e d to philosophy a n d ethics, journals not l i k e l y to be r e a d by sociologists or social psychologists. H i s only paper in a sociological journalof w h i c h I am awarewas his assessment of Cooley's theories.)
4

T h e oral tradition, it must be n o t e d , has some generic peculiarities w h i c h are e v i d e n c e d equally b y p r i m i t i v e m y t h and b y u n p u b l i s h e d intellectual orientation: there tends to be m u c h (almost ritual) repetition; there is a strain to "get it r i g h t , "
2

E d w a r d A l s w o r t h Ross, Young (ed.),

Social Psychology ( N e w Y o r k ,

1908). York:

George H. M e a d , "Thought, Symbols, and Language," in K i m Source Book for Social Psychology ( N e w

B u t e v e n t h o u g h the oral tradition has some tendency to continue in symbolic interactionism, the past twenty-five years have seen a m a r k e d increase in all kinds of activity i n v o l v i n g the published symbol: three textbooks on " o u r side of the social psychological fence"that b y R . E . L . Faris, that by L i n d e s m i t h a n d Strauss (now in its second edition) and the v e r y recent one by S h i b u t a n i ;
7
5

ball

A l f r e d A . K n o p f , 1928), p p . 3 4 1 - 4 6 , r e p r i n t e d f r o m " T h e B e h a v ioristic A c c o u n t phy, 19:159-63 of t h e (1922). S i g n i f i c a n t S y m b o l , " Journal of PhilosoKimball Young, F. Social Psychology: An S. Crofts, 1930). York:

Ellsworth in

Faris,

The

Nature (New and

of Human York Nature and

Nature and London:

Other EsMcGrawCourt

says

Social Psychology Dewey,

H i l l , 1937).
6

Analysis of Social Behavior ( N e w

4

John

Experience Faris,

(Chicago:

Open

[ K u h n is referring to George H. M e a d , "Cooley's Contribution American Social Thought," American Journal of Sociology,

P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y , 1925).
7

to

Robert E. L.

Social Psychology ( N e w Y o r k : T h e R o n a l d

3 5 : 6 9 3 - 7 0 6 ( M a r . , 1930). T h e s a m e j o u r n a l d i d i n f a c t p u b l i s h two earlier papers b y M e a d : " T h e W o r k i n g H y p o t h e s i s i n Social Reform," American Journal of Sociology, 5:367-71 (Nov., 1899); " T h e P s y c h o l o g y o f P r i m i t i v e J u s t i c e , " ibid., 2 3 : 5 7 7 - 6 0 2 ( M a r . 1918).The Editor.]

P r e s s , 1953); A l f r e d R . L i n d e s m i t h a n d A n s e l m L . Strauss, Social Psychology ( N e w Y o r k : T h e D r y d e n Press, 1 9 4 9 : r e v . e d . , 1956); Tamotsu Approach Shibutani, Society and Personality: An Interactionist Prenticeto Social Psychology ( E n g l e w o o d C l i f f s , N.J.:

H a l l , 1961).

Kuhn a sizable fraction of N e w c o m b ' s text and lesser amounts of others on the "other side"; a considerable n u m b e r of monographs, and into the h u n dreds of j o u r n a l articles. Basically the past twenty-five years have constituted, in contrast to the p r e c e d i n g era, the age of inquiry in symbolic interactionism. B u t w h i l e it has been an era of i n q u i r y , the i n q u i r y has b e e n directed at the testing and develo p i n g of what amounts almost to a welter of subtheories going by a variety of names other than symbolic interactionism. This spawning of smaller, less inclusive theories has b e e n due, in my o p i n i o n , neither to the propensity of scholars to attempt to make names for themselves by ren a m i n g what has already b e e n proposed, nor to their h a v i n g modified or augmented symbolic i n teraction in significant measure. This developm e n t of sub- or related orientations has s t e m m e d f r o m the essential ambiguities and contradictions in the M e a d i a n statementambiguities and contradictions w h i c h were generally i n t e r p r e t e d to be dark, inscrutable complexities too difficult to understand as long as the orientation r e m a i n e d largely in the oral tradition. M u c h of this confusion and contradiction may be s u m m e d u p b u t only in a vastly o v e r s i m p l i f y i n g way and for purposes l i m i t e d to i m m e d i a t e ones I hope here to expoundas a contradiction between [determinacy] a n d [indeterminacy] in Mead's overall point of view.
8

29 constituting in their conversation the self, he i n d i cated that the / is impulsive and essentially u n predictableand furthermore that the / is the initiating, acting aspect of the self. It is never c o m pletely clear w h e t h e r he meant only that the / is subjectively unpredictable or that it is indeterminate in a scientific sense. F u r t h e r m o r e , it seems apparent that there was a basic initiative attributed to the self in the whole process of role-taking, at any rate after the early l e a r n i n g of language and probably e v e n duri n g that process as w e l l . M e a d , after all, insisted that the self constitutes its o w n e n v i r o n m e n t , its o w n reality. F u r t h e r m o r e , there is the i m p l i c i t possibility of indeterminacy in the whole conversation b e t w e e n the / and the Me. A n d , finally, it is possible to see in Mead's notion of the self such an antithesis to structure, such a dynamically volatile process of shifting self-indications that, whatever the theoretical v i e w of d e t e r m i n a c y vs. i n d e t e r m i n a c y in any of the attributes of the self, the whole matter is so evanescent and shifting that it is obviously a practical impossibility to obtain access to anypossibly determinateantecedents in time to make usable or testable predictions. We m a y sum up this set of ambiguities about d e t e r m i n i s m as follows: T h e notion that the / is indeterminate but the Me's are determinate; the notion that b o t h the / a n d the Me's are i n d e t e r m i nate; the notion that whereas both the / a n d Me's are determinate results of identifiable events, the interaction (conversation) b e t w e e n the t w o is somehow itself indeterminate or emergent. B u t this is a p r e l i m i n a r y v i e w and does not cover the varieties of ways in w h i c h symbolic interactionism may be structured and, for that matter, has b e e n structured by those proposing i n q u i r y u n d e r its aegis. T h e two most frequently c o m p l i c a t i n g considerations are: (1) the question w h e t h e r the self is conceived, for research purposes, as the antecedent variable w i t h c r i t e r i o n events (especially behaviors) as consequent variables, or conversely w h e t h e r antecedent variables (ascribed identities, affiliations, associations, or c o m m u n i c a t i o n variables and other events) are conceived to predictthat is, to exist in regularity withconsequent self variations; and (2) the question w h e t h e r the relevant antecedent variables

It is apparent that M e a d took the v i e w that the i n d i v i d u a l is initially dependent on the antecedent existence of a social system, specifically as it exists in the ongoing process of a functioning language, for the means w h e r e w i t h to engage in experience or to take any k i n d of self-conscious and self-directed action. This internalization of language and the concomitant internalization of the role of the other has, in the M e a d i a n description, n o t h i n g in it inconsistent w i t h strict regularity or d e t e r m i n i s m . Yet, as M e a d proposed the / and the Me as the i n t e r n a l conversationalists
9

Theodore

M.

Newcomb,

Social Psychology

(New

York:

The

D r y d e n P r e s s , 1950).
9

" M e a d ' s account of c o n d u c t . . . is not opposed, in principle,

to a deterministic view of b e h a v i o r . " G u y E. Swanson, " M e a d a n d F r e u d , T h e i r R e l e v a n c e f o r S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y . " Sociometry 2 4 : 3 2 7 ( D e c , 1961). . . _. .


are c o n c e i v e d to be immediate or remote in t i m e w i t h respect to the events thought of as con sequent. This set of questions and ambiguities in sym bolic interaction theory has l e d to a variety of answers. O n e answer structures h u m a n behavior deterministically by c o n c e i v i n g antecedent, cau sal variables to be contemporaneous social ones w i t h the consequent ones h a v i n g to do w i t h the nature or structure of the self (either as a w h o l e or of the elements seen to constitute the whole). A second answer conceives the antecedent variables to be historical or d e v e l o p m e n t a l , thus possibly quite temporally remote f r o m the conse quent variables w h i c h are, as in the first answer, taken to be the nature or structure of the self, either holistically or elementally constituted. A t h i r d answer conceives the antecedent var iables to be the self, either as a w h o l e or e l e m e n tally, a n d the consequent variables to be those of overt behavior. A f o u r t h answer conceives the antecedent variables to be self variables w h i c h a m o n g t h e m selves p r o d u c e consequent, n o v e l , but d e t e r m i nate self-attributes. A similar variety of indeterminate answers has b e e n g i v e n to the questions raised by a m b i g u i ties and inconsistencies in symbolic interaction orientation. O n e answer appears to see v i r t u a l l y all signifi cant attributes of behavior to be i n t e r n a l choices a n d other self-indications, all of w h i c h are con c e i v e d to be emergent, w i t h no observable, regu lar antecedent. A n o t h e r is similar to this v i e w but sees ante cedents to these internal events in experiences lost, or partially lost, in the antiquity of the i n d i vidual's early biography, a n d w i t h o u t too close a d e p e n d e n c e on, or regularity w i t h , such early happenings. A t h i r d sees the significant variables as exter n a l behaviors w h i c h are either u n r e l a t e d to the self, or deviously related, or only loosely related to the self. Such is often the k i n d of orientation h e l d by those who see a sharp disjunction be t w e e n p u b l i c and private selves, w h e r e the p r i vate self is the true self w i t h unresearchable antecedents, a n d w h e r e the p u b l i c self is the so

PART I Theory and Methods cial self, b o t h in that it relates to observable be haviors and in that it has social antecedents. A f o u r t h conceives external events to be shaped m o r e or less u n p r e d i c t a b l y by self-activi ties w h i c h in t u r n are " s e l f - d e v e l o p e d , " i.e., i n d e t e r m i n a t e in any testable way. If one w e r e to arrogate to oneself the p r i v i lege of d e c i d i n g these issues a n d others raised essentially by the ambiguities in symbolic interac t i o n orientation, one c o u l d n a r r o w sharply the task of s u r v e y i n g the major trends in this theory in the past twenty-five years. This, h o w e v e r , I d e e m to be neither p r o p e r nor useful. S i m i l a r l y , if symbolic interactionists h a d their o w n profes sional organization, their o w n j o u r n a l or journals, their o w n pontifical leader or tight-knit little c l i que of leaders clearly assigned the role of deter m i n i n g the " c o r r e c t " v i e w a m o n g c o m p e t i n g d o c t r i n a l differences, the survey of the fruits of orthodoxy m i g h t be simple. Instead, h o w e v e r , we have none of these things, and for the most part we w i s h none of t h e m . B u t the consequences are that there is a w e l t e r of partial orientations w h i c h bear v a r y i n g relationships to the general p o i n t of v i e w . T h e r e is, for e x a m p l e , role theory. R o l e t h e o r y has m a n y intellectual antecedents other t h a n those i n C o o l e y , D e w e y , Thomas, Faris, a n d M e a d . T h e r e are debts, for instance, to L i n t o n , to M o r e n o , to Parsons; there are often overtones of one or another of the H a r n i n g theories. These are but a few of the sti ,nds of thought in role theory. Y e t role theory is not sharply dis tinguishableif at a l l f r o m symbolic interac tionism. T h e emphasis in role theory is on overt role p l a y i n g a n d on the researchable relation be t w e e n role expectations a n d role performances; the emphasis is either less, or altogether l a c k i n g , on role-taking, on the interior processes of the self, a n d what Shibutani calls the sentiments are often i g n o r e d . T h u s role theory tends t o w a r d what T u r n e r wishes to call the processes of conformity.
10

Y e t I must underscore the w o r d emphasis,

10

[Cp.

Shibutani, Behavior

op. and

at,

pp.

3 2 3 f f . , 5 4 8 f f . e t passim; R a l p h Versus An Conformity," Interactionist in Ap Processes:

H.

Turner,

"Role-Taking: Social

Process

Human

proach, A r n o l d M . R o s e , e d . ( B o s t o n : H o u g h t o n M i f f l i n , 1962), pp. 20-40.The Editor].

far in Sarbin's useful chapter in the Handbook :f Social Psychology, there is no i g n o r i n g of self nor of empathy, nor is there in his o w n research of w h i c h there is a fine example i n d i c a t i n g a positive relation b e t w e e n role-taking ability on the tne h a n d a n d degree of malleability of self-con: e p t i o n on the other). B u t on the w h o l e , role theory has i m p l i e d [determinacy] of T y p e I. A m o n g the important contributions of the quarter-century u n d e r the general aegis of role theory have b e e n the p r e l i m i n a r y systematization p r o v i d e d in the early part of Gross, M a s o n , a n d McEachern's Explorations in Role Analysis, md T u r n e r ' s paper in Rose's Human Behavior 2nd Social Processes, i n w h i c h issues of d e t e r m i nacy vs. i n d e t e r m i n a c y of the sort here proposed far all of symbolic interactionism are m a d e w i t h respect specifically to role t h e o r y . Role theory has e n g e n d e r e d a great deal of research; in fact, it is as m u c h to role theory as to any other development that I point w h e n I have designated this period u n d e r scrutiny as the era of i n q u i r y . This is no place in w h i c h to attempt to s u m m a r i z e this research. By and large we can say it has u n derscored Thomas's d i c t u m that " p e o p l e t e n d to play the roles assigned to t h e m . " T h e r e is by no means any strong evidence that there is a c o m pletely determinate relation b e t w e e n role expectations or recipes on the one h a n d a n d role performance o n the other. O n the other h a n d , there is a g r o w i n g m o u n t a i n of e v i d e n c e that w i t h
11 12

role conflicts a n d contradictions. This study has ranged f r o m the imaginative e m p l o y m e n t of personal documents a n d interviews b y M i r r a K o m a rovsky in her study of the conflicts s u r r o u n d i n g the role of y o u n g w o m e n in c o l l e g e to the construction of fairly precise and rigorous scales in the measure of such role conflict in the w o r k of Stouffer and T o b y . E v e n i n such studies w h i c h i m p l y i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n and thus the interposition of intermediate or i n t e r v e n i n g variables into our T y p e I d e t e r m i n a c y pattern, such i n t e r v e n i n g variables are basically unnecessary e v e n in the operations by K o m a r o v s k y ; for although they i n v o l v e d reports of subjective valuations, these reports c o u l d have b e e n r e p l a c e d by direct observations of communications a p p l y i n g the opposi n g pressuresit was simply i n c o n v e n i e n t to do so.
13

" k n o w n " o r p u b l i c role recipes i n h a n d w e can make v e r y useful probabilistic predictions w i t h respect to subsequent behaviors, not alone those representing the answering role performances but e v e n those w h i c h are but logically related and ancillary behaviors. M u c h of the utility of role theory has b e e n demonstrated thus far in the study of i n t e r n a l i z e d
;1

A n o t h e r equally salient d e v e l o p m e n t has b e e n that of reference group theory, so-named, o f course, b y H y m a n but getting m u c h o f the attention it has r e c e i v e d f r o m the concept of relative d e p r i v a t i o n as e m p l o y e d by Stouffer in The American Soldier a n d as r e w o r k e d in the w e l l k n o w n chapter o n reference group theory b y M e r t o n and K i t t . T h e r e have b e e n a n u m b e r of useful theoretical critiques as w e l l as creative e m p l o y m e n t s of reference group theory, notable a m o n g t h e m those of K e l l e y , Shibutani, T u r n e r , N e w c o m b , a n d Sherif. T h e notion of reference group is obviously closely related to the w h o l e p r o b l e m of the other as dealt w i t h by M e a d a n d Sullivan on the one h a n d , and to that of the p r i m a r y group as described by C o o l e y a n d Faris on the other. M u c h of the e m p l o y m e n t of this n e w theory has b e e n so far to p r o v i d e ex post or c i r c u lar explanation (explanation by naming). C o n t r o versy abounds, to be sure, over the m e a n i n g of the t e r m reference group itselfwhether it refers
1 4 1 5

Theodore

R.

Sarbin,

"Role

Theory,"

in

Handbook o f Social
13

Psychology, e d . b y G a r d n e r L i n d z e y ( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : A d d i s o n - W e s l e y P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y , 1954), 1 : 2 2 3 - 5 8 . [ T h e e x a m p l e o f S a r b i n ' s o w n r e s e a r c h that K u h n p r o b a b l y h a d i n m i n d is Theodore R. Sarbin and N o r m a n L. Farberow, "Contributions to Role-Taking Theory: of Abnormal and A Clinical Study of Self a n d 47:117-25 Role," (Jan., Journal Social Psychology,

Mirra Komarovsky, and H. Hyman,

Women

in

the Modem Little,

World:

Their Edu1953).

cation
14

Their Dilemmas ( B o s t o n :

Brown,

The Psychology o f Status ( A r c h i v e s o f P s y c h o l o g y ,

V o l . 38, n o . 2 6 9 , J u n e , 1942).
1 5

Robert K . M e r t o n a n d A l i c e S . Kitt, " C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the Continuities i n Social of "The American Studies in the Scope and Method

1952).The Editor.]
1 1

T h e o r y of R e f e r e n c e G r o u p B e h a v i o r , " in Research:

N e a l Gross, W a r d S . Mason, a n d Alexander W . M c E a c h e r n , in Bole Analysis; Studies of the School Superinten1958); R a l p h H . T u r n e r ,

Soldier, " e d . b y R o b e r t K . M e r t o n a n d P a u l F . L a z a r s f e l d ( G l e n c o e , I l l i n o i s : T h e F r e e P r e s s , 1950): r e p r i n t e d i n R o b e r t K . M e r ton, Social Theory and Social Structure, revised and enlarged e d i t i o n ( G l e n c o e , 111.: F r e e P r e s s , 1957), p p . 2 2 5 - 8 0 .

Explorations

dency Role ( N e w Y o r k : J o h n W i l e y ,

" R o l e - T a k i n g : P r o c e s s V e r s u s C o n f o r m i t y , " op. cit.

32
to a normative or to an evaluative function; w h e t h e r it must point to groups, to categories or both; whether it may best refer to relationships, as Rose suggests, or whether we may better use it to refer to derivative orientations, as Shibutani indicates. M a y we use the t e r m to refer to e m p i r i cally identifiable attitudes, expectations, and norms of existent others, or must w e l i m i t ourselves to such matters only after they have been transmuted to the images in the imagination of the actors themselves, to w h i c h C o o l e y referred as the " s o l i d facts" of social life? T h e classification of reference group theory is difficult, for in the theoretical statements of it, i n d e t e r m i n a t e m o d e l 7 fits, but in the actual application of the theory, determinate models 1 t h r o u g h 4 have b e e n variously e m p l o y e d . T h e contradictions between theoretical statements and operational implications i n reference group theory are one of the most u n h a p p y aspects of symbolic interactionism today, in this author's opinion. N e x t consider the related d e v e l o p m e n t of points of v i e w k n o w n as social perception and person perception. If we r e g a r d the ancient dicta: " W e see things not as they are but as we are," a n d " W e do not first see and then define; we define first and then see," as intimately i n v o l v e d in the point of v i e w of symbolic interactionism, we m a y p r o p e r l y c l a i m at least a strong interest in the d e v e l o p m e n t of these interrelated schools. T h e researches contained in the v o l u m e edited by Petrullo and T a g i u r i , for example, bear in m a n y instances on hypotheses generated by symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n i s m . On the other hand, this research m o v e m e n t is l e d by m e n relatively unacquainted w i t h " o u r " literature. Consequently our o w n reaction to any one piece of research such as is contained in Petrullo a n d Tagiuri's v o l u m e is that it is in one or m o r e respects naive: in its lack of sophistication about the f u n c t i o n of language in interaction, in its failure to employ a concept equivalent to social act or social object or significant other, etc., etc.
16

PART I Theory and Methods w o r k on the differential perception of the size of coins by subjects of different i n c o m e levels is a classic study in the field of social perception, has admirably stated in summary f o r m the general position of these schools in "Social Psychology and P e r c e p t i o n , " in the t h i r d edition of Readings in Social Psychology e d i t e d by M a c c o b y , N e w comb, and H a r t l e y . H i s summary is such that the symbolic interactionist can easily deduce for himself the c o m m o n g r o u n d this position shares w i t h symbolic interaction theory; I am therefore spared this task by c i t i n g this article. I w o u l d only object that the B r u n e r paper misleads somewhat in failing to indicate the degree to w h i c h " p e r c e p tual set" as a k e y concept central to this school has come to serve as u m b r e l l a for F r e u d i a n rather than symbolic interaction variables, and for i m p l y i n g , on the other h a n d , that social p e r c e p t i o n treats what people are d o i n g as central to the nature of what they perceive (for this is not borne out by their e x p e r i m e n t a l designs).
17

T h e models on w h i c h social and person perception theory rests appear to be types 1 a n d 4. That is, they are determinate and t e n d to designate either i m m e d i a t e or temporally distal antecedent social variables and consequent behavioral variables. H a d symbolic interactionists initiated the exploration of this field, they w o u l d have e m phasized the ways in w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l conceives himself as antecedent a n d the m a n n e r he perceives other objects i n c l u d i n g persons as consequent, w i t h probably some attention to designs in w h i c h these types of variables are reversed in time. So far, we have dealt w i t h subtheories w h i c h have had v e r y ambiguous boundaries. T h e same thing is certainly true of self theory w i t h w h i c h I have identified my o w n research activities. It was my i n t e n t i o n in 1946 or 1947 to e m p l o y a t e r m w h i c h w o u l d not so m u c h differentiate an e m e r g i n g point of v i e w f r o m the more or less orthodox ideas of symbolic interaction as it w o u l d enable, on the other h a n d , a distinction b e t w e e n a body of conjectural and deductive o r i e n t a t i o n
1 7

Jerome
18

Bruner,

whose

own
Behavior,

experimental
Jerome Bruner, in Social "Social Psychology, Psychology 3rd ed., and Perception," in ed. by Renato Readings Editorial Committee: Eleanor E . Maccoby, Theodore M . Neweomb, Eugene L . Hartl e y ( N e w Y o r k : H e n r y H o l t , 1958), p p . 8 5 - 9 4 .

Person

Perception

and Interpersonal

T a g i u r i a n d L u i g i Petrullo (Stanford, C a l i f : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958).

Where Soc refers to social variable Self refers to self variable, either holistic or elementalistic Selfp refers to "private self" Selfp b refers to "public self" A indicates antecedent variable A, indicates immediately antecedent variable A indicates antecedent but temporarily distal variable indicates consequent variable Beh indicates overt behavioral variable Ch indicates internal choice-making Ind indicates internal (self) indications Em indicates an emergent (I or Me) Det indicates a determinate (I or Me) Solid arrow indicates a determinate, causal process Broken arrow indicates an indeterminate, emergent process Asterisk (*) indicates the locus of indeterminacy; this may lie in the nexus between antecedent and consequent variables as well as in any of the following internal aspects of the self:
r U 2

as represented by Cooley, D e w e y , and M e a d and a derivative but d e v e l o p i n g set of generaliza tions, tested by e m p i r i c a l research. I f o u n d later that, at about the same time, C a r l Rogers h a d also t e r m e d as self theory his notions in clinical psychology h a v i n g to do w i t h the v a r y i n g discre pancies b e t w e e n the actual or p e r c e i v e d self and the ideal self. Since then the t e r m has been v a r i ously e m p l o y e d , often as an u m b r e l l a w o r d , to cover several or all of the subtheories here u n d e r consideration. T h e work undertaken by students of symbolic

interaction at the State University of Iowa fol l o w e d in several respects the programmatic pro posals of the summary m o n o g r a p h on social psychology in the 1930s by L e o n a r d C o t t r e l l and R u t h Gallagher and of Cottrell's later presidential address before the A m e r i c a n Sociological Society; that is to say, there has been considerable atten tion to the self itself and to r o l e - t a k i n g .
18
1 8

Leonard Social

S.

C o t t r e l l , Jr.,

and

Ruth (New

Gallagher, York:

Developments Press,

in

Psychology,

1930-1940 American

Beacon

1941); L e o n a r d S . C o t t r e l l , Jr., " S o m e N e g l e c t e d P r o b l e m s i n Social Psychology," Sociological Review, 15:705-12 ( D e c , 1950).

34
M c P a r t l a n d p i o n e e r e d i n his study relating differential nexi-to-social-structure to the differential characteristics of the self. L a t e r he has studied the relations among self, social strata, and the differential syndromes of mental-emotional disturbance. F r e d W a i s a n e n e x p l o r e d relations between self characteristics and prejudice. S t e w a r t demonstrated the often alleged relation of the self to a system of objects, as d i d C a r l W a i s a n e n and W y n o n a G a r r e t s o n i n other ways. M a r a n e l l studied relations b e t w e e n self a n d role-taking a n d began the exploration of transparency, the obverse of empathy. R o g l e r established that there is a direct relation b e t w e e n role-taking and access to a c o m m u n i c a t i o n syst e m . T h e validation and extension of symbolic i n teraction ideas represented in these researches is for the most part p r e l i m i n a r y and one must assess it as modest. Perhaps the most significant c o n t r i b u t i o n of the Iowa research is simply that in w h i c h it joins the research of M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h , D e u t s c h a n d Solomon, D i c k , D i n i t z a n d Mangus, M c K e e a n d Sheriffs, Stryker, V i d e beck and Bates, and m a n y others in demonstrati n g to some degree at least that the k e y ideas of symbolic interactionism c o u l d be operationalized a n d u t i l i z e d successfully i n e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h .
1 9 20 21 22 23 2 4 2 5 26

Self theory of this variety has i m p l i e d one or another of the five determinate models in our diagram, although this point is i m p l i c i t rather than explicit, a n d n e v e r a salient issue. T h e general attempt rests on the n o t i o n that there is a m o n g the several i m p o r t a n t matters a process considered nomothetic or genotypical by the symbolic interaction orientation. A m o n g the subtheories that seem to i m p l y i n d e t e r m i n a c y p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l theory, the study of careers, language, a n d culture of Sapir a n d W h o r f , the interpersonal theory of H. S. Sulliv a n , the self-constancy a n d self-actualizing theories of such m e n as Stegner a n d M a s l o w o n e seems to stand out as just a shade m o r e radical a n d eye-catching than the rest: the dramaturgical school o f K e n n e t h B u r k e , E r v i n g G o f f m a n , and possibly N e l s o n F o o t e and G r e g o r y Stone. The most significant alteration m a d e by this school is the general transmutation of the social act f r o m what i n traditional symbolic interactionism had c o n t i n u e d to be paradoxically an i n d i v i d u a l m o d e l (triggered by organic tensions and impulses and f o l l o w i n g t h r o u g h the course of the action w i t h reference to the singlealmost f e r a l m a n to e q u i l i b r i u m , restitution of tensionlessness in the organism) to the team-of-players m o d e l w h i c h i m plies that social agenda rather than tissue c o n d i tions serve to initiate the act a n d to cue its e n d as w e l l . This, of course, is but one of the extremely provocative aspects of dramaturgical theory, especially as initiated by B u r k e a n d d e v e l o p e d by Goffman. T h e difficulties w i t h this subtheory are, in the m a i n , those of d e r i v i n g f r o m it any testable generalizations. O n e must be tentative about this, it seems to m e , for this was exactly the c o m p l a i n t lodged against the w h o l e of symbolic interaction orientation in its early years. It may w e l l be that ingenious solutions w i l l be f o u n d to the problems of operationalizing the basic conceptions of this orientation. Of the models we suggest diagrammatically, n u m b e r s 8 a n d 9 seem to be the ones most frequently i m p l i e d i n dramaturgical theory, although the t e a m characteristics of Goffman's units appear to i m p l y models i n d i c a t i n g t e a m rather than i n d i v i d u a l conduct. T h e l o n g i t u d i n a l study of socialization a n d

1 9

T h o m a s S . M c P a r t l a n d , " T h e Self a n d Social Structure," un-

p u b l i s h e d d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n , State U n i v e r s i t y o f I o w a , 1953; " S e l f C o n c e p t i o n , S o c i a l C l a s s , a n d M e n t a l H e a l t h , " Human Organization, 1 7 : 2 4 - 2 9 (1958); T . S . M c P a r t l a n d , J o h n H . C u m m i n g and Wynona S. ( J u n e , 1961).
2 0

Garretson, "Self Conception and W a r d Sociometry, 2 4 : 1 1 - 2 4

Behavior in T w o Psychiatric Hospitals,"

F . B . Waisanen, " T h e Prejudice V a r i a b l e : A Social Psychologi-

c a l a n d M e t h o d o l o g i c a l S t u d y , " u n p u b l i s h e d d o c t o r a l dissertat i o n , State U n i v e r s i t y o f I o w a , 1954.

2 1

R o b e r t L . Stewart, " T h e Self a n d O t h e r Objects: T h e i r Meas-

u r e m e n t a n d I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p , " u n p u b l i s h e d d o c t o r a l dissertat i o n , State U n i v e r s i t y o f I o w a , 1955.

2 2

C a r l E . Waisanen, "Preference Aspects o f Self-Attitudes," unW y n o n a S m u t z Garretson, " C o l l e g e as Social Object: A Study

p u b l i s h e d d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n , State U n i v e r s i t y o f I o w a , 1957.
2 3

i n C o n s e n s u s , " u n p u b l i s h e d d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n , State U n i v e r sity o f I o w a , 1961; " T h e C o n s e n s u a l D e f i n i t i o n o f S o c i a l O b jects,"

1 1

Sociological M. 1959.

Quarterly,

3:107-13

(Apr., Empathy

1962). and Transpar-

Gary

Maranell,

"Role-Taking:

e n c y , " u n p u b l i s h e d d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n , State U n i v e r s i t y o f Iowa,

2 5

L l o y d H . Rogler, " A n E x p e r i m e n t a l Study o f the Relationship

b e t w e e n Structured Behavior Patterns a n d A c c u r a c y of Social S e n s i t i v i t y , " u n p u b l i s h e d d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n , State U n i v e r s i t y of Iowa,

2 6

1957.

See the a p p e n d e d bibliography.

Kuhn especially of career trajectories, best i n d i c a t e d in the w o r k of E. C. Hughes and H o w a r d S. B e c k e r , seems also to lie on the i n d e t e r m i n a c y side. T h e w o r k of these two m e n is v i r t u a l l y as imaginative a n d as creative as that of B u r k e a n d of Goffman. T h e r e is, in the literature, no m o r e insightful ac count of the relation of the actor to a social object through the processes of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d of self-definition, than Becker's account of b e c o m i n g a marijuana u s e r . Hughes's sensitivity to l i n g u a l indicators of status is w o n d e r f u l l y r e v e a l e d in his w e l l - k n o w n and f u n d a m e n t a l essay, " W o r k a n d the S e l f . " In it he presents a m o d e m - a g e social psychological interpretation of " w h a t the social classes owe to each o t h e r . "
27 28

M e a d i a n a n d F r e u d i a n viewpoints w i t h o u t admit t i n g any of the F r e u d i a n nonsense about p h y l o genetic inheritance of unconscious sense of guilt, the early Oedipus n o t i o n , the nature of m a n pit ted against society, etc., w h i l e u t i l i z i n g to the f u l l the p o w e r of F r e u d i a n explanation of interper sonal r i v a l r y a n d of distortions in c o m m u n i c a t i o n d o w n to the u t i l i z a t i o n of the concept of self-derogation a n d self-rejection and repression (the not-me)concepts h i n g i n g on interpersonal relations (reflected appraisals by others) r a t h e r than on t h w a r t e d instincts and biological drives as F r e u d h a d it. U n f o r t u n a t e l y the Sullivan interpersonal the ory is quite disjoined f r o m ideas of culture a n d of f o r m a l social organization. This has l e d Shibu tani to set up disjunctive self components: Those d e r i v e d f r o m conventional role-playing a n d those d e r i v e d as sentiments f r o m the kinds of interper sonal processes S u l l i v a n described, c o m p l e t e l y d i v o r c e d f r o m culture a n d organized systems. It is also unfortunate that the interpersonal theory suffers f r o m the same difficulties as the other i n determinate theories: inability to apply the usual scientific methods in order to b u i l d increasingly supported, dependable generalizations. T h e Sulli v a n m o d e l appears to rest on a c o m b i n a t i o n of models, 7, 8, a n d 9, thus indicating looseness be t w e e n antecedent, i n t e r v e n i n g a n d consequent variables, plus the possibility for further emer gence in the i n t e r i o r processes of the self. T h e specific, t e m p o r a l l y distal, antecedent variables on w h i c h the theory rests are those h a v i n g to do w i t h what S u l l i v a n calls the parataxic a n d prototaxic stages in w h a t is essentially the p r e v e r bal p e r i o d . In these, there is no real o p p o r t u n i t y c o n c e i v e d for direct e m p i r i c a l observation, a n d thus there is further indeterminacy b e y o n d the posited looseness b e t w e e n these stages and later self-attributes. O n e m o r e i n d e t e r m i n a t e subtheory is the Sapir-Whorf-Cassirer language and culture orientation? This is t r u l y a theory b e h i n d a the0
30

A g a i n , the difficulties w i t h this approach seem to lie in operationalization. It is most difficult to establish generalizations v a l i d for h u m a n be havior w i t h o u t methods w h e r e w i t h to m a k e pre cise checks on intersubjective perceptions of events such as are i n v o l v e d in witnessing tran sitional stages in a socialization process or rites of passage in the trajectory of a career. T h e indeterminate m o d e l on w h i c h this ap p r o a c h seems to rest is our type no. 7; that is, the antecedent variables, t e m p o r a r i l y distal, are loosely (indeterminately) related to the processes of choice a n d self-indication w h i c h constitute the self. T h e interpersonal theory of psychiatry p r o posed by H a r r y Stack S u l l i v a n was constructed early in this quarter-century p e r i o d . It has b e e n almost ubiquitously i n c o r p o r a t e d into the general body of symbolic interaction orientation, or per haps the v e r b should be " r e i n c o r p o r a t e d " since S u l l i v a n h a d been w e l l i n t r o d u c e d t o M e a d i a n theory in the 1920s and h a d built the interper sonal theory in significant part out of elements p r o v i d e d b y M e a d o n the one h a n d a n d b y F r e u d on the other. T h e theory is distinctive for the u n i q u e w a y in w h i c h it manages a synthesis of
2 9
2 7

H o w a r d S . B e c k e r , " B e c o m i n g a M a r i h u a n a U s e r , " American (Nov., 1953) (New [reprinted York: in Part Press

Journal of Sociology 5 9 : 2 3 5 - 4 2 Studies in the Sociology

V o f this b o o k T h e E d i t o r ] . [ C p . H o w a r d S . B e c k e r , Outsiders: of Deviance Free of G l e n c o e , 1963)The Editor.]

2 8

[See,

e.g.

Edward Language,

Sapir, Thought 1956);

Language: An and Reality: Cassirer,

Introduction Selected

to

the

E v e r e t t C . H u g h e s , " W o r k a n d t h e S e l f , " i n Social Psychology the Crossroads: The University of Oklahoma Lectures in So

Study o f Speech ( N e w Y o r k : H a r c o u r t , B r a c e , 1921): B e n j a m i n L. tute Whorf, Writings, e d . b y J o h n B . C a r r o l l ( T e c h n o l o g y P r e s s o f M a s s a c h u s e t t s Insti of T e c h n o l o g y , 2 vols. Ernst The Philosophy of Press, 1953Symbolic Forms, (New Haven: Yale U n i v .

at

cial Psychology, e d . b y J o h n H . R o h r e r a n d M u z a f e r S h e r i f ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d B r o t h e r s , 1951), p p . 3 1 3 - 2 3 .

2 9

See the a p p e n d e d bibliography.

1955)The Editor.]

36
ory, for it tends to be p r e s u m e d by symbolic interactionists as being p r e l i m i n a r y e v e n to a consideration of the basic assumptions of the theory u n d e r r e v i e w . T h e language and culture point of v i e w is surely so familiar as not to n e e d m u c h description. It points to the basic proposition that a language consists of a v e r y finite and l i m i t e d n u m b e r of concepts out of an u n l i m i t e d set of possibilities. F u r t h e r m o r e it underscores the fact that e v e n the ultimate and basic c o n c e p t s w h i c h we in our society think of as those dealing w i t h time, m o t i o n , matter and spaceare themselves l i n g u ally variable and relative. A n d , perhaps e v e n m o r e important, it takes the position that the v e r y g r a m m a r of a language is based on an unspoken, taken-for-granted logic w h i c h determines h o w people in that society think about anything. Thus it must follow that the categorization of one's self a n d his attributes, as w e l l as of his others, a n d of the significant n o n h u m a n objects in his system of objects is entirely dependent on the language of his group. He cannot t h i n k of himself or his experiences, or of his relationships, except in the arbitrary conceptualizations p r o v i d e d h i m i n his language. This is an indeterminate theory in so far as the i n d i v i d u a l person's behavior is concerned, for the language only sets the basic f r a m e w o r k for his thought and the outer limits, b e y o n d w h i c h he cannot conceive of things. W i t h i n these limits, and a r o u n d this framework, there is a looseness of connection. No determinate statements are suggested. H o w e v e r , attached as a p r e l i m i n a r y set of assumptions to any of the previously exami n e d determinant subtheories, this point of v i e w removes it f r o m determinacy only in the sense that, as is p o i n t e d out posthumously in the American Anthropologist by the late Clyde K l u c k h o h n , the Whorf-Sapir-Cassirer notions are basically untestable.
31

PART I

Theory and Methods

extensions or amendments to the orientation. These i n c l u d e such points of v i e w as cognitive theory, field theory, phenomenology, the developmental notions of Piaget, the current scrutiny of identity w h i c h bears strong overtones of ego psychology, the self-constancy theory of Stager and others, a n d the self-actualizing theory of Masl o w , in a d d i t i o n to w h i c h there is the self theory of C a r l Rogers, already m e n t i o n e d . M a n y of those theories w e r e d e v e l o p e d by students in the field of psychology. F e w indicate acquaintance w i t h the intellectual stream to w h i c h symbolic interactionism belongs. T h e l i n e I have d r a w n , e x c l u d i n g these f r o m consideration but i n c l u d i n g the ones I have discussed, is h i g h l y arbitrary and may not be defensible in any other sense than that t i m e places limitations e v e n u p o n the most condensed of discussions.

APPLICATIONS So far we have considered the d e v e l o p m e n t of amplifications, subtheories, and operationalizations of symbolic interaction theory. We cannot conclude w i t h o u t considering the p r o m i s i n g starts made in a p p l y i n g the orientation to p r o b l e m areas. T h e r e is the m u c h neglected book by L e m e r t , Social Pathology, w h i c h should have b e e n c a l l e d A Social Psychology of Deviants, in w h i c h the author makes the interesting proposal that a fundamental distinction exists in the behaviors of those whose deviation is accompanied by no corresponding self-definition and those whose deviation is so a c c o m p a n i e d he refers to the difference as secondary differentiation.
32

T h e r e are a n u m b e r of other subtheories w h i c h have h a d their d e v e l o p m e n t d u r i n g these past twenty-five years and w h i c h are related in one or several respects to symbolic interactioni s m , a n d w h i c h serve, if n o t h i n g else, to suggest

M u c h of the application of symbolic interaction theory has b e e n made by students of c r i m e and d e l i n q u e n c y n o t a b l y Crossey, Glaser a n d Reckless. Of the Iowa students, N a r d i n i in the field of the c r i m i n a l , M u l f o r d in the area of the
3 3

32

Edwin William

M.

Lemert, Behavior

Social Pathology: Approach York: McGraw-Hill, Self-Conceptions

to in

the the

Theory Penal

of Sociopathic
3 1

(New

1951).

C l y d e K l u c k h o h n , "Notes o n S o m e Anthropological Aspects Communication," American Anthropologist 63:895-910

3 3

Nardini,

"Criminal

of

C o m m u n i t y : A n E m p i r i c a l S t u d y , " u n p u b l i s h e d d o c t o r a l dissert a t i o n , S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o f I o w a , 1959.

( O c t . , 1961).

*
3 4

37
35

; h o l i c , H u r l b u r t in the area of f a m i l y adjust:rjaat, a n d Nass in the field of d r i v e r safety r e c o r d s , have made application of self-dimens : n s as antecedent variables in p r o m i s i n g eni f i v o r s to understand consequent variable rehavior i n p r o b l e m f i e l d s . T h e n e w c o m p i l a t i o n edited by Rose already r e f e r r e d to, Human Bezsior and Social Processes, contains as its t h i r d final section a set of papers on the relation :: interaction theory to social p r o b l e m areas. N o b b l e is Rose's o w n paper presenting his social:nological theory of neurosis, w h i c h has a zumber of parallels w i t h Sullivan's theory, but distinctive in most respects for its general appli cation of the symbolic interaction o r i e n t a t i o n .
36 37

N E G L E C T E D PROBLEMS I cannot leave the consideration of the devel: u m e n t of symbolic interactionism in the past r.venty-five years without reconsidering the - d e of CottrelFs presidential addressthe ques tion of " n e g l e c t e d p r o b l e m s . " M a n y of the r r o b l e m s w h i c h he f o u n d to be neglected are still neglected, w h i l e otherssuch as role: i k i n g , on w h i c h his o w n student, R. F. D y m o n d , ~ a d e such a notable s t a r t a r e b e g i n n i n g to
38
;

b e studied w i t h m o r e a n d more sophistication. T h e r e is no t i m e here to make a t h o r o u g h canvass of neglected problems, but I should l i k e to m e n t i o n two. O n e is the failure to m a k e appro priate conceptualization of the varieties of func tional relations that regularly occur b e t w e e n self a n d other. At present we appear to be in that rather foolish a n d useless situation in w h i c h we debate what a reference group really is. Most of the suggestions p o i n t to varieties of functional r e l ations b e t w e e n self a n d groups or categories of others. T h e question ought not to be w h i c h of these is really a reference group, but rather, what special t e r m shall we agree to use for each p a r t i c u lar r e l a t i o n ? H a v i n g reached a consensus on a constructed vocabulary w i t h w h i c h to refer to these functional relationships b e t w e e n self a n d other, we n e e d then to consider the serious questions of operationalization. W h a t kinds of questions must be asked to discover the nature of the particular relationship u n d e r inquiry?
39

" Harold

A.

M u l f o r d , Jr.,

"Toward

an

Instrument

to

Identify

n d M e a s u r e t h e Self, S i g n i f i c a n t O t h e r s , a n d A l c o h o l i n t h e -rnbolic E n v i r o n m e n t : A n E m p i r i c a l S t u d y , " u n p u b l i s h e d doc: : ral d i s s e r t a t i o n , State U n i v e r s i t y o f I o w a , 1955.

:

' Julia K n a f f H u r l b u r t ,

"Role

Expectations a n d

t h e Self:

An

EL -npirical S t u d y o f T h e i r R e l a t i o n s h i p t o M a r i t a l A d j u s t m e n t , " ^ p u b l i s h e d doctoral dissertation, 1960.

: ;

State U n i v e r s i t y o f I o w a ,

Gilbert D.

Nass, " A S t u d y o f t h e T e e n - A g e D r i v e r , H i s Selfand Definition of the Driving Situation,"

Definition,
:

u n p u b l i s h e d M a s t e r ' s thesis, State U n i v e r s i t y o f I o w a , 1958. " A r n o l d M . Rose, " A Systematic S u m m a r y o f S y m b o l i c Interac Theory," Relation Empathic of in Human Behavior and and Social Processes. of Consulting Psychology,
i

tion the of

[See R o s a l i n d F .

D y m o n d , " A P r e l i m i n a r y Investigation o f E m p a t h y , " Journal of Consulting

Insight Ability,"

Psychology, 13:127-33

1 2 : 2 2 8 - 3 3 (1948); " A S c a l e f o r t h e M e a s u r e m e n t Journal Small (1949), r e p r i n t e d in Croups: Studies in Social

Interaction, e d . b y A . P a u l H a r e , E d g a r F . B o r g a t t a , a n d R o b e r t F . B a l e s ( N e w Y o r k : A l f r e d A . K n o p f , 1955), p p . 2 2 6 - 3 5 . S e e also Rosalind F. Dymond, Anne S. Hughes, (1952); and Virginia L. R a a b e , " M e a s u r a b l e C h a n g e s i n E m p a t h y w i t h A g e , " Journal of Consulting of P e r c e i v e d Psychology, 16:202-6 Rosalind Sociometry Dymond C a r t w r i g h t , Julius S e e m a n , a n d D o n a l d L . G r u m m o n , "Patterns Interpersonal Relations," 19:166-77 Sept., 1965)The Editor.]

A second pressing question i m p l i e d in m u c h of this paper has to do w i t h the process by w h i c h self-conceptions change. Some theorists, notably those w h o lean t o w a r d the indeterminate side, discuss self-change as if it w e r e most volatile a n d evanescent; the self shifts w i t h each n e w indica t i o n one makes to himself, a n d t h c o indications are the constant accompaniments of experience. Others see in the self the more or less stable, c o n tinuous, o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e for the personality, offering the only constant, non-shifting anchorage for the p e r c e p t i o n of other objects. We have a r r i v e d at the point in sharpening of the tools by w h i c h we m a y identify self-attributes a n d measure t h e m a n d compare t h e m w i t h those of others, w h e r e we m a y treat this issue as a researchable question. As we attempt to measure the relative stability of the self, we n e e d to study the concomitants of self-attitude change. It m a y be argued that the self, like any attitude, m a y be usefully treated as an hypothesis w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l holds about himself, and w i t h respect to w h i c h he holds certain notions about testing for validity. We n e e d to study in short what corre3 9

[Cf. M a n f o r d H . K u h n , " T h e R e f e r e n c e G r o u p R e c o n s i d e r e d " The Sociological Quarterly), w h i c h was w r i t t e n

(in this issue of

shortly after the present e s s a y . T h e Editor.]

38
lates of self-attitude stability are p h e n o m e n a l a n d w h i c h are non-conscious a n d outside self-dir e c t e d control. If I may be p e r m i t t e d a b r i e f look at the crystal b a l l , I w o u l d see in it for the next twentyfive years of symbolic interaction theory an accelerated development of research techniques on the one h a n d , a n d a coalescing of most of the separate subtheories u n d e r consideration in this paper on the other. I have a basic confidence that symbolic interactionism w i l l h o l d its o w n and gain against the competition of such major theories as psychoanalysis, the l e a r n i n g theories, and field theory. T h e reason I am confident is that I believe that of these major theories o n l y symbolic interactionism is logically consistent w i t h the basic propositions of the social sciences: the psychic unit of m a n (Boas); the extreme c u l t u r a l variability of m a n ; the creativity of m a n ; the continual socializability a n d modifiability of m a n ; the ability of m a n to feed back complex correctives to his behavior w i t h o u t engaging in trial a n d error, or conditioni n g , learning.

PART I Theory and Methods Blumer, Herbert. "Sociological Analysis and the Variable," American Sociological Review, 21:683-90 (Dec, 1956). Boogs, Stephen T. " A n Interactional Study of Ojibwa Socialization," American Sociological Review, 21:191-98 (Apr., 1956). Bordua, David J. "Authoritarianism and Intolerance of Nonconformists," Sociometry, 24:198-216 (June, 1961). Brim, Orville, J., Jr. "Family Structure and Sex Role Learning by Children: A Further Analysis of Helen Koch's Data," Sociometry, 21:1-16 (Mar., 1958). Brown, J. C. " A n Experiment in Role-Taking," American Sociological Review, 17:587-97 (Oct., 1952). Bucher, Rue, and Strauss, Anselm. "Professions in Process," American Journal of Sociology, 66:325-34 (Jan., 1961). Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945. . A Rhetoric of Motives. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950. Cameron, Norman. The Psychology of Rehavior Disorders. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947. REFERENCES Cartwright, Rosalind Dymond, Seeman, Julius, and Grummon, Donald L. "Patterns of Perceived Interpersonal Relations," Sociometry, 19:166-77 (Sept., 1956). Clark, John P. "Measuring Alienation Within a Social System," American Sociological Review, 24:849-52 (Dec, 1959). Coates, Chas. H . , and Pellegrin, Roland J. "Executives and Supervisors: Contrasting Self-Conceptions and Conceptions of Each Other." American Sociological Review, 22:217-20 (Apr., 1957). Corwin, Ronald G. "A Study of Identity in Nursing," Sociological Quarterly, 2:69-86 (Apr., 1961). Couch, Carl J. "Self-Attitudes and Degree of Agreement with Immediate Others," American Journal of Sociology, 63:491-96 (Mar., 1958). . "Family Role Specialization and Self-Attitudes in Children," Sociological Quarterly, 3:115-21 (Apr., 1962). Cottrell, L. A., Jr. "The Adjustment of the Individual to His Age and Sex Roles," American Sociological Review, 7:617-20 (Oct., 1942). . "The Analysis of Situational Fields in Social Psychology," American Sociological Review, 7:370-82 (June, 1942).

Apple, D. "Learning Theory and Socialization," American Sociological Review, 16:23-27 (Feb., 1951). Comment by J. Gillin, American Sociological Review, 16:384 (June, 1951). Argyris, C. "The Fusion of an Individual with the Organization," American Sociological Review, 19:267-72 (June, 1954). Becker, Ernest. "Socialization, Command of Performance, and Mental Illness," American Journal of Sociology, 67:484-501 (Mar., 1962). Becker, Howard S. "Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation," American Sociological Review, 23:652-60 (Dec, 1958). Becker, Howard S., and Carper, James."The Elements of Identification with an Occupation," American Sociological Review, 21:341-48 (June, 1956). Becker, Howard S., and Geer, Blanche. "The Fate of Idealism in Medical School," American Sociological Review, 23:50-56 (Feb., 1958). Blau, Zena Smith. "Changes in Status and Age Identification," American Sociological Review, 21:198-203 (Apr., 1956).

39 . "Some Neglected Problems in Social Psychology," American Sociological Review, 15:705-12 (Dec, 1950). Coutu, Walter, Emergent Human Nature. New York: Knopf, 1949. . "Role-Playing vs. Role-Taking: An Appeal for Clarification," American Sociological Review, 16: 180-87 (Apr., 1951). Comment by J. L. Moreno, ibid., 16:550-51 (Aug., 1951). Dai, B. "A Socio-Psychiatric Approach to Personality Organization," American Sociological Review, 17:44-49 (Feb., 1952). . "Personality Problems in Chinese Culture," American Sociological Review, 6:688-96 (Oct., 1941). Davis, James A. "A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation," Sociometry, 22:280-96 (Dec, 1959). Deutsch, Morton, and Solomon, Leonard. "Reactions to Evaluations by Others as Influenced by Self-Evaluations," Sociometry, 22:93-112 (June, 1959). Dick, Harry R. "The Office Worker: Attitudes toward Self, Labor and Management," Sociological Quarterly, 3:45-56 (Jan., 1962). Dinitz, Simon, Mangus, A. R., and Passamanick, Benjamin. "Integration and Conflict in Self-Other Conceptions as Factors in Mental Illness," Sociometry, 22:44-55 (Mar., 1959). Faris, R. E. L. Social Psychology. New York: Ronald Press, 1952. . "Sociological Causes of Genius," American Sociological Review, 5:689-99 (Oct., 1940). Foote, Nelson N. "Anachronism and Synchronism in Sociology," Sociometry, 21:17-29 (Mar., 1958). . "Identification as a Basis for a Theory of Motivation," American Sociological Review, 16:14-21 (Feb., 1951). Comment by R. Bendix, ibid., 16:22 (Feb., 1951). Garretson, Wynona Smutz. "The Consensual Definition of Social Objects," Sociological Quarterly, 3:10713 (Apr., 1962). Gerth, Hans, and Mills, C. Wright. Character and Social Structure. New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1953. Getzels, J. W., and Guba, E. G. "Role, Role Conflict and Effectiveness: An Empirical Study," American Sociological Review, 19:164-75 (Apr., 1954). Glaser, Daniel. "Criminality Theories and Behavioral Images," American Journal of Sociology, 61:43344 (Mar., 1956). Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1959. Goldhamer, H. "Recent Developments in Personality Studies," American Sociological Review, 13:555-65 (Oct., 1948). Gough, H. G. "A New Dimension of Status: I. Development of a Personality Scale," American Sociological Review, 13:401-9 (Aug., 1948). Gross, Neal, Mason, Ward S., and McEachern, Alexander W. Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendent Role. New York: Wiley, 1958. Halbwachs, M. "Individual Psychology and Collective Psychology," American Sociological Review, 3:61523 (Oct., 1938). Heider, Fritz. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley, 1958. Hyman, H. The Psychology of Status (Archives of Psychology, vol. 38, no. 269, 1942). Ichheiser, G. "Structure and Dynamics of Interpersonal Relations," American Sociological Review, 8:3025 (June, 1943). Jackson, Jay. "Reference Group Processes in a Formal Organization," Sociometry, 22:307-27 (Dec, 1959). Kohn, Melvin L. "Social Class and the Exercise of Parental Authority," American Sociological Review, 24:352-66 (June, 1959). Kohn, A. Robert, and Fiedler, Fred E. "Age and Sex Differences in the Perceptions of Persons," Sociometry, 24:157-64 (June, 1961). Kuenzli, Alfred E. (ed.) The Phenomenological Problem. New York: Harper, 1959. Papers by Combs, Snygg, McLeod, Smith, Jessor, et al. Lemert, Edwin M . Social Pathology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951. Lindesmith, A. R. "The Drug Addict as a Psychopath," American Sociological Review, 5:914-20 (Dec, 1940). Littman, Richard A., Moore, Robert C. A., and Jones, John Pierce. "Social Class Differences in Child Rearing: A Third Community for Comparison with Chicago and Newton," American Sociological Review, 22:694-704 (Dec, 1957). Lundy, Richard M. "Self Perceptions and Descriptions of Opposite Sex Sociometric Choices," Sociometry, 19:272-77 (Dec, 1956). . "Self Perceptions Regarding M - F and Descriptions Same and Opposite Sex Sociometric Choices," Sociometry, 21:238-46 (Sept., 1958).

40
McKee, John P., and Sherriffs, Alex C. "Men's and Women's Beliefs, Ideals, and Self-Concepts," American Journal of Sociology, 64:356-63 (Jan., 1959). McPartland, T. S., Cumming, John H . , and Garretson, Wynona S. "Self-Conception and Ward Behavior in Two Psychiatric Hospitals," Sociometry, 24:11124 (June, 1961). Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. . Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936. . The Philosophy of the Act. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Merrill, Francis, "Stendhal and the Self: A Study in the Sociology of Literature," American Journal of Sociology, 66:446-53 (Mar., 1961). Merton, Robert K., and Kitt, Alice S. "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in R. K. Merton and P. F. Lazarsfeld (eds.), Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier." Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1950. Mills, C. Wright. "Language, Logic and Culture," American Sociological Review, 4:670-80 (Oct., 1939) . . "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," American Sociological Review, 5:904-13 (Dec, 1940) . Miyamoto, S. Frank, and Dornbusch, Sanford M. "A Test of Interactionist Hypotheses of Self-Conception," American Journal of Sociology, 61:399-403 (Mar., 1956). Motz, A. B. "The Role Conception Inventory: A Tool for Research in Social Psychology," A merican Sociological Review, 17:465-71 (Aug., 1952). Mullahy, Patrick. The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan. New York: Hermitage House, 1952. Natanson, Maurice. The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pfuetze, Paul E . The Social Self. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. Phillips, Bernard S. "A Role Theory Approach to Adjustment in O l d Age," American Sociological Review, 22:212-17 (Apr., 1957). Reckless, Walter C, Dinitz, Simon, and Murray, Ellen. "Self Concept as an Insulator Against Delinquency," American Sociological Review, 21:744-46 (Dec, 1956). Reckless, Walter C, Dinitz, Simon, and Kay, Barbara. "The Self Component in Potential Delinquency and

PART I Theory and Methods Potential Non-Delinquency," American Sociological Review, 22:566-70 (Oct., 1957). Rose, Arnold (ed.) Human Behavior and Social Processes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. Rosengren, William R. "The Self in the Emotionally Disturbed," American Journal of Sociology, 66:454-62 (Mar., 1961). Sarbin, Theodore, "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., 1945), vol. 1, ch. 6, pp. 223-58. Schuessler, K. F., and Strauss, A. "A Study of Concept Learning by Scale Analysis," American Sociological Review, 15:752-62 (Dec, 1950). Shibutani, Tamotsu. Society and Personality. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961. Simpson, Richard L., and Simpson, Ida Harper. "The Psychiatric Attendant: Development of an Occupational Self-image in a Low-Status Occupation," American Sociological Review, 24:389-92 (June, 1959). Slater, Philip E. "Parental Role Differentiation," American Journal of Sociology, 67:296-311 (Nov., 1961). Strauss, Anselm. Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity. Glencoe, III: The Free Press, 1959. Stryker, Sheldon. "Role-Taking Accuracy and Adjustment," Sociometry, 20:286-96 (Dec, 1957). Sullivan, Harry Stack. "A Note on the Implications of Psychiatry. The Study of Interpersonal Relations for Investigations in the Social Sciences," American Journal of Sociology, 42:846-61 (May, 1937). . "Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry," Psychiatry, 3:1-117 (1940). . Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry. Washington: W m . A. White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947. . The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. New York: Norton, 1953. Swanson, Guy E. "Mead and Freud: Their Relevance for Social Psychology," Sociometry, 24:319-39 (Dec, 1961). Tagiuri, Renato, and Petrullo, Luigi (eds.) Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958. Tremmel, W m . C. The Social Concepts of George Herbert Mead. Emporia State Research Studies, Kansas State Teachers College, vol. 5, no. 4 (June, 1957). Troyer, W. L. "Mead's Social and Functional Theory of M i n d , " American Sociological Review, 11:198202 (Apr., 1946).

pfcteer, Petras, Reynolds imer, R. H. "Moral Judgment: A Study in Roles," American Sociological Review, 17:70-77 (Feb., 1952). "Self and Other in Moral Judgment," American Sociological Review, 19:249-59 (June, 1954). idebeck, Richard. "Self-Conception and the Reactions of Others," Sociometry, 23:351-59 (Dec, 1960). .debeck, Richard, and Bates, Alan P. " A n Experimental Study of Conformity to Role Expectations," Sociometry, 22:1-11 (Mar., 1959).

41
Watson, Jeanne, "A Formal Analysis of Sociable Interaction," Sociometry, 21:269-80 (Dec, 1958). White, L. A. "Culturological vs. Psychological Interpretations of Human Behavior," American Sociological Review, 12:686-98 (Dec, 1947). Whorf, Benjamin Lee. Language, Thought and Reality. New York: Wiley and the Technology Press of MIT, 1956. Wylie, Ruth. The Self Concept: A Critical Survey of Pertinent Research Literature. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961.

Bernard N. Meltzer, John W. Petras, & Larry T. Reynolds

Varieties of Symbolic Interactionism

T H E C H I C A G O A N D IOWA S C H O O L S

D u r i n g the major p o r t i o n of the past generation, the two leading progenitors of the symbolic interactionist perspective have been H . G . B l u mer a n d the late M . H . K u h n . T h r o u g h his w r i t ings a n d his students at the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago and the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a (Berkeley), B l u m e r has elaborated the best-known variety of i n teractionisman approach we call the Chicago school. This approach continues the classical, M e a d i a n tradition. T h e Iowa school d e v e l o p e d through the work of K u h n a n d his students at the State U n i v e r s i t y of Iowa. This orientation, sustained almost exclusively, u n t i l quite recently, by articles p u b l i s h e d in the Sociological Quarterly, represents a m o r e eclectic f o r m of interactionism.

T h e two schools differ in important substantive a n d methodological matters, w h i c h can be delineated and illustrated f r o m the writings of the chief progenitor of each school. These matters reflect broader controversies throughout the behavior disciplines. Most influential of the interactionists we shall be considering, B l u m e r has had a career that requires only b r i e f exposition here. H i s doctoral w o r k at the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago brought h i m into close association w i t h M e a d a n d E. Faris (an early interactionist), as w e l l as w i t h R. E. P a r k (whose w o r k in collective behavior B l u m e r later expounded). B e g i n n i n g in 1925, three years p r i o r to his receipt of the doctorate, he h e l d a position in the D e p a r t m e n t of Sociology at C h i c a g o , w h e r e he established himself as the inheritor of Mead's mantle in symbolic interactionism. In 1952 he j o i n e d the faculty of the D e p a r t m e n t at B e r k e l e y . A b r i e f examination of K u h n ' s intellectual b a c k g r o u n d m a y assist an effort to understand his modifications of symbolic interactionism. W h i l e earning his Master's a n d Doctor's degrees at the

Bernard N. Meltzer, John W. Petras, and Larry T. Reynolds, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975), pp. 5 5 - 8 2 . Reprinted by permission. This section draws heavily upon Meltzer and Petras (1970).
1

Symbolic

Interactionism:

Genesis,

Varieties,

and

Criticism,

42 U n i v e r s i t y o f Wisconsin, K u h n studied w i t h K . Y o u n g , an eclectic proponent of the M e a d i a n perspective. F o l l o w i n g brief periods in the faculties of the U n i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin, W h i t t i e r College, a n d M o u n t H o l y o k e College, K u h n established himself at the State U n i v e r s i t y of Iowa in 1946, r e m a i n i n g there u n t i l his death in 1963. In this latter post, he taught graduate students w h o w e r e also b e i n g exposed to the logical positivism of G. B e r g m a n and to K. Spence's positivistic works in psychology and in the philosophy of science. That these briefly sketched currents of thought influe n c e d K u h n ' s w o r k is readily apparent. Before launching u p o n the differences bet w e e n the Chicago and Iowa schools, we shall venture, briefly, to relate these schools to their respective social backgrounds. T a k e n as a general orientation, symbolic interactionism has been described as an almost predictable product of A m e r i c a n society and culture. O n e w r i t e r comments (Shaskolsky, 1970:16): It is doubtful whether a theory such as symbolic interactionism could have arisen in any social and political context other than a society such as America's with its egalitarian ethos and its mobile class structure. The basic thesis on which it rests is clearly inapplicable to a class-structured society steeped in the formalistic, often fossilized, modes of behavior handed down from previous generations. A n d m o r e specifically (1970:20): symbolic interaction theory is a worthy attempt to create a unique philosophic rationale for the finer aspects of American societyfor what is known at the more colloquial level as the American way of life, characterized as it is by respect for the individual and a belief in gradual change to meet society's fluctuating needs. Intrinsic to the theory is the sense of fluidity and its a c c e n t . . . on flexible interpersonal relationships as a basis for an understanding of the working of society. W h i l e the foregoing comments may suggest the social sources of the general orientation, we must look elsewhere for clues to the differentiation of the Chicago and Iowa schools. In a series of pertinent articles, Reynolds offers e m p i r i c a l support for one plausible source (see Reynolds etal, 1970; Reynolds and M c C a r t , 1972; Reynolds and M e l t z e r , 1973; V a u g h a n and Reynolds, 1968).

PART I

Theory and Methods

It is his contention that certain associational patterns are conducive to the development and/or perpetuation of particular types of sociological work. Focusing u p o n patterns of institutional affiliation (fellow doctoral-level students, professors and students, a n d departmental colleagues), his studies indicate that representatives of the two schools exhibit different patterns. H i s data suggest that a relatively strong, m u l t i - b o n d e d n e t w o r k of supportive associations may account for the persistence of such unconventional approaches as the Chicago school's. On the other hand, the absence of a n e t w o r k of this k i n d may foster the developm e n t and persistence of an approach m o r e harmonious w i t h the p r e v a i l i n g perspectives in the discipline, as appears to be the case w i t h the Iowa school. It can be argued plausibly that the most f u n damental point of divergence between the C h i cago and Iowa schools is that of methodology. We find here, as in various disciplines studying h u m a n behavior, the opposition between " h u m a n i s t i c " and " s c i e n t i f i c " viewpoints. B l u m e r argues the case for a distinctive methodology in the study of such behavior, w h i l e K u h n stresses the unity of m e t h o d in all scientific disciplines. C o n t i n u i n g the nineteenth-century distinction between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, one position proposes an idiographic (or non-generalizing) function for behavioral studies, and the other a nomothetic (or generalizing) function. Thus, w h i l e B l u m e r strives simply "to make m o d e r n society i n t e l l i g i b l e , " K u h n seeks universal predictions of social conduct. T h r e e i n t e r t w i n e d topics represent the basic specifics of this methodological divergence: (1) the relative merits of phenomenological and operational approaches; (2) the appropriate techniques of observation; and (3) the nature of the concepts best suited for the analysis of h u m a n behavior. A l t h o u g h both B l u m e r and K u h n c l a i m t o be interested in what goes on "inside the heads" of humans, their approaches to this subject matter differ significantly. B l u m e r ' s advocacy of a special methodology lays heavy stress u p o n the n e e d for insightfully " f e e l i n g one's way inside the experience of the actor." T h e student of h u m a n conduct, he contends, must get inside the actor's w o r l d and must see the w o r l d as the actor sees it, for

initra

Meltzer, Petras, Reynolds : actor's behavior takes place on the basis of "-is her o w n particular meanings. T h r o u g h some f o r m of sympathetic introspection, the student must take the standpoint of the acting unit (per; ; n or group) whose behavior he/she is studying and must attempt to use each actor's o w n categor ies in capturing that actor's w o r l d of m e a n i n g . This intuitive, verstehende approach emphasizes ir.timate understanding m o r e than inter-subjecBve agreement among investigators. In a posthumously p u b l i s h e d article, K u h n 1964:72) describes as "perhaps the most signifi cant c o n t r i b u t i o n of the Iowa research" its demonstration "that the k e y ideas of symbolic interactionism c o u l d be operationalized and utidzed successfully i n e m p i r i c a l research." C o n t i n u ing in this v e i n , he refers to self theory (his designation of what we have labeled the " I o w a school") as an effort to develop a set of generaliza tions tested by e m p i r i c a l researchin contrast w i t h the earlier " b o d y of conjectural and deduc tive orientations" constituting symbolic interac tionism. It is w i t h this effort in m i n d that K u h n sought to " e m p i r i c i z e " Mead's ideas, reconceptualizing or abandoning those he d e e m e d " n o n - e m p i r i c a l " and d e v e l o p i n g observational techniques that w e r e consistent w i t h this a i m . H i s writings repeatedly sounded the call for the operational definition of concepts, for methods that w o u l d meet " t h e usual scientific c r i t e r i a , " and for a "standardized, objective, a n d dependable process o f measurement . . . o f significant variables" ( H i c k m a n a n d K u h n , 1956:224-5). K u h n and the Iowa school do not however, reject the study of the covert aspects of h u m a n behavior. Rather, they urge the utilization of objective overtbehavioral indices (chiefly v e r b a l protocols by the actor) of the covert aspects. In the light of Blumer's insistence u p o n sym pathetic introspection, it is entirely expectable that he advocates the use of such observational techniques as life histories, autobiographies, case studies, diaries, letters, interviews (especially of the free, or non-directive, type), and, most i m p o r tantly, participant observation. O n l y through intimate association w i t h those w h o are b e i n g studied, he maintains, can the investigator enter their i n n e r worlds. H i s basic c r i t i c i s m of the ex p e r i m e n t a l , instrumental, a n d quantitative m e t h

43
odology, in the f o r m of questionnaires, schedules, tests, laboratory procedures, and detached obser vation " f r o m the outside," is that they completely fail to catch the " m e a n i n g s " that crucially m e d i ate, a n d d e t e r m i n e h o w individuals respond to, objects and situations. A p p a r e n t l y u n t r o u b l e d by critics of the "soft science" techniques, B l u m e r shrugs off such strictures against these techniques as the following: these techniques are subjective and, hence, unsuited to the development of scien tific k n o w l e d g e ; i n f o r m a t i o n gathered through their use is too variable and unique for c o m p a r i son and generalization; they t e n d to be too timeconsuming for convenient use; it is not k n o w n h o w we can teach the subtle skills r e q u i r e d in their use; and they do not, typically, l e n d t h e m selves to the conventional testing of explicitly formulated theories by procedures subject to i n dependent validation. Striking back against the methods that characterize mainstream A m e r i c a n sociology, B l u m e r (1969:26-7) writes: The overwhelming bulk of what passes today as methodology is made up of such preoccupations as the following: the devising and use of sophisticated research techniques, usually of advanced statistical character; the construction of logical and mathemati cal models, all too frequently guided by a criterion of elegance; the elaboration of formal schemes on how to construct concepts and theories; valiant appli cation of imported schemes, such as input-output analysis, systems analysis, and stochastic analysis; stu dious conformity to the canons of research design; and the promotion of a particular procedure, such as survey research, as the method of scientific study. I marvel at the supreme confidence with which these preoccupations are advanced as the stuff of meth odology. A case can plausibly be made for equating K u h n ' s methodology w i t h the technique of the t w e n t y statements test (TST), as T u c k e r (1966) does. K n o w n also as the " W h o Am I ? " test, the T S T was d e v e l o p e d by K u h n , in 1950, as part of his endeavor to transform the concepts of sym bolic interactionism into variables that m i g h t be employable in generating and testing e m p i r i c a l propositions. In his c o n c e r n w i t h the construction of an instrument for e l i c i t i n g attributes of the self, K u h n explicitly rejected as unfeasible all attempts to "get inside the i n d i v i d u a l and observe these interior plans of action d i r e c t l y " or to infer t h e m

44
f r o m overt behavior. H e c o n c l u d e d , rather, that such devices as questionnaires a n d attitude scales c o u l d be adapted to identify a n d measure selfattributes. T h e resultant instrument, based u p o n an open-response m o d e l , requires a content analysis of the responses and can be subjected to G u t t man-scale analysis. Today, the T S T is the most w i d e l y used technique for studying self-conceptions, has h a d a section (entitled " I o w a Studies in Self-Attitudes") devoted to it at the 1958 meetings of the A m e r i c a n Sociological Association, has b e e n u t i l i z e d i n over 100 r e p o r t e d researches, a n d achieved a measure of national popular attent i o n w h e n it was administered to the early astronauts (Spitzer et al, no date). To study "the natural social w o r l d of our exp e r i e n c e " a phrase that recurs in his w r i t i n g s B l u m e r urges the e m p l o y m e n t of "sensitizing concepts." As Sjoberg a n d N e t t (1968:59) c o m m e n t : " T h a t B l u m e r objects to operational definitions of concepts a n d advocates the use of 'sensitizing concepts' is consistent w i t h his image of social r e a l i t y . " T h e image includes b o t h societal fluidity a n d a humanistic v i e w of the actor's ability to shape a n d reshape his/her e n v i r o n m e n t . C o n trasting conventional scientific concepts ("definitive concepts") w i t h sensitizing concepts, B l u m e r asserts that the former p r o v i d e prescriptions of w h a t to see, w h i l e the latter m e r e l y suggest directions along w h i c h to look. A concept should, he adds, sensitize one to the task of " w o r k i n g w i t h a n d t h r o u g h the distinctive nature of the e m p i r i cal instance, instead of casting the u n i q u e nature aside . . ." (Blumer, 1954:8). In B l u m e r ' s v i e w , the student of h u m a n conduct moves f r o m the abstract concept to the concrete distinctiveness of the instance; for, he/she must use the distinctive expression in order to d i s c e r n the c o m m o n . P u t t i n g i t m o r e fully: Because of the varying nature of the concrete expression from instance to instance we have to rely, apparently, on general guides and not on fixed objective traits or modes of expression. To invert the matter, since what we infer does not express itself in the same fixed way, we are not able to rely on fixed objective expressions to make the inference. W e can b e quite b r i e f i n presenting the v i e w p o i n t of K u h n and the Iowa school on the nature a n d f u n c t i o n of concepts, for theirs is the conven-

PART I Theory and Methods tional v i e w p o i n t w i t h i n present-day sociology. In K u h n ' s effort to convert the imprecise M e a d i a n concepts into researchable "variables," he has form u l a t e d explicitly operational definitions of "self," "social act," "social obect," "reference g r o u p , " a n d other concepts. A n instructive example is the f o l l o w i n g excerpt f r o m his discussion of the self: " O p e r a t i o n a l l y the self m a y be defined . . . a s answers w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l gives t o the question w h i c h he directs to himself, ' W h o am I?' or the question another directs to h i m , such as ' W h a t k i n d of a person are you?,' ' W h o are you?' e t c . " (no date: 4). These proposed questions, of course, are the basis of the T S T . A final issue in the methodological divergences b e t w e e n the t w o schools relates tc B l u m e r ' s attack on the use in social i n q u i r y of " v a r i a b l e s " w i t h their mechanistic implications of a static, stimulus-response image of h u m a n behavior. D e s p i t e K u h n ' s rejection of psychological behaviorism, his quest for variables commits h i m to some of its f a v o r e d methodological orientations, as we have already seen. Thus, it is evident that our t w o protagonists assign different p r i o r i ties to relevant u n d e r s t a n d i n g versus precise analysis, as w e l l as to the discovery of ideas versus the testing of propositional k n o w l e d g e . We can plausibly argue, further, that B l u m e r ' s i m a g e of humans l e d h i m to a particular methodology, w h i l e K u h n ' s methodological predilections led h i m to a particular image of humans. We now t u r n to these somewhat contrasting images. A second salient difference b e w e e n the two schools raises the ancient question of w h e t h e r hum a n behavior is free or d e t e r m i n e d . C o n c e i v i n g such behavior in terms of an interplay b e t w e e n the spontaneous a n d the socially d e r i v e d aspects of the self, B l u m e r builds into the behavior an unpredictable, i n d e t e r m i n a t e d i m e n s i o n . For h i m , this interplay is the f u n d a m e n t a l source of i n n o v a t i o n i n h u m a n society. B y contrast, exponents of the Iowa school reject b o t h i n d e t e r m i n i s m in h u m a n conduct and the explanation of social i n n o v a t i o n in terms of the emergent, creative element in h u m a n acts. T h e k e y issue is the place o f i m p u l s e i n conduct. In order to facilitate presentation of this issue, we shall briefly t o u c h on the ideas b e l o w . F o l l o w i n g Mead's treatment quite closely, B l u m e r views the self as i n v o l v i n g t w o analytically distinguisha-

Meltzer, Petras, Reynolds hie phases, the I a n d the M e . T h e first of these analytical entities is the i m p u l s i v e tendency of the i n d i v i d u a l . It is the i n i t i a l , spontaneous, unorganized aspect of h u m a n experience. It r e p r e sents, t h e n , the u n d i s c i p l i n e d , unrestrained, a n d undirected tendencies of the i n d i v i d u a l , w h i c h take the f o r m of diffuse a n d undifferentiated activity. A n example w o u l d b e one's i m m e d i a t e i m pulse of anger u p o n b e i n g struck by another. T h e M e , on the other h a n d , represents the incorporated other w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . H e n c e , i t comprises the o r g a n i z e d set of attitudes a n d definitions p r e v a i l i n g w i t h i n the g r o u p . I n any given situation, the Me constitutes the generalized other a n d , often, some particular other. E v ery act begins in the f o r m of an I a n d , generally, ends in the f o r m of a M e . F o r the I constitutes the i n i t i a t i o n of the act p r i o r to its c o m i n g u n d e r rhe c o n t r o l of the definitions of expectations of ethers (the Me). T h e I, thus, provides p r o p u l s i o n , while the M e provides d i r e c t i o n , t o the act. H u m a n behavior, then, is v i e w e d as an ongoing series of initiations of i n c i p i e n t acts by impulses (the I) and of guidance of the acts by the M e . T h e act is a resultant of this dialectical i n t e r p l a y a n d " c a n not be accounted for by factors w h i c h precede the a c t " ( B l u m e r , 1962:183). It is not entirely clear f r o m B l u m e r ' s w o r k whether the i n d e t e r m i n a c y that characterizes h u m a n conduct is the p r o d u c t simply of the exploratory, i m p r o v i s i n g , and i m p u l s i v e I or is a m o r e complex emergent f r o m the interaction b e t w e e n the I a n d the M e . C o n t r a s t i n g the symbolic-interactionist v i e w w i t h stimulus-response approaches and other conventional views, he points out that the f o r m e r is interested in action, a n d the latter in reaction. M o r e specifically, he contends that activity begins w i t h a n i n n e r i m p u l s e rather t h a n w i t h an external stimulus, a n d that this activity may undergo a significant course of d e v e l o p m e n t before c o m i n g to overt expression. T h i s developm e n t m a y b r i n g the e m e r g e n c e of n e w definitions and n e w arrangements of definitions. In any case, B l u m e r expresses skepticism of social-scientific theories that p u r p o r t to e m b o d y determinate, precisely p r e d i c t i v e propositions. In K u h n ' s self theory we find no explicit cognizance of either impulses or the I a n d Me c o m position of the self. F o r h i m , as for c o n v e n t i o n a l role theory, behavior is socially d e t e r m i n e d b y

45
the actor's definitions, particularly self-definitions. Thus, the self becomes a Me exclusively, a n d cond u c t is h e l d to be w h o l l y predictable (in principle) on the basis of i n t e r n a l i z e d prescriptions a n d p r o scriptions. If we k n o w the actor's reference groups, a c c o r d i n g to K u h n , we can p r e d i c t his/ her self-attitudes; a n d , if we k n o w these, we can p r e d i c t his/her behavior. In short, antecedent conditions d e t e r m i n e the h u m a n being's self; a n d his/her self determines his/her conduct. This v i e w , of course, c o n v e n i e n t l y disposes of such " n o n - e m p i r i c a l " concepts as the I a n d impulses. At the same t i m e , it preserves a premise that m a n y consider indispensable to the scientific enterprise, that of d e t e r m i n i s m . In so d o i n g , however, it sacrifices the processual character of the self and the negotiated character of behavior, points to w h i c h we shall soon devote attention. If the p r e c e d i n g few paragraphs w e r e exhaustive of the d e t e r m i n a c y - i n d e t e r m i n a c y controversy as it is manifested in the two schools, the matter m i g h t find a relatively easy resolution. B o t h standpoints m i g h t compromise s i m p l y by accepting a probabilistic frame of reference for h u m a n behavior. As the next several paragraphs w i l l demonstrate, h o w e v e r , the controversy holds i m p o r t a n t implications for other substantive elements in the viewpoints of the two schools. W e have m a d e passing reference, i n the course of the p r e c e d i n g discussion, to related fundamental divergences i n imagery. W e n o w t u r n our attention to a m o r e direct and fuller presentat i o n of these divergences, p l a c i n g t h e m in the clarifying context of a process-structure distinction. T h e C h i c a g o school tends to conceive of b o t h self and society in processual terms, w h i l e the Iowa school stresses structural conceptions of b o t h p h e n o m e n a . These opposing views are clearly discernible in two v e r y intimately related topics: (1) images of behavior as " c o n s t r u c t e d " or as " r e leased," a n d (2) images of role performance as " r o l e - m a k i n g " or as " r o l e - p l a y i n g . " B l u m e r states his p r e d i l e c t i o n for a processual image of h u m a n conduct a n d his r e p u d i a t i o n of the structuralist image in the f o l l o w i n g terms (1953:199): the likening of human group life to the operation of a mechanical structure, or to the functioning of a system seeking equilibrium, seems to me to face

46
grave difficulties in view of the formative and explorative character of interaction as the participants judge each other and guide their own acts by that judgment. Similarly, as we have n o t e d previously, he refers to the self as a flowing process of interaction b e t w e e n the I and the M e , a n d not m e r e l y a summ a t i o n of the two aspects n o r an organization of attitudes. This reflexive process is one in w h i c h the actor makes indications to himself/herself, that is to say, takes note of things a n d ascertains their i m p o r t for his/her line of action. A c t i o n is seen to be built up, or constructed, in the course of its execution, rather than " m e r e l y b e i n g released f r o m a pre-existing psychological structure by factors p l a y i n g on the s t r u c t u r e " (Blumer, 1966:536). T h e conditions accounting for the act i o n are not present at its b e g i n n i n g ; for, " w i t h the m e c h a n i s m of self-interaction the h u m a n bei n g ceases to be a responding organism whose behavior is a product of what plays u p o n h i m f r o m the outside, the inside, or b o t h " (1966:535). Rather, he/she rehearses his/her behavior, summ o n i n g up plans of action, assessing t h e m , changi n g t h e m , and f o r m i n g n e w ones, w h i l e i n d i c a t i n g to himself/herself what his/her action w i l l be. This tentative, exploratory process gives rise, we have suggested, to the possibility of novelty in behavior. A l t h o u g h K u h n has m a i n t a i n e d that " t h e i n d i v i d u a l is not merely a passive agent automatically responding to the group-assigned meanings of objects" ( H i c k m a n and K u h n , 1956:26), he and his adherents are c o m p e l l e d by their methodological and deterministic c o m m i t m e n t s to deviate a bit f r o m this disavowal. C o n c e i v i n g the self as a structure of attitudes d e r i v e d f r o m the i n d i v i d u al's i n t e r n a l i z e d statuses and roles, they assign causal significance in behavior to these somewhat fixed attributes. That these elements are conside r e d stable "traits," at least d u r i n g a g i v e n timep e r i o d , is reflected in the use of the T S T as a p r e d i c t o r of behavior w i t h o u t specification of the situations in w h i c h the test is administered or to w h i c h the predictions w i l l be a p p l i e d . This
2
2

PART I

Theory and Methods

same assumption of relative stability, or fixity, is found in Kuhn's implied notion of a " c o r e " self, as expressed in his assertion that: " C e n tral to an individual's conception of himself is his identity, that is, his generalized position in society . . ." (no date: 6). O m i t t i n g the I, impulses, or the spontaneous c o m p o n e n t of the self f r o m his consideration, K u h n is constrained to overlook the important process of interplay b e t w e e n the different aspects of the self. T h e foregoing discussion implies divergent conceptions of the nature of role-behavior. These conceptions can be s u m m a r i z e d as " r o l e - m a k i n g , " w h i c h designates a tentative, d y n a m i c , a n d creative process, a n d " r o l e - p l a y i n g " (occasionally t e r m e d " r o l e - t a k i n g " by some writers), w h i c h designates behavior in response to the role expectations of others. B o t h D . - W r o n g (1961) a n d R. T u r n e r (1962) have r e m a r k e d u p o n the c h a n g i n g character of role theory. O r i g i n a l l y , such theory d e p i c t e d an exploratory and emergent interaction process, one m a r k e d by fluidity and, often, some degree of innovation. Increasingly, h o w ever, this theory has come to be l i n k e d w i t h the concepts of "status" and " r o l e - p l a y i n g " and e m p l o y e d as a refinement of theories of conformity, or social control. B l u m e r resists this m o v e m e n t t o w a r d a collective d e t e r m i n i s m , describing h u m a n group life as a process of formative transactions. He sees cultural norms, status positions, a n d role relationships as only the frameworks w i t h i n w h i c h social action takes place and not the c r u c i a l and coercive determinants of that action. W i t h other members of the Chicago school, he conceives of the h u m a n bei n g as creating or r e m a k i n g his/her e n v i r o n ment, as " c a r v i n g o u t " his/her w o r l d of objects, in the course of actionrather than simply responding to normative expectations. As we have seen, K u h n , in sharp contrast, conceives of personality as an organization of attitudes, w h i c h are, in effect, internalizations of the individual's role recipes. He describes the i n d i v i d ual's roles as the n o r m in terms of w h i c h he/she structures objects and situations. P u t t i n g the matter quite succinctly, K u h n writes ( H i c k m a n and K u h n , 1956:45):

C . T u c k e r (1966:354-5). T u c k e r also p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e T S T to impose his own meanings on the subject's

c o n t r a d i c t s its o w n p u r p o r t e d a s s u m p t i o n s b y r e q u i r i n g t h e i n vestigator responses.

Meltzer, Petras, Reynolds As self theory views the individual, he derives his plans of action from the roles he plays and the statuses he occupies in the groups with which he feels identifiedhis reference groups. His attitudes toward himself as an object are the best indexes to these plans of action, and hence to the action itself, in that they are the anchoring points from which self-evaluations and other evaluations are made. A n y o n e familiar w i t h the T S T , i n w h i c h the assumption of conformity is i m p l i c i t , w i l l find no surprise in the foregoing statement. This assumption is foreshadowed, also, in an early (pre-TST) essay by K u h n , in w h i c h he claims: "Social and cultural factors become determinants of personality factors only as the i n d i v i d u a l comes to internalize the roles he plays and the statuses he occupies. He asks ' W h o am I?' and can answer this question of identity only in terms of his social position . . ." (1954:60). E v e n idiosyncratic elements in roleperformance are fully explainable, for K u h n , in terms of composites or resultants of the role-expectations h e l d by the actor's various reference groups. We see, then, that B l u m e r and K u h n attribute different properties to the self, the former emphasizing the deliberate element, out of w h i c h a " n e w " image may emerge, and the latter e m phasizing m o r e or less preset attitudes and responses. A c c o r d i n g to B l u m e r , the self is a process of i n t e r n a l conversation, in the course of w h i c h the actor can come to v i e w himself/herself in a n e w way, thereby b r i n g i n g about chances in h i m self/herself. M o r e o v e r , in his/her transactions w i t h others, there occurs a c o n t i n u i n g sequence of interpretation of the conduct of others, d u r i n g w h i c h the actor may subject his/her attributes to highly variable useor disuse. As B l u m e r puts it: " T h e vital dependency of the attitude on the nature of the on-going interaction suggests h o w fallacious it is to use the attitude to construct the scheme of that i n t e r a c t i o n " (1953:193). K u h n , on the other h a n d , characterizes both the self and h u m a n interaction as structured. T h e organized set of self-attitudes serves as a system of pre-established plans of action. A n d h u m a n association takes the f o r m of fairly stable, ready-made patterns of role and counter-role prescriptions. F o r h i m , then, prescriptions of behavior and descrip-

47 tions of behavior t e n d to coincide. Thus is social order maintained. T h e implications of these opposing conceptions, the processual and structural models of h u m a n social life, extend to such topics as the nature of socialization, social order, social control, social change, social disorganization, a n d social action generally. Of the m a n y other, relatively m i n o r , points of differentiation b e t w e e n the schools, we shall select only one for considerationthat of the basic forms of h u m a n interaction. A l t h o u g h the disagreement is a clear-cut one, its implications are not very far-reaching. H e n c e , our discussion w i l l be brief. F o l l o w i n g M e a d , B l u m e r distinguishes two forms, or levels, of h u m a n interaction: symbolic interaction (which is uniquely and distinctively human) and non-symbolic interaction (which is shared w i t h i n f r a h u m a n organisms). T h e latter is a conversation of gestures, essentially of a stimulus-response nature, in w h i c h each organism responds to the p e r c e i v e d actions, or gestures, of the other without m a k i n g efforts to ascertain the standpoint of the other. An example is p r o v i d e d by the vague feelings of uneasiness two persons may experience in one another's presence, feelings that may spiral in intensity e v e n in the absence of symbolic behavior. Such interaction m a y arise f r o m sources of w h i c h the actors are unaware a n d may i n v o l v e either u n w i t t i n g and u n i n t e n d e d responses or responses to u n i n d i c a t e d attributes of the other. It is true that this l e v e l of interaction has rec e i v e d little theoretical attention and e v e n less research attention f r o m members of the Chicago school. But, it appears to have been c o m p l e t e l y ignored by the Iowa school. By focusing its conc e r n u p o n the conduct of socialized persons, a n d v i e w i n g such conduct as responsive only to shared meanings, the latter school leaves no r o o m for non-symbolic behavior. In v i e w of this school's negation of the I concept, this omission is, of course, to be expected. W h a t emerges, then, is a conception of h u m a n behavior a n d interaction as highly cognitive, non-affective p h e n o m e n a . F o r all practical purposes, however, the divergence on this matter b e t w e e n the two schools is one of small degree rather than of k i n d . S u m m a r i z i n g the issues d i v i d i n g the C h i c a g o

48
a n d Iowa schools, we find t h e m , u p o n close examination, to have an organic, systematic character. In m a k i n g this point, it is useful to recall an argum e n t w e presented earlier: w h i l e B l u m e r ' s image of humans dictates his methodology, K u h n ' s m e t h o d o l o g y dictates his image of humans. Thus, B l u m e r commences w i t h a d e p i c t i o n of h u m a n behavior a n d interaction as emergent, processual, a n d voluntaristic, entailing a dialogue b e t w e e n impulses a n d social definitions, in the course of w h i c h acts are constructed. He pauses, h o w e v e r , to recognize a l e v e l of h u m a n interaction d e v o i d of social definitions and reflecting sheerly spontaneous behavior. H o l d i n g these t w o p r e c e d i n g ideas, he exhibits skepticism r e g a r d i n g the extent t o w h i c h h u m a n behavior i s predictable. A n d , f i nally, in the light of the foregoing components of his imagery, he must insist u p o n a methodology that "respects the nature of the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d , " r e l y i n g u p o n a phenomenological approach, participant observation, and sensitizing c o n c e p t s a l l l i n k e d w i t h a research " l o g i c of d i s c o v e r y . " Oppositely, K u h n begins w i t h a scientific conc e r n , stressing operationalism, the T S T (a papera n d - p e n c i l instrument), a n d definitive c o n c e p t s a l l l i n k e d w i t h a "logic of v e r i f i c a t i o n . " A l t h o u g h conjoined w i t h his symbolic-interactionist orientation, this c o n c e r n brings h i m to an acceptance of a basically deterministic image of h u m a n behavior. B o u n d to the service of scientism a n d d e t e r m i n i s m , he must deny to the I any role whatsoever in conduct, thereby dismissing the possibilities of b o t h emergence and true v o l u n t a r i s m , on the one h a n d , and non-symbolic h u m a n interaction, on the other. In r e c o g n i t i o n of the m a g n i t u d e of these modifications of symbolic interactionism, K u h n relinquishes the cust o m a r y n a m e of that orientation in favor of "self t h e o r y . " It appears quite l i k e l y that these two schools of thought m a y continue their present tendency of t a k i n g little cognizance of one another and goi n g their separate ways. This t e n d e n c y is e v i d e n c e d by the rarity w i t h w h i c h representatives of each school cite the w o r k of the other school. Fost e r i n g such parochialism a n d m i l i t a t i n g against the reconvergence of the C h i c a g o a n d Iowa schools, is their fundamental a n d irreconcilable d i v e r g e n c e on the methodological l e v e l .

PART I Theory and Methods T H E DRAMATURGICAL APPROACH

3

T h e major exponent of the dramaturgical app r o a c h in symbolic interactionism has b e e n E. Goffman. W h i l e obtaining two graduate degrees f r o m the U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o , he gained exposure t o B l u m e r , E . C . Hughes, and W . L . W a r n e r (as w e l l as other mentors) a n d , through t h e m , to the influential ideas of M e a d , D u r k h e i m , a n d Simm e l . It is f r o m these latter that he appears to have d e r i v e d the inspiration for his views on the reality-constructing behavior of humans, the persuasive significance of ceremony a n d r i t u a l in h u m a n social life, a n d the utility of a " f o r m a l " orientation that overlooks historical specificities in a quest for universal generalizations. H i s app r o a c h shows greater affinity, both substantively and methodologically, for the Chicago than for the Iowa school. C o m m e n t i n g u p o n a related matter, L o f l a n d (1970:38) refers to Goffman's prolific i n v e n t i o n of " m i n i - c o n c e p t s " and credits (or blames) the " c o n c e p t u a l l y i m p o v e r i s h e d symbolic interactionist t r a d i t i o n at the U n i v e r s i t y of C h i cago in the later forties a n d early fifties." T h e point of departure for Goffman's d r a m a turgical metaphor, d e r i v e d partly f r o m the influential ideas of the philosopher-critic K. B u r k e (especially 1945 a n d 1950), is the p r e m i s e that w h e n h u m a n beings interact each desires to " m a n a g e " the impressions the others receive of him/her. In effect, each puts on a " s h o w " for the others. T h e preface of Goffman's first m o n o g r a p h in the " l i f e as t h e a t e r " v e i n puts the matter as follows (1959:xi): The perspective employed in this report is that of the theatrical performance; the principles derived are dramaturgical ones. I shall consider the way in which the individual . . . presents himself and his activity to others, the ways in which he guides and controls the impressions they form of him, and the kinds of things he may and may not do while sustaining his performance before them. Thus, interactants, singly or in " t e a m s , " give " p e r f o r m a n c e s , " d u r i n g w h i c h they enact " p a r t s , " or " r o u t i n e s , " w h i c h m a k e use of a "sett i n g " a n d " p r o p s , " as w e l l as b o t h the " f r o n t reThis section, as well as the two subsequent ones, draws upon Petras and Meltzer (1973).
3

'-feltzer,

Petras, Reynolds

49
Social O r g a n i z a t i o n , " G o f f m a n describes situations in w h i c h some event threatens, challenges, or discredits the claims an actor has projected about himself/ herself. T h e social f u n c t i o n of e m barrassment is shown to reside in the demonstration that the face-losing actor is at least d i s t u r b e d by it a n d m a y p r o v e m o r e worthy another t i m e . " A l i e n a t i o n f r o m I n t e r a c t i o n " describes ways i n w h i c h an actor m a y lose his/her i n v o l v e m e n t in a conversational encounter. Such " m i s i n v o l v e m e n t s " (e.g., external preoccupation, self-consciousness, etc.) violate the social r e q u i r e m e n t that interactants must elicit and sustain spontaneous i n v o l v e m e n t in a shared focus of attention. C h a l l e n g i n g the v i e w that psychotic behavior is a defect in i n f o r m a t i o n transmitting or in interpersonal relating, " M e n t a l Symptoms a n d P u b l i c O r d e r " presents the v i e w that symptomatic behavior m a y w e l l b e e n seen as a failure to c o n f o r m to the tacit rules of d e c o r u m a n d demeanor that regulate interpersonal "occasions." " W h e r e the A c t i o n Is" employs the vocabulary of g a m b l i n g i n analyzing activities i n w h i c h actors k n o w i n g l y take avoidable risks. These activities p r o v i d e special opportunities to establish a n d m a i n t a i n face. I n c o m m o n w i t h the ethnomethodologists, w h o m we shall consider in a later section, Goffm a n recognizes that the norms regulating social conduct t e n d to escape notice, because they are taken for granted, a n d he stresses instances in w h i c h norms are violated in order to disclose w h a t they are and h o w they are maintained. C o l l i n s and M a k o w s k y describe this c o n c e r n as " t h e sociology of the c o m m o n m a n , " often concentrating u p o n "embarrassment, uneasiness, self-consciousness, a w k w a r d situations, faux pas, scandals, m e n t a l illness" (1972:202). Despite such concentration, h o w e v e r , Goffman's actors play their roles w i t h m i n i m a l manifestations of love, hate, or other emotions. A m o n g the m a n y commonalities o f d r a m a turgy a n d the Chicago school, is their shared corrective to the c o n v e n t i o n a l assumption that roles d e t e r m i n e the behavior of interactants. Stressing the calculative a n d situational behavior of actors, both approaches r e m i n d us that norms, positions, a n d roles are s i m p l y the frameworks w i t h i n w h i c h h u m a n interaction occurs. As we shall soon see,

z i o n " of the " s c e n e " a n d the "back-stage" (hidden : r : m the "audience"). T h e outcome of each per:rmance is an i m p u t a t i o n by the audience of a r e t i c u l a r k i n d of self to the p e r f o r m e d charac:eri s). This i m p u t a t i o n is as m u c h , or m o r e , a p r o d _:t of the expressive, ritualistic, or c e r e m o n i a l T .ements in the actor's behavior as of the instrumental, practical, or substantive elements. T h e core aspect of the actor's histrionics is presented in another statement by G o f f m a n 1959:15): I assume that when an individual appears before others he will have many motives for trying to control the impressions they receive of the situation. This report is concerned with some of the common :echniques that persons employ to sustain such impressions and with some of the common contingencies associated with the employment of these techniques . . . I shall be concerned only with the participant's dramaturgical problems of presenting the activity before others. As G o f f m a n points out, " I n f o r m a t i o n about the i n d i v i d u a l helps to define the situation, enab l i n g others to k n o w in advance what he w i l l expect of t h e m and what they expect of h i m " 1959:1). It is to the individual's advantage, of course, to present himself/herself in ways that w i l l best serve his/her ends. In Goffman's analysis, then, the self becomes an object about w h i c h the actor wishes to foster an impression. If we e v e n cursorily scan the essays in one of Goffman's numerous books, we can give some further impressions of his orientation. Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior (1967) furnishes a representative set of ideas. T h e first essay, " O n F a c e W o r k , " presents the keynote idea that h u m a n beings strive to interact w i t h others in ways that m a i n t a i n both their o w n " f a c e " and that of other interactants. Such management of impressions is the f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e of the tacit norms g o v e r n i n g such b r i e f encounters as conversations, track meets, banquets, j u r y trials, street loitering, a n d the like. " T h e N a t u r e of Deference a n d D e m e a n o r " draws u p o n Goffman's observations of m e n t a l patients to illustrate h o w deference represents the conveyance of regard or respect, a n d demeanor provides the means t h r o u g h w h i c h the actor creates an image of h i m self/herself for others. In " E m b a r r a s s m e n t a n d

50 h o w e v e r , i m p o r t a n t differences obtain b e t w e e n these approaches as to h o w they portray role-performances. Goffman's concept of " r o l e d i s t a n c e " t h e hiatus b e t w e e n the actor's role prescriptions and role performancecaptures, in its overtones of c y n i c i s m , a significant c o m p o n e n t of this difference. In his pursuit of the intricacies of impressionm a n a g e m e n t in face-to-face situations, G o f f m a n has r e l i e d u p o n sympathetic introspection as his m e t h o d of observation a n d u p o n a felicitous style of presentation. Reactions to these aspects of his w o r k have frequently e m p l o y e d such e n c o m i u m s as " i n s i g h t f u l , sensitive observer," "stylistic eleg a n c e , " " b r i l l i a n t , p r o v o c a t i v e , " " w i t t y a n d gracef u l w r i t i n g , " a n d so on. O t h e r critical responses have b e e n less favorable. H i s w o r k has b e e n c r i t i c i z e d on theoretical, methodological, and ideological grounds. T h e emotive language c o m p r i s i n g his style of presentation is quite c o m p a t i b l e w i t h his " l i t e r a r y " methodology a n d its substantive products. W e f i n d i n his w o r k n o explicit theory, but a plausible and loosely o r g a n i z e d frame of reference; little interest in explanatory schemes, but masterful descriptive analysis; v i r t u a l l y no acc u m u l a t e d evidence, but i l l u m i n a t i n g allusions, impressions, anecdotes, a n d illustrations; few formulations of e m p i r i c a l l y testable propositions, but i n n u m e r a b l e provocative insights. In addition, we find an insufficiency of qualifications a n d reservations, so that the limits of generalization are not i n d i c a t e d . D u n c a n (1968) essays a heroic exercise in r e m e d y i n g the latter deficiency, presenting an i n v e n t o r y of 12 "axiomatic propositions," 24 "theoretical propositions," a n d 35 " m e t h o d o l o g i c a l propositions." T o m a n y commentators, Goffman's scheme of i m a g e r y suggests a sordid, disenchanting v i e w of humans and their society, one m a r k e d by b o t h d u p l i c i t y a n d despair. It is c o n t e n d e d that this v i e w celebrates the subordination of reality to appearance, of Gemeinschaft to pseudoGemeinschaft, of morality to o p p o r t u n i s m . Thus, commentators refer to Goffman's views of the h u m a n b e i n g as " a n amoral m e r c h a n t of m o r a l i t y , " or as a "detached, rational impression-manager," a n d of the self "as pure c o m m o d i t y . " C u z z o r t , for example, scores the conceptions of " h u m a n i t y as the b i g c o n , " the " r e d u c t i o n of h u m a n i t y to

PART I

Theory and Methods

an act or p e r f o r m a n c e , " " t h e ' p h o n y ' e l e m e n t " in all social performances, and " m a n as role player and manipulator of props, costumes, gestures, and w o r d s " (1969:175-92). This c o n c e p t i o n of Goffman's imagery is clearly described b y L y m a n and Scott, e m p l o y i n g the titles of several of Goffman's p u b l i s h e d works (1970:20): Goffman's social actor, like Machiavelli's prince, lives externally. He engages in a daily round of impression management, presenting himself to advantage when he is able, rescuing what he can from a bad show. His everyday life consists of interaction rituals, employing deference and demeanor, saving his own and someone else's face, inhibiting actions that would spoil the fun in games, being intimate when occasion demands, maintaining his distance when proximity would be unwise, and in general being continuously alive to the requirements of behavior in public places. Goffman's predecessors in the symbolic interactionist perspective (Mead, D e w e y , C o o l e y , Thomas a n d others) gave no extensive consideration to impression management, insincerity, hypocrisy, or inauthentic self-presentations. H i s analysis advances, in effect, a significant r e c o n struction of the image of h u m a n beings offered in symbolic interactionism. In later paragraphs, we shall essay a possible explanation of this r e c o n struction. First, h o w e v e r , we shall t o u c h u p o n a d e m u r r e r f r o m the pejorative commentaries u p o n Goffman's m e t a p h o r and shall, also, describe a few m o r e unfavorable criticisms of his views. Messinger et al. (1962), challenge the foregoi n g interpretation o f Goffman's imagery, a r g u i n g that the d r a m a t u r g i c analyst does not consider the theatrical m o d e l as representing his subjects' v i e w of the w o r l d . T h e dramaturgical frame of reference is, rather, a device used by the analyst to focus attention u p o n the effects of the actor's behavior u p o n the perceptions of h i m / h e r by others. W h a t e v e r the actor's beliefs m a y be about what he/she is d o i n g , the dramaturgist attends to the impression the actor has u p o n others. T h e analyst's frame of reference, then, m a y or m a y not c o m p o r t w i t h that used by the actor in v i e w i n g his/her o w n conduct. As a matter of fact, acc o r d i n g to these defenders of G o f f m a n , the v e r y

li'-tzer, Petras, Reynolds rngth of dramaturgical analysis may reside in e discrepancy b e t w e e n the t w o frames of refer ence. F o r such discrepancy m a y enable the ana lyst to elucidate matters of w h i c h his/her subjects are unaware. Specifically, he/she may t h e n reveal e way in w h i c h interactants construct, t h r o u g h their o w n acts, the " r e a l i t y " that they take for r-anted is " o u t t h e r e . " Some critics have attacked G o f f m a n f r o m mother quarter, questioning his n o t i o n of the functional necessity of " p e r f o r m a n c e s " in the maintenance of social order (Collins a n d M a k o w y, 1972:212). In their v i e w , the increasing infor mality of m o d e r n interpersonal relationships and me erosion of rank in contemporary A m e r i c a n mciety raise doubts about the degree to w h i c h ach rituals are essential to social life. In any f vent, there appears to be good reason for doub ling the u b i q u i t y of cool, calculating impression management in h u m a n affairs. A n intensive critique o f Goffman's approach appears in a r e v i e w , by B l u m e r , of one of the former's recent books. B l u m e r , w h i l e c o m m e n d ing b o t h the book a n d Goffman's w o r k in gen eral, discusses certain i m p o r t a n t weaknesses in the approach. These weaknesses (Blumer, 1972:52): stem from the narrowly constructed area of human group life that he has staked out for study. He has limited the area to face-to-face association with a corresponding exclusion of the vast mass of human activity falling outside of such association. Further, he has confined his study of face-to-face association to the interplay of personal positioning at the cost of ignoring what the participants are doing. In other words, the d r a m a t u r g i c a l approach ignores the macrocosm w i t h i n w h i c h its m i c r o level concerns are i m b e d d e d . Similarly, the ap proach overlooks the actual substantive content of h u m a n encounters in its c o n c e r n exclusively w i t h the expressive forms of the encounters. T h e resultant image of the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n is a par tial, truncated one. This defect is exacerbated by an assumption that h u m a n interaction is always organized a n d stable, an assumption that excludes d y n a m i c , unstructured, a n d problematic inter personal situations. Still, this assumption is occa sionally bent (but not violated) by the analysis of

51
such pathological incidents as social miscues a n d lapses. H o w does G o f f m a n come by his image of h u mans in society? O n e can make a good case for l i n k i n g the genesis a n d popular appeal of the dramaturgical approach to the changing charac ter of A m e r i c a n society. We can point to mass society, w i t h its mass p r o d u c t i o n , mass m a r k e t i n g , and mass m a n i p u l a t i o n of tastes, as d i r e c t i n g soci ological attention to social appearance's. As D. M a r t i n d a l e expresses it (1960:79): Since the days of James, Cooley, and Mead, the full implications of mass society have gradually become clear. . . . The old intimacy of small town image and incident disappears as the elaborate complexi ties of the mass societies are presupposed. The analy sis shifts to social appearances and takes place in terms of roles, acts, scenes, and incidents. Man as an opportunist rather than moral agent is visualized operating at the center of his web. Both the religious and the humanistic view of man are excluded from the new theory. A . G o u l d n e r (1970a), i n m u c h the same v e i n , elaborates u p o n several interrelated societal sources of the dramaturgical metaphor. He points out that m o d e r n m e n a n d w o m e n are l i k e l y to be functionaries or clients of large-scale bureau cratic organizations over w h i c h they have little influence. This b e i n g the case, G o f f m a n pays little attention to the efforts of people to alter the struc ture of such organizations. F u r t h e r , in such or ganizations individuals t e n d to become r e a d i l y interchangeable units whose sense of w o r t h a n d p o w e r is, consequently, i m p a i r e d . L a c k i n g i m p a c t on the organizational structure a n d its f u n c t i o n i n g , they b e n d their efforts to the m a n a g e m e n t of impressions that w i l l m a i n t a i n or enhance sta tus. These efforts, G o u l d n e r asserts plausibly, are m o r e l i k e l y to be m a d e by persons w h o r e t a i n individualistic a n d competitive orientations to life, but w h o are dependent for their livings u p o n large-scale organizations. T h e n e w e r , salaried m i d d l e classes are those most d i r e c t l y vulnerable to the conditions just described. G o u l d n e r characterizes Goffman's dramaturgy as "a revealing s y m p t o m of the latest phase i n the l o n g - t e r m tension b e t w e e n the m i d dle class's orientation to morality a n d its c o n c e r n w i t h u t i l i t y " (1970a:386). C o n s t r a i n e d by the n e w

52 exigencies, their faith in b o t h utility and morality seriously u n d e r m i n e d , the n e w m i d d l e class endeavors to "fix its perspective in aesthetic standards, in the appearance of t h i n g s " (390). G o u l d n e r suggests still another way in w h i c h the social situation described above impinges u p o n the dramaturgical v i e w . M i r r o r i n g today's society, Goffman (as we have seen) focuses u p o n the episodic, or situational, u p o n micro-analysis of brief encounters, without reference to historical circumstances or institutional frameworks (390). This feature of Goffman's imagery is, of course, c o m m o n to the varieties of contemporary symbolic interactionism. T h e foregoing ideas about the social framew o r k of dramaturgical analysis are not universally h e l d . B r i t t a n (1973:121-6) considers these ideas to be in error, for dramatic performances are, for h i m , a feature of all interaction, w h e t h e r in preliterate or contemporary society. H u m a n s , he contends, offer their audiences what they believe the audiences expect, t r y i n g to m a x i m i z e the efficacy and power of their performances in order to m a x i m i z e the social cohesion. T h e D u r k h e i m i a n roots of this defense are readily evident. We have seen that dramaturgical analysis has its detractors, chiefly on the basis of its ideologically unpalatable imagery and, to a lesser extent, its "soft" methodology. This variety of interactioni s m , however, also has its equally ardent admirers. A m o n g these, R . Collins a n d M . M a k o w s k y are specially laudatory, perhaps extravagantly so. T h e y applaud the dramaturgical perspective for m a k i n g social behavior "the central focus of attention, not in unrealistic laboratory situations, but in real-life encounters that make up the substance of society," and they c l a i m that for the first t i m e there opens up a real possibility of sociology's bec o m i n g a sciencea precise a n d rigorous body of k n o w l e d g e . . ." (1972:213). To those w h o agree w i t h this appraisal, Goffman's dramaturgical stance only partially accounts for it. E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t are his contributions to the labeling perspective ("the dramatization of evil") on deviance, in Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963), a n d his scintillating depiction of "total institutions," in Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (1961).

P A R T I Theory and Methods ETHNOMETHODOLOGY Several writers have discussed the affinities (for example: D e n z i n , 1969, 1970; D r e i t z e l , 1970: Petras and M e l t z e r , 1973; Wallace, 1969; Warshay, 1971) and the differences (for example: Deutscher, 1973; Douglas, 1970c; H e a p and Roth, 1973; H i n k l e , 1972; Z i m m e r m a n and W i e d e r , 1970) b e t w e e n ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism. W e agree w i t h Wallace, who writes: "Insofar as ethnomethodology embraces a theoretic (rather than methodologic) viewpoint, it is clearly symbolic interactionist" (1969:35). H e n c e , we shall examine ethnomethodology as a variation of the general interactionist perspective. H . G a r f i n k e l , leading progenitor o f ethnomethodology, has b e e n on the faculty of the U n i versity of C a l i f o r n i a (Los Angeles) since 1954. F r o m this post he has developed and l e d a group of thinkers (several n o w at the Santa Barbara b r a n c h of the U n i v e r s i t y of California) w h o have felt themselves to be adherents of an embattled, " e n c a p s u l a t e d " specialty, targets of contemptuous rejection by mainstream A m e r i c a n sociology. H i s intellectual precursors have i n c l u d e d , most notably, A . Schutz, E . Husserl, M . Merleau-Ponty, A. G u r w i t s c h , and other phenomenologists, as w e l l as various linguistic philosophers. Of these former, Schutz has b e e n most influential in Garfinkel's t h i n k i n g ; but, T. Parsons, one of Garfinkel's mentors at H a r v a r d d u r i n g his doctoral studies, has also exerted important i n f l u e n c e .
4

A n y attempt to grasp the nature of ethnomethodology must come to grips w i t h Garfinkel's convoluted, opaque prose. A d d i t i o n a l l y , one must acquire a degree of facility w i t h a large array of esoteric concepts, such as the following: "bracketi n g , " "deep rules," "documentation," "epoche," "et cetera clause," "glossing," " i d e a l i z a t i o n , " "red u c t i o n , " " r e f l e x i v i t y , " "second order conceptions," " t y p i f i c a t i o n , " etc. W i t h this caution in m i n d , we shall follow the lead of P. F i l m e r (1972:206-7) a n d present some of the m a n y " d e f i nitions," or delimitations of ethnomethodology's scope offered by G a r f i n k e l :

S e e M u l l i n s ( 1 9 7 3 : 1 8 3 - 9 2 ) f o r a m o r e c o m p l e t e d i s c u s s i o n of

Garfinkel's intellectual antecedents, co-workers, a n d students.

ir.rzer, Petras, Reynolds lomethodological studies analyze everyday ac~ .-ties as members' methods for making those same -: trrities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-prac- : zl-purposes, i.e. "accountable," as organizations of : immonplace everyday activities. The reflexivity of mat phenomenon is a singular feature of practical aatioris, of practical circumstances, of common sense >m :\vledge of social structures, and of practical socioigieal reasoning. By permitting us to locate and emmine their occurrence the reflexity of that phe- imenon establishes their study. Their study is directed to the tasks of learning -: v members' actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical actions, practical cir: distances, common sense knowledge of social .ictures, and practical sociological reasoning ana. xable; and of discovering the formal properties of :: mmonplace, practical common sense actions, :r ;m within" actual settings, as ongoing accomplish~ ents of those settings. The formal properties obtain meir guarantees from no other source, and in no other way (1967:vii-viii). The following studies seek to treat practical ac- tries, practical circumstances, and practical socio: steal reasoning as topics of empirical study, and : paying to the most commonplace activities of daily life the attention usually accorded extraordi nary events, seek to learn about them as phenomena z; their own right. Their central recommendation ; that the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members' procedures for making these settings "account-able." The "reflexive," or inlamate character of accounting practices and ac:: unts make up the crux of that recommendation 1967:1). I use the term "ethnomethodology" to refer to me investigation of the rational properties of indexiral expressions and other practical actions as contin gent ongoing accomplishments or organized artful rractices of everyday life (1967:11). G i v e n the ponderous and difficult character : : Garfinkel's w r i t i n g , w e shall l i m i t further quotar_: rrs f r o m his works. M u c h of the f o l l o w i n g mate rial w i l l expatiate upon the implications of the t i r e g o i n g definitions. As the first step towards i n c h expatiation, we shall briefly s u m m a r i z e the :: f r o m w h i c h the definitions are quoted, Garrmkel's sole published book to date (1967). A n introductory chapter " W h a t I s E t h n o methodology?" illustrates the approach by exam ining the contingencies a n d practices that shape decisions in c o d i n g cases of suspected suicide. We beam that, despite definite a n d elaborate rales, in each case "et cetera," "unless," "let it pass,"

53 and " f a c t u m v a l e t " understandings c o m e into play in the actual coding. T h e seven f o l l o w i n g essays (three of t h e m published previously) p r o v i d e further illustrations. "Studies of the R o u t i n e G r o u n d s of E v e r y d a y A c t i v i t i e s " describes observations and experiments, by students in Garfinkel's classes, w h e r e b y the b a c k g r o u n d understandings that are taken for granted in c o m m o n p l a c e conversations and incidents are disclosed. T h e chief technique of experimentation is that of d i s r u p t i n g the smooth flow of r o u t i n e events. In " C o m m o n Sense K n o w l e d g e of Social Structures: the D o c u m e n t a r y M e t h o d of Interpre tation i n L a y a n d Professional Fact F i n d i n g , " w e see h o w persons w h o are l e d to believe that they are r e c e i v i n g counseling on personal problems manage to make sense of r a n d o m " y e s " a n d " n o " responses to their questions by pseudo-counselors. "Some Rules of C o r r e c t Decisions that Jurors Re spect" reports on the methods used by j u r y m e m bers to negotiate resolutions of differences be t w e e n legal rules and everyday rules. O n e of Garfinkel's m o r e notorious studies is r e p o r t e d in "Passing and the M a n a g e d A c h i e v e m e n t of Sex Status in an Intersexed P e r s o n . " Based u p o n inter views w i t h a male transvestite, the paper de scribes the techniques by w h i c h the subject adapted to the d e v e l o p m e n t of female secondary sex characteristics. In an appendix to the paper, G a r f i n k e l confesses to h a v i n g been d u p e d by the subject into b e l i e v i n g that these characteristics d e v e l o p e d spontaneously, whereas later i n f o r m a t i o n revealed that the subject h a d b e e n t a k i n g estrogens surreptitiously. " G o o d O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Reasons for ' B a d ' C l i n i c R e c o r d s " clarifies h o w case records (of the outpatient Psychiatric C l i n i c at the U . C . L . A . M e d i c a l Center) m a y be quite useful only for staff-members (who have the nec essary b a c k g r o u n d understandings) w h i l e b e i n g virtually useless for actuarial or research p u r poses. W h a t appears to be Garfinkel's most a m b i tious essay, replete w i t h interesting diagrams a n d statistical tables, is " M e t h o d o l o g i c a l A d e q u a c y in the Quantitative Study of Selection C r i t e r i a a n d Selection Activities i n Psychiatric O u t p a t i e n t C l i n i c s . " H e r e we find an analysis of the actual decision-making process in selecting outpatients for treatment a n d for discharge. T h e final paper, " T h e Rational Properties o f Scientific and C o m -

54 m o n Sense A c t i v i t i e s , " challenges the applicability of the conventional scientific m e t h o d to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the banalities of everyday life. W h a t each of these essays accomplishes on a s m a l l scale, CicoureFs The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice (1968) does m o r e fully i n an intensive, thorough study. C i c o u r e l succeeds in r e v e a l i n g , m o r e fully t h a n previous investigators u s i n g different theoretical frameworks a n d methods, the artifactual character of j u v e n i l e del i n q u e n c y . E x a m i n i n g the everyday routines of discretionary behavior by police, p r o b a t i o n officers, court officials, and school personnel, he m i n u t e l y documents the " c r e a t i o n " of d e l i n q u e n c y . A d d i t i o n a l ethnomethodological investigations are those by S u d n o w (1967), M c H u g h (1968), a n d M a c A n d r e w a n d E d g e r t o n (1969). In his comments on this variant of symbolic interactionism, L. C h u r c h i l l (1971:183) notes that " t h e ethnomethodologist continually asks the t e c h n i c a l question ' H o w is that social activity d o n e ? " E t h n o m e t h o d o l o g y , thus, concerns itself w i t h the process b y w h i c h w e understand the w o r l d ; hence, i t examines h u m a n behavior o n b o t h the conscious and, m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , takenfor-granted levels. A n excellent s u m m a r y o f the position by P. F i l m e r (1972:203-34) stresses the f o l l o w i n g ideas. C o m m o n p l a c e (everyday, takenfor-granted) activities are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an i m p l i c i t order that emerges in the course of interaction a n d the activity itself. This order functions to m a k e situations " a c c o u n t a b l e , " that is, explainable or understandable. M u c h of our daily activity, for example, assumes the existence of an "et cetera clause," w h e r e b y our expressions (verbal a n d non-verbal) i m p l y a c o n t i n u e d directive towards a g i v e n type of social activity that is not e x p l i c i t l y stated. F i l m e r (1972:210) makes it clear that according to ethnomethodology, sociology is the study of all aspects of everyday social life, however trivial they may seem, just as much as it is the study of extraordinary events; and . . . sociology is, in an important sense, itself an everyday activity. We have noted the debt o w e d to the earlier w o r k of the phenomenologists, especially A. Schutz. H o w e v e r , ethnomethodology attempts to m o v e b e y o n d the understanding of h u m a n behav-

P A R T I Theory and Metho ior in terms of the meanings constructed by eac' i n d i v i d u a l in social interaction, to a systemati search (documentary interpretation) for the way i n w h i c h shared meanings ("indexical expr sions") c o m e to be taken for granted in h u m society (see Psathas, 1968). T h e basic position this approach entails, of course, a processual vie of h u m a n society. E v e r y d a y reality continualb undergoes construction; for, although humans ac: in terms of a naive realism, they must activeb negotiate each social situation in terms of problematic subjective interpretations. We should like to point out t w o significant departures of ethnomethodology f r o m the general interactionist tradition. D r e i t z e l indicates one of these, n o t i n g that ethnomethodologists, unl i k e most other interactionists, m a i n t a i n that: "the social order, i n c l u d i n g all its symbols a n d meanings, exists not o n l y precariously but has nc existence at a l l i n d e p e n d e n t of the m e m b e r s ' acc o u n t i n g a n d d e s c r i b i n g practices" (1970:xv). The i m p l i e d thorough-going idealism and solipsism are suggested in Cooley's views but vigorously d e n i e d in Mead's. In any case, the focus of ethnomethodology "is not on activity but rather on the process by w h i c h m e m b e r s manage to produce a n d sustain a sense of social s t r u c t u r e " (Mullins. 1973:195). Secondly, ethnomethodology has established itself as an i m p o r t a n t force in the rise, or resurgence, over the past few years, of the sociology of sociology. In works by C i c o u r e l (1964) and Douglas (1970a; 1970b) we find depictions of the flimsy nature of social reality in general society, as w e l l as indications of the ways in w h i c h sociologists construct w i t h each other an equally flimsy social reality. This latter enterprise often gives rise to the assumption by sociologists of certain givens that h i n d e r efforts to understand social conduct f r o m the perspective of the actor. Thus, to assume the existence of a social reality actually " o u t t h e r e " appears to be universal. As "social realities" e m e r g e relative to our particular position i n social and c u l t u r a l matrixes, exactly what system of reality is defined as warr a n t i n g our trust varies. This assumed reality, in t u r n , defines the ways in w h i c h the relationships themselves are i n t e r p r e t e d and c a r r i e d out dur-

55 zz interaction. Ethnomethodologists are inter- in the " m e t h o d s " used by the observed and zz~ observer alike for dealing w i t h their everyday i f r realities (see, for example, C o l l i n s a n d M a k o w 1972:209). So, ethnomethodology closely approximates it the Chicago school in methodological prefer-tites, w i t h emphasis u p o n sympathetic introaction and participant-observer research. T h e rmnomethodologists, h o w e v e r , have s h o w n , i n instances, a greater cognizance of the role : history in behavior, as w e l l as such traditional ractionist concerns as t i m e , place, and situaz : n (see, for example, Warshay, 1971:25). N e e d .esi to say, such cognizance has its defects as w e l l tts virtues, r e n d e r i n g trans-situational generalii L i o n problematic. G e n e r a l l y speaking, h o w e v e r , nteractionism has b e e n notably ahistorical, w i t h ::.e follow-up of the types of analyses a p p e a r i n g zz Mead's Movements of Thought in the Nine:-:;nth Century (1936). We shall c o n c l u d e our consideration of ethnomethodology by briefly rLaxnining the image of humans p o r t r a y e d n the writings of that variety of interactionEm. M u c h of the c r i t i c i s m l e v e l e d against ethno methodology is d i r e c t e d at it as b o t h a sociological theory and a methodological approach. F o r exam ple, ethnomethodology has b e e n castigated for ignoring relationships b e t w e e n individuals and -irger social units, for offering no clear demonstra tion of h o w taken-for-granted assumptions oper ate in interaction, and for a lack of precision in explicating the documentary m e t h o d ( D e n z i n , 1969:929). O n e attempt to r e b u t the first of these criticisms, a c r i t i c i s m l a u n c h e d against the inter-ctionist f r a m e w o r k generally, is described by D r e i t z e l (1970). He contends that ethnometho dology "tends to cut off all macrosociological considerations for the time being in o r d e r to concentrate on the basic rules of everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d i n t e r a c t i o n " (x, our emphasis). Ethnomethodologists c l a i m , h e writes: " U n t i l w e have understood h o w we . . . understand each other, all further sociological i n q u i r y w i l l be use less" (1970:x). G o u l d n e r , however, touches u p o n what seems to us to be an e v e n m o r e serious c r i t i c i s m , one that involves ideological considerations, rather than the traditional problems of theory and research. In The Coming Crisis in Western Sociol ogy (1970a:395), G o u l d n e r puts f o r w a r d the v i e w that, " G a r f i n k e l ' s is a sociology m o r e congenial to the activistic 1960s a n d particularly to the m o r e politically rebellious campuses of the present pe r i o d . " Warshay, too, opines (1971:25) that ethno methodology is a sociology of i n v o l v e m e n t at all levels. M o r e than that, however, it is often a sociol ogy of instigation. Whereas Goffman appears con tent m e r e l y to study the d r a m a of c o p i n g w i t h the depersonalization a n d alienation prevalent in m o d e r n society, G a r f i n k e l and his cohorts often deliberately inflict these conditions u p o n others. Demonstrations of the acquisition of p o w e r by d i s r u p t i n g taken-for-granted assumptions, e.g., not accepting statements at their face value, bar gaining for fixed-value items in a store, and falsely p u r p o r t i n g to help individuals w i t h personal prob lems (Garfinkel, 1967:62-71 and C h a p t e r Three), all position the investigator as a superordinate m a nipulator a n d his subjects as mystified dupes. Thus, Goffman's opportunist becomes Garfinkel's b l u n d e r i n g fool, trusting in something that isn't there, w i l l f u l l y destroyed by those p r e t e n d i n g to share his/her trust.

SUMMARY We have presented a brief o v e r v i e w of four of the most p r o m i n e n t varieties of c o n t e m p o r a r y symbolic interactionism. These approaches have b e e n shown to differ not only in terms of what they consider to be the appropriate theoretical stance of interactionism but also in terms of the image of humans that results f r o m , a n d interacts w i t h , that particular stance. In the C h i c a g o school's orientation we find a conception of h u m a n beings as active agents i n creating the social e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h , i n t u r n , influences their behavior. T h e school's p r e f e r r e d methodology for understanding h u m a n behavior remains an unattained ideal in sociology. At pres ent, research techniques are not adequately at t u n e d to i n - d e p t h analysis of this u n i q u e feature of h u m a n conduct. T h e Iowa school, on the other h a n d , by insisting u p o n faithful adherence to posi-

56
t i v i s m , has i m a g e d relatively passive " h u m a n beings as internalizers," studying verbally expressed products of internalization. T h e dramaturgical app r o a c h has a d d e d a n e w d i m e n s i o n to the interactionist traditionthe m a n i p u l a t i v e penchant of humans. This focus has d r a w n attention to the taken-for-granted w o r l d in w h i c h the rituals of impression management are enacted. In d o i n g so, the approach has laid a foundation for study of the " w o r l d of everyday l i f e " that provides the subject matter of ethnomethodology. We must note, albeit belatedly, that our a p p l i cation of the label "schools" to these varieties is not i n t e n d e d to i m p l y that theorists and researchers w o r k i n g w i t h i n each perspective necessarily define themselves as adherents to the g i v e n perspective. Parenthetically, it should be clear that the Chicago and Iowa schools refer to intellectual perspectives, not to geographical locations. T w o " d e v i a n t cases" that illustrate this point are A. Rose, w h o studied w i t h B l u m e r at Chicago, a n d N . D e n z i n , w h o r e c e i v e d his doctorate f r o m the State U n i v e r s i t y of Iowa. In general, it seems to us that members of the Iowa school share little in the nature of a consciousness of k i n d . We conj e c t u r e that this is due p r i m a r i l y to the c i r c u m stance that the major thrust of this approach incorporates, rather than differentiates it f r o m , the mainstream of A m e r i c a n sociological theory a n d research. M e m b e r s of the Chicago school, in contrast, appear to be m u c h m o r e conscious of their distinctive theoretical a n d methodological position. Similarly, G o f f m a n a n d his disciples stand forth as clearly identifiable. A m o n g the ethnomethodologists, defined by themselves and by others as most at variance w i t h current A m e r i c a n sociology, self-identification is most h i g h l y salient; for, as Deutscher expresses it, " T h e y see themselves as a n e w disciplinea radical perspective on h u m a n behavior and its s t u d y " (1973:357). H a v i n g surveyed these different orientations w i t h i n m o d e r n interactionism, we are in a posit i o n to indicate one c o m m o n element that has b e e n connoted by m u c h of our discussion but n o w merits explicit m e n t i o n . W e have i n m i n d the i m p o r t a n t point that h u m a n interaction is a process of sharing one another's behavior rather than of m e r e l y responding to each other's words and actions. Such sharing is indispensable to, part and

PART I

Theory and Methods

parcel of, the f o r m a t i o n of a c o m m o n w o r l d by members of any h u m a n group.

REFERENCES Blumer, H. "Psychological Import of the Human Group," in M. Sherif and M. D. Wilson (eds.), Group Relations at the Crossroads. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953 pp. 185-202. . "What Is Wrong with Social Theory?" American Sociological Review, vol. 19 (February 1954) pp. 3-10. . "Society as Symbolic Interaction," in A. M. Rose (ed.), Human Behavior and Social Processes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962, pp. 179-192. . "Sociological Implications of the Thought of G. H. Mead." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 71 (March 1966), pp. 535-544. . Symbolic Interactionism. N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. Englewood Cliffs,

. "Action vs. Interaction," review of Relations in Public, by E. Goffman, Society, vol. 9 (April 1972); pp. 50-3. Brittan, A. Meanings and Situations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. Burke, K. A Grammar of Motives. New York: PrenticeHall, 1945. . A Rhetoric of Motives. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950. Churchill, L. "Ethnomethodology and Measurement." Social Forces, vol. 50 (December 1971); pp. 18291. Cicourel, A. V. Method and Measurement in Sociology. New York: Free Press, 1964. . The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice. New York: Wiley, 1968. Collins, R., and M. Makowsky. The Discovery of Society. New York: Random House, 1972. Cuzzort, R. P. Humanity and Modern Sociological Thought. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969. Denzin, N. K. "Symbolic Interactionism and Enthnomethodology: A Proposed Synthesis." American Sociological Review, vol. 34 (December 1969); pp. 922-34. . "Symbolic Interactionism and Ethnomethodol-

57 ogy," in J. D. Douglas (ed.), Understanding Every day Life. Chicago: Aldine, 1970, pp. 261-284. Deutscher, I. What We Say/What We Do. Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Company, 1973. D Duglas, J. D. (ed.) The Impact of Sociology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970a. -. (ed.), The Relevance of Sociology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970b. (ed.), Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago: Aldine; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970c. Dreitzel, H . P. (ed.) Recent Sociology, no. 2, London: Macmillan, 1970. Duncan, H. D. Symbols in Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 7ilmer, P. " O n Harold Garfinkel's Ethnomethodology," in P. Filmer, M. Phillipson, D. Silverman, and D. Walsh (eds.), New Directions in Sociological Theory. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1972, pp. 203-234. lirfinkel, H. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. -, E. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959. . Asylums. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961. . Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. . Interaction Ritual. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. I-ouldner, A. W. The Coming Crisis in Sociology. New York: Basic Books, 1970. Western ruptus," in T. Shibutani (ed.), Human Nature and Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren tice-Hall, 1970, pp. 35-45. Lyman, S. M . , and M. B. Scott. A Sociology of the Absurd. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970. MacAndrew, C, and R. Edgerton. Drunken Comport ment: A Social Explanation. Chicago: Aldine, 1969. McHugh, P. Defining the Situation. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1968. Martindale, D. American Society. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1960. Mead, G. H. Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. by M. H. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936. Meltzer, B. N . , and J. W. Petras. "The Chicago and Iowa Schools of Symbolic Interactionism," i n T . Shibutani (ed.), Human Nature and Collective Behavior. E n glewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 3-17. Messinger, S. E., with H. Sampson, and R. D. Towne. "Life as Theatre: Some Notes on the Dramaturgic Approach to Social Reality." Sociometry, vol. 25 (September 1962), pp. 98-110. Mullins, N. C with the assistance of C. J. Mullins. Theories and Theory Groups in Contemporary American Sociology, New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Petras, J. W., and B. N. Meltzer. "Theoretical and Ideo logical Variations in Contemporary Interaction ism," Catalyst, 7 (Winter 1973), pp. 1-8. Psathas, G. "Ethnomethods and Phenomenology," Social Research, vol. 35 (September 1968), pp. 50020. Reynolds, L. ., Vaughan, T. R., Reynolds, J. M, and Warshay, L. II. "The Self in Symbolic Interaction Theory," in L. T. Reynolds and J. M Reynolds (eds.), The Sociology of Sociology. New York: McKay, 1970, pp. 422-439. Reynolds, L. ., and C. McCart, "The Institutional Basis of Theoretical Diversity," Sociological Focus, vol. 5 (Spring 1972), pp. 16-39. Reynolds, L. ., and B. N. Meltzer, "The Origins of Divergent Methodological Stances in Symbolic In teractionism." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 14 (Spring 1973), pp. 189-99. Reynolds, J. M . , and L. T. Reynolds, "Interactionism, Complicity and the Astructural Bias," Catalyst, vol. 7 (Winter,' 1973), pp. 76-85. Shaskolsky, L. "The Development of Sociological The ory in AmericaA Sociology of Knowledge Inter pretation," in L. T. and J. M. Reynolds (eds.), The

Heap, J. L . , and P. A. Roth. " O n Phenomenological Soci ology." American Sociological Review, vol. 38 (June 1973); pp. 354-67. Hickman, C. A. and M. H. Kuhn. Individuals, Groups, and Economic Behavior. New York: Dryden, 1956. Hinkle, G. J. " 'Forms' and 'Types' in the Study of H u man Behavior: An Examination of the Generalizing Concepts of Mead and Schutz." Kansas Journal of Sociology, vol. VIII (Fall 1972), pp. 91-110. Kuhn, M. H. "Lectures on the Self," mimeographed (no date). . "Factors in Personality: Socio-cultural Determi nants as seen through the Amish," in F. L. K. Hsu (ed.), Aspects of Culture and Personality. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954, pp. 34-60. "Major Trends in Symbolic Interaction Theory in the Past Twenty-Five Years." Sociological Quar terly, vol. 5 (Winter 1964), pp. 61-84. Lnfland, J. "Interactionist Imagery and Analytic Inter-

58
Sociology of Sociology. New York: McKay, 1970, pp. 6-30. Sjoberg, G . , and R. Nett. A Methodology for Social Research. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Spitzer, S., C. Couch, and J. Stratton. The Assessment of Self Iowa City: Escort-Sernoll (no date). Sudnow, D. Passing On: The Social Organization of Dying. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Tucker, C. W. "Some Methodological Problems of Kuhn's Self Theory." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 7 (Summer 1966), pp. 345-358. Turner, R. H. "Role-Taking: Process versus Conformity," in A. M. Rose (ed.), Human Behavior and Social Processes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962, pp. 2040. Vaughan, T. R., and L. T. Reynolds. "The Sociology of

PART I

Theory and Methods

Symbolic Interactionism." American Sociologist. vol. 3 (August 1968), pp. 208-214. Wallace, W. L. (ed.) Sociological Theory, Chicago: A l dine, 1969. Warshay, L. "The Current State of Sociological Theory: Diversity, Polarity, Empiricism, and Small Theories." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 12 (Winter 1971), pp. 23-45. Wrong, D. H. "The Over-Socialized Conception of Man." American Sociological Review, vol. 26 (April 1961), pp. 185-93. Zimmerman, D. H . , and D. L. Wieder. "Ethnomethodology and the Problem of Order: Comments on Denzin," in J. D. Douglas (ed.), Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago: Aldine, 1970, pp. 287295.

Norman K. Denzin

The Research A c t

T H E INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THEORY AND METHOD T h e sociological enterprise m a y be said to rest on these elements: theory, methodology, research activity, a n d the sociological imagination. T h e f u n c t i o n of theory, w h i c h I define as a n intergrated b o d y of propositions, the d e r i v a t i o n of w h i c h leads to explanation of some social p h e n o m e n o n , is to give order a n d insight to research activities. Methodology, on the other h a n d ; represents the p r i n c i p a l ways the sociologist acts on his e n v i r o n m e n t ; his methods, be they experiments, surveys, or life histories, lead to different features of this reality, a n d it is t h r o u g h his methods that he makes his research p u b l i c a n d r e p r o d u c i b l e
From Hill The Research Act b y Book Company. Norman K. Denzin. Copyright

by others. As the sociologist moves f r o m his theories to the selection of methods, the emergence of that vague process c a l l e d research activity can be seen. In this process the personal preferences of a scientist for one theory or m e t h o d emerge. F u r t h e r m o r e , his selection of a g i v e n p r o b l e m area (e.g., d e l i n q u e n c y , the family, etc.) often represents a h i g h l y personal decision. O r d e r is g i v e n to theory, methodology, and research activity t h r o u g h the use of what M i l l s t e r m e d the sociological imagination. The sociological imagination, I remind you, in considerable part consists of the capacity to shift from one perspective to another, and in the process to build up an adequate view of a total society and its components. It is this imagination, of course, that sets off the social scientist from the mere technician. Adequate technicians can be trained in a few years. The sociological imagination can also be cultivated;

1970 b y M c G r a w - H i l l , Inc. U s e d w i t h p e r m i s s i o n o f M c G r a w -

Denzin

59 that this perspective w i l l assist sociology t o w a r d the goal of a mature science of h u m a n interaction.

certainly it seldom occurs without a great deal of routine work. Yet there is an unexpected quality about it. . . . There is a playfulness of mind back of such combining as well as a truly fierce drive to make sense of the world, which the technician as such usually lacks. Perhaps he is too well trained, too precisely trained. Since one can be trained only in what is already known, training sometimes incapacitates one from learning new ways; it makes one rebel against what is bound to be at first loose and even sloppy. But you cling to such vague images and notions, if they are yours, and you must work them out. For it is in such forms that original ideas, if any, almost always first appear [1959, pp. 21112]. T h e sociological imagination demands variaoility in the research process. T h e processes by vhich sociology is done should not be made too rigorous; an open m i n d is r e q u i r e d . W h a t some regard as doctrinaire w i l l be challenged by others and, therefore, methodological and theoretical principles must always be evaluated in terms of die sociological imagination. Rather than applying just a set of methodological principles to research strategieswhich leads to an e v e n greater gap b e t w e e n theory a n d m e t h o d I c o m b i n e a theoretical perspective w i t h a series of m e t h o d ological rules, w i t h symbolic interactionism as the theoretical framework and t a k i n g certain key principles f r o m the scientific m e t h o d and applying t h e m to both theory and m e t h o d . My a i m is first to show that each m e t h o d takes on a different meaning w h e n analyzed i n the interactionist f r a m e w o r k a n d hence can be shown to have different relevance for that t h e o r y a n d second, by e m p l o y i n g notions f r o m the scientific m e t h o d , I indicate h o w these methods can best be p u t to use to fit the demands of interaction theory. T h i r d , a n d r e t u r n i n g to the central thesis, I w i l l suggest that methods are not atheoretical tools, out rather means of acting on the e n v i r o n m e n t and m a k i n g that e n v i r o n m e n t m e a n i n g f u l . This point of v i e w w i l l , I hope, p e r m i t sociologists to overcome what I v i e w as errors of the past, and reduce the gap that presently exists b e t w e e n theory and m e t h o d . It should also lead sociologists :o cease using methods in rote and ritualistic fashion, a n d enable us to m o v e away f r o m m i d d l e range and small-scope theories to what I w i l l t e r m formal theory (see S i m m e l , 1950). F i n a l l y , I hope

T H EINTERACTIONISTPERSPECTIVE T h e interactionist's conception of h u m a n behavior assumes that behavior is self-directed and observable at t w o distinct levelsthe symbolic and the interactional (or behavioral). By "selfd i r e c t e d , " I m e a n that humans can act t o w a r d themselves as they w o u l d toward any other object. As B l u m e r (1966) says, the h u m a n m a y " p e r ceive himself, have conceptions of himself, c o m municate w i t h himself, and act toward himself [p. 535]." This behavior, w h i c h B l u m e r calls "selfi n t e r a c t i o n , " permits humans to p l a n a n d to align their actions w i t h others. Integral to this position is the proposition that man's social w o r l d is not constituted of objects that have intrinsic m e a n i n g , but that the m e a n i n g of objects lies in man's plans of action. H u m a n experience is such that the process of defining objects is ever changing, subject to redefinitions, relocations, and realignments, and for conduct t o w a r d any object to be m e a n i n g f u l , the definition of the object must be consensual. That is, if I cannot persuade another sociologist to accept my definition of what a particular research m e t h o d means, I shall be incapable of discussing m y actions w i t h h i m . T h e interactionist assumes that humans are able to act because they have agreed on the m e a n ings they w i l l attach to the relevant objects in their e n v i r o n m e n t . B u t before such consensus c a n occur, c o m m o n symbolic languages must be present, a n d in sociology it is mandatory that agreem e n t over basic terms be established before serious activity can begin. Consequently it w i l l be necessary to give precise definitions to the terms theory, method, experiment, social survey, participant observation a n d validity. T h e interactionist additionally assumes that m a n learns his basic symbols, his conceptions of self, a n d the definitions he attaches to his social objects t h r o u g h i n teraction w i t h others. M a n simultaneously carries o n conversations w i t h himself and w i t h his significant others.

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METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION FROM INTERACTION THEORY G i v e n these basics of the interactionist perspective, I can n o w propose a series of principles that this perspective demands of its methodologies. If h u m a n behavior is observable at t w o levelsthe symbolic and the b e h a v i o r a l t h e n central to understanding such behavior are the range a n d variety of symbols a n d symbolic meanings shared, c o m m u n i c a t e d , a n d m a n i p u l a t e d b y interacting selves in social situations. Society contributes t w o essential elements that reflect d i r e c t l y on concrete interactions: the symbols, or various languages p r o v i d e d a n d c o m m u n i c a t e d t h r o u g h the socialization process; a n d the concrete beh a v i o r a l settings i n w h i c h behavior occurs. An interactionist assumes that a complete analysis of h u m a n conduct w i l l capture the symbolic meanings that emerge over t i m e i n interaction. B u t the sociologist must also capture variations in ongoing patterns of behavior that reflect these symbols, images, a n d conceptions of self. These symbols are m a n i f o l d a n d complex, v e r b a l and nonverbal, intended and unintended. V e r b a l utterance, n o n v e r b a l gesture, m o d e a n d style of dress, a n d m a n n e r of speech all p r o v i d e clues to the symbolic meanings that b e c o m e translated into a n d emerge out of interaction. T h e first methodological principle is that symbols a n d interaction must be b r o u g h t together before an investigation is complete. To focus o n l y on symbols, as an attitude questionnaire m i g h t , fails to r e c o r d the emergent a n d n o v e l relationships these symbols have w i t h observable behavior. If I am studying the relationship b e t w e e n marijuana use a n d the strategies of concealing the d r u g in the presence of nonusers I w i l l w a n t to show that a marijuana user's attitude t o w a r d outsiders is reflected in his behavior in their presence. It w o u l d be insufficient to d o c u m e n t only the fact that users do not l i k e to get " h i g h " w h e n an outsider is present. C o m m i t t e d to the interactionist position, I must go f u r t h e r a n d d e m o n strate h o w this attitude is i n f l u e n c e d by contact w i t h nonusers. B e c k e r (1953, 1955, 1962) has p r o v i d e d such an analysis. In his interviews (1962, p. 597) it was d i s c o v e r e d that a m o n g nonregular smokers fear

PART I

Theory and Methods

of discovery took t w o forms: that nonusers w o u l d discover marijuana in one's possession; a n d that one w o u l d " b e unable to hide the effects of the d r u g w h e n h e i s ' h i g h ' w i t h nonusers." This type of user adopts deliberate strategies to conceal the effects a n d presence of marijuana; he m a y e v e n smoke i n f r e q u e n t l y because he cannot find a "safe" setting. A m o n g regular users such fears are not present, although B e c k e r i n d i c a t e d that as their interactional contacts change regular users m a y find it necessary to revert to only occasional use. O n e regular user w h o had m a r r i e d a nonuser eventually t u r n e d to irregular use. T h e f o l l o w i n g excerpt f r o m B e c k e r describes this p a t t e r n and demonstrates h o w the meanings attached to the social object (marijuana) actually e m e r g e d in patterns of interaction: (This man had used marihuana quite intensively but his wife objected to it.) Of course, largely the reason I cut off was my wife. There were a few times when I'd feel like . . . didn't actually crave for it but would just like to have had some. (He was unable to continue using the drug except irregularly on those occasions when he was away from his wife's presence and control [1962, p. 598].) A second methodological principle suggests that because symbols, meanings, and definitions are forged into self-definitions a n d attitudes, the reflective nature of selfhood must be captured. T h a t is, the investigator must indicate h o w shifti n g definitions of self are reflected in o n g o i n g patterns o f behavior. H e must, therefore, v i e w h u m a n conduct f r o m the point of v i e w of those he is s t u d y i n g " t a k e the role of the acting other i n concrete situations"and this m a y range f r o m l e a r n i n g the other's language to c a p t u r i n g his salient views of self. R e t u r n i n g to the example of the marijuana user, it w o u l d be necessary to l e a r n the language of marijuana subcultures, w h i c h , as B e c k e r shows, includes special words for getting " h i g h " a n d has various categorizations for " o u t s i d ers." T a k i n g the role of the acting other permits the sociologist to escape the fallacy of objectivism; that is, the substitution of his o w n perspective for that of those he is studying. T o o often the sociologist enters the field w i t h p r e c o n c e p tions that p r e v e n t h i m f r o m a l l o w i n g those studies

inzin

61 but he r e t a i n e d their sociological m e a n i n g . T h e sociologist must operate b e t w e e n t w o worlds w h e n h e engages i n researchthe everyday w o r l d of his subjects a n d the w o r l d of his o w n sociological perspective. Sociological explanations ultimately g i v e n for a set of behaviors are not l i k e l y to be c o m p l e t e l y understood by those studied; e v e n if they p r o v e understandable, subjects m a y not agree w i t h or accept t h e m , perhaps because they have b e e n p l a c e d in a category they do not like or because elements of their b e h a v i o r they prefer h i d d e n have b e e n m a d e p u b l i c . A n i r r e d u c i b l e conflict w i l l always exist b e t w e e n the sociological perspective a n d the perspective of everyday life (Becker, 1964). This is a fact the sociologist must recognize. I raise this p r o b l e m at this point to indicate that a c o m m i t m e n t to my second p r i n c i p l e goes further than m e r e l y taki n g the role of the other; sociologists must also place their interpretations w i t h i n a sociological perspective. T a k i n g the role of the acting other leads to the third methodological principle: T h e i n v e s t i gator must simultaneously l i n k man's symbols a n d conceptions of self w i t h the social circles a n d relationships that furnish h i m w i t h those symbols a n d conceptions. T o o frequently failure to achieve this l i n k leaves studies of h u m a n conduct at an i n d i vidualistic l e v e l , and as a consequence the i m p a c t of broader social structures on subjects' c o n d u c t can be only i n d i r e c t l y i n f e r r e d . This p r i n c i p l e is not u n i q u e to the interactionist perspective, b u t derives ultimately f r o m a conception of sociology that holds that the i m p a c t of social structure on groups a n d individuals must be examined. A p p l y i n g this p r i n c i p l e to the study of m a r i juana use suggests that the investigator must d e m onstrate h o w an i n d i v i d u a l user's definitions of the object are related to his group's conceptions. T h e f o l l o w i n g excerpt f r o m Becker's i n t e r v i e w w i t h a regular user satisfies this p r i n c i p l e . (You don't dig [like] alcohol then?) No, I don't dig it at all. (Why not?) I don't know. I just don't. Well, see, here's the thing. Before I was at the age where kids start drinking I was already getting on (using marihuana) and I saw the advantages of getting on, you know, I mean there was no sickness and it was much cheaper. That was one of the first things I learned, man. Why do you want to drink? Drinking

:: tell it "as they see i t . " A student of marijuana B e , for example, m a y i n c o r r e c t l y generalize f r o m is o w n experiences w i t h it to the group of users is studying. O f t e n the investigator w i l l find mat the meanings he has l e a r n e d to attach to h object have no relevance for the people he observing. This error occurs frequently in areas : conduct u n d e r g o i n g r a p i d change; studies of -iOial interaction, political activity, fads a n d fashions, a n d e v e n analyses of stratification hierarchies in bureaucracies m a y p r o v i d e cases w h e r e be definitions of the sociologist bear only slight resemblances to the actual situation.

EVERYDAY A N D SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTIONS OF REALITY I w i s h to m a i n t a i n a distinction b e t w e e n the :: eiologist's conceptions of his subject's behavior md the motives a n d definitions that subjects ascribe to their o w n conduct. T h e way a subject explains his behavior is l i k e l y to differ f r o m the ay a sociologist w o u l d . M a r i j u a n a users, for example, do not e m p l o y such terms as " m o r a l i t y , " rationalization," " c o l l u s i o n , " "social c o n t r o l , " subculture," " s o c i a l i z a t i o n , " or " r o l e b e h a v i o r . " Z o m m e n t i n g on this fact B e c k e r notes that the :: ciological v i e w of the w o r l d is "abstract, relativ-stic a n d g e n e r a l i z i n g [1964, p. 273]." On the :ther h a n d , the everyday c o n c e p t i o n of reality mat guides our subject's conduct is specific, tends root to be generalizing, a n d is based on special concepts that often lack any scientific validity. These points suggest that it is insufficient merely to state that the sociologist must take the role of the acting other in his investigations, and rhat a distinction must be m a d e b e t w e e n everyday conceptions of reality a n d scientific conceptions of that reality. An adherence to my second principle suggests that the sociologist first learns me everyday conceptions of this reality a n d then mterprets that reality f r o m the stance of his socio:gical theory. This is the strategy B e c k e r e m ployed in his analysis of the marijuana user. He regan w i t h a symbolic interactionist c o n c e p t i o n : f h u m a n conduct, and a p p l i e d it to behavior in me marijuana subculture. H i s concepts w e r e maped by the meanings g i v e n t h e m by the user,

S2 is dumb, you know. It's so much cheaper to get on and you don't get sick, and it's not sloppy and takes less time. And it just grew to be the thing you know. So I got on before I drank, you know. . . . (What do you mean that's one of the first things you learned?) Well, I mean, as I say, I was just starting to play jobs as a musician when I got on and I was also in a position to drink on the jobs, you know. A n d these guys just told me it was silly to drink. They didn't drink either [1962, p. 603]. This i n t e r v i e w offers an excellent instance of h o w a person's attitude toward a social object represents a combination of his o w n attitudes and those of his social groups. My t h i r d p r i n c i p l e is satisfied w h e n personal and social perspectives are b l e n d e d in a fashion similar to Becker's analysis. The fourth methodological principle derives f r o m the statement that any society provides its members w i t h a variety of behavior settings w i t h i n w h i c h interaction can occur. Research methods must therefore consider the "situated aspects" of h u m a n conductthat is, w h e n e v e r sociologists engage in observation, they must r e c o r d the dynamics of their specific observational situations. Situations vary w i d e l y in terms of the norms g o v e r n i n g conduct w i t h i n t h e m , and participants in any behavioral setting both create and interpret the rules that influence n o r m a l conduct w i t h i n that situation. R e c o r d i n g the situationality of h u m a n interaction w o u l d be less i m p o r t a n t if it w e r e not that symbols, meanings, conceptions of self, and actions toward social objects all vary because of the situation. As shown by Becker's study of marijuana users, in "safe" situations a m o n g regular users, the marijuana smoker is likely to get " h i g h " and feel no restraints in discussing the effects of the object on his conduct; in " u n s a f e " situations he w i l l go to extremes of secrecy and concealment.
1

P A R T I Theory and Methods explicitly situated his respondents by symbolically placing t h e m w i t h i n their favored shopping locale, thus p e r m i t t i n g a designation and description of relevant activities on the basis. Social selves, I am suggesting, are situated objects that reflect ongoing definitions of social situations. F o r this reason both the meanings attached to these situations and the types of selves and interactions that emerge w i t h i n t h e m must be examined. Stone's investigation treats the meanings attached to shopping situations a n d indirectly infers the types of selves that flow from t h e m . Becker's study achieves both goals: the m e a n i n g or definitions of the situation and the self-attitudes of marijuana users in varying situations. I m p l i c i t thus far has been the assumption that the forms and processes of interaction must be reflected in sociological methodologies. Since the emergent relationship between self-conceptions, definitions of social objects, and ongoing patterns of interaction must be recorded, analyzed, and explained, the fifth methodological principle is that research methods must be capable of reflecti n g both stable and processual behavioral forms. Speaking of models of causation, Becker makes the f o l l o w i n g argument for processual analyses of h u m a n behavior. A l l causes do not operate at the same time, and we need a model which takes into account the fact that patterns of behavior develop in orderly sequence. In accounting for an individual's use of marijuana, as we shall see later, we must deal with a sequence of steps, of changes in the individual's behavior and perspectives, in order to understand the phenomenon. Each step requires explanation, and what may operate as a cause at one step in the sequence may be of negligible importance at another step. We need, for example, one kind of explanation of how a person comes to be in a situation where marijuana is easily available to him, and another kind of explanation of why, given the fact of its availability, he is willing to experiment with it in the first place. And we need still another explanation of why, having experimented with it, he continues to use it. In a sense, each explanation constitutes a necessary cause of the behavior. That is, no one could become a confirmed marijuana user without going through each step. He must have the drug available, experiment with it, and continue to use it. The explanation of each step is thus part of the explanation of the resulting behavior [1963, p. 23].

" S i t u a t i n g " an observation or a respondent may require no more than asking the respondent to answer questions in terms of the situations where he normally engages in the behavior under study. Stone (1954) achieved this goal in his study of female shoppers in a large urban locale; he
In chapters 7 through 11 of his The Research Act, Denzin

s h o w s t h a t t h e m a j o r m e t h o d s o f t h e sociologist m e e t this req u i r e m e n t in different ways.

63 As I t u r n to the i n d i v i d u a l methods of the - ::ologist it w i l l become apparent that some are rerrer suited than others for the above kinds of iroalyses, that surveys better measure static and cable forms of behavior w h i l e life histories and c^rticipant observation m o r e adequately l e n d .-.imselves to processual analyses. THE ROLE OF METHODS T h e sixth methodological principle necessarbecomes more abstract and reflects directly . the role of methods in the entire sociological -ocerprise. It states that the v e r y act of engaging to social research must be seen as a process of mbolic interaction, that b e i n g a scientist reflects ; : cntinual attempt to lift one's o w n idiosyncratic 7 .periences to the level of the consensual and ~e shared meaning. It is in this context that the -^search m e t h o d becomes the major means of act ing on the symbolic e n v i r o n m e n t and m a k i n g noose actions consensual in the broader c o m m u nity of sociologists. W h e n a sociologist adopts the surveys as a - rthod of research he does so w i t h the belief mat w h e n he reports his results other investiga:: rs w i l l understand how he p r o c e e d e d to gather observations. T h e w o r d survey designates a _: rial object that has some degree of consensus a i o n g other sociologists. B u t m o r e than this the : r d implies a vast variety of actions in w h i c h : .e w i l l engage after he has adopted the m e t h o d . Persons w i l l be sampled, questionnaires w i l l be constructed, responses w i l l be coded, computers ill be e m p l o y e d , and some f o r m of statistical analysis w i l l be presented. If, on the other h a n d , participant observation is chosen as a m e t h o d , sailer samples w i l l be selected, documents w i l l be collected, informants w i l l be selected, unstruc tured i n t e r v i e w i n g w i l l be done, and descriptive iratistical analyses w i l l be presented. If a situation can be i m a g i n e d in w h i c h two : oiologists adopt different methods of study, the impact of symbolic interaction on their conduct can be v i v i d l y seen. Suppose that the same e m p i r cai situation is selectedfor example, a mental hospital. T h e first investigator adopts the survey is his m e t h o d ; the second, participant observa tion. E a c h w i l l make different kinds of observa tions, engage in different analyses, ask different questions, andas a resultmay reach different conclusions. (Of course the fact that they adopted different methods is not the only reason they w i l l reach different conclusions. T h e i r personalities, their values, and their choices of different theories w i l l also contribute to this result.) U l t i m a t e l y the sociologist's actions on the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d are achieved by the adoption of spe cific methodologies. H i s actions are translated into specific methods through lines of action that re flect his definitions of those methods. At the heart of this interaction is the concept. T h e concept, in conjunction w i t h the research m e t h o d , enables the sociologist to carry on an interaction w i t h his environment. Observers indicate to themselves what a concept and a m e t h o d m e a n and symboli cally act t o w a r d the designation of those m e a n ings. Sociologists are continually reassessing their i m p u t e d object meaningsassessing t h e m against their relationships to theories, their ability to be observed by others, and their ability to generate understanding and explanation of e m p i r i c a l reality. This point can be illustrated by again t u r n i n g to Becker's study of the marijuana user. B e g i n n i n g w i t h an interactionist conception of h u m a n conduct, B e c k e r a p p l i e d the generic principles f r o m that perspective to the p r o b l e m of h o w occu pancy of a role in a subculture shapes a person's perceptions and activities. H i s theory suggested that an intimate k n o w l e d g e of the subject's per spective must be learned, and to this e n d he adopted the open-ended i n t e r v i e w and partici pant observation as methodological strategies. Be g i n n i n g w i t h this conception, Becker's m a i n l i n e of action was to approach marijuana users a n d to have t h e m present their experiences as they saw t h e m . T h e final result of his analysis was a series of research findings that m o d i f i e d a role theory and subcultural theory of deviant behav ior. In f o r m u l a t i n g his research observations and conclusions, B e c k e r continually assessed his find ings against his conceptual framework; his methods and concepts continuously interacted w i t h observations and theorythat is, symbolic interaction g u i d e d the process of his research and theory construction. T h e scientist, then, designates units of reality

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to act u p o n , formulates definitions of those objects, adopts research methods to i m p l e m e n t these lines of action, and assesses the fruitfulness of his activity by his ability to develop, test, or m o d i f y existing social theory. Thus, b o t h his concept a n d his research methodology act as e m p i r i cal sensitizers of scientific observation. Concepts a n d methods o p e n n e w realms of observation, but concomitantly close others. T w o i m p o r t a n t consequences follow: If each m e t h o d leads to different features of e m p i r i c a l reality, t h e n no single m e t h o d can ever completely capture all the relevant features of that reality; consequently, sociologists must learn to e m p l o y m u l t i p l e methods in the analysis of the same e m p i r i c a l events. It can of course be argued that all research methods stand in an instrumental relationship to the scientific process. M e t h o d s become plans of action e m p l o y e d as sociologists m o v e f r o m theory to reality. T h e y are the major means of o r g a n i z i n g creative energy and operational activities t o w a r d concepts a n d theories a n d , as such, they at once release and direct activity, the success of w h i c h is assessed by the ability to satisfy the n o r m a l criter i a of validity w h i l e establishing f r u i t f u l ties w i t h theory. Research methods serve to p r o v i d e the scientist w i t h data that later m a y be p l a c e d in deductive schemes of thought. By observing several discrete instances of a concept or a series of concepts, scientists are able to m o v e above the single i n stance to the more c o m m o n problems that transcend i m m e d i a t e perceptions a n d observations. A failure to m o v e b e y o n d particularistic observations leaves the sociologist at the l e v e l of descriptive e m p i r i c i s m . He must establish articulations b e t w e e n his observations a n d some variety of theory. To the extent that Becker's investigation was related to a theoretical f r a m e w o r k , he satisfied this d e m a n d . I can n o w c l a i m another i m p o r t a n t role for methods in the scientific process: M e t h o d s are one of the major ways by w h i c h sociologists gather observations to test, m o d i f y , a n d develop theory. In this sense, methods go h a n d in h a n d w i t h the f o l l o w i n g less rigorous techniques of theoryw o r k . It is reasonable to argue, I believe, that methods do not do all the relevant w o r k for the sociologist. As stated earlier, u n d e r l y i n g the use

P A R T I Theory and Method; of methods must be a sociological imagination It is necessary to recognize that such technique; as introspection, the use of i m a g i n e d e x p e r i m e n t ! and the p l a y f u l c o m b i n a t i o n of contradictory concepts also serve as aids in the d e v e l o p m e n t of theory. M e t h o d s , because of their m o r e public nature are too f r e q u e n t l y g i v e n greater attention than these other techniques that are of e q u a l relevance. (In C h a p t e r 2 I w i l l develop further the use of introspection and i m a g i n e d experiment in the construction of social theory.)
1

T h e seventh methodological principle indicates that f r o m the interactionist's perspective the p r o p e r use of concepts is at first sensitizing and only later operational; further, the proper theory becomes f o r m a l ; and last, the p r o p e r causa, proposition becomes universal and not statistical By sensitizing concepts I refer to concepts thar are not transformed i m m e d i a t e l y into operational definitions t h r o u g h an attitude scale or check list An operational definition defines a concept b> stating h o w it w i l l be observed. Thus if I offer an operational definition for " i n t e l l i g e n c e , " II m i g h t state that intelligence is the score receivec on an I . Q . test. B u t if I choose a sensitizing approach to m e a s u r i n g intelligence, I w i l l leave it nonoperationalized u n t i l I enter the field anc learn the processes representing it a n d the specific meanings attached to it by the persons observed. It m i g h t be f o u n d , for example, that in some settings intelligence is not measured b> scores on a test but rather by k n o w l e d g e a n d skills p e r t a i n i n g to i m p o r t a n t processes in the group u n d e r analysis. A m o n g marijuana users intelligence m i g h t w e l l be represented by an abilit> to conceal the effects of the d r u g in the presence of nonusers. O n c e I have established the meanings of a concept, I can t h e n e m p l o y multiple research methods to measure its characteristics Thus, closed-ended questions, direct participation in the group b e i n g studied, and analysis of written documents m i g h t be the m a i n strategies of operat i o n a l i z i n g a concept. U l t i m a t e l y , all concepts must be operationalizedmust be measured anc observed. T h e sensitizing approach m e r e l y delays the point at w h i c h operationalization occurs. Goffman's treatment of stigma provides an excellent example of what I m e a n by "sensitizing a c o n c e p t . " He began w i t h a rather vague and

Trres ex :

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ferent contexts. S i m m e l t e r m e d this the strategy of " f o r m a l sociology," an attempt to abstract f r o m generically different p h e n o m e n o n commonalities or similarities. T h e synthesis of these c o m m o n threads into a coherent theoretical f r a m e w o r k represents the d e v e l o p m e n t of " f o r m a l t h e o r y . " Society, for S i m m e l , existed only in forms of interaction: More specifically, the interactions we have in mind when we talk of "society" are crystallized as definable, consistent structures such as the state and the family, the guild and the church, social classes and organizations based on common interests. But in addition to these, there exists an immeasurable number of less conscious forms of relationship and kinds of interaction. Taken singly, they may appear negligible. But since in actuality they are inserted into the comprehensive and, as it were, official social formations, they alone produce society as we know it. . . . Without the interspersed effects of countless minor syntheses, society would break up into a multitude of discontinuous systems. Sociation continuously emerges and ceases, emerges again. . . . That people look at one another and are jealous of one another; that they exchange letters or dine together; that irrespective of all tangible interests they strike one another as pleasant or unpleasant; that gratitude for altruistic acts makes for inseparable union; that one asks another man after a certain street, and that people dress and adorn themselves for one another-the whole gamut of relations that play from one person to another and that may be momentary or permanent, conscious or unconscious, ephemeral or of grave consequence (and from which these illustrations are quite causally drawn), all these incessantly tie men together. Here are the interactions among the atoms of society [1950, pp. 9-10]. T h e sociological task, for S i m m e l , became the isolation of these forms of interaction. In its very generality, this method is apt to form a common basis for problem areas that previously, in the absence of their mutual contact, lacked a certain clarity. The universality of sociation, which makes for the reciprocal shaping of the individuals, has its correspondence in the singleness of the sociological way of cognition. The sociological approach yields possibilities of solution or of deeper study which may be derived from fields of knowledge continually quite different (perhaps) from the field of particular problem under investigation [1950, p. 14]. As examples of this strategy S i m m e l suggests that the student of mass crimes m i g h t profitably

rose definition of stigma that he c l a i m e d was " a n iTTxibute that is deeply d i s c r e d i t i n g . " T h r e e types II this attribute w e r e designated: abominations :: rhe body or physical deformities, blemishes on maracter (mental disorder, homosexuality, addicrrrn, alcoholism), and last, t r i b a l stigma of race, nation, a n d religion. M o v i n g b e y o n d classification, le analyzed data collected in such traditional soci: . : gical specialties as social problems, ethnic relan:ns, social disorganization, c r i m i n o l o g y , a n d den n c e . F r o m these areas, relevant commonalities ere organized around the stigma theme. In summarizing this analysis he states: '. have argued that stigmatized persons have enough :: their situations in life in common to warrant classifying all these persons together for purposes of analyrm An extraction has thus been made from the tradimnal fields of social problems. . . . These :: rnmonalities can be organized on the basis of a very few assumptions regarding human nature. ''Vhat remains in each one of the traditional fields : :uld then be reexamined for whatever is really special to it, thereby bringing analytical coherence to what is now purely historic and fortuitous unity. Knowing what fields like race relations, aging and mental health share, one could then go on to see, analytically, how they differ. Perhaps in each case me choice would be to retain the old substantive areas, but at least it would be clear that each is merely an area to which one should apply several perspectives, and that the development of any one : f these coherent analytic perspectives is not likely to come from those who restrict their interest exclusively to one substantive area [1963, pp. 146-47]. Sensitizing a concept permits the sociologist to i _ i cover what is unique about each e m p i r i c a l i n mance of the concept w h i l e he uncovers what it msplays in c o m m o n across m a n y different settings. Such a conception allows, i n d e e d forces, me sociologist to pursue his interactionist v i e w : t reality to the e m p i r i c a l extreme. T h e n o t i o n of f o r m a l as opposed to other r.pes of theory w i l l be further d e v e l o p e d in chaprers 2 a n d 3. At this point it is only necessary to mdicate that such a stance relates d i r e c t l y to the l i s u m p t i o n that universal explanations of h u m a n rehavior can be d e v e l o p e d . W i t h S i m m e l (1950, pp. 3-25), I argue that h u m a n conduct presents t e e l f i n behavioral forms that differ only i n content. T h e job of sociology is to discover the forms mat universally display themselves in slightly dif-

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investigate the psychology of theater audiences. Similarly, the student of r e l i g i o n m i g h t examine labor unions for what they reveal about religious devotion, the student of political history, the history of art. T h e argument, I believe, is clear: A series of concepts and propositions f r o m the interactionist perspective are thought to be sufficient to explain the w i d e ranges of h u m a n b e h a v i o r whatever the social or cultural context. M o r e contemporary spokesmen of this position i n c l u d e Goffman and H o m a n s . G o f f m a n proposes a " f o r m a l sociological" stance for the analysis of fact-to-face interaction. Throughout this paper it has been implied that underneath their differences in culture, people everywhere are the same. If persons have a universal human nature, they themselves are not to be looked to for an explanation of it. One must look rather to the fact that societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members as selfregulating participants in social encounters. One way of mobilizing the individual for this purpose is through ritual; he is taught to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face, to have pride, honor and dignity, to have considerateness, to have tact and a certain amount of poise. . . . If a particular person or group or society seems to have a unique character of its own, it is because its standard set of human-nature elements is pitched and combined in a particular way. Instead of much pride, there may be little. Instead of abiding by rules, there may be much effort to break them safely. But if an encounter or undertaking is to be sustained as a viable system of interaction organized on ritual practices, then these variations must be held within certain bounds and nicely counterbalanced by corresponding modifications in some of the other rules and understandings. Similarly, the human nature of a particular set of persons may be specially designed for the special kind of undertakings in which they participate, but still each of these persons must have within him something of the balance of characteristics required of a usable participant in anv ritually organized system of social activity [1967, pp. 44-45]. W h i l e the reader need not accept Goffman's theoretical perspective, its thrust is apparenta small set of very abstract and general principles can explain all h u m a n behavior. Statements similar to Goffman's have been made by Homans, who has suggested that principles f r o m economics and behavioral psychology can be e m p l o y e d to explain all of h u m a n conduct.

P A R T I Theory and Methodi I believe that, in view of the deficiencies of functional theory, the only type of theory in sociology that stands any chance of becoming a general one is a psychological theory, in the sense that the deductive systems by which we explain social behavior would, if completed, contain among their highestorder propositions one or more of those I call psychological. The time may come when they will lose their place at the top, when they in turn will be shown to be derivable from still more general propositions such as those of physiology. But the time has not come yet, and psychological propositions remain our most general ones [1964, p. 968]. In the statements of S i m m e l , G o f f m a n , and H o m a n s there is an explicit c o m m i t m e n t to form a l sociological theory. H o m a n s ' theory would be based on propositions f r o m psychology, Goffman's f r o m functional theory and certain portions of symbolic interaction. In this context I can now define f o r m a l theory as any set of interrelated propositions based on a small set of concepts. Furthermore, these concepts w i l l be ordered in such a way that some are m o r e specific than others and hence capable of being d e r i v e d f r o m higherorder statements. O n c e this feature is achieved, explanation of the behavior indicated by those propositions shall be said to have o c c u r r e d . A last feature of the f o r m a l theory, w h i c h distinguishes it f r o m other types of theory, is the fact that it explicitly rests on e m p i r i c a l referents. Goffman's formulations are based on the observation that w h e r e v e r face-to-face interaction occurs, participants w i l l be observed e m p l o y i n g strategies of tact, p r i d e , defense, honor, and dignity. H i s highest-order proposition holds that all societies train their member-participants in the rituals of faceto-work because to do otherwise w o u l d leave that society w i t h o u t participants w h o c o u l d routinely engage in interaction. His lower-order propositions then i n c l u d e predictions concerning the balance b e t w e e n various types of rituals and their enactment in daily encounters. W h i l e I have not extensively quoted f r o m H o mans, his highest-order proposition holds that " T h e m o r e r e w a r d i n g m e n find the results of an action, the m o r e l i k e l y they are to take this act i o n " [1964, p. 968]. It is H o m a n s ' belief that variations on this proposition w i l l explain historical revolutions, daily interactions in work groups, and conduct w i t h i n social organizations.

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attitudes in a group setting. T h e earlier q u o t e d passage describing the marijuana user w h o al tered his using patterns after m a r r y i n g a n o n user represents a description of an instance of interaction. T h e user's attitudes toward the ob ject shifted and changed as he was forced to interact daily w i t h a person w h o d i d not h o l d his definitions. If the fact of h u m a n behavior is interaction, then sociological propositions must take an inter actional f o r m . In this sense Becker's analysis fits the criterion. T h e seventh p r i n c i p l e , to summa rize, is that methods must be constructed so that they contribute to formal theory w h i l e at the same time p e r m i t t i n g sensitizing concept analysis and the discovery and verification of universal interactive propositions.

T h e w o r k of these two spokesmen illustrates die use of formal theory as I have defined it. C o n trast their perspective w i t h that of M e r t o n (1967, pp. 39-72), who believes that sociologists should tevelop middle-range theories of specific prob.em areas. Merton's formulation is too restrictive our purposes; it leads to the endless prolifera tion of small-scope theories. (I shall develop this point in greater detail in the next chapter.) G r a n d meory represents the other alternative; it sug gests that one v e r y abstract and general theory : an be developed to explain all of h u m a n behav ior. Unfortunately, as it is currently practiced, grand theory has few, e m p i r i c a l referents. F o r m a l meory, e m p i r i c a l l y g r o u n d e d at all points, is pref erable to a grand theory w i t h a few e m p i r i c a l referents, or a series of middle-range theories, each of w h i c h have their o w n methods and spe cific domains. Basic to f o r m a l theory w i l l be universal inter active propositions that are assumed to apply to ail instances of the p h e n o m e n o n studiedat least tntil a negative case is discovered. By stating that these propositions w i l l be interactive, I suggest that they w i l l describe interrelationships b e t w e e n processes that mutually influence one another. In Becker's analysis of the marijuana user, an explicit reliance on interactive propositions of universal relevance can be seen. The analysis is based on fifty intensive interviews with marijuana users from a variety of social backgrounds and present positions in society. The interviews focused on the history of the person's ex perience with the durg, seeking major changes in his attitude toward it and in his actual use of it and the reasons for these changes. Generalizations stat ing necessary conditions for the maintenance of use at each level were developed in initial interviews, and tested and revised in the light of each succeed ing one. The stated conclusions hold true for all the cases collected and may tentatively be considered as true of all marijuana users in this society, at least until further evidence forces their revisions [1962, p. 592]. Becker's generalizations rest on the assumption feat they apply to all persons w h o have ever used marijuana. M o r e abstractly, his formulations bear a relationship to a f o r m a l theory c o n c e r n i n g sym bolic interaction and the d e v e l o p m e n t of self-

T H E INTERACTIONIST PRINCIPLES IN REVIEW I have s h o w n that interaction theory suggests seven principles against w h i c h methods a n d socio logical activity m a y be evaluated. These p r i n c i ples state: 1. Symbols and interactions must be c o m b i n e d before an investigation is complete. 2. T h e investigator must take the perspective or " r o l e of the acting o t h e r " and v i e w the w o r l d f r o m his subjects' point of v i e w b u t in so do i n g he must m a i n t a i n the distinction b e t w e e n everyday and scientific conceptions of reality. 3. T h e investigator must link his subjects' symbols and definitions w i t h the social relationships and groups that p r o v i d e those conceptions. 4. T h e behavior settings of interaction and scien tific observation must be recorded. 5. Research methods must be capable of reflect i n g process or change as w e l l as static beha v i o r a l forms. 6. C o n d u c t i n g research and b e i n g a sociologist is best v i e w e d as an act of symbolic interaction. T h e personal preferences of the sociologist (e.g., his definitions of methods, his values and ideologies, etc.) serve to shape fundamentally his activity as an investigator, and the major way in w h i c h he acts on his e n v i r o n m e n t is through his research methods.

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7. T h e proper use of concepts becomes sensitizi n g and not operational; the p r o p e r theory becomes formal and not g r a n d or middle-range; and the causal proposition m o r e p r o p e r l y becomes interactional a n d universal in application.

P A R T I Theory and Method; thur J. Vidich, Jospeh Bensman, Maurice R. Steir. eds. pp. 267-84. New York: John Wiley. Blumer, Herbert, 1966. "Sociological Implications o: the Thought of George Herbert Mead." America?. Journal of Sociology 71 (March): 535-44. Goffman, Erving, 1963. Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. . 1967. Interaction Ritual. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. Homans, George Caspar, 1964. "Contemporary Theor. in Sociology." In Handbook of Modern Sociology R. E. L. Faris, ed., pp. 951-77. Chicago: Ranc McNally. Merton, Robert K., 1967. On Theoretical Sociology. New York: The Free Press. Mills, C. Wright, 1959. The Sociological Imagination New York: Oxford University Press. Simmel, Georg, 1950. The Sociology of Georg Simmel Kurt Wolff, tran. New York: Free Press. Stone, Gregory P., 1954. "City Shoppers and Urban Identification: Observations of the Social Psychology of City L i f e . " American Journal of Sociology 60 (July): 36-45.

REFERENCES Becker, Howard S., 1953. "Becoming a Marihuana User." American Journal of Sociology 59 (November): 235-42. . 1955. "Marihuana Use and Social Control." Social Problems 3 (July): 35-44. Reprinted in Human Behavior and Social Processes, Arnold M. Rose, ed., pp. 589-607. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. . 1963. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press. . 1964. "Problems in the Publication of Field Studies." In Reflections on Community Studies, Ar-

Herbert Blumer

Sociological Analysis and the "Variable"

My a i m in this paper is to examine critically the scheme of sociological analysis w h i c h seeks to reduce h u m a n group life to variables a n d their
Herbert American Blumer, "Sociological Review, Analysis 21 and the 'Variable,'" 1956), pp. Sociological vol. (December

683-690. R e p r i n t e d by permission. Presidential address read at the a n n u a l m e e t i n g of the A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i c a l S o c i e t y , S e p t e m b e r 1956.

relations. I shall refer to this scheme, henceforth, as "variable analysis." This scheme is widespread and is g r o w i n g in acceptance. It seems to be bec o m i n g the n o r m of p r o p e r sociological analysis. Its sophisticated forms are b e c o m i n g the model of correct research procedure. Because of the influence w h i c h it is exercising in our discipline, I t h i n k that it is desirable to note the m o r e serious

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cise m u c h restriction on the n u m b e r and k i n d of variables w h i c h may be brought w i t h i n the framework of the design. N o r , finally, does careful w o r k w i t h variables, such as establishing tests of reliability, or inserting "test variables," exercise m u c h restraint on what may be put into the p o o l of sociological variables. In short, there is a great deal of laxity in choosing variables in our field. This laxity is d u e chiefly to a neglect of the careful r e d u c t i o n of problems that should p r o p e r l y precede the application of the techniques of variable analysis. This prior task requires thorough and careful reflection on the p r o b l e m to make reasonably sure that one has identified its genuine parts. It requires i n t e n sive and extensive familiarity w i t h the e m p i r i c a l area to w h i c h the p r o b l e m refers. It requires a careful and thoughtful assessment of the theoretical schemes that m i g h t apply to the p r o b l e m . C u r rent variable analysis in our field is i n c l i n e d to slight these requirements both in practice and in the t r a i n i n g of students for that practice. T h e scheme of variable analysis has become for too many just a handy tool to be put to i m m e d i a t e use. A second shortcoming in variable analysis in our field is the disconcerting absence of generic variables, that is, variables that stand for abstract categories. G e n e r i c variables are essential, of course, to an e m p i r i c a l sciencethey become the key points of its analytical structure. W i t h o u t generic variables, variable analysis yields only separate and disconnected findings. T h e r e are three kinds of variables in our discipline w h i c h are generally regarded as generic variables. N o n e of t h e m , in my j u d g m e n t , is generic. T h e first k i n d is the typical and frequent variable w h i c h stands for a class of objects that is tied d o w n to a g i v e n historical a n d cultural situation. C o n venient examples are: attitudes toward the Sup r e m e C o u r t , i n t e n t i o n to vote R e p u b l i c a n , interest in the U n i t e d Nations, a college education, army draftees a n d factory u n e m p l o y m e n t . E a c h of these variables, e v e n though a class t e r m , has substance only in a g i v e n historical context. T h e variables do not stand directly for items of abstract h u m a n group life; their application to h u m a n groups around the w o r l d , to h u m a n groups in the past, a n d to conceivable h u m a n groups in

of its shortcomings in actual use and to consider certain limits to its effective application. T h e first part of my paper w i l l deal w i t h the current shortcomings that I have in m i n d and the second.part .vith the more serious question of the limits to .is adequacy.

SHORTCOMINGS IN CONTEMPORARY V A R I A B L E ANALYSIS T h e first shortcoming I wish to note in current variable analysis in our field is the rather chaotic condition that prevails in the selection of variables. T h e r e seems to be little l i m i t to what may be chosen or designated as a variable. O n e may select something as simple as a sex distrioution or as complex as depression; something is specific as a b i r t h rate or as vague as social cohesion; something as evident as residential change or as i m p u t e d as a collective unconscious; something as generally r e c o g n i z e d as hatred or as doctrinaire as the Oedipus complex; something as i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n as a rate of newspaper c i r c u lation to something as elaborately fabricated as an index of anomie. Variables may be selected on the basis of a specious impression of what is important, on the basis of conventional usage, on the basis of what can be secured through a g i v e n instrument or technique, on the basis of the demands of some doctrine, or on the basis of an imaginative ingenuity in devising a n e w t e r m . Obviously the study of h u m a n group life calls for a w i d e range of variables. H o w e v e r , there is a conspicuous absence of rules, guides, limitations and prohibitions to govern the choice of variables. Relevant rules are not p r o v i d e d e v e n in the thoughtful regulations that accompany sophisticated schemes of variable analysis. F o r example, the rule that variables should be quantitative does not help, because w i t h ingenuity one can i m p a r t a quantitative dimension to almost any qualitative item. O n e can usually construct some k i n d of a measure or index of it or develop a rating scheme for judges. T h e proper insistence that a variable have a quantitative dimension does little to lessen the range or variety of items that may be set up as variables. In a comparable manner, the use of experimental design does not seemingly exer-

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the future is definitely restricted. W h i l e their use m a y y i e l d propositions that h o l d i n g i v e n culture settings, they do not y i e l d the abstract k n o w l e d g e that is the core of an e m p i r i c a l science. T h e second apparent k i n d of generic variable in current use in our discipline is represented by unquestionably abstract sociological categories, such as "social cohesion," "social i n t e g r a t i o n , " "assimilation," "authority," and "group morale." In actual use these do not t u r n out to be the generic variables that their labels w o u l d suggest. T h e difficulty is that such terms, as I sought to point out in an earlier article on sensitizing concepts, have no fixed or u n i f o r m indicators. Instead, indicators are constructed to fit the particular p r o b l e m on w h i c h one is w o r k i n g . Thus, certain features are chosen to represent the social integration of cities, but other features are used to represent the social integration of boys' gangs. T h e indicators chosen to represent morale in a small group of school c h i l d r e n are very different f r o m those used to stand for morale in a labor m o v e m e n t . T h e indicators used in studying attitudes of prejudice show a w i d e range of variation. It seems clear that i n d i cators are tailored and used to meet the peculiar character of the local p r o b l e m u n d e r study. In my j u d g m e n t , the abstract categories used as variables in our work t u r n out w i t h rare exception to be something other than generic categories. T h e y are localized in terms of their content. Some measure of support is g i v e n to this assertion by the fact that the use of such abstract categories in variable research adds little to generic k n o w l edge of t h e m . T h e thousands of " v a r i a b l e " studies of attitudes, for instance, have not c o n t r i b u t e d to our k n o w l e d g e of the abstract nature of an attitude; in a similar way the studies of "social cohesion," "social i n t e g r a t i o n , " " a u t h o r i t y , " or " g r o u p m o r a l e " have done n o t h i n g , so far as I c a n detect, to clarify or augment generic k n o w l edge of these categories.
1

P A R T I Theory and Methods m a n group life; each has the same clear a n d comm o n m e a n i n g in its application. Yet, it appears that in their use in our field they do not functior as generic variables. E a c h has a content that g i v e n by its particular instance of application, e.g.. the b i r t h rate in C e y l o n , or the sex distribution in the State of Nebraska, or the age distribution in the C i t y of St. L o u i s . T h e k i n d of variable relations that result f r o m their use w i l l be f o u n d to be l o c a l i z e d and non-generic. These observations on these three specious kinds of generic variables point, of course, to the fact that variables in sociological research are pred o m i n a n t l y disparate and localized in nature. Rarely do they refer satisfactorily to a dimension or property of abstract h u m a n group life. W i t h little exception they are b o u n d temporally, spatially, and culturally and are inadequately cast to serve as clear instances of generic sociological categories. M a n y w o u l d contend that this is because variable research and analysis are in a beg i n n i n g state in our discipline. T h e y believe that w i t h the benefit of w i d e r coverage, replication, and the co-ordination of separate studies disparate variable relations may be w e l d e d into generic relations. So far there has been little achievement along these lines. A l t h o u g h we already have appreciable accumulations of findings f r o m variable studies, little has b e e n done to convert the findings into generic relations. Such conversion is not an easy task. T h e difficulty should serve b o t h as a challenge to the effort and an occasion to reflect on the use a n d limitations of variable analyses. As a b a c k g r o u n d for n o t i n g a t h i r d major shortcoming I w i s h to d w e l l on the fact that current variable analysis in our field is operating pred o m i n a n t l y w i t h disparate and not generic variables and y i e l d i n g p r e d o m i n a n t l y disparate and not generic relations. W i t h little exception its data and its findings are " h e r e and n o w , " w h e r e v e r the " h e r e " b e located and w h e n e v e r the " n o w " be t i m e d . Its analyses, accordingly, are of locali z e d a n d concrete matters. Yet, as I t h i n k logicians w o u l d agree, to understand adequately a "here and n o w " relation it is necessary to understand the " h e r e a n d n o w " context. This latter understanding is not p r o v i d e d by variable analysis. T h e variable relation is a single relation, necessarily stripped bare of the complex of things that sustain

T h e t h i r d f o r m of apparent generic variable in our w o r k is represented by a special set of class terms like "sex," "age," " b i r t h rate," and " t i m e p e r i o d . " These w o u l d seem to be unquestionably generic. E a c h can be a p p l i e d universally to h u -

"What

Is

Wrong

with

Social

Theory?"

American

Sociological

Review, 1 9 ( F e b r u a r y 1954), p p . 3 - 1 0 .

71 in a " h e r e and n o w " context. A c c o r d i n g l y , our mderstanding of it as a " h e r e a n d n o w " matter mrrers. L e t me give one example. A variable rela tion states that reasonably staunch E r i e C o u n t y republicans become c o n f i r m e d in their attach ment to their candidate as a result of listening -1 the c a m p a i g n materials of the r i v a l party. This tare and interesting finding gives us no picture : I them as h u m a n beings in their particular w o r l d . me do not k n o w the r u n of their experiences H i i c h i n d u c e d an organization of their senti ments a n d views, nor do we k n o w what this organaation is; we do not k n o w the social atmosphere :: codes in their social circles; we do not k n o w reinforcements and rationalizations that come rtom their fellows; we do not k n o w the defining : rocess in their circles; we do not k n o w the presrares, the incitants, and the models that came rtom their niches in the social structure; we do lot k n o w h o w their ethical sensitivities are organzed a n d so what they w o u l d tolerate in the way : t shocking behavior on the part of their candiaate. In short, we do not have the picture to size -P and understand what their c o n f i r m e d attach ment to a political candidate means in terms of rhteir experience and their social context. This fuller picture of the " h e r e and n o w " context is not g i v e n by variable relations. T h i s , I believe, a major shortcoming in variable analysis, insofar is variable analysis seeks to explain m e a n i n g f u l l y the disparate and local situations w i t h w h i c h it teems to be p r i m a r i l y concerned. T h e three shortcomings w h i c h I have noted tn current variable research in our field are seriI us but perhaps not crucial. W i t h increasing expe rience and m a t u r i t y they w i l l probably be successtally overcome. T h e y suggest, however, the advisability of i n q u i r i n g m o r e deeply into the i n teresting a n d important question of h o w w e l l v a r i able analysis is suited to the study of h u m a n group Life in its fuller dimensions. process, w h i c h I believe to be the core of h u m a n action, gives a character to h u m a n group life that seems to be at variance w i t h the logical premises of variable analysis. I wish to explain at some l e n g t h what I have in m i n d . A l l sociologistsunless I presume too m u c h recognize that h u m a n group activity is c a r r i e d on, in the m a i n , t h r o u g h a process of interpreta tion or definition. As h u m a n beings we act singly, collectively, a n d societally on the basis of the meanings w h i c h things have for us. O u r w o r l d consists of i n n u m e r a b l e objectshome, c h u r c h , job, college education, a political election, a f r i e n d , an e n e m y nation, a tooth brush, or what noteach of w h i c h has a m e a n i n g on the basis of w h i c h we act t o w a r d it. In our activities we w e n d our way by r e c o g n i z i n g an object to be such and such, by defining the situations w i t h w h i c h we are presented, by attaching a m e a n i n g to this or that event, and w h e r e n e e d be, by devising a n e w m e a n i n g to cover something n e w or differ ent. This is done by the i n d i v i d u a l in his personal action, it is done by a group of individuals acting together in concert, it is done in each of the m a n i fold activities w h i c h together constitute an insti tution in operation, and it is done in each of the diversified acts w h i c h fit into a n d m a k e up the patterned activity of a social structure or a society. We can and, I think, must look u p o n h u m a n group life as chiefly a vast interpretative process in w h i c h people, singly and collectively, guide t h e m selves by defining the objects, events, a n d situa tions w h i c h they encounter. R e g u l a r i z e d activity inside this process results f r o m the application of stabilized definitions. Thus, an institution car ries on its c o m p l i c a t e d activity through an articu lated complex of such stabilized meanings. In the face of n e w situations or n e w experiences i n d i v i d uals, groups, institutions and societies find it nec essary to f o r m n e w definitions. These n e w defini tions m a y enter into the repertoire of stable meanings. This seems to be the characteristic way i n w h i c h n e w activities, n e w relations, a n d n e w social structures are f o r m e d . T h e process of inter pretation may be v i e w e d as a vast digestive proc ess t h r o u g h w h i c h the confrontations of experi ence are transformed into activity. W h i l e the process of interpretation does not embrace every t h i n g that leads to the formation of h u m a n group

LIMITS OF V A R I A B L E ANALYSIS In my j u d g m e n t , the c r u c i a l l i m i t to the suc cessful application of variable analysis to h u m a n group life is set by the process of interpretation or definition that goes on in h u m a n groups. This

72 activity and structure, it is, I think, the chief means through w h i c h h u m a n group life goes on a n d takes shape. A n y scheme designed to analyze h u m a n group life in its general character has to fit this process of interpretation. This is the test that I propose to apply to variable analysis. T h e variables w h i c h designate matters w h i c h either d i rectly or indirectly confront people and thus enter into h u m a n group life w o u l d have to operate t h r o u g h this process of interpretation. T h e variables w h i c h designate the results or effects of the happenings w h i c h play u p o n the experience of people w o u l d be the outcome of the process of interpretation. Present-day variable analysis in our field is dealing p r e d o m i n a n t l y w i t h such kinds of variables. T h e r e can be no doubt that, w h e n current variable analysis deals w i t h matters or areas of h u m a n group life w h i c h i n v o l v e the process of interpretation, it is m a r k e d l y disposed to ignore the process. T h e conventional procedure is to identify something w h i c h is p r e s u m e d to operate on group life and treat it as an i n d e p e n d e n t variable, and then to select some f o r m of group activity as the dependent variable. T h e i n d e p e n d ent variable is put at the b e g i n n i n g part of the process of interpretation and the dependent variable at the terminal part of the process. T h e interv e n i n g process is ignored or, what amounts to the same thing, taken for granted as something that n e e d not be considered. L e t me cite a few typical examples: the presentation of political programs on the radio and the resulting expression of i n t e n t i o n to vote; the entrance of N e g r o residents into a white neighborhood and the resulting attitudes of the white inhabitants toward Negroes; the occurrence of a business depression and the resulting rate of divorce. In such instancesso c o m m o n to variable analysis in our fieldone's c o n c e r n is w i t h the two variables and not w i t h what lies between t h e m . If one has neutralized other factors w h i c h are regarded as possibly exercising influence on the dependent variable, one is content w i t h the conclusion that the observed change in the dependent variable is the necessary result of the independent variable. This idea that in such areas of group life the i n d e p e n d e n t variable automatically exercises its

P A R T I Theory and Method: influence on the dependent variable is, it seemto me, a basic fallacy. T h e r e is a process of definition i n t e r v e n i n g b e t w e e n the events of experience presupposed by the independent variable and the f o r m e d behavior represented by the dependent variable. T h e political programs on the radio are i n t e r p r e t e d by the listeners; the N e g r i invasion into the w h i t e neighborhood must be defined by the whites to have any effect on their attitudes; the many events and happenings which together constitute the business depression mus: be i n t e r p r e t e d at their many points by husbancLand wives to have any influence on m a r i t a l relations. This i n t e r v e n i n g interpretation is essentia, to the outcome. It gives the m e a n i n g to the presentation that sets the response. Because of the integral position of the defining process betweer. the two variables, it becomes necessary, it seem; to me, to incorporate the process in the accoun: of the relationship. L i t t l e effort is made in variable analysis to do this. Usually the process is completely ignored. W h e r e the process is recognized its study is regarded as a p r o b l e m that is independent of the relation between the variables T h e indifference of variable analysis to the process of interpretation is based apparently or. the tacit assumption that the independent vari-| able predetermines its interpretation. This assumption has no foundation. T h e interpretation is not p r e d e t e r m i n e d by the variable as if the variable emanated its o w n meaning. If there is anything we do k n o w , it is that an object, event or situation in h u m a n experience does not carry its o w n m e a n i n g ; the m e a n i n g is conferrec on it. N o w , it is true that in many instances the interpretation of the object, event or situation may be fixed, since the person or people ma;, have an already constructed m e a n i n g w h i c h is i m m e d i a t e l y a p p l i e d to the item. W h e r e such stab i l i z e d interpretation occurs and recurs, variable analysis w o u l d have no n e e d to c o n s i d e r t h e interpretation. O n e c o u l d m e r e l y say that as a matter of fact under g i v e n conditions the i n d e p e n d e n : variable is followed by such and such a change in the dependent variable. T h e only necessary precaution w o u l d be not to assume that the stated relation b e t w e e n the variables was necessarily intrinsic and universal. Since anything that is de-

i-.umer

73 another's responses and other forms of social i n teraction in the group. T h e same difficulty exists in m a k i n g any of the processual parts into v a r i ables that exists in the case of the c o m p l e t e act of interpretation. T h e question of h o w the act of interpretation can be g i v e n the qualitative constancy that is logically r e q u i r e d in a variable has so far not b e e n answered. W h i l e one can devise some k i n d of a " m o r e or less" d i m e n s i o n for it, the n e e d is to catch it as a variable, or set of variables, in a m a n ner w h i c h reflects its functioning in transforming experience into activity. This is the p r o b l e m , i n deed d i l e m m a , w h i c h confronts variable analysis in our field. I see no answer to it inside the logical framework of variable analysis. T h e process of i n terpretation is not inconsequential or pedantic. It operates too centrally in group and i n d i v i d u a l experience to be put aside as being of i n c i d e n t a l interest. In addition to the by-passing of the process of interpretation there is, in my j u d g m e n t , another p r o f o u n d deficiency in variable analysis as a scheme for analyzing h u m a n group life. T h e deficiency stems f r o m the inevitable tendency to w o r k w i t h truncated factors and, as a result, to conceal or misrepresent the actual operations in h u m a n group life. T h e deficiency stems f r o m the logical n e e d of variable analysis to w o r k w i t h discrete, clean-cut a n d unitary variables. L e t me spell this out. As a w o r k i n g procedure variable analysis seeks necessarily to achieve a clean identification of the relation b e t w e e n two variables. Irrespective of h o w one m a y subsequently c o m b i n e a n u m b e r of such identified relationsin an additive m a n n e r , a clustering, a chain-like arrangement, or a " f e e d b a c k " schemethe objective of variable research is initially to isolate a simple and fixed relation b e t w e e n two variables. F o r this to be done each of the two variables must be set up as a distinct i t e m w i t h a unitary qualitative make-up. This is accomplished first by g i v i n g each variable, w h e r e needed, a simple quality or d i mension, and second by separating the variable f r o m its connection w i t h other variables t h r o u g h their exclusion or neutralization. A difficulty w i t h this scheme is that the e m p i r ical reference of a true sociological variable is not

zr.ed may be redefined, the relation has no intrinsc fixity. Alongside the instances w h e r e interpretation ^ made by m e r e l y a p p l y i n g stabilized meanings mere are the many instances w h e r e the interpretation has to be constructed. These instances are tbviously increasing in our changing society. It I imperative in the case of such instances for vari-z'.e analysis to include the act of interpretation fa its analytic scheme. As far as I can see, variable nalysis shuns such inclusion. N o w the question arises, h o w can variable dialysis i n c l u d e the process of interpretation? Presumably the answer w o u l d be to treat the act : interpretation as an " i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e . " 5 at, what does this mean? If it means that interpretation is m e r e l y an i n t e r v e n i n g neutral mel i u m through w h i c h the i n d e p e n d e n t variable exercises its influence, then, of course, this w o u l d :e no answer. Interpretation is a formative or creative process in its o w n right. It constructs meanings w h i c h , as I have said, are not predetermined or d e t e r m i n e d by the i n d e p e n d e n t ariable. If one accepts this fact and proposes to treat rhe act of interpretation as a formative process, men the question arises h o w one is to characterize it as a variable. What quality is one to assign to .:. what property or set of properties? O n e cannot, .ith any sense, characterize this act of interpretation in terms of the interpretation w h i c h it constructs; one cannot take the p r o d u c t to stand for me process. N o r can one characterize the act of mterpretation in terms of what enters into i t me objects p e r c e i v e d , the evaluations and assessments made of t h e m , the cues that are suggested, me possible definitions proposed by oneself or by : rhers. These vary f r o m one instance of interpretation to another and, further, shift f r o m point : J point in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the act. This varymg and shifting content offers no basis for m a k i n g me act of interpretation into a variable.
;

N o r , it seems to m e , is the p r o b l e m m e t by [ roposing to reduce the act of interpretation into component parts and w o r k w i t h these parts as I ariables. These parts w o u l d presumably have to be processual partssuch as p e r c e p t i o n , cognition, analysis, evaluation, a n d decision-making in me i n d i v i d u a l ; and discussion, definition of one

74
u n i t a r y or distinct. W h e n caught in its actual social character, it turns out to be an intricate a n d i n n e r m o v i n g complex. To illustrate, let me take what seems ostensibly to be a fairly clean-cut variable relation, n a m e l y b e t w e e n a b i r t h c o n t r o l p r o g r a m a n d the b i r t h rate of a g i v e n people. E a c h of these t w o variablesthe p r o g r a m of b i r t h c o n t r o l and the b i r t h ratecan be g i v e n a simple discrete a n d unitary character. F o r the p r o g r a m of b i r t h c o n t r o l one m a y choose m e r e l y its t i m e p e r i o d , or select some reasonable measure such as the n u m b e r of people visiting b i r t h c o n t r o l clinics. F o r the b i r t h rate, one m e r e l y takes it as it is. A p p a r e n t l y , these indications are sufficient to enable the investigator to ascertain the relations bet w e e n the two variables. Yet, a scrutiny of what the two variables stand for in the life of the group gives us a different p i c t u r e . Thus, v i e w i n g the p r o g r a m of b i r t h cont r o l i n terms of how it enters into the lives of the people, w e n e e d to note m a n y things such as the literacy of the people, the clarity of the p r i n t e d information, the m a n n e r and extent of its distribution, the social position of the directors of the p r o g r a m and of the personnel, h o w the personnel act, the character of their instructional talks, the way in w h i c h people define attendance at b i r t h control clinics, the expressed views of influential personages w i t h reference to the prog r a m , h o w such personages are regarded, and the nature of the discussions a m o n g people w i t h regard to the clinics. These are only a f e w of the matters w h i c h relate to h o w the b i r t h control prog r a m m i g h t enter into the experience of the people. T h e n u m b e r is sufficient, however, to show the complex and i n n e r - m o v i n g character of w h a t otherwise might seem to be a simple variable. A similar picture is g i v e n in the case of the other variablethe b i r t h rate. A b i r t h rate of a people seems to be a v e r y simple a n d unitary matter. Yet, in terms of what it expresses a n d stands for in group activity it is exceedingly c o m plex a n d diversified. We n e e d consider only the variety of social factors that i m p i n g e on and affect the sex act, e v e n though the sex act is only one of the activities that set the b i r t h rate. T h e selfconceptions h e l d b y m e n a n d b y w o m e n , the conceptions of family life, the values placed on c h i l d r e n , accessibility of m e n and w o m e n to each other, physical arrangements in the h o m e , the sanctions g i v e n by established institutions, the code of manliness, the pressures f r o m relatives a n d neighbors, and ideas of what is p r o p e r , convenient a n d tolerable in the sex actthese are a f e w of the operating factors in the experience of the group that p l a y u p o n the sex act. T h e y suffice to indicate something of the c o m p l e x body of actual experience a n d practice that is represented in and expressed by the b i r t h rate of a h u m a n group. I think it w i l l be f o u n d that, w h e n converted into the actual group activity for w h i c h it stands, a sociological variable turns out to be an intricate and i n n e r - m o v i n g complex. T h e r e are, of course, w i d e ranges of difference b e t w e e n sociological variables in terms of the extent of such complexity. Still, I believe one w i l l generally find that the discrete and u n i t a r y character w h i c h the labeling of the variable suggests vanishes. T h e failure to recognize this is a source of trouble. In variable analysis one is l i k e l y to accept the two variables as the simple a n d unitary items that they seem to be, a n d to believe that the relat i o n f o u n d b e t w e e n t h e m is a realistic analysis of the g i v e n area of group life. A c t u a l l y , in group life the relation is far m o r e likely to be b e t w e e n complex, diversified a n d m o v i n g bodies of activity. T h e operation of one of these complexes on the other, or the interaction b e t w e e n t h e m , is both concealed a n d misrepresented by the statem e n t of the relation b e t w e e n the t w o variables. T h e statement of the variable relation m e r e l y asserts a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n abbreviated terms of reference. It leaves out the actual complexes of activity and the actual processes of interaction in w h i c h h u m a n group life has its b e i n g T W e are here faced, it seems to m e , by the fact that the v e r y features w h i c h give variable analysis its h i g h m e r i t t h e qualitative constancy of the variables, their clean-cut s i m p l i c i t y , their ease of manipulat i o n as a sort of free counter, their ability to be brought into decisive relationare the features that lead variable analysis to gloss over the character of the real o p e r a t i n g factors in group life, and the real interaction a n d relations b e t w e e n such factors. T h e two major difficulties faced by variable

Blumer analysis point clearly to the n e e d for a m a r k e d l y different scheme of sociological analysis for the areas in w h i c h these difficulties arise. This is not the occasion to spell out the nature of this scheme. I shall m e r e l y m e n t i o n a few of its rudiments to suggest h o w its character differs fundamentally f r o m that of variable analysis. T h e scheme w o u l d be based on the premise that the chief means through w h i c h h u m a n group life operates and is f o r m e d is a vast, diversified process of definition. The scheme respects the e m p i r i c a l existence of this process. It devotes itself to the analysis of rhe operation and formation of h u m a n group life is these occur through this process. In d o i n g so :t seeks to trace the lines of defining experience rhrough w h i c h ways of l i v i n g , patterns of relations, a n d social forms are d e v e l o p e d , rather than to relate these formations to a set of selected items. It views items of social life as articulated inside m o v i n g structures a n d believes that they have to be understood in terms of this articulation. Thus, it handles these items not as discrete things disengaged f r o m their connections but instead, as signs of a supporting context w h i c h gives t h e m their social character. In its effort to ferret out lines of definition and networks of m o v i n g relation, it relies on a distinctive f o r m of procedure. This procedure is to approach the study of group activity through the eyes a n d experience of the people w h o have d e v e l o p e d the activity. H e n c e , it necessarily requires an intimate familiarity w i t h this experience and w i t h the scenes of its opera-

75 tion. It uses b r o a d and interlacing observations and not n a r r o w a n d disjunctive observations. A n d , may I add, that l i k e variable analysis, it yields e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s a n d " h e r e - a n d - n o w " propositions, although in a different f o r m . F i n a l l y , it is no worse off than variable analysis in developi n g generic k n o w l e d g e out of its findings and propositions. In closing, I express a hope that my c r i t i c a l remarks about variable analysis are not misinterp r e t e d to m e a n that variable analysis is useless or makes no c o n t r i b u t i o n to sociological analysis. T h e contrary is true. Variable analysis is a fit procedure for those areas of social life and formation that are not m e d i a t e d by an interpretative process. Such areas exist a n d are important. F u r t h e r , in the area of interpretative life variable analysis can be an effective means of unearthing stabilized patterns of interpretation w h i c h are not l i k e l y to be detected t h r o u g h the direct study of the experience of people. K n o w l e d g e of such patterns, or rather of the relations b e t w e e n variables w h i c h reflect such patterns, is of great value for understanding group life in its " h e r e - a n d - n o w " character and i n d e e d m a y have significant practical value. A l l of these appropriate uses give variable analysis a w o r t h y status in our field. In v i e w , h o w e v e r , of the current tendency of variable analysis to become the n o r m and m o d e l for sociological analysis, I believe it i m p o r tant to recognize its shortcomings and its l i m i t a tions.

Howard S. Becker & Blanche Geer

Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison

T h e most complete f o r m of the sociological d a t u m , after all, is the f o r m in w h i c h the participant observer gathers it: an observation of some social event, the events w h i c h precede and follow it, a n d explanations of its m e a n i n g by participants and spectators, before, d u r i n g , and after its occurrence. Such a d a t u m gives us m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n about the event under study than data gathered by any other sociological m e t h o d . Participant observation can thus p r o v i d e us w i t h a yardstick against w h i c h to measure the completeness of data gathered in other ways, a m o d e l w h i c h can serve to let us k n o w what orders of i n f o r m a t i o n escape us w h e n we use other methods.
1

to compare the results of such intensive field w o r k w i t h what m i g h t be regarded as the first step in the other d i r e c t i o n along this c o n t i n u u m : the detailed and conversational i n t e r v i e w (often referred to as the unstructured or u n d i r e c t e d i n t e r v i e w ) . In this k i n d of i n t e r v i e w , the interv i e w e r explores m a n y facets of his interviewee's concerns, treating subjects as they come up in conversation, p u r s u i n g interesting leads, a l l o w i n g his imagination and ingenuity f u l l r e i n as he tries to develop n e w hypotheses and test t h e m in the course of the i n t e r v i e w .
3

By participant observation we m e a n that m e t h o d i n w h i c h the observer participates i n the daily life of the people under study, either openly in the role of researcher or covertly in some disguised role, observing things that happen, listeni n g to what is said, and questioning people, over some length of t i m e . We want, in this paper,
2

In the course of our current participant observation a m o n g m e d i c a l students, we have thought a good deal about the kinds of things w e w e r e discovering w h i c h might o r d i n a r i l y b e missed or misunderstood in such an i n t e r v i e w . We have no i n t e n t i o n of denigrating the interv i e w or e v e n such less precise modes of data gathe r i n g as the questionnaire, for there can always be good reasons of practicality, economy, or research design for their use. We simply wish to
4

H o w a r d S. Becker and Blanche Geer, "Participant Observation and Interviewing: A C o m p a r i s o n . " R e p r o d u c e d by permission of the Society for A p p l i e d A n t h r o p o l o g y . zation,
1

F r o m Human

Organi-

Society

(Enlarged

Edition)

(Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

16(3),

1957.

P r e s s , 1955), 2 7 9 - 3 5 8 .
3

T w o provisos are in order. In the first place, we assume in

We wish to thank R. Richard W o h l and T h o m a s S. M c P a r t l a n d Cf. Florence R. Kluckhohn, " T h e Participant Observer T e c h in Small Communities," American Journal of Sociology,

o u r c o m p a r i s o n that t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l i n t e r v i e w e r a n d p a r t i c i p a n t o b s e r v e r w e discuss a r e e q u a l l y s k i l l e d a n d s e n s i t i v e . W e assume f u r t h e r that b o t h b e g a n their r e s e a r c h w i t h e q u a l l y w e l l f o r m u l a t e d p r o b l e m s , s o that t h e y a r e i n d e e d l o o k i n g f o r e q u i v a lent k i n d s of data.

4

f o r t h e i r c r i t i c a l r e a d i n g o f a n e a r l i e r v e r s i o n o f this p a p e r .
2

nique

4 5 ( N o v . , 1940), 3 3 1 - 4 3 ; A r t h u r V i d i c h , " P a r t i c i p a n t O b s e r v a t i o n a n d t h e C o l l e c t i o n a n d I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f D a t a , " ibid., 6 0 (Jan., Stuart 1955), W. 354-60; William Foote Whyte, "Observational the Social Sciences F i e l d - W o r k M e t h o d s , " in Marie Jahoda, M o r t o n Deutsch, and Cook (eds.), Research Methods in ( N e w Y o r k : D r y d e n P r e s s , 1951), II, 3 9 3 - 5 1 4 , a n d Street Comer

T h i s s t u d y i s s p o n s o r e d b y C o m m u n i t y S t u d i e s . , Inc., o f K a n s a s

C i t y , M i s s o u r i , a n d is b e i n g c a r r i e d out at the U n i v e r s i t y of K a n s a s M e d i c a l C e n t e r , t o w h o s e d e a n a n d staff w e are i n d e b t e d for their wholehearted cooperation. Professor Everett C. H u g h e s of the U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o is director of the project.

Becker,

Geer

77 have cultures, and languages in w h i c h they are expressed, w h i c h differ somewhat f r o m those of other groups of the same general type. So, al though we speak one language and share in many ways in one culture, we cannot assume that we understand precisely what another person, speak i n g as a m e m b e r of such a group, means by any particular w o r d . In i n t e r v i e w i n g members of groups other than our o w n , then, we are in some what the same position as the anthropologist w h o must learn a p r i m i t i v e language, w i t h the i m p o r tant difference that, as Icheiser has put it, we of ten do not understand that we do not understand and are thus likely to make errors in i n t e r p r e t i n g what is said to us. In the case of gross misunder standings the give and take of conversation may q u i c k l y reveal our mistakes, so that the inter viewee can correct us; this presumably is one of the chief mechanisms through w h i c h the anthro pologist acquires a n e w tongue. But in speaking A m e r i c a n E n g l i s h w i t h an interviewee w h o is, after all, m u c h like us, we may mistakenly assume that we have understood h i m and the error be small enough that it w i l l not disrupt c o m m u n i c a tion to the point w h e r e a correction w i l l be in order. ;
6

&

leer

make explicit the difference in data gathered by :ne or the other m e t h o d and to suggest the differ ing uses to w h i c h they can legitimately be put. In general, the shortcomings we attribute to the interview exist w h e n it is used as a source of i n formation about events that have occurred elsevhere and are described to us by informants. O u r criticisms are not relevant w h e n analysis is re stricted to interpretation of the interviewee's con duct during the interview, in w h i c h case the re searcher has in fact observed the behavior he is calking about.
5

T h e differences we consider between the two methods i n v o l v e two interacting factors: the kinds of words and acts of the people u n d e r study that the researcher has access to, and the k i n d of sensi tivity to problems and data p r o d u c e d in h i m . O u r comparison may prove useful by suggesting areas in w h i c h i n t e r v i e w i n g (the m o r e w i d e l y used method at present and likely to continue so) can improve its accuracy by taking account of sugges tions made f r o m the perspective of the partici pant observer. We begin by considering some concrete problems: l e a r n i n g the native language, or the p r o b l e m of the degree to w h i c h the inter viewer really understands what is said to h i m ; matters interviewees are unable or u n w i l l i n g to talk about; and getting i n f o r m a t i o n on matters people see through distorting lenses. We then consider some more general differences b e t w e e n the two methods.

LEARNING THE NATIVE LANGUAGE A n y social group, to the extent that it is a distinctive unit, w i l l have to some degree a cul ture differing f r o m that of other groups, a some what different set of c o m m o n understandings around w h i c h action is organized, and these dif ferences w i l l find expression in a language whose nuances are peculiar to that group a n d fully un derstood only by its members. M e m b e r s of churches speak differently f r o m members of i n formal tavern groups; m o r e importantly, m e m bers of any particular c h u r c h or tavern group
5

T h e i n t e r v i e w provides little opportunity of rectifying errors of this k i n d where they go u n recognized. In contrast, participant observation provides a situation in w h i c h the m e a n i n g of words can be learned w i t h great precision through study of their use in context, exploration through continuous i n t e r v i e w i n g of their i m p l i c a tions and nuances, and the use of t h e m oneself under the scrutiny of capable speakers of the lan guage. B e y o n d simply clarifying matters so that the researcher may understand better what peo ple say to each other and to h i m , such a linguistic exercise may p r o v i d e research hypotheses of great usefulness. T h e way in w h i c h one of us learned the m e a n i n g of the w o r d " c r o c k , " as m e d ical students use it, illustrates these points. I first heard the word "crock" applied to a pa tient shortly after I began my field work. The patient in question, a fat, middle-aged woman, complained
6

F o r d i s c u s s i o n o f this p o i n t , see T h o m a s S . M c P a r t l a n d , Formal and the Process of Professionalization: A Study of See t h e d i s c u s s i o n in Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science, 1948), and Religion and Other Essays ( G l e n c o e : T h e 232-8. F r e e Press,

Education 1957), 2 - 3 .

Student Nurses (Kansas C i t y , M i s s o u r i : C o m m u n i t y S t u d i e s , I n c . ,

78
bitterly of pains in a number of widely separated locations. When I asked the student who had so described her what the word meant, he said that it was used to refer to any patient who had psychosomatic complaints. I asked if that meant that Mr. X , a young man on the ward whose stomach ulcer had been discussed by a staff physician as typically psychosomatic, was a crock. The student said that that would not be correct usage, but was not able to say why. Over a period of several weeks, through discussion of many cases seen during morning rounds with the students, I finally arrived at an understanding of the term, realizing that it referred to a patient who complained of many symptoms but had no discoverable organic pathology. I had noticed from the beginning that the term was used in a derogatory way and had also been inquiring into this, asking students why they disliked having crocks assigned to them for examination and diagnosis. At first students denied the derogatory connotations, but repeated observations of their disgust with such assignments soon made such denials unrealistic. Several students eventually explained their dislike in ways of which the following example is typical: "The true crock is a person who you do a great big workup for and who has all of these vague symptoms, and you really can't find anything the matter with them." Further discussion made it clear that the students regarded patients primarily as objects from which they could learn those aspects of clinical medicine not easily acquired from textbooks and lectures; the crock took a great deal of their time, of which they felt they had little enough, and did not exhibit any interesting disease state from which something might be learned, so that the time invested was wasted. This discovery in turn suggested that I might profitably investigate the general perspective toward medical school which led to such a basis for judgment of patients, and also suggested hypotheses regarding the value system of the hospital hierarchy at whose bottom the student stood. At the risk of b e i n g repetitious, let us point out in this example both the errors a v o i d e d a n d the advantages gained because of the use of participant observation. T h e t e r m m i g h t never have b e e n used by students in an o r d i n a r y i n t e r v i e w ; if it had, the i n t e r v i e w e r m i g h t easily have ass u m e d that the scatological t e r m f r o m w h i c h it in fact is descended p r o v i d e d a complete definit i o n . Because the observer saw students on their daily rounds and h e a r d t h e m discussing everyday problems, he h e a r d the w o r d and was able to pursue it u n t i l he a r r i v e d at a m e a n i n g f u l definition. M o r e o v e r , the k n o w l e d g e so gained l e d to further

P A R T I Theory and Methods and m o r e general discoveries about the group u n der study. This is not to say that all of these things might not be discovered by a p r o g r a m of skillful interv i e w i n g , for this m i g h t w e l l be possible. B u t we do suggest that an i n t e r v i e w e r m a y misunderstand c o m m o n E n g l i s h words w h e n interviewees use t h e m in some m o r e or less esoteric w a y and not k n o w that he is misunderstanding t h e m , because there w i l l be little chance to check his u n derstanding against either further examples of their use in conversation or instances of the object to w h i c h they are a p p l i e d . This leaves h i m o p e n to errors of misinterpretation and errors of f a i l i n g to see connections b e t w e e n items of i n f o r m a t i o n he has available, and may prevent h i m f r o m seei n g a n d e x p l o r i n g i m p o r t a n t research leads. In dealing w i t h i n t e r v i e w data, then, experience w i t h participant observation indicates that both care a n d imagination must be used in m a k i n g sure of meanings, for the c u l t u r a l esoterica of a group may h i d e b e h i n d ordinary language used in special ways. I

I I I

I |

MATTERS INTERVIEWEES ARE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO TALK ABOUT F r e q u e n t l y , people do not tell an i n t e r v i e w e r all the things he m i g h t want to k n o w . This may be because they do not want to, feeling that to speak of some particular subject w o u l d be i m p o l i tic, i m p o l i t e , or insensitive, because they do not think to a n d because the i n t e r v i e w e r does not have enough i n f o r m a t i o n to i n q u i r e into the matter, or because they are not able to. T h e first casethe p r o b l e m of "resistance"is w e l l k n o w n and a considerable lore has developed about h o w to cope w i t h i t . It is m o r e difficult to deal w i t h the last two possibilities for the i n t e r v i e w e e is not likely to reveal, or the i n t e r v i e w e r to b e c o m e aware, that significant omissions are b e i n g made. M a n y events occur in the life of a social group and the experience of an i n d i v i d u a l so regularly
7
7

See, for e x a m p l e , A r n o l d M . Rose, " A R e s e a r c h N o t e o n InterAmerican Journal of Sociology, 12:4 (Winter, 51 (Sept., 31-2. 1945), 143-

viewing," Human

4; and H o w a r d S. Becker, "A Note on Interviewing Tactics," Organization, 1954),

Geer

79 A few months after the beginning of school, I went to dinner at one of the freshman medical frater nities. It was the night nonresident members came, married ones with their wives. An unmarried stu dent who lived in the house looked around at the visitors and said to me, "We are so much in transition. I have never been in this situation before of meeting fellows and their wives." This was just the sort of thing we were looking forchange in student relationships arising from group interactionbut I failed in every attempt to make the student describe the "transition" more clearly. From previous observation, though, I knew there were differences (other than marriage) be tween the nonresidents and their hosts. The former had all been elected to the fraternity recently, after house officers had gotten to know them through working together (usually on the same cadaver in anatomy lab). They were older than the average orig inal member; instead of coming directly from col lege, several had had jobs or Army experience before medical school. As a group they were somewhat lower in social position. These points indicated that the fraternity was bringing together in relative intimacy students dif ferent from each other in background and experi ence. They suggested a search for other instances in which dissimilar groups of students were joining forces, and pointed to a need for hypotheses as to what was behind this process of drawing together on the part of the freshman and its significance for their medical education. A n i n t e r v i e w e r , hearing this statement about " t r a n s i t i o n , " w o u l d k n o w that the interviewee felt himself in the midst of some k i n d of change but might not be able to discover anything further about the nature of that change. T h e participant observer cannot find out, any more than the inter v i e w e r can, what the student had in m i n d , pre sumably because the student had n o t h i n g m o r e in m i n d than this vague feeling of change. (Inter viewees are not sociologists and we ought not to assume that their f u m b l i n g statements are at tempts, c r i p p l e d by their lack of technical vocabu lary, to express what a sociologist m i g h t p u t in more f o r m a l analytic terms.) B u t he can search for those things in the interviewee's situation w h i c h m i g h t lead to such a feeling of transition. W h i l e the participant observer can m a k e i m mediate use of such vague statements as clues to an objective situation, the i n t e r v i e w e r is often bothered by the question of whether an inter viewee is not simply r e f e r r i n g to quite private

arid uninterruptedly, or so quietly and unnoticed, that people are hardly aware of t h e m , and do not think to c o m m e n t on t h e m to an i n t e r v i e w e r ; :r they may never have become aware of t h e m at all and be unable to answer e v e n direct ques tions. O t h e r events may be so unfamiliar that peo ple find it difficult to put into words their vague feelings about what has h a p p e n e d . If an inter viewee, for any of these reasons, cannot or w i l l not discuss a certain topic, the researcher w i l l fmd gaps in his information on matters about which he wants to k n o w and w i l l perhaps fail to become aware of other problems and areas of i n terest that such discussion m i g h t have opened up for h i m . This is m u c h less likely to h a p p e n w h e n the researcher spends m u c h time w i t h the people he studies as they go about their daily activities, for he can see the very things w h i c h m i g h t not be reported in an i n t e r v i e w . F u r t h e r , should he de sire to question people about matters they cannot or prefer not to talk about, he is able to point to specific incidents w h i c h either force t h e m to face the issue (in the case of resistance) or make clear what he means (in the case of unfamiliarity). Finally, he can become aware of the f u l l m e a n i n g of such hints as are g i v e n on subjects people are u n w i l l i n g to speak openly about and of such inar ticulate statements as people are able to make about subjects they cannot clearly formulate, be cause he frequently knows of these things through his observation and can connect his knowledge w i t h these half-communications. Researchers w o r k i n g w i t h i n t e r v i e w materi als, w h i l e they are often conscious of these prob lems, cannot cope w i t h t h e m so w e l l . If they are to deal w i t h matters of this k i n d it must be by inference. T h e y can only make an educated guess about the things w h i c h go unspoken in the inter view; it may be a very good guess, but it must be a guess. T h e y can e m p l o y various tactics to explore for material they feel is there but unspo ken, but e v e n w h e n these are f r u i t f u l they do not create sensitivity to those problems of w h i c h even the i n t e r v i e w e r is not aware. T h e f o l l o w i n g example indicates h o w participant observation aids the researcher in getting material, and mak i n g the most of the little he gets, on topics l y i n g w i t h i n this range of restricted c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

80 experiences. As a result, the i n t e r v i e w e r w i l l place less reliance on whatever inferences about the facts of the situation he makes, and is less likely to be sure enough of his g r o u n d to use t h e m as a basis for further hypotheses. I m m e d i a t e observ a t i o n of the scene itself and data f r o m previous observation enable the participant observer to make direct use of whatever hints the i n f o r m a n t supplies.

P A R T I Theory and Methods every opportunity. Before I joined the group, several of the students told me that the residents were "mean," "nasty," "bitchy," and so on, and had backed these characterizations up with evidence of particular actions. After I began participating daily with the students on this service, a number of incidents made it clear that the situation was not quite like this. Finally, the matter came completely into the open. I was present when one of the residents suggested a technique that might have prevented a minor relapse in a patient assigned to one of the students; he made it clear that he did not think the relapse in any way the student's fault, but rather that he was simply passing on what he felt to be a good tip. Shortly afterward, this student reported to several other students that the resident had "chewed him out" for failing to use this technique: "What the hell business has he got chewing me out about that for? No one ever told me I was supposed to do it that way." I interrupted to say, " H e didn't really chew you out. I thought he was pretty decent about it." Another student said, " A n y time they say anything at all to us I consider it a chewing out. Any time they say anything about how we did things, they are chewing us out, no matter how God damn nice they are about it." In short, participant observation makes it possible to check description against fact a n d , n o t i n g discrepancies, become aware of systematic distortions made by the person under study; such distortions are less likely to be discovered by i n t e r v i e w i n g alone. This point, let us repeat, is only relevant w h e n the i n t e r v i e w is used as a source of i n f o r m a t i o n about situations a n d events the researcher himself has not seen. It is not relevant w h e n it is the person's behavior in the interv i e w itself that is under analysis.

THINGS P E O P L E SEE T H R O U G H DISTORTINGLENSES In m a n y of the social relationships we observe, the parties to the relation w i l l have differi n g ideas as to what ought to go on in it, and frequently as to what does in fact go on in it. These differences in p e r c e p t i o n w i l l naturally affect what they report in an i n t e r v i e w . A m a n in a subordinate position in an organization in w h i c h subordinates believe that their superiors are " o u t to get t h e m " w i l l interpret m a n y incidents in this light, though the incidents themselves m a y not seem, either to the other party in the interaction or to the observer, to indicate such malevolence. A n y such mythology w i l l distort people's v i e w of events to such a degree that they w i l l report as fact things w h i c h have not o c c u r r e d , but w h i c h seem to t h e m to have o c c u r r e d . Students, for exa m p l e , frequently i n v e n t sets of rules to g o v e r n their relations w i t h teachers, and, although the teacher m a y never have h e a r d of such rules, regard the teachers as malicious w h e n they " d i s o b e y " t h e m . T h e point is that things m a y be rep o r t e d in an i n t e r v i e w t h r o u g h such a distorting lens, a n d the i n t e r v i e w e r m a y have no way of k n o w i n g what is fact a n d what is distortion of this k i n d ; participant observation makes it possible to check such points. T h e f o l l o w i n g is a particularly clear example. Much of the daily teaching was done, and practical work of medical students supervised, in a particular department of the hospital, by the house residents. A great deal of animosity has grown up between the particular group of students I was with at the time and these residents, the students believing that the residents would, for various malicious reasons, subordinate them and embarrass them at

I N F E R E N C E , PROCESS AND CONTEXT We have seen, in the previous sections of this paper, some of the ways in w h i c h e v e n v e r y good interviews m a y go astray, at least f r o m the perspective of the field observer. We t u r n n o w to a consideration of the m o r e general areas of difference b e t w e e n the t w o methods, suggesting basic ways in w h i c h the gathering and h a n d l i n g of data in each differ. Since we t e n d to talk in our analyses about m u c h the same order of thing whether we w o r k

Geer

81
times quite different, and that the students' per spective is strong enough to override such variant facts. B u t f r o m the i n t e r v i e w alone we c o u l d k n o w , not what actually h a p p e n e d in such cases, but what the students thought h a p p e n e d and h o w they felt about it, and this is the k i n d of inference we should make. W e a d d to the accuracy of our data w h e n we substitute observable fact for infer ence. M o r e important, we o p e n the way for the discovery of n e w hypotheses for the fact we ob serve m a y not be the fact we expected to observe. W h e n this happens we face a n e w p r o b l e m r e q u i r i n g n e w hypothetical explanations w h i c h can then be further tested in the field. Substitution of an inference about something for an observation of that thing occurs most fre quently in discussions of social process and change, an area in w h i c h the advantages of obser vation over an extended p e r i o d of t i m e are par ticularly great. M u c h sociological w r i t i n g is con cerned, openly or otherwise, w i t h problems of process: T h e analysis of shifts in group structure, i n d i v i d u a l selfconception and similar matters. B u t studies of such p h e n o m e n a in natural social contexts are typically based on data that tell only part of the story. T h e analysis may be made f r o m a person's retrospective account, in a single inter v i e w , of changes that have taken place; or, m o r e rarely, it is based on a series of interviews, the differences b e t w e e n successive interviews p r o v i d i n g the b e n c h marks of change. In either case, m a n y crucial steps in the process and i m p o r t a n t mechanisms of change must be a r r i v e d at t h r o u g h inferences w h i c h can be no more than educated guesses. T h e difficulties in analyzing change and proc ess on the basis of i n t e r v i e w material are particu larly i m p o r t a n t because it is precisely in discussing changes in themselves and their surroundings that interviewees are least likely or able to give an accurate account of events. Changes in the social e n v i r o n m e n t and in the self inevitably pro duce transformations of perspective, a n d it is characteristic of such transformations that the person finds it difficult or impossible to r e m e m b e r his former actions, outlook, or feelings. Reinter p r e t i n g things f r o m his n e w perspective, he can not give an accurate account of the past, for the concepts in w h i c h he thinks about it have c h a n g e d

room interviews or f r o m participantobservational materials, and to draw conclusions about social elations a n d the interaction that goes on w i t h i n m e m w h e t h e r we have actually seen these things :r only b e e n told about t h e m , it should be clear mat in w o r k i n g w i t h interviews we must necessar ly infer a great m a n y things we c o u l d have ob mrved had we only been in a position to do so. The kinds of errors we have discussed above are primarily errors of inference, errors w h i c h arise from the necessity of m a k i n g assumptions about die relation of i n t e r v i e w statements to actual events w h i c h m a y or m a y not be true; for what we have solid observable evidence on in the first :ase we have only secondhand reports and indices of in the second, and the gap must be b r i d g e d by inference. W e must assume, w h e n faced w i t h in account or transcription of an i n t e r v i e w , that we understand the m e a n i n g of the everyday vords used, that the i n t e r v i e w e e is able to talk mout the things we are interested i n , and that ris account w i l l be m o r e or less accurate. T h e examples detailed above suggest that these as mmptions do not always h o l d and that the process : inference i n v o l v e d in i n t e r p r e t i n g interviews mould always be made explicit and c h e c k e d , vhere possible, against what can be discovered through observation. W h e r e , as in often the case, this is not possible, conclusions should be l i m i t e d :o those matters the data d i r e c t l y describe. L e t us be quite specific, and r e t u r n to the earlier example of residentstudent hostility. In oescribing this relationship f r o m interviews w i t h ohe students alone we m i g h t have assumed their i e s c r i p t i o n to be accurate and made the infer ence that the residents w e r e in fact " m e a n . " O b servation p r o v e d that this inference w o u l d have oeen incorrect, but this does not destroy the ana lytic usefulness of the original statements made :o the fieldworker in an i n f o r m a l i n t e r v i e w . It ioes shift the area in w h i c h we can m a k e deduc tions f r o m this d a t u m , h o w e v e r , for we can see mat such statements, w h i l e incorrect factually, -re perfectly good statements of the perspective :rom w h i c h these students i n t e r p r e t e d the events m w h i c h they were i n v o l v e d . W e c o u l d not k n o w vithout observation w h e t h e r their descriptions were true or false; w i t h the a i d of observation we k n o w that the facts of the matter are some

82 and w i t h t h e m his perceptions and m e m o r i e s . Similarly, a person in the midst of such change may find it difficult to describe what is happening, for he has not developed a perspective or concepts w h i c h w o u l d allow h i m to think and talk about these things coherently; the earlier discussion of changes in m e d i c a l school fraternity life is a case in point.
8

P A R T I Theory and Methods than just in an isolated and formal i n t e r v i e w , he builds an e v e r g r o w i n g f u n d of impressions, many of t h e m at the subliminal level, w h i c h give h i m an extensive base for the interpretation and analytic use of any particular datum. This w e a l t h of information and impression sensitizes h i m to subtleties w h i c h might pass unnoticed in an interv i e w and forces h i m to raise continually n e w and different questions, w h i c h he brings to and tries to answer in succeeding observations. T h e biggest difference in the two methods, then, may be not so m u c h that participant observation provides the opportunity for a v o i d i n g the errors we have discussed, but that it does this by p r o v i d i n g a r i c h experiential context w h i c h causes h i m to become aware of incongruous or unexplained facts, makes h i m sensitive to their possible implications and connections w i t h other observed facts, and thus pushes h i m continually to revise and adapt his theoretical orientation and specific problems in the direction of greater relevance to the p h e n o m e n a under study. T h o u g h this k i n d of context and its attendant benefits cannot be r e p r o d u c e d in i n t e r v i e w i n g (and the same degree of sensitivity a n d sense of p r o b l e m prod u c e d in the interviewer), interviewers can profit f r o m an awareness of those limitations of their m e t h o d suggested by this comparison and perhaps i m p r o v e their batting average by taking account of t h e m .
9
9

Participant observation does not have so m a n y difficulties of this sort. O n e can observe actual changes in behavior over a p e r i o d of time and note the events w h i c h precede and follow t h e m . Similarly, one can carry on a conversation r u n n i n g over weeks and months w i t h the people he is studying and thus become aware of shifts in perspective as they occur. In short, attention can be focused both on what has h a p p e n e d and on what the person says about what has happened. Some inference as to actual steps in the process or mechanisms i n v o l v e d is still r e q u i r e d , but the amount of inference necessary is considerably reduced. A g a i n , accuracy is increased and the possibility of new discoveries b e i n g made is likewise increased, as the observer becomes aware of more p h e n o m e n a r e q u i r i n g explanation. T h e participant observer is both m o r e aware of these problems of inference and more e q u i p p e d to deal w i t h t h e m because he operates, w h e n gathering data, in a social context r i c h in cues and information of all kinds. Because he sees and hears the people he studies in many situations of the k i n d that normally occur for t h e m , rather
8

W e are a w a r e that p a r t i c i p a n t o b s e r v a t i o n raises a s m a n y t e c h -

n i c a l p r o b l e m s as it solves. (See, for i n s t a n c e , t h e d i s c u s s i o n s in Morris S. Schwartz and Charlotte G r e e n Schwartz, " P r o b l e m s in Participant Observation," American Journal of Sociology, 60

Anselm L.

Strauss, " T h e D e v e l o p m e n t a n d T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Meanings in the C h i l d , " American Sociological Re-

of M o n e t a r y lished

(Jan., 1955), 3 4 3 - 5 3 , a n d V i d i c h , op cit") W e f e e l , h o w e v e r , t h a t there is considerable value in using the strong points of o n e m e t h o d to i l l u m i n a t e the shortcomings of another.

ticle, 17 ( J u n e , 1952), 2 7 5 - 8 6 , a n d An Essay on Identity ( u n p u b manuscript], passim.

Manford . Kuhn & Thomas S. McPartland

An Empirical Investigation of Self-Attitudes

A l t h o u g h the self has l o n g b e e n the central concept in the symbolic interaction approach to social psychology, little if a n y t h i n g has been done e m p l o y it directly in e m p i r i c a l research. T h e r e are several reasons for this, one of the most i m p o r tant of w h i c h is that there has been no consensus regarding the class of p h e n o m e n a to w h i c h the self ought to be operationally o r d e r e d . T h e self has b e e n called an image, a conception, a concept, a feeling, an internalization, a self l o o k i n g at one self, a n d most c o m m o n l y simply the self (with perhaps the most ambiguous implications of all). O n e of these many designations of the self has been as attitudes. We do not have space here to discuss the theoretical clarification w h i c h results from the conscious conceptualization of the self as a set of attitudes except to point out that this conceptualization is most consistent w i t h Mead's view of the self as an object w h i c h is in most respects like all other objects, and w i t h his further view that an object is a p l a n of action (an attitude).
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by the individual's attitudes toward himself, it ought to be of c r u c i a l significance to social psy chology to be able to identify and measure selfattitudes. This paper is i n t e n d e d to p r o v i d e an initial demonstration of the advantages to e m p i r i cal research f r o m thus treating the self as attitudes.

PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A S E L F - A T T I T U D E S TEST T h e obvious first step in the application of self-theory to e m p i r i c a l research is the construc tion and standardization of a test w h i c h w i l l i d e n tify a n d measure self-attitudes. T h e i n i t i a l consideration i n designing such a test is the question of accessibility. W o u l d people give to investigators the statements w h i c h are op erative in i d e n t i f y i n g themselves and therefore i n o r g a n i z i n g and d i r e c t i n g their behavior? O r w o u l d they be i n c l i n e d to hide their significant self-attitudes b e h i n d innocuous and conventional fronts? Those f o l l o w i n g symbolic interaction or ientation have apparently guessed the latter to be the case for they have seldom if ever asked direct questions r e g a r d i n g self-attitudes, a n d have t e n d e d to assemble self-attitudes of those they w e r e studying f r o m diverse kinds of statements and behavior through the use of long a n d dubious chains of inference. O n e of the present authors, in an earlier at tempt to identify a n d measure self-attitudes

If, as we suppose, h u m a n behavior is organized a n d directed, a n d if, as we further sup pose, the organization and d i r e c t i o n are supplied
Manford H. K u h n and Thomas S. McPartland, " A n Empirical Investigation of Self-Attitudes," American Sociological Review, v o l . 1 9 ( F e b r u a r y 1954), p p . 6 8 - 7 6 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n . T h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o n w h i c h this p a p e r i s b a s e d was m a d e p o s s i b y a g r a n t f r o m t h e G r a d u a t e C o l l e g e o f t h e State U n i v e r s i t y ! Iowa. T h e p a p e r is a part of an e x t e n d e d e x a m i n a t i o n of self-theory g i v e n before the social p s y c h o l o g y section of the M i d w e s t S o c i o l o g i c a l S o c i e t y a t O m a h a , A p r i l 25,
;

1953.

A p a p e r d e a l i n g w i t h this v i e w i s b e i n g p r e p a r e d b y t h e p r e s

ent authors for p u b l i c a t i o n e l s e w h e r e .

84 a m o n g groups o f A m i s h , M e n n o n i t e a n d G e n t i l e school c h i l d r e n , made the assumption that selfattitudes m i g h t be studied in a fairly direct m a n ner by collecting statements of role preference a n d role avoidance, role expectations, models for the self, and the like. W h i l e this investigation y i e l d e d results w h i c h corresponded to the c u l t u r a l differences i n v o l v e d , it was clear that the self-statements w h i c h the c h i l d r e n gave w e r e specific to the role situations asked for and that therefore general self-attitudes still had to be (somewhat tenuously) i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e m .
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P A R T I Theory and Method; pie question 'Who am I?' in the blanks. Just give twenty different answers to this question. Answer as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not to somebody else. Write the answers in the order that they occur to you. Don't worry about logic or 'importance.' Go along fairly fast, for time is limited."

APPLICATION OF THE "TWENTYS T A T E M E N T S " TEST This test was g i v e n to 288 undergraduate students at the State U n i v e r s i t y of Iowa. It was adm i n i s t e r e d d u r i n g regular class meetings of introductory courses g i v e n in the D e p a r t m e n t of Sociology and A n t h r o p o l o g y at various times duri n g the s p r i n g of 1952. In a few classes the instructions w e r e presented orally rather than in w r i t i n g . In every instance students w e r e g i v e n twelve minutes in w h i c h to complete the test. T h e students w e r e naive in the sense that they h a d not r e c e i v e d instruction in the area to w h i c h this research was d i r e c t e d . T h e n u m b e r of responses per respondent e v o k e d by these instructions v a r i e d f r o m the twenty requested to one or two (with the m e d i a n b e i n g seventeen responses). T h e responses took the general f o r m " I a m . . . " F r e q u e n t l y " I a m " was o m i t t e d , the responses consisting of phrases {e.g., " a student," " a n athlete," " a blonde") or of single words {e.g., " g i r l , " " m a r r i e d , " "religious"). T h e responses w e r e dealt w i t h by a f o r m of content analysis. T h e y w e r e categorized dichotomously either as consensual references or as subconsensual references. These content categories distinguish b e t w e e n statements w h i c h refer to groups and classes whose limits and conditions of m e m b e r s h i p are matters of c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e , i.e., consensual; and those w h i c h refer to groups, classes, attributes, traits, or any other matters w h i c h w o u l d require interpretation by the respondent to be precise or to place h i m relative to other people, i.e., subconsensual. Examples of the consensual variety are " s t u d e n t , " " g i r l , " "husband," "Baptist," " f r o m Chicago," "prem e d , " " d a u g h t e r , " "oldest c h i l d , " " s t u d y i n g engi4
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Subsequent pilot studies w e r e m a d e compari n g the contents of extended autobiographies of university students w i t h paragraphs w r i t t e n in answer to the question " W h o are y o u ? " These paragraphs contained virtually all the items w h i c h w e r e y i e l d e d by r o u g h content analyses of the self-attitudes in their c o r r e s p o n d i n g autobiographies. This a p p l i e d to p a i n f u l and self-derogatory materials as w e l l as to self-enhancing materials. T h u s we c o n c l u d e d that it m i g h t be profitable to construct a test w h i c h was a i m e d directly at self-attitudes.
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T h e device w h i c h w e then used, a n d u p o n the use of w h i c h this research report is in major part based, consisted of a single sheet of paper h e a d e d by these instructions: "There are twenty numbered blanks on the page below. Please write twenty answers to the sim2

M a n f o r d H. K u h n , " F a m i l y Impact u p o n Personality," Chapter of Problems in Social Psychology: An Interdisciplinary H u l e t t , Jr., a n d Ross S t a g n e r , U r b a n a :

Five

Inquiry, e d i t e d b y J . E .

U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l i n o i s Press, 1953, e s p . p p . 5 0 - 5 2 . A m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e p o r t o f this s t u d y i s t o b e i n c l u d e d i n a s y m p o s i u m on culture a n d personality, edited by Francis L. K. H s u , to be p u b l i s h e d i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1954.

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T h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t , u n l i k e t h e F r e u d i a n , a s s u m e s that m o s t

h u m a n behavior is organized a n d directed by internalized but c o n s c i o u s l y h e l d r o l e r e c i p e s . S e e , for e x a m p l e , T h e o d o r e N e w c o m b , Social Psychology, N e w Y o r k : D r y d e n , 1950, for his e x c e l lent discussion of the relation of attitudes a n d symbols to the direction o f b e h a v i o r (pp. 7 7 - 7 8 , 82), a n d his d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e directive (versus t h e expressive) o r g a n i z a t i o n o f b e h a v i o r ( p p . 343-344). T h o s e absorbed in the present fashion of projective t e s t i n g w o u l d s e e m to h a v e the cart b e f o r e the horse, for relat i v e l y f e w o f t h e i r subjects h a v e b e e n s t u d i e d i n t e r m s o f t h e i r d i r e c t i v e a n d o v e r t attitudes. I t w o u l d s e e m m u c h m o r e r e a s o n a b l e t o r u n o u t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f f i n d i n g s tests o f s u c h a t t i t u d e s before attempting to uncover deeplying, unconscious or g u a r d e d attitudes. W e have c o n c l u d e d that m u c h t i m e i s w a s t e d d e b a t i n g i n advance t o w h a t e x t e n t p e o p l e w i l l h i d e t h e i r " t r u e a t t i t u d e s , " w h e t h e r they be self-attitudes or attitudes t o w a r d o t h e r o b j e c t s o r states o f affairs.

T h e precise w o r k i n g definitions of the two categories are g i v e n The Self and Social Structure: University of Iowa Empirical Approach, Iowa City: State

in d e t a i l in T h o m a s S. M c P a r t l a n d , An L i b r a r y , 1953, p .

147, P h . D . D i s s e r t a t i o n , m i c r o f i l m .

Kuhn, McPartland n e e r i n g " ; that is, statements r e f e r r i n g to consensually defined statuses a n d classes. Examples of the subconsensual category are " h a p p y , " " b o r e d , " "pretty good student," "too h e a v y , " " g o o d w i f e , " " i n t e r e s t i n g " ; that is, statements w i t h o u t positional reference, or w i t h references to consensual classes obscured by ambiguous modifiers. T h e assignment of responses to these d i chotomous content categories was highly reliable between different analysts, differences in categorization b e t w e e n two judges o c c u r r i n g less than three times in one h u n d r e d responses. W h e n the content was d i c h o t o m i z e d in this way several interesting a n d useful features emerged: First, f r o m the o r d e r i n g of responses on the page it was e v i d e n t that respondents tended to exhaust all of the consensual references they would make before they made (if at all) any subconsensual ones; that is, h a v i n g once b e g u n to make subconsensual references they t e n d e d to make no m o r e consensual references (if i n d e e d they h a d made any at all). T h i s o r d e r i n g of responses h e l d whether a respondent made as m a n y as n i n e t e e n consensual references or a few as one. Second, the n u m b e r of consensual references made by respondents v a r i e d f r o m t w e n t y to none. Similarly the n u m b e r of subconsensual references made by respondents v a r i e d f r o m t w e n t y to none. H o w e v e r , the n u m b e r of consensual a n d subconsensual references made by any g i v e n respondent did not stand in a simple a r i t h m e t i c relation (such as the n u m b e r of consensual references plus the n u m b e r of subconsensual references equals twenty). T h i s resulted f r o m the fact that m a n y respondents made fewer t h a n t w e n t y statements. For example, a respondent m i g h t make ten consensual statements a n d t h e n leave the r e m a i n i n g ten spaces blank, w h i l e another m i g h t m a k e two consensual references, t w e l v e subconsensual references, a n d then leave the last six spaces b l a n k .
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85 In the analysis on w h i c h this report is based, all consensual references are on one side of the d i chotomy, w h i l e "no-responses" are c o m b i n e d w i t h subconsensual references o n the other. A n individual's "locus score" is simply the n u m b e r of consensual references he makes on the " T w e n t y - S t a t e m e n t s " Test. These characteristics of the responses to the " T w e n t y - S t a t e m e n t s " Test satisfy the definition of a G u t t m a n scale. " T h e scalogram hypothesis is that the items have an order such that, ideally, persons who answer a given question favorably all have higher ranks on the scale than persons who answer the same question unfavorably. " In a p p l y i n g this c r i t e r i o n it is necessary to k e e p in m i n d that " a g i v e n q u e s t i o n " refers i n this case to a specified one (by order) of the t w e n t y statements, a n d that a "favorable response" w o u l d refer to a statement w i t h a consensual referenceone that places the i n d i v i d u a l in a social system.
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" T h e items used in a scalogram analysis must have a special cumulative property."'' A g a i n it must b e k e p t i n m i n d that "the i t e m s " must i n this case be i n t e r p r e t e d in terms of the content analysis a n d not in terms of the r a w responses to the open-ended question. Since a person w h o , let us say, makes a consensual statement as his seventh has also (in m o r e than ninety percent of the instances) made consensual statements in his first six, a n d since "consensuality" or " l o c u s " refers to anchorage or self-identification in a social system, a variable w h i c h is n u m e r i c a l l y c u m u l a tive, we m a y r e g a r d the c r i t e r i o n of cumulativeness as b e i n g satisfied in this test. G u t t m a n states, "A t h i r d equivalent definition of a scale is the one u p o n w h i c h our practical scalogram analysis procedures are d i r e c t l y based. It requires that each person's responses should be r e p r o d u c i b l e f r o m the rank alone. A more technical statement of the c o n d i t i o n is that each i t e m shall be a simple function of the persons' r a n k s . " This is true for the test u n d e r consideration.
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- T h e variables w h i c h result f r o m these characteristics of responses t o t h e " T w e n t y - S t a t e m e n t s " T e s t a r e p r e s e n t l y b e i n g utilized in further research w i t h special reference to clinical use. T h e r e a r e s o m e i n t e r e s t i n g i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t those w i t h f e w i f a n y consensual s t a t e m e n t s t o m a k e h a v e s y m p t o m s o f e m o tional d i s t u r b a n c e , w h i l e t h o s e h a v i n g f e w s t a t e m e n t s o f any kind t o m a k e a r e o f R i e s m a n ' s " r a d a r " t y p e , t a k i n g t h e i r c u e s r r o m e a c h s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n , a n d (in t h e p h r a s e o f J o h n G o u l d ) taking their ' i m m e d i a t e others' to be their 'significant others.' "
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S . A . Stouffer, L . G u t t m a n , E . A . S u e h m a n , P . F . L a z a r s f e l d , A. Star, a n d J. A. Clausen, Studies in Social Psychology in PrinceWorld War II, 10. 62. Volume IV: Measurement and Prediction,

S.

t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1950, p . 9 .
7

Ibid., p. Ibid., p.

86
T A B L E 7.1. The scale of locus, showing scale-types, frequency, total responses in each scale type and the coefficient of reproducibility for each scale type
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P A R T I Theory and Methods ficient of r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y of .892 for this scale type. At the other e n d of the scale there w e r e three respondents who belonged i n Scale T y p e O , w h i c h is that of m a k i n g no consensual statements, thus g i v i n g a perfect coefficient of r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y , 1.00.

Scale Type 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Frequency 19 5 1 4 1 6 8 8 4 13 7 9 9 7 10 11 8 12 2 4 3 151

Total Response 380 100 20 80 20 120 160 160 80 260 140 180 180 140 200 220 160 240 40 80 60 3020

Errors 41 13 1 7 3 24 9 19 10 21 15 19 15 9 15 24 11 24 5 8 0 293

C.R. .892 .870 .950 .913 .850 .800 .937 .875 .875 .915 .893 .895 .912 .936 .925 .891 .932 .900 .875 .900 1.000 .903

V A L I D I T Y O F T H E TEST T h e p r o b l e m of validity of a test in a hitherto uninvestigated area is a difficult one. T h e r e are generally r e c o g n i z e d to be two related but distinct methods of assessing validity. O n e is by exa m i n i n g the logical relatedness of the test w i t h the body of theory on w h i c h it rests. This subsumes the test of validity by correlating test results w i t h the c r i t e r i o n behavior i n d i c a t e d by the theory. T h e other m e t h o d is through correlation of the results of the test w i t h other (already standardized) tests of the p r o b l e m under investigation. W h e n a s in this casean area has not b e e n previously investigated by i n d u c t i v e research there are no other tests to use as correlation checks. We n e e d not be h e l d up u n d u l y by this consideration, however, for this is apparently a v e r y m u c h misused m e t h o d of assessing validity in the field of personality research.
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I n c l u d e s f a i l u r e to r e s p o n d to a b l a n k as a r e s p o n s e .

T h e r e are two kinds of demonstration req u i r e d to deal p r o p e r l y w i t h the p r o b l e m of the

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Scores can therefore be assigned w h i c h i n d i cate not only how many consensual references w e r e m a d e by each respondent, but which of his responses fell into the consensual category. T h e coefficient of r e p r o d u c i b i l i t y for this scale, based on 151 respondents, is .903. T h e test-retest reliab i l i t y of the scale scores is approximately + .85. B o t h for convenience a n d because consensual references are references to subjective identification by social position we have called the consensual-subconsensual variable the locus variable. T a ble 7.1 is a summary of the "scale of locus," a n d shows a m o n g other things the n u m b e r of respondents approximating each scale type. F o r examp l e , the first r o w in Table 7.1 indicates that 19 respondents most closely a p p r o x i m a t e d Scale T y p e 20, i.e., m a k i n g twenty statements of the consensual reference variety. Of their 380 responses there were 41 errors (that is, r a n d o m l y dist r i b u t e d nonconsensual statements), g i v i n g a coef-

T h e r e has b e e n a c o n s i d e r a b l e t e n d e n c y t o v a l i d a t e e a c h n e w

p e r s o n a l i t y test b y c o r r e l a t i n g its results w i t h those o b t a i n e d b y t h e a l r e a d y e x i s t e n t o n e s , w i t h o u t i n q u i r i n g i n t o their v a l i d ity. See Leonard W. Ferguson, Personality Measurement, New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1952. F e r g u s o n p o i n t s out (p. 178) that t h e B e r n r e u t e r P e r s o n a l i t y I n v e n t o r y was v a l i d a t e d b y c o r r e l a t i n g its scales w i t h s c o r e s o n t h e A l l p o r t A s c e n d a n c e - S u b m i s s i o n scale, t h e B e r n r e u t e r S e l f - S u f f i c i e n c y S c a l e , t h e L a i r d I n t r o v e r s i o n - E x t r o v e r s i o n S c h e d u l e a n d the T h u r s t o n e Personality Inv e n t o r y . T h e correlations w e r e h i g h . B u t the L a i r d a n d T h u r s t o n e tests h a d b e e n t h r o u g h no validation process whatsoever, a n d the other two w e r e unsatisfactorily validated! H e points o u t , later, t h a t t h e B e l l A d j u s t m e n t I n v e n t o r y w a s v a l i d a t e d a g a i n s t t h e A l l p o r t , T h u r s t o n e a n d B e r n r e u t e r tests (p. 232), thus p y r a m i d i n g still a n o t h e r v a l i d a t i o n o n t h e o r i g i n a l s h a k y base. A n d s o i t g o e s u n t i l p e o p l e h a v e c o m p l e t e l y f o r g o t t e n all details o f t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e earliest tests o n w h o s e v a l i d i t y t h e w h o l e series rests as far as this v a r i e t y of v a l i d a t i o n is concerned. W e s h o u l d n o t e p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y that w e w e r e n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n v a l i d a t i n g this test o p e r a t i o n o f o u r s a g a i n s t a n y o f t h e e x i s t e n t p e r s o n a l i t y tests n o t a l o n e f o r t h e reasons i n v o l v e d i n t h e a r g u m e n t a b o v e , b u t m o r e b a s i c a l l y b e c a u s e these o t h e r tests w e r e d e s i g n e d f r o m o r i e n t a t i o n s q u i t e f o r e i g n t o ours. O n e has o n l y t o c h e c k t h e i t e m s o n a n y c u r r e n t p e r s o n a l i t y test t o see h o w s e l d o m is there any logical relation to self-theory.

consistency of the test w i t h its antecedent body of orientational theory. O n e is that of m a k i n g explicit the chains of logic w h i c h w e n t into the designing of the test, the test operations and the manipulations of the data obtained through its application. T h e other is that of showing that the test results correlate in some consistent patterns w i t h the kinds of behavior w h i c h the orientation asserts are related. W i t h respect to the first k i n d of demonstration we n e e d indicate only that the question " W h o am I?" is one w h i c h m i g h t logically be expected to elicit statements about one's identity; that is, his social statuses, a n d the attributes w h i c h are in his v i e w relevant to these. To ask h i m to give these statements "as if to h i m s e l f " is an endeavor to obtain f r o m h i m general self-attitudes rather than simply ones w h i c h m i g h t be idiosyncratic to the test situation or those w h i c h m i g h t be uniquely h e l d toward himself in his relation to the test administrator. T h e request in the test for as m a n y as twenty statements of self-identity stems f r o m a recognition by the investigators of the complex and multifarious nature of an i n d i vidual's statuses, their curiosity regarding the question of w h e t h e r the ordering of responses correlates w i t h the individual's particular anchoring in society, and their interest in e x p l o r i n g the range of self-attitudes. T h e manipulation of the responses by assigning t h e m to dichotomous categories, that of consensual reference and that of subconsensual reference, rests on the self-theory v i e w that the self is an interiorization of one's positions in social systems. O n e may assume f r o m this orientation that variations in such self-identifications are equivalents of variations in the ways in w h i c h the i n d i viduals in a society such as ours have cast their lot w i t h i n the range of possible reference groups. T h e r e is an alternative hypothetical mechanism w h i c h might be a d v a n c e d to explain the salience of the consensual reference statement. It is this: O u r society requires such a v o l u m e of census information f r o m its citizens that the salience of consensual references in the replies to the "Twenty-Statements" Test is according to this hypothesis, simply a superficial carry-over f r o m other questionnaires and forms. On this v i e w those responses w h i c h are treated in our i n vestigation as subconsensual are " d e e p e r " self-

attitudes, and hence those w h i c h lie closer to the "authentic i n d i v i d u a l . " We do not agree w i t h this view. It is our belief that the o r d e r i n g of responses is a reflection of the make-up of the self-conception. T h e fact that the v o l u m e of consensual responses (corresponding to social anchorings) varies greatly f r o m respondent to respondent is taken to give i n d i r e c t confirmation of our position. A n o t h e r a n d m o r e direct e m p i r i c a l confirmation is to be f o u n d in the fact that three- and four-year-old c h i l d r e n w h e n asked " W h o are y o u ? " give, in a d d i t i o n to their names, their sex and occasionally their ages; in their instances one cannot allege a carry-over f r o m the g i v i n g of census data. Of course o n l y the pragmatic success or failure of the technique here u n d e r consideration w i l l give a dependable answer, and the latter part of this report is devoted to an account of one such pragmatic test. This pragmatic test of the usefulness of the scale scores of the " l o c u s " component of self-attitudes may serve also as the second k i n d of demonstration of the validity of the instrument.
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VARIATIONS IN SELF-ATTITUDES BY " K N O W N GROUPS" T h e behavior w h i c h we tested for correlation w i t h locus scores d e r i v e d from our self-attitudes test is that of differential religious affiliation. It is simply one of a multitude of possible investigations w h i c h now need to be undertaken to answer
! , )

I n t h e o r d e r i n g o f r e s p o n s e s w e are d e a l i n g e s s e n t i a l l y w i t h 151) says

t h e d i m e n s i o n o f salience o f self-attitudes. T h e o d o r e N e w c o m b (in his Social Psychology, N e w Y o r k : D r y d e n , 1950, p. of s a l i e n c e that it " r e f e r s to a p e r s o n ' s r e a d i n e s s to r e s p o n d in a certain way. T h e m o r e salient a person's attitude the m o r e readily will it be expressed with a m i n i m u m of outer stimulation. It s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e to a s s u m e that a v e r y s a l i e n t a t t i t u d e o n e expressed w i t h great spontaneityhas m o r e i m p o r t a n c e for t h e p e r s o n e x p r e s s i n g i t t h a n d o e s a n a t t i t u d e w h i c h h e expresses o n l y after a g o o d d e a l o f p r o d d i n g o r q u e s t i o n i n g . T h e w e a k n e s s o f d i r e c t q u e s t i o n s i s that t h e y p r o v i d e n o w a y of measuring the salience of an attitude; we never know w h e t h e r the attitude w o u l d have b e e n expressed at all, or in the same way, apart f r o m the direct q u e s t i o n . " T h u s w h e n a respondent, in reply to the "Who am I?" question on the "Twenty-Statements" Test, w r i t e s " I a m a m a n , " " I a m a stu-

d e n t , " "I am a f o o t b a l l p l a y e r , " it is r e a s o n a b l e to b e l i e v e that w e h a v e far m o r e s o l i d k n o w l e d g e o f the a t t i t u d e s w h i c h o r g a n i z e a n d d i r e c t his b e h a v i o r t h a n if, o n a c h e c k l i s t a n d a m o n g other questions, we had asked " D o you think of yourself as a m a n ? " " D o y o u think of yourself as a student?" a n d " D o you think of yourself as an athlete?"

88
T A B L E 7.2. Variations in self-attitudes by religious affiliation: the significance of observed differences between locus scores of affiliates of various religious denominations
Denominational Denomination N
l

TM

Significance of Difference
2

Significance of Difference*

Mean

Roman Catholic "Small Sects" "Protestant" Congregationalist Lutheran "Christian" Jewish Methodist Presbyterian "None"
4
1

38 20 21 13 33 11 19 73 32 28

11.89 11.00 10.47 10.30 10.09 9.81 9.57 8.94 8.18 5.75

not sig. not sig. not sig. not sig. not sig. not sig. P<.02 P<.01 P<.001*

P<.001 P <.01 P <.01 P <.01 P <.01 P <.02 P<.05 not sig. not sig.

T h e total N i s 288. T h e s e 2 8 8 i n c l u d e t h e 151 o n w h o m t h e l o c u s scale, r e p o r t e d i n T a b l e 7.1, w a s C o m p u t e d f r o m the R o m a n C a t h o l i c g r o u p m e a n a s the base. C o m p u t e d f r o m the g r o u p m e a n s of " N o n e s " as the base. Includes Baptists, E p i s c o p a l i a n s , E v a n g e l i c a l s , M e n n o n i t e s , N a z a r e n e s , R e o r g a n i z e d L a t t e r D a y Saints,

e s t a b l i s h e d , p l u s 137 cases o b t a i n e d s u b s e q u e n t l y .
2 3

Unitarians. * W h i l e this a n d t h e o t h e r m e a s u r e s o f statistical s i g n i f i c a n c e o f d i f f e r e n c e a r e s u c h a s t o g i v e g r e a t c o n f i d e n c e that the differences are not d u e to c h a n c e , it w i l l o n l y be t h r o u g h r e p e a t e d correlations o f l o c u s s c o r e s w i t h o t h e r b e h a v i o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a m p l e s that w e w i l l b e a b l e t o d i s c o v e r the theoretical i m p o r t of the magnitude o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e .

the larger question " W h a t values of this variable (locus) are related to what kinds of behavior and to w h a t trains of social e x p e r i e n c e ? " O u r orientation indicates that the self-conc e p t i o n should vary w i t h differential social anchorage in (a) large, conventional, "respectable," accepted a n d influential groups; (b) small, weak or different, ambivalently v i e w e d , m a r g i n a l or dissident groups; or (c) no groups at all (in institutional areas in w h i c h a large fraction of the society's m e m b e r s h i p belongs a n d is identified by status in one or another of the existent groups). Religious groups and corresponding affiliation by our respondents fitted this m o d e l admirably so that we m i g h t check differentials in their selfattitudes against differentials in their religious group affiliations. Some religious groups in our society are "majority g r o u p s , " w h i l e others are groups whose subcultures contain norms w h i c h set their members at odds w i t h the norms of the larger society. T h e n , too, a large fraction of the p o p u l a t i o n either has no religious reference group or no religious group m e m b e r s h i p . Reports of m e m b e r s h i p in religious groups in our sample w e r e collected by means of the

direct question: " W h a t is your religious affiliation or p r e f e r e n c e ? " T h e numbers of each variety of affiliation are g i v e n in the c o l u m n u n d e r the headi n g " N " i n T a b l e 7.2. T h e m e a n locus scale scores w e r e c o m p u t e d for each of these religious groups a n d are g i v e n in the next c o l u m n . T h e m e a n scale scores r a n g e d f r o m 11.89 (for Catholics) to 5.75 (for "nones"). These scale scores are s i m p l y the m e a n n u m b e r of consensual reference statements m a d e by respondents in each of the religious groups. Analysis of variance revealed a relation bet w e e n religious affiliation and scale scores significant b e y o n d the one percent l e v e l . T h e differences b e t w e e n group means of R o m a n Catholics on the one h a n d a n d Methodists, Presbyterians, a n d persons r e p o r t i n g no affiliation on the other, w e r e significant b e y o n d the t w o percent level. T a k i n g the group r e p o r t i n g no affiliation as the base, we found significant differences b e t w e e n this g r o u p - m e a n and the group-means of R o m a n Catholics, " s m a l l sects," "Protestants," Congregationalists, Lutherans, Christians, and Jews. A l t h o u g h the N ' s w e r e relatively large, Methodists and Presbyterians d i d not differ signif-

Kuhn, McPartland T A B L E 7.3. Differential self-anchorage in religious groups: the significance of observed differences between mean salience scores of religious references among affiliates of various religious denominations

89

T A B L E 7.4. Reference group evidence: the dichotomous division of 116 respondents on the basis of religious affiliation and identification with religious groups
Religious Reference Present Religious Reference Absent

Catholics and J sws A l l others Total Chi Square: Q: P less than 17.03 .875 .0001

13 (5.5) 19 (26.5) 32

7 (14.5) 77 (69.5) 84

20 96 116

rcantly f r o m " n o n e s " at any usually accepted .evel of statistical significance. T h e results of this analysis appear in the last two columns in Table 7.2. These results indicate clear differences in the relative strength of the m o r e directly socially an chored component of the self-conception a m o n g affiliates of certain religious subcultures, but leave the question of the antecedent correlates of these differences. If one postulates that R o m a n Catholics have in c o m m o n w i t h m e m b e r s of small Protestant denominations, L u t h e r a n s and Jews rhe characteristic that religious affiliation is p i c k e d out as " i m p o r t a n t " and differentiating; and that Methodists, Presbyterians, and "indifferentists" have in c o m m o n the characteristic that religious affiliation is not " i m p o r t a n t " or that it is taken

for granted, then the two clusters of d e n o m i n a tions by scale scores m a k e sense. If this postulate is sound, then R o m a n Catho lics, Jews, and members of small sects should carry religious references more saliently in the self-conception. T h e " T w e n t y - S t a t e m e n t s " Test provides data on this p o i n t . T h e salience of a self-reference may be u n derstood as the relative spontaneity w i t h w h i c h a particular reference w i l l be used as an orienta tion in the organization of b e h a v i o r . In this
11 12
11

T h i s , o b v i o u s l y , i s a use o f d a t a f r o m t h e " T w e n t y - S t a t e m e n t s "

Test in an altogether different way than t h r o u g h the use of t h e m t o o b t a i n l o c u s scores. T h e r e a r e , i n fact, a l m o s t u n l i m i t e d n u m b e r s o f ways i n w h i c h these self-statements m a y b e treated, b u t e a c h w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e e s s e n t i a l l y a n e w test.
1 2

T h e c o m m e n t s a n d quotation i n footnote

10 above apply

equally here.

90

P A R T I Theory and Methods T A B L E 7.5. Reference group evidence on the gradient of differentism: the dichotomous division of respondents by religious identification against a trichotomous division by religious affiliation

research, salience of religious reference in the self-conception was measured by the rank of r e l i gious reference (if any was made) on the page of t w e n t y statements, m e n t i o n of religious affiliat i o n in the first place b e i n g scored 20, m e n t i o n in last place scoring 1, and omission of reference to religious affiliation arbitrarily scored zero. T h e m e a n salience of religious references on the " T w e n t y - S t a t e m e n t s " Test ranged f r o m 7.4 f r o m R o m a n Catholics to 1.82 for " C h r i s t i a n s . " Analysis of variance of religious references s h o w e d salience scores to be related to religious affiliation b e y o n d the one p e r cent l e v e l . T h e analysis of the significance of the difference b e t w e e n group means appears in T a b l e 7.3. A completely i n d e p e n d e n t operation was c o n d u c t e d to test this finding of the relation bet w e e n the social " i m p o r t a n c e " of group affiliation a n d " i m p o r t a n c e " in the self-conception; 116 u n dergraduates, whose religious affiliations w e r e k n o w n , w e r e asked to answer one of two alternative " r e f e r e n c e - g r o u p " questions: " W i t h what groups do you feel most closely i d e n t i f i e d ? " or " I a m proudest o f m y m e m b e r s h i p i n ." W h e n respondents w e r e cross-classified (a) by religious affiliation and (b) by their g i v i n g or not g i v i n g religious affiliation references in response to these direct questions, Table 7.4 resulted. Since we had obtained, f r o m the self-attitudes research done previously, an e m p i r i c a l l y d e r i v e d gradient of " d i f f e r e n t i s m , " we used this to m a k e a finer subdivision of these responses, w h i c h y i e l d e d Table 7.5. These i n d e p e n d e n t l y d e r i v e d data support

the hypothesized relation b e t w e e n salience in the self-conception a n d socially defined importance of group m e m b e r s h i p at h i g h levels of statistical significance.

CONCLUSIONS T h e evidence p r o v i d e d b y the " T w e n t y Statements" Self-Attitudes Test and by its applicat i o n to " k n o w n g r o u p s , " in this case religious groups, gives support to the f o l l o w i n g e m p i r i c a l l y g r o u n d e d inferences w h i c h have, i n our v i e w , rather large theoretical implications: 1. T h e consensual (more directly socially anchored) c o m p o n e n t of the self-conception is the m o r e salient component. Stated differently, consensually supported self-attitudes are at the top of the hierarchy of self-attitudes. 2. Persons vary over a rather w i d e range in the relative v o l u m e of consensual a n d subconsensual components in their self-conceptions. It is in this finding that our e m p i r i c a l investigat i o n has g i v e n the greatest advance over the p u r e l y d e d u c t i v e and more or less literary formulations o f G e o r g e H e r b e r t M e a d . Stated i n terms of the language of this test, people have locus scores w h i c h range f r o m 0 to 20. T h e variable i n v o l v e d here is one w h i c h we can correlate w i t h a w i d e variety of other attitudes and behavior. 3. T h e variation i n d i c a t e d in (1) and (2) can be established and measured by the e m p i r i c a l

Kuhn, McPartland
ous

91 y o u i n t e n d to d o ? " " W h a t do y o u take the most p r i d e i n ? " " A s a m e m b e r of what groups or cate gories w o u l d you like to count yourself?" are a few of the i n d i c a t e d types in the directions sug gested of b u i l d i n g a soundly g r o u n d e d approach to a science of personality and culture.

- 1-,

techniques of attitude researchspecifically, the G u t t m a n scaling technique. This gives a dual advantage in that it furthers the presump tion that the locus variable is a unitary one and also in that it facilitates the further m a n i p ulation of values of the variable w i t h respect to other quantitative problems. 4. Locus scores vary w i t h religious affiliation, as our i n i t i a l validation test shows, m e m b e r s of the "differentistic" religious groups h a v i n g sig nificantly higher locus scores than do m e m b e r s of the " c o n v e n t i o n a l " religious groups (using an i n d e p e n d e n t source of i n f o r m a t i o n to estab lish the fact of m e m b e r s h i p in religious groups). - Religious affiliation references are significantly more salient a m o n g the self-attitudes of m e m bers of "differentistic" religious groups than among members of " m a j o r i t y " or conventional religious groups. E. Corroboratively, the religious group as a refer ence group appears far m o r e frequently as an answer to a direct, reference-group type of question among those m a d e by m e m b e r s of "differentistic" religious groups. This is a first (and only partially completed) effort -: b u i l d a personality test consistent w i t h the as(mptions a n d findings of social science. T h e so rt al science v i e w is that people organize and d i ect their behavior in terms of their subjectively refined identifications. These in t u r n are seen as nternalizations of the objective social statuses they occupy, but for p r e d i c t i o n we n e e d to have rhe subjective definitions of identity, in v i e w of Ike looseness b e t w e e n the social systems and the --.dividual occupants of statuses in t h e m in a soci ety such as ours, characterized by alternatives, tr.ange, a n d collective b e h a v i o r i n short, a soci ety toward the secular e n d of the scale. O u r test rjcits these self-definitions. To complete a comprehensive personality est on this basis w e w i l l n e e d to k n o w , i n a d d i t i o n |b the subjects' subjective identifications in terms : E statuses, their roles, role preferences and avoidmces and role expectations, their areas of selfrrrxeat and vulnerability, their self-enhancing evaluations, their patterns of reference-group f'ection (their "negative others" as w e l l as their z Dsitive others"), and probably their self-dissocii : e d attitudes. Questions such as " W h a t do y o u do?" " W h o d o you wish y o u w e r e ? " " W h a t d o

SELECTED REFERENCES PART ONE Baldwin, James Mark. The Individual and Society; or Psychology and Sociology. Boston: R. G. Badger, 1911. By a somewhat neglected early symbolic interactionist. Blumer, Herbert. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. A collection of writings by the chief pro genitor of the Chicago School of symbolic interactionism. Cooley, Charles Horton. "The Roots of Social Knowl edge." The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 32 (fuly 1926), pp. 59-79. A classic statement of the "sympathetic introspection" method in the study of human behavior. Denzin, Norman K. The Research Act. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970. The most comprehen sive exposition available on methods appropriate to the perspective of symbolic interactionism. See also the set of readings edited by Denzin, Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook. Chicago: A l dine Publishing Company, 1970. Garfinkel, Harold. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Engle wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. By a ma jor exponent of a variant form of symbolic interac tionism, this is one of several recent books expounding ethnomethodology. Hewitt, John P. Self and Society: A Symbolic Interac tionist Psychology. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1976. Basic concepts and their interrelationships in readable, useful form. Hickman, Addison, and Manford H. Kuhn. Individuals, Groups, and Economic Behavior. New York: Dryden Press, 1956, pp. 21-45. A comprehen sive statement of self-theory, the Iowa School of symbolic interactionism. Contrasts this approach with Freudian, field, and learning theories. Kuhn, Manford H. "Kinsey's View of Human Nature." Social Problems, vol. 1 (April 1954), pp. 119-125. A devastating critique of the neobehavioristic, zoo-

92 morphic assumptions underlying Kinsey's approach to human sexual behavior. Lewis, J. David. "The Classic American Pragmatists as Forerunners to Symbolic Interactionism," The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 17 (Summer, 1976), pp. 347-359. Argues that Mead's writings were more closely aligned with the social realism of Charles Peirce's pragmatism than with the social nominalism of William James' pragmatism. Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934. The single most influential book, to date, on symbolic interactionism. Mehan, Hugh, and Houston Wood. The Reality of Ethnomethodology. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975. A readable exposition. Meltzer, Bernard N . , John W. Petras, and Larry T. Reynolds. Symbolic Interactionism: Genesis, Varieties and Criticism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. A concise and comprehensive summation. Miller, D. L. George Herbert Mead. University of Texas Press, 1973. A comprehensive overview of Mead's ideas. Morrione, Thomas J. "Symbolic Interactionism and Social Action Theory." Sociology and Social Research 59 (April 1975), pp. 200-218. Compares views of Blumer with Talcott Parsons' voluntaristic theory. Morris, Monica B. An Excursion into Creative Sociology. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Comparison and contrast of phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and dramaturgical sociology. Petras, John W. (ed.). George Herbert Mead: Essays on His Social Philosophy. New York: Teachers College

PART I

Theory and Methods

Press, Columbia University, 1968. A group of articles related to Mead's theory of mind, self, and society, emphasizing his concern with applied pragmatism. Also see the articles by Petras in the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences on John Dewey (vol. 4, January 1968, pp. 18-27), James Mark Baldwin and William James (vol. 4, April 1968, pp. 132-142), and W: I. Thomas (vol. 6, January 1970, pp. 70-79). Psathas, George (ed.). Phenomenological Sociology: Issues and Applications. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. A useful collection of original essays. Schwartz, Morris S., and Charlotte G. Schwartz. "Problems in Participant Observation." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 60 (January 1955), pp. 343353. An evaluation of one of the favorite research techniques of symbolic interactionists. Shott, Susan. "Society, Self, and Mind in Moral Philosophy: The Scottish Moralists as Precursors of Symbolic Interactionism." Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, vol. 12 (1976), pp. 39-46. Shows that many important concepts of symbolic interactionism were anticipated by a group of eighteenth-century thinkers. Singelmann, Peter. "Exchange as Symbolic Interactionism: Convergences Between Two Theoretical Perspectives." American Sociological Review, vol. 37 (August 1972), pp. 414-424. The author reviews assumptions and interpretations while aiming at synthesized theory. Swanson, Guy E. "Mead and Freud: Their Relevance to Social Psychology." Sociometry, vol. 24 (December 1961), pp. 319-339. Uses Freud as a benchmark for assessing Mead's work.

PART two

Society

O n e of symbolic interactionism's basic propositions (proposition 3) is: H u m a n society is most usefully conceived as consisting of people in interaction. T h u s , symbolic interactionists view society as a process of ongoing activity a n d varied interactions, not as a relatively static system, structure, or organization. T h e symbolic interactionist conception of society tends to rocus attention on interpersonal relationships rather than on whole societies or groups. As a consequence, some critics have questioned the applicability of the microsociological approach of symbolic interactionism to macrosociological phenomena. T h e y argue that symbolic interactionist concepts, propositions, and methods tend to ignore the importance of large-scale organizations and institutions. T h e paucity of empirical studies by symbolic interactionists of the nature and impact of government bureaucracies, multinational corporations, the military establishment, and other massive collectivities, lends some substance to their claims. Such criticisms seem particularly appropriate for those who do not differentiate between symbolic interactionism as a sociological and as a social-psychological perspective. In present A m e r i c a n sociology, the developing emphases on structuralfunctional analysis and on historical and comparative studies have brought a focus on social systems and subsystems. Such analyses have stressed the role of larger social units in shaping component, smaller units. F o r many exponents of symbolic interactionism, this stress has been accompanied by an unacceptable collective determinism of h u m a n conduct. T h a t is, the individual presented in such schemes is often merely a passive, pliant, takenfor-granted recipient of relatively inflexible societal influences. On two counts, this presentation is h e l d to be inadequate. In the first place, it overlooks the m u t u a l , bilateral relationship between society and the individual. Most symbolic interactionists reject collective determinism almost as strongly as they reject biological determinism. Second, the assumption of a fixed or durable societal structure contradicts the symbolic interactionists' conception of a dynamic society ever in the process of " b e c o m i n g . "

94

P A R T II

Socieh

In the essay, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," Herbert B l u m e r presents the basic premises and methodological implications of this position. He focuses on the distinctive character of h u m a n relationshipsthe learned ability of h u m a n beings to construct a n d share their social worlds. He links this focus with a microsociological approach to understanding human society. T h e importance of communication in social life is stressed in the selection by J o h n D e w e y . H e r e D e w e y suggests a conception of society as existing in the process of communication. T h r o u g h communication, individuals are l i n k e d in a dynamic social process. T h e D e w e y excerpt, a n d the succeeding one by C o o l e y , amplify another basic proposition (proposition 2): T h e individual becomes h u m a n i z e d through interaction with others. T h e excerpt f r o m one of Charles H o r t o n Cooley's books constitutes his classic statement of the centrality of the family a n d other intimate group relationships in forming what he calls " h u m a n nature." T h i s selection, written in 1909, remains valuable despite his obsolete, unfortunate reference to race differences. A fairly good synopsis of Cooley's contributions to social psychology can be gained by reading this selection along with his article in Part III. Reference group theory, first formulated by Herbert H y m a n , has been congruent with the ideas of symbolic interactionism. Tamotsu Shibutani analyzes the ways the concept has been used a n d points out its specific relevance to communication and social relationships. T h e selection b y H a n s G e r t h a n d C . Wright M i l l s concerns the ways institutions a n d roles are treated by symbolic interactionists, considered in the contexts of self-conceptions and interpersonal relations. T h e closing phrase of this brief excerpt from Character and Social Structure, referring to "the social structures within w h i c h persons live out their lives," along with the elaboration of this point in their book, prefigured M i l l s ' later analyses in The Power Elite and The Sociological Imagination. T h e s e books offer the reader important insights into the relationship between individuals and society. A l t h o u g h conformity to group rules is socially approved, every society has its rule-violators. A c c o r d i n g to some observers, the causes of crime, alcoholism, homosexuality, and other forms of deviance are the genetic or mental flaws of abnormal individuals. In contrast, labeling theory, the basis of several selections in this book, views deviant behavior as a social product. Groups define what is deviant, decide who is deviant, and, through the stigma of derogatory labels, unwittingly maintain deviance. H o w e v e r , an organization's strategy of using stigmatizing labels in order to change deviant behavior toward conformity is the subject of the article by Barbara Laslett and C a r o l A . B . Warren. A central feature of h u m a n groups is the power relationship between individuals in different social positions. O n e facet of this topic, the connection between role-taking and power, is the theme of an empirical research

PART II

Society

95

described i n the article b y D a r w i n L . T h o m a s , D a v i d D . Franks, and James M. C a l o n i c o . In their study of 888 members of 222 families, they tested the hypothesis that role-taking accuracy is inversely related to power within the family. T h e i r findings cast new light u p o n family decision-making processes. In a rather abstract but rewarding essay, E u g e n e A. Weinstein a n d J u d i t h M. T a n u r consider the impact of social structure u p o n interaction by means of a frame of reference that draws u p o n symbolic interactionism, structuralfunctionalism, and exchange theory. T h i s article directs attention to the important newly emerging concept of "situational identity" as a refinement of role. It merits study b o t h because of its eclectic effort to combine relevant elements of three different perspectives and its concern with bridging the gap between microsociological and macrosociological levels of analysis. T h e final article in this section deals with societal interpretations of collective strife and violence. R a l p h H. T u r n e r attempts to develop criteria for determining w h y some of these collective actions are viewed as acceptable social protest, rather than crime or revolutionary upheavals. F o l l o w i n g an era of racial riots, antiwar demonstrations, and a host of liberation movements, his analysis of p u b l i c perceptions a n d reactions merits our attention. W h i l e differing in focus a n d technique, the articles in Part II have a c o m m o n perspective: T h e y suggest that h u m a n relationships are neither static nor abstract, but reflect the constructed, emergent quality of h u m a n behavior. T h i s central feature helps to account for both the stability and the changeability of h u m a n society.

Herbert Blumer

Society as Symbolic Interaction

A v i e w of h u m a n society as symbolic interaction has b e e n followed m o r e than it has b e e n formulated. Partial, usually fragmentary, statements of it are to be found in the writings of a n u m b e r of e m i n e n t scholars, some inside the field of sociology a n d some outside. A m o n g the f o r m e r we may note such scholars as Charles H o r t o n Cooley, W . I . Thomas, Robert E . Park, E . W . Burgess, F l o rian Z n a n i e c k i , E l l s w o r t h Faris, and James M i c k e l Williams. A m o n g those outside the discipline we may note W i l l i a m James, J o h n D e w e y , and George H e r b e r t M e a d . N o n e of these scholars, in my j u d g m e n t , has presented a systematic statement of the nature of h u m a n group life f r o m the standpoint of symbolic interaction. M e a d stands out a m o n g all of t h e m in l a y i n g bare the fundamental premises of the approach, yet he d i d little to develop its methodological implications for sociological study. Students w h o seek to depict the position of symbolic interaction m a y easily give different pictures of it. W h a t I have to present should be regarded as my personal version. My a i m is to present the basic premises of the point of v i e w and to develop their methodological consequences for the study of h u m a n group life. T h e t e r m "symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n " refers, of course, to the peculiar a n d distinctive character of interaction as it takes place b e t w e e n h u m a n beings. T h e peculiarity consists in the fact that h u m a n beings interpret or " d e f i n e " each other's actions instead of merely reacting to each other's
From by Human Behavior and Mifflin Social Processes, Blumer. Used by edited by Arnold 1962 o f the

actions. T h e i r "response" is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the m e a n i n g w h i c h they attach to some actions. Thus, h u m a n interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaini n g the m e a n i n g of one another's actions. This m e d i a t i o n is equivalent to inserting a process of interpretation b e t w e e n stimulus and response in the case of h u m a n behavior. T h e simple recognition that h u m a n beings interpret each other's actions as the means of acti n g toward one another has p e r m e a t e d the thought and writings of many scholars of h u m a n conduct and of h u m a n group life. Yet few of t h e m have endeavored to analyze what such interpretation implies about the nature of the h u m a n b e i n g or about the nature of h u m a n association. T h e y are usually content w i t h a mere recognition that " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " should be caught by the student, or w i t h a simple realization that symbols, such as cultural norms or values, must be i n t r o d u c e d into their analyses. O n l y G . H . M e a d , i n m y j u d g ment, has sought to think through what the act of interpretation implies for an understanding of the h u m a n being, h u m a n action, and h u m a n association. T h e essentials of his analysis are so penetrating and p r o f o u n d and so important for an u n derstanding of h u m a n group life that I wish to spell t h e m out, e v e n though briefly. T h e key feature in Mead's analysis is that the h u m a n being has a self. This idea should not be cast aside as esoteric or glossed over as something that is obvious and hence not w o r t h y of attention. In declaring that the h u m a n being has a self, M e a d had in m i n d chiefly that the h u m a n b e i n g can

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P A R T II be the object of his o w n actions. He can act t o w a r d himself as he m i g h t act t o w a r d others. E a c h of us is familiar w i t h actions of this sort in w h i c h the h u m a n b e i n g gets angry w i t h himself, rebuffs himself, takes p r i d e i n himself, argues w i t h h i m self, tries to bolster his o w n courage, tells himself that he should " d o t h i s " or not " d o that," sets goals for himself, makes compromises w i t h h i m self, a n d plans what he is going to do. That the h u m a n b e i n g acts t o w a r d himself i n these a n d countless other ways is a matter of easy e m p i r i c a l observation. To recognize that the h u m a n b e i n g can act t o w a r d himself is no mystical conjuration. M e a d regards this ability of the h u m a n b e i n g to act t o w a r d himself as the central m e c h a n i s m w i t h w h i c h the h u m a n b e i n g faces a n d deals w i t h his w o r l d . This m e c h a n i s m enables the h u m a n b e i n g to m a k e i n d i c a t i o n to himself of things in his surroundings and thus to guide his actions by what he notes. A n y t h i n g of w h i c h a h u m a n b e i n g is conscious is something w h i c h he is i n d i c a t i n g to himsefthe t i c k i n g of a clock, a k n o c k at the door, the appearance of a f r i e n d , the r e m a r k m a d e by a c o m p a n i o n , a r e c o g n i t i o n that he has a task to p e r f o r m , or the realization that he has a c o l d . Conversely, a n y t h i n g of w h i c h he is not conscious is, ipso facto, s o m e t h i n g w h i c h h e is not i n d i c a t i n g to himself. T h e conscious life of the h u m a n being, f r o m the t i m e that he awakens u n t i l he falls asleep, is a c o n t i n u a l flow of selfindicationsnotations of the things w i t h w h i c h t h e n , a picture of the h u m a n b e i n g as an organism w h i c h confronts its w o r l d w i t h a m e c h a n i s m for m a k i n g indications to himself. This is the m e c h a n i s m that is i n v o l v e d in i n t e r p r e t i n g the actions of others. To interpret the actions of another is to p o i n t out to oneself that the action has this or that m e a n i n g or character. N o w , according to M e a d , the significance of m a k i n g indications to oneself is of p a r a m o u n t i m portance. T h e importance lies along two lines. First, to indicate something is to extricate it f r o m its setting, to h o l d it apart, to give it a m e a n i n g or, in Mead's language, to m a k e it into an object. An objectthat is to say, a n y t h i n g that an i n d i v i d u a l indicates to himselfis different f r o m a stimulus; instead of h a v i n g an intrinsic character w h i c h acts on the i n d i v i d u a l and w h i c h can be identified

Societv

apart f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l , its character or meani n g is c o n f e r r e d on it by the i n d i v i d u a l . T h e object is a p r o d u c t of the individual's disposition to act instead of b e i n g an antecedent stimulus which evokes the act. Instead of the i n d i v i d u a l being s u r r o u n d e d by an e n v i r o n m e n t of pre-existing objects w h i c h play u p o n h i m and call f o r t h his behavior, the p r o p e r p i c t u r e is that he constructs his objects on the basis of his on-going activity. In any of his countless actswhether m i n o r , like dressing himself, or major, like o r g a n i z i n g himself for a professional careerthe i n d i v i d u a l is design a t i n g different objects to himself, g i v i n g them m e a n i n g , j u d g i n g their suitability to his action, and m a k i n g decisions on the basis of the judgm e n t . This is what is meant by i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or acting on the basis of symbols. T h e second i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n of the fact that the h u m a n b e i n g makes indications to h i m self is that his action is constructed or b u i l t up instead of b e i n g a m e r e release. W h a t e v e r the action in w h i c h he is engaged, the h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l proceeds by p o i n t i n g out to himself the divergent things w h i c h have to be taken into account in the course of his action. He has to note what he wants to do a n d h o w he is to do it; he has to point out to h i m s e l f the various conditions w h i c h m a y be i n s t r u m e n t a l to his action a n d those w h i c h m a y obstruct his action; he has to take account of the demands, the expectations, the prohibitions, and the threats as they may arise in the
ataaiion in w b i c b he is acting. His action is built

up step by step t h r o u g h a process of such selfindication. T h e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l pieces together and guides his action by taking account of different things and i n t e r p r e t i n g their significance for his prospective action. T h e r e is no instance of conscious action of w h i c h this is not true. T h e process of constructing action through m a k i n g indications to oneself cannot be swall o w e d up in any of the conventional psychological categories. This process is distinct f r o m a n d different f r o m what is spoken of as the "ego"just as it is different f r o m any other conception w h i c h conceives of the self in terms of composition or organization. Self-indication is a m o v i n g c o m m u nicative process in w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l notes things, assesses t h e m , gives t h e m a m e a n i n g , and decides to act on the basis of the m e a n i n g . T h e

Blumer h u m a n b e i n g stands over against the w o r l d , or against "alters," w i t h such a process and not w i t h a m e r e ego. F u r t h e r , the process of self-indication cannot be subsumed u n d e r the forces, w h e t h e r f r o m the outside or inside, w h i c h are p r e s u m e d to play u p o n the i n d i v i d u a l to produce his behavior. E n v i r o n m e n t a l pressures, external stimuli, organic drives, wishes, attitudes, feelings, ideas, and their like do not cover or explain the process of self-indication. T h e process of self-indication stands over against t h e m in that the i n d i v i d u a l points out to himself a n d interprets the appearance or expression of such things, n o t i n g a g i v e n social d e m a n d that is made on h i m , r e c o g n i z i n g a c o m m a n d , observing that he is hungry, r e a l i z i n g that he wishes to buy something, aware that he has a g i v e n feeling, conscious that he dislikes eating w i t h someone he despises, or aware that he is t h i n k i n g of d o i n g some g i v e n things. By virtue of i n d i c a t i n g such things to himself, he places h i m self over against t h e m and is able to act back against t h e m , accepting t h e m , rejecting t h e m , or transforming t h e m i n accordance w i t h h o w h e defines or interprets t h e m . H i s behavior, accordingly, is not a result of such things as e n v i r o n m e n tal pressures, stimuli, motives, attitudes, and ideas but arises instead f r o m h o w he interprets and handles these things in the action w h i c h he is constructing. T h e process of self-indication by means of w h i c h h u m a n action is f o r m e d cannot be accounted for by factors w h i c h precede the act. T h e process of self-indication exists in its o w n right and must be accepted a n d studied as such. It is through this process that the h u m a n b e i n g constructs his conscious action. N o w M e a d recognizes that the formation of action by the i n d i v i d u a l t h r o u g h a process of selfindication always takes place in a social context. Since this matter is so v i t a l to an understanding of symbolic interaction it needs to be explained carefully. Fundamentally, group action takes the f o r m of a fitting together of i n d i v i d u a l lines of action. E a c h i n d i v i d u a l aligns his action to the action of others by ascertaining what they are doing or what they i n t e n d to dothat is, by getting the m e a n i n g of their acts. F o r M e a d , this is done by the i n d i v i d u a l " t a k i n g the r o l e " of otherseither the role of a specific person or the role of a group (Mead's " g e n e r a l i z e d other"). In

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taking such roles the i n d i v i d u a l seeks to ascertain the i n t e n t i o n or d i r e c t i o n of the acts of others. He forms and aligns his o w n action on the basis of such interpretation of the acts of others. This is the f u n d a m e n t a l w a y in w h i c h group action takes place in h u m a n society. T h e foregoing are the essential features, as I see t h e m , in Mead's analysis of the bases of s y m bolic interaction. T h e y presuppose the f o l l o w i n g : that h u m a n society is made up of individuals w h o have selves (that is, make indications to t h e m selves); that i n d i v i d u a l action is a construction a n d not a release, b e i n g built up by the i n d i v i d u a l through n o t i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g features of the situations in w h i c h he acts; that group or collective action consists of the aligning of i n d i v i d u a l actions, brought about by the individuals' interp r e t i n g or taking into account each other's actions. Since my purpose is to present and not to defend the position of symbolic interaction I shall not endeavor in this essay to advance support for the three premises w h i c h I have just i n d i c a t e d . I wish m e r e l y to say that the three premises can be easily verified empirically. I k n o w of no i n stance of h u m a n group action to w h i c h the three premises do not apply. T h e reader is challenged to find or think of a single instance w h i c h they do not fit. I wish n o w to point out that sociological views of h u m a n society are, in general, m a r k e d l y at v a r i ance w i t h the premises w h i c h I have i n d i c a t e d as u n d e r l y i n g symbolic interaction. Indeed, the p r e d o m i n a n t n u m b e r of such views, especially those in vogue at the present time, do not see or treat h u m a n society as symbolic interaction. W e d d e d , as they t e n d to be, to some f o r m of sociological d e t e r m i n i s m , they adopt images of h u m a n society, of individuals in it, a n d of group action w h i c h do not square w i t h the premises of symbolic interaction. I w i s h to say a few words about the major lines of variance. Sociological thought rarely recognizes or treats h u m a n societies as composed of individuals who have selves. Instead, they assume h u m a n beings to be m e r e l y organisms w i t h some k i n d of organization, responding to forces w h i c h play u p o n t h e m . G e n e r a l l y , although not exclusively, these forces are lodged in the make-up of the society, as in the case of "social system," "social

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s t r u c t u r e , " " c u l t u r e , " "status p o s i t i o n , " "social r o l e , " " c u s t o m , " " i n s t i t u t i o n , " " c o l l e c t i v e representation," "social situation," "social n o r m , " a n d " v a l u e s . " T h e assumption is that the behavior of p e o p l e as m e m b e r s of a society is an expression of the play on t h e m of these kinds of factors or forces. This, of course, is the logical position w h i c h is necessarily taken w h e n the scholar explains their behavior or phases of their behavior in terms of one or other of such social factors. T h e i n d i v i d u als w h o compose a h u m a n society are treated as the m e d i a through w h i c h such factors operate, a n d the social action of such i n d i v i d u a l s is reg a r d e d as an expression of such factors. This app r o a c h or point of v i e w denies, or at least ignores, that h u m a n beings have selvesthat they act by m a k i n g indications to themselves. Incidentally, the " s e l f " is not brought into the p i c t u r e by introd u c i n g such items as organic drives, motives, attitudes, feelings, i n t e r n a l i z e d social factors, or psychological components. S u c h psychological factors have the same status as the social factors m e n t i o n e d : they are r e g a r d e d as factors w h i c h play on the i n d i v i d u a l to p r o d u c e his action. T h e y do not constitute the process of self-indication. T h e process of self-indication stands over against t h e m , just as it stands over against the social factors w h i c h play on the h u m a n b e i n g . Practically all sociological conceptions of h u m a n society fail to recognize that the individuals w h o compose it have selves in the sense spoken of. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , such sociological conceptions do not r e g a r d the social actions of individuals in h u m a n society as b e i n g constructed by t h e m t h r o u g h a process of interpretation. Instead, act i o n is treated as a p r o d u c t of factors w h i c h play o n a n d t h r o u g h individuals. T h e social behavior of people is not seen as b u i l t up by t h e m t h r o u g h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of objects, situations, or the actions of others. If a place is g i v e n to " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " the interpretation is r e g a r d e d as m e r e l y an expression of other factors (such as motives) w h i c h precede the act, a n d accordingly disappears as a factor in its o w n right. H e n c e , the social action of people is treated as an o u t w a r d flow or expression of forces p l a y i n g on t h e m rather than as acts w h i c h are built up by people through their interpretation of the situations in w h i c h they are placed.

P A R T II

Society

These remarks suggest another significant line of difference b e t w e e n general sociological views a n d the position of symbolic interaction. These t w o sets of views differ in w h e r e they lodge social action. U n d e r the perspective of symbolic interaction, social action is lodged in acting i n d i viduals w h o fit their respective lines of action to one another t h r o u g h a process of interpretation: group action is the collective action of such i n d i viduals. As opposed to this v i e w , sociological conceptions generally lodge social action in the action of society or in some u n i t of society. Examples of this are legion. L e t me cite a few. Some conceptions, in treating societies or h u m a n groups as "social systems," r e g a r d group action as an expression of a system, either in a state of balance or seeking to achieve balance. Or group action is c o n c e i v e d as an expression of the " f u n c t i o n s " of a society or of a g r o u p . Or group action is regarded as the o u t w a r d expression of elements lodged in society or the group such as cultural demands, societal purposes, social values, or institutional stresses. These typical conceptions ignore or blot out a v i e w of group life or of group action as consisting of the collective or concerted actions of individuals seeking to meet their life situations. If r e c o g n i z e d at all, the efforts of people to dev e l o p collective acts to meet their situations are subsumed u n d e r the play of u n d e r l y i n g or transcending forces w h i c h are lodged in society or its parts. T h e i n d i v i d u a l s composing the society or the group become " c a r r i e r s , " or m e d i a for the expression of such forces; and the interpretative behavior b y means o f w h i c h people f o r m their actions is m e r e l y a coerced l i n k in the play of such forces. T h e i n d i c a t i o n of the foregoing lines of v a r i ance should help to p u t the position of symbolic interaction in better perspective. In the r e m a i n i n g discussion I w i s h to sketch somewhat m o r e fully h o w h u m a n society appears in terms of s y m bolic interaction a n d to point out some methodological implications. H u m a n society is to be seen as consisting of acting people, a n d the life of the society is to be seen as consisting of their actions. T h e acting units may be separate individuals, collectivities whose m e m b e r s are acting together on a c o m m o n quest, or organizations acting on behalf of a con-

101 - r u e n c y . Respective examples are i n d i v i d u a l : -Tzhasers in a market, a play g r o u p or missionary : a n d a business corporation or a national :-::essional association. T h e r e is no e m p i r i c a l l y rservable activity in a h u m a n society that does - : : spring f r o m some acting unit. This banal state- -t needs to be stressed in light of the c o m m o n ictice of sociologists of r e d u c i n g h u m a n society - social units that do not actfor example, social pfasses in m o d e r n society. O b v i o u s l y , there are ivs of v i e w i n g h u m a n society other than in rrms of the acting units that compose it. I m e r e l y -_sh to p o i n t out that in respect to concrete or pirical activity h u m a n society must necessarily |e seen in terms of the acting units that f o r m I w o u l d a d d that any scheme of h u m a n society .aiming to be a realistic analysis has to respect md be congruent w i t h the e m p i r i c a l recogni tion that a h u m a n society consists of acting rruts. C o r r e s p o n d i n g respect must be s h o w n to the renditions u n d e r w h i c h such units act. O n e p r i c o n d i t i o n is that action takes place in a n d s i t h regard to a situation. W h a t e v e r be the acting _ r i t a n i n d i v i d u a l , a family, a school, a c h u r c h , I business f i r m , a labor u n i o n , a legislature, a n d so onany particular action is f o r m e d in the light :: the situation in w h i c h it takes place. This leads the recognition of a second major c o n d i t i o n , onmely, that the action is f o r m e d or constructed :y i n t e r p r e t i n g the situation. T h e acting u n i t nec essarily has to identify the things w h i c h it has take into accounttasks, opportunities, obstapes, means, demands, discomforts, dangers, a n d me l i k e ; it has to assess t h e m in some fashion rood it has to make decisions on the basis of the assessment. Such interpretative behavior m a y :ake place in the i n d i v i d u a l g u i d i n g his o w n acfion, in a collectivity of i n d i v i d u a l s acting in con:ert, or in "agents" acting on behalf of a group : organization. G r o u p life consists of acting units l e v e l o p i n g acts to meet the situations in w h i c h they are p l a c e d . Usually, most of the situations e n c o u n t e r e d by people in a g i v e n society are defined or "struc t u r e d " b y t h e m i n the same w a y . T h r o u g h p r e v i ous interaction they d e v e l o p a n d acquire c o m mon understandings or definitions of h o w to act in this or that situation. These c o m m o n definitions enable people to act alike. T h e c o m m o n r e p e t i tive behavior of people in such situations s h o u l d not mislead the student into b e l i e v i n g that no process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is in play; on the c o n trary, e v e n though fixed, the actions of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g p e o p l e are constructed b y t h e m t h r o u g h a process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Since ready-made a n d c o m m o n l y accepted definitions are at h a n d , l i t t l e strain is p l a c e d on people in g u i d i n g a n d organiz i n g their acts. H o w e v e r , m a n y other situations m a y not be defined in a single way by the p a r t i c i p a t i n g people. In this event, their lines of action do not fit together readily a n d collective action is b l o c k e d . Interpretations have to be d e v e l o p e d and effective a c c o m m o d a t i o n of the participants to one another has to be w o r k e d out. In the case of such " u n d e f i n e d " situations, it is necessary to trace a n d study the e m e r g i n g process of d e f i n i t i o n w h i c h is brought into play. Insofar as sociologists or students of h u m a n society are c o n c e r n e d w i t h the behavior of a c t i n g units, the position of symbolic interaction requires the student to catch the process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h they construct their actions. T h i s process is not to be caught m e r e l y by t u r n i n g to conditions w h i c h are antecedent to the process. Such antecedent conditions are h e l p f u l i n u n d e r standing the process insofar as they enter into it, but as m e n t i o n e d previously they do not consti tute the process. No can one catch the process m e r e l y by i n f e r r i n g its nature f r o m the overt ac t i o n w h i c h is its p r o d u c t . To catch the process, the student must take the role of the acting u n i t whose behavior he is studying. Since the i n t e r p r e tation is b e i n g m a d e by the acting u n i t in terms of objects designated a n d appraised, meanings ac q u i r e d , a n d decisions made, the process has to be seen f r o m the standpoint of the acting unit. It is the r e c o g n i t i o n of this fact that makes the research w o r k of such scholars as R. E. P a r k a n d W. I. Thomas so notable. To try to catch the inter pretative process by r e m a i n i n g aloof as a so-called " o b j e c t i v e " observer a n d refusing to take the role of the acting unit is to risk the worst k i n d of sub j e c t i v i s m t h e objective observer is l i k e l y to fill in the process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i t h his o w n sur mises in place of c a t c h i n g the process as it occurs in the experience of the acting u n i t w h i c h uses it.

102 By and large, of course, sociologists do not study h u m a n society in terms of its acting units. Instead, they are disposed to v i e w h u m a n society in terms of structure or organization and to treat social action as an expression of such structure or organization. Thus, reliance is p l a c e d on such structural categories as social system, culture, norms, values, social stratification, status positions, social roles and institutional organization. These are used both to analyze h u m a n society and to account for social action w i t h i n it. O t h e r major interests of sociological scholars center a r o u n d this focal theme of organization. O n e line of interest is to v i e w organization in terms of the functions it is supposed to p e r f o r m . A n o t h e r line of interest is to study societal organization as a syst e m seeking e q u i l i b r i u m ; here the scholar endeavors to detect mechanisms w h i c h are indigenous to the system. A n o t h e r line of interest is to identify forces w h i c h play u p o n organization to b r i n g about changes in it; here the scholar endeavors, especially through comparative study, to isolate a relation between causative factors and structural results. These various lines of sociological perspective and interest, w h i c h are so strongly entrenched today, leap over the acting units of a society and bypass the interpretative process by w h i c h such acting units b u i l d up their actions. These respective concerns w i t h organization on one h a n d and w i t h acting units on the other h a n d set the essential difference b e t w e e n conventional views of h u m a n society and the v i e w of it i m p l i e d i n symbolic interaction. T h e latter v i e w recognizes the presence of organization in h u m a n society and respects its importance. H o w e v e r , it sees and treats organization differently. T h e difference is along two major lines. First, f r o m the standpoint of symbolic, interaction the organization of a h u m a n society is the f r a m e w o r k inside of w h i c h social action takes place and is not the d e t e r m i n a n t of that action. Second, such organization a n d changes in it are the product of the activity of acting units and not of "forces" w h i c h leave such acting units out of account. E a c h of these two major lines of difference should be exp l a i n e d briefly in order to obtain a better understanding of h o w h u m a n society appears in terms of symbolic interaction.

P A R T II

Socieh

F r o m the standpoint of symbolic interaction, social organization is a framework inside of which acting units develop their actions. Structural features, such as " c u l t u r e , " "social systems," "social stratification," or "social roles," set conditions for their action but do not determine their action. Peoplethat is, acting unitsdo not act toward culture, social structure or the like; they act tow a r d situations. Social organization enters into action only to the extent to w h i c h it shapes situations in w h i c h people act, and to the extent to w h i c h it supplies fixed sets of symbols w h i c h people use in i n t e r p r e t i n g their situations. These two forms of influence of social organization are important. In the case of settled and stabilized societies, such as isolated p r i m i t i v e tribes and peasant c o m m u n i ties, the influence is certain to be p r o f o u n d . In the case of h u m a n societies, particularly m o d e r n societies, in w h i c h streams of n e w situations arise and o l d situations become unstable, the influence of organization decreases. O n e should bear in m i n d that the most important element confronti n g an acting unit in situations is the actions of other acting units. In m o d e r n society, w i t h its increasing crisscrossing of lines of action, it is comm o n for situations to arise in w h i c h the actions of participants are not previously r e g u l a r i z e d and standardized. To this extent, existing social organization does not shape the situations. Correspondingly, the symbols or tools of interpretation used by acting units in such situations may vary and shift considerably. F o r these reasons, social action may go b e y o n d , or depart f r o m , existing organization in any of its structural dimensions. T h e organization of a h u m a n society is not to be identified w i t h the process of interpretation used by its acti n g units; e v e n though it affects that process, it does not embrace or cover the process. Perhaps the most outstanding consequence of v i e w i n g h u m a n society as organization is to overlook the part p l a y e d by acting units in social change. T h e conventional procedure of sociologists is (a) to identify h u m a n society (or some part of it) in terms of an established or organized f o r m , (b) to identify some factor or condition of change playing u p o n the h u m a n society or the g i v e n part of it, and (c) to identify the n e w f o r m assumed by the society f o l l o w i n g u p o n the play of the factor of change. Such observations p e r m i t the stu-

Blumer dent to c o u c h propositions to the effect that a given factor of change p l a y i n g u p o n a g i v e n organized f o r m results in a g i v e n n e w organized form. Examples r a n g i n g f r o m c r u d e to refined statements are legion, such as that an economic depression increases solidarity in the families of w o r k i n g m e n or that industrialization replaces extended families by nuclear families. My c o n c e r n here is not w i t h the validity of such propositions but w i t h the methodological position w h i c h they presuppose. Essentially, such propositions either ignore the role of the interpretative behavior of acting units in the g i v e n instance of change, or else r e g a r d the interpretative behavior as coerced by the factor of change. I w i s h to point out that any line of social change, since it involves change in h u m a n action, is necessarily m e d i a t e d by interpretation on the part of the people caught up in the changethe change appears in the f o r m of n e w situations in w h i c h people have to construct n e w forms of action. Also, in line w i t h what lias b e e n said previously, interpretations of n e w situations are not p r e d e t e r m i n e d by conditions antecedent to the situations but d e p e n d on what is taken into account a n d assessed in the actual situations in w h i c h behavior is f o r m e d . Variations in interpretation may readily occur as different acting units cut out different objects in the situation, or give different weight to the objects w h i c h they note, or piece objects together in different patterns. In formulating propositions of social

103 change, it w o u l d be wise to recognize that any g i v e n line of such change is m e d i a t e d by acting units i n t e r p r e t i n g the situations w i t h w h i c h they are confronted. Students of h u m a n society w i l l have to face the question of w h e t h e r their preoccupation w i t h categories of structure and organization can be squared w i t h the interpretative process by means of w h i c h h u m a n beings, i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d collectively, act in h u m a n society. It is the discrepancy b e t w e e n the two w h i c h plagues such students in their efforts to attain scientific propositions of the sort achieved in the physical and biological sciences. It is this discrepancy, further, w h i c h is chiefly responsible for their difficulty in fitting hypothetical propositions to n e w arrays of e m p i r i c a l data. Efforts are made, of course, to o v e r c o m e these shortcomings by devising n e w structural categories, by f o r m u l a t i n g n e w structural h y p o t h eses, by d e v e l o p i n g m o r e refined techniques of research, and e v e n b y f o r m u l a t i n g n e w methodological schemes of a structural character. These efforts continue to ignore or to explain away the interpretative process by w h i c h people act, i n d i vidually and collectively, in society. T h e question remains w h e t h e r h u m a n society or social action can be successfully analyzed by schemes w h i c h refuse to recognize h u m a n beings as they are, namely, as persons constructing i n d i v i d u a l a n d collective action t h r o u g h an interpretation of the situations w h i c h confront t h e m .

John Dewey

Communication, Individual and Society

We often fancy that institutions, social cust o m , collective habit, have been f o r m e d by the consolidation of i n d i v i d u a l habits. In the m a i n this supposition is false to fact. To a considerable extent customs, or widespread uniformities of habit, exist because individuals face the same situation a n d react in like fashion. But to a larger extent customs persist because individuals f o r m their personal habits under conditions set by p r i o r customs. A n i n d i v i d u a l usually acquires the morality as he inherits the speech of his social group. T h e activities of the group are already there, and some assimilation of his o w n acts to their pattern is a prerequisite of a share therein, and hence of havi n g any part in what is going on. E a c h person is b o r n an infant, and every infant is subject f r o m the first breath he draws a n d the first cry he utters to the attentions and demands of others. These others are not just persons in general w i t h minds in general. T h e y are beings w i t h habits, and beings w h o u p o n the whole esteem the habits they have, if for no other reason than that, h a v i n g t h e m , their imagination is thereby l i m i t e d . T h e nature of habit is to be assertive, insistent, selfp e r p e t u a t i n g . T h e r e is no miracle in the fact that if a c h i l d learns any language he learns the language that those about h i m speak and teach, especially since his ability to speak that language is a p r e - c o n d i t i o n of his e n t e r i n g into effective conn e c t i o n w i t h t h e m , m a k i n g wants k n o w n a n d getFrom Human Nature and Conduct b y J o h n Inc. Dewey. Copyright 1950 b y

t i n g t h e m satisfied. F o n d parents a n d relatives frequently p i c k up a f e w of the child's spontaneous modes of speech a n d for a t i m e at least they are portions of the speech of the group. B u t the ratio w h i c h such words bear to the total vocabulary in use gives a fair measure of the part played b y p u r e l y i n d i v i d u a l habit i n f o r m i n g custom i n comparison w i t h the part p l a y e d by c u s t o m in f o r m i n g i n d i v i d u a l habits. F e w persons have either the energy or the w e a l t h to b u i l d private roads to travel u p o n . T h e y find it convenient, " n a t u r a l , " to use the roads that are already there: w h i l e unless their private roads connect at some point w i t h the h i g h w a y they cannot b u i l d them e v e n i f they w o u l d . These simple facts seems to me to give a simp l e explanation of matters that are often surr o u n d e d w i t h mystery. To talk about the priority of " s o c i e t y " to the i n d i v i d u a l is to i n d u l g e in nonsensical metaphysics. B u t to say that some preexistent association of h u m a n beings is p r i o r to every particular h u m a n b e i n g w h o is b o r n into the w o r l d is to m e n t i o n a c o m m o n p l a c e . These associations are definite modes of i n t e r a c t i o n of persons w i t h one another; that is to say they f o r m customs, institutions. T h e r e is no p r o b l e m in all history so artificial as that of h o w " i n d i v i d u a l s " manage to f o r m " s o c i e t y . " T h e p r o b l e m is due to the pleasure taken in m a n i p u l a t i n g concepts, and discussion goes on because concepts are kept f r o m i n c o n v e n i e n t contact w i t h facts. T h e facts of infancy a n d sex have only to be called to m i n d to see h o w m a n u f a c t u r e d are the conceptions w h i c h enter into this particular p r o b l e m .

1922 b y H o l t ,

Rinehart and Winston,

Copyright

J o h n D e w e y . R e p r i n t e d w i t h t h e p e r m i s s i o n o f T h e C e n t e r for D e w e y S t u d i e s , S o u t h e r n Illinois U n i v e r s i t y a t C a r b o n d a l e .

Dewey T h e p r o b l e m , h o w e v e r , of h o w those estab lished a n d m o r e or less d e e p l y grooved systems of interaction w h i c h we call social groups, b i g a n d small, m o d i f y the activities of individuals w h o per force are caught up w i t h i n t h e m , a n d h o w the activities of c o m p o n e n t individuals r e m a k e and redirect previously established customs is a deeply significant one. V i e w e d f r o m the stand point of custom and its p r i o r i t y to the formation of habits in h u m a n beings w h o are b o r n babies and gradually g r o w to m a t u r i t y , the facts w h i c h are n o w usually assembled u n d e r the conceptions of collective m i n d s , group-minds, national-minds, crowd-minds, etc., etc., lose the mysterious air they exhale w h e n m i n d is thought of (as orthodox psychology teaches us to t h i n k of it) as something w h i c h precedes action. It is difficult to see that collective m i n d means a n y t h i n g m o r e than a cus tom brought at some point to explicit, e m p h a t i c consciousness, emotional or i n t e l l e c t u a l . T h e family into w h i c h one is b o r n is a family in a village or city w h i c h interacts w i t h other more or less integrated systems of activity, a n d w h i c h includes a diversity of groupings w i t h i n it self, say, churches, political parties, clubs, cliques, partnerships, trade-unions, corporations, etc. If
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105 we start w i t h the traditional notion of m i n d as something c o m p l e t e i n itself, then w e m a y w e l l be p e r p l e x e d by the p r o b l e m of h o w a c o m m o n m i n d , c o m m o n ways o f feeling and b e l i e v i n g and p u r p o s i n g , comes into existence and t h e n forms these groups. T h e case is quite otherwise if we recognize that in any case we must start w i t h g r o u p e d action, that is, w i t h some fairly settled system of interaction among individuals. T h e p r o b l e m of o r i g i n a n d development of the various groupings, or definite customs, in existence at any particular t i m e in any particular place is not solved by reference to psychic causes, elements, forces. It is to be solved by reference to facts of action, d e m a n d for food, for houses, for a mate, for someone to talk to and to listen to one talk, for control of others, demands w h i c h are all i n t e n sified by the fact already m e n t i o n e d that each person begins a helpless, dependent creature. I do not m e a n of course that hunger, fear, sexual love, gregariousness, sympathy, parental l o v e , love of bossing a n d of b e i n g ordered about, i m i t a tion, etc., play no part. B u t I do m e a n that these words do not express elements or forces w h i c h are psychic o r m e n t a l i n their f i r s t intention. T h e y denote ways of behavior. These ways of b e h a v i n g i n v o l v e interaction, that is to say, and p r i o r group ings. A n d to understand the existence of organ i z e d ways or habits we surely n e e d to go to phys ics, chemistry a n d physiology rather t h a n to psychology. T h e r e is doubtless a great mystery as to w h y any such t h i n g as b e i n g conscious should exist at all. B u t if consciousness exists at all, there is no mystery in its b e i n g connected w i t h what it is connected w i t h . That is to say, if an activity w h i c h is an interaction of various factors, or a g r o u p e d activity, comes to consciousness it seems natural that it should take the f o r m of an emotion, belief or purpose that reflects the interaction, that it should be an " o u r " consciousness or a " m y " con sciousness. A n d by this is meant both that it w i l l be shared by those w h o are i m p l i c a t e d in the asso ciative custom, or m o r e or less alike in t h e m a l l , and that it w i l l be felt or thought to c o n c e r n others as w e l l as one's self. A family-custom or o r g a n i z e d habit of action comes into contact a n d conflict for example w i t h that of some other f a m i l y . T h e emotions of ruffled p r i d e , the belief about superi-

M o b psychology comes u n d e r the same principles, but in a

negative aspect. T h e c r o w d a n d m o b express a disintegration o f habits w h i c h releases i m p u l s e a n d r e n d e r s persons susceptible to i m m e d i a t e stimuli, rather t h a n s u c h a f u n c t i o n i n g of habits as is f o u n d in the m i n d of a c l u b or school of thought or a political party. L e a d e r s of an o r g a n i z a t i o n , that is of an interac tion h a v i n g settled habits, m a y , h o w e v e r , i n o r d e r t o p u t o v e r some schemes, deliberately resort to s t i m u l i w h i c h w i l l b r e a k t h r o u g h the crust o f o r d i n a r y c u s t o m a n d release i m p u l s e s o n s u c h a scale as to c r e a t e a m o b p s y c h o l o g y . S i n c e f e a r is a n o r m a l reaction to the unfamiliar, d r e a d a n d suspicion are the forces m o s t p l a y e d u p o n t o a c c o m p l i s h this r e s u l t , t o g e t h e r w i t h v a s t vague contrary hopes. T h i s is an ordinary t e c h n i q u e in excited political c a m p a i g n s , in starting war, etc. B u t an assimilation like that o f L e B o n o f the p s y c h o l o g y o f d e m o c r a c y t o the psy chology of a c r o w d in o v e r r i d i n g i n d i v i d u a l j u d g m e n t shows lack of p s y c h o l o g i c a l insight. A p o l i t i c a l d e m o c r a c y exhibits an o v e r r i d i n g o f t h o u g h t like that s e e n i n a n y c o n v e n t i o n o r institu t i o n . T h a t is, t h o u g h t i s s u b m e r g e d i n h a b i t . I n a c r o w d a n d mob, it is submerged in undefined emotion. C h i n a and Japan exhibit c r o w d psychology m o r e f r e q u e n t l y t h a n d o western democratic countries. N o t i n m y j u d g m e n t because o f any essen tially O r i e n t a l p s y c h o l o g y b u t b e c a u s e o f a n e a r e r b a c k g r o u n d of r i g i d a n d solid customs c o n j o i n e d w i t h the p h e n o m e n a of a period o f transition. T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f m a n y n o v e l stimuli creates o c c a s i o n s w h e r e h a b i t s a f f o r d n o b a l l a s t . H e n c e g r e a t w a v e s o f e m o t i o n e a s i l y s w e e p t h r o u g h masses. S o m e t i m e s t h e y are w a v e s o f e n t h u s i a s m f o r t h e n e w ; s o m e t i m e s o f v i o l e n t r e a c tion a g a i n s t i t b o t h e q u a l l y u n d i s c r i m i n a t i n g . T h e w a r has l e f t b e h i n d it a somewhat similar situation in western countries.

106
ority or b e i n g "as good as other p e o p l e , " the i n t e n t i o n to h o l d one's o w n are naturally rfeeling a n d i d e a of our treatment and position. Substitute the R e p u b l i c a n party or the A m e r i c a n nation for the family and the general situation remains the same. T h e conditions w h i c h d e t e r m i n e the nature and extent of the particular g r o u p i n g in question are matters of supreme i m p o r t . B u t they are not, as such, subject-matter of psychology, but of the history of politics, law, religion, economics, i n v e n t i o n , the technology of c o m m u n i c a t i o n and intercourse. Psychology comes in as an indis pensable tool. B u t it enters into the matter of understanding these various special topics, not into the question of what psychic forces f o r m a

P A R T II

Society

collective m i n d and therefore a social group. That way of stating the case puts the cart a l o n g way before the horse, and naturally gathers obscurities and mysteries to itself. In short, the p r i m a r y facts of social psychology center about collective habit, custom. In addition to the general psychology of h a b i t w h i c h is general not i n d i v i d u a l in any i n telligible sense of that w o r d w e n e e d to find out just h o w different customs shape the desires, be liefs, purpose of those w h o are affected by them. T h e p r o b l e m of social psychology is not h o w ei ther i n d i v i d u a l or collective m i n d forms social groups and customs, but h o w different customs, established interacting arrangements, f o r m and nurture different minds.

Charles Horton Cooley

10

Primary Group and Human Nature

P r i m a r y groups are p r i m a r y in the sense that they give the i n d i v i d u a l his earliest a n d completest experience of social unity, a n d also in the sense that they do not change in the same degree as m o r e elaborate relations, but f o r m a compara tively p e r m a n e n t source out of w h i c h the latter are ever springing. Of course they are not i n dependent of the larger society, but to some ex tent reflect its spirit; as the G e r m a n family a n d the G e r m a n school bear somewhat distinctly the p r i n t of G e r m a n militarism. B u t this, after all, is like the tide setting back into creeks, and does not c o m m o n l y go very far. A m o n g the G e r m a n , a n d still m o r e among the Russian, peasantry are
B e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n o f C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons f r o m Social Organization, pages 26-31, by Charles Horton Cooley. Copy r i g h t 1909 C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s S o n s ; r e n e w a l c o p y r i g h t 1937 E l s i e Jones C o o l e y .

found habits of free cooperation and discussion almost uninfluenced by the character of the state; and it is a familiar and well-supported v i e w that the village c o m m u n e , self-governing as regards local affairs and habituated to discussion, is a very widespread institution in settled communities, and the continuator of a similar autonomy p r e v i ously existing in the clan. "It is m a n w h o makes monarchies and establishes republics, but the c o m m u n e seems to come directly f r o m the h a n d of G o d . " In our o w n cities the c r o w d e d tenements and the general economic and social confusion have sorely w o u n d e d the family and the neighborhood, but it is remarkable, in v i e w of these condi tions, what vitality they show; and there is n o t h i n g
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De T o c q u e v i l l e , Democracy in America, v o l . i, c h a p .

5.

Cooley upon w h i c h the conscience of the time is m o r e i e t e r m i n e d than u p o n restoring t h e m to health. These groups, then, are springs of life, not only for the i n d i v i d u a l but for social institutions. They are only in part m o l d e d by special traditions, and, in larger degree, express a universal nature. T h e religion or g o v e r n m e n t of other c i v i l i zations may seem alien to us, but the c h i l d r e n or the family group wear the c o m m o n life, a n d w i t h them we can always make ourselves at home. By h u m a n nature, I suppose, we may understand those sentiments and impulses that are h u m a n in b e i n g superior to those of lower animals, and also in the sense that they b e l o n g to m a n k i n d at large, and not to any particular race or time. It means, particularly, sympathy a n d the i n n u merable sentiments into w h i c h sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, heroworship, and the feeling of social right and wrong.
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107 as they understand it, k i n d to their c h i l d r e n and to the aged, and by no means harsh to w o m e n . T h e i r faces as shown in the photographs are w h o l l y h u m a n a n d m a n y of t h e m attractive. A n d w h e n we come to a comparison b e t w e e n different stages in the development of the same race, b e t w e e n ourselves, for instance, a n d the Teutonic tribes of the time of Caesar, the difference is neither in h u m a n nature nor in capacity, but in organization, in the range and complexity of relations, in the diverse expression of powers and passions essentially m u c h the same. T h e r e is no better proof of this generic l i k e ness of h u m a n nature than in the ease a n d joy w i t h w h i c h the m o d e r n m a n makes himself at home in literature d e p i c t i n g the most remote a n d v a r i e d phases of l i f e i n H o m e r , in the N i b e l u n g tales, in the H e b r e w Scriptures, in the legends of the A m e r i c a n Indians, in stories of frontier life, of soldiers and sailors, of criminals and tramps, and so on. T h e m o r e penetratingly any phase of h u m a n life is studied the more an essential likeness to ourselves is revealed. To r e t u r n to p r i m a r y groups: the v i e w here m a i n t a i n e d is that h u m a n nature is not something existing separately in the i n d i v i d u a l , but a groupnature or primary phase of society, a relatively simple and general c o n d i t i o n of the social m i n d . It is something m o r e , on the one h a n d , than the m e r e instinct that is b o r n in usthough that enters into i t a n d something less, on the other, than the m o r e elaborate d e v e l o p m e n t of ideas a n d sentiments that makes up institutions. It is the nature w h i c h is d e v e l o p e d a n d expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the p l a y g r o u n d , and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be f o u n d the basis, in experience, for similar ideas a n d sentiments in the h u m a n m i n d . In these, e v e r y w h e r e , h u m a n nature comes into existence. M a n does not have it at b i r t h ; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, a n d it decays in isolation. If this v i e w does not r e c o m m e n d itself to c o m m o n sense I do not k n o w that elaboration w i l l be of m u c h avail. It simply means the application at this point of the idea that society and i n d i viduals are inseparable phases of a c o m m o n w h o l e , so that w h e r e v e r we find an i n d i v i d u a l

ev

H u m a n nature in this sense is justly regarded as a comparatively permanent element in society. Always and everywhere m e n seek honor and i r e a d r i d i c u l e , defer to p u b l i c o p i n i o n , cherish their goods and their c h i l d r e n , a n d admire courage, generosity, and success. It is always safe to assume that people are a n d have b e e n h u man. It is true, no doubt, that there are differences of race capacity, so great that a large part of m a n kind are possibly incapable of any h i g h k i n d of social organization. B u t these differences, like those a m o n g individuals of the same race, are subde, d e p e n d i n g u p o n some obscure intellectual deficiency, some want of vigor, or slackness of m o r a l fibre, and do not involve unlikeness in the generic impulses of h u m a n nature. In all these races are very m u c h alike. T h e m o r e insight one gets into the life of savages, e v e n those that are r e c k o n e d rhe lowest, the more h u m a n , the m o r e like ourselves, they appear. Take for instance the natives of C e n t r a l Australia, as described by Spencer and G i l l e n , tribes having no definite g o v e r n m e n t or worship and scarcely able to count to five. T h e y are generous to one another, emulous of virtue
3
:

T h e s e m a t t e r s are e x p o u n d e d a t s o m e l e n g t h i n t h e w r i t e r ' s Nature and the Social Order. C o m p a r e also D a r w i n ' s The Native Tribes of Central Australia.

Human '-

riews a n d e x a m p l e s g i v e n in c h a p . 7 of h i s Descent of Man.

108
fact we may look for a social fact to go w i t h it. If there is a universal nature in persons there must be s o m e t h i n g universal in association to corres p o n d to it. W h a t else can h u m a n nature be than a trait of p r i m a r y groups? Surely not an attribute of the separate i n d i v i d u a l s u p p o s i n g there w e r e any such thingsince its t y p i c a l characteristics, such as affection, ambition, vanity, a n d resentment, are inconceivable apart f r o m society. If it belongs, then, to m a n in association, what k i n d or degree of association is r e q u i r e d to develop it? E v i d e n t l y n o t h i n g elaborate, because elaborate phases of society are transient and diverse, w h i l e h u m a n nature is comparatively stable a n d universal. In

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short the family a n d neighborhood life is essential to its genesis a n d n o t h i n g m o r e is. H e r e as e v e r y w h e r e in the study of society we must l e a r n to see m a n k i n d in psychical wholes, rather than in artificial separation. We must see a n d feel the c o m m u n a l life of family a n d local groups as i m m e d i a t e facts, not as combinations of something else. A n d perhaps we shall do this best by recalling our o w n experience a n d extendi n g it t h r o u g h sympathetic observation. W h a t , in our life, is the f a m i l y and the fellowship; what do we k n o w of the we-feeling? T h o u g h t of this k i n d may h e l p us to get a concrete perception of that p r i m a r y group-nature of w h i c h everything social is the o u t g r o w t h .

Tamotsu Shibutani

11

Reference Groups as Perspectives

A l t h o u g h H y m a n c o i n e d the t e r m scarcely m o r e than a decade ago, the concept of reference group has become one of the central analytic tools i n social psychology, b e i n g used i n the construct i o n of hypotheses c o n c e r n i n g a variety of social p h e n o m e n a . T h e inconsistency in behavior as a person moves f r o m one social context to another is accounted for in terms of a change in reference groups; the exploits of j u v e n i l e delinquents, especially in interstitial areas, are b e i n g explained by the expectations of peer-group gangs; modifications in social attitudes are f o u n d to be related to changes in associations. T h e concept has b e e n particularly useful in accounting for the choices
Tamotsu Shibutani, "Reference vol. Groups 60 (May as Perspectives," pp. 562-

American Journal

of Sociology,

1955),

5 6 9 , b y p e r m i s s i o n o f T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press. C o p y right 1955 b y T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o .

made a m o n g apparent alternatives, particularly w h e r e the selections seem to be contrary to the "best interests" of the actor. Status p r o b l e m s aspirations of social climbers, conflicts in group loyalty, the dilemmas of marginal m e n h a v e also b e e n analyzed in terms of reference groups, as have the differential sensitivity and reaction of various segments of an audience to mass c o m m u nication. It is r e c o g n i z e d that the same generic processes are i n v o l v e d in these p h e n o m e n a l l y d i verse events, a n d the increasing popularity of the concept attests to its utility in analysis. As m i g h t be expected d u r i n g the exploratory phases in any field of i n q u i r y , however, there is some confusion i n v o l v e d in the use of this concept, arising largely f r o m vagueness of signification. T h e available f o r m a l definitions are i n c o n sistent, a n d sometimes formal definitions are

Shibutani contradicted in usage. T h e fact that social psychologists can understand one another in spite of these imbiguities, however, implies an intuitive recognition of some central m e a n i n g , and an explicit statement of this w i l l enhance the utility of the concept as an analytic tool. T h e literature reveals that all discussions of reference groups involve some identifiable g r o u p i n g to w h i c h an actor is related in some manner a n d the norms a n d values shared in that group. H o w e v e r , the relationship between these three terms is not always clear. Our i n i t i a l task, then, is to examine the conceptions of reference group i m p l i c i t in actual usage, irrespective of f o r m a l definitions. O n e c o m m o n usage of the concept is in the designation of that group w h i c h serves as the point of reference in m a k i n g comparisons or contrasts, especially in f o r m i n g judgments about one's self. In the original use of the concept H y man spoke of reference groups as points of c o m parison in evaluating one's o w n status, and he round that the estimates v a r i e d according to the proup w i t h w h i c h the respondent c o m p a r e d h i m self. M e r t o n and K i t t , in their r e f o r m u l a t i o n of Stouffer's theory of relative d e p r i v a t i o n , also use the concept in this manner; the judgments of rearechelon soldiers overseas c o n c e r n i n g their fate varied, d e p e n d i n g u p o n w h e t h e r they c o m p a r e d themselves to soldiers who w e r e still at home or men in combat. T h e y also propose concrete research operations in w h i c h respondents are to be asked to compare themselves w i t h various groups. The study of aspiration levels by C h a p m a n and V o l k m a n n , frequently cited in discussions of reference-group theory, also involves variations in judgment arising f r o m a comparison of one's o w n proup w i t h others. In this m o d e of application, then, a reference group is a standard or check point w h i c h an actor uses in f o r m i n g his estimate of the situation, particularly his o w n position vithin it. L o g i c a l l y , then, any group w i t h w h i c h
1

109 an actor is familiar m a y become a reference group. A second referent of the concept is that group in w h i c h the actor aspires to gain or m a i n t a i n acceptance: hence, a group whose claims are paramount in situations r e q u i r i n g choice. T h e reference group of the socially ambitious is said to consist of people of higher strata whose status symbols are i m i t a t e d . M e r t o n and K i t t interpret the expressions of willingness and felt readiness for c o m bat on the part of i n e x p e r i e n c e d troops, as opposed to the h u m i l i t y of battle-hardened veterans, as the efforts of newcomers to identify themselves w i t h veterans to w h o m they had mistakenly i m p u t e d certain values. Thus, the concept is used to point to an association of h u m a n beings a m o n g w h o m one seeks to gain, maintain, or enhance his status; a reference group is that group in w h i c h one desires to participate.
2

In a t h i r d usage the concept signifies that group whose perspective constitutes the frame of reference of the actor. Thus, Sherif speaks of reference groups as groups whose norms are used as anchoring points in structuring the p e r c e p t u a l field, and M e r t o n a n d K i t t speak of a "social frame of r e f e r e n c e " for interpretations. T h r o u g h direct or vicarious participation in a group one comes to perceive the w o r l d f r o m its standpoint. Y e t this group n e e d not be one in w h i c h he aspires for acceptance; a m e m b e r of some m i n o r i t y group may despise it but still see the w o r l d largely through its eyes. W h e n used in this m a n n e r , the concept of reference group points m o r e to a psychological p h e n o m e n o n than to an objectively existing group of m e n ; it refers to an organization of the actor's experience. That is to say, it is a structuring of his perceptual field. In this usage a reference group becomes any collectivity, real or i m a g i n e d , e n v i e d or despised, whose perspective is assumed by the actor.
3 4

H . H . H y m a n , " T h e P s y c h o l o g y o f S t a t u s , " Archives o f Psychology, X X X V I I (1942), 15: R . K . M e r t o n a n d A . K i t t , " C o n t r i b u tions t o t h e T h e o r y o f R e f e r e n c e G r o u p B e h a v i o r , " i n R . K . Merton and Method 1350), A :f 38. of pp. P. F. L a z a r s f e l d (eds.), D. W. Studies in 111.: the Scope and Free Press, Volkmann, (1939), 225-

Thus, an examination of current usage discloses three distinct referents for a single concept: (1) groups w h i c h serve as comparison points; (2)
2

Op. cit, p p . 7 5 - 7 6 . M . Sherif, " T h e C o n c e p t o f R e f e r e n c e G r o u p s i n H u m a n RelaSherif and M. O. W i l s o n (eds.), Group Relations 1953), p p . 2 0 3 H a r p e r & Bros.,

"The

American 69;

Soldier" ( G l e n c o e , of the Level

42-53, and

C h a p m a n and J. XXXIV

tions," in M. 31.
4

Social Abnormal

Determinant Social

o f A s p i r a t i o n , " Journal

at the Crossroads ( N e w Y o r k : Op. cit, p p . 4 9 - 5 0 .

Psychology,


groups to w h i c h m e n aspire; a n d (3) groups whose perspectives are assumed by the actor. A l t h o u g h these terms may be related, treating together what should be clearly delineated as generically different can lead only to f u r t h e r confusion. It is the contention of this paper that the restriction of the concept of reference group to the t h i r d alternativethat group whose perspective consti tutes the frame of reference of the a c t o r w i l l increase its usefulness in research. A n y group or object m a y be used for comparisons, and one n e e d not assume the role of those w i t h w h o m he c o m pares his fate; hence, the first usage serves a quite different purpose and m a y be e l i m i n a t e d f r o m further consideration. U n d e r some circumstances, h o w e v e r , group loyalties a n d aspirations are re l a t e d to perspectives assumed, a n d the character of this relationship calls for further exploration. S u c h a discussion necessitates a restatement of the familiar, but, in v i e w of the difficulties in some of the w o r k on reference groups, r e p e t i t i o n m a y not be entirely out of order. In spite of the enthu siasm of some proponents there is actually noth i n g n e w i n reference-group theory.

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zation of p e r c e p t u a l experience depends in part u p o n what is anticipated a n d what is taken for granted. Judgments rest u p o n perspectives, and people w i t h different outlooks define i d e n t i c a l sit uations differently, responding selectively to the e n v i r o n m e n t . Thus, a prostitute a n d a social w o r k e r w a l k i n g t h r o u g h a s l u m area notice differ ent things; a sociologist should p e r c e i v e relation ships that others fail to observe. A n y change of perspectivesbecoming a parent for the first time, l e a r n i n g that one w i l l die in a few months, or suffering the failure of w e l l - l a i d plansleads one to notice things previously o v e r l o o k e d and to see the familiar w o r l d in a different light. As Goethe c o n t e n d e d , history is continually r e w r i t ten, not so m u c h because of the discovery of n e w d o c u m e n t a r y evidence, but because the c h a n g i n g perspectives of historians lead to n e w selections f r o m the data. C u l t u r e , as the concept is used by R e d f i e l d , refers to a perspective that is shared by those in a particular group; it consists of those " c o n v e n tional understandings, manifest in act a n d artifact, that characterize societies." Since these conven tional understandings are the premises of action, those w h o share a c o m m o n culture engage in c o m m o n modes of action. C u l t u r e is not a static entity but a c o n t i n u i n g process; norms are cre atively reaffirmed f r o m day to day in social inter action. Those t a k i n g part in collective transactions approach one another w i t h set expectations, a n d the realization of what is anticipated successively confirms a n d reinforces their perspectives. In this way, people i n each c u l t u r a l group are c o n t i n u ously s u p p o r t i n g one another's perspectives, each by r e s p o n d i n g to the others in expected ways. In this sense culture is a p r o d u c t of c o m munication.
5

CULTURE A N D PERSONAL CONTROLS Thomas p o i n t e d out m a n y years ago that w h a t a m a n does depends largely u p o n his defini t i o n of the situation. O n e m a y a d d that the m a n n e r in w h i c h one consistently defines a succession of situations depends u p o n his o r g a n i z e d perspec tive. A perspective is an o r d e r e d v i e w of one's w o r l d w h a t is taken for granted about the attrib utes of various objects, events, a n d h u m a n nature. It is an order of things r e m e m b e r e d a n d expected as w e l l as things actually p e r c e i v e d , an o r g a n i z e d c o n c e p t i o n of what is plausible and w h a t is possi ble; it constitutes the matrix t h r o u g h w h i c h one perceives his e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e fact that m e n have such o r d e r e d perspectives enables t h e m to conceive of their ever c h a n g i n g w o r l d as rela t i v e l y stable, orderly, a n d predictable. As R i e z l e r puts it, one's perspective is an outline scheme w h i c h , r u n n i n g ahead of experience, defines a n d guides it. T h e r e is abundant e x p e r i m e n t a l evidence to show that p e r c e p t i o n is selective; that the organi

In his discussion of endopsychic social c o n t r o l M e a d spoke of m e n " t a k i n g the role of the gener a l i z e d o t h e r , " m e a n i n g by that that each person approaches his w o r l d f r o m the standpoint of the culture of his group. E a c h perceives, thinks, forms

B.

Redfield,

The Folk

Culture of Yucatan ( C h i c a g o :

University Writings ed.

o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1941), p . 132. F o r a m o r e e x p l i c i t p r e s e n t a t i o n of a b e h a v i o r i s t i c t h e o r y of c u l t u r e see of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture The Selected and Personality,

D . G . M a n d e l b a u m (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1949), p p . 1 0 4 - 9 , 3 0 8 - 3 1 , 5 4 4 - 5 9 .

Ill
-dgments, and controls himself a c c o r d i n g to the rrame of reference of the group in w h i c h he is articipating. Since he defines objects, other peo: .e, the w o r l d , and himself f r o m the perspective p a t he shares w i t h others, he can visualize his r reposed line of action f r o m this g e n e r a l i z e d rrmdpoint, anticipate the reactions of others, i n -_rbit undesirable impulses, and thus guide his con duct. T h e socialized person is a society in m i n i a mre; he sets the same standards of conduct for fcmself as he sets for others, and he judges himself the same terms. He can define situations p r o p erly and meet his obligations, e v e n in the absence :f other people, because, as already noted, his rerspective always takes into account the expec-dons of others. Thus, it is the ability to define rmations f r o m the same standpoint as others riiat makes personal controls possible. W h e n -read spoke of assuming the role of the generh_rzed other, he was not r e f e r r i n g to people but rr perspectives shared w i t h others in a transac6

familiar theory, m a d e necessary by the special characteristics of m o d e r n mass societies. F i r s t of all, in m o d e r n societies special problems arise f r o m the fact that m e n sometimes use the stand ards of groups in w h i c h they are not r e c o g n i z e d members, sometimes of groups in w h i c h they have never participated directly, a n d sometimes of groups that do not exist at all. Second, in our mass society, characterized as it is by c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m , each person internalizes several per spectives, and this occasionally gives rise to embarrassing dilemmas w h i c h call for systematic study. F i n a l l y , the d e v e l o p m e n t of referencegroup theory has b e e n facilitated by the i n creasing interest in social psychology a n d the subjective aspects of group life, a shift f r o m a pre dominant c o n c e r n w i t h objective social structures to an interest in the experiences of the p a r t i c i pants whose r e g u l a r i z e d activities m a k e such structures discernible. A reference group, then, is that group whose outlook is used by the actor as the frame of refer ence in the organization of his p e r c e p t u a l field. A l l kinds o f groupings, w i t h great variations i n size, composition, a n d structure, m a y b e c o m e ref erence groups. Of greatest importance for most people are those groups in w h i c h they participate d i r e c t l y w h a t have b e e n called m e m b e r s h i p groupsespecially those containing a n u m b e r of persons w i t h w h o m one stands in a p r i m a r y rela tionship. B u t in some transactions one m a y as sume the perspective attributed to some social categorya social class, an ethnic group, those in a g i v e n c o m m u n i t y , or those c o n c e r n e d w i t h some special interest. On the other h a n d , refer ence groups m a y be imaginary, as in the case of artists w h o are " b o r n ahead of their t i m e s , " scien tists w h o w o r k for " h u m a n i t y , " or philanthropists w h o give for " p o s t e r i t y . " Such persons estimate their endeavors f r o m a postulated perspective i m p u t e d to people w h o have not yet b e e n b o r n . T h e r e are others w h o live for a distant past, i d e a l i z i n g some p e r i o d i n history a n d l o n g i n g for " t h e good o l d days," c r i t i c i z i n g c u r r e n t events f r o m a standpoint i m p u t e d to people l o n g since dead. Reference groups, t h e n , arise through the inter nalization of norms; they constitute the structure of expectations i m p u t e d to some audience for w h o m one organizes his conduct.

T h e consistency in the behavior of a m a n in I vide variety of social contexts is to be accounted rr, then, in terms of his o r g a n i z e d perspective. Dnce one has incorporated a particular outlook r am his group, it becomes his orientation t o w a r d rrne w o r l d , and he brings this frame of reference Id bear on all n e w situations. Thus, immigrants i n d tourists often misinterpret the strange things mey see, a n d a d i s c i p l i n e d C o m m u n i s t w o u l d dei n e each situation differently f r o m the n o n - C o m rri'jnist. A l t h o u g h reference-group behavior is rrenerally studied in situations w h e r e choices :eem possible, the actor h i m s e l f is often unaware rrrat there are alternatives. T h e proposition that m e n think, feel, and see rrrings f r o m a standpoint peculiar to the group w h i c h they participate is an o l d one, repeatedly r-mphasized by students of anthropology and of be sociology of k n o w l e d g e . W h y , then, the sudr.en c o n c e r n w i t h reference-group theory d u r i n g rrre past decade? T h e concept of reference group r.rraally introduces a m i n o r refinement in the l o n g
! G. H. M e a d , " T h e Genesis of the Self and Social C o n t r o l , " '-.iernational !:nd, Journal of Ethics, XXXV (1925), 251-77, and Press, Self and Society ( C h i c a g o : University of C h i c a g o

. 34), p p . 1 5 2 - 6 4 . C f . T . P a r s o n s , " T h e S u p e r e g o a n d t h e T h e : - o f S o c i a l S y s t e m s , " Psychiatry, X V (1952), 1 5 - 2 5 .

112 T H E CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL WORLDS As D e w e y emphasized, society exists in and through c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; c o m m o n perspectives c o m m o n culturesemerge through participation in c o m m o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n channels. It is through social participation that the perspectives shared in a group are internalized. Despite the frequent recitation of this proposition, its full i m plications, especially for the analysis of mass societies, are not often appreciated. Variations in outlook arise through differential contact and association; the maintenance of social distance through segregation, conflict, or simply the readi n g of different literatureleads to the formation of distinct cultures. Thus, people in different social classes develop different modes of life and outlook, not because of anything inherent in econ o m i c position, but because similarity of occupation and limitations set by i n c o m e l e v e l dispose t h e m to certain restricted c o m m u n i c a t i o n channels. Those in different ethnic groups f o r m their o w n distinctive cultures because their identifications incline them to interact intimately w i t h each other and to maintain reserve before outsiders. Different intellectual traditions w i t h i n social psychologypsychoanalysis, scale analysis, Gesialt, p r a g m a t i s m w i l l r e m a i n separated as long as those in each tradition restrict their sympathetic attention to works of their o w n school a n d v i e w others w i t h contempt or hostility. Some social scientists are out of touch w i t h the masses of the A m e r i c a n people because they eschew the mass m e d i a , especially television, or expose themselves only condescendingly. E v e n the outlook that the avant-garde regards as " c o s m o p o l i t a n " is cultureb o u n d , for it also is a product of participation i n restricted c o m m u n i c a t i o n channelsbooks, magazines, meetings, exhibits, and taverns w h i c h are out of bounds for most people in the m i d dle classes. Social participation may even be vicarious, as it is in the case of a medievalist w h o acquires his perspective solely through books. E v e n casual observation reveals the amazing variety of standards by w h i c h A m e r i c a n s live. T h e inconsistencies and contradictions w h i c h charac-

P A R T II

Society

terize m o d e r n mass societies are products of the m u l t i t u d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n channels a n d the ease of participation in t h e m . Studying relatively isolated societies, anthropologists can speak meaningfully of " c u l t u r e areas" in geographical terms; in such societies c o m m o n cultures have a territor i a l base, for only those who live together can interact. In m o d e r n industrial societies, however, because of the d e v e l o p m e n t of r a p i d transportation and the m e d i a of mass c o m m u n i c a t i o n , people w h o are geographically dispersed can c o m m u n i c a t e effectively. C u l t u r e areas are coterminous w i t h c o m m u n i c a t i o n channels; since comm u n i c a t i o n networks are no longer coterminous w i t h territorial boundaries, culture areas overlap and have lost their territorial bases. Thus, nextdoor neighbors may be complete strangers; e v e n in c o m m o n parlance there is an intuitive recognition of the diversity of perspectives, and we speak meaningfully of people l i v i n g in different social worldsthe academic w o r l d , the w o r l d of child r e n , the w o r l d of fashion. M o d e r n mass societies, indeed, are made up of a b e w i l d e r i n g variety of social worlds. E a c h is an organized outlook, built up by people in their interaction w i t h one another; hence, each c o m m u n i c a t i o n channel gives rise to a separate w o r l d . Probably the greatest sense of identification a n d solidarity is to be found in the various c o m m u n a l structuresthe u n d e r w o r l d , ethnic minorities, the social elite. Such communities are frequently spatially segregated, w h i c h isolates t h e m further f r o m the outer w o r l d , w h i l e the " g r a p e v i n e " and foreign-language presses provide i n t e r n a l contacts. A n o t h e r c o m m o n type of social w o r l d consists of the associational structuresthe w o r l d of m e d i c i n e , of organized labor, of the theater, of cafe society. These are h e l d together not only by various voluntary associations w i t h i n each locality but also by periodicals like Variety, specialized journals, and feature sections in newspapers. F i n a l l y , there are the loosely connected universes of special interestthe w o r l d of sports, of the stamp collector, of the daytime serialserviced by mass m e d i a programs a n d magazines l i k e Field and Stream, E a c h of these worlds is a u n i t y of order, a universe of regulari z e d m u t u a l response. E a c h is an area in w h i c h

Shibutani there is some structure w h i c h permits reasonable anticipation of the behavior of others, hence, an area in w h i c h one may act w i t h a sense of security and confidence. E a c h social w o r l d , then, is a c u l ture area, the boundaries of w h i c h are set neither by territory nor by f o r m a l group m e m b e r s h i p but by the limits of effective c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Since there is a variety of c o m m u n i c a t i o n channels, differing in stability a n d extent, social 'vorlds differ in composition, size, a n d the territo rial distribution of the participants. Some, like local cults, are small and concentrated; others, like the intellectual w o r l d , are vast a n d the partic ipants dispersed. W o r l d s differ in the extent and clarity of their boundaries; each is confined by come k i n d of h o r i z o n , but this m a y be w i d e or narrow, clear or vague. T h e fact that social worlds are not coterminous w i t h the universe of m e n recognized; those in the u n d e r w o r l d are w e l l aware of the fact that outsiders do not share their values W o r l d s differ in exclusiveness a n d in the extent to w h i c h they d e m a n d the loyalty of their participants. Most i m p o r t a n t of all, social worlds are not static entities; shared perspectives are continually being reconstituted. W o r l d s come mto existence w i t h the establishment of c o m m u nication channels; w h e n life conditions change, social relationships m a y also change, a n d these vorlds may disappear.
7

113
f r o m w h o m b a d manners may be expected. A social w o r l d , then, is an order conceived w h i c h serves as the stage on w h i c h each participant seeks to carve out his career and to m a i n t a i n a n d enhance his status. O n e of the characteristics of life in m o d e r n mass societies is simultaneous participation in a variety of social worlds. Because of the ease w i t h w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l m a y expose himself to a n u m b e r of c o m m u n i c a t i o n channels, he m a y lead a segmentalized life, participating successively in a n u m b e r of u n r e l a t e d activities. F u r t h e r m o r e , the particular c o m b i n a t i o n of social worlds differs f r o m person to person; this is what l e d S i m m e l to declare that each stands at the point at w h i c h a u n i q u e c o m b i n a t i o n of social circles intersects. T h e geometric analogy is a happy one, for it en ables us to conceive the numerous possibilities of combinations and the different degrees of par ticipation in each circle. To understand what a m a n does, we must get at his u n i q u e perspec t i v e w h a t he takes for granted and h o w he de fines the situationbut in mass societies we must learn i n a d d i t i o n the social w o r l d i n w h i c h h e i s participating in a g i v e n act.

LOYALTY A N D SELECTIVE RESPONSIVENESS In a mass society w h e r e each person i n t e r n a l izes numerous perspectives there are b o u n d to be some incongruities a n d conflicts. T h e overlap p i n g of group affiliation and participation, h o w ever, n e e d not lead to difficulties a n d is usually u n n o t i c e d . T h e reference groups of most persons are m u t u a l l y sustaining. Thus, the soldier w h o v o l unteers for hazardous duty on the battlefield may p r o v o k e anxiety in his family but is not acting contrary to their values; both his family a n d his comrades admire courage a n d disdain cowardice. Behavior may be inconsistent, as in the case of the p r o v e r b i a l office tyrant w h o is m e e k before his wife, but it is not noticed if the transactions occur in dissociated contexts. Most people l i v e more or less c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d lives, shifting f r o m one social w o r l d to another as they p a r t i c i pate in a succession of transactions. In each w o r l d

E v e r y social w o r l d has some k i n d of c o m m u nication systemoften n o t h i n g m o r e than differ ential associationin w h i c h there develops a spe cial universe of discourse, sometimes an argot. Special meanings and symbols further accentuate differences a n d increase social distance f r o m outiders. In each w o r l d there are special norms of onduct, a set of values, a special prestige ladder, characteristic career lines, and a c o m m o n outlook coward l i f e a Weltanschauung. In the case of elites there may e v e n arise a code of honor w h i c h nolds only for those w h o belong, w h i l e others are dismissed as beings somewhat less than h u m a n

I .

Cf.

Riezler,

Man:

Mutable

and

Immutable Philosophy

(Chicago: and

Henry

? f g n e r y C o . , 1950), p p . 6 2 - 7 2 ; L . L a n d g r e b e , " T h e W o r l d a s Phenomenological Essay in Social Problem," Psychology," Phenomenologof Sociology, Research, I (1940), 3 8 - 5 8 ; a n d A . S c h u e t z , " T h e S t r a n g e r : | American Journal O J X (1944), 4 9 9 - 5 0 7 .

114 their roles are different, their relations to other participants are different, a n d they r e v e a l a different facet of their personalities. M e n have b e c o m e
sc aceustcm&d to this mode of Hie that they

P A R T II

Socieb

manage to conceive of themselves as reasonably consistent h u m a n beings in spite of this segmentalization and are generally not aware of the fact that their acts do not fit into a coherent pattern. People become acutely aware of the existence of different outlooks only w h e n they are successively caught i n situations i n w h i c h conflicting demands are m a d e u p o n t h e m , all of w h i c h cannot possibly be satisfied. W h i l e m e n generally a v o i d m a k i n g difficult decisions, these dilemmas a n d contradictions of status m a y force a choice b e t w e e n two social worlds. These conflicts are essentially alternative ways of defining the same situation, arising f r o m several possible perspectives. In the words of W i l l i a m James, " A s a m a n I p i t y y o u , but as an official I must show y o u no m e r c y ; as a politician I r e g a r d h i m as an ally, but as a moralist I loathe h i m . " In p l a y i n g roles in different social worlds, one imputes different expectations to others whose differences cannot always be c o m p r o m i s e d . T h e p r o b l e m is that of selecting the perspective for defining the situation. I n Mead's terminology, w h i c h generalized other's role is to be taken? It is only in situations w h e r e alternative definitions are possible that problems of loyalty arise. G e n e r a l l y such conflicts are e p h e m e r a l ; in c r i t i c a l situations contradictions otherwise unnot i c e d are brought into the o p e n , a n d p a i n f u l choices are forced. In poorly integrated societies, h o w e v e r , some people find themselves c o n t i n u ally beset w i t h such conflicts. T h e N e g r o i n tellectual, c h i l d r e n of m i x e d marriages or of i m m i g r a n t s , the f o r e m a n in a factory, the professional w o m a n , the m i l i t a r y c h a p l a i n a l l l i v e in the interstices of w e l l - o r g a n i z e d structures a n d are m a r g i n a l m e n . In most instances they manage to m a k e their w a y t h r o u g h their c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d lives, although personal m a l 8
8

adjustments are apparently frequent. In extreme cases amnesia a n d dissociation of personality can occur. M u c h or" the interest in reference groups arises out of c o n c e r n w i t h situations in w h i c h a person is c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the necessity of choosi n g b e t w e e n two or m o r e o r g a n i z e d perspectives. T h e hypothesis has b e e n advanced that the choice of reference groupsconformity to the n o r m s of the group whose perspective is assumedis a f u n c t i o n of one's interpersonal relations; to what extent the culture of a group serves as the matrix for the organization of perceptual experience depends u p o n one's relationship a n d personal loyalty to others w h o share that outlook. Thus, w h e n personal relations to others in the group deteriorate, as sometimes happens in a m i l i t a r y u n i t after c o n t i n u e d defeat, the norms become less b i n d i n g , a n d the u n i t m a y disintegrate i n panic. Similarly, w i t h the transformation of personal relationships b e t w e e n parent a n d c h i l d in late adolescence, the desires a n d standards of the parents often become less obligatory. It has b e e n suggested further that choice of reference groups rests u p o n personal loyalty to significant others of that social w o r l d . "Significant others," for S u l l i v a n , are those persons directly responsible for the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of norms. Socialization is a p r o d u c t of a gradual accumulation of experiences w i t h certain people, particularly those w i t h w h o m w e stand i n p r i m a r y relations, and significant others are those w h o are actually i n v o l v e d in the c u l t i v a t i o n of abilities, values, and outlook. C r u c i a l , apparently, is the character of one's emotional ties w i t h t h e m . Those w h o think the significant others have treated t h e m w i t h affection a n d consideration have a sense of personal obligation that is b i n d i n g u n d e r all circumstances, and they w i l l be loyal e v e n at great personal sacrifice. Since p r i m a r y relations are not necessarily satisfactory, h o w e v e r , the reactions may be negative. A person w h o is w e l l aware of the expectations of significant others may go out of his way to reject t h e m . This m a y account for the bifurcat i o n o f orientation i n m i n o r i t y groups, w h e r e
9

C f . E . C . H u g h e s , " D i l e m m a s a n d Contradictions o f Status," of Sociology, Marginal Man L (1945), 353-59, and E. V.

9

American Journal Stonequist, Sons,1937). The

(New

York:

Charles

Scribner's

H.

S.

Sullivan,

Conceptions of Modern

Psychiatry ( W a s h i n g t o n ,

D . C . : W . H . W h i t e P s y c h i a t r i c F o u n d a t i o n , 1947), p p . 1 8 - 2 2 .

Shibutani some r e m a i n loyal to the parental culture w h i l e others seek desperately to b e c o m e assimilated in the larger w o r l d . Some w h o w i t h d r a w f r o m the uncertainties of real life m a y establish loyalties :o perspectives a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h vicarious rela tionships w i t h characters e n c o u n t e r e d i n b o o k s . Perspectives are continually subjected to the test of reality. A l l p e r c e p t i o n is hypothetical. Be cause of what is taken for granted f r o m each standpoint, each situation is approached w i t h a set of expectations; if transactions actually take place as anticipated, the perspective itself is r e i n forced. It is thus the c o n f i r m i n g responses of other people that p r o v i d e support for p e r s p e c t i v e s . 3ut in mass societies the responses of others v a r y , and in the study of reference groups the p r o b l e m that of ascertaining whose c o n f i r m i n g responses w i l l sustain a g i v e n point of v i e w .
10 11

115
analysis requires a study of these transformational processes themselves. H e r e the concept of refer ence group c a n be of c r u c i a l importance. F o r ex a m p l e , all forms of social mobility, f r o m sudden conversions to gradual assimilation, m a y be re garded essentially as displacements of reference groups, for they i n v o l v e a loss of responsiveness to the demands of one social w o r l d and the adop tion of the perspective of another. It m a y be hy pothesized that the disaffection occurs first on the l e v e l of personal relations, followed by a w e a k e n i n g sense of obligation, a rejection of o l d claims, and the establishment of n e w loyalties a n d incor poration of a n e w perspective. T h e conflicts that characterize all persons in m a r g i n a l roles are of special interest in that they p r o v i d e opportunities for cross-sectional analyses of the processes of so cial change. In the analysis of the behavior of m e n in mass societies the c r u c i a l p r o b l e m is that of ascertain i n g h o w a person defines the situation, w h i c h perspective he uses in a r r i v i n g at such a defini tion, a n d w h o constitutes the audience whose re sponses p r o v i d e the necessary confirmation a n d support for his position. This calls for focusing attention u p o n the expectations the actor imputes to others, the c o m m u n i c a t i o n channels in w h i c h he participates, a n d his relations w i t h those w i t h w h o m he identifies himself. In the study of con flict, i m a g e r y provides a fertile source of data. A t moments o f indecision, w h e n i n doubt and confusion, w h o appears in imagery? In this m a n ner the significant other can be identified. An adequate analysis of m o d e r n mass socie ties requires the d e v e l o p m e n t of concepts and operations for the description of the m a n n e r in w h i c h each actor's orientation toward his w o r l d is successively reconstituted. Since p e r c e p t i o n is selective a n d perspectives differ, different items are n o t i c e d a n d progressively diverse set of i m ages arises, e v e n a m o n g those exposed to the same m e d i a of mass c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e concept of reference group summarizes differential associa tions a n d loyalties a n d thus facilitates the study of selective p e r c e p t i o n . It becomes, therefore, an indispensable tool for c o m p r e h e n d i n g the d i v e r sity a n d d y n a m i c character of the k i n d of society i n w h i c h w e live.

T H E STUDY OF MASS SOCIETIES Because of the differentiated character of m o d e r n mass societies, the concept of reference group, or some suitable substitute, w i l l always have a central place in any realistic conceptual scheme for its analysis. As is p o i n t e d out above, it w i l l be most useful if it is used to designate that group whose perspective is assumed by the actor as the frame of reference for the organiza tion of his perceptual experience. O r g a n i z e d per spectives arise in and become shared t h r o u g h par ticipation i n c o m m o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n channels, and the diversity of mass societies arises f r o m the multiplicity of channels a n d the ease w i t h w h i c h une m a y participate in t h e m . Mass societies are not only diversified a n d pluralistic but also continually changing. T h e suctessive modification of life-conditions compels changes in social relationships, and any adequate
:

Cf.

R.

R.

Grinker

a n d J.

P.

Spiegel,

Men

under

Stress

P h i l a d e l p h i a : B l a k i s t o n C o . , 1945), p p . 1 2 2 - 2 6 ; a n d E . A . S h i l s ir.d M . Janowitz, " C o h e s i o n and Disintegration i n the W e h r n a c h t in W o r l d W a r II," 150-315.

;

Public Opinion

Quarterly, X I I (1948), Univer

sity

Cf.

G.

H.

Mead,

The Philosophy of the Act ( C h i c a g o :

o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1938), p p . 1 0 7 - 7 3 ; a n d L . P o s t m a n , " T o (eds.), Social Psychology at the Crossroads (New York:

-ard a General Theory of Cognition," in J. H. Rohrer and M. 5herif :--arper & B r o s . , 1951), p p . 2 4 2 - 7 2 .

Hans Gerth & . Wright Mills

12

Institutions and Persons

If we shift our v i e w f r o m the external behav ior of i n d i v i d u a l organisms and f r o m explanations of such behavior in terms of physiological ele ments and mechanisms, a n d v i e w m a n as a person w h o acts w i t h and against other persons, we m a y t h e n (1) examine the patterns of conduct w h i c h m e n enact together, and (2) avail ourselves of the direct experiences w h i c h persons have of one an other a n d of themselves. At its m i n i m u m , social conduct consists of the actions of one person o r i e n t e d to another, and most of the actions of m e n are of this sort. Man's action is interpersonal. It is often i n f o r m e d by awareness of other actors and directly oriented to their expectations and to anticipations of their behavior. O u t of the metaphors of poets and philoso phers, who have l i k e n e d man's conduct to that of the stage actor, sociologists have fashioned ana lytical tools. Long-used phrases readily come to m i n d : " p l a y i n g a r o l e " in the "great theater of p u b l i c l i f e , " t o m o v e " i n the l i m e l i g h t , " the "thea ter of W a r , " the "stage is all set." M o r e techni cally, the concept " r o l e " refers to (1) units of con d u c t w h i c h by their recurrence stand out as regularities and (2) w h i c h are o r i e n t e d to the con duct of other actors. These r e c u r r e n t interactions f o r m patterns of mutually o r i e n t e d conduct. By definition, roles are interpersonal, that is, o r i e n t e d to the conduct a n d expectations of oth ers. These others, w h o expect things of us, are also p l a y i n g roles: we expect t h e m to do things
From Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social 1953 Institutionsby H a n s G e r t h a n d C . of the publishers. Wright Mills, copyright

b y H a r c o u r t B r a c e J o v a n o v i c h , Inc. R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n

in certain ways a n d to refrain f r o m d o i n g and feeling things in other ways. Interpersonal situa tions are thus built up and sets of roles h e l d in line by m u t u a l expectation, approbation, and disfavor. M u c h of our social conduct, as we k n o w f r o m direct experience, is enacted in order to meet the expectations of others. In this sense, our ene mies often control us as m u c h as our friends. The father of a patriarchal family is expected by his wife and c h i l d r e n to act in certain ways w h e n confronted w i t h g i v e n situations, and h e i n t u r n expects t h e m to act in certain regular ways. B e i n g acquainted w i t h these simple facts about patri archal families we expect regularities of conduct f r o m each of their members, and h a v i n g experi e n c e d family situations, we expect, w i t h some de gree of probability, that each of these members will experience his place and his self in a certain way. M a n as a person is an historical creation, and can most readily be understood in terms of the roles w h i c h he enacts and incorporates. These roles are l i m i t e d by the k i n d of social institutions i n w h i c h h e happens t o b e b o r n and i n w h i c h he matures into an adult. H i s m e m o r y , his sense of t i m e and space, his p e r c e p t i o n , his motives, his c o n c e p t i o n o f his self . . . his psychological functions are shaped a n d steered by the specific configuration of roles w h i c h he incorporates f r o m his society. Perhaps the most important of these features of m a n is his image of his self, his idea of what k i n d of person he is. This experience of self is a crucially interpersonal one. Its basic organization

Gerth, Mills is reflected f r o m s u r r o u n d i n g persons to whose approbation and criticism one pays attention. W h a t we think of ourselves is decisively influ enced by what others think of us. T h e i r attitudes of approval and of disapproval guide us in learn ing to play the roles we are assigned or w h i c h we assume. By i n t e r n a l i z i n g these attitudes of oth ers t o w a r d us and our conduct we not only gain new roles, but in time an image of our selves. Of course, man's "looking-glass self" m a y be a true or a distorted reflection of his actual self. Yet those f r o m w h o m a m a n continually seeks approval are important determinants of what k i n d of m a n he is b e c o m i n g . If a y o u n g lawyer begins to feel satisfaction f r o m the a p p r o v a l of the boss of the local political m a c h i n e , if the labels w h i c h this boss uses to describe his behavior mat ter a lot to the lawyer, he is b e i n g steered into new roles and into a n e w image of his self by the party machine and its boss. T h e i r values m a y i n t i m e become his o w n and h e w i l l apply t h e m not only to other m e n but to his o w n actions as w e l l . T h e self, H a r r y Stack Sullivan once said, is made up of the reflected appraisals of others.
1 2

117 i m p l i e d in the party role is not often possible in her family circle. In the family circle the party role might be amusing, as a c h a r m i n g attempt at sophistication " b e y o n d her age and experi ence," but at the party it might b r i n g prestige and e v e n the adulation of young males. She can not, usually, act out the self-conception of a longsuffering lover before her grandfather, but she can w h e n she is alone w i t h her y o u n g m a n . T h e chance to display emotional gestures, and even to feel t h e m , varies w i t h one's status and class position. F o r emotional gestures, ex pected by others and by one's self, form important features of m a n y social roles. T h e V i c t o r i a n lady could dramatize certain emotions in a way that today w o u l d be considered silly, if not hysterical. Yet the w o r k i n g g i r l who was her contemporary was not as likely to faint as was the lady; there w o u l d probably not have been anyone to catch the w o r k i n g g i r l . D u r i n g the nineties in A m e r i c a it was expected that w o m e n who were also ladies, that is, members of an upper status group, w o u l d faint upon very exciting occasions. T h e role of the delicate and fainting lady was i n v o l v e d in the v e r y b e i n g of a l a d y . But the " s a m e " occasions w o u l d not elicit fainting on the part of the ladies' m a i d , who d i d not conceive of her " p l a c e , " and of her self, as a fainting lady; fainting requires a certain amount of leisure and gentlemanly atten tion, and accordingly offers opportunities to the gentleman to demonstrate that chivalry is not dead. T h e roles a l l o w e d and expected, the self-im ages w h i c h they entail, and the consequences of these roles and images on the persons we are w i t h are firmly e m b e d d e d in a social context. Inner psychological changes and the institutional con trols of a society are thus i n t e r l i n k e d . An institution is an organization of roles, w h i c h means that the roles carry different degrees of authority, so that one of the roleswe m a y call it the " h e a d " roleis understood a n d ac c e p t e d by the m e m b e r s of the other roles as guar anteeing the relative permanence of the total conduct pattern. An institution is thus (1) an or ganization of roles, (2) one or m o r e of w h i c h is
3
3

T h e concept of role does not of course i m p l y a one person-one role equation. O n e person m a y play m a n y different roles, a n d each of these roles may be a segment of the different institutions and interpersonal situations in w h i c h the person moves. A corporation executive acts differently in his office than in his child's nursery. An adoles cent g i r l enacts a different role w h e n she is at a party composed of m e m b e r s of her o w n clique than w h e n she is at her family's breakfast table. Moreover, the luxury of a certain image of self
:

T h e m e c h a n i s m b y w h i c h persons thus i n t e r n a l i z e roles a n d w h i c h call forth similar responses

the a t t i t u d e s o f o t h e r s i s l a n g u a g e . L a n g u a g e i s c o m p o s e d o f gestures, n o r m a l l y v e r b a l , in two individuals. W i t h o u t such gestures m a n c o u l d not incor porate the attitudes of others, a n d c o u l d not so easily m a k e these a t t i t u d e s a c o n d i t i o n o f his o w n l e a r n i n g a n d e n a c t m e n t o f r o l e s o f his o w n i m a g e o f self. T h e s e conceptions will be discussed in greater detail in C h a p t e r s III: O r g a n i s m a n d P s y c h i c S t r u c t u r e a n d I V : T h e P e r son. H e r e w e a r e o n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h s e t t i n g f o r t h i n t h e m o s t general w a y the sociological m o d e l of explanation. reference
2

[Ed. Note:

is

to

chapters

in

Character and Social Structure^

" C o n c e p t i o n s o f M o d e r n P s y c h i a t r y , " Psychiatry, V o l . I l l , N o . Nature and Social the Social Order (rev. (New ed.; N e w York: Scrib1932).

1 ( F e b r u a r y 1949), p p . 1 0 - 1 1 . C o m p a r e also . H . C o o l e y ' s Human American ner's, 1922). T h e t r a d i t i o n i s w e l l d o c u m e n t e d b y F a y B . K a r p f , Psychology York: McGraw-Hill,

Cf.

Ralph Linton,

The Study of Man

(New York:

Appleton-

C e n t u r y , 1936).

118
understood to serve the m a i n t e n a n c e of the total set of roles. T h e " h e a d r o l e " o f a n institution i s v e r y i m portant in the psychic life of the other m e m b e r s of the institution. W h a t "the h e a d " thinks of t h e m in their respective roles, or w h a t they conceive h i m to t h i n k , is i n t e r n a l i z e d , that is, taken over, by t h e m . In a strictly patriarchal f a m i l y , the head, the father, is l o o k e d up to; his is the most i m p o r tant attitude t o w a r d the c h i l d that m a y d e t e r m i n e the child's attitude t o w a r d his, the child's, o w n conduct a n d perhaps t o w a r d his self: in taking over this attitude the c h i l d builds up an " o t h e r " w i t h i n his self, a n d the attitude he conceives this other to have t o w a r d h i m is a c o n d i t i o n for his attitude t o w a r d his o w n self. O t h e r persons in other roles also have attitudes t o w a r d h i m and each of these m a y be i n t e r n a l i z e d , a n d eventually f o r m segments of his self-conception. B u t the attitude of the head of the major institution in w h i c h we play a role is a decisive one in our o w n maturat i o n . If " h e says it is all r i g h t , " we feel secure in w h a t w e are d o i n g and h o w w e are c o n c e i v i n g our self. W h e n his attitudes are t a k e n over into the self, this head constitutes in a concrete f o r m , a " p a r t i c u l a r o t h e r . " B u t he is not seen m e r e l y as a particular person; he is the s y m b o l and the " m o u t h p i e c e " o f the entire institution. I n h i m is focused the " f i n a l " attitudes t o w a r d our major roles a n d our self w i t h i n this institution; he sums t h e m u p , a n d w h e n w e take over these attitudes a n d expectations we c o n t r o l our institutional c o n d u c t in terms of t h e m . It is by means of such i n t e r n a l i z e d others that our conduct, our p l a y i n g of roles w i t h i n institutions, is "self-controlled." By choosing the social role as a major concept we are able to reconstruct the i n n e r experience of the person as w e l l as the institutions w h i c h

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m a k e u p a n historical social structure. F o r m a n as a person (from the L a t i n persona, m e a n i n g "mask") is composed of the specific roles w h i c h he enacts a n d of the effects of enacting these roles u p o n his self. A n d society as a social structure is composed of roles as segments variously comb i n e d in its total circle of institutions. T h e organiz a t i o n of roles is i m p o r t a n t in b u i l d i n g up a particular social structure; it also has psychological implications for the persons w h o act out the social structure. M o s t of the various interpersonal situations i n w h i c h w e are i n v o l v e d exist w i t h i n institutions, w h i c h m a k e up a social structure; a n d changes of social structure m a k e up the m a i n course of h u m a n history. In o r d e r to understand men's conduct and experience we must reconstruct the historical social structures in w h i c h they play roles a n d acquire selves. F o r such regularity of conduct, and of the motives for this conduct, as we may find w i l l rest u p o n the historical regularities of these social structures, rather than u p o n any suprahistorical, biological elements assumed to be innate a n d constant w i t h i n the organism. F r o m the sociological p o i n t of v i e w , m a n as a person is a social-historical creation. If his v i e w of his self and of his motives is intimately connected w i t h the roles w h i c h are available to h i m and w h i c h he incorporates, t h e n we m a y not expect to l e a r n m u c h that is v e r y concrete about i n d i v i d u a l m e n unless we investigate a n u m b e r of his specific roles in a n u m b e r of v a r i e d social-historical settings. Rather t h a n constant elements w i t h i n a p h y siological organism, the sociologist rests his p r i m a r y m o d e l of explanation u p o n the interpersonal situations, a n d in the last analysis, the social structures w i t h i n w h i c h persons live out their lives.

Barbara Laslett & C a r o l A. B. Warren

^ ^ 1.0

Losing Weight: The Organizational Promotion of Behavior Change

Fatness, or as it is more politely called in our society "obesity," is b o t h a m e d i c a l a n d a social p r o b l e m , since in our society the fat are stigmatized. H o w e v e r , unlike other forms of deviant behavior such as check forgery a n d shoplifting, obesity is not against the law. Reaction to this deviant status a n d behavior cannot, therefore, be channeled through the c r i m i n a l justice system as a means of control.
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O n e purpose of this analysis is to explore the sociological dimensions of obesity as a type of deviance by a p p l y i n g the concept of stigma, as developed by Goffman (1963), to the strategies used by one voluntary weight loss o r g a n i z a t i o n to tombat obesity. In this organization, efforts to thange the behavior of fat people so that they v o u l d become t h i n i n c l u d e d , as a central feature,
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Barbara Laslett a n d C a r o l A . B . W a r r e n , " L o s i n g Weight: T h e Organizational P r o m o t i o n of B e h a v i o r Change," Social Prob. ems 23:1 ( O c t o b e r 1975) p p . 6 9 - 8 0 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n . A n e a r l i e r v e r s i o n o f this p a p e r w a s r e a d a t t h e 1973 m e e t i n g s : : ' the P a c i f i c S o c i o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , S c o t t s d a l e , A r i z o n a . T h i s - r s e a r c h was s u p p o r t e d b y the Social S c i e n c e R e s e a r c h Institute, University of Southern California. U n d e r the m o r e technical rubric "obesity," two types of p r o b l e m are i n c l u d e d : overfat a n d o v e r w e i g h t . A person can be t e n d e r a n d overfat, a n d o v e r w e i g h t b u t not overfat. F o r example, a f o o t b a l l p l a y e r m a y w e i g h m o r e t h a n i d e a l f o r his h e i g h t , = s s p e c i f i e d b y l i f e i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y t a b l e s , b u t his b o d y m a y - : t h a v e a n y excess fat o v e r m u s c l e . A s l e n d e r , s e d e n t a r y p e r s o n m a y , i n c o n t r a s t , h a v e a n excess o f fat c e l l s i n h i s o r h e r b o d y i n d b e " o v e r f a t " b u t n o t o v e r w e i g h t . W e use the terms " f a t " md " o b e s e " i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y to refer to persons w h o are per: e i v e d a s too l a r g e b y s i g n i f i c a n t o t h e r s a n d w h o p e r c e i v e t h e m selves t h a t w a y a s w e l l . P e r m i s s i o n t o use t h e n a m e o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s t u d i e s w a s i e n i e d . T h e r e f o r e , w e r e f e r o n l y t o t h e " w e i g h t loss o r g a n i z a tion" i n the discussion.

the application of stigmatizing labels. T h e insights w h i c h this analysis provides w i l l t h e n be used to specify variation in the meanings, uses and consequences of a p p l y i n g stigmatizing labels. T h e use of stigma as a strategy for c h a n g i n g behavior f r o m deviant to n o r m a l presents a challenge to labeling theory in general, a n d in particular to L e m e r t ' s (1967) theory of secondary deviation w h i c h assumes that further deviance follows f r o m the application of stigmatizing labels. We w i l l argue that the social labeling i n v o l v e d in stigmatization m a y also be used to change behavior in the opposite d i r e c t i o n , i.e., t o w a r d n o r m a l c y . If this is true, t h e n w h e t h e r a stigmatizing label has a positive or negative effect on behavior w i l l d e p e n d on other features of the situation than the labeling process alone. T h e e m p i r i c a l example u p o n w h i c h this analysis is based presents some suggestions of what these features m a y be, a n d they w i l l be discussed in the c o n c l u d i n g section of the paper.

STIGMA A N D OBESITY Stigma, as G o f f m a n (1963 : 3) puts it, is " a n attribute that is deeply d i s c r e d i t i n g . " In L e m e r t ' s terms, it is a negative label. Goffman distinguishes three types of stigma: (1) p e r c e i v e d "blemishes of i n d i v i d u a l character," such as c r i m i n a l i t y , (2) the " t r i b a l stigma of race, nation and r e l i g i o n " a n d (3) "abominations of the bodyvarious physical deformities." Obesity is one type of " a b o m i n a -

120 t i o n of the b o d y " w h i c h is particularly affected by c u l t u r a l definitions. N o t o n l y do physiologically based definitions of obesity vary, but definitions of b e a u t y w h e r e obesity m a y or may not be disc r e d i t i n g a r e particularly liable to c u l t u r a l and historical v a r i a t i o n . In our society, although slimness is a general societal i d e a l , definitions of fat a n d s l i m v a r y according to social class, ethnicity, age a n d geographical area. Adolescents are m o r e i n c l i n e d to v i e w themselves as fat than are adults, females m o r e than males, a n d people of h i g h e r socio-economic status m o r e than l o w e r status ( D w y e r et al. 1970). Fatness can also affect socioeconomic opportunities: i n N e w Y o r k , the ext r e m e l y obese may go on welfare p e r m a n e n t l y since they are regarded as essentially u n e m p l o y able, a n d in one California city, teachers may not b e m o r e than 2 5 % o v e r w e i g h t .
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the popular a n d professional literature (Stuart and Davis, 1972; A l l o n , 1973). D w y e r et al. (1970) point out that " n o r m a l " persons (using the t e r m as G o f f m a n does, to contrast w i t h the stigmatized) stereotype fat persons as weak w i l l e d , ugly, awkw a r d a n d i m m o r a l a n d the fat themselves have negative self-images to m a t c h the stereotypes. Fat people i n c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n society, therefore, are the subject of the stigmatizing labels used by others a n d themselves.
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T H E LABELING PERSPECTIVE T h e l a b e l i n g perspective defines deviance a n d n o r m a l c y in terms of the reactions of social audiences. L e m e r t (1967:41) extends this perspective to the theory of secondary deviation. T h e essence of the theory of secondary deviation is contained in t w o propositions, one explicit a n d one i m p l i c i t : (1) F u r t h e r deviance is prom o t e d by audience l a b e l i n g of persons as deviant, and (2) the " f u r t h e r d e v i a n c e " p r o m o t e d by labeli n g is m a d e up of a deviant identity, deviant behavior, a n d a deviant way of life which vary together. T h i s study questions these propositions by s h o w i n g that the use of negative or stigmatizing labels, in this case the label "fat," can be used to promote the normalization of deviant behavior, i.e., to make fat people thin. A d d i t i o n a l l y , we question the logically assumed c o n n e c t i o n bet w e e n identity, behavior and way of life.
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G o f f m a n (1963:3-4) emphasizes that w h i l e stigma m i g h t be seen in terms of i n d i v i d u a l characteristics, "a language of relationships, not attributes is really n e e d e d . " T h e social m e a n i n g of obesity is d e r i v e d in interaction w i t h others, not f r o m the attribute alone. It is for this reason that Goffman's further distinction of discrediting features that are or are not visible to others is relevant to the study of obesity. F o r stigmatization to occur, the discrediting attribute must be k n o w n by the others w i t h w h o m interaction takes place. Some stigmatizing attributes, like c r i m i n a l i t y a n d homosexuality, are not i m m e d i a t e l y apparent. G o f f m a n (1963:4) refers to those persons whose stigma is invisible as discreditable. O t h e r attributes, such as obesity, p r o v i d e visible cues to stigma: their bearers are discredited. T h e obese cannot " p a s s " as t h i n ; they must either lose weight or r e m a i n stigmatized. Obesity as a source of stigma in c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n society has b e e n d o c u m e n t e d i n b o t h
3

METHODOLOGY T h e data w e r e collected in six months of systematic participant observation by the t w o authors in two different groups of the organization's w e e k l y meetings. W e observed three lecturers
5

T h e only c o u n t e r - t r e n d to the negative labeling of obesity is

I n classical H a w a i i a n c u l t u r e , f o r e x a m p l e , a m a n ' s w e a l t h ,

the d e v e l o p m e n t of a "fat p o w e r " m o v e m e n t to destigmatize t h e category " f a t p e r s o n s " r a t h e r t h a n t o d e s t i g m a t i z e fat p e r sons b y m a k i n g t h e m t h i n . (See A l l o n , 1973).
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a n d a woman's beauty, w e r e b o t h m e a s u r e d by the a m o u n t o f fat a c c u m u l a t e d . * O c c u p a t i o n a l health standards of s u c h large-scale e m p l o y e r s as the L o s A n g e l e s C i t y School system, a n d the L o s A n g e l e s C i t y a n d C o u n t y g o v e r n m e n t s i n c l u d e a s o n e c r i t e r i a for e m p l o y m e n t i n all j o b s , that t h e i n d i v i d u a l b e w i t h i n a r a n g e o f w e i g h t s p e c i f i e d a s n o r m a l f o r a g i v e n a g e , h e i g h t , a n d sex g r o u p , u s u a l l y a c c o r d i n g t o M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s u r a n c e C o m p a n y tab l e s . (See M e t r o p o l i t a n L i f e I n s u r a n c e C o . , N e w Y o r k : 1969.)

" S t i g m a " e n c o m p a s s e s t h e s a m e p h e n o m e n a a s " d e v i a n t , " ex-

c e p t t h a t (1) s t i g m a f o c u s e s m o r e c l e a r l y o n t h e a u d i e n c e r e a c tion than d e v i a n c e (and m o r e than the labeling theory of d e v i ance, which includes the definitionally illegitimate concept " s e c r e t d e v i a n c e " ) , a n d (2) s t i g m a e n c o m p a s s e s " b o d i l y a b o m i n a t i o n s " a n d " t r i b a l s t i g m a " w h e r e a s d e v i a n c e i s g e n e r a l l y restricted to "defects of character."

Laslett, Warren i n d several h u n d r e d m e m b e r s i n interaction. O n e :: the authors had b e e n a l o n g - t e r m m e m b e r of be organization (for over three years), a n d c o u l d rrovide additional i n f o r m a l data on m o r e than I other lecturers. T h e other author j o i n e d the : : g a n i z a t i o n for the purpose of the research. E a c h observer p a r t i c i p a t e d as a m e m b e r , a n d was only as a m e m b e r that access to the organization was p e r m i t t e d . Leaders of the w e i g h t loss : rganization itself suggested the tactic of b e c o m ing a m e m b e r w h e n a representative d e n i e d our request for permission to do overt research. T h e iuthors w e r e therefore in the unusual situation : F d o i n g secret research w i t h the i m p l i c i t permission of the institution i n v o l v e d . T h e lack of overt permission d i d present certain problems for data collection. E a c h observer attempted to take notes in the field on the content :f the w e e k l y meetings. D u r i n g one m e e t i n g , nowever, another m e m b e r (who, to our k n o w l edge, was not a researcher) was asked not to take down what the lecturer was saying, despite her : l a i m that she was just p r a c t i c i n g her shorthand. Note-taking therefore was covert. T h e themes, nowever, w e r e frequently reiterated in the lectures, facilitating accurate field notes. T h e focus of analysis was the organization's strategies for p r o m o t i n g behavior change, particularly the use of a stigmatized i d e n t i t y label as a way of p r o m o t i n g n o r m a l i z e d behavior a n d a normal w a y of life. U s i n g Glaser a n d Strauss' 1967) m o d e l for the generation of g r o u n d e d theory, the analytic categories w e r e generated d u r ing data collection a n d p r e l i m i n a r y analysis.

121 be erased by weight loss, although it can be shifted f r o m a visible stigma to an invisible o n e f r o m discrediting to discreditable. F o r the fat person w h o has become t h i n , weight loss is always p o t e n tially reversible a n d is an ever-dangerous i n v i s i b l e stigma w h i c h threatens the i n d i v i d u a l : Lecturer: / am a fat person who got thin. M e m b e r (250 lb. loser): I still think of myself as really heavy. At most, then, the fat person can expect a partial destigmatization: the destigmatization of behavior reflected in appearance, but not the destigmatization of i d e n t i t y . A c c o r d i n g to the weight loss organization, a change of i d e n t i t y f r o m fat to t h i n w o u l d r e m o v e one of the best safeguards the fat person has against future weight gains. T h e continual awareness of an essential fat identity, w h e t h e r visible (in pounds a n d fat) or invisible, acts as a w a r n i n g device against the type of eating behavior p r o m o t i n g the disc r e d i t e d fat state.
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Lecturer: One doctor at UCLA says that he wishes that the word "obese" would appear on fat people's foreheads when they become 5 % overweight, since that much body weight changes chemistry so you can't use the same drugs. Furthermore, fat can be concealed by clothes. It is those women with lovely faces and good dress sense who are worse off than anyone, because they can put it on and not even notice. A l t h o u g h i d e n t i t y cannot a n d should not be changed, eating behavior is amenable to change. T h e behavior change p r o m o t e d by the organization is a p e r m a n e n t change in the quality a n d quantity of the food consumed so that external slenderness can be m a i n t a i n e d for life. T h e threat of compulsive eating, h o w e v e r , is always present. Therefore c o m p u l s i v e eating behavior must be changed, either t o w a r d m o r e m o d e r a t i o n i n eati n g habits or t o w a r d less fattening objects: Lecturer: You will learn moderation here, too to have Y2 cup of ice cream and feel satisfied
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S T I G M A T I Z I N G I D E N T I T Y AS A STRATEGY FOR BEHAVIOR C H A N G E T h e major strategy used by the organization to p r o m o t e the desired behavior (adoption of a rigidly defined p r o g r a m of eating) is intensive stigmatization of the members as fat persons and the continued application of the label "fat" as an essential identity. M e m b e r s are t o l d that the world is d i c h o t o m i z e d into t w o types of people w i t h reference to food a n d weight: the fat, a n d the " c i v i l i a n s " (the slender). T h e stigmatized identity of the fat person is p e r m a n e n t . It cannot

F o r a general discussion of the p h e n o m e n o n of destigmatizasee W a r r e n , 1975.

tion,

122 with it. You will learn that 4 teaspoons of sour cream will be plenty on a baked potato and 1 teaspoon of cream cheese is enough on your bagel. Lecturer: / am still a compulsive eater, but now I eat lettuce compulsively. T h e fact that food must be consumed to live gives the weight loss organization a tactical probl e m i n p r o m o t i n g the desired behavior change u n l i k e the self-help organizations for smokers, d r u g addicts and alcoholics w h i c h f o r b i d the u n desirable behavior. Instead, an exactly opposite m e c h a n i s m is substitutedcontinuously focusing on food and stressing to the m e m b e r s that they must eat. M e m b e r s w h o do not eat breakfast or w h o have a skimpy l u n c h are l e c t u r e d to about the dangers of not eating enough. F o r fat people, b e i n g h u n g r y is a violation of their essential self. T h e y must be sure both to eat regularly so that they do not become h u n g r y , a n d to exercise constant vigilance over food. Lecturer: (to a member who complained about having to eat the weekly liver portion which is required): You must eat it. Everything you put in your mouth does not have to be a thrill of a lifetime. Lecturer: Set up a barrier between you and food. A barrier that thin people have automatically, but for you it must be a conscious matter. B e i n g hungry is a violation of the essential self, and carries w i t h it the danger to w h i c h fat people are always exposed: the " b a d , " uncont r o l l e d eating w h i c h may occur if the m e m b e r gets too hungry. T h e organization promotes the c o n c e p t i o n of food as a v i t a l force in a person's life. Meetings are characterized by this focus on food, w h i c h also contributes to r e i n f o r c i n g the individual's identity as fat, since fat people are seen as p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h eating. T h e organization encourages a change in behavior w h e r e one set of foodstuffs (thinning, good, "treats") are substituted for another (fattening, b a d , "monsters"). T h e r e is an emphasis on traditional recipes using " l e g a l " ingredients, like lobster n e w b u r g made w i t h b l e n d e d cauliflower for sauce, rather than completely different foods.

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M e m b e r s are f o r b i d d e n to use dietetic foods except for sugar-free soda and substitute sweeteners. So w h i l e stressing the significance of a total change in eating habits, the organization attempts to c h a r m the m e m b e r s by focusing on their favorite vice, food, as a central symbol and by promisi n g slenderness through this "totally n e w w a y " of using o l d recipes. T h e sin of gluttony can be satisfied through the back door. O n e of the organization's slogans is " y o u w i l l never be h u n g r y on our p r o g r a m . " T h e preoccupation w i t h food a n d eating, w h i c h comprises a large part of the program's rhetoric, of lecturers' materials, and i n f o r m a l interaction at the w e e k l y meetings, relates to this c o m m o n feature of fat people's essential identity. T h e w e i g h t loss organization's goal is to change the eating behavior of the obese. O n e of thenstrategies to achieve their e n d is to emphasize the identity of " b e i n g a fatty" and fat people's obsession w i t h food a n d eating. Negative labels, then, w h i c h reinforce the essential identity of the fat as fat, are used as a means of changing behavior from deviant to normal, thereby p r e s e n t i n g a challenge to the theory of secondary deviation, w h i c h w o u l d p r e d i c t an escalation of deviant behavior to follow f r o m the act of stigmatization.

LIFESTYLE C H A N G E " L i f e s t y l e " or " w a y of l i f e " are ill-defined terms, used by b o t h L e m e r t (1967) and the weight loss organization to describe the types of behavior change persons undergo that are related to but are not composed of the behavior under consideration. Persons losing weight are presented by the organization as u n d e r g o i n g not only behavior change related to eating but also to change in other personal attributes and the social life that accompanies b o t h eating and a size that is stigmat i z e d in our society. Lecturer: When I was fat, I could never balance my check book. My husband had to do it for me. But now I am more independent and more able to take care of myself. You have to be more independent and you can do it.

Laslett, Warren T h e organization reinforces the image that the lifestyle of fat people is f u l l of embarrassing and self-demeaning experiences. L e c t u r e r s tell of getting stuck in theatre seats and b e h i n d the wheel of a car, or r e q u i r i n g other people to push as one tries to p u l l oneself out of a pool. T h e y tell stories of not going places they really w a n t e d to go because of h a v i n g to sit in the back seat :f a small car and fearing they w o u l d not be able to get out of it, or not h a v i n g clothes that fit. They also emphasize that fat p e o p l e are self-de l u d i n g and make irrational excuses for themselves and their stigma: Member: / have to have cookies in the house in case my grandchildren come to visit. Lecturer: Member: California.) Where do your grandchildren live?

of r e t u r n i n g to " b a d " eating behavior is always possible. This l i f e l o n g c o m m i t m e n t is expressed linguistically i n the organization's e x t i n c t i o n be tween a "diet" and a "program." A " d i e t " is what fat people go on a n d off; it involves a t e m p o r a r y behavior change f o l l o w e d by relapse. A " p r o g r a m " is a changed lifestyle and pattern of eating lasting a Ufetime. A " d i e t " implies the illusory promise of the d e s t i g m a t i z i n g of the i n d i v i d u a l , the shedding of the fat self for a r e b o r n t h i n one. A " p r o g r a m " establishes the alternative i d e a l of a lifelong struggle to d i v o r c e eating behavior a n d way of life f r o m an i n e v i t a b l y fat identity. L i n k e d w i t h the concept of " p r o g r a m " is a v i e w of t i m e encompassing a whole past, present and future of eating habits. T h e lffetime p r o g r a m is d i v i d e d into three stages the initiate must pass through before the attainment of a stigma w h i c h is discreditable only: the basic w e i g h t loss p r o g r a m , the " l e v e l i n g " p r o g r a m (beginning w h e n the person is w i t h i n 10 lbs of goal weight) a n d the " m a i n t e n a n c e " p r o g r a m theoretically c o n t i n u e d for the r e m a i n d e r of the person's future. F r e e lifetime m e m b e r s h i p in the organization accrues to people w h o have achieved their goal w e i g h t , complete the " m a i n t e n a n c e " p r o g r a m , w e i g h i n m o n t h l y a n d do not gain m o r e t h a n 2 pounds above their goal weight. Initiates to the organiza t i o n are g i v e n a master p l a n for their entire life, d i v i d e d into four distinct time tracks: three as a m e m b e r of the organization and one (always in the past) as a discredited fat person. A tactical p r o b l e m for the organization is posed, h o w e v e r , by the fact that m e m b e r s do not follow the master p l a n : they do not always lose weight (or worse still, sometimes gain) d u r i n g the t i m e they attend meetings. T h e y r e t u r n to the organization after losing forty pounds a n d regain i n g fifty. F o r such contingencies the organization has another perspective on time: it is the present only, just the i m m e d i a t e day or e v e n m e a l at h a n d , w h i c h countsnot the past, a n d not the future. T h e m e m b e r s are told, on the one h a n d , that the p r o g r a m is a master p l a n for their entire lives, and on the other h a n d that no past action constitutes failure. This paradox is illustrated by two quotes f r o m an organizational p a m p h l e t : " I f you do the best a n d the most y o u can today, don't

In New York! (This study was done in

W h i l e such stories are often told to amuse die m e m b e r s h i p , their serious m e a n i n g is clear: until fat people reduce their w e i g h t they w i l l l i v e w i t h painfully r e d u c e d self-esteem in a restricted range of activities, a n d a correspondingly unsatis factory lifestyle. Lecturers p r o m o t e an imagery and p r o v i d e examples of the " b e t t e r " way of life automatically accruing to fat persons as they be come slender. F o r instance, lecturers state that a variety of positive changes a c c o m p a n i e d their weight losssparkling w i t at parties, m o r e en ergy, a greater ability to cope w i t h fife's vicis situdes. T h e y suggest greater business and professional, as w e l l as social, success are a conse quence of e l i m i n a t i n g the visible stigma of fat. Thus, there is no n e e d to force m e m b e r s to exer cise, quit smoking, or have better h u m a n relation ships: these good things w i l l automatically follow from the transformation in lifestyle accompany ing w e i g h t loss. T h e organization is c o n c e r n e d w i t h life style in the context of attributes a n d activities uncon nected w i t h eating behavior; it also claims that a lifelong c o m m i t m e n t to its w e i g h t loss a n d lossmaintenance p r o g r a m must b e c o m e part of the individual's way of life. Because the person's es sential fat identity is always present, the threat

124 w o r r y about t o m o r r o w " ; " P e r f e c t i o n is attained by slow degrees; she requires the h a n d of t i m e . " Since a l l acts w i l l eventually b e c o m e past, success is always possible and organizational m e m b e r s h i p is always available. No matter h o w often one joins or rejoins, lecturers tell n e w m e m b e r s " T o d a y is the first day of the rest of your l i f e . " T h e m i x e d perspective o n t i m e and a n e m phasis on the p e r m a n e n c e of their fat i d e n t i t y enables the weight loss organization to place the responsibility for failure on the i n d i v i d u a l a n d not the organization. T h e m e m b e r s h i p , at any one t i m e , includes m a n y f o r m e r m e m b e r s w h o failed to lose weight, or w h o lost w e i g h t a n d later regained it. T h e y are w e l c o m e d back a n d reassured that behavior change is always possible. T h r o u g h the use of stigma as a strategy for i n d i v i d u a l beh a v i o r change, the organization constructs a foolp r o o f ideology: success comes f r o m f o l l o w i n g the organization's p r o g r a m , w h i l e failure is the responsibility of the i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r reflecting his or her essential identity. L e m e r t ' s theory o f secondary d e v i a t i o n i m plies that a deviant identity, deviant behavior a n d a deviant way of life vary together. T h e weight loss organization's separation of i d e n t i t y , behavior a n d lifestylethrough its use of stigma b o t h as a means of changing behavior a n d as a basis on w h i c h to attribute responsibility for failure to i n d i v i d u a l memberspresents a further challenge to the theory as it has b e e n f o r m u l a t e d . N o t only c a n a stigmatized identity lead to non-deviant behavior, but " n o r m a l " behavior can lead to a " n o r m a l " w a y of life despite the r e t e n t i o n of an i d e n tity w h i c h bears a negative label. A lifestyle change is only possible, though, w h e n the stigma becomes discreditable (i.e., w h e n it is no longer visible).

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of change agents w h o are themselves successful graduates of the p r o g r a m . T h e i n g r o u p - o u t g r o u p differentiation is dual: b e t w e e n fat m e m b e r s and fat n o n m e m b e r s of the organization, a n d , m o r e important, b e t w e e n fat "foodaholics" a n d t h i n " c i v i l i a n s . " C i v i l i a n s are regarded, m u c h as G o f f m a n defines t h e m : as "norm a l s . " F a t n o n - m e m b e r s are u n e n l i g h t e n e d potential members; if they are not a t t e m p t i n g to become t h i n they are slothful and i m m o r a l . At best they are to be p i t i e d , a n d members m a y serve as models to h e l p t h e m to a future in w h i c h they m a y be discreditable rather than discredited persons. If they are f o l l o w i n g some other w e i g h t prog r a m , such as diet pills, they are d o o m e d to failure. W h a t e v e r the case, they are potential converts t h r o u g h efforts of b o t h members a n d organizational advertising. U n l i k e some behavior changing institutions such as Synanon, the weight loss organization is not a total institution (Goffman, 1961), a n d cannot set up walls b e t w e e n the m e m b e r s h i p a n d the c i v i l i a n w o r l d . Worse, housewives f o r m a large p r o p o r t i o n of the m e m b e r s h i p ; they have the traditional female role tasks of m a k i n g meals for their familiesmeals w h i c h i n c l u d e desserts, cookies, potatoes a n d creamy salad dressings. So the m e m b e r s are e n c o u r a g e d to quarantine themselves, either physically or m e n t a l l y f r o m the s u r r o u n d i n g temptations of their everyday lives. Q u a r a n t i n e involves b o t h r e m o v a l f r o m the non-quarantined and association w i t h other quarantined persons (the i n g r o u p impulse). U n l i k e A l coholics A n o n y m o u s , though, the organization can rarely suggest that the members socialize only w i t h those w h o do not use the substance, both because everyone uses food, and because so m u c h of the m e m b e r ' s lives are i n v o l v e d w i t h food p r e p a r a t i o n for a n d c o n s u m p t i o n w i t h " c i v i l i a n s . " B u t the m e m b e r s are exhorted mentally to disassociate themselves f r o m civilians, w h o are p i c t u r e d as dedicated to the m e m b e r s ' failure. Lecturer: Friends want us is the only way they you have to be prepared for may be a civilian, and then stand. to fail because that can succeed . . . them . . . or they they do not under-

ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF BEHAVIOR CHANGE T h e two major strategies of change e m p l o y e d by the organization to p r o m o t e a n d reinforce a stigmatized fat identity, n o r m a l i z e d eating behavior a n d a better lifestyle are (1) the fostering of an i n g r o u p - o u t g r o u p sentiment a n d (2) the use

Laslett, Warren Weekly organization meetings are presented as a kind of inoculation against external pressures which weaken will-power and resolve: waitresses in restaurants, children begging for homemade cookies, husbands asserting that they like cuddly women, are all threats: Lecturer: We must have free will not to eat and resist others. . . fat people are afraid of asserting themselves in the face of pressures to eat by restaurants, hostesses, fat people and others. Besides, they don't want to resist pressure. When you say "no" and mean it there is a tone in your voice that says you mean it. But a fat person's "no" to a second helping may be accompanied by salivating and panting. While the outgroup is the non-fat world, the urgroupr-ii"iJbr wxmlr'ui ifjuukiiuili;5, auu 'mosi' particularly the membership of the organization. In the early days of the organization, there was more stress on ingroup participation (for example, members tempted to eat would telephone another member for moral support), but at the present time the organization has become so large that the notion of "interdependence of members' goals" is not used as a social control mechanism. Unlike other self-help groups such as Synanon and AA, group therapy and other group dynamics take at most a secondary place to the lecture as a primary focus of organizational meetings (see Crosbie et al., 1972). The difference may lie in the profit-making nature of the weight loss organization. Having more and smaller groups would reduce the money which the organization makes by increasing staff (lecturers, weighers and clerks) and hall rental costs.
r

125 weight during the week, and rounds of hand clapping both for persons who had lost weight and others who were "trying." Since goal interdependence and ingroup sentiment is hard to manage in a nontotal institution of a large size which cannot forbid the addictive substance to members, the organization stresses the theme of self-discipline considerably more than that of discipline by peers: "it's up to you" is a phrase constantly used by the lecturers. Along with the theme of self-discipline, however, there is the continuing suggestion that pressures from the outgroupthe non-fat civilian societyis the source of external pressure on the individual: Lecturer: We are victims of patterns taught us in childhood of obeying our mothers and eating
it all WO heCailSP. Of the Xtnrtlitur. neonle in vn-nmrl-

so country, but we must no longer be victims. As with many other self-help behavior modification groups, however, the pursuit of "causes" such as this hypothetical one remains completely secondary to the "major" goal of changing behavior in the here and now. Lecturer: / am not concerned with why you are fat because of past factors. You are rolling in mud because of your own choice. But if there are deep reasons for that, you should go to a doctor who can take care of you up here (points to his head). As an enterprise, this weight loss organization has an additional reason to refrain from seeking the hidden psychological and medical causes of obesity: legal responsibility. Lecturers constantly stress that they are not psychiatrists and will not dispense psychiatric advice, nor will they dispense authoritative nutritional, medical or scientific knowledge about obesity. Members with special problems are always told to consult their doctors. A denial of scientific expertise is yet another way of establishing the organization's lack of responsibility for any member's failure, and of placing the blame on the individual. Thus they cannot be held accountable for a failure of the program (the product) which they sell.

In addition to quarantining and inoculation, which promote ingroup-outgroup differentiation, ingroup sentiment is fostered by organizational rituals. Among the most important of these are group rituals instituted by the organization to reward persons who lose weight; these include graduation ceremonies from the three phases of the program, special pins, and certificates of merit. Other rituals, which socialize and cement the group as an institution, are the semi-public weekly weighing of each member, shows of hands of persons who had gained, lost or remained at the same

126 THE CHANGE AGENT We f o u n d the change agent to be one of the most i m p o r t a n t facilitators for the "escalation" of behavior f r o m deviant to n o r m a l (as defined b y the organization). A l l the lecturers a n d other organizational personnel are fat persons t u r n e d thin-on-the-outside: they p r o v i d e a v i t a l s y m b o l of identification for persons w h o believe that " n o one ever loses weight and keeps it off." T h e major ways i n w h i c h the lecturers accomplish such i d e n tification for the m e m b e r s are stigma display (linking the past of the lecturer w i t h the soonto-be-past of the m e m b e r ) a n d deviance display (linking the lecturer's present w i t h the m e m bers'). Stigma display is the constant reiteration by the lecturers of their o w n identity as essentially fat persons, once discredited but n o w discreditable. This is accomplished in various ways: display of " b e f o r e " a n d " a f t e r " pictures of the lecturer, anecdotes of the past sins of eating, a n d sad tales of the lifelong misery of the discredited fat a n d the counterpoint happiness of the discreditable (leavened quite often w i t h humor): Lecturer: F told a story about how her husband had given her (now that she is thin) a black lace night gown and black satin sheets for Xmas. "Before, when I was a fat lady, we had a king size bed. He stayed on his side and I stayed on mine and we didn't meet in the middle very often. Satin sheets are very slippery. You slide off them." As H u r v i t z (1968:4) notes, such identification of the change agents' past w i t h the m e m b e r s ' t r i als a n d tribulations is a f u n d a m e n t a l aspect of most self-help type organizations. B u t a sorry past does not always qualify one to w i n present peer identification, as studies of d r u g addicts w h o become "fat c a t " bureaucrats have shown. Lecturers in this organization use a second tactic to promote m e m b e r s ' identification w i t h the change agent's present experience: deviance display, a tactic f o r b i d d e n organizations as AA w h i c h ban the use of the deviant substance. C h a n g e agents underline the fact of lifelong temptation by food by i n d i c a t i n g that they, too, are sometimes t e m p t e d and fail (but that the or-

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ganization gives t h e m the ability to recoup failures q u i c k l y a n d effectively): Lecturer: / ate three barrels of sauerkraut over the weekend and gained seven pounds, but now I know what to do and have taken almost all of it back off. D e v i a n c e display serves to promote identification, underlines the continued necessity of organizational m e m b e r s h i p , and highlights the necessity for changed behavior a n d an ultimate c o m m i t m e n t to "a n e w way of l i f e , " at the same t i m e as it reinforces the stigmatized essential identity.

SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSIONS O u r data lead us to the conclusion that an e m p i r i c a l l y g r o u n d e d elaboration of L e m e r t ' s theory of secondary deviation is both possible a n d needs to be tested in various behavior change settings. O u r elaboration of L e m e r t ' s theory of secondary deviation or, as w o u l d be m o r e accurate in the situation described here, a theory of secondary normalization, adds the f o l l o w i n g propositions w h i c h delineate those features of the labeling situation w h i c h make secondary n o r m a l i zation m o r e probable than secondary deviation. 1. T h e central change strategy in organizations w h i c h use "ex's" as change agents is the p e r m a nent acceptance of a stigmatized identity. This strategy is in opposition to the strategy of the p r o m o t i o n of a " c u r e d " or " n o r m a l " identity, attempted by organizations w h i c h are staffed by professional agents, such as m e n t a l hospitals a n d jails. Successful behavior change u n d e r the conditions described above, however, m a y req u i r e lifetime organizational m e m b e r s h i p to enable the stigmatized identity to be r e i n forced as a " p o s i t i v e " feature of n o r m a l behavior and a n o r m a l way of life. 2. Individuals may change their behavior a n d way of life f r o m deviant to n o r m a l on some relevant d i m e n s i o n , but m a y retain a stigmat i z e d identity connected w i t h that same dimension.

Laslett, Warren T h e ideal test of the theory of secondary nor malization, w o u l d , like a test of the theory of sec ondary deviation, i n v o l v e a l o n g - t e r m evaluative follow-up study of organizational graduates, some t h i n g w h i c h has never b e e n fully accomplished w i t h any organization. Since the weight loss or ganization does not give permission for social or m e d i c a l research, it was not possible to obtain i n f o r m a t i o n p e r m i t t i n g us to evaluate the success w h i c h they c l a i m for their p r o g r a m .
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127 independent of a n d not coterrriinous w i t h deviant or n o r m a l behavior and way of life. In summary, negative social labeling, or stig matization, m a y have fateful consequences for the i n d i v i d u a l , but these are not always in the ex p e c t e d d i r e c t i o n . In an expanded study of m a n y behavior change groups dealing w i t h d r u g use and c h i l d abuse as w e l l as obesity, we f o u n d that groups who used ex's as change agents all used strategies of identity stigmatization in order to facilitate normalization of members' behavior (Warren, 1974). Such data give further e m p i r i c a l thrust to the conclusion that n o r m a l or deviant identity, way of life and behavior are e m p i r i c a l l y separable p h e n o m e n a , erroneously analyzed u n der the u m b r e l l a "secondary d e v i a t i o n . "

This stance is typical of behavior-changing organizations, w h i c h generally resist i n d e p e n d e n t evaluation of their success a n d failure rates. Some behavior changing organizations keep their o w n statistics of success and failure; this weight loss organization claims not to keep systematic rec ords of any k i n d , and only occasionally gives any indication of the success or failure of the m e m bers. F o r example, the lecturers sometimes quoted gross total weight losses for the class (or for the city), but these w e r e often misleading since gross weight gain was not subtracted. In one class w h e r e this was done, the gross class weight loss for the m o n t h was over a h u n d r e d pounds, but the gross weight gain was nearly a h u n d r e d l e a v i n g a total w e i g h t loss of a few pounds to be distributed a m o n g sixty or so members! F a i l i n g the ideal test of L e m e r t ' s theory of secondary deviation (independently measured rates of success and failure w h e n negative labels are used as a strategy for c h a n g i n g deviant behav ior) this analysis suggests that the self-help organi zation studied here does not accept the v i e w that escalation to deviant behavior always follows neg ative social labels. F u r t h e r m o r e , u n d e r certain conditions, such labeling can be used as a means to n o r m a l i z e deviant behavior. It is also clear that, in conflict w i t h the traditional f o r m u l a t i o n of the theory of secondary deviation, stigmatization or normalization of identity can be v i e w e d as

REFERENCES Allon, Natalie. "Group Dieting Rituals." Society 10 (January-February 1973): 36-42. Becker, Howard S. Outsiders. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963. Berger, Peter I., and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Doubleday, 1967. Dwyer, Johanna ., Jacob J. Feldman, and Jean Mayer. "The Social Psychology of Dieting." Journal of Health and Social Behavior 11 (December 1970): 269-287. Fisher, Sethard. "Stigma and Deviant Careers in Schools." Social Problems 20 (Summer 1972): 7883. Foster, Jack D., Simon Dinitz, and Walter C. Reckless. "Perceptions of Stigma Following Public Interven tion for Deviant Behavior." Social Problems'20 (Fall 1972): 202-209. Goffman, Erving. Asylums. New York: Doubleday, 1961. . Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. Hurvitz, Nathan. "The Characteristics of Peer Self-help Psychotherapy Groups and Their Implications for the Theory and Practice of Psychiatry." Paper pre sented at the San Francisco convention of The American Psychological Association, 1968. Lemert, Edwin. Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1967.

A f e w e m p i r i c a l (but n o t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l - e v a l u a t i v e ) s t u d i e s o f the effects o f s t i g m a d o , h o w e v e r , exist. T h e s e s t u d i e s i l l u s t r a t e that t h e p r o c e s s o f s t i g m a t i z a t i o n i n v o l v e s the exchange of meanings b e t w e e n participants a n d is not simply a matter of l a b e l - s t i c k i n g a n d p a s s i v e r e c e i v i n g . F u r t h e r m o r e , " m e n t a l la b e l i n g " or stereotyping is not the same thing as the behavior that i s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e p e r s o n s o l a b e l e d . (See f o r e x a m p l e , Fisher, 1970.) 1972; Foster et al., 1972; Schwartz and Stryker,

128 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. " N e w Weight Standards for Men and Women." Statistical Bulletin 20 (November-December 1969). Schur, Edwin. Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Schwartz, Michael, and Sheldon Stryker. Deviance, Selves and Others. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1970.

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Stuart, Richard R., and Barbara Davis. Slim Chance in a Fat World. Champaign, Illinois: Research Press Co., 1972. Warren, Carol A. B. "The Use of Stigmatizing Labels in Conventionalizing Deviant Behavior." Sociology and Social Research 58 (April 1974): 303-311. . "Destigmatization: Acts, Identities, and Categories." Unpublished paper, 1975.

Darwin L. Thomas, David D. Franks, & James M. Calonico

Role-taking and Power in Social Psychology

14

THEORETICAL RATIONALE Role-Taking. F r o m a sociological orientation in social psychology, few concepts r i v a l roletaking in theoretical importance. It is a truly interactive concept (Turner, 1962), a n d at the same time it plays a critical role in a sociological v i e w of the d e v e l o p m e n t of self as w e l l as in a theory of social control (Shibutani, 1961:194-201). T h e " b i o l o g i c a l " i n d i v i d u a l becomes a m e m b e r of a social c o m m u n i t y w h e n he becomes self-conscious about his o w n actions f r o m society's standD a r w i n L . T h o m a s , D a v i d D . Franks, a n d James M . C a l o n i c o , " B o l e - T a k i n g a n d P o w e r i n S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , " American Sociological Review, v o l . 3 7 , O c t o b e r 1972, p p . 6 0 5 - 6 1 4 . R e p r i n t e d by p e r m i s s i o n . A n e a r l i e r v e r s i o n o f this p a p e r w a s p r e s e n t e d a t t h e R o c k y M o u n t a i n S o c i a l S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n M e e t i n g s , Salt L a k e C i t y , U t a h , 1972. T h i s r e s e a r c h was s u p p o r t e d i n p a r t b y N S F G r a n t G S 2650. W e wish t o thank V i k t o r G e c a s a n d A n d r e w J . W e i g e r t f o r h e l p f u l s u g g e s t i o n s o n e a r l i e r v e r s i o n s o f this p a p e r a n d t o B e r n a r d Babbitt, M a r l e n e H u n t s i n g e r a n d L o r r i e R i p p e e for c o m p u t e r p r o g r a m m i n g assistance.

point. This makes h i m distinctively h u m a n and roots his social nature in the interactive process. " T h e biologic i n d i v i d u a l must be able to c a l l out in himself the response his gesture calls out in the other, a n d t h e n u t i l i z e this i m a g i n e d response of the other for the control of his o w n further conduct. T h e ability to call out the same response in b o t h self a n d other gives the content necessary for c o m m u n i t y of m e a n i n g . " (Mead, 1934, p. xxi) Self is not a biological g i v e n but emerges in social interaction. T h e c h i l d develops a self (becomes self-conscious) only to the extent that he can see himself as others do (role-taking) a n d use this to m o n i t o r his behavior w i t h others. O n e becomes an object to himself through b e i n g able to take others' perspectives. This depends on significant symbols or shared meanings (language) w h i c h actors use in a g i v e n reference group. Paradoxically, only t h r o u g h an i n h e r e n t l y social process of role-taking c a n one develop a viable sense of individuality.

lomas, Franks, Calonico In v i e w of the central nature of the theoretial construct of role-taking, (see C o t r e l l , 1950; : rryker, 1971) one w o u l d expect sociologists inter- : : e d in i n d i v i d u a l conduct to continue to contribire at both the theoretical and hypothesis testing r els. Such is not the case. T h e theoretical potential of the concept has not b e e n m a t c h e d by atten: : r i a t the operational a n d research l e v e l (Stone _ - d F a r b e r m a n , 1970; K u h n , 1964). Stryker .971) laments the absence of sociologically orirT.red theory and research in his recent r e v i e w : f the latest Handbook of Social Psychology. B o t h "eoretically and e m p i r i c a l l y , the relationship between role-taking and p o w e r is a potentially aitful area of investigation in social psychol-

129 self-system are potentially available to all persons d e p e n d i n g o n their i n d i v i d u a l competencies i n interpersonal relations. G r a n t e d that b o t h subordinates and superordinates have at their disposal potentials for controlling each other, power w i l l refer to potentials g i v e n by one's structural position vis a vis the other; and the t e r m influencewill be used to refer to potential for c o n t r o l based on one's interpersonal skill, i n d e p e n d e n t of his social position. P o w e r a n d influence are fundamentally distinct modes of gaining control, the former u t i l i z i n g a relatively e n d u r i n g structure and the latter the reservoir of interpersonal abilities.
2 3

Role-Taking and Power. O f t e n in theoretical discussions of interpersonal behavior along the dimension of power, an i m p o r t a n t distinction in levels of analysis is overlooked. Sociologists are appropriately interested in c l a r i f y i n g the interactional nature of p o w e r relations (see W r o n g , 1968:673; E m e r s o n , 1962:31-32). T h e y emphasize that subordinates can have " p o w e r " since they can a n d do constrain superiors. Thus E m e r son describes one of four types of " b a l a n c i n g operations" w h i c h :
1

F o r the social psychologist h o w are p o w e r and role-taking related? F o l l o w i n g G o f f m a n (1959), role-taking not only socializes the i n d i v i d ual, but it is used to control others' responses by pleasing t h e m on their o w n terms. A p r e m i u m is placed on accuracy m role-taking w h e n the subordinate utilizes controls based on interpersonal abilities. Such control is m o r e p a r t i c u l a r i z e d than the use of power. T h e subordinate must role-take accurately if he is not to destroy his potential control say, by misjudging the superordinate's response and b e c o m i n g identified as an "ingratiator." T h e general proposition is that persons in higher p o w e r positions do not n e e d to a n d therefore do not use role-taking to the same degree as persons of l o w e r p o w e r positions. This is not to say that c o n t r o l l i n g others through p o w e r does not i n v o l v e role-taking. H o w e v e r , once a person

. . > increases the weaker member's power to control the formerly more powerful member through increasing the latter's motivational investment in the relation. This is normally accomplished through giving him status recognition in one . . . of its many forms, from ego-gratifications to monetary differential. The ego rewards . . . are highly valued . . . while given at a low cost to the giver, (p. 39) This theoretical formulation is important, but the aroad use of " p o w e r " tends to obscure the distinction b e t w e e n resources s t e m m i n g f r o m one's social position and those s t e m m i n g f r o m an i n d i v i d ual's self-system. Resources a c c r u i n g f r o m the
S e e S e c o r d a n d B a c k m a n (1964) f o r a s u m m a r y o f t h e m a i n :oncepts c o n c e r n i n g p o w e r relations u s e d here. ". . . an unbala n c e d (power) r e l a t i o n i s u n s t a b l e s i n c e i t e n c o u r a g e s t h e use ::" p o w e r , w h i c h i n t u r n sets i n t o m o t i o n p r o c e s s e s t h a t E m e r s o n , 1962) has c a l l e d cost r e d u c t i o n a n d b a l a n c i n g o p e r a t i o n s . " (Parentheses a r e ours.) T h e b a l a n c i n g o p e r a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t h e r e i s nmerson's third o n e .

S e c o r d a n d B a c k m a n (1964:293) e m p h a s i z e this f e a t u r e . " V a r i -

o u s i n t e r p e r s o n a l strategies a r e e m p l o y e d t o shift t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r either in fact or perceptually. P e o p l e m a y disguise their d e p e n d e n c y , p r e t e n d to h a v e m a n y desirable alternatives, i n c r e a s e t h e i n v e s t m e n t o f t h e o t h e r b y r a i s i n g his status, o r i n v o k e n o r m s that r e s t r i c t t h e o t h e r p e r s o n ' s a l t e r n a t i v e s . " T h e y g o o n t o discuss i n t e r p e r s o n a l a t t r a c t i o n a s a s o u r c e o f " p o w e r , " while w e w o u l d prefer the t e r m influence.
3

T h e e m p h a s i s on e n d u r i n g sources of c o n t r o l is o f t e n isolated

as an important feature of potential p o w e r in a structural framework. Since b e h a v i o r on the interactional level is situated a n d episodic, p o w e r , to be e n d u r i n g , must be seen as h a v i n g the q u a l i t y o f p o t e n t i a l . S t r u c t u r a l p o w e r i n o u r t e r m i n o l o g y has this e n d u r i n g q u a l i t y b e c a u s e i t i s t r a n s s i t u a t i o n a l . F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f this see D e n n i s W r o n g , 1968. O u r use o f t h e t e r m p o w e r i s s i m i l a r t o E m e r s o n (1962) a n d W o l f e ' s (1959) " a u t h o r i t y " c o n c e p t , w h i c h has c o n n o t a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o " l e g i t i m a t e p o w e r " a s u s e d b y S m i t h (1970) a n d o t h e r s .

130 in p o w e r has correctly identified a resource desired by the other, it is m o r e i m p o r t a n t for the subordinate to act a c c o r d i n g to the desires a n d orientations of the p o w e r h o l d e r than vice versa. Rose (1969) has enunciated a similar idea using the t e r m empathy instead of role-taking: It may be that persons who are members of minority groups are forced, because of their underprivileged positions, to develop an empathetic ability as a condition of their adjustment to the subtle expression of dominance by members of superordinate groups. Thus, Negroes in minority situations have been characterized as having a more accurate perception of white mentality than whites have of Negro mentality. . . . One of the privileges of power, perhaps an often overlooked one, is the privilege of insensitivity to the negative attitudes of others, (p. 476) Rose also generalizes the basic idea by proposing that w o m e n should be m o r e accurate role-takers than m e n . Subordinate status in a situated roleset should be characterized by role-taking accuracy a m o n g m e m b e r s of different social categories. Hypotheses. O n e c o u l d deduce f r o m this that c h i l d r e n w o u l d t e n d to be m o r e accurate i n i n t r a f a m i l i a l role-taking than their parents. F u r t h e r m o r e , i n families i n male d o m i n a n t societies, the females should be m o r e accurate i n their role-taking ability t h a n the males. B y c o m b i n i n g the two propositions, one can deduce the following hypothesis: Accuracy in roletaking will exhibit the following pattern among family members: father < mother < male child < female child. N o t e that the hypothesis that c h i l d r e n w i l l be better role-takers than their parents is not a common-sense notion. O n e c o u l d m a i n t a i n that their greater f u n d of k n o w l e d g e and experience about theirs and their children's lives w o u l d m a k e parents better role-takers. Indeed, parents are oft e n f o r c e d to anticipate their child's behavior to protect against possible danger or p r o d u c e a desired outcome. A second hypothesis can be generated f r o m this basic l i n k b e t w e e n role-taking a n d p o w e r w h i c h w i l l allow for an investigation of the effect of personal p o w e r style on role-taking. Individuals

P A R T II

Society

in a particular social position w i l l v a r y on the degree of p o w e r they exercise a n d hence on the degree to w h i c h others in that social group perceive t h e m as p o w e r f u l . If personal p o w e r style is related to role-taking as structural p o w e r is in the above theoretical rationale, t h e n children who perceive their fathers and mothers as highly powerful individuals should be better role-takers than children who perceive their fathers and mothers as low power individuals. By the same r e a s o n i n g husbands and wives who exercise a high degree of power in the conjugal relationship should be less accurate role-takers than those with low conjugal power.

METHODOLOGY Sample. In o r d e r to test the h y p o t h e s i z e d relationships, data w e r e gathered f r o m b o t h parents a n d c h i l d r e n in intact nuclear families. A "face-sheet" requesting necessary i n f o r m a t i o n about the respondent a n d his family was administered to a r o u n d a thousand undergraduate students at a large w e s t e r n state university. F r o m these responses a sample of the student p o p u l a t i o n was d r a w n w h i c h represented the student body on the f o l l o w i n g characteristics: sex, year in school, major field of study and grade p o i n t average. F u r t h e r requirements for i n c l u s i o n i n the study w e r e intact families composed of m o t h e r , father, h i g h school aged c h i l d a n d college aged c h i l d . A r a n d o m sample of three h u n d r e d q u a l i f y i n g families was d r a w n f r o m the families m e e t i n g the necessary criteria. D u r i n g the s u m m e r a packet of materials was sent to each family chosen. E a c h packet c o n t a i n e d four questionnaires, one for each family m e m b e r , along w i t h a cover letter and instructions to assist respondents i n c o m p l e t i n g and r e t u r n i n g questionnaires. Separate r e t u r n envelopes w e r e i n c l u d e d for each respondent to allow as m u c h p r i vacy as possible. F o u r m a i l e d follow-ups w e r e sent to families at approximately ten-day intervals, the first b e i n g sent t e n days after the family r e c e i v e d the o r i g i n a l packet. At the b e g i n n i n g of data analysis, questionnaires h a d b e e n r e t u r n e d by 82.8% (994) of the sample's 1,200 family m e m b e r s (four m e m b e r s in each of three h u n d r e d families).

Thomas, Franks, Calonico Comparisons w e r e made w i t h the non-responients using i n f o r m a t i o n gathered on the i n i t i a l face-sheet," a n d those families not r e t u r n i n g their questionnaires w e r e f o u n d not to differ significantly on SES l e v e l , f a m i l y size, religious affiliation, a n d parents' education l e v e l . Since the current analysis r e q u i r e d the use of both parents and children's responses, we decided to use only the scores of " c o m p l e t e d " families, i.e., scores f r o m all four f a m i l y members. F o r the present analysis, 222 c o m p l e t e d families w e r e available necessitating the use of only the roletaking scale. This represents 7 4 % of the three n u n d r e d families i n the o r i g i n a l sample. W h e r e analysis r e q u i r e d using b o t h the role-taking a n d power (as measured by the semantic differential) scales, 70.7% (212) of the c o m p l e t e d families w e r e available. This difference occurs because some persons c o m p l e t e d only one of the t w o scales, invalidating the use of that family for the particu-ar analysis. F i n a l l y , a measure of conjugal p o w e r was obtained in the second phase of data collection, a telephone follow-up six months after the beginning of the first phase. A n u m b e r of families c o u l d not be contacted d u r i n g this follow-up; thus, for the analysis r e q u i r i n g b o t h role-taking a n d conjugal p o w e r scores, 56.3% (169) of the c o m p l e t e d families c o u l d be i n c l u d e d . Role-Taking Measure. T h i s scale was developed specifically for the current w o r k . Judgment tests usually employ either a " t r a i t - r a t i n g " procedure (Bronfenbrenner, H a r d i n g a n d G a l l vey, 1958; F i e d l e r , 1954; F i e d l e r , Blaisdell and Warrington, 1952) or a direct p r e d i c t i o n of another's response to attitude items (Byrne a n d Blaymck, 1963). T h e present effort differs f r o m these and most other types of " j u d g i n g i n s t r u m e n t s " see C l i n e , 1964:224) in its attempt to approximate role-taking m o r e closely. It is a modification :f the d i l e m m a resolution technique previously used in parent-child research (see Thomas a n d Weigert, 1971). T h e role-taking measure is most easily understood by considering the f o l l o w i n g item f r o m the scale. A young man about to graduate from college is opposed to military service but is sure he will be drafted shortly after he graduates. He is trying to decide whether to allow himself to be drafted and serve in the armed forces or to unlawfully resist the draft, thereby risking the chance of arrest and imprisonment.

a. I w o u l d advise this y o u n g m a n to allow h i m self to be d r a f t e d a n d serve in the a r m e d forces. 1. no 2. p r o b a b l y no 3. probably yes 4. yes b . I n m y o p i n i o n , m y father (older child) w o u l d advise this y o u n g m a n to allow himself to be drafted and serve in the a r m e d forces. 4. yes 3. probably yes 2. probably no 1. no c . I n m y o p i n i o n m y m o t h e r (younger child) w o u l d advise this y o u n g m a n to allow h i m self to be drafted and serve in the a r m e d forces. 1. no 2. probably no 3. probably yes 4. yes

E a c h of the t e n items presents a hypothetical situation in w h i c h an abstract other, i.e., n e i t h e r actor nor the specific person whose role he is taki n g , is p l a c e d in a behavioral d i l e m m a . T h e abstract other is shown as p e r c e i v i n g two possible responses to his d i l e m m a . T h e actor must indicate h o w he w o u l d advise the abstract other to respond. H e must t h e n indicate h o w each o f t w o significant others, persons whose roles he is taki n g , w o u l d advise the abstract other to respond. Parents w e r e asked to take the role of each of the two p a r t i c i p a t i n g c h i l d r e n and each c h i l d was asked to take the role of each parent. T h e names of specific family m e m b e r s were w r i t t e n into the questions so that the person w o u l d k n o w whose role he was taking. A role-taking accuracy or difference score is c o m p u t e d for each respondent by c o m p a r i n g the other's actual response w i t h the actor's p r e d i c t i o n of that response. T h u s the range of absolute difference b e t w e e n any t w o subjects on any i t e m is

132
T A B L E 14.1. taking scale Principal axis factor analysis of role-

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Society

Item 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Military Draft Homosexual as Security Risk Communist Teacher Search Warrant Marriage at College-Age Spanking of Children Employee Theft Atheism of College Student Prisoner as Parole Risk Police Shooting of Burglar
1

Factor Loading .59* .55* .52* .34* .32* .28 .18 .11 .08 .06

Those items 5).

1

u s e d i n t h e r o l e - t a k i n g s c o r e (see F o o t n o t e this scale, w r i t e

For exact w o r d i n g o f t h e i t e m s u s e d i n authors.

the

Power Measures. In the test of the first hypothesis, the individual's position in the family was taken as an index of his power in the family. T h e position rank on the power dimension is father > m o t h e r > male c h i l d > female c h i l d . In the test of the second hypothesis, two p o w e r measures w e r e used. In the first, each family m e m b e r rated himself and each other m e m b e r on ten adjective pairs. T h r o u g h factor analysis of the semantic differential, two adjective pairs, stern-mild and powerful-powerless, e m e r g e d for constructing a p o w e r measure. Fathers and mothers w e r e d i v i d e d at the m e d i a n into high and low p o w e r groups according to the children's perception. F o r the present w o r k , role-taking scores of c h i l d r e n w h o p e r c e i v e d their mothers and fathers as h i g h on p o w e r were c o m p a r e d w i t h c h i l d r e n w h o p e r c e i v e d their parents as l o w on power.
6

from zero to three. Higher scores denote greater r o l e - t a k i n g inaccuracy. These absolute scores w e r e factor analyzed T a b l e 14.1 presents the factor loadings obtained by means of p r i n c i p a l axis factor analysis. F r o m these results, role-taking scores w e r e created by i n c l u d i n g those items w i t h a factor loading > .30.
4 5
4

S i n c e o u r p r i m a r y c o n c e r n was t o i d e n t i f y a m a j o r u n d e r l y i n g from the difference scores on each of the

r o l e - t a k i n g factor

A second p o w e r measure (conjugal power; was constructed by using the responses to four questions asked of the wife in four areas of decision m a k i n g : w h e n you and your husband disagree over (money, r e l i g i o n , furnishing the house, and disciplining the children) w h o has the final say? 1. mother always, 2. mother m o r e than father, 3. m o t h e r a n d father about equal, 4. father m o r e than mother, 5. father always. A second scoring scheme (DS scale or degree of Shared A u thority Index) was d e v e l o p e d w h e r e the 1 and 5 response categories r e c e i v e d a one, the 2 and 4 response categories r e c e i v e d a two; a n d the 3 response category r e c e i v e d a three; these two i n dices of p o w e r were c o m b i n e d (RS-Relative P o w e r Index) to p r o d u c e the four conjugal power types d e v e l o p e d by Wolfe (1959): namely, mother dominant, father dominant, syncratic and a u t o n o m i c . These four types are p i c t u r e d graphi7
6

t e n i t e m s , w e u s e d t h e p r i n c i p a l axis f a c t o r analysis. T h r e e factors w e r e p r o d u c e d i n this analysis w i t h t h e v a l u e s i n T a b l e 1 4 - 1 c o m i n g f r o m the f i r s t . T h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d a c c o u n t e d f o r less t o t a l v a r i a n c e i n t h e r o l e - t a k i n g scale t h a n d i d f a c t o r o n e , a n d s o m e items (marriage, parole, search warrant) l o a d e d o n m o r e t h a n o n e factor. I n a n a t t e m p t t o a n a l y z e f o r o t h e r possible factor structures, the v e r i m a x factor rotation solution w a s u s e d t o i d e n t i f y o r t h o g o n a l factors. T h e f i r s t o r t h o g o n a l factor consisted of three items: draft, h o m o s e x u a l , c o m m u n i s t . T h e s e three items h a d the strongest loadings on the first factor f r o m t h e p r i n c i p a l axis f a c t o r analysis. T h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d o r t h o g o n a l factors w e r e a m i x t u r e o f t h e r e m a i n i n g s e v e n i t e m s . T h u s t h e results o f t h e o r t h o g o n a l f a c t o r i n c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r o l e - t a k i n g scores.
5

analysis s e e m e d t o

F a c t o r analysis o f t h e t e n a d j e c t i v e pairs p r o d u c e d a p o t e n c y

s u p p o r t t h e d e c i s i o n t o use t h e p r i n c i p a l axis f a c t o r analysis S c a l e scores are c r e a t e d b y f i r s t s t a n d a r d i z i n g e a c h v a r i a b l e

f a c t o r (using t h r e e f a c t o r v e r i m a x solution) c o n s i s t i n g o f these t w o i t e m s h a v i n g t h e h i g h e s t l o a d i n g s , .81 f o r s t e r n - m i l d a n d .51 for p o w e r f u l - p o w e r l e s s .

7

(item) t o h a v e a m e a n o f z e r o . T h e n , for a n y s u b j e c t , t h e v a l u e o f e a c h v a r i a b l e i n his o r i g i n a l s c o r e w h i c h i s t o b e i n c l u d e d i n his scale s c o r e i s m u l t i p l i e d b y its c o r r e s p o n d i n g f a c t o r l o a d i n g . T h e p r o d u c t s are t h e n s u m m e d t o c o n s t i t u t e his scale score. T h i s w e i g h t s e a c h i t e m i n t h e s c o r e b y t h e s i z e o f its f a c t o r l o a d i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e m e a n o f t h e f a c t o r analysis scale scores i s set t o zero; thus, for the present w o r k , the m o r e positive a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s scale s c o r e t h e m o r e i n a c c u r a t e i s his r o l e - t a k i n g ; a n d t h e m o r e negative his s c a l e s c o r e t h e m o r e a c c u r a t e i s h i s role-taking.

Since four items w e r e u s e d in the present study, different

c u t off p o i n t s f r o m e i t h e r t h e D e t r o i t S t u d y ( B l o o d a n d W o l f e , 1960) o r t h e L o s A n g e l e s S t u d y ( C e n t e r s eta!., 1971) w e r e u s e d . I n this r e s e a r c h (see F i g u r e 14.1) M o t h e r D o m i n a n c e w a s d e fined as the b o t t o m 25% o n t h e r e l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y scale (RA) a n d F a t h e r D o m i n a n c e was the top 25% o n the R A Scale. S y n c r a t i c was d e f i n e d a s a n y o n e s c o r i n g i n t h e m i d d l e 5 0 % o n the R A Scale a n d the top 5 0 % o n the D S Scale. A u t o n o m i c was a n y o n e f a l l i n g i n t h e m i d d l e 5 0 % the b o t t o m 50% o n the D S Scale. o n the R A Scale a n d

Thomas, Franks, Calonico

133

: ally in F i g u r e 14.1. T h e father is hypothesized being most p o w e r f u l in the father dominant r p e and least p o w e r f u l i n the m o t h e r dominant. The m o t h e r is seen as most p o w e r f u l in the mother dominant and least p o w e r f u l in the father oominant families. T h e autonomic and syncratic r-pes are conceptualized as m i d d l e p o w e r types for both the father and mother, since they both tend to m a k e decisions in different areas (autor.omic) or share in joint decision m a k i n g (syntratic). As indicated previously, 169 families w e r e available for this phase of the analysis.

FINDINGS T h e first hypothesis (on the basis of power ttifferences) predicts the f o l l o w i n g order on roletaking across family positions: father < m o t h e r < male c h i l d < female c h i l d . T a b l e 14.2 presents the m e a n role-taking scores and significance lev els for t-tests b e t w e e n adjacent positions on the power c o n t i n u u m . T h e p a t t e r n of the data sup ports the hypothesized relationship. Fathers are ttgnificantly less accurate role-takers than m o t h ers (p < .001) a n d mothers significantly less accu rate than male c h i l d r e n (p < .001; section A, T a

ble 14.2). T h e difference between the m e a n roletaking scores of male and female c h i l d r e n is in the p r e d i c t e d direction, but it is not statistically significant. T h e literature on the sociology of the f a m i l y contains the idea that order of b i r t h is i m p o r t a n t in ascribing positions of power to c h i l d r e n (see Thomas and C a l o n i c o , 1972; Reiss, 1967:154). O l d e r c h i l d r e n in families are seen as o c c u p y i n g positions of b o t h p o w e r and responsibility c o m pared to younger c h i l d r e n . If this reasoning is cor rect, younger c h i l d r e n should be better roletakers than older c h i l d r e n . To further test the proposition relating role-taking to p o w e r , the ef fect of b i r t h order on sibling role-taking was inves tigated. Table 14.2, section B, presents these re sults. T h e p a t t e r n b e t w e e n the means indicates that younger c h i l d r e n are better role-takers than older c h i l d r e n , but again the difference is not sta tistically significant. At this juncture we reasoned that if both order of b i r t h (older and younger) and sex w e r e c o m b i n e d , the oldest male c h i l d might be significantly less accurate in role-taking than the youngest female c h i l d . Section in T a b l e 14.2 presents the m e a n scores. It can be seen that the absolute difference in means is increased w h e n the effects of order of b i r t h and sex are

134 T A B L E 14.2.

P A R T II Mean role-taking scores and significance levels for t-test by position in the family

Socieh

* * = p < .001 f o r o n e t a i l e d t-test c o m p u t e d b e t w e e n a d j a c e n t m e a n s .

1

W h e n f a c t o r analysis scale s c o r e s a r e c r e a t e d , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e s c o r e s i s r e c o n s t i t u t e d t o set t h e m e a n o f

t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n a t / . F o r t h e analysis h e r e , t h e m o r e n e g a t i v e a s c o r e is, t h e m o r e a c c u r a t e t h e r o l e - t a k i n g a n d t h e m o r e p o s i t i v e a s c o r e is, t h e less a c c u r a t e t h e r o l e - t a k i n g .

2

T h e s e c h i l d r e n a r e c o l l e g e a g e : m o s t l y F r e s h m e n a n d S o p h o m o r e w i t h a m e a n a g e o f 19.5. T h e s e c h i l d r e n a r e h i g h s c h o o l a g e : w i t h a m e a n age o f 15.9.

c o m b i n e d , but none of the differences b e t w e e n adjacent means is statistically significant. W h e n a separate t-test was c a l c u l a t e d b e t w e e n the m e a n score of older male c h i l d r e n w i t h that of younger female c h i l d r e n , the difference was not statisti cally significant. T h e second hypothesis predicts that c h i l d r e n i n families w i t h h i g h p o w e r fathers a n d mothers w i l l be significantly better role-takers than c h i l d r e n in families of l o w p o w e r fathers and mothers. T a b l e 14.3 presents the m e a n role-taking scores for h i g h a n d l o w p o w e r fathers and mothers as p e r c e i v e d b y their c h i l d r e n . T h e relationships a m o n g the m e a n role-taking scores for the female c h i l d r e n are as p r e d i c t e d . N o n e of the differences in means is statistically significant, but the differ ence in m e a n role-taking scores for female c h i l d r e n i n l o w and h i g h p o w e r m o t h e r homes approaches the .05 l e v e l of significance. T h e dif ference in means for male c h i l d r e n is small, and

T A B L E 14.3. Children's mean role-taking scores by parental power and sex Level of Perceived Parental Power Father's Power Low High Female Children N = Male Children N = -.278 113 -.163 109 -.344 95 -.115 107 Mother's Power High Low -.008 117 -.314 111 --.246 91 --.238 105

T h e difference in means of female c h i l d r e n in h i g h and l o w p o w e r m o t h e r groups is the only c o m p a r i s o n w h i c h a p p r o a c h e s s i g n i f i c a n c e at t h e .05 l e v e l (t = 1.52).

Thomas, Franks, Calonico T A B L E 14.4. Parents' mean role-taking scores by conjugal power type Conjugal Power F-:-iale Husband Dominant N Fathers' Mean Score Mothers' Mean Score
1
1

135

:lv

Syncratic (76) .469 -.013

Autonomic (18) 1.132 -.507

Wife Dominant (35) .704 .414

-.442 223
;er '.'

(40) .660 .295

**

N o n e o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n a n y o f t h e a d j a c e n t m e a n s a r e statistically s i g n i f i c a n t . * * = p < .025 f o r o n e t a i l e d t-test c o m p u t e d b e t w e e n a d j a c e n t m e a n s .

J

iren

^.478 122

\ 456

r .ean of H g and

their role-taking scores of father a n d m o t h e r are i n the opposite p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n . T h e test of the second hypothesis using conju gal p o w e r scores as a measure of the husband's and wife's relative p o w e r in the conjugal relation ship is presented in T a b l e 14.4. T h e hypothesized relationship that fathers (husbands) w i t h l o w power (wife d o m i n a n t conjugal relations) w i l l be more accurate than fathers w i t h h i g h p o w e r (fa ther d o m i n a n t conjugal relations) is not sup ported. Fathers w i t h l o w relative p o w e r i n the conjugal relationship are not the most accurate role-takers. N e i t h e r are fathers w i t h h i g h p o w e r in the conjugal relationship the least accurate. N o n e of the differences b e t w e e n the means is statistically significant. It w i l l be noted f r o m T a b l e 14.4 that the hy pothesized relationship that mothers (wives) h i g h on p o w e r w o u l d be the least accurate role-takers is supported. H o w e v e r , the most accurate roletakers are mothers (wives) w h o come f r o m auto nomic conjugal power structures. T h e difference in means b e t w e e n w i f e d o m i n a n t a n d autonomic groups is statistically significant at the .025 l e v e l .

c h i l d r e n , that positions h a v i n g the least p o w e r i n the f a m i l y (younger female children) are m o r e accurate role-takers than positions h a v i n g m o r e p o w e r (older male children) also support the theo retical proposition that role-taking ability varies inversely w i t h the degree of p o w e r ascribed to social positions. T h i s basic theoretical proposition should n o w be tested on other social groups to d e t e r m i n e the generalizability of the findings. T h e f a m i l y as a social group differs on i m p o r tant dimensions f r o m other social groups, a n d it is possible that findings r e p o r t e d here apply only to variations in role-taking ability a m o n g different family members. T h e family is a social group hav i n g a history i m p o r t a n t in the f u n c t i o n i n g of its members. It is also characterized by strong emo tional bonds' b e t w e e n and w i t h i n generations. Therefore, attempts to generalize these findings to other social groups are risky. Despite these dif ferences b e t w e e n the family and other social groups we b e l i e v e the findings are not group specific. This j u d g m e n t derives f r o m previous ana lyses of the data along w i t h possible interpreta tions of it presented in this report. T h e emotional d i m e n s i o n characteristic of the family was not f o u n d to be an i m p o r t a n t predictor of roletaking ability (see C a l o n i c o and Thomas, 1972).

r.i-.-:ed

DISCUSSION A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
T h e major findings of this research, that fa thers are significantly less accurate role-takers than mothers a n d mothers significantly less accu rate role-takers than their c h i l d r e n , support the theory g u i d i n g this research. T h e data trends for
8
5

::4

o f t h e statistical s i g n i f i c a n c e . C o m p u t i n g O m e g a S q u a r e d [ ]
2

(see H a y e s , 1965:327) a s a m e a s u r e o f a s s o c i a t i o n b a s e d o n t h e t v a l u e b e t w e e n m e a n r o l e - t a k i n g scores o f f a t h e r s a n d y o u n g e r f e m a l e c h i l d r e n , y i e l d s a v a l u e o f .085. T h u s k n o w i n g t h a t a p e r s o n is a father or a f e m a l e c h i l d w i l l allow o n e to a c c o u n t for a b o u t n i n e p e r c e n t o f t h e v a r i a n c e i n r o l e - t a k i n g scores. C l e a r l y m u c h w o r k remains for the researcher interested i n a c c o u n t i n g for variance in role-taking ability.

in

H o w e v e r , o n e s h o u l d n o t c l a i m too m u c h for p o w e r a s i n d e x e d

b y p o s i t i o n i n t h e f a m i l y i n this r e s e a r c h . G i v e n t h e r e l a t i v e l y 'arge N ' s u s e d h e r e , one s h o u l d not o v e r e s t i m a t e the i m p o r t a n c e

136 V a r i a t i o n in the amount of emotional support c h i l d r e n r e c e i v e d f r o m parents was only related to role-taking w h e n parents and c h i l d r e n d i d not share similar value orientations. Such c h i l d r e n f r o m families w i t h h i g h p a r e n t - c h i l d affect w e r e not accurate role-takers. T h e explanation offered for this f i n d i n g was that w i t h h i g h emotional supp o r t f r o m parents, c h i l d r e n c o u l d not accurately take the role of parents because they assumed parents w e r e like themselves, w h e n in fact parents and c h i l d r e n d i d not share similar values. T h a t finding c o m b i n e d w i t h the data in this research suggests that persons in l o w p o w e r positions w h o share similar values w i t h persons of high p o w e r , and w h o have a h i g h positive emotional b o n d w i t h people i n p o w e r w i l l b e accurate roletakers. H o w e v e r , if persons in l o w p o w e r positions do not share similar value positions w i t h persons i n h i g h p o w e r positions, but have h i g h positive emotional bonds w i t h t h e m , they w i l l b e inaccurate role-takers. This relationship is posited to h o l d for any group w h i c h has interacted long e n o u g h for bonds of emotional support to have developed. T h e major findings in this research cannot be explained by differences b e t w e e n the generations. T r u e , the data show that c h i l d r e n are better role-takers than parents but mothers are significantly better than fathers a fact w h i c h argues against differences in generations b e i n g the cause of the findings. Also, mothers in wife d o m i n a n t families are less accurate in role-taking abilities than mothers in autonomic families. Differences b e t w e e n generations w o u l d not help explain this finding; thus, the p o w e r explanation becomes m o r e credible. T h e finding for wives that the autonomic conj u g a l p o w e r structure rather than the husband d o m i n a n t produces the most accurate role-taker requires some comment. T h e theoretical underpinnings may require modification. F u r t h e r research is n e e d e d to untangle methodological problems associated w i t h different p o w e r measures f r o m theoretical inadequacies. T h e conjugal p o w e r measure asks about decision m a k i n g in the husband-wife d y a d , w h i l e the role-taking measure is b e t w e e n the parent's and children's generations. It is not clear w h y this p o w e r measure is related to the wife's but not the husband's ability

P A R T II

Society

to accurately take the role of their c h i l d r e n . Research concentrating on exercise of p o w e r and role-taking across a n d w i t h i n family generations c o u l d contribute i m p o r t a n t knowledge about the f u n c t i o n i n g of families as w e l l as other groups. O u r theoretical orientation leads us to assume that rather than i n d i v i d u a l characteristics the superordinate-subordinate characteristic of social structure should p r e d i c t differences in role-taking ability. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n receives some support in the data. T h e nuclear family positions arrayed on a p o w e r c o n t i n u u m produce significant differences in role-taking, w h i l e the group m e m b e r s ' perceptions along the powerful-powerless d i m e n sion are not consistently related to role-taking. T h e t r e n d in the data seems to suggest that perception of others' p o w e r characteristics m a y be i m p o r t a n t for women's role-taking ability but not for men's (note that it is the wife's perception in the conjugal p o w e r dimension and the female child's p e r c e p t i o n of parents' p o w e r that seem related to role-taking.) This fact suggests that in A m e r i c a n society w o m e n may become m o r e adept at p e r c e i v i n g their o w n as w e l l as others' power characteristics in order to role-take more accurately. Thus the autonomic wife must roletake accurately to m a k e and carry out decisions in her areas of p o w e r . H e r position as wife does not automatically carry this p o w e r w i t h it. T h e p o w e r must be w o n . A c c u r a t e role-taking is one way of w i n n i n g it. F u r t h e r research c o u l d clarify these a n d other relationships. An i m p o r t a n t aspect of this research is the type of investigations that it points t o w a r d . It calls for research to isolate the personal d i m e n s i o n f r o m the structural. If our t h e o r i z i n g is accurate, any i n d i v i d u a l should be a m o r e accurate roletaker of people in superordinate rather than subordinate positions in the group. A c a d e m i c institutions, hospitals or any other hierarchically organized structure w o u l d p r o v i d e ample tests for a n u m b e r of propositions. W o u l d department c h a i r m e n be better role-takers of deans than vice versa? W o u l d deans better take the role of vice presidents than of their department chairmen? If an i n d i v i d u a l tends to develop these different abilities to take the other's role on the basis of p o w e r differences e m e r g i n g in specific role sets, then one should probably not emphasize person-

Thomas, Franks, Calonico ality traits or characteristics but rather systemic qualities of the social structure. Such research could b e g i n to identify the contributions of the i n d i v i d u a l and social structure in the basic social psychological role-taking process.

137 Hays, William L. Statistics for Psychologists. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963. Kuhn, Manford H. "Major Trends in Symbolic Interac tion Theory in the Past Twenty-five Years." Sociological Quarterly 5 (Winter 1964):61-84. Mead, George H . Mind, Self and Society. Edited with introduction by Charles W. Morris. Chicago: Uni versity of Chicago Press, 1934. Reiss, Ira. The Social Context of Premarital Sexual Per missiveness. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. Rose, Jerry D. "The Role of the Other in Self-evalua tion." The Sociological Quarterly 10 (Fall 1969): 470-79. Secord, Paul F. and Carl W. Backman. Social Psychol ogy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. Shibutani, Tamptsu. Society and Personality. E n glewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1961. Smith, Thomas Ewin. "Foundations of Parental Influ ence Upon Adolescents: An Application of Social Power Theory." American Sociological Review 35 (October 1970):860-73. Stone, Gregory P. and Harvey A. Farberman. Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction. Waltham, Massachusetts: Ginn Blaisdell, 1970. Stryker, Sheldon. "Review of the Handbook of Social Psychology." The American Sociological Review 36 (October 1971):894-98. Thomas, Darwin L. and James M. Calonico. "Birth Or der and Family Sociology: A Reassessment." Social Science Al (Winter 1972):48-50. Thomas, Darwin L. and Andrew J. Weigert. "Social ization and Adolescent Conformity to Significant Others: A Cross-national Analysis." American Socio logical Review 36 (October 1971):835-47. Turner, Ralph H. "Role-taking: Process Versus Con formity." Human Behavior and Social Processes. Edited by A. M. Rose. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962, pp. 20-40. Wolfe, D. M. "Power and Authority in the Family." Studies in Social Power. Edited by Dorwin Cartwright. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, 1959, pp. 99-117. Wrong, Dennis H. "Some Problems in Defining Social Power." American Journal of Sociology 73 (May 1968):673-81.

REFERENCES Blood, R. O. and D. M. Wolfe. Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. Bronfenbrenner, U., J. Harding and M. Gallwey. "The Measurement of Skill in Social Perception." Talent and Society. Edited by D. C. McClelland et al. New York: Van Nostrand, 1958, pp. 20-111. , D. and B. Blaylock. "Similarity and Assumed Similarity of Attitudes Between Husbands and Wives." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychol ogy 67 (1963):636-40. Calonico, James M. and Darwin L. Thomas. "Role Tak ing as a Function of Value Similarity and Affect in the Nuclear Family." Unpublished. Washington State University, 1972. Centers, Richard, Bertram H. Raven and Aroldo Rodrigues. "Conjugal Power Structure: A Re-examina tion." American Sociological Review 36 (April 1971):264-78. Cline, V. B. "Interpersonal Perception." Progress in Ex perimental Research. Edited by Brendan A. Maker. New York: Academic Press, 1964, pp. 221-284. 2ottrell, Leonard S. "Some Neglected Problems in So cial Psychology." American Sociological Review 6 (December 1950):705-12. Emerson, Richard M. "Power-dependence Relations." American Sociological Review 27 (February 1962):31-41. Fiedler, F. E. "Assumed Similarity Measures as Pre dictors of Team Effectiveness." Journal of Abnor mal and Social Psychology 49 (1954):381-88. Fiedler, F. E., E. L. Blaisdell and W. G. Warrington. "Unconscious Attitudes as Correlates of Sociometric Choice in a Social Group." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 47 (1952):790-96. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959.

Eugene A. Weinstein & Judith M. Tanur

15

Meanings, Purposes, and Structural Resources in Social Interaction

T h r e e orientations c o m p e t e for d o m i n a n c e a m o n g sociologists c o n c e r n e d w i t h accounting for social interaction. T h e first, symbolic interactioni s m , argues for the p r i m a c y of such subjective determinants as the perceptions of the situation a n d of one another that interactants f o r m . T h e second, exchange theory, focuses on the interests of those engaged in interaction, a n d assigns p r i m a c y to the interplay of those interests. T h e t h i r d , structural-functionalism, emphasizes maintenance requirements for aggregate social entities. It sees the ways individuals are i m p l i c a t e d in networks m e e t i n g those requirements as the p r i m a r y d e t e r m i n a n t of interactive behavior. Various spokesmen for each position ignore criticisms m a d e b y others o r respond w i t h m u c h rancor, usually w r i t i n g past one another. By l i n i n g up concepts side by side and a p p l y i n g some tinkeri n g , it seems possible to generate a scheme for the analysis of interaction that does violence to n o n e of the essential tenets of these approaches a n d yet preserves their special strengths. This paE u g e n e A . Weinstein and Judith M . T a n u r , "Meanings, Purposes, and Structural The Resources in Social Interaction." Relations, Re-

printed

from

Cornell Journal

of Social

volume

11, n o . 1 ( S p r i n g 1976), p p . 1 0 5 - 1 1 0 . N o t e t o the r e a d e r : W e w i s h t o t h a n k the N a t i o n a l Institute o f M e n t a l H e a l t h f o r t h e i r g e n e r o u s s u p p o r t o f this w o r k ( G r a n t M H 1 6 9 5 2 ) . W e also w i s h t o t h a n k P h i l i p B l u m s t e i n , A a r o n C i c ourel, Steven Cole, O . A n d r e w Collver, Rose Coser, Forest D i l l , K e n n e t h Feldman, N o r m a n Goodman, H a n a n Selvin, Jerome S i n g e r , S h e l d o n S t r y k e r , G e r a l d Suttles, J o h n W e i l e r a n d Sasha W e i t m a n , as w e l l as other colleagues a n d students for their h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s o n a n e a r l i e r v e r s i o n o f this p a p e r . Its f l a w s r e m a i n our responsibility, of course.

per is devoted to that task. It points to a direction that we believe social psychology must take if it is to i n f o r m sociology a n d itself. Historically, some of the debates b e t w e e n orientations d e v e l o p e d f r o m a change in focus in sociology f r o m process to structure. In turn-ofthe-century sociology it was fashionable to argue that society is social processthat social interaction is the locus of social order. This c o n c e r n w i t h social process d e v e l o p e d in two directions. O n e m o v e m e n t e m p h a s i z e d the forms of social interaction, i n d e p e n d e n t of their content (association, dissociation, accommodation, etc.). In so doing, this school m a r c h e d bravely into a taxonomic b l i n d alley. (Simmel is a clear exception to the sterility of F o r m a l i s m in sociology. H o w e v e r , his most f r u i t f u l insights came f r o m his sensitive observations of the substance of social interaction rather than a classification of its forms.) L i t t l e is h e a r d f r o m t h e m save for lists of definitions to b e m e m o r i z e d b y students i n introductory sociology courses. T h e second m o v e m e n t was m o r e d i rectly c o n c e r n e d w i t h the substance or content of interaction. S t e m m i n g f r o m an a m a l g a m of G e r m a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d A m e r i c a n pragmatism, this m o v e m e n t was concerned w i t h substance as it was experienced by those i n v o l v e d i n the interaction process. T h e p r i n c i p a l i n h e r i tors of this orientation in contemporary sociology are the symbolic interactionists, w h o r e m a i n persistent evangelists for the point of v i e w that societies are u n e n d i n g streams of interaction process (see B l u m e r , 1962:179-192).

Weinstein, nu We have no quarrel w i t h the symbolic inter actionist's emphasis on process. Indeed, we share it. T h e real strength of symbolic interaction is in its sensitivity to the emergen properties of inter action. T h e episode of interaction (Goffman's " e n counter") becomes a temporary w o r d in itself for the participants. A n d , of course, it is in such worlds that social structure finds its concrete expression. H o w e v e r , in an overemphasis on these strengths, at least one w i n g of symbolic interac tionism (The NeoBlumerians) c o m m i t two ex cesses that are not inherent in all versions (or prac tice) of the perspective. Symbolic interaction sees social processes as the interplay of m i n d e d i n d i viduals, both conscious and selfconscious. Its con cepts are fully rooted in the interaction itself, and finked to the contents of the participants' con sciousness, as i n , for example, such constructs as the definition of the situation, roletaking, and awareness contexts. This emphasis on conscious ness by the symbolic interactionists is the source of the first excess they c o m m i t . Just because the contents of consciousness are qualitative, does not mean that their exterior expression cannot be coded, classified, even counted, m u c h as the i n d i vidual himself codes, classifies, a n d counts in deal i n g w i t h the qualitative richness of his o w n experi ence. No one, not e v e n the most m i c r o o r i e n t e d ethnomethodologist, can attend to all of the po tential i n f o r m a t i o n that is simultaneously availa ble to h i m ; categoric systems for collapsing a n d coding information is what makes minds possible in the first place, and i n f o r m a l c o u n t i n g of occur rences accumulate to what we call experience. In any research endeavor there is a possible trade off b e t w e e n a qualitative but vague richness, dependent u p o n the p e r c e p t i v e skills of the i n d i v i d u a l analyst, and a m o r e precise and m o r e replicable, but more n a r r o w , identification of patterns. Thus orthodox symbolic interactionists b e g the question of this tradeoff by m a k i n g the i n j u n c t i o n against quantitative analysis an article of faith rather than a matter of style. (There are notable exceptions to this methodological stance. T h e research careers of S. Stryker a n d C. N. A l e x ander p r o v i d e exemplary instances.) In practice, this has l e d to a proliferation of sensitizing con

139 cepts for describing the contents of people's con sciousness. Of particular concern are people's i m ages of a n d orientation t o w a r d the social scenes in w h i c h they are i n v o l v e d . At its best, this w o r k results in sensitive a n d c o m p e l l i n g understand i n g of the perspectives of the participants; at its worst, it wanders precariously close to the tax onomic trap of F o r m a l i s m , obscuring the essen tial distinction b e t w e e n definition a n d explana tion. T h e sensitizing orientation of symbolic inter action can lead to w o r k that is prospective, quanti tative, a n d o r i e n t e d to explanation rather than only retrospective, qualitative, a n d oriented to w a r d understanding. This can be accomplished by using the insights gained by taking a p h e n o m o nological stance and casting t h e m , selfconsciously and explicitly, into a f r a m e w o r k of measurement rather than description. This recasting, w h i l e re taining the phenomonologists' sensitivity to the dependence of m e a n i n g on context, allows for two potential gains. First, it makes it possible to assess the degree of consensus in intersubjectivity (that is, estimate reliability). Thus, reliance on the perceptions of a single analyst is r e d u c e d . Second, the results of phenomonologically p r e m i s e d i n vestigation can be incorporated into quantitative modes of analysis. Symbolic interaction has used i n f o r m a l con tent analysis for the generation of qualitatively differentiated types. F o r m a l c o d i n g procedures are not used to establish the types. Rather a docu mentary m e t h o d uses instancesincontext as i n dexical particulars signifying the essential conno tative m e a n i n g . T h e same documentary approach can be used to m a k e comparative ratings of h o w m u c h of a particular quality is represented by an observation of contentincontext rather than the m o r e basic decision as to whether the content falls w i t h i n the type. H o w e v e r , ethnomethodolo gists, among others, point out serious problems in any content analytic procedure, w h e t h e r quali tative or quantitative (cf. A a r o n C i c o u r e l , 1964, Method and Measurement in Sociology, N e w York: T h e F r e e Press). Ethnomethodologists are rightfully upset about the assumed isomorphism between the c o m m u n i c a t i v e intent of the actor and the perception of it by the coder. This as sumption rests in t u r n upon the further assump

140 t i o n of a c o m m o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e culture bet w e e n actor and analyst. Sensitivity to contextd e p e n d e n c e of m e a n i n g does not obviate the p r o b l e m . In some respects, the p r o b l e m is insoluble. As we note later, there are always unlocatable limits to the extent of intersubjectivity. Perhaps it is most reasonable to v i e w a c o m m u n i c a t i v e act as a resource available for sense-making in the elaboration of m e a n i n g by a " n o r m a l m e m b e r . " T h u s the analyst does not take the role of the source of c o m m u n i c a t i o n but of the category of persons to w h o m the c o m m u n i c a t i o n is d i r e c t e d . O r the analyst can participate directly i n the process u n d e r investigation in w h i c h case he "takes his o w n r o l e " as the source of i n f o r m a t i o n about c o m m u n i c a t i o n d i r e c t e d t o w a r d himself. This orientation is m o r e interactive in nature a n d shifts the focus f r o m intent to potential effect. It does not, however, eliminate t w o difficulties w h i c h can plague any research operation i n w h i c h meanings are the object of study. First, there is the danger that the analyst's theoretical scheme w i l l interfere w i t h his capacity to take the role of the " n o r m a l m e m b e r . " Second, the assumption that c o m m u n i c a t i o n is b e i n g addressed to a " n o r m a l m e m b e r " is not always tenable in established relationships w h i c h may have generated their o w n c o m m u n i c a t i v e culture. N o t that quantification is to be r e g a r d e d as an e n d in itself. It is m e r e l y a means of m a k i n g available techniques w h i c h a d d p o w e r and sensit i v i t y to i n d i v i d u a l j u d g m e n t w h e n one attempts to detect a n d describe patterning in a set of observations. T h r o u g h using the most p o w e r f u l tools available, some purchase c a n be obtained on the c o m p l e x interplay among the conditions charact e r i z i n g a social scene, the participants' attrib u t i o n of meanings to the scene, and their actions t o w a r d one another. W h y t h r o w away a n y t h i n g helpful? A n d , equally to the point, w h y insist that o n l y understanding is possible w i t h o u t e x p l o r i n g the potentials for explanation available in one's o w n framework? By concentrating its analysis almost exclusively on events interior to an episode of interaction and to the people w i t h i n it, symbolic interaction almost c o m p l e t e l y neglects the connectedness of episodes to each other. B u t episodes are connected. T h e very fact that a particular e p i -

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sode occurs, the identities of the particular participants w h o populate it, the context w i t h i n w h i c h it occurs i n c l u d i n g the resources, b o t h material a n d cultural, available to the participants are not matters of happenstance. These matters are the results of the aggregated outcomes of m a n y prior episodes of interaction. It is the aggregated outcomes that form the linkages among episodes of interaction that are the concern of sociology qua sociology. Social order is d e p e n d e n t not only on the p r e v e n t i o n of universal aggression, b u t on the existence of some measure o f coordination. A n d the maintenance of effective c o o r d i n a t i o n in e v e n the simplest of social institutions requires a base of i n f o r m a l u n derstandings, codified rules, shared meanings, a n d material resources that is enormous b o t h in m a g n i t u d e a n d complexity. As an example, consider the specialized sort of interaction that takes place w i t h i n the institution called collective bargaining. A n y b a r g a i n i n g session clearly must beg i n w i t h and m a k e use of the outcomes of previous sessions b e t w e e n the particular participants. T h e r e is an e m e r g e n t culture generated out of these p r i o r episodes that is specific to this set of relationships a n d that evolves d u r i n g this particular session. B u t the participants must also w o r k w i t h i n a shared f r a m e w o r k that takes into account p r i o r interactions b e t w e e n others, w h i c h have left such residues or resources as labor laws, previous contracts, the possibility of arbitration, a c o m m o n language (both general a n d specialized), the ethic of good faith, the solvency of management (or its lack) that sets b r o a d limits on the terms of settlement, the reality of strike threats, expectation for c u r r e n t l y accepted contract terms, and the v e r y n o t i o n of a contract. T h e list stretches on to i n c l u d e the total content of both the culture of the relationship b e t w e e n these parties a n d the larger culture w i t h i n w h i c h that m i n i - c u l t u r e is situated. Of course, any collective bargaining session or to r e t u r n to our m a i n argument, any episode of interactioncan be described on the basis of its u n i q u e parameters. It is undeniably true that there is only one t i m e in the history of the u n i verse w h e n these particular participants m e t i n this precise setting, in these v e r y special frames of m i n d , to discuss these v e r y aspects of these

Weinstein, Tanur specific issues. B u t it is probably an impossible task, a n d certainly an u n p r o d u c t i v e one, to per f o r m a l l the tracebacks necessary to explain a cur rent episode of interaction in terms of its u n i q u e links w i t h other concrete episodes. E c o n o m y of description a n d the possibility of generalization exist only w h e n abstraction of the properties of a particular episode a n d their aggregation w i t h properties of other such epi sodes has taken place. To thus examine the aggre gate properties of episodes of interaction a n d to see t h e m as analytically representable as a social system is a legitimate enterprise. It is possible, without D u r k h e i m i a n reification, to see these ag gregate properties as c o n t r i b u t i n g to the re sources available to participants in any concrete episode. F u r t h e r , it is possible to do so w i t h o u t denying that it is i n d e e d w i t h i n the episode that resources become manifest, m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h the consciousness of the participants. N e i t h e r is it necessary to insist on the r e d u c t i o n of social structure to i n d i v i d u a l consciousness. T h e con cept of social structure is necessary to deal w i t h the i n c r e d i b l e density a n d c o m p l e x i t y of relations through w h i c h episodes of interaction are inter connected. So we are perfectly comfortable w i t h Merton's statement that " D e t e r m i n a n t s of social life . . . are n o t necessarily evident to those e n gaged i n i t " (1972:41). Structural-functional orientations towards i n teraction, on the other h a n d , start f r o m this aggre gate l e v e l . T h e y assume a set of coordinating func tions l i n k i n g together elements of a structure into an integrated, coordinated n e t w o r k . P e o p l e lotated at g i v e n positions in the structure t h e n tarry the structural imperatives as at least partial recipes for their activities in ongoing interaction. The strength of structural-functional theories is an their emphasis on the m o d e of coordination, that is on the consequences of aggregation, a n d using system maintenance requirements as simplifying assumptions for accounting for the na ture of interaction process itself. W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k , the concepts l i n k i n g structure and process are status a n d role. P e o p l e are attached to structure in everyday interaction through normatively scripted roles. These n o r m a tive scripts (role expectations) are part of the nec essary e q u i p m e n t individuals possess for p a r t i c i

141 pation in the social process, e q u i p m e n t a c q u i r e d by individuals d u r i n g socialization, a process w h i c h is itself n o r m a t i v e l y scripted. These role expectations are i n t e r n a l i z e d by individuals, they operate as self-regulatory mechanisms, a n d they become manifest i n interaction w i t h other i n d i viduals possessing c o m p l e m e n t a r y e q u i p m e n t . T h e b u r d e n that must be c a r r i e d by the con cept of role in structural-functional accounts of interaction is clearly too heavy. It is possible, h o w ever, to m o d i f y the position-role treatment of the i n d i v i d u a l to i n c l u d e b o t h contextual a n d proces sual components. T h e concept of situational iden tity serves this purpose. A person's situational identity is the locus of all attributes a n d character istics i m p u t e d to h i m by those present in a partic ular encounter. A n y social position one occupies is a candidate for inclusion in a situational i d e n tity. B u t so are dispositional tendencies, elements of biography i n c l u d i n g p r i o r actions in the present encounter, and any characteristics we possess. Sit uational identities serve as bases b o t h for expecta tions a n d actions. Some social position m a y be p r e d o m i n a n t in o r g a n i z i n g the elements of a situ ational i d e n t i t y as in typical status activation. E v e n so, status elements m a y only set b r o a d boundaries for behavior; these boundaries m a y be sufficiently broad that they are of limited im portance i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h behavior w i l l take place t o w a r d what e n d . C i c o u r e l (1972) goes further along these lines by asserting that the structural-functional treat m e n t of interaction is analytically i n c o m p l e t e ; it fails to specify the details of how, in process, roles become manifest. H o w do people signal to one another the roles they w i l l carry out and the c o m p l e m e n t a r y roles that others ought to carry out? H o w do they achieve consensus as to w h i c h roles are relevant a n d w h a t matters are outside the d o m a i n of relevance in any particular episode of interaction? H o w , if i n d e e d it is the case, is the sharedness of role definitions r e c o g n i z e d a n d b u i l t upon? C i c o u r e l notes that by asserting that roles structure social situations, one automatically i m poses, rather t h a n investigates, the fit b e t w e e n structural i m a g e r y a n d manifest social process. In e m p i r i c a l investigations, this i m a g e r y is translated into a set of c o d i n g operations that t e n d to exclude the problematic aspects of interaction,

142 or e v e n worse, to treat t h e m as m e r e l y u n i l l u m i nating examples of a l i m i t e d range of p e r m i t t e d variation in role activity. Thus the fit b e t w e e n data and theory becomes tautological. Instead, the "roledness" of a social encounter should be, itself, taken as problematic a n d w o r t h y of investigation. N o r m s and roles t h e n become part but not the totality, of the pool of meanings accessible to " n o r m a l m e m b e r s , " to be used as resources in the m u n d a n e process of getting through the day. T h e extent, the conditions a n d the means by w h i c h such structural resources are brought into play, are thus investigated w i t h i n a context of discovery rather than serving as the analyst's arbitrarily imposed metaphor. Social locations bear still another b u r d e n in structural-functional analysis. At the aggregate l e v e l , interests pattern according to structural location. B u t h o w interests operate at the l e v e l of ongoing process is less clearly d e v e l o p e d . N u m e r ous conceptual treatments of role omit any direct inclusion of purposes as part of the core m e a n i n g of the concept. At best one m i g h t be able to squeeze purposive connotations out of such terms as " r i g h t s " and "obligations." B u t one w o u l d have to squeeze v e r y h a r d and, in practice, the enterprise is rarely undertaken. Instead, roles are defined almost exclusively in terms of the three " P ' s , " p r e s c r i b e d , proscribed, and p e r m i t t e d behavior associated w i t h social positions. Perhaps if one c o u l d assume that personal goals and struct u r e d roles w e r e always in harmony, the p r o b l e m w o u l d not be so serious. By behaving in socially appropriate ways one w o u l d automatically be pursuing one's o w n interests. B u t to assume so again resolves by fiat what is essentially an e m p i r i c a l issue. Indeed, there is clear recognition in functionalism that goals and roles may not be articulated. Exchange theory provides an alternative orientation to the analyzing of the interplay of interests. In exchange theory, rather than as bearers of normative scripts, people are seen as packages of hierarchically arranged interests. Positional location, w h i c h in structural-functional analysis w o u l d be seen as the major warrant for claims on resources, is, in exchange theory, only one of several possible sources of legitimating claims. Others, such as distributive justice, no less norma-

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tive, then can supercede or subsume social location. T h e discussion of preference orderings or outcome values by exchange theorists has an atomistic flavor; there is little in the way of p o i n t i n g out h o w values for outcomes are interrelated withiii the i n d i v i d u a l . T h e y probably are. A useful way of dealing w i t h the interrelationships is to v i e w t h e m as integrated w i t h the self-system. Singleman (1972) emphasizes the i m p o r t a n c e of "selves" to exchange theory. T h e overt manifestation of this system in interaction is the individual's situational identity. Situational identities per se can be loci of rewards and costs. As we have noted elsewhere (Weinstein, 1969), the actor may have highly specific objectives in the encounter such as touching another for a five dollar loan. W h o he can be or has to be in order to get the five dollars w i l l constitute an important set of costs for h i m . It w o u l d be only in the most secondary and impersonal encounters that the situational identities of the parties w o u l d not be the p r i n c i p a l nexus of rewards a n d costs. O f t e n , they are precisely and completely that. A person's p r i n c i p a l m o t i v a t i o n may be to get affirmation f r o m the other(s) for an identity he desires or requires for himself, e.g., w o r t h y of esteem. Or establishing a particular situational identify can be a prerequisite means for pursuing other types of purposes as in getting oneself defined as essential to the group for future leverage in it. In either case, whatever the more specific goals of exchange in interaction, u n d e r l y i n g t h e m are negotiations, and subsequent renegotiations as w e l l , about who is " r e a l l y " w h o m in the current situation. F u r t h e r , to see exchange as the modus operandi of social relations does not require glossing over the linkage i n t e r v e n i n g between i n d i v i d u a l interests and society-at-large as some exchange theorists are wont to do. Interests do not get exchanged in the abstract, but in the marketplaces of everyday social encounters. T h e r e is a l e v e l of analysis b e t w e e n social structures and i n d i v i d ual interests, the l e v e l of concrete social process. A n d just as there are concepts and propositions at the sociological and at the psychological levels, so too must there be propositions and concepts dealing w i t h the l e v e l of everyday interaction it-

Weinstein, Tanur

143 n e e d not be any assumption that purposes are transitive, either w i t h i n individuals or across t h e m , or any assumption of conscious, let alone self-conscious, rationality. O n e n e e d not be an orthodox F r e u d i a n to be c o n v i n c e d that people c a n have purposes of w h i c h they are unaware a n d pursue t h e m vigorously. W h a t is important to e m phasize is that, by definition, interaction entails not only the activity of one person p u r s u i n g his o w n interests, but the responsive behavior of others to that activity. G o a l seeking in interaction, then, is a process i n v o l v i n g both these defining features; personal purposes must get p u r s u e d through c o n t r o l l i n g or d i r e c t i n g the responses that others make to one's o w n activity. As such, these responsive actions themselves become goals of interpersonal activity. T h e responses of another i n t e n d e d by one person may be quite overt, as w h e n one hands another m o n e y or covert, as w h e n one thinks another to be a good person. B u t w h e t h e r overt or covert, i n t e n d e d consciously or w i s h e d subconsciously, they are the objects a r o u n d w h i c h people's everyday social activities are organized. Interpersonal task is a generic t e r m to denote the response f r o m another that a person's activities are d i r e c t e d to elicit. T h e purposive activities themselves are lines of action. T h i r d , e x p a n d i n g Goffman's analysis to general social theory suggests that the f u n d a m e n t a l process in encounters is the transformation of resource potentials into r e a l i z e d resources. (The i m plications o f " F u n i n G a m e s , " (Goffman, 1961) extend b e y o n d the construction of reality in the encounter to a general theory of the interchange b e t w e e n social structure and social process. M u c h of this paper is m e r e l y tracing out and a t t e m p t i n g to generalize those implications. Perhaps fools rush in w h e r e angels fear to tread.) T h e potential resources of an encounter are functions of the physical context of the encounter, and the participants themselves, w i t h their characteristics, purposes, interests and schemes for constructing sense. T a k e n together, these p o t e n tial resources d e t e r m i n e what is available for realization. F o r example, each of the participants occupies a n u m b e r of different social locations vis-avis the other. W h i l e all these locations are part of the potential resources, only some w i l l be rele-

Bum

self. G o f f m a n has made a major c o n t r i b u t i o n to the d e v e l o p m e n t of such a conceptual f r a m e w o r k w i t h such notions as " w o r k i n g consensus" (1959), " r e a l i z e d resources" and rules of relevance and irrelevance (1961). Symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and the tradition of field-work have m a d e contributions as w e l l , contributions that not only sensitize us to the processes by w h i c h social structures are actualized in interaction, but alert us to ways in w h i c h the outcomes of exchange are c o n d i t i o n e d to reduce society i m mediately to the interplay of i n d i v i d u a l interests, as does m u c h of exchange theory, is to neglect a critical l e v e l of analysis. We have n o w p o i n t e d to m a n y questions raised about the completeness or adequacy of some existing paradigms of social interaction. In the process, we have noted the possibility of generating a framework for analyzing interaction incorporating the capacity of symbolic interactionism to deal w i t h meanings and w i t h the emergent aspects of interaction, the ability of structural-functionalism to deal w i t h linkages among episodes of interaction, and the strength of exchange theory in dealing w i t h coordination of contingencies in the pursuit of i n d i v i d u a l interests. L e t us n o w draw together the essential aspects of such a framework. First, interaction is an analytically separable level, not the e p i p h e n o m e n o n of i n d i v i d u a l interests or consciousness, or of structural residues Swanson, 1965). On this l e v e l the focal u n i t of analysis is the episode of interactionGoffman's " e n c o u n t e r , " a contained social w o r l d w i t h i n a stream of such worlds. Encounters occur w h e n people make themselves available to one another for c o m m u n i c a t i v e contact, and terminate w h e n that availability is w i t h d r a w n . (Purposive i g n o r i n g d u r i n g co-presence is a special instance w h i c h fits ordinary definitions of interaction but w o u l d be excluded u n d e r this definition.) Second, the pursuit of personal purposes is what these episodes of social interaction are all about. This assumption of purposiveness is a u n i versal feature of all theoretical schemes for accounting for social action. F r o m Aristotle to Schutz, f r o m Homans to Parsons, f r o m needs to values, some f o r m of hedonic assumption is necessary to render social activity as sensible. T h e r e

144 vant to the joint definition of the situation that emerges a n d thus become r e a l i z e d resources. In the above example, the realization of resources are used as equivalent to M e r t o n ' s "status a c t i v a t i o n . " B u t Goffman's idea of resources is broader a n d not l i m i t e d o n l y to social locations. A n y value, preference, expectation p r e s u m e d b y one participant to be h e l d by another c a n be made an object of joint attention, e x p l i c i t l y agreed u p o n as irrelevant, or go i g n o r e d because the focus of j o i n t attention is placed on other values, preferences or expectations. O t h e r potential resources i n c l u d e any i n d i v i d u a l characteristic of the coparticipants, any action or event in the history of their co-participation, and the c u l t u r a l i m p l i c a tions of such events for a t t r i b u t i n g traits or dispositions. A n d each of these additional resources carries the possibility for focus or disregard. T h e p r o b l e m for theory at the interactional l e v e l is to account for the specific transformations (or realizations) that take place. W h a t are the processes i n v o l v e d i n selecting f r o m a m o n g the various constructions that c o u l d be p l a c e d u p o n an encounter the one to w h i c h its participants tacitly subscribe? W h a t are the determinants of h o w these processes t u r n out? W h i c h resources w i l l b e c o m e r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h i n c o r p o r a t i o n into the j o i n t definition of the s i t u a t i o n " w o r k i n g consensus"that serves as the prerequisite base for maintenance of interaction? A n d w h i c h of the lines of action available w i t h i n this larger frame w i l l be expressed, thus b e c o m i n g b o t h a r e a l i z e d resource a n d a n e w potential one for p r e d i c a t i n g f u r t h e r lines of action? F o u r t h , the location o f a n i n d i v i d u a l i n a n encounter cannot be adequately described only in terms of the structural locations he occupies; that list is b o t h too l o n g a n d too short. It must be shortened to exclude those social positions that are o n l y potential and not r e a l i z e d resources, a n d it must be lengthened to i n c l u d e all the other r e a l i z e d resources, and it must be l e n g t h e n e d to i n c l u d e all the other r e a l i z e d resources attaching to the person. This total set of r e a l i z e d resources is an individual's situational identity. Status activ a t i o n is thus subsumed u n d e r the construction of situational identities a n d situational identities are, in t u r n , central but not exhaustive elements of a w o r k i n g consensus.

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F i f t h , the w o r k i n g consensus itself is usefuli;analyzed as the o u t c o m e of exchange processes E a c h participant m a y have somewhat differer.interests in w h i c h of the particular " e v e n t s " that could be c r e a t e d out of the " s t u f f " (potential resources) of the present occasion becomes manifest. To establish a w o r k i n g consensus, therefore involves negotiating agreement on meanings particularly the implications for action to be asc r i b e d to elements in the p o o l of resources. (Trus is roughly equivalent to i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h the ir.dexical status of any specific element.) T h e forrthat the pursuit of interests takes is this negotia:i n g over meanings. (It is important to note tha: the " n e g o t i a t i o n " m a y i n v o l v e n o t h i n g m o r e thar. tacit assent to the c o m m o n - c u l t u r a l implication; of some e l e m e n t of context or action-in-context Negotiations c a n thus take place over w h i c h pctential elements of situational identities (includi n g w h i c h of the various structural positions each of the participants occupies vis-a-vis the others is to be appropriate for the current occasion W h a t , for example, should be the implications c: p r i o r episodes i n v o l v i n g these participants fc: w h o they are n o w ? Or for what should "rightf u l l y " engage their attention? Or w h i c h of the possible norms (also part of potential resources for s u p p o r t i n g claims and counterclaims tha: participants c a n m a k e on one another are appropriately invocable on the basis of situational identities? P r e s u m a b l y , p e o p l e w i l l negotiate aspects c: the w o r k i n g consensus on the basis of h o w it wiL
1

G o f f m a n i m p l i c i t l y rests his d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e w o r k i n g consen-

sus o n e x c h a n g e . " E a c h p a r t i c i p a n t i s a l l o w e d t o e s t a b l i s h thr tentative official r u l i n g r e g a r d i n g matters w h i c h are vital t: h i m . . . I n e x c h a n g e f o r this c o u r t e s y h e r e m a i n s s i l e n t o r n o n c o m m i t t a l o n m a t t e r s i m p o r t a n t t o o t h e r s . . . " (1959:9 Our treatment is a bit less passive. Interestingly Goffmar (1969:38) s u b s e q u e n t l y r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e i d e a o f t h e exchangeability of intangibles such as esteem. We disagree. Whilf t h e tactics u s e d t o e l i c i t e x p r e s s i o n s o f e s t e e m m a y n o t b e d i r e c : i t s e e m s u n p a r s i m o n i o u s t o r e q u i r e t h a t t h e c o g n i t i v e processed i n v o l v e d i n e v a l u a t i n g t h e satisfactions l i k e l y t o o c c u r a s a conseq u e n c e o f o u r a c t i o n s a r e d i f f e r e n t f o r i n t a n g i b l e t h a n f o r tangib l e o u t c o m e s . N o r d o e s i t s e e m n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v i d e a separate a c c o u n t f o r t h e p r o c e s s o f choice o f a c t i o n s d e s i g n e d t o o v e r t ; p r o d u c e o u t c o m e s t h a t m a y n o t e v e n b e o v e r t l y e x p r e s s e d . Peop l e c a n a n d d o a c t i n w a y s w h i c h t h e y c a n o n l y a s s u m e arf l e a d i n g others to v a l u e t h e m . A d m i t t e d l y , it is o f t e n gauchf ( a n d foolish) t o b a r g a i n f o r t h e i r o v e r t e x p r e s s i o n s i n c e th=e x p r e s s i o n i s e a s i l y f a k e d a n d m a y b e m a n d a t o r y a s a matte: o f tact.

Weinstein, Tanur affect their interpersonal tasks. Indeed, the estab lishment of some particular w o r k i n g consensus is always an interpersonal task in itself. P o w e r has its i m p a c t in this process. P o w e r has its roots in the capacity of one person to affect the interests of another (both inside of the c u r r e n t encounter and in possible other encounters. This is u l t i mately reducible to terms of affecting the proba bility of success in interpersonal tasks.) T h a t ca pacity m a y not be equally distributed a m o n g participants, so that some m a y be at an advantage in negotiating meetings. (This is the interpersonal analog of the f u n c t i o n i n g of p o w e r in the aggre gate social construction of reality, B e r g e r a n d L u c k m a n , 1966.) H o w e v e r , p o w e r m a y b e l i m i t e d in its exercise by the reluctance of its holder to use it because of its implications for the situational identities of b o t h its user a n d its target. (Blau 1964) makes a similar point in discussing the l i m its of p o w e r in w h i c h one w i t h greater p o w e r may exchange fairness for esteem.) Thus, one who exercises p o w e r may be l i m i t e d by his de sire to avoid b e i n g seen as one w h o w o u l d "take advantage" of his position. A n d its target m a y be reluctant to accept the i d e n t i t y of one w h o w o u l d be exploited by superior p o w e r . (Using somewhat different terms, T h i b a u t a n d K e l l e y T959] talk about the tendency to transform what they call fate control into m u t u a l behavior control.) These niceties may not always obtain; coer cive p o w e r exists a n d is unhesitantly used by some. B u t , as l o n g as constraints of legitimacy a n d altruism exist, differential p o w e r alone is insuffi cient to p r e d i c t the results of negotiation over meaning. So, ultimately, the pursuit of personal purposes always involves negotiation over m e a n ings, w h e t h e r tacit or explicit. H e r e symbolic i n teraction, w i t h its emphasis on the continuous construction of m e a n i n g , merges w i t h exchange theory w h e n that construction becomes a j o i n t process. F o r negotiation over meanings does not stop w i t h the establishment of the w o r k i n g con sensus. E a c h act, each event o c c u r r i n g in the en counter, not only adds to, but in part m a y trans form, the pool of resources for constructing a n d retrospectively reconstructing m e a n i n g . A n ex change already made can no longer be h e l d up as a contingency. Or an event can ause a person

145 to discover that his interests are not w h e r e he thought they lay. Sixth, all interaction is inherently p r o b l e m atic; the definition of the situation may n e v e r be assumed to be necessarily " g i v e n . " T h e idea of the i n h e r e n t l y problematic nature of situational definitions runs counter to some versions of structural-functionalism a n d to m u c h of our unexam i n e d everyday experience. In those versions of structural-functionalism, problematic definitions are usually treated as either the result of malarticulation in the social structure (some forms of role conflict) or as a residual category s t e m m i n g f r o m the w i d e range of latitude p e r m i t t e d in sta tus-linked behavior. In our everyday experience, we often go into contexts for w h i c h there exist p r i o r coordinating arrangements (e.g., schedules, agendas, appointments) for our b e i n g there, w h i c h i n c l u d e agreements as to the nature of the future w o r k i n g consensus. We come, we act as if such w e r e i n d e e d the arrangements, so do our co-participants, so w h e r e is the problem? Indeed, the omnipresence of the possibility of problems has generated a variety of interactive techniques (e.g., tact) for protection of encounters against the failure of expectations. T h e existence of such elab orate routines (like the existence of incest taboos) is testimony to the importance of u n t o w a r d events, not necessarily their commonness. A n y situation, h o w e v e r , may become prob lematic at any t i m e . Exogenous occurrences may upset the balance of interests that originally p r o d u c e d a w o r k i n g consensus. O r , the interests of some participants m a y be p e r c e i v e d as not b e i n g sufficiently satisfied by an u p c o m i n g arrange ment. Renegotiation, i n c r e m e n t a l or radical, of the terms of the previous w o r k i n g consensus t h e n becomes the object of b a r g a i n i n g (Goode, 1960). In order for us to experience a situation as n o n problematic, it is necessary for i n i t i a l action to convey the meta-message that all is to p r o c e e d along expected lines. A n d it is necessary that no i n f o r m a t i o n be i n t r o d u c e d countering such pre suppositions (including assumptions about the sta tus elements in situational identities). W h e n our subjective expectancies are exceedingly h i g h , we are l i k e l y to falsely assign zero probability to such exceptions a n d hence see the situation as n o n problematic.

146 A n o t h e r place u n d e r w h i c h problems are b u r i e d is the heap of u n e x a m i n e d assumptions whose v e r y u n e x a m i n e d status makes social life possible (Garfinkel, 1967). These i n c l u d e the ass u m p t i o n of a single, ultimately k n o w a b l e " r e a l i t y " a n d the tendency to overattribute intersubjectivity f r o m the evidence of similar linguistic practices. C o m m o n words m a y have elements of u n c o m m o n m e a n i n g . We do not have sufficient attention to focus b o t h on consensus and on exami n i n g the possibilities of h a v i n g " t a l k e d past one a n o t h e r . " As long as there is sufficient appearance of c o m m o n a l i t y to manage the practical aspects of coordination, we do not t e n d to question our assumption that accurate role-taking is c o m m o n to the co-participants. B u t inconsistencies crop u p , a n d what we had b e e n taking for granted all along may require reinterpretation. We are not d e n y i n g the possibility of partial identity of meanings. To do so w o u l d be to deny culture itself. W h a t we are i m p l y i n g is that the m y r i a d elements of the situation vary in the l e v e l of consensus that exists about their categoric placement and the ease of such placement. O n e i m p o r t a n t consequence of the partial lack of intersubjectivity is, as Goffman emphasizes, that we must ultimately rely on impressions and thus are constantly vulnerable to b e i n g d u p e d . B u t it has another consequence as w e l l . It means that definitions of the situation are not totally and i m m e d i ately fixed for all by the " g i v e n s " of i m m e d i a t e experience. A n d this leaves o p e n the possibility of m u t u a l negotiation over meanings and their implications for appropriate behavior as avenues for p u r s u i n g personal interests. This is not to i m p l y that the social process is only m e a n i n g negotiation, or that exchange of objects as w e l l as of implications for identity does not take place. N o r do the everpresent possibilities of surprise, discovery, or renegotiation deny the occurrence of the regular, the expected, or, in short, the degree of stability necessary for the continued existence and functioning of social structure. Interaction, it occurrence, its forms, and its outcomes are not r a n d o m but patterned. This p a t t e r n i n g comes f r o m the aggregate outcomes of i n u m m e r a b l e encounters. T h e i r traces (in concrete objects, in records, and in the recall of those w h o participated) and the cultural mean-

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ings and n o r m a t i v e implications of those objects and recalled events are a large share of the potential resources of any encounter. T h e r e m a i n i n g share consists of the co-presence of this particular set of participants w i t h their particular interests and frameworks for o r g a n i z i n g experience. B u t e v e n the agendas that brought these co-participants together are influenced by the ways these people are i m p l i c a t e d in social structure. In particular, the social positions people can c l a i m to occupy and the interests that they have as a result of these positions strongly affect the agendas for their rounds of everyday encounters. T h e i m p a c t of social structure u p o n interaction is thus not direct. Its j u n c t u r e w i t h social process is in the potential resources available in any encounter for constructive definitions of the situation. A n d the w o r k of social process is transformi n g structurally p r o v i d e d potentials into r e a l i z e d resources. T a k e n collectively, the outcomes of that realization process aggregate into social structure.

REFERENCES Barnsley, John H. 1972. " O n the Hobbesian Problem of Order: A Comment." American Sociological Review, 37 3(June):369-373. Berger, P. L., and T. Luckman. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Doubleday. Blau, Peter. 1964. "Justice in Social Exchange." Sociological Inquiry, 26:183-193. Blumer, Herbert. 1962. "Society as Symbolic Interaction." Pp. 179-192 in Arnold M. Rose (ed.), Human Behavior and Social Process. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. Cicourel, Aaron. 1972. "Basic and Normative Rules in the Negotiation of Status and Role." Pp. 229-258 in David Sudnow (ed.), Studies in Social Interaction. New York: The Free Press. Ellis, Desmond P. 1971. " O n the Hobbesian Problem of Order: A Critical Reappraisal of the Normative Solution." American Sociological Review, 36:692703. Garfinkel, H. 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. New York: Prentice-Hall. Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

Turner . 1961. " F u n in Games." Pp. 17-84 in Encounters. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. . 1969. Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Goode, William J. 1960. "Norm Commitment and Conformity to Role Status Obligations." American Journal of Sociology, 66:246-258. Merton, Robert. 1957. "Social Structure and Anomie." Pp. 131-194 in Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. . 1972. "Insiders and Outsiders." American Journal of Sociology, 78 1:41.

147 Singleman, Fred. 1972. "Exchange as Symbolic Interaction." American Sociological Review, 37:414424. Swanson, Guy E. 1956. " O n Explanations of Social Interaction." Sociometry, 28:101-123. Thibaut, John W., and Harold H. Kelley. 1959. The Social Psychology of Groups. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Weinstein, Eugene. 1969. "The Development of Interpersonal Competence." In David Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Ralph H. Turner

16

The Public Perception of Protest

T h e year 1965 m a r k e d a dramatic t u r n i n g point in A m e r i c a n reactions to racial disorder. Starting w i t h Watts, d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t y sentiment and the verdicts of politically sensitive c o m missions have identified mass violence by blacks p r i m a r i l y as acts of social protest. In spite of its w e l l advertised failings, the M c C o n e C o m m i s s i o n (Governor's C o m m i s s i o n on the Los Angeles R i ots, 1965) devoted most of its attention to reporti n g the justified complaints of Negroes and proposing their amelioration. T h e K e r n e r Report
R a l p h H . T u r n e r , " T h e P u b l i c P e r c e p t i o n o f P r o t e s t , " American Sociological Review, v o l . 34, D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 9 , p p . 8 1 5 - 8 3 1 . R e printed by permission. P r e p a r e d as Presidential Address, 64th A n n u a l Meetings of the A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , S e p t e m b e r 3 , 1969. T h e a u thor is grateful for the s e a r c h i n g critiques of an earlier v e r s i o n of the paper by H e r b e r t B l u m e r , J o h n H o r t o n , L e w i s Kfflian, L e o K u p e r , K u r t L a n g , M e l v i n Seeman, N e i l Smelser, and Samuel Surace.

(National A d v i s o r y Commission o n C i v i l Disorders, 1968) w e n t further in p r e d i c a t i n g r e c o m mendations for action on the assumption that disorders must be understood as acts of social protest, and not m e r e l y as c r i m e , anti-social violence, or revolutionary threats to l a w and order. A few earlier bodies h a d seen m i n o r i t y protest as a component in racial disorders (Silver, 1968), but in most cases these commissions w e r e far r e m o v e d f r o m the political process. E v e n w h e n whites had perpetrated most of the violence, p u b l i c officials before 1965 typically v e n t e d their most intense anger against Negroes, N e g r o leaders, and their w h i t e allies (Lee a n d H u m p h r e y s , 1943; R u d w i c k , 1964). If comparable data w e r e available f r o m earlier racial disturbances, it is u n l i k e l y they w o u l d m a t c h M o r r i s a n d Jeffries' (1967:5) finding that 5 4 % in a sample of white L o s Angeles residents v i e w e d the disturbance as N e g r o protest.

148 T h e a i m of this paper is to suggest several theoretical vantage points f r o m w h i c h to p r e d i c t w h e n a public w i l l a n d w i l l not v i e w a major disturbance as an act of social protest. Historically, labor strife has sometimes b e e n understood as protest and sometimes not. A p p a r e n t l y the protest m e a n i n g in the activities of Cesar C h a v e z a n d his f a r m laborers is discounted by most A m e r icans today. A gang rumble is seldom v i e w e d as protest, e v e n w h e n Puerto Paeans a n d other m i norities are p r o m i n e n t l y i n v o l v e d . Three-fourths of an unspecified sample of L o s Angeles residents in M a y , 1969, are r e p o r t e d to have seen disorders in secondary schools as the w o r k of agitators and not as social protest, (Los Angeles T i m e s , M a y 19, 1969), e v e n though M e x i c a n - A m e r i c a n s and blacks have p l a y e d the l e a d i n g roles. E v e n t s of early 1969 h i n t at a rising m o v e m e n t to redefine all racial and youthful disturbances in other terms t h a n social protest. H e n c e , it is of b o t h current a n d c o n t i n u i n g sociological interest to advance our understanding of these variable p u b l i c definitions, in b r o a d terms that m i g h t apply to all kinds of disturbances, a n d eventually to other cultures a n d eras. The Meaning of Protest. Protest has b e e n d e f i n e d as " a n expression or declaration of object i o n , disapproval, or dissent, often in opposition to something a person is powerless to p r e v e n t o r a v o i d . " (Random House D i c t i o n a r y , 1967). A n act of protest includes the f o l l o w i n g elements: the action expresses a grievance, a c o n v i c t i o n of w r o n g or injustice; the protestors are unable to correct the c o n d i t i o n directly by their o w n efforts; the action is i n t e n d e d to d r a w attention to the grievances; the action is further meant to p r o v o k e ameliorative steps by some target group; and the protestors d e p e n d u p o n some c o m b i n a t i o n of sympathy a n d fear to m o v e the target group in their behalf. Protest ranges f r o m relatively persuasive to relatively coercive combinations (Bayley, 1962), but always includes both. M a n y forms of protest i n v o l v e no violence or disruption, but these w i l l not c o n c e r n us further in this paper. T h e t e r m protest is sometimes a p p l i e d to trivi a l a n d chronic challenges that are m o r e i n d i c a tive of a reaction style t h a n of deep grievance. F o r instance, we speak of a c h i l d w h o protests

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every c o m m a n d f r o m parent or teacher in the hope of gaining occasional small concessions. It is in this sense that the protestations by some groups in society are p o p u l a r l y discounted because " t h e y just protest e v e r y t h i n g . " B u t the subject of this analysis is social protest, b y w h i c h we m e a n protest that is serious in the feeling of grievance that moves it a n d in the intent to provoke ameliorative action. W h e n violence a n d disorder are identified as social protest, they constitute a m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n m o r e t h a n a f o r m of direct action. L o o t i n g is not p r i m a r i l y a means of a c q u i r i n g property, as it is n o r m a l l y v i e w e d in disaster situations (Dynes a n d Q u a r a n t e l l i , 1968); b r e a k i n g store w i n d o w s and b u r n i n g buildings is not m e r e l y a p e r v e r t e d f o r m of amusement or i m m o r a l vengeance like the usual vandalism and arson; threats of violence and injury to persons are not simply c r i m i n a l actions. A l l are expressions of outrage against injustice of sufficient magn i t u d e and d u r a t i o n to r e n d e r the resort to such exceptional means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n understandable to the observer. In i d e n t i f y i n g the p r i n c i p a l alternatives to protest we must first differentiate c r i m e a n d d e v i ance on the one h a n d and rebellion and r e v o l u tion on the other. T h e latter may or m a y not express a generally understandable grievance, but they constitute direct action rather than c o m m u nication a n d their a i m is to destroy the authority of the existing system either totally or so far as the rebellious group is concerned. Thus protest a n d r e b e l l i o n are distinguished a c c o r d i n g to their ultimate goal a n d a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r the disruptions are meant as c o m m u n i c a t i o n or d i r e c t action. D e v i a n c e a n d c r i m e are actions i d e n t i f i e d chiefly a c c o r d i n g to their n o n c o n f o r m i n g , illegal, or h a r m f u l character. D e v i a n c e a n d c r i m e are seen p r i n c i p a l l y i n i n d i v i d u a l terms, and w h i l e there m a y be " s o c i a l " causes that r e q u i r e attention, the h a r m f u l or n o n c o n f o r m i n g features of the behavior are the p r i m a r y concern. T h e distinctions are not absolute. E x t o r t i o n , " p o w e r p l a y s , " and similar ideas fall b e t w e e n c r i m e a n d protest. N o r can the l i n e b e t w e e n protest a n d r e b e l l i o n be d r a w n precisely. A t t r i b u t i n g disorders to agitators is another c o m m o n variation, in w h i c h either c r i m i n a l or rebellious m e a n i n g is

Turner ascribed to the agitators, but any c r i m i n a l , protest, or rebellious m e a n i n g is b l u n t e d for the mass of participants. In d e c i d i n g that individuals v i e w a disturbance as social protest, it is h e l p f u l but not conclusive to note whether they apply the t e r m protest. D e f i n i n g a disturbance as protest does not preclude disapproving the violence or disorder by w h i c h the protest is expressed, nor does it preclude advocating i m m e d i a t e measures to control and suppress the disturbance. Thus M a r v i n O l sen's (1968) study of the legitimacy that i n d i v i d u als assign to various types of protest activities is related to the present question, but makes a somewhat different distinction. T h e p r i n c i p a l indicators of a protest definition are c o n c e r n e d w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g the grievances as the most adequate way of accounting for the disturbance and the belief that the m a i n treatment indicated is to ameliorate the unjust conditions. Fogelson (1968:37-38) offers an exceptionally explicit statem e n t of this mode of i n t e r p r e t i n g racial disorder: ". . . the riots of the 1960's are articulate protests against genuine grievances in the N e g r o ghettos. T h e riots are protests because they are attempts to call the attention of w h i t e society to the N e groes' widespread dissatisfaction w i t h racial subordination and segregation i n u r b a n A m e r i c a . T h e riots are also articulate because they are restrained, selective, and perhaps e v e n m o r e i m p o r tant, d i r e c t e d at the sources of the Negroes' most i m m e d i a t e and profound grievances." Definitions by Publics. We assume that i n dividuals and groups of individuals assign s i m p l i fying meanings to events, a n d then adjust their perceptions of detail to these comprehensive i n terpretations. L e m e r t ' s (1951) p i o n e e r i n g examination of deviance as a label a p p l i e d by society's agents serves as a valuable prototype for the analysis of responses to p u b l i c disturbances. We scrupulously a v o i d assuming that there are objectifiable p h e n o m e n a that must be classified as deviance, as protest, or as rebellion. We further assume that participant motivations are complex and diverse, so that a g i v e n disturbance is not simply protest, or not protest, a c c o r d i n g to participant motives. Just as Negroes a n d whites used different labels for the Watts disturbance (Tomlin-

149 son and Sears, 1967), we also assume that publics w i l l often interpret the events quite differently f r o m the participants. This c o n c e r n w i t h public definitions c o n trastsbut is not i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h studies in w h i c h protest is defined and examined as an objective p h e n o m e n o n . F o r example, L i p s k y ' s (1968) careful statement of the prospects and l i m i tations in the use of protest as a political tool deals w i t h an objectively identified set of tactics rather than a subjective category. I r v i n g H o r o w i t z and M a r t i n L i e b o w i t z (1968:285) argue that " T h e l i n e b e t w e e n the social deviant and the political marginal is f a d i n g . " T h e political m a r g i n a l engages in social protest, in our sense, and the authors are p o i n t i n g out that m u c h of what sociologists heretofore understood as deviance is n o w t a k i n g on the character of social protest, either as objectively defined or according to the motives of the subject individuals. T h e question of labeling disturbances has been examined by other investigators f r o m somewhat different points of v i e w . L a n g and L a n g (1968) have observed that the label " r i o t " is used to identify quite different kinds of events that are similar only in the k i n d of official response they evoke. G r i m s h a w (1968) p o i n t e d out the different labels attached to recent disturbances acc o r d i n g to w h e t h e r they are seen as racial clashes, class conflict, or c i v i l disturbances in w h i c h the theme of intergroup conflict is de-emphasized. T h e nature of the p u b l i c definition undoubtedly has consequences for the course and recurrence of the disturbance, and for short- and longt e r m suppression or facilitation of r e f o r m . O n e of the most important consequences is probably that a protest definition spurs efforts to m a k e legitimate and nonviolent methods for p r o m o t i n g ref o r m m o r e available than they had b e e n p r e v i ously, w h i l e other definitions are followed by e v e n m o r e restricted access to legitimate means for p r o m o t i n g change (Turner and K i l l i a n , 1957:327329). Persons to w h o m the Joseph M c C a r t h y m o v e m e n t was a massive protest against threats to our national integrity w e r e u n w i l l i n g to oppose the Senator actively e v e n w h e n they a c k n o w l edged that his methods were i m p r o p e r . F o l l o w i n g the recent student disruption of a Regents meeti n g a t U C L A , a faculty m e m b e r w h o p e r c e i v e d

150 the activity as protest against academic injustice advised the A c a d e m i c Senate to listen m o r e to what the students w e r e saying and less to the tone of voice in w h i c h they said it. B u t the i m p o r tant tasks of specifying a n d v e r i f y i n g the consequences of protest definition fall b e y o n d the limits of this paper. A n y j u d g m e n t that protest definit i o n i s " g o o d " o r " b a d " must d e p e n d u p o n the findings of such investigation a n d on such other considerations as one's evaluation of the cause and one's p r e f e r r e d strategy for change. T h e rest of this paper w i l l be d e v o t e d to suggesting five theoretical vantage points f r o m w h i c h it is possible to formulate hypotheses r e g a r d i n g the conditions u n d e r w h i c h one group of people w i l l define as disturbances a n d some other group as social protest. First, publics test events for credibility in relation to folk-conceptions of social protest a n d justice. Second, disturbances c o m m u nicate some c o m b i n a t i o n of appeal and threat, a n d the balance is i m p o r t a n t in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r the disturbances are r e g a r d e d as social protest. T h i r d , disturbances instigate conflict w i t h a target group, w h o m a y define t h e m as social protest in the course of a t t e m p t e d conciliation to a v o i d f u l l scale conflict. F o u r t h , d e f i n i n g disturbances as protest is an i n v i t a t i o n f r o m a t h i r d p a r t y for the t r o u b l e m a k i n g group to f o r m a coalition. A n d fifth, acting as if the disturbances w e r e social protest can be a step by p u b l i c officials in establishing a bargaining relationship. T h e paper offers theoretical proposals a n d not tested findings. T h e proposals are not a c o m plete catalogue of causes for protest interpretat i o n ; notably o m i t t e d are such variables as understanding, empathy, and kindness. T h e proposals generally assume that there is no well-established t r a d i t i o n of disruptive or violent protest (Silver, 1968), that the society is not sharply p o l a r i z e d , a n d that the disturbances emanate f r o m a clearly subordinated segment of the society.

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conception of social protest, they are u n l i k e l y to identify the disturbance as social protest in spite of any i n t e r g r o u p process in w h i c h they are inv o l v e d . On the other h a n d , if events are clearlyseen to correspond precisely w i t h people's idea of social protest, i n t e r g r o u p processes w i l l have to operate w i t h exceptional force to b r i n g about a different definition. It is w i t h i n the limits i m posed by these two extreme conditions that the i n t e r g r o u p process variables m a y assume param o u n t i m p o r t a n c e . H e n c e it is appropriate to beg i n our analysis by e x a m i n i n g these l i m i t i n g considerations. O u r f i r s t t w o theoretical perspectives conc e r n this p r e l i m i n a r y question, w h e t h e r the events w i l l be recognizable as social protest or not. First, there are the viewer's preconceptions about protest that r e n d e r believable the c l a i m that what he sees is protest. We look to the predispositions of i n d i v i d u a l s and groups to ascertain what characteristics a disturbance must exhibit if it is to be credible as protest. Second, the ability of the observer to attend to one or another of the melange of potential messages c o m m u n i c a t e d to h i m w i l l be affected by the specific nature of the disturbance. F o r example, the balance bet w e e n appeal and threat messages seems especially c r u c i a l for w h e t h e r observers see the disturbance as social protest. Credibility: The Folk Concept. T h e main outlines of a. folk concept (Turner, 1957) o f social protest appear to be identifiable in c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n culture. T h e folk concept is only partially explicit, and is best identified by e x a m i n i n g the arguments people m a k e for v i e w i n g events and treating troublemakers in one w a y or another. Letters to newspapers a n d editorial and feature columns supply abundant m a t e r i a l in w h i c h to conduct such a search. M o r e explicit statements are to be f o u n d in essays that present reasoned arguments for v i e w i n g disturbances as protest (Boskin, 1968). T h e folk concept supplies the c r i t e r i a against w h i c h people j u d g e w h e t h e r what they see looks like social protest or not. Often the process works in reverse: p e o p l e w h o are predisposed to i n t e r p r e t a disturbance as protest, or as c r i m i n a l r i o t i n g , p e r c e i v e events selectively so as to correspond w i t h the respective folk concept. B u t in so far as there is any testing of the

7. ' \

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CREDIBILITY A N D COMMUNICATIONS If a disturbance is to be v i e w e d as social protest, it must somehow look a n d sound l i k e social protest to the people witnessing it. If they see that the events are w i d e l y at variance f r o m their

Turner

151 restraint on other occasions. N o n v i o l e n t m o v e ments that precede violent disruptions h e l p to establish the c r e d i b i l i t y of protest. W i d e s p r e a d support and sympathy for the objectives of protest c o u p l e d w i t h the group's p r i n c i p l e d rejection of the violent means e m p l o y e d by a f e w of their m e m b e r s h e l p to establish the deserving nature of the group w i t h o u t u n d e r m i n i n g the pervasive character of their grievances. To be credible as protest, the disturbance itself must be seen either as a spontaneous, u n p l a n n e d , and naive outburst, or as an openly o r g a n i z e d protest of m o r e l i m i t e d nature that got tragically out of h a n d . A n y evidence of covert p l a n n i n g , conspiracy, or seriously i n t e n d e d threats of v i o lence before the event w o u l d w e a k e n the c r e d i b i l i t y of the protest interpretation. On the other h a n d , naive expressions of rage, released u n d e r the stimulus of r u m o r and c r o w d excitement, are consistent w i t h a folk-image of protest. In this connection the protest interpretation is supp o r t e d by demonstrating that what t r i g g e r e d the disturbances was some i n c i d e n t or act of provocation, and that a succession of recent provocations had p r e p a r e d the g r o u n d for an e r u p t i o n . To be credible as protest, indications of the use of riots for self-aggrandizement, the settlem e n t of private feuds, or enjoyment of v i o l e n c e and destruction must be subordinated to naive anger a n d desperation. L o o t i n g for personal g a i n and the attitude that r i o t i n g is " h a v i n g a b a l l " are two features of the racial disturbances since 1965 that have repeatedly detracted f r o m the i m age of social protest. In a w i d e l y read article t y p i cal of m a n y such statements, E r i c Sevareid (1967) challenged the protest definition by d e s c r i b i n g the c a r n i v a l atmosphere at certain stages in m a n y of the disturbances. F i n a l l y , some indications of restraint are i m portant cues to interpretation as protest. A belief that only p r o p e r t y a n d not personal injury was the object of attack, that deaths a n d severe injuries to persons resulted only u n d e r special c i r c u m stances of confusion a n d provocation, a n d that rioters w e n t to exceptional lengths in a f e w d r a matic instances to protect a w h i t e person or guarantee a college administrator safe passage is often salient in the i m a g e r y of persons defining the activity as protest.

events to see whether they look like protest, crime, or rebellion, the folk concepts are the key. The folk concept w i l l not necessarily correspond w i t h what sociologists w o u l d find in a study of objectively defined protest behavior. Several components of the folk concept of social protest emerge f r o m examination of relevant materials. To be credible as protestors, troublemakers must seem to constitute a major part rf a group whose grievances are already w e l l documented, w h o are b e l i e v e d to be i n d i v i d u a l l y or tollectively powerless to correct their grievances, and w h o show some signs of m o r a l v i r t u e that render t h e m " d e s e r v i n g . " A n y i n d i c a t i o n that ; n l y f e w participated or felt sympathy w i t h the disturbances predisposes observers to see the activities as deviance or as revolutionary activity by a small cadre of agitators. T h e c l a i m that a group's conditions explain their resort to unusual means for gaining p u b l i c attention to their p l i g h t as u n d e r m i n e d w h e n it appears that m a n y persons an i d e n t i c a l situations w i l l not j o i n or support the protest. C o m m o n arguments against protest i n t e r p r e tation take the f o l l o w i n g f o r m : " U n e m p l o y e d ? l e t h i m go out, w a l k the streets, a n d find a j o b the way I d i d ! " " T h e y have one vote each the same as we d o ! " Powerlessness a n d grievance : robably cannot be effectively c o m m u n i c a t e d for the first t i m e in a large-scale disturbance. To be tredible as protest, a disturbance must follow an extended p e r i o d i n w h i c h b o t h the powerlessness and the grievances have already b e e n repeatedly and emphatically advertised. A n y weak i n d i v i d u a l o r group w h o comes vith a plea to m o r e p o w e r f u l personages is nortnally r e q u i r e d to be m o r e circumspect a n d m o r e irtuous than those to w h o m he appeals. T h e normative p r i n c i p l e w o u l d not be endorsed in this explicit f o r m b y majority groups. B u t the de facto principle operates because the sincerity a n d justiaability of the pleader's c l a i m is subject to investigation a n d test w h i l e there is no investigation of we other's legitimacy. Since v i o l e n c e a n d disruption i m m e d i a t e l y call v i r t u e into question, there r u s t be offsetting indications of goodness in the group's past or current behavior. T h e group in t aestion must be customarily l a w - a b i d i n g a n d must have used acceptable means a n d exercised

152 Credibility: The Admission of Injustice. Interpretations of disruptive activity as protest i n v o k e conceptions of justice and injustice. H o mans (1961) a n d B l a u (1964a a n d 1964b) are a m o n g those who interpret the sense of injustice as a feeling of inadequate reciprocation in social exchange. R u n c i m a n (1966), a p p l y i n g M e r t o n and Kitt's (1950) conception of relative deprivation, proposes that the selection of reference groups determines whether there is a sense of injustice w i t h respect to the rewards of position. B u t these theories do not answer the question: w h e n is it possible and probable that one group w i l l see another group's position as unjust to the point of accepting violence and d i s r u p t i o n as the natural expression of that injustice? If we assume that each group tends to e m p l o y its o w n situation as the point of reference in assessing another group's claims of injustice, we are l e d to the conclusion that groups w h o are clearly advantagedby comparison w i t h the "protestors" can find the c l a i m of injustice m o r e credible than groups less advantaged. C r u c i a l here is the ass u m p t i o n that objective and detached comparison b e t w e e n the situations of the troublemakers and the target groups is less p o w e r f u l in shaping the assessment of injustice than the observing group's position vis-a-vis the troublemakers. Consequently, the great m i d d l e segment of A m e r i c a n population finds it easier to identify black ghetto disturbances as social protest than to interpret college student demonstrations in the same sense. Similarly, black student demonstrations are less amenable to interpretation as protest than ghetto demonstrations. A c c o r d i n g to this v i e w , groups w h o see themselves as e v e n more disadvantaged than the protestors are least likely to grant their c l a i m . V i e w e d f r o m below, disturbances are most easily compreh e n d e d as power plays or as deviance. Groups w h o see their situation as about the same as that of the protestors likewise do not find it easy to accord the protest interpretation. Leaders in such groups c o m m o n l y attempt to w e l d alliances based on m u t u a l appreciation, and these sometimes w o r k as political devices. B u t they are h i n d e r e d rather than h e l p e d by the spontaneous reaction to disruptive activity by a group whose position is apparently no worse than that of the group

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passing j u d g m e n t . Olsen's (1968) finding that persons who score h i g h on measures of political incapability and political disability are least w i l l i n g to adjudge direct action to correct grievances as legitimate m a y also be consistent w i t h this reasoning. Credibility: Crediting Crime, Protest, Rebellion. T h e credibility of a disturbance as protest also reflects the variable strength of resistances against b e l i e v i n g that massive c r i m e , protest, or r e b e l l i o n is taking place. E a c h person's security system is anchored in some fashion in the assumption that he is part of an integral society. This anchorage poses obstacles to b e l i e v i n g that any of these conditions is widespread. But each interpretation of disorder has different i m plications for societal integrity. R e b e l l i o n is difficult to credit by all but those whose disaffection w i t h the social order is such that they delight in the threat of its disintegration. W h e n c r i m e and deviance become extensive and blatant, the assumption of a society integrated on the basis of consensus over major values is shaken. H e n c e , people whose personal security is rooted in the c o n v i c t i o n of a f u n d a m e n t a l consensus are resistant to a d m i t t i n g widespread c r i m e and deviance. People who understand society as a sort of jungle accommodation w i l l find it easier to interpret disturbances as c r i m i n a l outbursts. In contrast, protestorseven w h e n they resort occasionally to desperate meansneed not reject the values of those to w h o m they protest. T h e y m a y share the same values and seek only their share of what others already have. Therefore, the belief in w i d e spread protest calls into question the mechanics of society's operation, but not necessarily the value consensus. W h e n judgments by different socioeconomic strata are c o m p a r e d , the m i d d l e strata f i n d it m o r e difficult to credit massive deviance and c r i m e and less difficult to acknowledge protest because of their c o m m i t m e n t to society as a syst e m of values. T h e lower strata have m o r e dayto-day experience of c r i m e and the rejection of societal values, and are forced to anchor their security to a less consensual image of society. H e n c e they do not find massive c r i m e so difficult to believe. If these assumptions about credibility are

153 correct, and if we have characterized the strata accurately, investigators should find m i d d l e class populations readier to make protest interpretations than w o r k i n g class groups. and bounds of the disorder and to the position of various p o p u l a t i o n segments reacting to the disorders. C e r t a i n l y the threat posed by disorders d u r i n g the last half decade has b e e n sufficient to gain attention a n d force examination of the message. At the same time, threat has b e e n l i m i t e d by the localization of disorders in the ghettos a n d by the m i n i m i z a t i o n of direct personal confrontation b e t w e e n whites and blacks. W i t h o u t r e p l i c a ble measurements of the magnitude of threat a n d appeal components, predictions regarding specific situations can only be f o r m e d intuitively. Intuition suggests that either p i t c h e d battles l e a d i n g to death and injury of any substantial n u m b e r of whites, or spread of the disorders outside of the boundaries of black neighborhoods and especially into w h i t e residence areas, w o u l d substantially reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of disorders b e i n g i n terpreted as a f o r m of protest a n d w o u l d seriously d i v e r t attention away f r o m black grievances. Differential p e r c e p t i o n of threat by population segments is affected by a combination of personal i n v o l v e m e n t a n d p r o x i m i t y to the events and of ability to perceive the limits and patterns of disorder realistically. On this basis it is easiest for groups w h o live a safe distance f r o m black neighborhoods and w h o have no stake in ghetto businesses to t u r n their attention t o w a r d the appeal c o m p o n e n t of the disturbance message. B u t we must also take note of the p r i n c i p l e suggested by Diggory's (1956) findings regarding a r a b i d fox scare in Pennsylvania. W h i l e fear was greater among persons near to the r u m o r e d center of r a b i d fox sightings, the tendency to exaggerate the extent of the menace was less. Persons closest to the events w e r e able to f o r m a m o r e realistic picture. Similarly, whites closest to the disturbances may be better able to discount inflated reports of violence against the persons of whites, and to see a p a t t e r n in the properties attacked and protected. Thus persons close enough to fear any spread of disorders but not close e n o u g h to correct exaggerated reports f r o m personal experience may find it most difficult to see the activities as protest. A f t e r the 1964 riots, Harper's (1968) Rochester suburban subjects were most l i k e l y to acknowledge that Negroes had a right to c o m p l a i n ; city residents l i v i n g more than one block f r o m

A P P E A L A N D T H R E A T MESSAGES It is a reasonable assumption that most observers could, under appropriate circumstances, see both an appeal a n d a threat i n a violent disturbance. If this combination of messages is present, reading the disturbance as protest means that the appeal component is m o r e salient to the observer than the threat component. F o r we can safely assume that w h e n the preoccupation w i t h threat to self and to those objects identified w i t h self is foremost, appeals are no longer heard. Threat so often monopolizes attention to the exclusion of appeals, and a c k n o w l e d g i n g justice in rhe appeals weakens the foundation for defensive efforts r e q u i r e d to meet the threat. Thus we are led to the proposition that disruptions are interpreted as protest only w h e n the experience of threat is not excessive. T h e foregoing observation h o w e v e r is i n c o m plete. Somehow the appeal message must c o m mand attention, and resistance to a c k n o w l e d g i n g rhe protest message must be overcome. T h e iredibility requirements we have just outlined are so restrictive that a positive incentive is reI: aired to overlook some of the criteria. An appeal by itself is normally a weak attention-getter; mreat is m u c h stronger in this respect. A c o m b i nation of threat and appeal serves to gain attention and to create the sense of urgency necessary to overcome the resistance to a c k n o w l e d g i n g protest. W h e n threat is insufficient, the events can tte disregarded or w r i t t e n off as deviance, to be tontained by the established systems of social conrrol. A n o p t i m a l combination o f threat and appeal ta necessary for the probability of seeing disturbance as protest. W h e n the threat component falls telow the o p t i m a l range, the most l i k e l y interpretation is deviance; above the o p t i m a l range, pre: ccupation w i t h threat makes r e b e l l i o n the probaole interpretation. This approach suggests several hypotheses relating interpretation as protest to the nature

154 a N e g r o family w e r e least l i k e l y to grant Negroes this right; a n d subjects l i v i n g w i t h i n one block of a N e g r o family w e r e i n t e r m e d i a t e in their responses. A f t e r the 1965 Watts disorder, M o r r i s a n d Jeffries (1967) f o u n d upper-middle-class P a cific Palisades residents most l i k e l y to identify the events as N e g r o protest a n d all-white l o w socioe c o n o m i c status B e l l residents least l i k e l y , a m o n g the six w h i t e areas of L o s Angeles C o u n t y sampled. T h e experience of threat is not entirely an i n d i v i d u a l matter. T h e self-conception is m a d e up of group memberships, a n d the i n d i v i d u a l is threatened w h e n e v e r an i m p o r t a n t m e m b e r s h i p g r o u p seems to be the object of threat. Conseq u e n t l y , we should expect m e m b e r s of such groups as small merchants, police, a n d firemen, e v e n though they w e r e personally unaffected by the disturbances, to experience m u c h threat because of their identification w i t h these same groups i m m e d i a t e l y i n v o l v e d i n the confrontat i o n . P o l i c e a n d merchants w i t h i n the ghettos w e r e not generally disposed to v i e w racial disord e r as social protest (Rossi, et al., 1968). It w o u l d be surprising to discover m a n y people a m o n g these groups in the larger c o m m u n i t y w h o see the events p r i m a r i l y as protest. It is possible to overlook what others see as threat because one rejects identification w i t h the g r o u p u n d e r attack. T h e p h e n o m e n o n of a few Jews w h o supported H i t l e r a n d w e r e able to discount his antisemitic policies as threats to themselves suggests such a m e c h a n i s m . T h e r a d i c a l rep u d i a t i o n of Jewish identity, labeled self-hatred b y K u r t L e w i n (1941), m a y have b e e n strong e n o u g h in these individuals that they w e r e unable to conceive of the attacks as b e i n g d i r e c t e d t o w a r d themselves. T h e r e are m a n y whites w h o radically reject any identification w i t h A m e r i c a n society. F o r those to w h o m disidentification w i t h conventional society a n d conventional peop l e is a strong c o m p o n e n t of the self-conception, threats d i r e c t e d t o w a r d w h i t e society, t o w a r d honkies, or t o w a r d whitey are u n l i k e l y to be perc e i v e d as r e f e r r i n g to themselves. H e n c e the personal threat is m i n i m i z e d , a n d it is easiest for such persons to identify the disturbances as protest. F i n a l l y , according to the assumption of an o p t i m a l m i x t u r e of threat a n d appeal, it m a y be

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difficult to k e e p the awareness of protest dominant for an e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of time. We have noted that escalation of violence is l i k e l y to preclude protest d e f i n i t i o n because of preoccupation w i t h the threat. B u t repeated threat that is not f o l l o w e d by tangible injury to the threatened loses its impact. T h e d i m i n i s h i n g force of r e p e a t e d destructive activity confined to ghettos lessens the c o n c e r n that originally d i r e c t e d attention toward the appeal c o m p o n e n t . H e n c e , repeated unescalated disturbances are l i k e l y to be accompanied by decreasing degrees of interpretation as protest, r e p l a c e d by increasing tendencies to see the events as deviance. E x c e p t for understanding protest interpretat i o n as a means to protect the observer f r o m seei n g a serious lack of consensus in society, we have thus far treated protest interpretation as a passive matter. B u t the observation that some of the most unsympathetic interpretations abound among groups far r e m o v e d f r o m the disorders is difficult to understand w i t h the principles o u t l i n e d . It is true that small t o w n a n d r u r a l dwellers often feel somewhat d e p r i v e d relative to large city dwellers, a n d therefore m a y have difficulty seeing justice in the complaints e v e n of ghetto dwellers. T h e y also lack the i n c e n t i v e of the large city dwellers to avoid a c k n o w l e d g i n g widespread c r i m e by int e r p r e t i n g disturbances as protest. B u t perhaps the protest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is part of a m o r e active stance, brought about by i n v o l v e m e n t in a relationship w i t h the t r o u b l e m a k i n g group. C r i m e a n d r e b e l l i o n are in an i m p o r t a n t sense easier interpretations to m a k e since they c a n be i n f e r r e d f r o m the most conspicuous a n d superficial aspects of behavior, w i t h o u t a search for the motives and grievances b e h i n d the violence a n d disruption. O u r r e m a i n i n g three approaches rest on this assumption.

CONCILIATION OF CONFLICT A m o r e c o m p l e x basis for p r e d i c t i n g the assignment of m e a n i n g to disorders is s u p p l i e d by v i e w i n g the protestors and the interpreters as engaged in a real or potential process of conflict. T h e aggressive initiative of the m o m e n t lies w i t h

Turner the protestors. I n t e r p r e t i n g the disturbances as protest c a n t h e n usefully be seen as a gesture of conciliation, an action to forestall the i n c i p i e n t conflict or to reduce or conclude the conflict w i t h out v i c t o r y or surrender. We can justify this assertion a n d use it to suggest conditions l e a d i n g to protest interpretation only after briefly r e v i e w i n g the nature of the conflict process. W e shall use the t e r m " c o n f l i c t , " not i n the broad sense that includes all disagreements a n d all efforts by people or groups to pursue incompatible goals, but in the tradition of S i m m e l (1955), v o n W i e s e (1932:246) a n d P a r k a n d Burgess (1921). In Coser's (1968:232) definition of conflict as "a struggle over values or claims to status, power, a n d scarce resources, in w h i c h the claims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their r i v a l s , " we u n d e r l i n e the latter portion. Conflict has properties that distinguish it f r o m other processes r e v o l v i n g about disagreement because there is an autonomous goal of i n j u r i n g the antagonistautonomous in the sense that efforts to injure the antagonist are not f u l l y subjected to the test of effectiveness in p r o m o t i n g the other ostensible goals of the conflicting party. Conflict exists w h e n the relationship b e t w e e n groups is based on the p r e m i s e that whatever enhances the w e l l - b e i n g of one group lessens the w e l l - b e i n g of the other, a n d that i m p a i r i n g the w e l l - b e i n g of the antagonist is a favored means for e n h a n c i n g the w e l l - b e i n g of one's o w n group. T h e strategy of conflict centers about i n j u r i n g the other w i t h o u t simultaneously i n j u r i n g the self, w h i l e i n h i b i t i n g a n d d e f e n d i n g against retaliatory injury f r o m the opponent. Consequently, conflict tends, particularly as it persists a n d intensifies, to be volatile a n d comprehensive w i t h respect to the issues that d i v i d e the combatants. C o m batants must be able to shift grounds a n d issues as necessary to fight on terrains that are strategically favorable for t h e m . T h e r e has p r o b a b l y never b e e n a w a r o r violent r e v o l u t i o n i n w h i c h the question of what either side was fighting for d i d not become unclear, n o r i n w h i c h the issue at the close of fighting was defined in the same way as at the start of combat. W h e n conflict occurs b e t w e e n groups re-

155 garded as m e m b e r s of some c o m m o n social order, the process is c i r c u m s c r i b e d by a somewhat distinctive set of conflict norms. In certain respects the conflict n o r m a t i v e system grants license not available to other relationships. In other respects it imposes stricter obligations, such as those req u i r i n g demonstrations o f i n g r o u p loyalty. T w o consequences of assimilation of conflict to a norm a t i v e order have b e a r i n g on our subsequent discussion of conciliation. First, because conflict involves i n f l i c t i n g i n j u r y on persons w h o are part of a c o m m o n social order, a course of action that is not n o r m a t i v e l y sanctioned except w i t h i n a r e c o g n i z e d conflict relationship, the preoccupation w i t h n o r m a t i v e considerations is heightened. T h e r e is special attention to p a i n t i n g the antagonist as villainous a n d to establishing the virtuousness of the protagonist group. An i m p o r t a n t aspect of conflict strategy is to manipulate the normative aspects of the exchange so as to justify the c l a i m to a reserve o f m o r a l credit u p o n w h i c h the combatant can d r a w w h e n he engages in what m i g h t otherwise be considered shocking or reprehensible behavior. Second, a great deal of conflict is fought symbolically w i t h symbolic injuries i n the f o r m o f i n sults a n d threats a n d symbolic defenses against such injuries. M u c h of the symbolic conflict consists of testing the other and j o c k e y i n g for position. B u t because the combatants are m e m b e r s of a social order, the effective use of symbols so as to place the other in an unfavorable light is a w a y o f i n f l i c t i n g injury u p o n h i m . Thus, what W a l ler a n d H i l l (1951) called " m a n i p u l a t i o n of m o r a l i t y " in family conflict is an i m p o r t a n t part of the repertoire of symbolic tactics available for use in any conflict. T h e r e is frequently confusion b e t w e e n the steps f r o m disagreement t o w a r d agreement and the process of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d because the combatants must cope w i t h b o t h disagreement and the patt e r n of r e c i p r o c a l injury. T h e past a n d projected m u t u a l injury is the m o r e fundamental p r o b l e m since it is possible to resolve conflict w i t h o u t agreement on substantive issues, but agreement on these issues does not erase the injury that each has done to the other in the course of the conflict.

156 T h e latter supplies i n d e p e n d e n t m o m e n t u m for the continuation of conflict. H e n c e the key to all conflict resolution is the repair of previous injury a n d protection against future injury. W h e n conflict resolution is by surrender, the victor disarms the vanquished and extracts reparations. T h e v a n quished party cannot usually exact compensation in r e p a i r i n g the injury to himself, but he n o r m a l l y surrenders u n d e r the assumption that once he no longer offers any threat of injury to the victor, h e w i l l b e i m m u n e f r o m further injury b y the victor. W h e n conflict resolution occurs w i t h o u t surrender, both parties must give assurances against d o i n g h a r m in the future and both must take steps to ameliorate the injury that each has already done to the other. Since surrender is an u n l i k e l y response to current disorders, our interest is in conflict resolutions characterized by some degree of mutuality. We shall refer to any act whose a i m is to avert or discontinue conflict w i t h o u t either asking or offering surrender as conciliation. To be effective, a conciliatory act must incorporate b o t h an offer to discontinue attacks and a tender of h e l p to correct the h a r m already done. To the extent to w h i c h the conflict is b e i n g fought at the symbolic level, the remedies are partially symbolic. W i t h respect to the exchange of threats a n d insults (i.e., symbolic conflict), conciliation is an offer to discontinue such attacks and to discount the m e a n i n g of p r i o r threats and insults. In order to p a r t i c i pate in conciliatory exchange, the combatant
nrmot b e p r e p a r e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t t r i e o t l i c r d i d

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alternatives, though not all are viable in any given situation. An effort c a n be made to ignore or depreciate the conflict significance of the disturbances by i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m as deviance. T h e challenge of conflict c a n be accepted, in w h i c h case the disturbance is defined as r e b e l l i o n a n d the appropriate response is retaliatory suppression. This was p l a i n l y the d o m i n a t i n g white reaction in earlier race riots such as St. Louis in 1919 and D e t r o i t in 1943, w h e n whites not only t u r n e d the encounters into massive attacks on Negroes but c o n t i n u e d to take p u n i t i v e action for weeks after the riots w e r e finished and after the evidence of disproportionate injury to Negroes was p l a i n to all (Lee and H u m p h r e y s , 1943; R u d w i c k , 1964). It is also c o m m o n for some individuals to respond by r e p u d i a t i n g their o w n group identification and j o i n i n g w i t h the dissidents, at least symbolically. H e r e too the definition is rebellion, but f r o m the opposite side of the conflict. This position norm a l l y includes recognition of the protest orientation, though the i d e n t i t y problems i n v o l v e d in this position often cause the protest theme to become secondary in i m p o r t a n c e to the a i m of disc r e d i t i n g one's group and disidentifying f r o m it. Some of the difficulties in this response are represented w h e n w h i t e students have attempted to participate in black protests, and w h e n the Hell's Angels have offered support to conservative protesters against militant youth. If we omit the possibility of surrender, the r e m a i n i n g alternative is to extend an offer of conciliation. T h e prospect of conflict is accepted as real, but the a i m is to i n t e r r u p t the reciprocation of attack that locks the combatants into full-scale conflict. T h e conciliator offers p u b l i c a c k n o w l edgement that he has done injury to the protestor, p r o m i s i n g repentence and corrective actions. By m a k i n g this a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t he grants that there is some justification for the other's hostility t o w a r d h i m , and he also supplies the basis for b e l i e v i n g that the other's antagonism is not unalterable and is not personal to himself or his group. T h e w h i t e m a n can say that the black's antagon i s m is not really d i r e c t e d against the white m a n , but m e r e l y against those people who h a p p e n to be d o i n g the black an injustice at a particular time. C o n c i l i a t i o n is thereby r e n d e r e d a viable posture, because there is no reason to expect the

not f u l l y m e a n what he said, that his threats w e r e not really meant to be c a r r i e d out, a n d that his insults d i d not express his m o r e e n d u r i n g feelings and views. H e n c e an act of conciliation must prov i d e the other w i t h a basis on w h i c h such beliefs are credible. We are n o w p r e p a r e d to see reaction to public disturbances as response in a situation of potential conflict. T h e disturbance involves physical i n j u r y a n d threats of further damage to the p r o p e r t y a n d persons of the dominant w h i t e group, the college faculty or administration, management a n d ownership of industry, or colonial powers. In addition, it conveys insulting characterizations and promises of escalating disrespect. F a c e d w i t h potential conflict, the d o m i n a n t group has several

Turner other to continue his attacks once he is assured of compensation and security f r o m further injury. I n t e r p r e t i n g violent a n d disruptive action as protest is following exactly this pattern. It means assuming that the intent to do injury is secondary in importance to the effort to secure redress, a n d it means acknowledging that there is some basis in the behavior of one's o w n group for the antagon i s m displayed by the protestor. If we have correctly identified the process, we must predict the protest interpretation by specifying the conditions that lead to acts of conciliation. Individuals and groups seek to avert conflict for four reasons: to avoid the risk of injury or further injury) to themselves; to avoid the risk of injury or further injury to the potential opponent; to protect the relationship b e t w e e n the potential combatants f r o m damage or increased damage; a n d to avoid the diversion of resources and energy into the conduct of conflict at the expense of other activities. T h e v i e w of protest interpretation as conciliation and the reasons for conciliation suggest several correlates of protest interpretation.
1

157 n o r m a l activities. Private industry was l o n g able to avoid treating labor unrest as social protest because private police c o u l d be h i r e d to isolate the conflict w h i l e p r o d u c t i o n continued. Universities are not e q u i p p e d in this fashion, and must therefore face d i s r u p t i o n of their n o r m a l functions u n der e v e n m i l d conflict. H e n c e , universities are relatively q u i c k to i n t e r p r e t internal disturbances as social protest. F i f t h , the less the anticipated costs of conciliation, the greater the tendency to see disturbance as protest. College officials who believe that disc o n t i n u i n g an R . O . T . C . p r o g r a m is sufficient to b r i n g an e n d to campus conflict find it easy to see student activism as social protest, rather than as rebellious confrontation. Because of the tendency for moralistic perspectives to be an inseparable part of conflict, an offer of conciliation is typically v i e w e d by the conciliator as an act of generosity, going b e y o n d what c o u l d be expected or r e q u i r e d of h i m . U n d e r the reciprocity p r i n c i p l e (Gouldner, 1960) the act of placing a m o r e generous than necessary interpretation on the other's actions obligates the latter to m a k e generous response. Because the n o r m a tive system of conflict permits a combatant to place a less favorable interpretation on the other's actions, the sense of self-righteous virtue attached to protest interpretation can be great. F u r t h e r more, the protest interpretation w i t h its clearly i m p l i e d admission of fault places the conciliator in a precarious position, for his admission of prejud i c e , m i l i t a r i s m , or insensitivity to student needs, for instance, can be used against h i m later if the other does not respond in k i n d . T h e risk he knows he is taking enhances the conciliator's self-righteousness. H e n c e , there is a strong tendency for conciliatory gestures to be w i t h d r a w n and replaced by active p r o m o t i o n of conflict w h e n there is no discontinuance of insults and threats and no retraction of earlier attacks. H e n c e we are l e d again (as u n d e r the appealthreat perspective) to the generalization that i n terpretation of disorder as protest is a conditional and unstable response. A c c o r d i n g to the conflict m o d e l , it readily gives way to the interpretation of disorder as r e b e l l i o n w h e n it is not soon foll o w e d by subsidance of disorder and threat. On the other h a n d , w i t h o u t the prospect of i n v o l v e -

First, protest interpretation is m o r e l i k e l y to occur w h e n there is some apparent danger to the group than w h e n there is none. Second, the stronger the norms, values, or sentiments against doing injury to others, the greater the l i k e l i h o o d of i n t e r p r e t i n g disorder as protest. T h i r d , the greater the i n t e r d e p e n d e n c y b e t w e e n groups, the greater the l i k e l i h o o d of protest interpretation. T h e interdependency may be ecological or social; the solidarity, organic or m e c h a n i c a l in nature. If breaking or w e a k e n i n g the bonds b e t w e e n the groups is threatening, the l i k e l i h o o d of offering the conciliatory protest interpretation w i l l be increased. F o u r t h , the greater the c o m m i t m e n t to activities a n d resources that may have to be sacrificed in order to carry on the conflict, the greater the readiness to make a protest interpretation. If there is a greater tolerance for conflict in lower socioeconomic strata and less exploration of conciliatory approaches, it m a y be because there is less at stake in the disruption of the standard r o u n d of life than there is in the higher social strata. Some groups are flexibly organized so that conflict can be sustained alongside of c o n t i n u i n g

158 m e n t in conflict, there is no occasion for concilia t i o n , a n d c r i m e or deviance is the most natural interpretation.

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THIRD PARTY POINT OF VIEW F r o m b o t h the appeal-threat a n d conflictc o n c i l i a t i o n approaches comes the h i n t that a third party m a y u n d e r some circumstances find it easier to interpret disturbance as protest than does the group against w h o m the disturbance is d i r e c t e d . F o r the target group, the m e r i t of c o n c i l i a t i o n rather than accepting the challenge of con flict declines as the prospective costs of concilia t i o n increase. F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n e v e r group m e m b e r s h i p is a salient aspect of personal i d e n tity, it is difficult to accept group fault w i t h o u t offsetting the admission by assessing equal or greater fault to the protestors. B u t a t h i r d party is not so directly threatened a n d does not pay most of the costs of conciliation a n d , conse q u e n t l y , is able to sustain a protest v i e w of the disturbances after such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ceases to be tenable for the target group. To account for t h i r d party protest interpreta t i o n , we must first ask w h y the t h i r d party should be sufficiently c o n c e r n e d about a conflict, in w h i c h they are bystanders, to acknowledge griev ances and take a sympathetic stand. T h e question i m p l i e s the answer: that protest interpretations by t h i r d parties are only l i k e l y to occur w h e n there is some threat of t h i r d party i n v o l v e m e n t in the conflict or a strong basis for identification w i t h one of the two parties. A m e r i c a n people sel d o m c o n c e r n e d themselves sufficiently to m a k e any interpretation of student riots abroad u n t i l student disorders became an i m m e d i a t e c o n c e r n at h o m e . Labor-management strife in the U n i t e d States today attracts sufficient attention only w h e n it threatens the supply of goods a n d services to the c o m m u n i t y T h i r d party protest interpretations indicate either the defense of neutrality against the threat of partisan i n v o l v e m e n t in conflict or the active acceptance of partisanship on the side of the protestors. T h e bystander w h o is e n d a n g e r e d by conflict is not i n c l i n e d t o w a r d a sympathetic inter pretation of either side, but rather t o w a r d w i s h i n g

" a plague o n b o t h your houses!" O n l y w h e n iden tities or interests p u l l h i m in one d i r e c t i o n or the other can the threat of i n v o l v e m e n t press h i m to see the disturbance as protest. D e f i n i n g , . as. protest can. he. a defense of neutrality for the t h i r d party for some of the same reasons that it c a n be a means of conciliation for the target group. A c k n o w l e d g i n g v a l i d grievances w h i l e c o n d e m n i n g i m p r o p e r means is a way of g i v i n g something to each side Protest d e f i n i t i o n as a defense of neutrality occurs w h e n (1) strong pressures t o w a r d partisan in v o l v e m e n t play on the t h i r d party but (2) partisan ship on either side is a costly prospect. Protest d e f i n i t i o n as partisanship differs from a similar d e f i n i t i o n as a f o r m of neutrality in ignor i n g or d e - e m p h a s i z i n g c o n c e r n w i t h the legiti macy of means e m p l o y e d to register protest. Par tisan protest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is l i k e l y u n d e r two conditions: shared m e m b e r s h i p group identities and circumstances that facilitate coalition forma tion. We have already observed that objectively similar plights are not usually e n o u g h to lead to partisan support. T h e poor w h i t e m a n is often the last to v i e w black activism as social protest, and the large M e x i c a n - A m e r i c a n vote i n L o s A n geles was a liability rather than an asset for the black candidate for m a y o r in 1969. Identification through a c o m m o n m e m b e r s h i p group that is a salient c o m p o n e n t of the self-conception is re q u i r e d for partisanship. T h e protest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is understandable as an i n v i t a t i o n to f o r m a coalition, or preparation to enter into a coalition. W h e n the possibility of a m u t u a l l y acceptable coalition for m u t u a l gain seems to be present, the t h i r d party is i n c l i n e d toward u n d e r s t a n d i n g the disruption as social pro test. L i p s k y (1968) proposes that activating t h i r d parties is the p r i n c i p a l way in w h i c h protest by weak groups can hope for some success. T h e com plexities of coalition theory are elaborations of a p r i n c i p l e of self-interest. In the broadest of terms, coalitions are f o r m e d w h e n the allies can do bet ter together than they can separately vis-a-vis some other group a n d w h e n they c a n arrange b e t w e e n t h e m an acceptable division of the ad vantages that accrue f r o m the coalition (Caplow, 1968). On this basis other disadvantaged m i n o r i t y groups m i g h t support the efforts of militant

Turner blacks, if they c o u l d be reasonably sure of gaining a substantial share of whatever concessions m i l i tancy wins f r o m the target group. B u t since the concessions are likely to fall short of m e e t i n g black wants, they are unlikely to be d i v i d e d . On the other hand, f o r m i n g an alliance w i t h the p o w e r f u l target group may offer the prospect of greater rewards than an alliance w i t h blacks. It is clear that contradictory tendencies are at w o r k in this situation but that the p r o b l e m of distributing l i m ited benefits works against strong coalitions and against i n t e r p r e t i n g the other m i n o r i t y group's activism as social protest. Coalitions w i t h disruptive groups are m o r e likely to be favorable for groups of higher standi n g whose o w n position is strengthened by a d d i n g the threat of disorder f r o m the protesting group to their o w n established power. Groups and agencies w h o are in a position to serve as the i n t e r m e diate l i n k in distributing benefits to protestors may i n v i t e the protestors into a coalition by announcing acknowledgement of the latter's grievances. In r e t u r n for support of the protestors, they offer the power of their o w n position in h e l p i n g to legitimate the grievance claims and in a p p l y i n g pressure on the target group. It is interesting that several principles converge to predict the o v e r w h e l m i n g tendency for college and university faculties to v i e w campus disruptions as social protest. First, the credibilityinjustice p r i n c i p l e is i n v o k e d by the faculty position of superordination to the students. T h r o u g h constant contact and intimate familiarity w i t h the circumstances of student life, faculty members readily understand the grievances of students by comparison w i t h their o w n m o r e favorable position. Second, the earlier student disorders w e r e directed almost w h o l l y against college administrations rather than faculty, m a k i n g the latter a t h i r d party. Structurally, the faculty position makes them subject to strong pressures t o w a r d partisan involvement but makes partisanship on either side costly. Organizationally, the faculty belong to the same side as the administration but their contacts w i t h students are m o r e frequent a n d more crucial to the success of their teaching and research activities on the day to day basis. As t h i r d parties, faculty members sought neutrality by i n terpreting student disturbances as protest. T h i r d ,

159 by virtue of the residue of resentments f r o m their o w n relationships w i t h administrators, some faculty members w e r e i n c l i n e d to proffer a coalition to the students. On the basis that the higher status partner in a coalition ultimately gains m o r e if the coalition lasts, this c o u l d be an effective tactic in strengthening the faculty position vis-a-vis a d m i n istration. H o w e v e r , all of these principles operate differently w h e n students take faculty as the target for their disruptions. Threat soon becomes m o r e salient than appeal; neutrality is no longer attainable; and the only available coalition for faculty is w i t h the administration. If it is true that the faculty have b e e n the p r i n c i p a l carriers for the protest interpretation of student disorders, the current m o v e t o w a r d i n c l u d i n g faculty as targets of student disorder may have p r o f o u n d effects on the way these activities are seen in A m e r i can society. We have spoken as if the target group w e r e precisely designated a n d the line b e t w e e n the target group and t h i r d parties were precise. B u t the protest message is usually vague a n d w i t h vary i n g targets, l e a v i n g considerable latitude for i d e n t i f y i n g the boundaries. Existing cleavages w i t h i n the m o r e broadly defined target group then m a r k off as t h i r d parties those segments to w h o m coalitions w i t h the protestors w o u l d enhance their position in internecine strife. Thus "anti-establishment" whites may ally themselves symbolically w i t h blacks i n i d e n t i f y i n g " w h i t e y " as r e f e r r i n g only to "establishment" whites. Interp r e t i n g ghetto disorder as protest can t h e n serve as an i n v i t a t i o n to blacks to j o i n t h e m in a coalition.

OFFICIAL ACTIONS We have spoken of the predisposition by various groups to identify disturbances u n d e r v a r y i n g circumstances as social protest. But we have neglected thus far to assign enough importance to the actions of officials and formal leaders w h o must react conspicuously. On the basis of w e l l established principles in the study of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , o p i n i o n leadership and k e y n o t i n g by officials should be a substantial determinant of p u b l i c definitions (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955).

160 T h e p r o b l e m of officials in the face of disturbance differs f r o m the p r o b l e m of others as action differs f r o m attitude. T h e adoption of an attitude by itself has no consequences, a n d for most people its p u b l i c enunciation has v e r y little effect. B u t official action has consequences w i t h respect to effectiveness, reactions p r o v o k e d , and p u b l i c c o m m i t m e n t s made. H e n c e , the p u b l i c definition e x h i b i t e d by officials is only a simple application of their private views w h e n two conditions are met: the c o m m u n i t y definitions are o v e r w h e l m i n g l y homogeneous; and officials have the resources to be certain their efforts are effective. W h e n F e d e r a l B u r e a u of Investigation officials set out in the 1930's to eradicate gangster leaders, these conditions p r e v a i l e d , a n d there was no n e e d to explore the possibility that gangsterism was a protest against ethnic discrimination, cultural assimilation, and poverty. B u t w h e n these c o n d i tions do not p r e v a i l , treating disturbances as protest can serve as a h e d g i n g tactic. It permits a restrained h a n d l i n g that does not create the expectation of i m m e d i a t e suppression of disturbances, w i t h o u t forestalling a shift t o w a r d a harder l i n e after c o m m u n i t y sentiment a n d official capab i l i t y have b e e n tested. Official protest interpretat i o n can serve as an effective hedge only in societies and communities w h e r e h u m a n i t a r i a n values are strong relative to toughness values, so that failure of official action in the service of h u m a n i tarianism is excusable. B u t since this is true in m a n y parts of A m e r i c a n society, and because of the volatility of protest groups and the u n d e p e n d ability of c o m m u n i t y support, official a c k n o w l e d g m e n t that disturbances are a f o r m of protest has b e c o m e progressively m o r e c o m m o n d u r i n g the span of the last five years. This observation applies to almost all kinds of disturbances, and goes considerably b e y o n d Etzioni's (1969) parallel observ a t i o n that demonstrations have come increasi n g l y to be accepted as a legitimate tactic of p o l i t i c a l persuasion. T h e effect of these official responses is initially to keynote and legitimate the protest interpretat i o n by various c o m m u n i t y segments. W h e n these responses coincide w i t h substantial prestigious c o m m u n i t y definitions of the events, the effect is further to establish a situational n o r m identifyi n g the p r o p e r or p u b l i c l y acceptable interpreta-

P A R T II

Society

tion. V i e w s that the disturbances are s i m p l y c r i m e on a larger scale d e m a n d i n g strengthened l a w enforcement, or that they are sinister rebellions to be h a n d l e d as i n t e r n a l wars, t e n d to be suppressed, e v e n though many individuals a n d groups i n c l i n e t o w a r d such views. T h e result is a n unstable situation i n w h i c h t e m p o r a r i l y the socially sanctioned v i e w sees disturbance as protest, w h i l e dissident views subsist as an audible r u m b l i n g i n the b a c k g r o u n d . A strong g o v e r n m e n t w i t h assured c o m m u nity support is u n l i k e l y to tolerate massive disruption to the extent of v i e w i n g it as social protest. B u t w h e n the grievance is not so l i m i t e d and specific that it can be easily and q u i c k l y r i g h t e d , w h e n complete confidence i n official capability to suppress massive c r i m e or rebellion is l a c k i n g , or w h e n c o m m u n i t y support is uncertain, the standard official approach is to explore the possibilities of resolving the confrontation t h r o u g h bargaining. Accounts of the 1967 racial disorders i n dicate repeated efforts to identify black representatives w h o c o u l d bargain for the protestors, a n d numerous instances of tentative bargains that failed because agents on one side or the other c o u l d not c o m m a n d the support of the group they w e r e supposed to represent. Official e n t r y into a b a r g a i n i n g relationship serves initially to v a l i date a p u b l i c definition of the disturbances as social protest, a c k n o w l e d g i n g the m e r i t of some grievances. W h e n the potential for disturbances persists, the tendency is to m o v e toward an accommodation t h r o u g h a system of r o u t i n i z e d bargaining, such as we practice b e t w e e n management a n d labor unions or t h r o u g h the sensitive w a r d organization of m a c h i n e politics. B u t the effect of a routinized b a r g a i n i n g relationship is to erode the protest meanings. R o u t i n i z e d bargaining and the protest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are incompatible for several reasons. Protest tends to define o p e n - e n d e d c o m m i t m e n t s : no one can tell h o w m u c h effort and m o n e y w i l l ultimately be r e q u i r e d to correct racial inequities in the U n i t e d States. B u t bargaini n g can only occur w i t h respect to specific a n d d e l i m i t e d demands, p e r m i t t i n g concessions to be w e i g h e d against costs. T h e bargainer must v i e w the exchange impersonally, seeing the other's demands as tactics. He cannot afford the sentimen-

Turner tality of v i e w i n g t h e m as legitimate grievances. The attributes of spontaneity a n d naivete that i n here in the folk concept of social protest are no longer m e t by organized, r o u t i n i z e d disorders. Quite a different concept of protest, for instance, is i n v o l v e d in the r o u t i n i z e d disorders of the L o n don mobs described by H o b s b a u m (1959). As it becomes evident that the official approach is n o w the i m p e r s o n a l approach of bargaining, p u b l i c sanction for the protest interpretation weakens. T h e result is either to free the suppressed unsympathetic interpretations in the pattern k n o w n as " b a c k l a s h , " or to accept the relationship as one of i m p e r s o n a l bargaining. If the f o r m e r happens, there is pressure on p u b l i c officials to discontinue bargaining. At the t i m e of this w r i t i n g this is clearly h a p p e n i n g in connection w i t h the pattern of bargaining by university officials w i t h militant student groups. If the latter happens, m i n o r disturbances come to be accepted as r e c u r r i n g m i n o r annoyances. As in most contemporary labor disputes, p u b l i c attitude is " w h a t are they asking for this t i m e ? " assuming that the aim is c o m p e t i t i v e b e t t e r m e n t rather t h a n grievance correction. O n c e again, if our t h e o r i z i n g is correct, the protest interpretation is i n h e r e n t l y unstable, tending to transform into another definition as disturbances continue and recur.

161 currently a n d retrospectively as the process u n folds a n d as i n t e r g r o u p relationships change. Second, there are important shades of differences in protest interpretations that c o r r e s p o n d w i t h the specific types of intergroup process in w h i c h the interpreters are i n v o l v e d . T h r e e k i n d s of relationships have b e e n r e v i e w e d . O n e g r o u p m a y become partisans in conflict w i t h the troublemakers, either because they b e l o n g to a g r o u p that can usefully m a k e c o m m o n cause against the target group w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g an advantageous position in a coalition w i t h the troublemakers, or because of disaffection f r o m their o w n g r o u p so that they ally w i t h its enemies. C o n c e r n of the former w i t h the protestors' grievances is c o n stantly tinged w i t h a comparison of benefits that each group gains f r o m the coalition. F o r the latter, orientation t o w a r d conflict is the salient b o n d , a n d discomfiture of t h e target group easily becomes a m o r e i m p o r t a n t a i m than ameliorating the c o n d i t i o n of the troublemakers. A second group m a y see themselves as p r i m e target for attack or as neutrals in danger of b e i n g d r a w n into conflict w i t h the troublemakers, a n d thus respond w i t h an offer of conciliation. C o n c i l i ation involves a generous interpretation of the troublemakers' activities, a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e i r grievances, a d m i t t i n g fault, and i d e n t i f y i n g their activity as social protest. Grievances must be i d e n tified if conciliation is to proceed. B u t the salient c o n d i t i o n easily becomes protection of the target group, a n d the protest interpretation is h i g h l y v u l nerable in the event that conciliation is not reciprocated. A t h i r d group, consisting of p u b l i c officials and spokesmen, engages in bargaining by offering some amelioration in r e t u r n for guarantees against further violence and disorder. B u t the i m personal a n d calculating nature of bargaining, especially as it recurs and is r o u t i n i z e d , w o r k s against seeing the trouble as social protest. T h e disturbance soon becomes a m o v e in a c o m p e t i tive game, to be m e t by m i n i m a l and calculated concessions. A n d as the masters of u r b a n political machines have l o n g understood, " b u y i n g off" p r o test leaders, d i r e c t l y , tends to be a less costly a n d m o r e i m m e d i a t e l y effective tactic of b a r g a i n i n g than offering programs for amelioration of u n d e r l y i n g grievances.

CONCLUSION A speculative analysis of this sort should be completed by b r i n g i n g together all of the predictions a n d i n d i c a t i n g w h e r e the sets of assumptions are redundant, w h e r e they are contradictory, a n d where they are c o m p l e m e n t a r y . B u t neither the theories nor the variables can be designated precisely enough at the present t i m e to support this type of summation. T h r e e observations w i l l u n derline the m a i n thrust of the approach we have employed. First, the analysis exemplifies the assumption that meanings are attached to events as an aspect of i n t e r g r o u p process. T h e m e a n i n g attributed to a p u b l i c disturbance expresses in large part the current and anticipated interaction b e t w e e n the various relevant groups. M e a n i n g s change b o t h

162 O u r t h i r d and final observation is that inter p r e t i n g p u b l i c disorders as social protest is an unstable a n d precarious c o n d i t i o n . It requires an optimally balanced set of conditions, and is diffi cult to m a i n t a i n over an extended p e r i o d of time. Insofar as such interpretations are favorable to social r e f o r m , it appears that they must be capital i z e d q u i c k l y , w h i l e conditions are favorable, t h r o u g h programs that c a n be i m p l e m e n t e d on a c o n t i n u i n g basis by a m o r e r o u t i n i z e d a n d i m personal bargaining. Perhaps a residue of under standing that can be favorable to future reforms m a y r e m a i n in spite of c o m m u n i t y redefinition. Perhaps, also, reformers should not overestimate what can be gained by disorderly protest in rela t i o n to the many other means for effecting change. Fogelson, Robert M. "Violence as Protest." Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change. Edited by Robert H. Connery. New York: Academy of Political Science. 1968, pp. 25-41. Gouldner, Alvin W. "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Pre liminary Statement." American Sociological Review 25 (April 1960):161-178. Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots. Violence in the CityAn End or a Beginning?'Los Angeles, 1965. Grimshaw, Allen D. "Three Views of Urban Violence: Civil Disturbance, Racial Revolt, Class Assault." Riots and Rebellion. Edited by Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1968, pp. 103-119. Harper, Dean. "White Reactions to a Riot." Riots and Rebellion. Edited by Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications. 1968, pp. 307-314. Hobsbaum, Eric J. Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels. Glencoe, III: Free Press, 1959. Homans, George. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Norms. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961. Horowitz, Irving L. and Martin Liebowitz. "Social Devi ance and Political Marginality: Toward a Redefini tion of the Relation Between Sociology and Politi cs." Social Problems 15 (Winter 1968):280-296. Katz, Elihu and Paul Lazarsfeld. Personal Influence. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1955. Kelley, Harold H. "Attribution Theory in Social Psychol ogy." Pp. 192-238 in Nebraska Symposium on Moti vation, 1967. Lang, Kurt and Gladys E. Lang. "Racial Disturbances as Collective Protest." Riots and Rebellion. Edited by Louis H. Masoti and Don R. Bowen. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1968, pp. 121-130. Lee, Alfred McClung and Norman D. Humphrey. Race Riot. New York: Dryden Press, 1943. Lemert, Edwin. Social Pathology. New York: McGrawHill, 1951. Lewin, Kurt. "Self-hatred Among Jews." Contemporary Jewish Record 4 (1941):219-232. Lipsky, Michael. "Protest as a Political Resource." American Political Science Review 62 (December, 1968): 1144-1158. Merton, Robert K. "The Self-fulfilling Prophecy." Antioch Review 8 (Summer 1948):193-210. Merton, Robert K. and Alice S. Kitt. "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior." Studies

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163 . "Collective Behavior and Conflict: New Theo retical Frameworks." Sociological Quarterly 5 (Spring 1964):122-132. Turner, Ralph H. and Lewis M. Killian. Collective Be havior. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957. von Wiese, Leopold. Systematic Sociology. Adapted and amplified by Howard Becker. New York: John Wi ley and Sons, 1932. Waller, Willard and Reuben Hill. The Family: A Dy namic Interpretation. New York: Dryden Press, 1951.

Blumer, Herbert. "Social Problems as Collective Behav ior." Social Problems 18 (Winter 1971), pp. 298306. Social problems viewed as subjective interpre tations and group responses. Briedis, Catherine. "Marginal Deviants: Teenage Girls Experience Community Response to Premarital Sex and Pregnancy." Social Problems 22 (April 1975), pp. 480-493. Parental and community reac tion to deviant behavior. Couch, Carl J. "Dimensions of Association in Collective Behavior Episodes." Sociometry, vol. 33 (December 1970), pp. 457-471. Challenges the need for a spe cial set of concepts in the examination of collective, as opposed to societal, behavior. Davis, Fred. "The Cab Driver and His Fare: Facets of a Fleeting Relationship." American Journal of Soci ology, vol. 65 (September 1959), pp. 158-165. Par ticipant-observation study of a special kind of hu man encounter. Denzin, Norman K. "The Significant Others of a College Population." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 7 (Sum mer 1966), pp. 298-310. Based on a distinction made by Kuhn, the article identifies role-specific "significant others" and "orientation others." Farberman, Harvey H. "A Criminogenic Market Struc ture: The Automobile Industry." The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 16 (Autumn 1975), pp. 438-457. A symbolic interactionist perspective on illegal ac tions by an established organization. Garfinkel, Harold. "Conditions of Successful Degrada tion Ceremonies." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 61 (March 1956), pp. 420-424. An early precur sor of ethnomethodology and labeling.

164 . "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities." Social Problems, vol. 11 (Winter 1964), pp. 225-250. Inspired by Alfred Schuetz's phenomenology. An insightful delineation of taken-forgranted elements in everyday human relationships. Goffman, Erving. Asylums. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961. Description of "total institutions" (prisons, mental hospitals, convents, orphanages, and other societies-in-miniature) and the kinds of interaction typifying them. --. " O n Face-Work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction." Psychiatry, vol. 18 (August 1955), pp. 213-231. Discusses the elaborate social rituals that function primarily to reduce the likelihood of invalidation of self-image, particularly in casual contacts. Gross, Edward, and Gregory P. Stone. "Embarrassment and the Analysis of Role Requirements." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 60 (July 1964), pp. 1-15. Study of 1,000 instances of recalled embarrassment, revealing some major sociological functions of deliberate embarrassment. Hall, Peter M. "A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics." Sociological Inquiry 42, (3-4, 1972), pp. 35-70. A detailed application of concepts to the political process. Kuhn, Manford H. "The Reference Group Reconsidered." The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 5 (Winter 1964), pp. 6-21. Distinguishing between "group" and "category," Kuhn proposes new ways of defining the idea of "the other." Lauer, Robert H. "Social Movements: An Interactionist Analysis." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 13 (Summer 1972), pp. 315-328. A study of the L S D movement led by Timothy Leary. Manis, Jerome G. "The Concept of Social Problems: Vox Populi and Sociological Analysis." Social Problems, vol. 21 (1974), pp. 305-315. A contrasting position to the article by Blumer cited above. Martin, William B. "The Negotiated Order of Teachers in Team Teaching Situations." Sociology of Education, 40 (Spring 1975), pp. 202-222. Analysis of classroom behavior.

P A R T II

Society

McPhail, Clark. "Student Walkout: A Fortuitous Examination of Elementary Collective Behavior." Socic. Problems, vol. 16 (Spring 1969), pp. 441-455. An empirical challenge to the customary separations of explanations of collective "unstructured" behavior and routine social behavior. Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934. pp. 260-328. Mead here explores the complex relationship between society and the individual. Scheff, Thomas. "Negotiating Reality: Notes on Power in the Assessment of Responsibility." Social Problems, vol. 16 (Summer 1968), pp. 3-17. A symbolicinteractionist view of power. Schmitt, Raymond L. The Reference Other Orientation: An Extension of the Reference Group Concept Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972. A careful examination or the concept of "reference group." Stryker, Sheldon. "Relationships of Married Offspring and Parent: A Test of Mead's Theory." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 62 (November 1956), pp. 308-319. Empirical tests of hypotheses on role-taking drawn from propositions of Mead. Turner, Ralph H. "Role-Taking: Process versus Conformity." In Arnold M. Rose (ed.) Human Behavior and Social Processes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962, pp. 20-40. Makes an important distinction between role-taking and role-making. . "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and ReferenceGroup Behavior." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 61 (January 1956), pp. 316-328. Clarification of certain important social-psychological concepts. Urry, John. Reference Groups and Theory of Revolution. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. Uses the postulates of symbolic interactionism in studying the genesis of revolutionary consciousness in Indonesia in the twentieth century. Warriner, Charles K. The Emergence of Society. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1970. Examines the social-psychological phenomena involved in the formation and persistence of social forms and processes.

PART three

Self

A m o n g the concepts of symbolic interactionism, none has received more discussion and investigation than that of the "self." D u r i n g the past few decades a host of books and articles by social psychologists, both symbolic interactionists and others, have explored this concept. T h e formation of the self is a crucially important aspect of the process of socialization (see proposition 2). Moreover, the concept of the self is fundamental to the major symbolic interactionist principle expressed in proposition 4: H u m a n beings are active in shaping their o w n behavior. As we pointed out in the Introduction to this book, the idea of self received considerable attention by some of the late nineteenth- a n d early twentieth-century philosophers a n d psychologists. To W i l l i a m James, Josiah Royce, James M a r k B a l d w i n , a n d others, the development a n d functioning of the self were central to the study of social life. W i t h the rise of Watsonian behaviorism, however, the concept was rejected as subjective a n d unscientific. In turn, behaviorism has been criticized for neglecting important, though covert, aspects of h u m a n behavior. Mead's social behaviorism stressed the process by w h i c h individuals become aware of and learn to guide their behavior. T h e article by M e l t z e r summarizing Mead's approach (in Part One) discussed the major contributions a n d problems of his concept of self. T h e ambiguity of Mead's work has been paralleled by recent divergences among social psychologists in defining and empirically studying the idea of the self. A m o n g current symbolic interactionists, those who see the self as a dynamic processof viewing and responding to one's o w n behavioremphasize participant-observation, interviews, a n d Cooley's "sympathetic introspection." T h o s e who see the self as a structure of internalized roles stress such devices as the " W h o Am I" Test (also k n o w n as the Twenty-Statements Test). F i n a l l y , some investigators, conceiving the self as a set of attitudes or evaluations, use selfrating scales in their research. T h e first two selections in Part III deal with two distinct facets of the

166

P A R T III

Self

7 . A R T III

self: object a n d actor. T h e selection f r o m Cooley's work describes h o w individuals come to experience themselves as objects. T h r o u g h the attitudes of others, persons learn to "see" and to evaluate their appearance, attitudes, a n d behavior. It is in this sense that the self is sometimes defined as "the i n d i v i d u a l as k n o w n to the i n d i v i d u a l . " C o o l e y terms this self-reflective process, w h i c h closely resembles his r e c o m m e n d e d method for the acquisition of social knowledge, the "looking-glass self." T h e E r v i n g G o f f m a n article concerns the individual as subject rather than object. H e r e the self is considered in its active aspect. Individuals are capable not only of viewing their o w n behavior, but also of directing and guiding this behavior and of shaping the images of themselves available to others. In explaining his view of the self, G o f f m a n draws on drama, literature, a n d observation. H i s perspective is dramaturgicalinterpreting the individual as an actor in a theatrical performance. G r e g g S. W i l k i n s o n uses the dramaturgical perspective as a way of interpreting behavior that psychiatrists diagnose as mental illness. T h o u g h W i l kinson uses the term "identity," rather than self or self-identity, his analysis of the i n d i v i d u a l as actor reveals the importance of one's skills in the presentation of self to others. H i s data suggest that dramaturgic incompetence mismanaged performancesappears to be used as evidence of psychiatric disorder. Moreover, degree of dramaturgic incompetence, and its components, is f o u n d to be associated with diagnosed degree of psychiatric disorder. On these grounds, W i l k i n s o n suggests alternative conceptualizations to the medical m o d e l of mental "illness." W i l l i a m L. Kolb's article evaluates two of M e a d ' s central concepts that have received scant study. A l t h o u g h the " I " and the " M e " have been analytically useful, K o l b points out their basic lack of clarity. He suggests that their ambiguity stems f r o m the complexity of the relationship between social and biological phenomena. A series of experiments by J o h n K i n c h was designed to test a proposition he derived f r o m the M e a d - C o o l e y theory of self-conception. He developed four hypotheses to test the basic proposition that individuals' self-conceptions are based on their conception of others' behavior toward them. E a r l y contributors to symbolic interactionism were m u c h concerned with the development of the self. W h i l e stressing the dynamic and diverse nature of self-conceptions, their emphasis was p l a c e d u p o n the socialization process in c h i l d h o o d . M o r e recently, attention has been given to the critical changes in self-conceptions w h i c h take place d u r i n g the adult years. An example is the article by H e l e n a Z n a n i e c k i L o p a t a . She examines the impact of marriage a n d w i d o w h o o d u p o n women's self-identities. O n e of her noteworthy, a n d perhaps surprising, findings concerns the stronger consequences these life-stages have u p o n the self-identities of the more highly educated w o m e n in her sample. E. L. Quarantelli a n d Joseph C o o p e r describe a study of professional self-conception a n d its relation to the generalized other. U s i n g a structured

P A R T III

Self

167

questionnaire, a technique not often e m p l o y e d by symbolic interactionists, they a p p l y a ten-point scale to measure development of the professional self-image. No theory of h u m a n behavior can be restricted to a single h u m a n grouping. E d w i n D. Driver's comparison of self-conceptions in India and the U n i t e d States, however, is among the few cross-cultural studies. H i s data are used to assess the validity of the Twenty-Statements Test. Some of the selections composing this Part e m p l o y concepts a n d techniques devised b y M a n f o r d H . K u h n . Charles W . Tucker's article raises crucial questions about K u h n ' s self-theory and its most c o m m o n research tool. D e a l i n g with such problems as the "situationality" of responses to the Twenty-Statements Test, and the questionable content-analysis procedures used in analyzing the responses, he points out a lack of fit between the theory a n d the technique. Tucker's analysis thereby makes a valuable contribution to what he has called the "age of i n q u i r y " in symbolic interactionism. W h i l e these articles represent substantial divergences in interpretation and research orientation, they agree in their central thesis that self-conceptions are largely derived f r o m experiences with others and are crucial sources of individual and interpersonal behavior. These articles are only a small segment of the rapidly growing theoretical and empirical literature on what might be considered the core of the h u m a n personality.

1
Looking-Glass Self

r=f /

In a very large a n d interesting class of cases the social reference takes the f o r m of a somewhat definite imagination of h o w one's selfthat is any idea he appropriatesappears in a particular m i n d , a n d the k i n d of self-feeling one has is determ i n e d by the attitude t o w a r d this attributed to that other m i n d . A social self of this sort m i g h t be called the reflected or looking-glass self: "Each to each a looking-glass Reflects the other that doth pass." As we see our face, figure, a n d dress in the glass, and are interested in t h e m because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise w i t h t h e m according as they do or do not answer to what we should like t h e m to be; so in imagination we perceive in another's m i n d some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so o n , a n d are variously affected by it. A self-idea of this sort seems to have three p r i n c i p a l elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his j u d g m e n t of that appearance, a n d some sort of self-feeling, such as p r i d e or mortification. T h e comparison w i t h a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the i m a g i n e d j u d g m e n t , w h i c h is quite essential. T h e t h i n g that moves us to p r i d e or shame is not the m e r e m e c h a n i c a l reflection of ourselves, but an i m p u t e d sentiment, the i m a g i n e d effect of this reflection u p o n another's m i n d . This is evident f r o m the fact that the character a n d weight of that other, in whose m i n d we see ourselves, makes all the difference w i t h
Reprinted Human by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons from

our feeling. We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward m a n , c o w a r d l y in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one, and so on. We always imagine, and in i m a g i n i n g share, the judgments of the other m i n d . A m a n w i l l boast to one person of an actionsay some sharp transaction in t r a d e w h i c h he w o u l d be ashamed to o w n to another.

Nature and the Social Orderby C h a r l e s H o r t o n C o o l e y .

T h e process by w h i c h self-feeling of the lookingglass sort develops in c h i l d r e n may be followed without m u c h difficulty. Studying the movements of others as closely as they do they soon see a connection between their o w n acts and changes in those movements; that is, they perceive their o w n influence or p o w e r over persons. T h e c h i l d appropriates the visible actions of his parent or nurse, over w h i c h he finds he has some c o n t r o l , in quite the same way as he appropriates one of his o w n members or a plaything, and he w i l l try to do things w i t h this new possession, just as he w i l l w i t h his h a n d or his rattle. A g i r l six months old w i l l attempt i n the most evident a n d deliberate m a n n e r to attract attention to herself, to set going by her actions some of those movements of other persons that she has appropriated. She has tasted the j o y of b e i n g a cause, of exerting social p o w e r , a n d wishes more of it. She w i l l t u g at her mother's skirts, w r i g g l e , gurgle, stretch out her arms, etc., all the time w a t c h i n g for the hoped-for effect. These performances often give the c h i l d , e v e n at this age, an appearance of what is called affectation, that is, she seems to be u n d u l y p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h what other people t h i n k of her.

170 Affectation, at any age, exists w h e n the passion to influence others seems to overbalance the established character and give it an obvious twist or pose. It is instructive to find that e v e n D a r w i n was, in his c h i l d h o o d , capable of d e p a r t i n g f r o m t r u t h for the sake of m a k i n g an impression. " F o r instance," he says in his autobiography, "I once gathered m u c h valuable fruit f r o m m y father's trees and h i d i t i n the shrubbery, a n d t h e n r a n in breathless haste to spread the news that I h a d discovered a h o a r d of stolen f r u i t . " T h e y o u n g p e r f o r m e r soon learns to be different things to different people, s h o w i n g that he begins to a p p r e h e n d personality and to foresee its operation. If the m o t h e r or nurse is m o r e tender t h a n just, she w i l l almost certainly be " w o r k e d " by systematic w e e p i n g . It is a matter of c o m m o n observation that c h i l d r e n often behave worse w i t h their m o t h e r t h a n w i t h other a n d less sympathetic people. Of the n e w persons that a c h i l d sees, it is evident that some m a k e a strong impression and awaken a desire to interest a n d please t h e m , w h i l e others are indifferent or repugnant. Sometimes the reason can be perc e i v e d or guessed, sometimes not; but the fact of selective interest, a d m i r a t i o n , prestige, is o b v i ous before the e n d of the second year. By that t i m e a c h i l d already cares m u c h for the reflection of himself u p o n one personality a n d little for that u p o n another. M o r e o v e r , he soon claims intimate a n d tractable persons as mine, classes t h e m a m o n g his other possessions, a n d maintains his o w n e r s h i p against all comers. M . , at three years of age, vigorously resented R.'s c l a i m u p o n their m o t h e r . T h e latter was "my m a m m a , " w h e n e v e r the p o i n t was raised. Strong joy and grief d e p e n d u p o n the treatm e n t this r u d i m e n t a r y social self receives. In the case of M. I noticed as early as the f o u r t h m o n t h a " h u r t " way of c r y i n g w h i c h seemed to indicate a sense of personal slight. It was quite different f r o m the c r y of p a i n or that of anger, but seemed about the same as the cry of fright. T h e slightest tone o f reproof w o u l d p r o d u c e it. O n the other h a n d , if people took notice and laughed and encouraged, she was hilarious. At about fifteen months o l d she had become "a perfect little actress," seeming to live largely in imaginations of
1
1

P A R T III

Self

her effect u p o n other people. She constantly and obviously l a i d traps for attention, a n d looked abashed or w e p t at any signs of disapproval or indifference. At times it w o u l d seem as if she could not get over these repulses, but w o u l d c r y long in a g r i e v e d way, refusing to be c o m f o r t e d . If she hit u p o n any little t r i c k that m a d e people laugh she w o u l d be sure to repeat it, l a u g h i n g l o u d l y a n d affectedly i n i m i t a t i o n . She h a d quite a r e p e r t o r y of these small performances, w h i c h she w o u l d display to a sympathetic audience, or e v e n try u p o n strangers. I have seen her at sixteen months, w h e n R. refused to give her the scissors, sit d o w n a n d make-believe cry, p u t t i n g up her u n d e r l i p a n d snuffling, m e a n w h i l e l o o k i n g u p n o w a n d t h e n to see what effect she was producing.
2

In such p h e n o m e n a we have p l a i n l y enough, it seems to m e , the g e r m of personal a m b i t i o n of every sort. Imagination co-operating w i t h i n stinctive self-feeling has already created a social " I , " a n d this has become a p r i n c i p a l object of i n terest a n d endeavor. Progress f r o m this point is chiefly in the way of a greater definiteness, fulness, and inwardness in the i m a g i n a t i o n of the other's state of m i n d . A little c h i l d thinks of a n d tries to elicit certain visible or audible p h e n o m e n a , a n d does not go back of t h e m ; but what a grown-up person desires to p r o d u c e in others is an internal, invisible c o n d i t i o n w h i c h his o w n r i c h e r experience enables h i m to i m a g i n e , a n d of w h i c h expression is only the sign. E v e n adults, h o w e v e r , make no separation b e t w e e n what other p e o p l e think a n d the visible expression of that thought. T h e y i m a g i n e the w h o l e t h i n g at once, a n d their idea differs f r o m that of a c h i l d chiefly in the comparative richness and c o m p l e x i t y of the elements that accompany and i n t e r p r e t the visible or audible sign. T h e r e is also a progress f r o m the naive to the subtle in socially self-assertive action. A c h i l d obviously and s i m p l y , at first, does things for effect. L a t e r there is an endeavor to suppress the appearance of d o i n g so; affection, indifference, contempt, etc., are simulated to h i d e the real wish to affect the self-image. It is p e r c e i v e d that an obvious seeking after good o p i n i o n is weak a n d disagreeable.
2

T h i s sort o f t h i n g i s v e r y f a m i l i a r t o o b s e r v e r s o f c h i l d r e n . 153.

See, for instance, Miss S h i n n ' s Notes on the D e v e l o p m e n t of Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, by F. Darwin, p. 27. a C h i l d , p.

Erving Goffman

18

The Presentation of Self to Others

W h e n an i n d i v i d u a l enters the presence of others, they c o m m o n l y seek to acquire i n f o r m a tion about h i m or to b r i n g into play i n f o r m a t i o n about h i m already possessed. T h e y w i l l b e interested in his general socio-economic status, his conception of self, his attitude t o w a r d t h e m , his c o m petence, his trustworthiness, etc. A l t h o u g h some of this i n f o r m a t i o n seems to be sought almost as an e n d in itself, there are usually quite practical reasons for a c q u i r i n g it. I n f o r m a t i o n about the i n d i v i d u a l helps to define the situation, e n a b l i n g others t o k n o w i n advance what h e w i l l expect of t h e m a n d what they m a y expect of h i m . Inf o r m e d i n these ways, the others w i l l k n o w h o w best to act in order to call f o r t h a desired response from h i m . F o r those present, m a n y sources of inform a t i o n become accessible a n d m a n y carriers (or "sign-vehicles") become available for c o n v e y i n g this information. If u n a c q u a i n t e d w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l , observers can glean clues f r o m his conduct and appearance w h i c h allow t h e m to apply their previous experience w i t h individuals roughly similar to the one before t h e m or, m o r e important, to a p p l y untested stereotypes to h i m . T h e y can also assume f r o m past experience that only i n d i viduals of a particular k i n d are l i k e l y to be f o u n d in a g i v e n social setting. T h e y c a n r e l y on w h a t the i n d i v i d u a l says about himself or on d o c u m e n tary evidence he provides as to w h o a n d what he is. If the> k n o w , or k n o w of, the i n d i v i d u a l by v i r t u e of experience p r i o r to the interaction, they c a n r e l y on assumptions as to the persistence
From The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life by Erving Goff-

a n d generality of psychological traits as a means of p r e d i c t i n g his present and future behavior. H o w e v e r , d u r i n g the p e r i o d i n w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l is in the i m m e d i a t e presence of the others, few events m a y occur w h i c h directly p r o v i d e the others w i t h the conclusive i n f o r m a t i o n they w i l l n e e d if they are to direct wisely their o w n activity. M a n y c r u c i a l facts lie b e y o n d the t i m e and place of i n t e r a c t i o n or lie concealed w i t h i n it. F o r example, the " t r u e " o r " r e a l " attitudes, beliefs, a n d emotions of the i n d i v i d u a l can be ascertained only i n d i r e c t l y , t h r o u g h his avowals or through what appears to be i n v o l u n t a r y expressive behavior. Similarly, if the i n d i v i d u a l offers the others a p r o d u c t or service, they w i l l often find that d u r i n g the interaction there w i l l be no t i m e and place i m m e d i a t e l y available for eating the p u d d i n g that the proof can be f o u n d i n . T h e y w i l l be f o r c e d to accept some events as c o n v e n tional or natural signs of something not d i r e c t l y available to the senses. In Ichheiser's terms, the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l have to act so that he i n t e n t i o n a l l y or unintentionally expresses himself, a n d the others w i l l i n t u r n have to be impressed i n some way b y h i m .
1

T h e expressiveness of the i n d i v i d u a l (and therefore his capacity to give impressions) appears to i n v o l v e t w o radically different kinds of sign activity: the expression that he gives, a n d the expression that he gives off. T h e first involves verbal symbols or their substitutes w h i c h he uses admittedly a n d solely to convey the i n f o r m a t i o n that he a n d the others are k n o w n to attach to
1

Gustav Ichheiser, " M i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s in H u m a n Relations," to The American Journal of Sociology. LV (Septem-

m a n . C o p y r i g h t 1959 b y E r v i n g G o f f m a n . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r -

Supplement

m i s s i o n o f D o u b l e d a y & Company, I n c .

b e r 1949), p p . 6 - 7 .

172 these symbols. This is c o m m u n i c a t i o n in the traditional and narrow sense. T h e second involves a w i d e range of action that others can treat as symptomatic of the actor, the expectation b e i n g that the action was p e r f o r m e d for reasons other than the i n f o r m a t i o n conveyed in this way. As we shall have to see, this distinction has an only i n i t i a l validity. T h e i n d i v i d u a l does of course intentionally convey misinformation by means of both of these types of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the first i n v o l v i n g deceit, the second feigning. T a k i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n in both its narrow and broad sense, one finds that w h e n the i n d i v i d u a l is in the i m m e d i a t e presence of others, his activity w i l l have a promissory character. T h e others are l i k e l y to find that they must accept the i n d i v i d u a l on faith, offering h i m a just r e t u r n w h i l e he is present before t h e m in exchange for something whose true value w i l l not be established u n t i l after he has left their presence. (Of course, the others also live by inference in their dealings w i t h the physical w o r l d , but it is only in the w o r l d of social interaction that the objects about w h i c h they m a k e inferences w i l l purposely facilitate a n d h i n d e r this inferential process.) T h e security that they justifiably feel in m a k i n g inferences about the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l vary, of course, d e p e n d i n g on such factors as the amount of information they already possess about h i m , but no amount of such past evidence can entirely obviate the necessity of acting on the basis of inferences. As W i l l i a m I. Thomas suggested: It is also highly important for us to realize that we do not as a matter of fact lead our lives, make our decisions, and reach our goals in everyday life either statistically or scientifically. We live by inference. I am, let us say, your guest. You do not know, you cannot determine scientifically, that I will not steal your money or your spoons. But inferentially I will not, and inferentially you have me as a guest.
2

P A R T III

Self

or to perceive h o w in fact he feels t o w a r d t h e m , or to obtain no clear-cut impression; he m a y wish to ensure sufficient h a r m o n y so that the interaction can be sustained, or to defraud, get r i d of, confuse, mislead, antagonize, or insult t h e m . Regardless of the particular objective w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l has in m i n d a n d of his motive for h a v i n g this objective, it w i l l be in his interests to control the conduct of the others, especially their responsive treatment of h i m . This control is achieved largely by i n f l u e n c i n g the definition of the situation w h i c h the others come to formulate, a n d he can influence this definition by expressing himself in such a way as to give t h e m the k i n d of impression that w i l l lead t h e m to act voluntarily in accordance w i t h his o w n plan. Thus, w h e n a n i n d i v i d u a l appears in the presence of others, there w i l l usually be some reason for h i m to m o b i l i z e his activity so that it w i l l convey an impression to others w h i c h it is in his interests to convey. Since a girl's d o r m i t o r y mates w i l l glean evidence of her popularity f r o m the calls she receives on the phone, we can suspect that some girls w i l l arrange for calls to be made, and W i l l a r d Waller's finding can be anticipated:
3

It has been reported by many observers that a girl who is called to the telephone in the dormitories will often allow herself to be called several times, in order to give all the other girls ample opportunity to hear her paged.* Of the two kinds of communicationexpressions g i v e n and expressions g i v e n offthis report w i l l b e p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h the latter, w i t h the m o r e theatrical a n d contextual k i n d , the n o n verbal, presumably unintentional k i n d , w h e t h e r this c o m m u n i c a t i o n be purposely e n g i n e e r e d or not. As an example of what we must try to examine, I w o u l d l i k e to cite at length a novelistic i n c i dent in w h i c h P r e e d y , a vacationing E n g l i s h m a n ,
3

L e t us n o w t u r n f r o m the others to the point of v i e w of the i n d i v i d u a l w h o presents himself before t h e m . He may w i s h t h e m to think highly of h i m , or to think that he thinks highly of t h e m ,
3

H e r e I owe m u c h to an unpublished paper by T o m Burns of

the U n i v e r s i t y o f E d i n b u r g h . H e presents the a r g u m e n t that in all i n t e r a c t i o n a basic u n d e r l y i n g t h e m e is the desire of e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t t o g u i d e a n d c o n t r o l the responses m a d e b y the o t h e r s p r e s e n t . A s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t has b e e n a d v a n c e d b y J a y H a l e y in a recent u n p u b l i s h e d paper, but in regard to a special k i n d o f c o n t r o l , that h a v i n g t o d o w i t h d e f i n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f those i n v o l v e d i n t h e i n t e r a c t i o n .
4

Q u o t e d in E.

H.

Volkart, editor,

Social Behavior and Personal-

ity. C o n t r i b u t i o n s o f W . I . T h o m a s t o T h e o r y a n d S o c i a l R e s e a r c h ( N e w Y o r k : S o c i a l S c i e n c e R e s e a r c h C o u n c i l , 1951), p . 5.

W H l a r d W a l l e r , " T h e R a t i n g a n d D a t i n g C o m p l e x , " American II, p. 730.

Sociological Review,

Goffman makes his first appearance on the beach of his summer hotel i n Spain: But in any case he took care to avoid catching anyone's eye. First of all, he had to make it clear to :hose potential companions of his holiday that they ere of no concern to him whatsoever. He stared tiirough them, round them, over themeyes lost in space. The beach might have been empty. If by chance a ball was thrown his way, he looked surprised; then let a smile of amusement lighten his face (Kindly Preedy), looked round dazed to see that there were people on the beach, tossed it back with a smile to himself and not a smile at the people, and then resumed carelessly his nonchalant survey of space. But it was time to institute a little parade, the parade of the Ideal Preedy. By devious handlings he gave any who wanted to look a chance to see the title of his booka Spanish translation of Homer, classic thus, but not daring, cosmopolitan tooand then gathered together his beach-wrap and bag into a neat sand-resistant pile (Methodical and Sensible Preedy), rose slowly to stretch at ease his huge frame Big-Cat Preedy), and tossed aside his sandals (Carefree Preedy, after all). The marriage of Preedy and the sea! There were alternative rituals. The first involved the stroll that turns into a run and a dive straight into the water, thereafter smoothing into a strong splashless crawl towards the horizon. But of course not really to the horizon. Quite suddenly he would turn on to his back and thrash great white splashes with his legs, somehow thus showing that he could have swum further had he wanted to, and then would stand up a quarter out of water for all to see who it was. The alternative course was simpler, it avoided the cold-water shock and it avoided the risk of appearing too high-spirited. The point was to appear to be so used to the sea, the Mediterranean, and this particular beach, that one might as well be in the sea as out of it. It involved a slow stroll down and into the edge of the waternot even noticing his toes were wet, land and water all the same to him!-with his eyes up at the sky gravely surveying portents, invisible to others, of the weather (Local Fisherman Preedy).
5

173 false impression, and that the others present receive either no impression at all, or worse still, the impression that P r e e d y is affectedly t r y i n g to cause t h e m to receive this particular impression. B u t the i m p o r t a n t point for us here is that the k i n d of impression P r e e d y thinks he is m a k i n g is in fact the k i n d of impression that others correctly and incorrectly glean f r o m someone i n their midst. I have said that w h e n an i n d i v i d u a l appears before others his actions w i l l influence the definition of the situation w h i c h they come to have. Sometimes the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l act in a thoroughly calculating m a n n e r , expressing himself in a g i v e n way solely in order to give the k i n d of impression to others that is l i k e l y to evoke f r o m t h e m a specific response he is c o n c e r n e d to obtain. Sometimes the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be calculating in his activity but be relatively unaware that this is the case. Sometimes he w i l l intentionally a n d consciously express himself in a particular way, but chiefly because the tradition of his group or social status r e q u i r e this k i n d of expression and not because of any particular response (other than vague acceptance or approval) that is likely to be e v o k e d f r o m those impressed by the expression. Sometimes the traditions of an individual's role w i l l lead h i m to give a well-designed impression of a particular k i n d a n d yet he may be neither consciously nor unconsciously disposed to create such an impression. T h e others, in their t u r n , may be suitably impressed by the individual's efforts to convey something, or may misunderstand the situation a n d come to conclusions that are warranted neither by the individual's intent nor by the facts. In any case, in so far as the others act as if the i n d i v i d u a l h a d conveyed a particular i m pression, we may take a functional or pragmatic v i e w and say that the i n d i v i d u a l has " e f f e c t i v e l y " projected a g i v e n definition of the situation a n d " e f f e c t i v e l y " fostered the understanding that a g i v e n state of affairs obtains. T h e r e is one aspect of the others' response that bears special c o m m e n t here. K n o w i n g that the i n d i v i d u a l is l i k e l y to present himself in a light that is favorable to h i m , the others may d i v i d e what the)' witness i n t o two parts; a part that is relatively easy for the i n d i v i d u a l to manipulate at w i l l , being chiefly his verbal assertions, a n d a

T h e novelist means us to see that P r e e d y is i m p r o p e r l y concerned w i t h the extensive impressions he feels his sheer b o d i l y action is g i v i n g off to those a r o u n d h i m . We can m a l i g n P r e e d y further by assuming that he has acted m e r e l y in order to give a particular impression, that this is a William Sansom, ;.?. 230-32.
:

A Contest of Ladies

(London: Hogarth,

1956),

174 part in r e g a r d to w h i c h he seems to have little c o n c e r n o r control, b e i n g chiefly d e r i v e d f r o m the expressions he gives off. T h e others m a y then use what are considered to be the ungovernable aspects of his expressive behavior as a check u p o n the v a l i d i t y of what is c o n v e y e d by the governable aspects. In this a fundamental a s y m m e t r y is d e m onstrated in the c o m m u n i c a t i o n process, the i n d i v i d u a l presumably b e i n g aware of only one stream of his c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the witnesses of this stream and one other. F o r example, in Shetland Isle one crofter's wife, in serving native dishes to a visitor f r o m the m a i n l a n d of B r i t a i n , w o u l d listen w i t h a polite smile to his polite claims of l i k i n g what he was eating; at the same t i m e she w o u l d take note of the r a p i d i t y w i t h w h i c h the visitor lifted his fork or spoon to his m o u t h , the eagerness w i t h w h i c h he passed food into his m o u t h , a n d the gusto expressed in c h e w i n g the food, using these signs as a check on the stated feelings of the eater. T h e same w o m a n , in order to discover what one acquaintance (A) " a c t u a l l y " thought of another acquaintance (B), w o u l d wait u n t i l was in the presence of A but engaged in conversation w i t h still another person (C). She w o u l d t h e n covertly examine the facial expres sions of A as he r e g a r d e d in conversation w i t h C . N o t b e i n g i n conversation w i t h B , a n d not be i n g directly observed by h i m , A w o u l d sometimes relax usual constraints and tactful deceptions, a n d freely express what he was " a c t u a l l y " feeling about B. This Shetlander, in short, w o u l d observe the unobserved observer. N o w g i v e n the fact that others are l i k e l y to check up on the m o r e controllable aspects of be h a v i o r by means of the less controllable, one can expect that sometimes the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l try to exploit this very possibility, g u i d i n g the impres sion he makes through behavior felt to be reliably i n f o r m i n g . F o r example, i n g a i n i n g admission t o a tight social circle, the participant observer may not o n l y wear an accepting look w h i l e listening to an informant, but may also be careful to wear the same look w h e n observing the informant talk6
6

P A R T III

Self

i n g to others, observers of the observer w i l l then not as easily discover w h e r e he actually stands. A specific illustration m a y be c i t e d f r o m Shetland Isle. W h e n a neighbor d r o p p e d in to have a cup of tea, he w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y wear at least a hint of an expectant w a r m smile as he passed through the door into the cottage. Since lack of physical obstructions outside the cottage a n d lack of light w i t h i n it usually m a d e it possible to observe the visitor unobserved as he approached the house, islanders sometimes took pleasure in w a t c h i n g the visitor d r o p w h a t e v e r expression he was manifest i n g a n d replace it w i t h a sociable one just before reaching the door. H o w e v e r , some visitors, in ap p r e c i a t i n g that this examination was occurring, w o u l d b l i n d l y adopt a social face a l o n g distance f r o m the house, thus ensuring the projection of a constant image. This k i n d of c o n t r o l u p o n the part of the i n d i v i d u a l reinstates the s y m m e t r y of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n process, a n d sets the stage for a k i n d of i n formation gamea potentially infinite c y c l e of concealment, discovery, false revelation, a n d re discovery. It should be a d d e d that since the others are l i k e l y to be relatively unsuspicious of the pre sumably u n g u i d e d aspect of the individual's con duct, he can gain m u c h by c o n t r o l l i n g it. T h e others of course m a y sense that the i n d i v i d u a l is m a n i p u l a t i n g the presumably spontaneous as pects of his behavior, a n d seek in this v e r y act of m a n i p u l a t i o n some shading of conduct that the i n d i v i d u a l has not m a n a g e d to control. This again provides a check u p o n the individual's behavior, this t i m e his presumably uncalculated behavior, thus re-establishing the asymmetry of the c o m m u nication process. H e r e I w o u l d like o n l y to add the suggestion that the arts of p i e r c i n g an i n d i v i d ual's effort at calculated unintentionality seem better d e v e l o p e d than our capacity to manipulate our o w n behavior, so that regardless of h o w many steps have o c c u r r e d in the i n f o r m a t i o n game, the witness is l i k e l y to have the advantage o v e r the actor, and the i n i t i a l asymmetry of the c o m m u n i cation process is l i k e l y to be retained. W h e n we allow that the i n d i v i d u a l projects a definition of the situation w h e n he appears before others, we must also see that the others, h o w e v e r passive their role may seem to be, w i l l themselves effectively project a definition of the

T h e w i d e l y r e a d and rather sound writings of S t e p h e n Potter

a r e c o n c e r n e d i n p a r t w i t h signs t h a t c a n b e e n g i n e e r e d t o g i v e a s h r e w d observer the apparently i n c i d e n t a l cues he needs to discover c o n c e a l e d virtues the g a m e s m a n does not in fact possess.

Goffman ruation by v i r t u e of their response to the i n d i v i d ual and by v i r t u e of any lines of action they initiate to h i m . O r d i n a r i l y the definitions of the situation projected by the several different participants are rjfficiently attuned to one another so that o p e n : ontradiction w i l l not occur. I do not m e a n that .here w i l l be the k i n d of consensus that arises w h e n each i n d i v i d u a l present c a n d i d l y expresses what he really feels a n d honestly agrees w i t h the expressed feelings of the others present. This k i n d :: h a r m o n y is an optimistic i d e a l a n d in any case not necessary for the smooth w o r k i n g of society. Rather, each participant is expected to suppress his i m m e d i a t e heartfelt feelings, c o n v e y i n g a view of the situation w h i c h he feels the others w i l l be able to find at least t e m p o r a r i l y acceptable. The maintenance of this surface of agreement, this v e n e e r of consensus, is facilitated by each participant concealing his o w n wants b e h i n d statements w h i c h assert values to w h i c h everyone present feels obliged to give l i p service. F u r t h e r , there is usually a k i n d of d i v i s i o n of definitional -abor. E a c h participant is a l l o w e d to establish the tentative official r u l i n g r e g a r d i n g matters w h i c h are v i t a l to h i m but not i m m e d i a t e l y i m p o r t a n t to others, e.g., the rationalizations a n d justifica tions by w h i c h he accounts for his past activity. In exchange for this courtesy he remains silent or n o n - c o m m i t t a l on matters i m p o r t a n t to others but not i m m e d i a t e l y i m p o r t a n t t o h i m . W e have then a k i n d of interactional modus vivendi. Together the participants contribute to a single overall definition of the situation w h i c h involves not so m u c h a real agreement as to what exists but rather a real agreement as to whose claims c o n c e r n i n g what issues w i l l be t e m p o r a r i l y h o n ored. R e a l agreement w i l l also exist c o n c e r n i n g the desirability of a v o i d i n g an o p e n conflict of definitions of the situation. I w i l l refer to this
7

175 l e v e l of agreement as a " w o r k i n g consensus." It is to be understood that the w o r k i n g consensus established in one interaction setting w i l l be quite different in content f r o m the w o r k i n g consensus established in a different type of setting. Thus, b e t w e e n two friends at l u n c h , a r e c i p r o c a l show of affection, respect, and concern for the other is m a i n t a i n e d . In service occupations, on the other h a n d , the specialist often maintains an image of disinterested i n v o l v e m e n t in the p r o b l e m of the client, w h i l e the client responds w i t h a show of respect for the competence and integrity of the specialist. Regardless of such differences in con tent, h o w e v e r , the general f o r m of these w o r k i n g arrangements is the same. In n o t i n g the tendency for a participant to accept the definitional claims made by the others present, we can appreciate the c r u c i a l i m p o r tance of the i n f o r m a t i o n that the i n d i v i d u a l initially possesses or acquires c o n c e r n i n g his fel l o w participants, for it is on the basis of this i n i t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n that the i n d i v i d u a l starts to define the situation a n d starts to b u i l d up lines of respon sive action. T h e individual's i n i t i a l projection commits h i m to w h a t he is proposing to be a n d requires h i m to d r o p all pretenses of b e i n g other things. As the interaction among the participants progresses, additions a n d modifications in this i n i tial informational state w i l l of course occur, but it is essential that these later developments be related w i t h o u t contradiction to, a n d e v e n b u i l t up f r o m , the i n i t i a l positions taken by the several participants. It w o u l d seem that an i n d i v i d u a l can m o r e easily m a k e a choice as to what l i n e of treatment to d e m a n d f r o m a n d extend to the others present at the b e g i n n i n g of an encoun ter than he c a n alter the line of treatment that is b e i n g p u r s u e d once the interaction is underway. In everyday life, of course, there is a clear understanding that first impressions are i m p o r tant. Thus, the w o r k adjustment of those in ser v i c e occupations w i l l often hinge u p o n a capac i t y to seize a n d h o l d the initiative in the service relation, a capacity that w i l l require subtle ag gressiveness on the part of the server w h e n he is of l o w e r socio-economic status than his client. W. F. W h y t e suggests the waitress as an exam ple:

' A n i n t e r a c t i o n c a n b e p u r p o s e l y set u p a s a t i m e a n d p l a c e for v o i c i n g d i f f e r e n c e s i n o p i n i o n , b u t i n s u c h cases p a r t i c i p a n t s must be careful to agree not to disagree on the p r o p e r tone o f v o i c e , v o c a b u l a r y , a n d d e g r e e o f seriousness i n w h i c h all arguments are t o b e p h r a s e d , a n d u p o n the m u t u a l respect w h i c h d i s a g r e e i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t c a r e f u l l y c o n t i n u e t o ex press t o w a r d o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s d e b a t e r s ' o r a c a d e m i c d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n m a y also b e i n v o k e d s u d d e n l y a n d j u d i c i o u s l y

...

as a w a y of translating a serious that c a n b e present. handled within

conflict of v i e w s

into

one

a framework

acceptable

to all

176
The first point that stands out is that the waitress who bears up under pressure does not simply respond to her customers. She acts with some skill to control their behavior. The first question to ask when we look at the customer relationship is, "Does the waitress get the jump on the customer, or does the customer get the jump on the waitress?" The skilled waitress realizes the crucial nature of this question . . . The skilled waitress tackles the customer with confidence and without hesitation. For example, she may find that a new customer has seated himself before she could clear off the dirty dishes and change the cloth. He is now leaning on the table studying the menu. She greets him, says, "May I change the cover, please?" and, without waiting for an answer, takes his menu away from him so that he moves back from the table, and she goes about her work. The relationship is handled politely but firmly, and there is never any question as to who is in charge.
8

PART III

Self

events may occur w i t h i n the interaction w h i c h contradict, discredit, or otherwise t h r o w doubt u p o n this projection. W h e n these disruptive events occur, the interaction itself may come to a confused and embarrassed halt. Some of the assumptions u p o n w h i c h the responses of the participants had b e e n predicated become untenable, and the participants find themselves l o d g e d in an interaction for w h i c h the situation has b e e n w r o n g l y defined a n d is n o w no longer defined. At such moments the i n d i v i d u a l whose presentation has b e e n discredited may feel ashamed w h i l e the others present m a y feel hostile, a n d all the participants may come to feel i l l at ease, nonplussed, out of countenance, embarrassed, experie n c i n g the k i n d of anomy that is generated w h e n the m i n u t e social system of face-to-face interaction breaks d o w n . In stressing the fact that the initial definition of the situation projected by an i n d i v i d u a l tends to p r o v i d e a p l a n for the co-operative activity that f o l l o w s i n stressing this action point of v i e w we must not overlook the crucial fact that any projected definition of the situation also has a distinctive m o r a l character. It is this m o r a l character of projections that w i l l chiefly c o n c e r n us in this report. Society is organized on the p r i n c i p l e that any i n d i v i d u a l w h o possesses certain social characteristics has a m o r a l right to expect that others w i l l value and treat h i m i n a n appropriate way. C o n n e c t e d w i t h this p r i n c i p l e is a second, n a m e l y that an i n d i v i d u a l w h o i m p l i c i t l y or explicitly signifies that he has certain social characteristics ought in fact to be what he claims he is. In consequence, w h e n an i n d i v i d u a l projects a definition of the situation and thereby makes an i m p l i c i t or explicit c l a i m to be a person of a particular k i n d , he automatically exerts a m o r a l d e m a n d u p o n the others, o b l i g i n g t h e m to value and treat h i m in the m a n n e r that persons of his k i n d have a right to expect. He also i m p l i c i t l y forgoes all claims to be things he does not appear to b e and hence forgoes the treatment that w o u l d be appropriate for such individuals. T h e others find,
1 1
11

W h e n the interaction that is initiated by "first impressions" is itself m e r e l y the i n i t i a l interaction in an extended series of interactions i n v o l v i n g the same participants, we speak of " g e t t i n g off on the right foot" and feel that it is crucial that we do so. Thus, one learns that some teachers take the following view: You can't ever let them get the upper hand on you or you're through. So I start out tough. The first day I get a new class in, I let them know who's boss . . . You've got to start off tough, then you can ease up as you go along. If you start out easy-going, when you try to get tough, they'll just look at you and laugh.
9

Similarly, attendants in m e n t a l institutions may feel that if the n e w patient is sharply put in his place the first day on the w a r d a n d made to see w h o is boss, m u c h future difficulty w i l l be prevented. G i v e n the fact that the i n d i v i d u a l effectively projects a definition of the situation w h e n he enters the presence of others, we c a n assume that
10
8

W. F. Whyte, " W h e n Workers and Customers M e e t , " Chap.

V I I , Industry and Society, e d . W . F . W h y t e ( N e w Y o r k : M c G r a w H i l l , 1946), p p . 1 3 2 - 3 3 .

9

T e a c h e r i n t e r v i e w q u o t e d by H o w a r d S. B e c k e r , " S o c i a l Class XXV, p. 459. Structure in a Mental Hospital T h i s role o f the witness i n l i m i t i n g what i t i s the i n d i v i d u a l Being and c a n b e has b e e n s t r e s s e d b y E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , w h o see i t a s a b a s i c threat to i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . See J e a n - P a u l Sartre, L i b r a r y , 1956), p . 3 6 5 f f . Nothingness, trans, b y H a z e l E . B a r n e s ( N e w Y o r k : P h i l o s o p h i c a l

V a r i a t i o n s in t h e T e a c h e r - P u p i l R e l a t i o n s h i p . " Journal of Educational Sociology,

1 0

Harold

Taxel,

"Authority

W a r d " ( u n p u b l i s h e d M a s t e r ' s thesis, D e p a r t m e n t o f S o c i o l o g y , U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o , 1953).

Goffman then, that the i n d i v i d u a l has i n f o r m e d t h e m as to what is and as to what they ought to see as the " i s . " O n e cannot judge the i m p o r t a n c e of definitional disruptions by the frequency w i t h w h i c h they occur, for apparently they w o u l d occur m o r e frequently were not constant precautions taken. We find that p r e v e n t i v e practices are constantly e m p l o y e d to avoid these embarrassments and that corrective practices are constantly e m p l o y e d to compensate for discrediting occurrences that have not been successfully avoided. W h e n the i n d i v i d u a l employs these strategies and tactics to protect his o w n projections, we m a y refer to t h e m as "defensive practices"; w h e n a participant e m ploys t h e m to save the definition of the situation projected by another, we speak of " p r o t e c t i v e practices" or "tact." Together, defensive a n d p r o tective practices comprise the techniques e m p l o y e d to safeguard the impression fostered by an i n d i v i d u a l d u r i n g his presence before others. It should be added that w h i l e we m a y be ready to see that no fostered impression w o u l d survive if defensive practices w e r e not e m p l o y e d , we are less ready perhaps to see that few impressions c o u l d survive if those w h o r e c e i v e d the i m pression d i d not exert tact in their r e c e p t i o n of it. In addition to the fact that precautions are taken to p r e v e n t d i s r u p t i o n of projected definitions, we m a y also note that an intense interest in these disruptions comes to play a significant role in the social life of the group. Practical jokes and social games are p l a y e d in w h i c h embarrassments w h i c h are to be taken unseriously are purposely e n g i n e e r e d . Fantasies are created in w h i c h devastating exposures occur. Anecdotes f r o m the pastreal, e m b r o i d e r e d , or fictitious are t o l d a n d retold, detailing disruptions w h i c h o c c u r r e d , almost occurred, or o c c u r r e d and w e r e a d m i r a b l y resolved. T h e r e seems to be no groupi n g w h i c h does not have a ready supply of these games, reveries, and cautionary tales, to be used as a source of h u m o r , a catharsis for anxieties, and a sanction for i n d u c i n g individuals to be m o d est in their claims and reasonable in their projected expectations. T h e i n d i v i d u a l may tell h i m 12
12

177 self through dreams of getting into impossible positions. Families tell of the time a guest got his dates m i x e d and a r r i v e d w h e n neither the house nor anyone in it was ready for h i m . Journalists tell of times w h e n an all-too-meaningful misp r i n t o c c u r r e d , and the paper's assumption of obj e c t i v i t y or d e c o r u m was humorously discredited. P u b l i c servants tell of times a client ridiculously misunderstood f o r m instructions, g i v i n g answers w h i c h i m p l i e d a n unanticipated and bizarre defin i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . Seamen, whose h o m e away f r o m h o m e is rigorously he-man, tell stories of c o m i n g back h o m e and inadvertently asking m o t h e r to "pass the f u c k i n g b u t t e r . " D i p l o m a t s tell of the t i m e a near-sighted q u e e n asked a rep u b l i c a n ambassador about the health of his king.
13 14 1 5

To s u m m a r i z e , then, I assume that w h e n an i n d i v i d u a l appears before others he w i l l have m a n y motives for t r y i n g to control the impression they receive of the situation. This report is conc e r n e d w i t h some of the c o m m o n techniques that persons e m p l o y to sustain such impressions and w i t h some of the c o m m o n contingencies associated w i t h the e m p l o y m e n t of these techniques. T h e specific content of any activity presented by the i n d i v i d u a l participant, or the role it plays in the i n t e r d e p e n d e n t activities of an on-going social system, w i l l not be at issue; I shall be c o n c e r n e d only w i t h the participant's dramaturgical problems of presenting the activity before others. T h e issues dealt w i t h by stagecraft and stage managem e n t are sometimes t r i v i a l but they are quite general; they seem to occur e v e r y w h e r e in social life, p r o v i d i n g a clear-cut dimension for f o r m a l sociological analysis. It w i l l be convenient to e n d this i n t r o d u c t i o n w i t h some definitions that are i m p l i e d in what has gone before a n d r e q u i r e d for what is to follow. F o r the purpose of this report, interaction (that is, face-to-face interaction) may be roughly defined as the r e c i p r o c a l influence of individuals
P e t e r B l a u , " D y n a m i c s o f B u r e a u c r a c y " ( P h . D . dissertation, D e p a r t m e n t o f Sociology, C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y , f o r t h c o m i n g , U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press), p p . 127-29.
13

W a l t e r M . Beattie, Jr., " T h e M e r c h a n t S e a m a n " ( u n p u b l i s h e d M . A . R e p o r t , D e p a r t m e n t o f Sociology, U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o , 1950), p. 35.

1 4
15

Sir

Frederick

Ponsonby,

Recollections

of Three Reigns ( N e w

G o f f m a n , op. t i t , p p . 319-27.

Y o r k : D u t t o n 1952), p. 46.

178 u p o n one another's actions w h e n in one another's i m m e d i a t e physical presence. A n interaction m a y be defined as all the interaction w h i c h occurs throughout any one occasion w h e n a g i v e n set of individuals are in one another's continuous presence; the t e r m " a n e n c o u n t e r " w o u l d do as w e l l . A " p e r f o r m a n c e " may be defined as all the activity of a g i v e n participant on a g i v e n occasion w h i c h serves to influence in any w a y any of the other participants. T a k i n g a particular participant a n d his performance as a basic point of reference, we m a y refer to those w h o contribute the other performances as the audience, observers, or coparticipants. T h e pre-established p a t t e r n of action w h i c h is u n f o l d e d d u r i n g a performance a n d w h i c h m a y b e presented o r p l a y e d through o n other occasions may be called a " p a r t " or " r o u
1 6

PART III

Self

t i n e . " These situational terms can easily be re lated to conventional structural ones. W h e n an i n d i v i d u a l or p e r f o r m e r plays the same part to the same audience on different occasions, a social relationship is l i k e l y to arise. D e f i n i n g social role as the enactment of rights and duties attached to a g i v e n status, we can say that a social role w i l l i n v o l v e one or m o r e parts and that each of these different parts may be presented by the p e r f o r m e r on a series of occasions to the same kinds of audience or to an audience of the same persons.
1 6

F o r comments o n the importance o f distinguishing between routine of interaction and any particular of Games instance and when Be

this r o u t i n e i s p l a y e d t h r o u g h , see J o h n v o n N e u m a n n a n d Oskar p . 49. Morgenstern, The Theory Economic havior ( 2 n d e d . ; P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1947),

Gregg S. Wilkinson

19

Psychiatric Disorder Dramaturgically Considered

In the past, a n u m b e r of scholars have n o t e d the importance of social interaction for considera tions of psychiatric disorder. F o r instance, Sullivan

Gregg

S.

Wilkinson,

"Psychiatric

Disorder

Dramaturgically 15 ( W i n t e r 1974),

Considered,"

The Sociological Quarterly, v o l .

p p . 143-158. R e p r i n t e d b y permission. T h i s p a p e r was m a d e p o s s i b l e b y s u p p o r t r e c e i v e d f r o m P H S T r a i n i n g G r a n t N o . H S 0 0 0 1 9 , N a t i o n a l C e n t e r for H e a l t h Serv ices R e s e a r c h a n d D e v e l o p m e n t , S a x o n G r a h a m , D i r e c t o r ; a n d by a N I M H Postdoctoral Fellowship in Sociology a n d Psychiatry, N o . 1 3 1 1 2 , G e o r g e M a d d o x , D i r e c t o r . D u r i n g various stages o f its i n c e p t i o n , this w o r k has r e c e i v e d t h e b e n e f i t o f a d v i c e a n d c r i t i c i s m s f r o m D a n i e l Y u t z y , D e n n i s Brissett, G r e g ory P. Stone, R i c h a r d Zeller, Saxon G r a h a m , T a i S. K a n g as w e l l as the c o n t i n u i n g support of Jacqueline N. W i l k i n s o n . Secre t a r i a l assistance was p r o v i d e d b y V a l e r i e H a w k i n s .

(1953) advocated v i e w i n g m e n t a l disorders as p r i m a r i l y a disruption of c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h i c h al ways o c c u r r e d w i t h i n an "interpersonal field." G o u g h (1968) has argued that psychopathy results largely f r o m e m p a t h i c deficiency on the part of psychopathic individuals. E. B e c k e r (1968) views schizophrenia as inadequate social p e r f o r m a n c e i n the rituals w h i c h characterize any g i v e n c u l ture, resulting f r o m faulty socialization. Rose (1968) has offered an explanation of i n v o l u t i o n a l neurosis based u p o n loss of roles w h i c h departs f r o m the often c i t e d h o r m o n a l theories. L e m e r t (1968) has shown that paranoid individuals do not contrive the conspiracies they often argue exist against t h e m , but rather actually experience a se-

ries of interactional episodes, i n c l u d i n g a w i t h d r a w a l by others of interpersonal contact, w h i c h c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as conspiratorial in nature. G o f f m a n (1967:141) argues that psychosis m i g h t be v i e w e d as situationally i m p r o p e r behavior w h i c h disrupts social gatherings (Goffman, 1963a:242-248). Scheff (1966, 1968) has d e v e l o p e d a sociological theory of m e n t a l illness e m phasizing the reactions of others to acts of "resid u a l d e v i a n c e " w h i c h h e l p to stabilize deviant roles. A l t h o u g h of diverse nature, social interaction constitutes an i m p o r t a n t t h e m e in all of the above conceptualizations. It also has b e e n argued that m e n t a l illness may be fruitfully c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as dramaturgic incompetence (Wilkinson, 1973a) insofar as it comprises an interactional p h e n o m e n o n . This paper is c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e p o r t i n g the results of an investigation into the e m p i r i c a l applicability of such a m o d e l . D r a m a t u r g i c a l thought has b e e n d e p i c t e d as a b r a n c h of the symbolic interactionist school ( K u h n , 1970). Similar to symbolic interaction, m u c h of its foundation is based u p o n the thought of M e a d (1934), C o o l e y (1902), James (1892), a n d D e w e y (1922). T h e dramaturgical emphasis is probably most evident in the formulations of B u r k e (1965; 1969a, b), D u n c a n (1968), G o f f m a n (1959; 1961a, b; 1963a, b; 1967; 1971), Stone (1970), F o o t e (1967), Brissett (1968), a n d perhaps E. B e c k e r (1962). B u i l d i n g u p o n the w o r k of the above as w e l l as numerous others, I have att e m p t e d to achieve some degree of operationalization and have endeavored to apply such a m o d e of thought to the description a n d analysis of m e n tal disorders.
1

f r o m the symbiotic relationship of p e r f o r m e r and audiences; a n d finally, aspects of the all p e r v a d i n g influence exerted by the nutrient social matrix in w h i c h these elements are i m m e r s e d . In att e m p t i n g to apply such a m o d e of thought to a consideration of psychiatric disorder, the concept dramaturgic i n c o m p e t e n c e was d e v e l o p e d . Before e x p l o r i n g this n o t i o n in detail, h o w e v e r , it may be appropriate to consider its o p p o s i t e dramaturgic competence.
2 3

Dramaturgic Competence

N u m e r o u s investigators have noted the i m portance of identity (e.g., Goffman, 1963; Stone, 1970) and identification (e.g., Foote, 1967; Thomas, 1967; Strauss, 1959) for h u m a n interaction. Identity refers to one's existence as a social entity, i.e., what a n d w h e r e an i n d i v i d u a l is (Stone, 1970:399), whereas identification consists of recognition of an object's existence and i m p u t a t i o n of a symbolic label thereby enabling one to act t o w a r d and in terms of a g i v e n entity. Identities are presented d u r i n g interactional encounters and are subject to confirmation by the audience before w h o m they are p e r f o r m e d . If i n teraction process b e t w e e n p e r f o r m e r and audience is to continue, validation of the presented identity must be f o r t h c o m i n g . Those situations i n w h i c h identities are announced, c o n f i r m e d , and i n w h i c h interaction proceeds smoothly m a y be i n t e r p r e t e d as dramaturgically competent encounters. Those i n w h i c h audience confirmation is not f o r t h c o m i n g , resulting in disruption of interaction flow, may be v i e w e d as dramaturgically incompetent. D r a m a t u r g i c competence consists of five core elements or stages. T h e first, performative c o m petence, refers to activities associated w i t h the presentation a n d staging of social performances
2

H u m a n behavior dramaturgically considered entails explicit cognizance of performers, those before w h o m they p e r f o r m , a n d the influence exe r t e d by each u p o n the other. M o r e specifically, d r a m a t u r g i c a l analysis requires explication of: activities and elements w h i c h affect or contribute to the actions of i n d i v i d u a l performers; characteristics, modes of action, and influences experienced and exerted by audiences; dimensions emanating
1

T h e most definitive statements of dramaturgical thought a n d

its c o r e e l e m e n t s a r e t o b e f o u n d i n B u r k e (1965; 1 9 6 9 a , b ) a n d D u n c a n (1968). G o f f m a n (1959; 1963b) a n d S t o n e (1970) d e a l w i t h s p e c i f i c c o n c e p t s s u c h a s s e l f a n d i d e n t i t y f r o m this orientation.

3

F o r c r i t i c a l a p p r a i s a l s o f this a p p r o a c h s e e M e s s i n g e r e t a l .

(1962) a n d D e w e y (1969). T h e w r i t i n g s o f Strauss (1959) e s p e c i a l l y as it relates to i d e n t i t y c o u l d also be i n t e r p r e t e d as of a dramaturgic nature.

T h e t e r m d r a m a t u r g i c i n c o m p e t e n c e was f i r s t b r o u g h t t o t h e

author's a t t e n t i o n b y D e n n i s Brissett.

180 (see G o f f m a n , 1959). T h e second, empathic c o m petence, is c o n c e r n e d w i t h processes of empathy i n c l u d i n g reflexive activities manifested i n the i n teractional experiences of actor a n d audience. T h e p h e n o m e n o n of " t a k i n g the role of the o t h e r " is probably the most i m p o r t a n t aspect of empathic process (see M e a d , 1934; Foote a n d C o t t r e l l , 1955; Sarbin, 1954; Scheff, 1968). T h e t h i r d stage, m o tive competence, refers to the facility w i t h w h i c h vocabularies of m o t i v e (Mills, 1967) are e m p l o y e d to account for staged performances. C o n t e x t u a l m o t i v e m a n i p u l a t i o n is either anticipatory or explanatory in nature (see also, B u r k e , 1969a, b; Scott a n d L y m a n , 1970; B l u m a n d M c H u g h , 1971). In the fourth stage, substantive m e a n i n g is invested in the performance w h i c h enables the audience to respond to those events previously o c c u r r i n g . If the above stages have taken place, the fifth and final stage consisting of confirmation of the actor's identity probably w i l l occur. As a consequence, the p e r f o r m e r becomes socially situated, a social identity has b e e n achieved, a n d social process continues without i n t e r r u p t i o n .
4

P A R T III

Self

actions. At this t i m e the actor is expected to justify his behavior by offering a suitable explanation (Mills, 1967; Scott a n d L y m a n , 1970; B l u m a n d M c H u g h , 1971). In the event an actor is unable or u n w i l l i n g to account for his behavior in a satisfactory m a n n e r , the encounter m a y be described as displaying m o t i v e i n c o m p e t e n c e . L a c k i n g receipt of a suitable explanation, the performance loses all m e a n i n g for the audience w h o as a consequence is unable to respond. M e a n i n g loss prevails over the interactional encounter. T h e e n d result is a w i t h h o l d i n g of confirmation by the audience a n d a questioning of the performer's i d e n tity. T h e actor, in a v e r y real sense, experiences identity loss.
5 6

D r a m a t u r g i c Incompetence Interactional encounters, h o w e v e r , b e i n g continuously subject to various kinds of disruptions are fraught w i t h difficulty. If, for instance, a p e r f o r m a n c e is i n c o r r e c t l y or i m p r o p e r l y staged, the encounter m i g h t be characterized as p e r f o r m a t i v e l y incompetent. Examples of such performances w o u l d i n c l u d e i n a p p r o p r i a t e use of cosmetic equipment, stage props (Goffman, 1959), o r f l o o d i n g out (Goffman, 1961b). A n i n c o m p e t e n t p e r f o r m a n c e h a v i n g o c c u r r e d , the audience is l i k e l y to experience empathetic difficultiesi.e., an i n a b i l i t y to take the role of actor (see e.g., M e a d , 1934; Sarbin, 1954). If such should be the case, we m a y speak of the encounter as e x h i b i t i n g e m p a t h i c incompetence. U p o n ascertaining a n i n c o m p e t e n t performance a n d h a v i n g e x p e r i e n c e d difficulty in assuming the role of the actor, the audience m a y challenge the motives or m o t i v a t i o n w h i c h presumably u n d e r l i e the performer's
4

A dramaturgically i n c o m p e t e n t encounter then, is characterized by a mismanaged p e r f o r m ance, an i n a b i l i t y of the audience to anticipate future actions a n d to act t o w a r d or in terms of the p e r f o r m e r , a n d a disruption or cessation of interaction process (Wilkinson, 1973a). P e r f o r m ers w h o are unfortunate enough to experience such a t r a i n of events are p r o v i d e d w i t h an i d e n tity m a i n t a i n e d by society specifically for such situationsthat o f m e n t a l l y i l l persons. H a v i n g b e e n identified as such, a set of socially prescribed responses is called f o r t h a l l o w i n g interaction to proceed once again. Some w o u l d argue (e.g., Foote, 1967; Thomas, 1967; Strauss, 1959) that before one m a y act t o w a r d or w i t h respect to a g i v e n object, that object must first be identified. T h i s i m p l i e s that identification of the acting other constitutes a necessary r e q u i r e m e n t for interaction b e t w e e n h u mans. It is a c h i e v e d by attributing an i d e n t i t y f r o m performances a n d proffered vocabularies of m o t i v e . If an actor's identity is questioned or not validated he must be g i v e n another before audiences find it possible to incorporate h i m into the ongoing social process. In our society, a psychiat5

M o t i v e i n c o m p e t e n c e i s b a s e d u p o n t h e n o t i o n , m o t i v e loss,

o r i g i n a t e d b y C h a r l e s E d g l e y (1970) i n h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n : V o c a b u laries o f M o t i v e a n d t h e S o c i a l D e f i n i t i o n o f S c h i z o p h r e n i a . B u f falo:

6

SUNY.

A l l i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y lost. A p e r f o r m e r u p o n h a v i n g his i d e n t i t y

challenged w i l l usually i m m e d i a t e l y adopt a n d a n n o u n c e another. O n e engages in identity manipulation. It is only w h e n one runs out of identities to adopt or announces an identity

O n e m i g h t a r g u e t h a t p e r f o r m a n c e s also m u s t b e m e a n i n g f u l

s o c o n t e x t u a l l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e that n o a m o u n t o f s w i t c h i n g w i l l s a v e t h e e n c o u n t e r t h a t o n e u n d e r g o e s i d e n t i t y loss. ( T h i s c o n c e p t w a s f i r s t s u g g e s t e d t o t h e a u t h o r b y D e n n i s Brissett.)

for t h e p e r f o r m e r . F o r discussions o f m e a n i n g a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s e e M e a d (1934), B e c k e r (1962), a n d B l u m e r (1969).

181 r i c i d e n t i t y constitutes a substitute i d e n t i t y w h i c h m a y be appropriated in such situations thereby a l l o w i n g the audience to define the situation and act a c c o r d i n g l y .
7

DRAMATURGIC INCOMPETENCE AND PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS It was hypothesized that each c o m p o n e n t of d r a m a t u r g i c incompetence as w e l l as dramaturgic i n c o m p e t e n c e in general w o u l d be positively associated w i t h degree of diagnosed psychiatric disturbance a n d general diagnosis. Performances of a b i z a r r e , severely i n c o m p e t e n t , or totally out of context nature are m o r e l i k e l y to be taken as e v i dence of severe psychiatric i m p a i r m e n t t h a n are those w h i c h seem m e r e l y eccentric, strange, or slightly out of frame. L i k e w i s e , the degree to w h i c h one is able to e m p a t h i z e w i t h a p e r f o r m ance similarly w o u l d be related to psychiatric d i agnosis. Performers w h o display a total lack of m o t i v e competence or w h o offer no motives w i l l appear m o r e h a n d i c a p p e d than w i l l those w h o occasionally subrn.it w r o n g or slightly implausible motives. A l s o , performances c o m p l e t e l y v o i d of m e a n i n g are likely to seem m o r e disturbed t h a n those in w h i c h m e a n i n g is confused or ambiguous. F i n a l l y , total identity loss w i l l correspond w i t h diagnoses of a severe nature. It also was h y p o t h e s i z e d that each event w o u l d occur i n the f o l l o w i n g order: p e r f o r m a t i v e i n c o m p e t e n c e first, e m p a t h i c i n c o m p e t e n c e seco n d , m o t i v e i n c o m p e t e n c e t h i r d , m e a n i n g loss fourth, a n d identity loss fifth. Method Patients and a significant audience w e r e i n t e r v i e w e d by means of an o p e n - e n d e d structured i n t e r v i e w schedule as they w e r e processed
7

t h r o u g h the psychiatric screening facility of Northeastern C o u n t y H o s p i t a l . This agency served as a screening a n d referral service for all p u b l i c psychiatric facilities in the county. Interviews w e r e c o n d u c t e d d u r i n g the intake phase as part of the regular screening p r o c e d u r e . A l l types of patients, b o t h first and readmissions, w e r e selected w i t h o n l y d r u g abuse a n d alcoholism cases b e i n g e l i m i n a t e d . T h e audience p r o v e d to be an amorphous category i n c l u d i n g at times: friends, relatives, acquaintances, close f a m i l y m e m b e r s , spouses, parents, social workers, police, a n d hospital personnel. T h e significance of the audience was d e t e r m i n e d on the basis of w h o i n i tiated hospital screening. H o s p i t a l records w e r e e x a m i n e d later for i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g to diagnosis. Interest was focused u p o n elaboration of the series of interactional events l e a d i n g to hospitalization and c u l m i n a t i n g i n a n i n i t i a l psychiatric diagnosis.
8

A total of 87 interviews w e r e c o m p l e t e d . A l though the o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n was to obtain a u n i verse, this was not achieved for the f o l l o w i n g reasons: 1) a large n u m b e r of patients d i d not enter w i t h significant audiences and as such w e r e i n a p propriate: 2) some patients w e r e so obstreperous they i m m e d i a t e l y w e r e sent to an inpatient w a r d ; 3) at times the influx of patients was so great that not all of t h e m c o u l d be i n t e r v i e w e d ; a n d 4) 24hour coverage was not possible. As a result, it was necessary to characterize the sample as a pseudo-universe (i.e., a universe that was not, in a strict sense, achieved). F o r this reason, o n l y n o n parametric forms of measurement w e r e conside r e d appropriate. C r i t e r i a for each component w e r e devised; data w e r e coded in terms of presence or nonpresence, w i t h a value of 1 i n d i c a t i n g presence a n d 0 nonpresence; scores w e r e s u m m e d ; the m e a n was c o m p u t e d ; a n d scores w e r e categorized as either above or b e l o w the m e a n for each variable e x a m i n e d . Classification i n this m a n n e r p r o v i d e d
9
8

T h e present conceptualization is c o m p l e m e n t a r y to Scheff's 1968) t h e o r y o f m e n t a l i l l n e s s i n t h a t b o t h d e a l w i t h

(1966;

role, a u d i e n c e response, a n d l a b e l l i n g (identification). H o w e v e r , several points of d i v e r g e n c e are present. T h e current f o r m u l a tion is focused u p o n identity. F u r t h e r m o r e , whereas Scheff adm i t t e d l y skips o v e r the i n d i v i d u a l w h i l e e m p h a s i z i n g the social, the present m o d e l attempts to capture b o t h the p e r f o r m e r a n d his a u d i e n c e e n g a g e d i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e p r o c e s s . A s s u c h , t h e c u r r e n t a r g u m e n t i s s i m i l a r i n m a n y r e s p e c t s t o S a r b i n ' s (1954) t r e a t m e n t o f r o l e , self, a n d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a n d m a y b e i n t e r p r e t e d a s a n e x t e n s i o n o f S c h e f f ' s (1966) a r g u m e n t . A p s e u d o n y m . T h i s was a large c o u n t y hospital affiliated w i t h a university m e d i c a l school, located in a m e t r o p o l i t a n u r b a n a r e a o f a d e n s e l y p o p u l a t e d state i n t h e n o r t h e a s t e r n U n i t e d States. T h e p s y c h i a t r i c f a c i l i t y w a s p r i m a r i l y a n a c u t e c a r e f a c i l i t y w i t h t h e a v e r a g e l e n g t h o f stay f o r p a t i e n t s b e i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 to 3 w e e k s .
9

T h e coding protocol is included in an appendix. T h e interview

s c h e d u l e m a y b e o b t a i n e d f r o m the author.

182 a c r u d e f o r m of ordinal measurement. D e g r e e of psychiatric disturbance also may be interpreted as constituting a crude f o r m of o r d i n a l measurem e n t in that patients were r a n k e d by psychiatric staff on a scale ranging f r o m severely disturbed to no disturbance. It c o u l d be argued, however, that such a f o r m of classification does not really meet o r d i n a l criteria since it is based u p o n the subjective evaluations of staff, and since it seems highly questionable whether one can determine (in a reliable manner) whether a patient is slightly, moderately, or highly disturbed. It does seem possible for one to distinguish in a fairly consistent m a n n e r b e t w e e n the severely disturbed and the slightly disturbed. Therefore, for the purposes of the present study, evaluations w e r e collapsed into two categories: h i g h and low disturbance. G e n e r a l diagnosis may be i n t e r p r e t e d in similar fashion if psychosis is v i e w e d as b e i n g m o r e severe than neurosis. Statistical analysis entailed the use of P - R - E related measures: gamma, dyx, and T a u beta. Such statistics are superior to chi-square based measures in that chi-square indicates only presence or nonpresence of an association. P - R - E measures, however, not only demonstrate presence, but also direction, relative strength, and f o r m (see e.g., K a n g , 1972, 1973; K i m , 1971). Therefore, rather than being l i m i t e d to monotonic biconditional associations, as we are by chisquare, conditional and weak biconditional relationships become suitable material for analysis.

P A R T III

Self

clusion of m e a n i n g loss, there is a pronounced tendency for h i g h incompetence or loss to be related to h i g h disturbance. In the case of meani n g loss, no responses occurred in the h i g h lossl o w disturbance cell, w i t h most observations falli n g along the major diagonal and a lesser number o c c u r r i n g in the low m e a n i n g loss-high disturbance cell. This indicates that h i g h loss rarely contributes to diagnoses of low disturbance whereas low loss may be present w h e n h i g h disturbance is diagnosed. 2) G e n e r a l diagnosis in terms of psychosis versus neurosis follows a similar pattern although the values are slightly lower than was the case w i t h degree of disturbance. W h e n considered in its entirety, dramaturgic incompetence was f o u n d to be strongly associated w i t h psychiatric diagnosis as m i g h t be expected f r o m the previous findings. A weak, monotonic, biconditional relationship in the p r e d i c t e d direction appears w h e n degree of disturbance is exami n e d , w h i l e general diagnosis approaches a strong conditional association in the predicted direction. T h e n u m b e r of observations falling in each of the cells comprising the m i n o r diagonal is less than 10 percent for degree of psychiatric disturbance, w h i c h may be attributed to error, measurement crudity, variations in diagnosis, or a combination of all three. H o w e v e r , in the case of general diagnosis, w h i c h approaches a conditional association, it is interesting to note that approximately 13 percent of the observations fall in the low incompetence-psychosis cell. This may indicate a tendency for psychiatric staff to render a diagnosis of a more severe nature (psychosis) in ambiguous c i r c u m stances, an interpretation that is equally plausible for degree of disturbance. In any event, the evidence in this case appears to support the contention that dramaturgic incompetence is positively associated w i t h psychiatric diagnosis.
10

Results A strong relationship was found between each of the elements c o m p r i s i n g dramaturgic i n competence and psychiatric diagnosis. In all cases v e r y h i g h gammas were observed w i t h values for dyx and r being on the average 2 to 3 points lower. This information w h e n c o m b i n e d w i t h examination of the cross-tabular distributions i n d i cates the following: 1) in terms of degree of psychiatric disturbance most distributions c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as variants of weak, monotonic, biconditional forms w i t h the exception of m e a n i n g loss w h i c h is more appropriately i n t e r p r e t e d as a strong conditional association. Thus, w i t h the exb

W i t h respect to order of placement, a definite trend was f o u n d in the hypothesized direction. It is interesting to note in Table 19.3 that deviations f r o m the p r i m a r y diagonal tend to occur before, rather than after, the hypothesized stage. W i t h the exception of identity loss, w h i c h does not offer such a possibility, only performative i n 1 0

D r a m a t u r g i c i n c o m p e t e n c e was c o m p u t e d b y s u m m i n g t h e

r a w scores f o r e a c h o f its c o m p o n e n t s , c o m p u t i n g a g r a n d m e a n , a n d c a t e g o r i z i n g i n t e r m s o f this m e a n a s e i t h e r h i g h o r l o w .

ITST<" * 3

lis.
< ^ fl> Q-. 0 p 4

c2 < 5

184 T A B L E 19.2. Association between dramaturgic incompetence and psychiatric diagnosis* Dramaturgic Incompetence Degree of Psychiatric Disturbance General Diagnosis High Low Psychosis Neurosis No disturbance High 53.5 2.3 51.2 4.7 0 Low 9.3 34.9 12.8 27.9 3.5 N = 86
7

P A R T III

Se

7 .98 d.75 . 7 7 p<.00T

= .93 d.63

= .64<.001

' H i g h a n d l o w cells a r e i n p e r c e n t s .

c o m p e t e n c e presents an e r r o r after the p r e d i c t e d stage, a n d in this case no possibility exists for an e r r o r of precedence. Those cases w h i c h c o u l d not be assigned a specific p l a c e m e n t w i t h respect to other stages w e r e categorized as uncodable. Such observations constitute another f o r m of error. It is interesting to note that empathic i n c o m p e t e n c e a n d m e a n i n g loss demonstrate the highest f r e q u e n c y of u n

codable observations. T h i s m a y indicate the ne cessity for f u r t h e r refinement since it is precisely these t w o variables w h i c h are most difficult to operationalize. W h e n presence a n d nonpresence of a perfect sequence was e x a m i n e d in terms of degree of dis turbance a n d general diagnosis, it was f o u n d that presence was strongly associated w i t h h i g h dis turbance a n d a diagnosis of psychosis. T h i s i n d i -

Wilkinson cates that the sequence as h y p o t h e s i z e d is m o r e descriptive of psychosis t h a n neurosis.

185 is the r e q u i r e m e n t that presented identities conf o r m to the situation in w h i c h they occur. It is impossible to cite all situations and correspondingly acceptable identities since they are too n u merous, m a n y are u n k n o w n , they are often contextually related, a n d they are often situationally constructed. It is quite evident, however, that one m a y present himself as A t i l l a the H u n on the form a l stage but not on the stage of everyday social life. A measure of social control is i m p l i e d m e r e l y t h r o u g h the restrictions placed u p o n the use of identities. O n c e an i n d i v i d u a l has b e e n p r o v i d e d w i t h an i d e n t i t y , audiences pertinent to that particular situation are able to direct their behavior t o w a r d h i m in a m a n n e r corresponding to the individual's validated identity. A n individual's p e r c e p t i o n o f his identity, however, m a y differ f r o m that of the audience, or he m a y p r o v e unable to present an i d e n t i t y w h i c h achieves audience satisfaction. S u c h circumstances have b e e n defined as dramaturgically incompetent. Those individuals characterized by h i g h dramaturgic i n c o m p e t e n c e are m o r e l i k e l y to be diagnosed as psychotic whereas those disp l a y i n g l o w e r degrees of dramaturgic i n c o m p e tence are m o r e l i k e l y to be considered neurotic. This m a y indicate: 1) the presence of pathology or i n d w e l l i n g behavioral limitations on the part of the p e r f o r m e r before entering the encounter (see G o u g h , 1968; Sarbin, 1954); 2) the i m p o r tance of interactional processes in h u m a n behavior; and/or 3) a m a n n e r in w h i c h societal restraints u p o n h u m a n behavior are exercised. T h e evidence in this p a p e r is l i m i t e d to interpretations 2 and 3 above. D r a m a t u r g i c i n c o m p e t e n c e as c o n c e i v e d in this investigation appears to occupy a p r o m i n e n t position in the d e v e l o p m e n t of psychiatric i d e n t i ties although it is necessary to recognize that it may not be the only factor. As an interactional p h e n o m e n o n , dramaturgic incompetence constitutes a d i m e n s i o n that cannot be accounted for by physiological, psychic, or sociostructural factors alone. It is an entirely different p h e n o m e n o n c o m p r i s e d of b u t superceding these factors. This does not m e a n that it is possible to rule out entirely the plausible contributions of such elements to h u m a n behavior. It is conceivable that a c h e m i -

PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER DRAMATURGICALLY CONSIDERED :<.001 It has b e e n possible to demonstrate that d r a m a t u r g i c i n c o m p e t e n c e a n d each of its components are positively associated w i t h severity of psychiatric diagnosis. It also has b e e n d e m o n strated that each c o m p o n e n t tends to occur in the p r e d i c t e d sequence w h i c h gives us some i n sight into the nature of the dynamics i n v o l v e d . T h e i m p o r t a n c e of interpersonal processes in the d e v e l o p m e n t of psychiatric identities is strongly i m p l i e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , the d e v e l o p m e n t o f m e n tal illness has b e e n v i e w e d as a social p h e n o m e n o n i n v o l v i n g both a p e r f o r m e r a n d an audience. E a c h are necesary for the e n d result, a psychiatric identity, to occur. It is distorting to concentrate u p o n one w i t h o u t taking i n t o account the other. T h e m u t u a l engagement o f p e r f o r m e r a n d audience in a social encounter m a y be designated as an interactional frame. Theoretically speaking, the means by w h i c h interactional frames are sust a i n e d a n d social performances c a r r i e d to c o m p l e t i o n entails the processes of identification a n d i d e n t i t y negotiation. If an identity, u p o n b e i n g presented, fails to receive audience validation, the interactional frame i s b r o k e n resulting i n i n teraction b r e a k d o w n a n d d i s r u p t i o n of social drama. Social life is c o m p r i s e d of m a n y dramas f r o m the basic d y a d to complex collectivities. It m i g h t be a r g u e d that macro processes ultimately rest u p o n m i n u t e everyday dramas. If these are in some w a y disrupted, the b r e a k d o w n i n social process m i g h t eventually achieve m a c r o d i m e n sions w i t h concomitant implications for the p u b l i c order. M a i n t e n a n c e of social order i m p l i e s m o r e than traffic laws, regulation of e c o n o m i c transactions, c r i m i n a l penalties, etc. Also i n c l u d e d are acceptable definitions of reality, rules g o v e r n i n g social performance, a n d standards for behavior in general. Existence of such n o r m a t i v e requirements serves as an effective m o d e of c o n t r o l cont r i b u t i n g to maintenance of the p u b l i c order. O n e of the most important facets of this c o n t r o l aspect

<

.001

zble

186 cal imbalance or neurogenic t r a u m a c o u l d lead to manifestation of dramaturgically i n c o m p e t e n t behavior. In the case of syphilitic psychosis, a d e l i m i t i n g factor influencing performance is i n d e e d present. F u r t h e r m o r e , psychic states and culturally learned patterns of behavior do i n d e e d influence social performance. H o w e v e r , whereas it is possible to demonstrate dramaturgical parameters in all instances of m e n t a l illnessespecially psychosisnot all psychoses result f r o m c h e m i c a l imbalance or neurogenic trauma. On this basis, it c o u l d be argued that biologically i n d u c e d forms of psychiatric disorder constitute a subset of the larger set dramaturgic i n c o m p e t e n c e . Therefore, a reconceptualization of m e n t a l illness as dramaturgic incompetence w o u l d not be epistemologically or e m p i r i c a l l y unsound especially since it allows consideration of the influence exerted by the audience without disregarding the i n d i v i d u a l himself. In other words, the potential exists for a true interactional m o d e l of m e n t a l illness and h u m a n behavior. N u m e r o u s investigators have d o c u m e n t e d that certain psychoses (especially schizophrenia) occur more frequently among the lower social classes (e.g., Hollingshead and R e d l i c h , 1958; R u s h i n g , 1971). T h e p r o b l e m has been h o w to explain such findings, and explanations have i n c l u d e d m o b i l i t y , isolation, stress, culture conflict, d e p r i v a t i o n , and frames of reference. A p p l y i n g the findings of the present study, one c o u l d speculate that dramaturgic incompetence may p r o v i d e a clue to the l i n k b e t w e e n social class and psychiatric disorder, at least in some cases. G i v e n that h i g h incompetence occurs m o r e frequently a m o n g lower status individuals (Wilkinson, 1973a), one might argue that l o w e r educational achievement, w i t h concomitant limitations of a symbolic nature, combines w i t h relative lack of social p o w e r as manifested by l o w occupational prestige to produce the inverse connections bet w e e n social class and m e n t a l illness. Those w h o possess a preponderance of social p o w e r (higher status groups) are able to set behavioral standards of b o t h an overt and symbolic nature to w h i c h others must conform. On the other h a n d , lower status individuals, h a m p e r e d by lack of education a n d l i m i t e d symbolic skills are not only m o r e l i k e l y to appear severely disturbed to psychiatric

P A R T III

Self

diagnosticians (who are likely to possess highly d e v e l o p e d symbolic skills), but also are l i k e l y to be at a disadvantage in terms of performance, motive m a n i p u l a t i o n , and identity negotiation. T h e disadvantage stems f r o m l i m i t e d interactional skills, divergent cultural experiences, and lack of social power. It is possible that dramaturgic incompetence, as it has b e e n defined, taps these dimensions in a c r u d e w a y .
1 1

Identities a n d Identification: A C r u c i a l Process T h e concept dramaturgic incompetence is especially appropriate w h e n identity serves as the focus of attention. E v i d e n c e obtained in this i n vestigation has demonstrated not only the existence of the elements m e n t i o n e d in behavior adjudged psychiatrically i m p a i r e d and the order in w h i c h they occur d u r i n g the process of attaini n g a psychiatric identity, but also the crucial nature of identification processes and concomitant i d e n t i t i e s . In order for interactants to take part in social drama, the interactional situation must first be defined by the interactants. Performative, empathic, m o t i v e incompetence, m e a n i n g , and identity loss t e n d to i m p e d e defining the situation and in this m a n n e r h a m p e r social process.
12

D e f i n i n g the situation entails i d e n t i f y i n g objects and ascribing some type of identity to t h e m . This allows an i n d i v i d u a l to incorporate an object w h i c h has b e e n identified and attributed an i d e n tity into his p r o g r a m of action. It is precisely this process w h i c h has b e e n d o c u m e n t e d in the d e v e l opment of psychiatric identities. Audiences, u p o n encountering strange or bizarrely p e r f o r m i n g i n dividuals, are unable to identify t h e m w i t h respect to the social context at hand. As a conse1 1

O f course, since w e have not b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h distin-

g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n those groups d e m o n s t r a t i n g h i g h a n d l o w i n c o m p e t e n c e , such notions must be regarded as highly speculative. Nevertheless, such an explanation seems plausible a l t h o u g h i t d i s r e g a r d s p e r f o r m a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s that m a y b e o f s o m a t i c o r i g i n . S u c h l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d n o t s e e m t o b e s e n s i t i v e t o status designations, h o w e v e r , unless they w e r e of an e n d o g e n o u s n a t u r e i n w h i c h case r a c e o r e t h n i c o r i g i n w o u l d b e m o r e v a l i d i n d i c a t o r s t h a n w o u l d status p e r se.
1 2

I t m u s t b e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t this i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d d i s c u s s i o n claims, and projections based upon the data

is l i m i t e d to the topic of identity attainment. Interpretations, conclusions, p r e s e n t e d a r e s u b j e c t t o this l i m i t a t i o n .

Wilkinson quence, they are unable to p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h identities w h i c h w o u l d allow the audience to act t o w a r d , u p o n , and w i t h the individuals i n ques tion. In order to do so, some type of identity must be ascribed. U n d e r such circumstances, the per former m a y be identified as m e n t a l l y i l l w h i c h permits audience incorporation of the p e r f o r m e r into the interactional w o r l d . D u r i n g a social encounter a p e r f o r m e r an nounces his identity in either a manifest or latent fashion and conducts a performance appropriate for the identity presented. If one's identity a n d performance do not jibe or are not contextually proper, one is likely to encounter interactional problems. F o r instance, a hobo who attempts to pass himself off as a m i l l i o n a i r e , or an illiterate field w o r k e r who claims he is a physician, or a m a i d w h o claims she is the V i r g i n M a r y are likely to be h e l d suspect. Audiences often find that such identities do not fit their frames of reference, ex pectations, or repertoires of social experience. M e n t a l illness serves as a handy catchall m o d e of identification that can be a p p l i e d w h e n e v e r identities are questioned a n d the encounter threatened. It is a substitute identity of extreme flexibilityespecially in western industrialized societies that is used to fill the v o i d created by i d e n t i t y loss. Implications are f o r t h c o m i n g f r o m such find ings bearing u p o n the more general topic of i d e n tity construction and negotiation in social life at large. If psychiatric identities result f r o m drama turgic incompetenceit seems reasonable to sus pect that in the absence of i n c o m p e t e n c e or pres ence of competenceso-called n o r m a l identities w i l l be presented, validated, sustained, a n d inter action process w i l l continue u n i m p e d e d . O n e must exercise caution, h o w e v e r , in generalizing f r o m the data presented in this report since it was obtained only f r o m individuals who came in contact w i t h psychiatric facilities.
1 3 14
: 3

187 A t t r i b u t i o n of psychiatric identities fulfills a r e q u i r e d societal function. It provides for mainte nance of our social gatherings (Goffman, 1967) and facilitates continuation of interactional proc esses. A taken-for-granted n o r m seems to exist that social process should flow u n i m p e d e d a n d interaction b e t w e e n performers should be smooth and without i n t e r r u p t i o n (Goffman, 1968; Szasz, 1970). We cannot at this t i m e say w h y this existsonly that it does.

Limitations A n u m b e r of qualifications should be cited c o n c e r n i n g the findings of this investigation and the methods used. First, the concepts and measur i n g devices are crude and require further refine ment. Second, operationalization has b e e n inade quate in a n u m b e r of instancesespecially in t a p p i n g the dimensions of empathic process a n d m e a n i n g loss. T h i r d , although an attempt was made to sample a universe, because of limitations encountered at the research site, it p r o v e d impos sible. Therefore, in a strict sense the sample c o m prises neither a r a n d o m sample nor a universe. H o w e v e r , w h e n one considers the refusal rate en countered in most surveys and the r e t u r n rate of most questionnaire studies, the present study has achieved as strong a sample, if not stronger, as is usually achieved. F o u r t h , the interviews w e r e directed t o w a r d ascertaining the interactional events w h i c h p r e c e d e d psychiatric screening and in this sense are retrospective. H o w e v e r , the p r o b l e m of c o n d u c t i n g an investigation into the p h e n o m e n a considered in other than a retro spective fashion constitutes a serious d i l e m m a . F i nally, although c o n c e r n e d w i t h process, a certain amount of reification is present as a result of l i n guistic limitations. It should be explicitly u n d e r stood that the m o d e l presented is processual a n d not structural. Several theoretical limitations also should be m e n t i o n e d . In the first place, the present concep tualization of audience is too simplistic. It has be come obvious that any g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l performs before m a n y audiences even under further spe cific circumstances such as achieving a psychiatric identity. Therefore further specification of the au-

W e a r e f a c e d w i t h t h e task o f e x p l a i n i n g w h y o n e i d e n t i t y

comes to be a c c e p t e d over another. T h i s m a y be in part, a f u n c t i o n o f s o c i a l p o w e r ; i.e., t h o s e w h o a r e a b l e t o m a r s h a l a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f social s u p p o r t r e c e i v e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f their definitions o f o t h e r s a s w e l l a s v a l i d a t i o n o f t h e i r o w n i d e n t i t y presentations.

1 1

A p s y c h i a t r i s t o n c e m e n t i o n e d t o t h e a u t h o r that p s y c h i a t r i c

i m p a i r m e n t c o u l d be found in anyone if one w a n t e d to look rar e n o u g h a s t a t e m e n t w h i c h i s s o b e r i n g i n d e e d !

188 dience(s) i n v o l v e d w o u l d greatly strengthen sub sequent research efforts. A possible strategy c o u l d entail refinement i n the m a n n e r o f D u n c a n (1968). A n o t h e r l i m i t a t i o n concerns the m a n n e r i n w h i c h empathic i n c o m p e t e n c e was ap p r o a c h e d . In contrast to p r i o r conceptions of this concept, it was v i e w e d as an attribute of the a u d i ence rather than a characteristic of the per f o r m e r . It c o u l d also be argued that empathic i n c o m p e t e n c e characterizes the p e r f o r m e r thereby affecting his performance (see G o u g h , 1968; Sar b i n , 1954). F i n a l l y , we have not adequately ac c o u n t e d for w h y some i n d i v i d u a l s are able to re ceive validation for their i d e n t i t i e s g i v e n similar types of performanceswhereas others are not. A structural approach to this type of p r o b l e m m i g h t p r o v e i l l u m i n a t i n g not only i n terms o f whose definition comes to p r e v a i l , but also in terms of role expectations a n d corresponding so cial situations. APPENDIX

P A R T III

Self

Method Employed in Coding & Computing Dramaturgic Incompetence

15

I. P e r f o r m a t i v e Incompetence Score 1 for presence, 0 for nonpresence A. Value Dimension 1. Violations of rules of relevance and irrelevance 2. Violations of residual rules 3. I m p r o p e r management of expressive equipment 4. I m p r o p e r management of structural props 5. I n v o l v e m e n t in situational i m p r o p r i e ties S of items present B. Mood Dimension 1. I m p r o p e r engrossment-involvement 2. Violations of personal ease-tension continuum 3. Contributes to interactional tension 4. F l o o d i n g out 2 of items present Total P e r f o r m a t i v e Incompetence = A 4- II. E m p a t h i c Incompetence 1. Patient unable to understand h o w he should have acted 2. Patient unable to understand what consti tutes p r o p e r behavior 3. Patient seems unable to take role of the other

SUMMARY D r a m a t u r g i c a l thought has b e e n c r i t i c i z e d by K u h n (1970) for its p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l characteris tics a n d unoperationalized nature. This investiga t i o n was in part an attempt to operationalize dramaturgical thought a n d in part an attempt to conceptualize m e n t a l illness i n dramaturgical terms. A measure of i n i t i a l success has b e e n achieved. E v i d e n c e was presented in support of the proposition that individuals identified as psychiatrically i m p a i r e d display d r a m a t u r g i c i n c o m petentence. It has also b e e n s h o w n that the sepa rate components of d r a m a t u r g i c i n c o m p e t e n c e t e n d to occur in the specified order, especially i n those circumstances w h e r e b y individuals c o m e to be identified as psychotic or severely disturbed. F u r t h e r refinement and elaboration of the con cepts e m p l o y e d in this investigation are r e q u i r e d . Nevertheless, it has b e e n demonstrated that con ceptualization of m e n t a l illness in dramaturgic terms is plausible and m a y p r o v e to be a w o r t h w h i l e d i r e c t i o n for subsequent research. In this m a n n e r , interactional dimensions of psychiatric disorder in particular w i l l be i l l u m i n a t e d as w e l l as explication of social d r a m a in general.

1 5

Performative

incompetence

is

based

upon

the

following

s o u r c e s : r u l e s o f r e l e v a n c e a n d i r r e l e v a n c e ( G o f f m a n , 1961b); r e s i d u a l r u l e s (Scheff, 1966); e x p r e s s i v e e q u i p m e n t a n d s t r u c t u r a l p r o p s ( G o f f m a n , 1959); s i t u a t i o n a l i m p r o p r i e t i e s ( G o f f m a n , 1967); e n g r o s s m e n t - i n v o l v e m e n t ( G o f f m a n , 1963a); p e r s o n a l ease-tension, interactional tension, a n d flooding out ( G o f f m a n , 1961b); v a l u e - m o o d d i m e n s i o n ( S t o n e , 1970). Empathic in a n d Sullivan c o m p e t e n c e w a s d e v e l o p e d f r o m M e a d (1934)

(1953). M o t i v e i n c o m p e t e n c e w a s d e r i v e d f r o m B u r k e (1965, 1 9 6 9 a , b), M i l l s (1967), S c o t t a n d L y m a n (1970), a n d E d g l e y (1970). M e a n i n g loss i s b a s e d o n B e c k e r (1962), B l u m e r (1969), as w e l l as M e a d (1934). I d e n t i t y loss is a n e x t e n s i o n o f S t o n e (1970) a n d G o f f m a n (1963b). F o r a m o r e d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f i d e n t i t y loss a n d its c o m p o n e n t s a s w e l l a s a l l o f t h e a b o v e , see W i l k i n s o n (1973a).

Wilkinson 4. Patient unable to successfully manage role obligations 5. A u d i e n c e unable to understand patients behavior 6. A u d i e n c e unable to take role of patient 2 of items present I I . M o t i v e Incompetence 1. Patient unable to offer any motives justifyi n g his behavior 2. Patient offers w r o n g motives 3. A u d i e n c e rejects proffered motives 4. A u d i e n c e unable to understand proffered motives 5. Patient engages in m o t i v e confusion. (Offers several or m a n y motives w h i c h confuse rather than explain) 2 of items present [V. A u d i e n c e M e a n i n g Loss 1. A u d i e n c e unable to respond to p e r f o r m er's announced identity (apparent) 2. A u d i e n c e unable to respond to p e r f o r m er's announced identity (discursive) 3. A u d i e n c e able to respond to performer's announced identity only i n psychiatric terms 4. A u d i e n c e able to respond to performer's announced identity only in terms of illness 5. A u d i e n c e experiences m e a n i n g confusion/ ambivalence 2 of items present V . Identity Loss 1. Involuntary rather than voluntary commitment 2. Presentation as somatically i l l rather than mentally i l l 3. C o n f u s e d as to time, location, w h o m one is 4. Presentation as sane rather than disturbed 5. Presentation as r e q u i r i n g less help than audience defines as n e e d i n g 6. Presentation as w e l l rather than i l l 7. G e n e r a l confusion as to what is o c c u r r i n g 8. A u d i e n c e ascription of an identity different f r o m that announced 2 of items present

189 D r a m a t u r g i c Incompetence = 2 of P e r f o r m a t i v e Incompetence + E of Empathic Incompetence + 2 of M o t i v e Incompetence 4- 2 of M e a n i n g Loss + 2 of Identity Loss

REFERENCES Blum, A. F., and P. McHugh. "The Social Ascription of Motives." American Sociological Review 35 (February 1971):98-108. Blumer, Herbert. Symbolic Interactionism. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969. Becker, Ernest. "Socialization, Command of Performance, and Mental Illness." The Mental Patient: Studies in The Sociology of Deviance. Edited by Stephan P. Spitzer and Norman K. Denzin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968, pp. 31-40. . The Birth and Death of Meaning. New York: The Free Press, 1962. Brissett, D. "Collective Behavior: The Sense of a Rubric." American Journal of Sociology 74 (July 1968):70-78. Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969a. . A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969b. . Permanence and Change. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1965. Cooley, Charles H. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Charles Scribner' Sons, 1902. Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1922. Dewey, R. "The Theatrical Analogy Reconsidered." The American Sociologist (November 1969):307311. Duncan, Hugh D . Symbols in Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Dunham, H. Warren and Robert E. L. Faris. Mental Disorders in Urban Areas. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1939. Foote, Nelson and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. Identity and Interpersonal Competence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. Foote, Nelson. "Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation." Symbolic Interaction. Edited by Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967, pp. 343-354. Goffman, Erving. Relations in Public. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

190 . Interaction Ritual, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967. . Behavior in Public Places. New York: The Free Press, 1963a. . Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963b. . Asylums. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1961a. . Encounters. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1961b. . The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959. Gough, Harrison G. "A Sociological Theory of Psychopa thy." The Mental Patient: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. Edited by Stephan P. Spitzer and Nor man K. Denzin. New York: McGraw H i l l , 1968, pp. 60-68. Hollingshead, August B. and Fredrick C. Redlich. Social Class and Mental Illness. New York: John Wiley, 1958. Hunt, R. G. "Socio-cultural Factors in Mental Disor ders." Behavioral Science 4 (April 1959):96-106. James, William. Psychology. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1892. Kang, T. S. "Ordinal Measures of Association and Form of Hypotheses." Sociological Quarterly 14 (Spring 1973):235-248. . "Linking Forms of Hypothesis to Type of Statis tics: An Application of Goodman's z . " American So ciological Review 37 (June 1972):357-365. K i m , J. O. "Predictive Measures of Ordinal Association." American Journal of Sociology 76 (March 1971):891-907. Kuhn, Manford H. "Major Trends in Symbolic Interac tion Theory in the Past Twenty-five Years." Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction. Edited by Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, pp. 70-87. Lemert, Edwin M. "Paranoia and the Dynamics of Ex clusion." The Mental Patient: Studies in the Sociol ogy of Deviance. Edited by Stephan P. Spitzer and Norman K. Denzin. New York: McGraw H i l l , 1968, pp. 68-84. Manis, Jerome G . , and Bernard N. Meltzer. Symbolic Interaction. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967. Mead, George H . Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: Uni versity of Chicago Press, 1934. Messinger, S. L., with H. Sampson and R. D. Tonne. "Life as Theater: Some Notes on the Dramaturgical

P A R T III

Self

Approach to Social Reality." Sociometry 25 (March 1962):98-110. Mills, C. Wright. "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive." Symbolic Interaction. Edited by Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967, pp. 355-366. Rose, Arnold M. "A Social-psychological Theory of Neu rosis." The Mental Patient: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. Edited by Stephan P. Spitzer and Nor man K. Denzin. New York: McGraw H i l l , 1968, pp. 52-59. Sabin, Theodore R. "Role Theory." Handbook of Social Psychology. Edited by Gardner Lindzey. Cam bridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954, pp. 223258. Scheff, Thomas J. "The Role of the Mentally 111 and the Dynamics of Mental Disorder: A Research Framework." The Mental Patient: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. Edited by Stephen P. Spit zer and Norman K. Denzin. New York: McGraw Hill, 1968, pp. 8-22. . Being Mentally III: A Sociological Theory. Chicago: Aldine, 1966. Scott, Marvin ., and Stanford M. Lyman. "Accounts." Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction. Edited by Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farber man. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, pp. 489-509. Stone, Gregory P. "Appearance and the Self." Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction. Edited by Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, pp. 394414. Strauss, Anselm. Mirrors and Masks. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959. Sullivan, Harry S. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychia try. New York: W. W. Norton, 1953. Thomas, William I. "The Definition of the Situation." Pp. 315-321 in Symbolic Interaction. Edited by Je rome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967, pp. 315-321. Wilkinson, Gregg S. "The Social Construction of Psychi atric Disorders: Mental Illness as Dramaturgic In competence." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation State University of New York at Buffalo, 1973a. . "Patient-audience Social Class and the Social Construction of Psychiatric Disorders." Paper pre sented to American Sociological Association Annual Meeting. New York, 1973b.

William L. Kolb

20

A Critical Evaluation of Mead's " I and " M e " Concepts

Social scientists have finally c o m e to the reali zation that the task of a specific systematic science is not the exhaustive explanation of the e m p i r i c a l reality f r o m w h i c h it draws its data, but rather the v e r i f y i n g of a series of abstract hypotheses w h i c h can then b e used i n conjunction w i t h the concepts of other sciences to explain a specific situation in r e a l i t y . T h e infinite d i v i s i b i l i t y of re ality makes any other approach impossible; any e m p i r i c a l situation is m a d e up of a m u l t i p l i c i t y of systems, physical, biological a n d social. These variables c o m b i n e i n d e t e r m i n i n g the structure of the situation, and any attempt to explain this tangled w e b of p h e n o m e n a w i t h i n the f r a m e of reference offered by any one science can only end in disaster. Conversely, any attempt to c o n struct a systematic science on the basis of all these variables can only result in the crudest f o r m of eclecticism and inconsistent systematization. T h e social psychologist has b e e n one of the most per sistent offenders of this unalterable canon of sci ence. This inability or disinclination to d e a l only w i t h that w h i c h falls p r o p e r l y w i t h i n the sphere of social psychology is reflected in the unsyste matic character of textbooks that are p u r p o r t e d
1

to be systematic analyses of personality or of other social psychological p h e n o m e n a . Of all social psychologists the one that w o u l d seem least guilty of this desire to explain every t h i n g about personality i s G . H . M e a d . Yet, e v e n here, it is possible to discover the results of an attempt to e x p l a i n aspects of personality a n d self that m o r e p r o p e r l y b e l o n g to other sciences. In his logical d e v e l o p m e n t of a systematic theory of the social nature of the g r o w t h of the self a n d of the personality t h r o u g h social interaction a n d role-taking, M e a d gives no explicit explanation of the facts of social change or of the fact that the actions of individuals never exactly corre spond to the roles w h i c h they are expected to play, p r i o r t o the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the " I " a n d " m e " concepts. If he h a d closed his system w i t h o u t tak i n g these p h e n o m e n a into consideration, the per sonality and social structures f o r m e d by processes delineated in his analysis w o u l d have b e e n con2 3

S i n c e t h e w r i t e r i s u n f a m i l i a r w i t h a n y s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y text

w h i c h has n o t b e e n c o n c e i v e d i n too g r a n d i o s e a f a s h i o n , i t i s unfair to single out any particular offender, but for a s o m e w h a t s i m i l a r c r i t i c i s m p o i n t e d a t a s p e c i f i c text see H . H . G e r t h ' s r e v i e w of S t e u a r t Life ( N e w Y o r k , Henderson 1941), Britt, Social Psychology of Modern Sociological Review, 6 (De in American

Reprinted 296.

from

Social Forces, v o l . 2 2 ( M a r c h

1944), p p . 2 9 1 -

c e m b e r 1941), 9 1 5 - 9 1 6 .
3

"A Critical Evaluation of Mead's T and ' M e ' Concepts"

G . H . M e a d , Mind, Self, and Society ( C h i c a g o 1934). S e e also "The Social Self," Journal (1912), Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and and Scien Must

by William L. Kolb. Copyright T h e University of North Caro lina Press.

1

his

Scientific Method, X (1913), 3 7 4 - 3 8 0 ; " T h e M e c h a n i s m o f S o c i a l The Structure of Social Action ( N e w Y o r k , Consciousness," tific Method, Psychology and Scientific IX of Philosophy, Journal (1910), of Psychology Philosophy, "A 401-406; " W h a t Social Objects 174-180;

C f . Talcott Parsons,

1937), p p . 3 - 4 2 . H e r e t h e e m p h a s i s i s o n t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a g i v e n b o d y o f t h e o r y a n d e m p i r i c a l fact. S e e also F l o r i a n Z n a n iecki, The Method of Sociology ( N e w Y o r k , 1934), passim. Both of these w o r k s are c o n c e r n e d w i t h the necessity of abstraction i n w h a t m i g h t b e c a l l e d sociology p r o p e r , but their strictures are a p p l i c a b l e t o a n y s y s t e m a t i c b o d y o f k n o w l e d g e .

Presuppose," Method, VII Significant of Ethics,

Psychology XIX

Behavioristic

A c c o u n t of the

S y m b o l , " Journal o f Philosophy, XXXV (1924-1925),

(1922), 1 5 7 - 1 6 3 ; a n d , " G e n e s i s o f t h e S e l f a n d S o c i a l C o n t r o l , " International Journal 251-277.

192 stant, i.e., personality w o u l d not vary f r o m the various roles defined by the culture of the society. This is not an a p r i o r i impossibility, since as we have seen, a systematic science m a y not explain e v e r y t h i n g concerning a particular p h e n o m e n o n , a n d thus all differences in personality not acc o u n t e d for by differentiated roles m i g h t conceivably be due to differences generated by other than social factors. Nevertheless, M e a d was perfectly justified in attempting to discover whether or not some of these differences c o u l d be exp l a i n e d w i t h i n his frame of reference. In so doing, however, he e r r e d in a t t e m p t i n g to explain these residual p h e n o m e n a u n d e r one concept, the " I , " a n d in a t t e m p t i n g to close his system by enclosing w i t h i n i t heterogeneous p h e n o m e n a . T h e " I " becomes accountable for e v e r y t h i n g that cannot be explained by the organized set of roles w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l takes over in the processes of social i n t e r a c t i o n . This conceptualizing of a residual category of p h e n o m e n a as b e i n g homogeneous has b e e n a source of confusion for both M e a d and his interpreters; the nature of this confusion can be demonstrated by an analysis of the characteristics w h i c h have b e e n attributed to the " I " as opposed to the " m e . " T h e first characteristic of the " I , " that we do not experience it u n t i l it passes into m e m o r y , fails to distinguish it f r o m the " m e , " if we define the latter behavioristically. Since this point of v i e w involves defining attitude as an early stage of an act, the " m e , " w h i c h consists of organized i n t e r n a l i z e d attitudes of others, can and must be regarded, unless one is w i l l i n g to disregard the behavioristic aspects of Mead's w o r k , as r e a l i z i n g itself only in responses. In other words, unless one regards the aspects of the active " m e " as existi n g in various responses called out by various stimu l i , i n c l u d i n g earlier actions of the i n d i v i d u a l , the " m e " becomes merely a fictional concept, useful,
4
4

P A R T III

Self

perhaps, but unrelated to a behavioristic psychology. If t h e n we are unconscious of what we are d o i n g u n t i l we respond to our d o i n g it, as M e a d assumed w h e n he speaks of our consciousness of the " I , " we are unconscious of any specific active aspect of the " m e " u n t i l we have responded to it. This b e i n g true, the first c r i t e r i o n b y means o f w h i c h w e can distinguish the " I " f r o m the " m e " becomes meaningless: the assumption that we become conscious of the " I " only w h e n it has passed into experience and become part of the " m e . " If we use a behavioristic definit i o n of the " m e " as o u t l i n e d above, the " m e " and the " I " become hopelessly confused because we are conscious of neither of t h e m u n t i l they have passed into experience, i.e., u n t i l we respond to them.
5

A n o t h e r c r i t e r i o n used to identify the " I " can, if p r o p e r l y d e v e l o p e d , be used to differentiate between sectors of the self, but can h a r d l y be used to account for the uniqueness of response w h i c h it is supposed to explain. We are told that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the " I " is that around it persists ". . . the sense of i n d i v i d uality of our o w n movements in relation to outer objects or persons, a n d of our activity in r e g a r d to these i n t e r n a l i z e d " m e ' s . " If we use this conception of the " I " it becomes differentiated f r o m the " m e " only in that it is that segment of attitudes w h i c h w i l l issue in overt action unless m o d i fied by the responses of other segments of attitudes. W h a t is one t i m e the " I " may next time be the " m e . " If, for example, a m a n sees someone beating a w o m a n , his definition of the situation may be of such a nature that his i m m e d i a t e i m pulse is to strike the woman-beater; but this i m pulse calls out in h i m an attitude of d i s c r e t i o n ,
6 7
5

Ibid., p p . 1 - 4 1 . I n a s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y d e v o t e d p u r e l y t o t h e

c o n t e n t o f p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s , i . e . , those d e v o t e d t o s u c h p h e n o m e n a a s v a l u e h i e r a r c h i e s a n d t h e i r effect o n a c t i o n , l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n n e e d b e p a i d t o this t e c h n i c a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l p o i n t , f o r this r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p s y c h o l o g y a n d s o c i a l a c t i o n c a n b e a s s u m e d ; b u t i t f o r m s t h e c e n t e r o f a s y s t e m a t i c analysis w h i c h is directed toward an explanation of the dynamics of personality and self-development.
6

F o r M e a d ' s b a s i c d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e " I " see

Mind,

Self, and

Society, p p . 1 7 3 - 1 7 8 a n d 1 9 2 - 1 9 9 . I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t t h e chronological d e v e l o p m e n t of Mead's t h i n k i n g is not i n v o l v e d h e r e . I t m a y w e l l b e that M e a d f i r s t m a d e the d i s t i n c t i o n bet w e e n t h e " I " a n d " m e " l o n g b e f o r e o t h e r e l e m e n t s o f his syst e m h a d b e e n c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y d e v e l o p e d ; b u t t h e fact r e m a i n s , t h e r e a d e r of Mind, Self, and Society is m o r e i n t e r e s t e d in t h e l o g i c o f M e a d ' s d i s c u s s i o n a s i t i s d e v e l o p e d i n this b o o k ; a n d i n t h e l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t social c h a n g e a n d p e r s o n a l u n i q u e n e s s e s a r e o n l y a c c o u n t e d for a f t e r t h e " I " a n d " m e " h a v e b e e n i n t r o d u c e d o n p . 173. A f t e r t h e " I " i s i n t r o d u c e d i t i s t h e n u s e d a s an e x p l a n a t i o n of the e m e r g e n c e of the n o v e l , p p . 196-200.

Kimball

Young,

Personality

and

Problems

of

Adjustment

( N e w Y o r k , 1940), p . 175. Cf. M e a d , op. cit., p p . 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 .

7

N o s o c i a l a c t i o n i s a s s i m p l e a s this e x a m p l e m i g h t l e a d o n e

t o b e l i e v e , b u t t h e r e still r e m a i n s a c o n v e n i e n t d i s t i n c t i o n t o b e d r a w n b e t w e e n t h e i n i t i a l i m p u l s e t o act a n d t h e v a r i o u s " m e ' s " w h i c h a r e d r a w n o u t b y it; i t i s t h e f u n c t i o n o f this e x a m p l e t o i l l u s t r a t e this d i s t i n c t i o n i n its s i m p l e s t f o r m .

193 r i c h m a y lead to inaction. In that case the " I " - ; u l d be the anti-woman beating attitude, and me " m e " w o u l d be the attitude of caution w h i c h - mlified the active impulse. If, however, his wife i : e s something of w h i c h he disapproves there be called out in h i m a wife-beating response, Trhich in t u r n m a y call out an a n t i - w o m a n beating response of the nature described above. In that f ent, the " I " w o u l d consist of the wife-beating mrpulse, and the " m e " of the anti-woman beating response. Thus this differentiation is m e r e l y a con venient m e t h o d of distinguishing the original i m pulse f r o m the m o d i f y i n g attitudes w h i c h p r e v e n t its f r u i t i o n in overt action. B o t h attitudes are part : f the generalized pattern of attitudes or general ized other w h i c h make up the personality of the i n d i v i d u a l , and offer no explanation of uniqueness of overt a c t i o n .
8

T h e t h i r d distinguishing feature o f the " I " : that it is unpredictable. Thus we are g i v e n the l u s t r a t i o n of the baseball player whose " m e " calls for a t h r o w to first base w h e n a g r o u n d ball is nit in his direction, but w h o actually m a y either iucceed in t h r o w i n g the b a l l directly to his m a n :r ten feet over his h e a d . It is in this example mat we must take care not to fall into an errone ous conception of the relations of the various seg ments of the action: it is not the action of t h r o w i n g rhe b a l l and t h r o w i n g it t e n feet over the first oaseman's head w h i c h are related socially, but rather the attitude of t h r o w i n g the ball to first base a n d the actual t h r o w i n g of the b a l l that are bound together. If the " I " concept is m e a n i n g f u l at all in this case it must consist of the attitude w h i c h is called forth by the i n t e r n a l i z e d attitudes of others, and its relation to the subsequent action. we accept this as sound, there m a y or m a y not
9

be a relation b e t w e e n the attitudes i n v o l v e d a n d the fact that the b a l l was t h r o w n w i l d . If there is such a relation it can be explained only in terms of the uniqueness of the organized set of attitudes i n terms o f w h i c h the player was a c t i n g . A n y other explanation involves the appeal to another system of causation. Thus if the player in t h r o w i n g had slipped on a banana p e e l , there w o u l d have been n o relationship b e t w e e n the w i l d t h r o w a n d the attitude w h i c h we have designated as the " I . " To force the banana p e e l or an organic r h e u m a t i c twinge in the thrower's a r m into a social frame of reference w o u l d of course be sheer nonsense. T h e r e is t h e n no significance to the concept of the " I " as the unpredictable unless we r e g a r d the " I " as that attitude, located in the g e n e r a l i z e d system of attitudes, w h i c h was called out by the situation and by the attitudes of the other players i n t e r n a l i z e d in the same system. If this is so, t h e n the p r o b l e m becomes one of the analysis of the determinants of the uniqueness of the attitude configuration or of a specific attitude w h i c h r e n ders unnecessary any division of the self into the " I " a n d the " m e " unless i t i s used i n the m a n n e r exemplified above, i.e., as a means of distinguish i n g b e t w e e n that attitude w h i c h is called out in any specific situation a n d all those others w h i c h respond to it a n d perhaps m o d i f y it.
10 11

I n this analysis t h e sense o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y w o u l d g r o w o u t o f

the set o f a t t i t u d e s w h i c h o n e t o o k t o w a r d o n e ' s self a s d i s t i n c t r r o m o t h e r objects i n the e n v i r o n m e n t , a n d n o t out o f s o m e m y s t i c a l c o n c e p t o f " b e i n g . " T h u s this a p p r o a c h i s a l i n e w i t h M e a d ' s analysis o f h o w t h e i n d i v i d u a l b e c o m e s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s , but refutes any attempt to account for later self-consciousness in terms of the " I . " A n o t h e r somewhat related, although not i d e n t i c a l , c o n c e p t i o n of the " I " is that it is that attitude w h i c h i s i s s u i n g i n t o r e s p o n s e a t a n y i n s t a n t o f t i m e . I n this case t h e c o n c e p t i o n " ! " w o u l d be compatible w i t h the " I " as not directly experienced, but would be undistinguishable from the "me" except as t h e latter c o n c e p t is u s e d to refer to attitudes in their latent state. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n m a y b e u s e f u l f o r s o m e p u r p o s e s , but c a n n o t be used to explain the residual category of p h e n o m ena w h i c h it is i n t e n d e d to explain. Mead, op. cit,.pp. 17,5-76.

This still leaves us, however, w i t h the prob l e m of the definite residual category that M e a d i n t r o d u c e d w h e n he had practically finished his analysis. It is necessary to carve out of the cate gory those sectors w h i c h contain factors related to the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of h u m a n behavior w h i c h can be analyzed w i t h i n Mead's scheme a n d to separate t h e m f r o m those sectors w h i c h c a n o n l y be h a n d l e d w i t h i n a different frame of reference. This is not an easy task to p e r f o r m and the follow i n g schematization must be regarded as p r e l i m i nary and provisional i n nature. Physical factors, of course, can be most easily e l i m i n a t e d , since the social psychologist has n e v e r insisted on i n c l u d i n g p h e n o m e n a in his research
1 0

A g a i n w e see that the c o n c e p t o f the " I " b e c o m e s f u n c t i o n a l l y

useless, s i n c e i t i s e i t h e r p a r t o f t h e g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r , o r i s p a r t o f a n o t h e r s y s t e m o f r e l a t i o n s that has n o p l a c e w i t h i n a social f r a m e of r e f e r e n c e .

1 1

I f the b a n a n a p e e l a n d the r h e u m a t i c t w i n g e b e c o m e d e f i n e d

w i t h i n the system of attitudes w h i c h constitutes the g e n e r a l i z e d other o f the p l a y e r , t h e n they m a y b e i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h i n socio.IsgaruJ theory &f p^rajtTixlity; bui nut' uuCxV iiuxt time.

194 that c a n only be explained on the basis of physical laws. Thus h u m a n behavior w h i c h is r e n d e r e d deviant f r o m expectations by changes in the physi c a l e n v i r o n m e n t must m e r e l y be r e g a r d e d as s o m e t h i n g that complicates the task of p r e d i c t i o n w i t h i n the e m p i r i c a l sphere a n d about w h i c h n o t h i n g can be done w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of a systematic social psychology. O u r b a l l player w h o s l i p p e d on a banana p e e l must be r e g a r d e d as a p h e n o m e n o n unexplainable in terms of our frame of reference, a n d we must r e c o g n i z e that the " I " has n o t h i n g to do w i t h the outcome of a situation in w h i c h a m a n is kept f r o m r e a c h i n g his goal by reason of the fact that he is b o u n d by i r o n chains. W h e n we come to the r e a l m of biological phen o m e n a , however, the p r o b l e m becomes somewhat m o r e complicated, since the relationship p r e v a i l i n g b e t w e e n biological a n d social p h e n o m ena is m u c h m o r e complex and subtle, a n d the effect of the biological is discernible e v e n on that f u n d a m e n t a l l y social p h e n o m e n o n , the p a t t e r n of integrated attitudes w h i c h M e a d calls the "genera l i z e d o t h e r . " W h i l e M e a d himself attached n o explicit biological significance to the " I , " others have a t t e m p t e d to explain the " I " as b e i n g c o m posed of basically biological elements. Y o u n g , for example, finds the roots of the " I " p a r t l y located in the biological or constitutional foundations of a c t i o n . W h i l e there is some v a l i d i t y in this conc e p t i o n of the " I , " the issue is still basically confused. We cannot think of the " I " as b e i n g a biological response to the " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r " w h i c h is social in nature, since we k n o w that the actual response is made up of an attitude called out f r o m this g e n e r a l i z e d system of attitudes, and hence if they are social it too must be r e g a r d e d as social. T h e solution to this d i l e m m a is to be f o u n d in a n a l y z i n g the " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r " as the p r o d u c t o f social interaction i n w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l w i t h certain biological characteristics has engaged. Thus the " m e " or the " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r " of a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l is u n i q u e in that as a biological s p e c i m e n he is unique. T h e question t h e n arises as to the possibility of e x p l a i n i n g this uniqueness w i t h i n a social frame of reference. It is the writer's position that this
12
12

P A R T III

Self

is an impossibility if we i n t e n d to d e v e l o p a systematic social psychology of personality. Since the set of attitudes is the product of b o t h biological a n d social factors w h i c h present almost infinite possibilities of c o m b i n i n g w i t h one another, attempts to explain the i m p o r t a n c e of shifting biological conditions w h i l e at the same t i m e analyzi n g the effect of socialization can only result in the conclusion that each personality is incapable of b e i n g c o m p a r e d w i t h any other. This does not m e a n , h o w e v e r , that we should ignore the biological, but rather that we should assess it as a constant. We must take the typical biological characteristics of m a n as m a n and consider t h e m as d y n a m i c factors in the d e v e l o p m e n t of personality, not m e r e l y as the preconditions of social d e v e l o p m e n t . In d o i n g this we forego the urge to explain differences of behavior rising w i t h i n the same social group as a product of biological differences b e t w e e n the members, b u t we are enabled to o p e n up a n e w r e a l m of research to Mead's frame of reference: the p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h K a r d i n e r calls basic personality s t r u c t u r e . Thus we find a connective l i n k b e t w e e n the w o r k of a cultural psychoanalyst a n d M e a d , w h i c h w i l l m a k e Mead's w o r k m o r e d y n a m i c a n d the research of K a r d i n e r m o r e relevant for the sociologist a n d the social psychologist. If Mead's theory is used as an explanation of the process of social13 14
13

M e a d treats t h e b i o l o g i c i n d i v i d u a l a s a c o n s t a n t , b u t t e n d s p. 139, 347-353, a n d passim. Society ( N e w York,

t o e m p h a s i z e t h e n o n d y n a m i c a s p e c t s o f t h e c o n s t a n t . S e e Mind, Self and Society,

14

Abram

Kardiner,

The Individual and His

1939). B a s i c p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e i s d e f i n e d b y L i n t o n i n t h e f o r e w o r d of K a r d i n e r ' s study as "the constellation of personality characteristics w h i c h w o u l d appear t o b e c o n g e n i a l w i t h the total r a n g e of institutions c o m p r i s e d w i t h i n a g i v e n c u l t u r e . " p . v i . T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f this c o n c e p t i s t h a t w i t h i t K a r d i n e r emphasizes the d y n a m i c relationships existing b e t w e e n the dem a n d s of the society a n d the basic b i o l o g i c a l characteristics of m a n . T h i s is not a r e v e r s i o n to instinct theory, since it is recogn i z e d that the d r i v e s are g e n e r a l i z e d a n d that all that is necessary i s that t h e y b e satisfied s o m e way, n o t i n a n y specific. T h u s : "If, i n a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e , t h e b i o l o g i c a l n e e d f o r s e x u a l g r a t i f i cation is systematically interfered with, f r o m infancy o n , f r o m o u r k n o w l e d g e o f h u m a n n a t u r e w e c a n e x p e c t t h a t this w i l l g i v e rise to a series of reactions, a n d that these r e a c t i o n s m a y eventually b e c o m e p e t r i f i e d i n institutions w h i c h offer some expression for the effects created by the frustrations conc e r n e d . " p . 11. S i n c e a n y i n s t i t u t i o n i s t h e r e s u l t o f h u m a n a c t i o n we h a v e h e r e a situation in w h i c h the internalization of attitudes i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h a basic d r i v e result in s o m e t h i n g n e w : a c u l t u r e c o m p l e x w h i c h was not present before, a n d w h i c h is d u e to j u s t this d y n a m i c i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n i n t e r n a l i z e d a t t i t u d e a n d biological drives.

Young,

op.

cit,

p.

178

Kolb i z a t i o n K a r d i n e r ' s w o r k used as a means of del i n e a t i n g the d y n a m i c relationship b e t w e e n the socially i n c o r p o r a t e d attitudes a n d the constant b i o l o g i c a l drives of m e n , there is some possibility o f the t w o theories m e r g i n g into o n e . E v e n i f this is not accomplished, there is still some benefit to be d e r i v e d f r o m the a d d i t i o n of a d y n a m i c biologic e l e m e n t to Mead's theory; a n d the w o r k of t r a c i n g the relation b e t w e e n socially d e r i v e d attitudes, the basic personality structure, a n d the secondary institutions, w h i c h are the p r o d u c t of the d y n a m i c interaction of basic drives a n d social attitudes, w i l l not suffer because of an increased k n o w l e d g e of h o w the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of social attitudes into the personality actually takes place. A t t e m p t s to reconcile different bodies of theory that s t e m f r o m such d i v e r g e n t origins as do these two is obviously dangerous, but since the psychoanalysts are gradually a p p r o a c h i n g a social point of v i e w the gap b e t w e e n the t w o bodies o f theory i s m u c h m o r e apparent t h a n r e a l .
1 5 1 6

195 p r o a c h e d the c e n t r a l p r o b l e m w h i c h faces us, but have not quite c o m e to grips w i t h it. That p r o b l e m is, of course, w h e t h e r there is any source of uniqueness of attitudes a n d behavior that is definitively social in nature, a n d that does not i n v o l v e extra-social considerations. T h e generic answer to this question is probably in the negative. G i v e n absolutely the same biological m a k e u p , the i d e n t i c a l geographic e n v i r o n m e n t , a constancy in the t i m e element, a n d i d e n t i c a l physical c o n d i tions, there seems no reason to believe that there is a n y t h i n g in the process of socialization that w o u l d l e a d to d i v e r g e n t attitudes a n d hence to divergent behavior. T h i s , h o w e v e r , is scarcely a relevant answer. O n c e a process of attitude differentiation sets i n , for whatever reason, it should be obvious that the operation of p u r e l y social factors w i l l increase that differentiation. T h i s is most apparent in the social interaction that takes place b e t w e e n p e o p l e w h o have d i v e r g e n t backgrounds. T h e personality structures of b o t h are m o d i f i e d , usually i n a n unpredictable d i r e c t i o n , a n d in a d i r e c t i o n w h i c h perhaps has n e v e r b e e n manifested before in either of the social groups f r o m w h i c h the individuals originated. I f either of these i n d i v i d u a l s returns to his group the result is the differentiation of attitudes w i t h i n the g r o u p , p r o v i d e d the i n d i v i d u a l i s not r e m o v e d i n o r d e r to r e m o v e the danger of change. T h e literature w h i c h w e have a c c u m u l a t e d c o n c e r n i n g c u l t u r e contact, acculturation, a n d social change w i t h i n a society bears witness to this analysis. T h u s a u n i q u e set of attitudes is the p r o d u c t of the social i n t e r a c t i o n i n w h i c h one engages w i t h a n i n d i v i d u a l w h o has a different set of attitudes, a n d at least part of this change can be v i e w e d as b r o u g h t about by p u r e l y social factors. T h e result of c o n t i n u e d differentiation of this sort is a g r o w i n g discrepancy b e t w e e n the various basic attitudes w h i c h are the c o m m o n p r o p e r t y of the g r o u p , a n d a c h i l d b o r n into this t y p e of society is l i k e l y to i n h e r i t a set of attitudes w h i c h are not consistently r e l a t e d to one another. T h e analysis of this situation is best c a r r i e d out in terms o f Mead's theory o f i n t e r n a l c o n v e r s a t i o n . W h e n a situation arises w h i c h is g o v e r n e d by c o n f l i c t i n g attitudes, unless the self of the i n d i v i d u a l is c o m 17
1 7

T h e application o f this p o i n t o f v i e w w h i c h considers biological factors as d y n a m i c elements in the f o r m a t i o n of the personality also makes it possible to explain w i d e l y d i v e r g e n t overt behavior w h e r e the difference b e t w e e n the social attitudes i n v o l v e d seems v e r y slight. If one f a m i l y adds just a slightly h i g h e r degree of emphasis on anti-masturbation attitudes t h a n does another, w i t h the result that the sexual b e h a v i o r of the offspring of the t w o families varies w i d e l y , it m i g h t be possible to e x p l a i n this difference on the basis of the relation b e t w e e n the sex d r i v e a n d the t w o sets of attitudes. In a l l the above analysis of the r e l a t i o n of biological factors to social factors in the f o r m a t i o n of u n i q u e attitudes a n d b e h a v i o r , we have apIt must be remembered that this convergence becomes possible only after we have reopened Mead's system by throwing out the concept of the " I " and re-examining the residual category of phenomena which Mead cloaked with this concept. T h e dangers inherent in the reconciling of divergent bodies of theory grow primarily from two sources: premature reconciliation and crude eclecticism. This attempt to bring together the work of Kardiner and Mead may be somewhat premature since the cultural psychoanalysts are still hazy in their ideas concerning the influence and nature of social factors, and since such convergence also depends on the validity of the writer's arguments concerning the "I"; but it certainly does not suffer from eclecticism since there is no picking and choosing involved, but rather a conjunction of the theories in their totality has been suggested.
1! 16

Mead, op cit, pp. 61-75.

196 p a r t m e n t a l i z e d , a conversation b e t w e e n various aspects of the self ensues a n d the resultant atti tude is l i k e l y to diverge significantly f r o m both of the previously existing ones, so that the overt action m a y be greatly different f r o m what anyone expected. F i n a l l y , there are shifts in attitudes w h i c h oc c u r as a result of success or failure in r e a c h i n g the goals or values defined by the attitudes so that the behavior becomes unpredictable. Success is almost certain to result in the r e i n f o r c e m e n t of the attitude, but p r o l o n g e d a n d persistent fail ure m a y result in shifts in attitudes in at least t w o basic fashions. T h e first is s i m p l y that if the d e f i n e d value is i m p o r t a n t enough, the ethically enjoined attitudes t o w a r d the means w i l l gradu ally lose their strength so that the goal m a y be sought by a n e w pattern of a c t i v i t y . T h e second involves an evaluation of failure. If, for example, the culture places a h i g h p r e m i u m on success, p r o l o n g e d failure is l i k e l y to result in self-condem n a t i o n w h i c h in t u r n violates basic security atti tudes. In t u r n the interaction of these attitudes m a y result in what H o m e y has called neurotic trends, set up to protect the i n d i v i d u a l . T h e na ture of this t r e n d is l i k e l y to d e p e n d on other techniques for gaining security w h i c h are ap p r o v e d by the society.
18 1 9

P A R T III

Self

are expressed, but we have succeeded, perhaps in p o i n t i n g out the scientific benefits to be derived f r o m the b r e a k i n g d o w n of the residual categor; w h i c h M e a d c a l l e d the " I " into some of its various components. We have discovered that some uniquenesses in behavior are unexplainable terms of a social f r a m e of reference; that others can be e x p l a i n e d only in terms of the dynamic interaction of a constant biological factor a n d vari ous social factors; a n d finally, that there does exist a r e a l m of attitude differentiation w h i c h analyti cally belongs w h o l l y w i t h i n the field of social in teraction. We must r e m e m b e r that these various forms are i n t e r m i x e d in the w o r l d , but neverthe less, they are analytically separable. O n e m o r e result of this b r e a k d o w n of the residual category should n o w be apparent: W i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of Mead's theory certain aspects of behavior w h i c h w e r e unexplainable except by the use of the ambiguous concepts of the " I " and the " m e " are n o w not only explainable but have b e e n processed so that they may to some extent e v e n b e c o m e predictable. If we recognize the basic social factors at w o r k in attitude differentia tion, it should be possible to discover predictable features in their r e c u r r e n c e . T h e way has already b e e n o p e n e d by the c u l t u r a l psychoanalysts, and w i t h the r e o p e n i n g of Mead's system to include the basic findings of these researchers, it seems plausible to expect that future research w i l l dis cover that variation f r o m the dominant sets of attitudes of any society are not r a n d o m but follow a pattern that can be discovered, p r o v i d e d one stays w i t h i n the limits of the social frame of refer ence. That there always w i l l be unexplainable dif ferences in attitude a n d action is obvious, but that the area not only of theoretical u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y but of e m p i r i c a l unpredictability w i l l be cut d o w n can certainly be anticipated. In that case the ex t r e m e l y h i g h probabilities that of necessity ac c o m p a n y all theoretical p r e d i c t i o n w i l l be of m o r e significance, in that they w i l l serve to increase the somewhat l o w probabilities w h i c h attend our present efforts at e m p i r i c a l p r e d i c t i o n . We shall never k n o w all about reality, but if we recognize the nature of systematic science a n d its l i m i t a tions, we can approach closer and closer to the goal.

It is manifestly impossible to present all the various forms of attitude differentiation w h i c h arise out of the d y n a m i c interplay b e t w e e n differ i n g social attitudes a n d the situation in w h i c h they
1 8

A n analysis o f this t y p e o f a t t i t u d e shift i s t o b e f o u n d i n Merton's article, Review, "Social III Structure and A n o m i e , " oriented Sociological (1938), 672-682.

Eobert K. American
1 9

While

the c u l t u r a l psychoanalysis

of Kardiner is

a b o u t t h e i n t e r p l a y o f biological a n d social factors, K a r e n H o r ney's studies are c o n c e r n e d w i t h the n a t u r e o f conflict b e t w e e n social attitudes w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . I f w e d i s r e g a r d h e r u n d u e emphasis on security, h e r research delineates q u i t e clearly cer tain types of personality conflict based on the p r e s e n c e of con flicting attitudes, or of attitudes c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h actual p e r f o r m a n c e , a n d traces t h e conflicts b a c k t o t h e i r o r i g i n i n t h e c u l t u r e p a t t e r n o f our society. T h e s a m e things m a y b e said o f the possible c o n v e r g e n c e o f H o r n e y ' s t h e o r y w i t h that o f M e a d a s w e r e s a i d i n t h e case o f K a r d i n e r a n d M e a d , e x c e p t t h a t i n this case H o r n e y offers a t e c h n i q u e f o r u n r a v e l i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s existing b e t w e e n conflicting attitudes w i t h i n M e a d ' s f r a m e o f reference. York, See Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis Time ( N e w (New York, 1939); The Neurotic Personality of Our

1937); a n d " C u l t u r e a n d N e u r o s i s , " American Sociological

Review, I (1936), p p . 2 2 1 - 2 3 0 .

I
John W. Kinch

21

Experiments on Factors Related to Self-Concept Change

A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK T h e C o o l e y - M e a d formulations c o n c e r n i n g the self-concept are p r i m a r i l y focused on the relationships b e t w e e n other persons' responses to an i n d i v i d u a l and his c o n c e p t i o n of himself. M o r e specifically, they argue that a person's c o n c e p t i o n of himself comes about as a result of the w a y he perceives the responses of others t o w a r d h i m [Cooley's "looking-glass s e l f " (5) a n d Mead's "taking-the-role-of-the-other" (14)]. This, they aver, is particularly important, since the way the i n d i v i d u a l sees himself (his self-concept) has the function of directing, or influencing, the way he w i l l behave. T h i s approach has h a d w i d e acceptance a m o n g social psychologists, b u t not without some reservations. T h e vague concepts a n d general propositions m a k e its application v e r y difficult. H o w e v e r , w h e n the basic ideas are used as a general f r a m e w o r k f r o m w h i c h m o r e specific statements are developed, the theory is most f r u i t f u l . These extensions or elaborations are not necessarily d e r i v e d f r o m the theory in a logical sense, but are i n t e r v e n i n g claims that reduce the generality or abstractness of the f r a m e w o r k a n d b r i n g it conceptually closer to the specific p h e n o m e n a it p u r ports to explain. In the study r e p o r t e d here, previous w o r k
John W. K i n c h , "Experiments on Factors Related to Self-Conc e p t C h a n g e , " Journal of Social Psychology, v o l . 251-258. R e p r i n t e d by permission. 74 (1968), p p .

on one of the propositions is used as a f r a m e w o r k f r o m w h i c h specific hypotheses are d e v e l o p e d to be tested. T h e proposition m a y be stated as follows: The individual's conception of himself is based on his perception of the way others are responding to him. T h e r e is a m p l e research e v i dence s u p p o r t i n g this general relationship bet w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s ' perceptions of others a n d their self-concepts. H o w e v e r , few writers in this tradit i o n have p a i d specific attention to h o w this process works. It is obvious that the theorists are not arguing that e v e r y t i m e a n e w response is d i rected t o w a r d an i n d i v i d u a l there w i l l be a corresponding change in his self-concept. W h a t is needed is an expansion of this general proposition so that the relationships are made explicit. T h e basic question seems to be: Under what conditions do the perceptions of the others' responses have an effect on the individual's self-conception? T h e theoretical f r a m e w o r k a n d what e v i dence there is available in the literature suggest that the effect of p e r c e i v e d responses on the selfconcept is a f u n c t i o n of a series of factors i n v o l v e d in interpersonal contacts. T h e y are (a) the frequency of responses in the course of these interpersonal contacts, (b) the p e r c e i v e d importance of the contacts, (c) the temporal proximity of the contacts, a n d (d) the consistency of the responses resulting f r o m the contacts. It should be understood that each of the hypotheses that follows is p r e c e d e d by an i m p l i e d "other-factorsbeing-equal."

198 1. H y p o t h e s i s 1 (Frequency) The more frequently the individual perceives others as responding toward him in a particular way, the more likely he is to align his self-concept with the perceived responses. A l t h o u g h v e r y little attention is g i v e n to the direct test of this notion, there are m a n y studies that i m p l i c i t l y do so. F o r example, e x p e r i m e n t a l studies have for the most part g i v e n the subjects specific ratings or evaluations w h i c h , in effect, i n crease the frequency of these responses, thus i n d i rectly testing this hypothesis (4, 9, 13, 17). 2. H y p o t h e s i s 2 (Importance) The more important the individual perceives the contact between himself and the others to be, the more likely it is that the individual's perceptions of the responses of the others will be used in defining his self-image. It is w i d e l y a c c e p t e d that contacts w i t h "significant others" are req u i r e d before the individual's self-concept w i l l be affected. These "significant others" m a y take the f o r m of prestigeful persons (experts) or of personal acquaintances (friends). H o w e v e r , the research e v i d e n c e available is not c o m p l e t e l y consistent on this subject (4, 10, 11).

P A R T III

Self

(2, 3, 8, 15). T h e r e f o r e , once an i n d i v i d u a l d e v e l ops a c o n c e p t i o n of himself, he w i l l interact as m u c h as possible w i t h others w h o w i l l reinforce this c o n c e p t i o n for h i m . T h e second part o f H y pothesis 3 suggests that those most immediate contacts are i m p o r t a n t i n understanding the i n d i vidual's self-concept at any g i v e n t i m e . A l m o s t w i t h o u t exception those studies w h i c h have c o m p a r e d p e r c e i v e d responses of others to self-concepts have dealt w i t h responses of others in the i m m e d i a t e situation (7, 16). In one study that d i rectly confronted this issue, it was f o u n d that the most exaggerated changes w e r e observed i m m e diately f o l l o w i n g the experiment. H o w e v e r , some significant change still r e m a i n e d six weeks followi n g the e x p e r i m e n t , w h i c h suggests some lasting effects (9).

4. H y p o t h e s i s 4 (Consistency) The more the individual perceives a consistent pattern in the responses of others, the more likely he is to let this affect his self-concept.

B. RESEARCH DESIGN T h e research presented here e m p i r i c a l l y evaluates certain aspects of the hypotheses suggested above. It employs a series of e x p e r i m e n t s each f o l l o w i n g the classical design w i t h before a n d after tests on b o t h e x p e r i m e n t a l a n d c o n t r o l groups. T h e d e p e n d e n t variable concerns changes in one aspect of an individual's selfconcept a n d the i n d e p e n d e n t , or e x p e r i m e n t a l , variables consist of the "factors" (frequency, i m portance, t e m p o r a l p r o x i m i t y , a n d consistency) w h i c h are v a r i e d , one at time, in the e x p e r i m e n t a l situations. In the present study the n o t i o n of the selfconcept is d e f i n e d as the organization of qualities which the individual attributes to himself. A l t h o u g h this self-concept is " o r g a n i z e d , " it cannot be measured on a single c o n t i n u u m of selfregard (as m a n y social psychologists have used the concept), but must be a n a l y z e d in terms of i n d i v i d u a l attributes or clusters of attributes. T h e r e seems to be substantial evidence for this

3. H y p o t h e s i s 3 (Temporal Proximity) The individual's concept of himself is a function of (a) the earliest evaluations he receives on a particular attribute and (b) the most immediate evaluations. This hypothesis has two parts. First, it is c o n t e n d e d that the first contacts w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l perceives as f a v o r i n g a particular selfconcept are of extreme i m p o r t a n c e . Self-conceptions that develop in early c h i l d h o o d are l i k e l y to persist throughout life. No direct evidence is available on this hypothesis, but there is considerable i n d i r e c t evidence w h e n one considers the selective aspect of early evaluations. If the author's basic contention is true that the responses of others are used in the original f o r m a t i o n of the selfconcept, there is ample e v i d e n c e in the literature to suggest that persons choose friends and j o i n groups w h i c h they perceive as evaluating t h e m congruently w i t h their p e r c e p t i o n of themselves

Kinch contention (1, 6, 13, 17). In the present study, subjects w e r e r e q u i r e d to evaluate themselves on several descriptive objectives by use of a sevenp o i n t scale. Rather than attempt to accumulate these self-evaluations, the investigation concen trated on one adjective, " l e a d e r s h i p . " As in other experimental studies of the self, the subjects were asked to evaluate themselves before a n d after they w e r e i n v o l v e d in an experi m e n t a l situation. In the set of experiments, condi tions w e r e v a r i e d in order to demonstrate the effect of those factors w h i c h the hypotheses sug gest should influence self-concept change. In or der to specify the p r o c e d u r e m o r e clearly, a de tailed description follows: E a c h e x p e r i m e n t f o l l o w e d a design w h e r e b y all participants, w i t h one exception, w e r e confederates of the investiga tor. D u r i n g the activity in the e x p e r i m e n t a l set ting, the one naive student was assigned a position of leadership a n d was r e q u i r e d to direct the oth ers. On c o m p l e t i o n of this activity the confeder ates w e r e presented to the naive subject as stu dents w h o were experts in organizational dynamics, all h a v i n g taken advanced courses on the subject. T h e y w e r e t h e n asked by the investi gator to rate the naive subject's p e r f o r m a n c e as a leader. This was done a c c o r d i n g to a prear r a n g e d system, independent of the subject's ac tual performance. T h e ratings w e r e c o m m u n i cated by the v e r b a l response of each confederate and w e r e m a r k e d on a scale on the blackboard in front of all the participants. T h e confederates were pre-instructed to p e r f o r m the task reason ably w e l l regardless of the naive subject's orders, so that the prearranged ratings d i d not appear out of line. F o u r variations in the confederates' ratings made u p what w e r e called " e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n d i tions" a n d w e r e designed to test several of the hypotheses. In E x p e r i m e n t a l C o n d i t i o n 1, each subject was rated favorably by all experts w i t h v e r y little variation in ratings. In the second con d i t i o n ( E . G . 2) each subject was i n v o l v e d in two sessions, thus d o u b l i n g the n u m b e r of evaluations w h i c h they r e c e i v e d . E x p e r i m e n t a l Conditions 3 a n d 4 f o l l o w e d the same p a t t e r n as E . G . 1, except that in E . C . 3 only five confederates w e r e used a n d a sixth rating was g i v e n by the investigator c o n d u c t i n g the experiment, a n d in E . C . 4 the six

199 ratings w e r e m o r e dispersed a n d less consistent than in E . C . 1, although the average ratings w e r e the same for both. These categories w e r e c o m pared w i t h a c o n t r o l group: a m a t c h e d category of students w h o d i d not participate in the ex periment. A l l the p r e a r r a n g e d ratings w e r e higher than the i n d i v i d u a l h a d rated himself before the ex p e r i m e n t . T h e question of the consequence of lower ratings was not examined. In a l i m i t e d ex p e r i m e n t in w h i c h negative ratings w e r e g i v e n a n u m b e r of subjects, the results seemed to suggest that these ratings w e r e e v e n m o r e influential in changing self-concepts than were the positive rat ings. H o w e v e r , for ethical reasons this study was l i m i t e d to only a few students a n d was not c o n t i n u e d after the first responses were considered (12). A b o u t half of the naive students w e r e i n t e r v i e w e d and questioned about their impressions of the ex p e r i m e n t . A l t h o u g h there were several reasons for these interviews, one major c o n c e r n was w i t h establishing some i d e a of the subjects' p e r c e p t i o n of the ratings they w e r e given. Since the theory suggests that it is the way the i n d i v i d u a l perceives the responses of others that changes his self-con cept, it was felt that the investigators must m a k e certain that the favorable ratings w h i c h w e r e g i v e n the subjects w e r e p e r c e i v e d as such. T h e difficulty of setting up an e x p e r i m e n t that w o u l d test the hypotheses of this theory is apparent. T h e e x p e r i m e n t a l situation h a d to be somewhat artificial. T h e ratings w e r e rather for m a l c o m p a r e d w i t h the ratings that one gets in everyday life. T h e student participation i n the experiment took a relatively short t i m e (10 m i n utes). F o u r to five weeks elapsed b e t w e e n the before a n d after tests. D u r i n g that t i m e these freshmen i n college w e r e experiencing m a n y other situations relevant to their self-concept. F o r

these reasons trie sensitivity the experiment

a n d its significance for the respondents was seen as one of the major problems to be dealt w i t h in the research presented here. Several devices w e r e e m p l o y e d to increase the significance of the situation for the subjects. T h e subjects w e r e re q u i r e d to w o r k w i t h the other m e m b e r s of the e x p e r i m e n t "as a t e a m , " and it was this " t e a m " that rated t h e m . In other experiments of this type, the subjects w e r e rated by someone (expert,

200 stranger, or friend) w h o was not engaged w i t h t h e m i n the experiment. I n the interviews, the subjects i n d i c a t e d considerable c o n c e r n over w h a t ratings they r e c e i v e d a n d considered the ratings as favorable. This suggests that the others i n the e x p e r i m e n t w e r e significant t o t h e m . T h e p r o b l e m of sample size is particularly difficult in this type of design, since, for each sub ject, there must be a separate e x p e r i m e n t , plus c o m p l e t e before and after test i n f o r m a t i o n . W h e n the total n u m b e r of cases is d i v i d e d into four e x p e r i m e n t a l conditions a n d a c o n t r o l group, the n u m b e r of cases in any one c o n d i t i o n is l i k e l y to be cut seriously l o w . This was the case in the present study, w h i c h started w i t h 105 subjects, 21 assigned to each of the four e x p e r i m e n t a l con ditions a n d 21 to the c o n t r o l group. Some of the disadvantages of the small n u m b e r s w e r e r e d u c e d by precision m a t c h i n g and r a n d o m i z a t i o n of as signments.

P A R T

Self

T h e r e are several ways in w h i c h these data m a y be a p p l i e d to Hypothesis 1. In this hypothesis it is suggested that the m o r e frequently a person perceives a particular type of response d i r e c t e d t o w a r d h i m , the m o r e l i k e l y he is to use that re sponse in c h a n g i n g his self-concept. Since a l l those t a k i n g part in the experiments h a d a particular type of response (favorable ratings on leadership) d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e m , w e can assume that " o n the a v e r a g e " this group has h a d m o r e of this type of response t h a n the control group. T h e r e f o r e , one test of the hypothesis is a simple c o m p a r i s o n of those in the e x p e r i m e n t a l groups w i t h those in the c o n t r o l g r o u p . T h e results are in the ex p e c t e d d i r e c t i o n w i t h m e a n changes of + .65 of a u n i t on the r a t i n g scale for those in the experi m e n t a l groups (N= 71). a n d only + .23 of a u n i t for the c o n t r o l group (N=21). T h e differences b e t w e e n the t w o changes are statistically signifi cant at the .05 l e v e l of significance (t= 1.76, dif ference b e t w e e n i n d e p e n d e n t m e a n test). A m o r e r e f i n e d test on this hypothesis i n volves c o m p a r i n g those i n E . C . 2 w i t h those i n E . C . 1 a n d the c o n t r o l group, since the subjects in E . C . 2 h a d m o r e of a particular type of response d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e m t h a n d i d the subjects i n E . C . 1. T h e results support the hypothesis. Those who performed under E . C . 2 showed a mean change in their self-conceptions of one c o m p l e t e u n i t on the r a t i n g scale, w h i l e those in E . C . 1

C. RESULTS By c o m p a r i n g before-after changes in selfconcept ratings on leadership for the subjects in each of the conditions, evidence is brought to bear on at least part of three of the four hypotheses m e n t i o n e d above. T h e complete results are re p o r t e d i n T a b l e 21.1.

T A B L E 21.1. Mean self-ratings on leadership before and after experimental evaluations by experimental conditions BeforeAfter Differences M SD .37 1.00 .63 .60 .65 .23 .98 1.15 .74 .92 .99 .75

Experimental Condition E . C . 1 (Standard) E . C . 2 (Repeat) E . C . 3 (Importance) E . C . 4 (Dispersed) A l l experimental conditions Control group

N 19 18 19 15 71 21

Before M SD 4.26 4.28 4.26 4.20 4.25 4.29 1.02 1.04 1.12 1.11 1.07 1.16

After M SD 4.63 5.28 4.89 4.80 4.90 4.52 .93 .73 .73 .83 .83 .96

t 1.59 3.57** 3.62** 2.36* 5.45** 1.42

Note: A l l tests are o n e - t a i l e d . T h e t's a b o v e r e f e r t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e b e f o r e a n d a f t e r m e a n s of d e p e n d e n t samples.

I
Kinch changed only .37 of a unit. This difference is statis tically significant (t= 2.29, difference b e t w e e n i n dependent m e a n test). F r o m Hypothesis 2 (Importance) it was felt that the a d d e d prestige of the investigator's r a t i n g i n E . C . 3 w o u l d lead t o greater changes t h a n i n the comparable E . C . 1. H e r e the results are in the expected direction; h o w e v e r , the difference b e t w e e n the two e x p e r i m e n t a l groups was small and not statistically significant (means of .37 a n d .63 for E . C . 1 a n d 3, respectively 1= .93). Hypothesis 4 suggests that the consistency of responses is i m p o r t a n t and w o u l d lead to the expectation of a greater before-after difference i n E . C . 1 t h a n i n E . C . 4 . H e r e the results show just the opposite. Those students w h o w e r e g i v e n about the same ratings by all the raters c h a n g e d less t h a n those subjects w h o w e r e g i v e n m o r e dis persed ratings (mean changes of .37 in E . C . 1 as c o m p a r e d w i t h a change of .60 in E . C . 4). 201 2. Backman, C. W., & Secord, P. F. The effect of per ceived liking on interpersonal attraction. Hum. Relat, 1959, 12, 379-384. 3. . Liking, selective interaction, and misperception in congruent interpersonal relations. Sociometry, 1962, 25, 321-335.

4. Bergin, A. The effect of dissonant persuasive com munications upon changes in a self-referring atti tude. /. Personal, 1962, 30, 423-438. 5. Cooley, . H. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Scribner, 1902. 6. Couch, C. Family role specialization and self-atti tudes in children. Sociolog. Quart, 1962, 3, 115122. 7. Davidson, H. H . , & Lang, G. Children's perceptions of their teachers' feelings toward them related to self-perception, school achievement and behavior. /. Exper. Edua, 1960, 29, 107-118. 8. Dittes, J. E. Attractiveness of group as a function of self-esteem and acceptance by group. /. Abn. & Soc. Psychol., 1959, 59, 77-82. 9. Haas, H. L . , & Moehr, M. L. Two experiments on the concept of self and reactions of others. / Per sonal. 6-Soc. Psychol., 1965, 1, 100-105. 10. Harvey, O. J., Kelley, H. H . , & Shapiro, M. M. Reac tions to unfavorable evaluations of the self made by other persons. /. Personal, 1957, 25, 393-411. 11. Kennedy, J. L . , & Lasswell, H. D. A cross-cultural test of self-image. Hum. Organization, 1958,17,4143. 12. Kinch, J. W. The manipulation of subjects in experi ments. Unpublished paper presented at the Pacific Sociological Association Meetings, Vancouver, Brit ish Columbia, Canada, 1966. 13. Maehr, M . , Mensing, J., & Nafager, S. Concept of self and the reaction of others. Sociometry, 1962, 25, 353-357. 14. Mead, G. H. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago, 111.: Univ. Chicago Press, 1934. 15. Reese, H. W. Relationships between self-acceptance and sociometric choices. /. Abn. h- Soc. Psychol., 1961, 62, 472-474. 16. Rosengren, W. R. The self in the emotionally dis turbed. Amer. J. Socio!., 1961, 66, 454-462. 17. Videbeck, R. Self-conception and the reaction of others. Sociometry, 1960, 23, 351-359

D. SUMMARY T h e study described h e r e is one in a series of studies proposed by the author designed to vary systematically factors relevant to changes in selfconceptions. A l t h o u g h e x p e r i m e n t a l studies of this type are h a m p e r e d by the several difficulties apparent in this report, the valuable m a n i p u l a t i v e power that the investigator has over his variables allows c r u c i a l tests w h i c h c o u l d not be accom plished by other methods. T h e n e e d for system atic e m p i r i c a l support or investigation of social psychological theory is r e c o g n i z e d by all. This study has attempted to p r o v i d e that type of sup port for the M e a d - C o o l e y notions about the selfconcept.

REFERENCES 1. Akeret, R. U. Interrelationships among various di mensions of the self concept. / Counsel, Psychol., 1959, 6, 199-201.

Helena Znaniecki Lopata

Self-Identity in Marriage and Widowhood

This paper examines some of the processes b y w h i c h w o m e n re-define their identities i n mar riage a n d in w i d o w h o o d , a n d the influence that their educational achievement has u p o n the proc esses a n d the results. Theories of symbolic interac t i o n a n d ethnomethodology p r o v i d e certain basic assumptions about the construction of social real ity, i n c l u d i n g self-identity, as it emerges in social interaction (Berger a n d L u c k m a n , 1966; B l u m e r , 1969; Goffman, 1963,1967; M c C a l l and Simmons, 1966). These assumptions are: 1) that identities are f o r m u l a t e d in a c o m p l i c a t e d process of social interaction w h i c h involves symbolic definitions of the self, the other, a n d the situation; 2) that re peated interaction w i t h the same other in similar situations, as in l o n g - t e r m significant relations, re sults in rather definite a n d stabilized self and Helena Z n a n i e c k i L o p a t a , owhood," The Sociological This a r t i c l e was ried
"Self-Identity i n Marriage and W i d Quarterly, vol 14 ( S u m m e r 1973),

other identities; 3) that these identities are m o d : fied as the self, the other, or the definition of the situation change; a n d 4) that the r e m o v a l of the significant other f r o m interaction w i t h the self w i l l necessitate a reformulation of the identitie: in w h i c h he or she was i n v o l v e d . T h e m o r e impor tant a n d pervasive the relation w i t h the other the m o r e the actor's entrance into it, a n d f r o m it, w i l l i n v o l v e reformulation of p r i o r iden tities. T w o sets of studies are used here to question some of the assumptions about the pervasiveness and the d e p t h of i d e n t i t y reformulations w i t h en trance into a n d exit f r o m a major social relation the nuclear f a m i l y marriage. O n e set of studies has e x a m i n e d the role a n d self-definitions of 571 u r b a n a n d suburban housewives a n d working w o m e n , a n d the descriptions of life a n d self changes w h i c h w e r e p r o d u c e d by major events in the past of another 205 respondents. T h e sec o n d i n v o l v e d interviews w i t h a modified area probability sample of 301 widows residing in met ropolitan Chicago. Most observers of the A m e r i c a n urban scene consider marriage to be one of the major social relations for b o t h partners, but particularly for w o m e n . O n l y the parent-child relation is ex1
1

pp. 4 0 7 - 4 1 8 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n . first p r e s e n t e d as a p a p e r at t h e A m e r i c a n S o c i o

l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n m e e t i n g s i n D e n v e r , A u g u s t , 1971. T h e f i r s t set o f s t u d i e s , t h a t o f r o l e d e f i n i t i o n s o f s e v e r a l s a m p l e s o f m a r w o m e n l i v i n g i n m e t r o p o l i t a n C h i c a g o , was f a c i l i t a t e d b y The Chicago Tribune, T h e M i d w e s t f e l l o w s h i p s and g r a n t s f r o m

C o u n c i l for Social Research on A g i n g , a n d Roosevelt University, a n d i s s u m m a r i z e d e l s e w h e r e (1971a). T h e s e c o n d , c o n s i s t i n g o f i n t e r v i e w s w i t h a m o d i f i e d a r e a p r o b a b i l i t y s a m p l e o f 301 metropolitan Chicago widows aged 50 a n d over, d r a w n by the N a t i o n a l O p i n i o n R e s e a r c h C e n t e r , was s u p p o r t e d i n part b y an A d m i n i s t r a t i o n on A g i n g grant, a division of the D e p a r t m e n t of Health, Education and Welfare (Grant N o . A A - 4 - 6 7 - 0 3 0 01-A1) a n d in part by Roosevelt University. I am grateful to Herbert paper. Blalock, Richard Hill, Eileen Markley Znaniecki, D a v i d M a i n e s , a n d F r a n k S t e i n h a r t f o r h e l p i n g m e w i t h this

E d m u n d V o l k h a r t (1965:272-293) explains i n detail t h e factors in the structure a n d functions o f the

c o n t r i b u t i n g t o shifts

n u c l e a r f a m i l y i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f w h y its m e m b e r s a r e s o v u l n e r a b l e t o b e r e a v e m e n t . M o s t o f his c o m m e n t s a r e d i r e c t e d t o p a r e n t - c h i l d r e l a t i o n s , b u t t h e y c e r t a i n l y f i t t h o s e b e t w e e n hus band and wife

Lopata p e c t e d t o approximate i t i n importance. T h e r e is no agreement as to w h e t h e r these two sets of relations are equal or, if they are not, w h i c h is the m o r e i m p o r t a n t one in the lives of w o m e n . A c c o r d i n g t o B e r g e r a n d K e l l n e r (1970), entrance into such an intense relation as m o d e r n marriage requires cooperative objectification of a c o m m o n w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the identities of the husband a n d the wife. T h e i d e n tity changes result not only f r o m their interaction in the d y a d , as described by B e r g e r a n d K e l l n e r , but also f r o m the c o m m o n front they present tow a r d the w o r l d a n d the influence of their marriage u p o n other relations. T h e process c a n be expected to have a p r o f o u n d influence u p o n a wife for several reasons, a l l e m b e d d e d in the family institution. In the first place, although girls are socialized into individualistic personality i d e n t i t i e s , m a r r i e d w o m e n a n d mothers are expected to be o r i e n t e d p r i m a r i l y t o w a r d family welfare. Secondly, the roles of w i f e a n d m o t h e r are considered the basic a n d the only really i m p o r t a n t ones for adult w o m e n . T h e a d d i t i o n of the roles of husband a n d father are not expected to p r o d u c e an equivalently significant shift in the role cluster of m e n . F i n a l l y , the reality constructed by a couple symbolically and in actual life-style tends to be b u i l t a r o u n d the husband's occupational role outside of the h o m e . This is particularly true if
2 3 4

203 his occupation has, or is expected to achieve, h i g h status in the c o m m u n i t y , such as f o r e m a n or craftsman in the blue-collar c o m m u n i t y or practically any type of professional or managerial w o r k e r i n m i d d l e - o r upper-class neighborhoods. A l t h o u g h there m a y be a t r e n d decreasing this heavy stress o n m a l e e m p l o y m e n t i n A m e r i c a n society, most people agree that residence a n d style of life, i n c l u d i n g the daily r h y t h m , possessions, vocations, friendships, etc., should be b u i l t a r o u n d the man's job. A f t e r all, goes the argument, w i t h o u t it the family c o u l d not be m a i n tained. T h e i m p o r t a n c e of marriage in the life of a w o m a n is s y m b o l i z e d by her n a m e change. In effect, b e c o m i n g M r s . H a r r y Jones wipes out the whole past of M a r y S m i t h , her f a m i l y , h e r ethnic and personal achievement identities. In the historical past this was a c c o m p a n i e d by a c o m p l e t e shift into the husband's family-life-style, a n d e v e n n o w continuity of i d e n t i t y w i t h o u t change is almost impossible as n e w relations, residence, econ o m i c base, a n d fresh responsibilities are thrust u p o n the wife. T h e influence of marriage u p o n the self-identity of w o m e n e m e r g e d as a fact in the studies o f the housewives a n d the w o r k i n g w o m e n l i v i n g in m e t r o p o l i t a n C h i c a g o , leading to the p r e d i c tion that the abrupt e n d i n g of marriage t h r o u g h the death of the husband w o u l d also result in a dramatic identity reformulation. H o w e v e r , a n add i t i o n a l fact e m e r g e d f r o m these studies, l e a d i n g to a re-examination of the assumptions about the influence of marriage u p o n the construction of social reality. T h e w o m e n whose self a n d role definitions w e r e e x a m i n e d v a r i e d considerably i n the extent to w h i c h they felt their identities w e r e influenced by marriage a n d by the identities of their husbands. T h e basic factor affecting their

First, the suburban full-time housewives were asked to list, in rrder of importance, the most important roles of women. The
next study isolated 13 roles mentioned by the respondents to

T h e role hierarchy of American metropolitan women was rapped in two different ways within several research projects.

die first study and asked for a ranking of all in relation to the
D t h e r s . T h e several different patterns of ranking were found to be dependent upon education of the woman and several socioeconomic factors (Lopata, 1965). There is considerable evidence that American women do not rake seriously their obligations to society. They justify work as merely a means of getting more money for the home and are very unreliable as voluntary workers. Occupation: Housewife respondents ranked the roles of worker, self expressive (i.e., Titer) member of community, and member of a religious organization at the bottom of the rank order of importance of omen's roles, ranking mother, wife, woman, housewife, daughrsr, grandmother, sister, neighbor and friend above these (LoI =ta, 1971a and 1971b).
:

Ogburn (1922) built a theory of social change around the thesis rimt the economic technological institurion is the focal one imin a society and is the first to change, forcing adjustments n other institutions, with cultural lag on the part of the family. He was generalizing only from American social life, since there
1

have been, and still are, societies focusing around other institutions. It is quite probable that the low status of women in societies with complex industrialized and urbanized cultures and a strong focus on the economic institurion is due to the fact that they are not expected to take an important part in that segment of life. Their Second Sex location can be seen as peripheral to the masculine sex whose primary contribution is within the focal institution. (See also Friedan, 1963, de Beauvoir, 1953, Greer, 1971, Janeway, 1971, Klein, 1949, Komarovsky, 1953, and 1950).

204
awareness a n d expression of i d e n t i t y r e f o r m u l a t i o n i n marriage and their i n v o l v e m e n t i n a c o m m o n w o r l d w i t h their husbands p r o v e d t o b e the l e v e l o f f o r m a l education w h i c h they h a d a c h i e v e d . T h e r e w e r e several pieces of evidence l e a d i n g to this conclusion. T h e less educated w o m e n often forgot to list marriage as a major e v e n t of the past, focusing rather on the b i r t h of the first a n d of subsequent c h i l d r e n . T h e less e d u c a t i o n w o m e n have, the less apt they are to list the role of wife as b e i n g of p r i m a r y i m p o r tance in the lives of w o m e n ; they concentrate instead on the role of mother. T h e y n o w see life i n m u c h the same w a y they h a d v i s u a l i z e d i t i n adolescence, c o m m e n t i n g chiefly on its economic features. These w o m e n do not feel that they share in the w o r k - l i f e of the husband. T h e y b e l i e v e that they have no influence on it or else that their o n l y c o n t r i b u t i o n is to f e e d their husband w e l l at h o m e a n d to nag h i m o r not nag, as the case m a y beto get a better j o b a n d b r i n g h o m e m o r e m o n e y . T h e lower the e d u c a t i o n of the re spondent, the m o r e the difference b e t w e e n the man's a n d the woman's lives a p p e a r e d in the se l e c t i o n o f friends, i n c h i l d - r e a r i n g , a n d i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the neighborhood a n d the c o m m u n i t y . R a t h e r t h a n b u i l d i n g a c o m m o n w o r l d w i t h their husbands, they exist in segregated, though often p a r a l l e l hemispheres, w i t h little k n o w l e d g e o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the other half (see also, R a i n w a t e r et a l . , 1959).
5

P A R T III

SeJ

she is n o w l e a d i n g the k i n d of life she visualized in adolescence, re-defining h e r p r i o r interest an occupation as unrealistic. T h e m o r e educated w o m a n feels that she influences h e r husband's p e r f o r m a n c e at w o r k either directly, through specific tasks or entertainment, or indirectiy by u n d e r s t a n d i n g his problems a n d b e i n g able to discuss t h e m . She shares w i t h h i m a defini tion of the w o r l d , or of a large part of it, and builds a set of social relations w h i c h i n v o l v e him including couple-companionate friendshipsn e i g h b o r i n g , m e m b e r s h i p i n voluntary associa tions, etc.
6

O n the other h a n d , the m o r e educated a w o m a n is, the m o r e influence she assigns in her i d e n t i t y f o r m u l a t i o n to b e i n g m a r r i e d , to b e i n g m a r r i e d to this particular husband, a n d to b e i n g p a r t of this couple. She is v e r y apt to list marriage as a major event a n d to e x p l a i n carefully the changes she experienced in herself as a result of it. She assigns the role of w i f e first place in a r a n k o r d e r of i m p o r t a n c e or explains h e r emphasis on the role of m o t h e r as t e m p o r a r i l y necessitated by the age of her c h i l d r e n . She does not t h i n k

Thus, these studies of u r b a n a n d suburban housewives a n d w o r k i n g w o m e n i n d i c a t e d tha: there are differences in the degrees to which wives weave b e i n g m a r r i e d a n d the identities o: their husbands i n t o their w o r l d constructs, result i n g in a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of their o w n identities Awareness of these variations l e d , in a study c: widows aged 50 a n d over, to a hypothesis con c e r n e d d i r e c t l y w i t h i d e n t i t y r e f o r m u l a t i o n . The hypothesis is that the h i g h e r the e d u c a t i o n of a w o m a n as m e a s u r e d by f o r m a l schooling, the m o r e she w i l l be affected by w i d o w h o o d , because w i t h this event she w i l l undertake a m o r e com plete reconstruction of reality a n d i d e n t i t y than h e r less educated counterpart w i l l . This hypothe sis actually contains t w o components of identity formulation: the abstracted a n d constructed real ity, a n d the extent to w h i c h this reality is w o v e n a r o u n d the presence of a husband, the presence of this particular husband, a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a m e m b e r of this couple. Theoretically, the death of the husband is b o u n d to p r o d u c e d i r e c t a n d secondary changes i n the identities o f A m e r i c a n m e t r o p o l i t a n w o m e n , particularly if p r i o r to that e v e n t he was r e s i d i n g w i t h the w i f e a n d sharing a life-style and
As late as 1965 Rossi (1965:180) reported that most women college students were not seriously preparing for a variety of occupational roles. Most either planned on becoming house wives or entering traditional fields. Only 7 percent declared an interest in fields of knowledge in which they were "pioneers" because of their sexual identities. It is possible that the new trends in the women's movement will have a direct effect on the young couples who will construct their world to include more complex identities for women and convert the abstrac tions into concrete plans for implementing occupational aspira tions (see also Rose, 1961).
9

Komarovsky (1967) also found that the higher the educational level, even within Blue-Collar Marriage, the greater the com munication between marital partners. Some of our less educated respondents did not even know how many years of schooling their husbands had completed, or where his relatives are living now, or the names of his married sisters.
s

Lopata social relations with her. The stronger the bond with the husband and the more varied the sets of relations she had with hime.g., couple-companionate friendships, neighboring, serving as a daughter-in-law to his parents, as a salesman's wife to his sales manager, etc.the more complex and significant the changes which could be expected to follow in her life and identities with his death.
7

205 sion of labor. She has no object for her work, and since marriage created a system of specialization in knowledge and skills, she has definite gaps in her abilities. Many widows report strong feelings of inadequacy and frustration because of their inability to handle money transactions or to maintain an automobile. In addition, no one is available to act as a man around the house, and widows feel very imfeiriinine doing things previously undertaken by the husband. For many women the division of tasks into "his" or "hers" creates a real void, which has repercussions upon her feeling as an incomplete person. It is in interaction with others that widows are most apt to report identity problems. Two aspects of interaction are of special significance: without her husband, the woman cannot reproduce certain interactional sequences, and other people do not treat her the same way as before. Their image of her is that of a widow and not that of a wife, while she frequently wants to retain her prior identity. If they knew her husband well, they see her as the widow of that particular man, a constant reminder of the mortality of men. Some respondents report being literally shunned, because the late husband's friends are made so uncomfortable by their presence. Others report that their mutual friends now regard them as dangerous objects around their still living husbands, assurriing the widow to be out to get another mate, in marriage or sexually only. Respondents sense that friends are also afraid of the demands they might be making for sympathy or services, which the associates define as unreasonable in the framework of the past relation. Widows often feel that their married friends no longer trust them or seem unwilling to meet their needs. What also seems to happen is that a new widow is undergoing a "status passage" with no clearly defined end product. What is a widow in American society? There is no single, predictable pattern of behavior associated with that status. It is not a role in the sense that it was in traditional India. The associates of a woman whose husband has recently died know that she is undergoing changes, but they often cannot predict the results of the process of modification. Many alternative identities are available to modern women who are widows, but

The study of widowhood in the Chicago area brought forth several reasons why a woman experiences changes with the death of her husband. In the first place, she loses the partner with whom she has shared the on-going process of defining the world. Living alone, as most older widows do (and women are apt to become widowed when they grow older), she gradually loses the memory of her husband's definitions. She will often report that, as new situations arise, she tries to imagine what her husband would have said were he alive, but the dialogue becomes difficult over time. She may hang on to her husband's image of her, as she had perceived it, but that, too, fades or becomes harder to revive, as her mirror and others note the changes.
8

Identity reformulation is also a consequence of the changes in daily life. The absence of the husband dramatically or gradually changes the routine, what is thought about, and what is felt in response to events, mcluding those on television. Furthermore, his absence cuts off the help upon which the woman depended in their divi* There have been several studies of the problems of the widowed, including Marris (1958) i n London, England and Berardo (1967, 1968a, 1968b) of both m e n and women in the state of Washington, U.S.A. Townsend (1968) and Turnstall (1966) also talk of these problems. Some of the psychiatrists and related social scientists of the Harvard Medical School studied grief intensively (Maddison, 1968; Maddison and Walker, 1967; Parkes, 1964,1965; Parkes and Benjamin, 1967). See also Jackson's (1959,1969) discussion of death and grief. See also Lopata 1972). Many of the "Forms of Loneliness" (Lopata, 1969) reported by the Chicago area widows really focus upon identity problems which are ignored because grief is culturally defined as a pining :or the deceased, without analysis of what this means. M c C a l l and Simmons (1966) point out, however, that marriage or another diadic relation constructs a person's agenda so that " T h e two persons are not merely disjointed individuab but constitute a unit, a collective unit of which they are members . . . (175). Married people are invited to events not as persons but as couples (176)."
!

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the future they choose is often a surprise to friends. In most cases, any real change takes or pushes h e r away f r o m t h e m . Thus, since the rec e n t l y b e r e a v e d w o m a n is not a stable identity, she threatens the identities of others. A major variation in the p e r c e i v e d changes in her identities lies in the m a n n e r in w h i c h a w i d o w ' s late husband served as a link b e t w e e n h e r a n d society, the extent to w h i c h their w o r l d was b u i l t a r o u n d h i m , and his outside identities. C h i c a g o area respondents report a decrease in social life, if it was d e p e n d e n t on his business c o n tact, or because they are afraid to go out at n i g h t alone, hesitant about e n t e r i n g p u b l i c places w i t h out a m a l e escort, unable to r e a c h distant events, a n d i n general helpless i n m a n y social situations. T h e u n d e r c u r r e n t of m a n y complaints about the problems of w i d o w h o o d thus consists of three segments: a feeling of i n c o m p e t e n c e a n d i n c o m pleteness as persons, b e i n g s h u n n e d by others, a n d experiences of strain in social interaction. T h e r e are strong stigmatic aspects to these feelings, often camouflaged by descriptions of what grief means, but r e s e m b l i n g attitudes t o w a r d the self felt by people w h o are adjusting to a major physical or social disfigurement (Goffman, 1963).
9

P A R T HI

Self

A l t h o u g h these sentiments are r e p o r t e d as a d i r e c t consequence of the d e a t h of the husband, there are w o m e n in the sample w h o still experience negative seff-feelings after years of w i d o w h o o d . H o w e v e r , most o f the w o m e n w h o are aware of changes in themselves report positive i d e n t i t y reformulations after the i n i t i a l " g r i e f w o r k " is c o m p l e t e d (see L i n d e m a n n , 1944;

T h e n e e d s and t h e p r o b l e m s o f i d e n t i t y r e f o r m u l a t i o n i n w i d -

o w h o o d a r e n e g l e c t e d b y s o c i o l o g i s t s a n d o t h e r s o c i a l scientists, w h o really should k n o w better than to m a k e the assumptions s u c h n e g l e c t i m p l i e s . C u n i m i n g a n d H e n r y (1961) c l a i m e d t h a t w i d o w h o o d i s easier for w o m e n t h a n r e t i r e m e n t i s for m e n , b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o loss o f status i n t h e f o r m e r c a s e . R i l e y a n d associates (1969:968) e v e n state t h a t " B e r e a v e m e n t i s n o t a t h r e a t t o t h e s e l f - i m a g e (in t h e s a m e s e n s e a s r e t i r e m e n t ) , b e cause i t results n e i t h e r f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l ' s failure n o r f r o m his loss o f c a p a c i t y t o p e r f o r m t h e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e r o l e . " T h i s s t a t e m e n t n e g l e c t s t h e loss o f c a p a c i t y a n d i d e n t i t y f o l l o w i n g t h e d e a t h , l e t a l o n e t h e g u i l t f e e l i n g s c o n n e c t e d w i t h it. E v e n p s y c h o l o g i s t s s t u d y i n g " g r i e f w o r k , " as L i n d e m a n n (1944) c a l l e d it, u n d e r - v a l u e t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h i t i n v o l v e s i d e n t i t y r e f o r m u l a t i o n . T h e y m a y m e n t i o n i t ( F l e s c h , 1969) i n p a s s i n g , b u t t h e y n e v e r r e t u r n to it n o r h a v e they investigated the process or the e n d result.

Parkes, 1964, a n d 1965; M a d d i s o n , 1968; M a d d i son a n d W a l k e r , 1967). W h e n questioned: " M a n y w o m e n t e l l us that they change after b e c o m i n g widows. H o w d o y o u think y o u have changed?", 54 p e r c e n t of the respondents listed at least one change. Sixty-three percent of those w h o list a first or only change believe themselves to be m o r e i n d e p e n d e n t and competent n o w than w h i l e their husbands w e r e l i v i n g . A n o t h e r 10 p e r c e n t report that they are freer a n d m o r e active individuals. O n l y 18 p e r c e n t v i e w the major change in negative terms. T h e y find themselves p r o n e to w o r r y or to be less sociable, and 2 percent are more suspicious of other people. O n e h u n d r e d widows list a second change in themselves a n d of these, 18 p e r c e n t explain it as b e i n g a freer person, 47 percent as b e i n g m o r e active, and 23 p e r c e n t as b e i n g m o r e w o r r i e d and suspicious. F i n a l l y , 62 respondents list a t h i r d change in answer to this open-end question: 31 percent of t h e m are more socially engaged individuals, but 68 percent report b e i n g m o r e w o r r i e d and c o n c e r n e d about themselves and their fives, w i t h only one w o m a n r e p o r t i n g an increase of suspicion. Thus, the overw h e l m i n g p r o p o r t i o n of w i d o w s w h o recognize or admit change in their personalities or identities consider themselves fuller a n d freer people than before the death of their husbands. T h e y have r o u n d e d out their personalities, previously restricted or l i m i t e d as a result of marriage. This does not m e a n necessarily that they h a d b a d marriages, as these are the v e r y same individuals who list loneliness, rather than m o n e y or other troubles as the worst p r o b l e m of w i d o w h o o d , a n d miss their husband most as a person or a partner, rather t h a n as a b r e a d w i n n e r , w o r k e r , or a presence in the house. This is the f o r m of loneliness most often experienced (Lopata, 1969). Also, the fact that they n o w feel fuller and m o r e competent identities does not m e a n that the i n t e r i m p e r i o d was easy, since w o r r y , strain in relations, a n d grief w e r e a part of it. Of special c o n c e r n to this discussion are the w o m e n w h o reject the idea of change in themselves in w i d o w h o o d . Those who c l a i m not to have b e e n changed by the death of their husband contravene all the theoretical propositions of symbolic interaction a n d ethnomethodology, as w e l l as the logic of life in A m e r i c a n u r b a n centers.

207

X = 12.15; d.f. = 4; l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e < .01

K e n d a l l ' s = 0.179; l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e < .001

T h e r e c o u l d be several reasons w h y w o m e n refuse to admit change in themselves in spite of the fact that, throughout the i n t e r v i e w , they make frequent references to relation problems and the n e e d to develop skills, change friends, move, go to work, etc. In the first place, A m e r i c a n culture, particularly that shared at the l o w e r so cioeconomic levels, contains fixed personality i m agery. A d u l t s are regarded as possessing stable traits. Secondly, permanence of i d e n t i t y into w i d owhood performs the i m p o r t a n t traditional func tion of sanctifying the dead. T h e w i f e remains the same as b e f o r e " i n his m e m o r y . " A t h i r d reason may be n o n - i n v o l v e m e n t in i d e n t i t y refor mulation in marriage and absence of a strong de pendence of life-style on the husband, in that he was not an integral part of the wife's life. A fourth reason may be the absence of social interaction w i t h people able and w i l l i n g to r e c o r d change i n the w i d o w . A n isolated w o m a n may not have anyone aware of w h e t h e r she is changing or not; an uneducated one may have companions w h o also lack the conceptualization skills r e q u i r e d to note patterns of behavior in her. Those hy potheses w o u l d lead to the expectation that the w o m e n r e p o r t i n g n o change i n their identity as a result of the death of their husband w o u l d be uneducated, lacking a strong interpersonal social life, not highly d e p e n d e n t u p o n the hus band w h e n he was l i v i n g , and c u r r e n t l y socially isolated.

T h e distributions of the widows r e p o r t i n g change in themselves or rejecting the idea are significant a n d support the conclusions r e a c h e d by the study of m a r r i e d w o m e n and the hypothe ses d r a w n f r o m the theoretical bases. T h e v a r i ables w h i c h have the strongest significant associa tions w i t h each other i n connection w i t h r e p o r t e d change in the self f o l l o w i n g the death of the hus b a n d t u r n e d out to be: education of the w o m a n , occupation of h e r husband, social isolation, a n d r e p o r t e d change in the l e v e l and quality of social life.
1 0

T h e respondents w h o report n o change i n themselves as a result of w i d o w h o o d are less e d u cated, m o r e socially isolated and less d e p e n d e n t in their social life on the presence of their hus b a n d than are the w o m e n w h o have consciously experienced i d e n t i t y reformulation. T h e educa tional differences are v e r y strong (see T a b l e 22.1). Also, w o m e n r e p o r t i n g " n o c h a n g e " scored h i g h

1 0

S e v e r a l factors w h i c h I e x p e c t e d t o b e o f significance i n differ

entiating between w o m e n who report change in themselves as a result of w i d o w h o o d a n d those w h o reject the i d e a p r o v e d insignificant. F o r example, the n u m b e r of children a w o m a n has, o r t h e i r total a b s e n c e , a n d t h e n u m b e r o f p e o p l e w i t h w h o m she is c u r r e n t l y l i v i n g do not i n f l u e n c e h e r p e r c e p t i o n of i d e n t i t y modifications. N e i t h e r does the l e n g t h of w i d o w h o o d , mostly because so few respondents w e r e recently bereaved. A g e at w i d o w h o o d is i n f l u e n t i a l o n l y in the oldest age categories of 6 5 a n d o v e r , b u t this t r e n d i s also r e l a t e d t o e d u c a t i o n a n d husband's e d u c a t i o n , w h i c h h a v e a m u c h stronger association with reported change.

208

P A R T T A B L E 22.2. Association between perceived change since the death of the husband and score on the social isolation scale Change in Self No Change N= 138 % 10 71 19 100
X = 15.35; d.f. = 2; l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e < .005
2

Self

Level of Social Isolation Low (N = 52) Medium (N = 210) High (N = 38)

Change N= 162 % 24 69 7 100

K e n d a l l ' s = .22; l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e

< .001

T A B L E 22.3. Association between perceived change in the self since death of husband and changes in social life Change in Self No Change N= 130 % 32 58 8 2 100
X = 2 3 . 3 8 ; d.f. = 3 ; l e v e l o f s i g n i f i c a n c e < .001
2

Change in Social Life Less Now (N = 113) Same (N = 126) More (N = 34) Different People or Activity (N = 14)

Change N=157 % 45 32 15 8 100

on the social isolation scale, based on the absence of a variety of potential social relations at the t i m e of the i n t e r v i e w (see T a b l e 22.2). In addition, the social isolation of these w o m e n is not a consequence of the absence of the husband, but seems to be a chronic state, since these w o m e n report themselves as h a v i n g the same type, in quality a n d quantity, of social life as they h a d w h e n he was l i v i n g (see T a b l e 22.3). In fact, 97 percent of the h i g h l y isolated w o m e n , c o m p a r e d to 43 percent of the m e d i u m isolated a n d 41 percent of those scoring " l o w " on the so cial isolation scale report their social life to be the same as before the death of the husband. These are strong contrasts. Those w h o report an increase in social life, interestingly enough, t e n d

to score " m e d i u m " on the social isolation scale rather than " l o w . " T h e l o w scorers are the m o r e educated w o m e n , w h o nevertheless r e p o r t a change or decrease in social life w i t h w i d o w h o o d . It is l i k e l y that they re-engaged in society in differ ent types of activities than before, since they are the same w o m e n w h o report i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d feeling freer than in the past. T h a t social life a n d other engagement relations affect self-identity is i n d i c a t e d by the fact that w o m e n w h o report change in themselves as a result of losing the hus b a n d are the most apt to report either a lessening of social life or an increase. T h e y are v e r y u n l i k e l y to c l a i m it to be the same. T a b l e 22.4 summarizes in greater detail the general trends. T h e importance of e d u c a t i o n

209 TABLE 2 2 . 4 . Association between social isolation and education for women reporting change in themselves as a result of widowhood and those reporting no change

comes out in the rotation of all five of the significant variableseducation, occupation of husband, social isolation, r e p o r t e d changes in social life, and r e p o r t e d changes in the self. T h e occupation of the husband is associated w i t h social isolation most strongly for w o m e n w i t h less than an eighth grade education, but for h i g h l y trained w o m e n the husband's job has less influence on isolation and felt reformulation of life a n d self. T h e relation b e t w e e n the variables w h i c h emerges f r o m such a rotation is as follows: A m i n i m a l educational achievement restricts a woman's ability to obtain a husband w i t h w h o m she w i l l become fully i n v o l v e d i n the reconstruction of reality a n d self-identity a n d also her ability to become socially active w i t h or w i t h o u t h i m . T h e less educated w o m a n does not consciously reformulate self-identities i n conjunction w i t h her husband and is thus less affected by his presence or absence than is the m o r e educated w o m a n . T h e higher the education of the wife, the greater her i n v o l v e m e n t i n i d e n t i t y reconstruction i n marriage a n d w i d o w h o o d . This k i n d o f w o m a n reports change i n social life, i n quality o r quantity, without b e c o m i n g socially isolated, and feels that she has changed in consequence of w i d o w h o o d . T h e change was p a i n f u l in the process, but n o w she feels l i k e a fuller h u m a n being, m o r e independent a n d competent than i n the past.

SUMMARY T h e education, social isolation, a n d r e p o r t e d changes in the social life package indicate that w o m e n differ i n their degree o f i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h their husband a n d that these differences are reflected in their self-identities. W o m e n at the l o w e r e n d of the socioeconomic scale, particularly those w h o do not have m u c h f o r m a l education in abstractly o r g a n i z i n g their worlds, do not engage in the process described by ethnomethodologists (Berger a n d K e l l n e r , 1970) as strongly as the m o r e educated wives of w h i t e collar husbands. It is probable that they lack both complexity a n d structure i n their construction o f reality, w h i c h includes their self identities, a n d that they do not go through a self-conscious process of re-structuri n g a n d objectifying their reality u p o n marriage, so that they do not n e e d or are not i n c l i n e d to re-structure it in w i d o w h o o d . T h e y are less affected in their conscious identities by the presence and w o r l d constructs of their husband than are the m o r e educated w o m e n . T h e y c o m m u n i cate w i t h the mate less; his entrance into, a n d exit f r o m their lives does not r e q u i r e conscious reformulation o f their o w n identities a n d location i n the constructed w o r l d . O n e conclusion of this paper is that the construction process a n d the e n d product of self i d e n tity a n d w o r l d f o r m u l a t i o n vary b y the f o r m a l

210 education achieved by a w o m a n a n d by the social class of her life style. T h e second is that marriage a n d w i d o w h o o d are less disorganizing to the i d e n tities of lower-class w o m e n than for those w i t h higher t r a i n i n g and life style, because the better e d u c a t e d w o m e n devote m o r e t i m e a n d resources to constructing a w o r l d v i e w a r o u n d the presence a n d w i t h the h e l p o f the m a n they m a r r y t h a n do their less educated counterparts.

P A R T III

Self

. Encounters. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961 Greer, Germain. The Female Eunuch. New York McGraw-Hill, 1971. Jackson, Edgar N. "Attitudes toward Death in our Cul ture." Death and Bereavement. Edited by Austin H. Kutscher. Springfield, 111.: Charles Thomas. 1969, pp. 204-206. . "Grief and Religion." The Meaning of Death Edited by Herman Feifel. New York: McGraw-Hili. 1959, pp. 218-233. Janeway, Elizabeth. Man's World Woman's Place: A Study in Social Mythology. New York: William Morrow, 1971. Klein, Viola. The Feminine Character: History of an Ideology. New York: International Universities Press, 1949. Komarovsky, Mirra. Blue-Collar Marriage. New York: Random House, 1967. . Women in the Modern World: Their Education and Their Dilemmas. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1953. . "Functional Analysis of Sex Roles." American Sociological Review (August 1950):508-516. Lindemann, E. "Symptomology and Management of Acute Grief." American Journal of Psychiatry 101 (July 1944):141-148. Lopata, Helena Znaniecki. Widowhood in an American City. Cambridge, Mass.: Sehenkman Publishing Company, 1972. . Occupation: Housewife. New York: Oxford Uni versity Press, 1971. . "Loneliness: Forms and Components." Social Problems 17 (Fan 1969):248-262. . "The Secondary Features of a Primary Rela tionship." Human Organization 24 (Summer 1965):116-123. Lopata, H. Z. and F. Steinhart. "Work Histories of Amer ican Urban Women." The Gerontologist (Winter 1971):27-36. Maddison, D. "The Relevance of Conjugal Bereavement for Preventative Psychiatry." British Journal of Psychiatry 41 (September 1968):223-233. Maddison, D., and W. L. Walker. "Factors Affecting the Outcome of Conjugal Bereavement." British Jour nal of Psychiatry 113 (October 1967):1057-1067. Marris, Peter. Widows and Their Families. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1958. McCall, George, and J. L . Simmons. Identities and Interactions. New York: The Free Press, 1966. Ogburn, William. Social Change. New York: The Viking Press, 1922.

REFERENCES Berardo, Felix. "Widowhood Status in the United States: Perspective on a Neglected Aspect of the Family Life-cycle." The Family Coordinator 17 (July 1968a):191-203. . "Survivorship and Social Isolation. The Case of the Aged Widower." (Manuscript), 1968b. . "Social Adaptation to Widowhood among a Ru ral-Urban Population." Washington State Univer sity, College of Agriculture: Agricultural Experi ment Station Bulletin 689 (December 1967). Berger, Peter, and Hansfried Kellner. "Marriage and the Construction of Reality." Recent Sociology 2. Edited by Hans Dreitzel. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970, pp. 50-73. Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckman. The Social Con struction of Reality. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966. Blumer, Herbert. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969. Cumming, Elaine, and William E. Henry. Growing Old: The Process of Disengagement. New York: Basic Books, 1961. de Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953. Flesch, Regina. "The Condolence Call." Death and Bereavement. Edited by Austin H . Kutscher. Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas, 1969, pp. 236248. Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. New York: W. W. Norton, 1963. Goffman, Erving. Interaction Ritual. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967. . Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

Quarantelli, Cooper Parkes, M. "Bereavement and Mental Illness: A Clinical Study." British Journal of Medical Psychology, Part I, 38 (1965):1-12 and Part II, 38 (1965):13-26. . "Effects of Bereavement on Physical and Mental Health: A Study of the Medical Records of Widows." British Medical Journal 2 (August 1964):272279. Parkes, M. and B. Benjamin. "Bereavement." British Medical Journal 3 (July-September 1967):232233. Piainwater, Lee, Richard Coleman and Gerald Handel. Workingman's Wife. New York: Oceana Publica tions, 1959. PJley, Matilda White and Associates. "Socialization for the Middle and Later Years." Handbook of Sociali zation Theory and Research. Edited by David A . Goslin. Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1968, pp. 951982. Rose, A. "The Inadequacy of Women's Expectations for

211 Adult Roles." Social Forces 30 (October 1961):6977. Rossi, Alice. "Barriers to the Career Choice of Engineer ing, Medicine or Science among American Women." Women and the Scientific Professions. Edited by Jacquelyn A. Mattfelt and Carol G. Van Aken. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965, pp. 55127. Townsend, Peter. "Isolation, Desolation and Loneli ness." Old People in Three Industrial Societies. Edited by Ethel Shanas, Dorothy Wedderburn, Henning Friis, Poul Mithoj, Jan Stehoumer. New York: Atherton Press, 1968, pp. 258-285. Tunstall, Jeremy. Old and Alone. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, L t d . , 1966. Volkhart, Edmund H. and Stanley T. Michael. "Bereave ment and Mental Health." Death and Identity. Edited by Robert Fulton. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965, pp. 272-293.

E. L. Quarantelli & Joseph Cooper

Self-Conceptions and Others: A Further Test of Meadian Hypotheses

In this p a p e r we attempt to do the f o l l o w i n g ith respect to the symbolic interactionist apf roach to social psychological p h e n o m e n a : (1) to
;

L. Quarantelli and Joseph Cooper, "Self-Conceptions a n d The Sociologi

a d d to its relatively meager e m p i r i c a l base; (2) to d e v e l o p a n e g l e c t e d aspect of the position, n a m e l y , the t i m e d i m e n s i o n ; a n d (3) to contribute to b o t h the r e p l i c a t i o n a n d the extension of t h e l i m i t e d systematic research w h i c h has used this

I t i e r s : A F u r t h e r T e s t of M e a d i a n H y p o t h e s e s , " ; rinted by permission.

s t Quarterly, v o l . 7 , n o . 3 ( S u m m e r 1966), p p . 2 8 1 - 2 9 7 . H e portant role in gathering a major part of the data u s e d in t h e analysis. T h e a u t h o r s a r e also i n d e b t e d t o A l b e r t S c h w a r t z f o r his s u g g e s t i o n s a n d a d v i c e o n e a r l i e r d r a f t s . J a m e s R o s s h e l p e d w i t h some of the data processing.

T h i s investigation was s u p p o r t e d i n p a r t b y P u b l i c H e a l t h Service Research G r a n t D H - 0 0 0 1 4 - 0 4 , T h e D i v i s i o n o f D e n t a l r i b l i c H e a l t h a n d Resources. M a r g a r e t H e t f r i c h p l a y e d a n i m -

212 particular f r a m e w o r k to focus on the key concept of self. T h a t the symbolic interactionist approach does not rest on a substantial b o d y of e m p i r i c a l research has b e e n n o t e d by e v e n such a sympathetic critic as M e r t o n . Proponents of the a p p r o a c h have t e n d e d to substitute discursive illustrations for hypothesis testing especially w h e n setting forth the ideas o f G e o r g e H . M e a d , the major progenitor of the scheme. In fact, some of the major commentators on M e a d have at times suggested that his p r i m e c o n t r i b u t i o n is an abstract frame of reference w i t h w h i c h an observer c a n look at behavior rather t h a n a set of specific hypotheses to be tested. We try to show it is possible to test a key M e a d i a n n o t i o n on the relationship b e t w e e n self-conception a n d social others, through an examination of concrete data.
1 2

P A R T III

Self

Stryker has noted the general paucity of symbolic interactionist studies w h i c h systematically deal w i t h the time d i m e n s i o n in the stream of h u m a n conducts. This is a t e l l i n g c r i t i c i s m , since the processual aspects of behavior are central to the interactionist frame of reference. R e c e n t efforts to formulate a n d test hypotheses based on Mead's v i e w of the self as p r o d u c t of social interact i o n are cases in p o i n t . A l t h o u g h these studies
3 4
1

unambiguously v i e w self-conceptions as dynamic consequences of interaction, self-attitudes are typically analyzed either w i t h reference to some static instant or against a t i m e p e r i o d of short d u r a t i o n . In contrast, our study utilizes data cove r i n g t i m e periods of up to two years. F i n a l l y , the symbolic interactionist approach suffers, as does most sociology, f r o m a lack of replication a n d c u m u l a t i o n . To be sure, findings from i n n u m e r a b l e studies can be i n t e r p r e t e d in M e a d i a n terms. H o w e v e r , such analyses do n o : represent any k i n d of systematic testing of the framework. E v e n a n u m b e r of the studies recently brought together by Rose, as b e i n g w i t h i n the symbolic interactionist framework, are neither clearly d r a w n f r o m the basic propositions in the f o r m u l a t i o n nor built u p o n earlier research. This p a p e r instead reports a partial replication of t w o p r i o r studies specifically testing hypotheses based on Mead's notion of the social origins of the self. It also extends the range cf these earlier studies by offering data in s u p p o n of d e r i v e d hypotheses w h i c h focus on future orie n t e d self-conceptions.
5 6

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND As m a n y observers have noted, the d y n a m i : nature of the symbolic interactionist framework has m a d e its e m p i r i c a l test exceedingly difficult This has b e e n particularly true w i t h respect t: a central thesis of the scheme, the v i e w that thr self is social in that it is d e r i v e d f r o m responses of other persons. Nevertheless, some aspects c: this particular idea have b e e n investigated, firsr

Robert

K.

Merton,

Social

Theory

and

Social

Structure,

rev.

a n d e n l a r g e d ( G l e n c o e , 111.: F r e e P r e s s , 1957), p . 2 3 9 . S e e also M a n f o r d K u h n , " M a j o r T r e n d s i n Symbolic Interaction T h e o r y in the Past Twenty-Five Years," Sociological Quarterly, 5:618 4 ( W i n t e r , 1964).
a

F o r e x a m p l e , Strauss o n c e w r o t e i n a p r e f a c e t o a c o m p i l a t i o n "The truth of the matter seems to be that

of Mead's work:

M e a d offers u s n o t s o m u c h s p e c i f i c h y p o t h e s e s , o r e v e n a t h e o r y , as a rather abstract f r a m e of r e f e r e n c e . " See (ed.), The Social to Psychology the of George Herbert A n s e l m Strauss Mead (Chicago: book also,

U n i v . o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1956), p . x v i . T h e s e r e m a r k s a r e n o t in the preface entitled George 1964 s e c o n d e d i t i o n o f t h e s a m e Mead on Social Psychology. See Herbert L e e Reeder, George Donohue, and Arturo Biblarz, "Conceptions of of Self and with Others," Immediate American Others," Journal of Sociolog. :1 6 6 : 1 5 3 - 5 9 (Sept., 1960); C a r l C o u c h , " S e l f - A t t i t u d e a n d Degr~e-r Agreement Samuel American Journal Reactions Sociology, 6 3 : 4 9 1 - 9 6 ( M a r . , 1958); M a r t i n M a e h n , J o s e f M e n s i n i and and Situational ApNafager, " C o n c e p t of Self a n d the and Referent Others," O t h e r s , " Sociometry, 2 5 : 3 5 3 - 5 7 ( D e c , 1962); a n d J o h n J . S h e : wood, "Self Identity Sociometry, 28:6c81 ( M a r . , 1965).
5

G u y E . Swanson, " M e a d a n d F r e u d : T h e i r R e l e v a n c e for Social P s y c h o l o g y , " Sociometry, 24: 3 1 9 - 3 9 ( D e c , 1961). A s o m e w h a t contrasting viewpoint i s presented b y John K i n c h , " A F o r m a l ized Theory of the Self Concept," American Journal o f Sociology, 6 8 : 4 8 1 - 8 6 ( J a n . ,
3

1963). Interactional

Sheldon

Stryker, in

"The

proaches"

Harold

Christensen

(ed.),

Handbook

o f Marriage

and the Family ( C h i c a g o : R a n d M c N a l l y , 1964), p . by Wilbert Moore in his Man, Time and Society

162. N e g l e c t (New York:

o f t h e t i m e d i m e n s i o n i n s o c i o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s has b e e n s t r e s s e d W i l e y , 1963).
4

At most the the

time Self

p e r i o d is a matter of weeks. F o r examp.f Concept," (Nov., Journal of Abnormal and Soc-.-

a six w e e k p e r i o d w a s u s e d b y M e l v i n M a n i s i n " S o c i a l Inter* I tion a n d Psychology,

6

F o r example, S. Frank Miyamoto and Sanford Dornbusch, "A American Journal of Sociology, 617:399-403 (Mar., 1956);

51:362-70 Rose

1955). Behavior and Social Procesx-

T e s t of the S y m b o l i c Interactionist H y p o t h e s i s of S e l f - C o n c e p tion,"

Arnold

(ed.),

Human

( B o s t o n : H o u g h t o n M i f f l i n , 1962).

Quarantelli, Cooper f a y M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h a n d later b y Reeder, Donohue, a n d B i b l a r z . M i y a m o t o and D o r n b u s c h , using ten somevhat miscellaneous semigroupings f r o m fraterniSes, sororities, and college sociology classes, ask -heir respondents to give self-ratings a n d also to rate every other group m e m b e r on four specified personal characteristics. T h e y conclude that their i n d i n g s f r o m 195 individuals not only show the possibility of e m p i r i c a l l y studying self-conception ' i t h i n the symbolic interactionist f r a m e w o r k , but also support three general propositions. First, the response of others is related to self-conceptions; second, the subject's p e r c e p t i o n of that response 15 m o r e closely related to self-conceptions than jjhe actual response of others; a n d t h i r d , an i n d i vidual's self-conception is m o r e closely related to his estimate of the g e n e r a l i z e d attitude t o w a r d h i m than to the p e r c e i v e d responses of m e m b e r s of a particular group.
7

213 their research on a different a n d m u c h larger p o p ulation. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , we try to d e v e l o p three lines of n e w research suggested to us by these previous studies. First, a better indicator of self-conception is desirable. M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h use self-ratings of intelligence, self-confidence, physical attractiveness and likableness as an index of selfconception. B u t no e v i d e n c e is presented that any or all of these features w e r e salient in the selfconception of their respondents. W h i l e there is no reason to question that some of these characteristics w e r e c e n t r a l to parts of the self-definition of some of their subjects, their centrality to the selves of a l l the participants in the study is neither subjectively n o r objectively argued or d o c u m e n t e d . Similarly, R e e d e r a n d his co-workers do not particularly justify their use of r a n k i n g along the dimensions of best leader a n d best w o r k e r as a v a l i d measure of the individual's self-conception. T h e y s i m p l y say that " i t is assumed that the self-rank is an expression of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s selfc o n c e p t i o n . " A n index o f self-conception for w h i c h a case for saliency in the life of the i n d i v i d ual can b e m a d e w o u l d b e m o r e i n k e e p i n g w i t h Mead's v i e w .
9 10

Reeder, D o n o h u e , a n d B i b l a r z are particularly interested in the relation b e t w e e n self-con: e p t i o n a n d b o t h the actual a n d the p e r c e i v e d ratings by members of g i v e n groups. T h e y report on n i n e w o r k crews (totaling 54 enlisted men), at a small m i l i t a r y base. E a c h respondent was asked to rank every m e m b e r of his c r e w (including himself) in terms of t w o criteria: best w o r k e r and best leader. F u r t h e r , each respondent was asked to indicate h o w he thought most of the m e n i n his group w o u l d rank h i m o n these dimensions. Reeder a n d his co-workers find, in general, that die responses of others have " a n influence in shaping one's self-definition" a n d that his self-definirion is " d e r i v e d chiefly f r o m the p e r c e p t i o n of die generalized o t h e r . " In essence, the findings parallel those r e p o r t e d by M i y a m o t o and Dornbusch.
8

B o t h sets of authors judge their research as supporting key notions i m p l i c i t i n the M e a d i a n conception of the social nature of the self. Y e t both acknowledge the l i m i t e d conclusions of their studies, w h i l e also i n d i c a t i n g that future research should go b e y o n d d u p l i c a t i n g their o w n w o r k . H e n c e our w o r k is not m e r e l y a r e p l i c a t i o n of

Second, neither of the previous studies takes into account the t i m e d i m e n s i o n in the emergence and maintenance of the self. T h e questions p u t to respondents are confined to the instant of questioning. If the M e a d i a n formulationthat the i n d i v i d u a l learns to define a n d to i d e n t i f y h i m self as he begins to p e r c e i v e (and later to share) the responses of others t o w a r d h i m i s correct, this neglect of t i m e is a serious omission in the research design. T h e r e are two ways to r e m e d y this oversight. O n e way is t h r o u g h a l o n g i t u d i n a l study w h i c h catches the individual's self-conceptions at t w o or m o r e points in time. A n o t h e r way is by h a v i n g the respondent project his self-conceptions at future times. T h e latter p r o c e d u r e has the advantage of b e i n g less likely to be confused by the attempts of individuals to reconcile what

Studies that h a v e u s e d the " W h o A m I?" i n s t r u m e n t w o u l d

cast s o m e d o u b t a b o u t t h e s a l i e n c y o f a l l f o u r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n the self-conceptions o f m a n y persons. See M a n f o r d K u h n , ' Miyamoto Biblarz, op. and cit. Dornbusch, op. or.; Reeder, Donohue, and "Self-Attitudes Sociological
10

by

Age,

Sex,

and (Jan.,

Professional 1960). 154.

Training,"

Quarterly,

1:40-55

' Ibid., p. 158.

R e e d e r , D o n o h u e , a n d B i b l a r z , op. cit, p .

214 they w i s h they w e r e w i t h w h a t they p e r c e i v e themselves to be. T h i r d , b o t h previous studies struggle to operationalize the somewhat abstract concept of the " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r " and seem, i n part, t o deviate f r o m what its originator h a d i n m i n d . M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h take the position that M e a d treats the " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r " as the i n d i v i d u a l ' s con c e p t i o n of the o r g a n i z e d social process of w h i c h he is a part, a n d that he sees it " c o m p o s e d of numerous specialized r o l e s . " T h e y note, h o w ever, that persons often enter into social relation ships w h e r e i n there is a response to a "general i z e d o t h e r , " but w h e r e the organization of roles is obscure or m i n i m a l . In fact, the M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h study relies u p o n social groupings " w h o s e m e m b e r s w e r e , at best, loosely j o i n e d by friendships a n d h a d no definite o r g a n i z e d group activity w i t h i n w h i c h t o i d e n t i f y their respective r o l e s . " A c c o r d i n g l y , their i n d e x of the general i z e d other is based on the respondent's p e r c e p t i o n of the typical attitudes of others t o w a r d h i m . O p e r a t i o n a l l y , they ask: " H o w i n t e l l i g e n t . . . d o most people t h i n k y o u a r e ? "
11 12 13

P A R T

Self

other, they use the participant's "estimated objec tive group r a t i n g . " In t u r n , this rating is based on the respondent's i n d i c a t i o n of the r a n k w h i c h he thinks most of his w o r k group assign h i m w i t h respect to t w o criterialeadership and w o r k m a n ship. U n l i k e the p r o c e d u r e used by M i y a m o t o and D o r n b u s c h , this technique has the m e r i t of con c e i v i n g the g e n e r a l i z e d other in terms of the atti tudes of an o r g a n i z e d a n d on-going g r o u p . R e e d e r a n d his co-authors, h o w e v e r , assume "that the i n d i v i d u a l , i n m a k i n g a n estimate o f how the group ranks h i m , is t a k i n g the role of the g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r . " In this research the group is treated as the equivalent of the s m a l l number o f i m m e d i a t e l y present individuals i n any given w o r k c r e w . This is not inconsistent w i t h one of M e a d ' s t w o somewhat different uses of the term " o r g a n i z a t i o n . " In the research of R e e d e r a n d his colleagues, the w o r k crews seem analogous tc Mead's famous example of the b a l l t e a m , where the t e a m is seen as the generalized other "insofar as it entersas an o r g a n i z e d process or social ac t i v i t y i n t o the experience of any one of the indi v i d u a l m e m b e r s . " M e a d ' s other use of the tenx " o r g a n i z a t i o n , " h o w e v e r , appears to place greater stress on the actor's o r g a n i z i n g of attitudes to wards himself t h a n on the possibility that these attitudes m a y be d e r i v e d f r o m an o r g a n i z e d activ ity. E v e n w h i l e discussing games, it is noted: "We get t h e n an organization of attitudes of those in v o l v e d in the same p r o c e s s . " C l e a r l y the process can e x t e n d b e y o n d any group. In fact, most Mead's discussion of the g e n e r a l i z e d other is in terms of the socialization of the c h i l d . In this con text, the child's organization of the attitudes others is of greater i m p o r t a n c e t h a n the organ i z e d nature of the activity w h e r e i n he draws self-conception.
16 1 7 18

In other words, M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h use the t e r m " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r " to refer to the n o n particular other taken into account by the i n d i v i d u a l i n situations w h i c h are l a c k i n g organization for h i m . This seems a partial, albeit conscious, d e p a r t u r e f r o m the M e a d i a n f o r m u l a t i o n . M e a d , in a frequently cited passage, speaks of the gener a l i z e d other as the process w h e r e b y the person "takes the attitudes of the o r g a n i z e d social group to w h i c h he b e l o n g s . " As suggested in his ac count on the game stage in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the self, the internalization of the g e n e r a l i z e d other requires the i n d i v i d u a l to define a n d regu late his conduct w i t h r e g a r d for the expectations of a complexly organized m u l t i p l i c i t y of other actors.
1 4 15

JAeeder a n d his co-workers capture part of this f o r m u l a t i o n . As an index of the g e n e r a l i z e d

11

Miyamoto and Dornbusch, Ibid.

op.

cit, p .

400.

i a

At still another point, M e a d observes that th! i n d i v i d u a l enters into two kinds of social relationi. "Some of t h e m are concrete social classes or surgroups. . . . T h e others are abstract social class? o r subgroups . . . i n terms o f w h i c h their individ ual m e m b e r s are related to one another only more or less i n d i r e c t l y a n d w h i c h only m o r e or less ind.-

1 3

Ibid., p . 4 1 0 . T h e r e i s a n i n t e r e s t i n g a s s u m p t i o n h e r e t h a t Ibid., p . 4 0 0 .
5 1 6

the " t y p i c a l " is equivalent to the " m o s t . "

1 4

R e e d e r , D o n o h u e , a n d B i b l a r z , op. cit, p . Morris, op. cit, p. 154.

154.

C h a r l e s W . M o r r i s (ed.), Mind, Self and Society ( C h i c a g o : U n i

17

v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1934), p . 155.

1 8

Ibid., p . 154.

Quarantelli, Cooper reedy f u n c t i o n as social units. . . . " A research effort c e n t e r e d on the latter f o r m u l a t i o n seems called for. T h e g e n e r a l i z e d other w o u l d be v i e w e d as the individual's p e r c e p t i o n of the re sponses of others as he sees t h e m w i t h r e g a r d to some salient aspect of himself. T h e p e r c e i v i n g i n d i v i d u a l a n d the others whose responses he or ganizes n e e d not be m e m b e r s of any particular group. T h e y do, h o w e v e r , stand i n some role rela tionship to h i m (e.g., as f r i e n d or teacher). Analysis along these lines emphasizes process rather t h a n structure. Such an analysis proceeds f r o m the ac tor's p o i n t of v i e w a n d not f r o m the standpoint of an outside observer.
1 9

215 A m o n g m a n y other questions, w e asked each student at the start of every academic year to complete the f o l l o w i n g professional l a b e l i n g scale. T h e l i n e i n the d i a g r a m represents a n arbi trary distance b e t w e e n a dental student a n d a dentist. DENTAL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 STUDENT 1 1 I I DENTIST U s i n g ONE of the w r i t e i n below: WHOLE numbers on this l i n e

G i v e n these considerations, this study seeks to develop a m o r e salient index of self-conception, to incorporate the t e m p o r a l aspect of the process of self-identification a n d to operationalize the generalized other so as to reflect M e a d ' s c o n c e r n w i t h the self-as-process.

A . W h e r e w o u l d y o u place yourself a t this time? B. W h i c h p o i n t on the l i n e is closest to w h e r e y o u t h i n k y o u w i l l b e one year f r o m n o w ? C . I n general, w h e r e d o y o u t h i n k y o u w i l l b e about two years f r o m n o w , i.e., w h e n y o u start t o w o r k i n the clinic? D . W h e r e d o y o u t h i n k that the d e n t a l faculty n o w sees you? E . W h e r e d o y o u t h i n k that the faculty w i l l ex pect y o u to be one year f r o m now? F . W h e r e d o y o u t h i n k your parents n o w see your G . (IF M A R R I E D ) W h e r e d o y o u think your w i f e n o w sees you? H . W h e r e d o y o u t h i n k that your non-dental school friends a n d acquaintances n o w see you? I. W h e r e do y o u t h i n k that your classmates n o w see you? J. W h e r e do y o u t h i n k that the advanced d e n t a l students n o w see you? We use the respondent's self-placement on the scale (Item A) as a salient index of self-concept i o n . T h e student's v e r y presence in a professional school is taken as a firm indication that a d e n t a l career is of considerable importance to h i m . E n t e r i n g d e n t a l school is not only a v o l u n t a r y act on the part of the student but it also follows u p o n a series of necessarily rather self-conscious d e c i sions. E v e n w i t h o u t assuming total or i d e n t i c a l c o m m i t m e n t to the profession, the e m b a r k a t i o n u p o n a l o n g a n d expensive educational career ar gues for the i m p o r t a n c e of the u n d e r t a k i n g to the participant. In this respect the d e n t a l student differs f r o m the t y p i c a l social club m e m b e r , the

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES We d r a w data for this study f r o m a m u c h broader investigation of factors i n f l u e n c i n g the professionalization of d e n t a l students. In the larger effort on career fines, we are f o l l o w i n g two successive waves of students panel-like f r o m the time of entrance into d e n t a l school u n t i l gradua tion. (Two other waves are u n d e r study for shorter periods.) This report is based on a small segment of the extensive questionnaire data o b t a i n e d f r o m all students at the v e r y b e g i n n i n g of each aca d e m i c year. T h e larger study is still in progress; but data are available f r o m 600 f r e s h m e n (waves 1, 2, 3, 4) a n d f r o m 450 sophomores (waves 1, 2, 3 ) . No doubt our findings w o u l d be strength e n e d if all the l o n g i t u d i n a l data (ultimately to cover the entire four years' experience of 300 dental students) w e r e available. H o w e v e r , the particular hypotheses to be e x a m i n e d are testable just as readily w i t h the i n f o r m a t i o n already in h a n d ; that is, w i t h data c o v e r i n g one year's actual experience, as w e l l as a two-year projection of self-ratings.
20

" Ibid., p. 157.

Because of dropouts and failures to answer relevant questions we have data for only 594 freshmen and 432 sophomores.
30

P A R T III T A B L E 23.1, Means of actual and projected ratings by self and others

Self

student in a sociology class, or the w o r k e r on a m i l i t a r y crew. In a d d i t i o n to r e c o r d i n g his c u r r e n t location (or actual self-conception) on the professional la b e l i n g scale, each respondent projected the locations he expected to occupy in one or two years' t i m e (Items B-C). We discuss these as projected self-ratings or self-conceptions. F u r t h e r , each respondent n o t e d his p e r c e p t i o n of c u r r e n t a n d proj e c t e d placements by a variety of others: (Items D-J) these w e treat as perceived actual or projectedratings by others. A parallel questionnaire c o m p l e t e d by 86 percent of the dental school's faculty (N-93), provides data on the actual faculty ratings of the students at three points in their academic careers: these data we refer to

as the actual r a t i n g s c u r r e n t or projected b others. Table 23.1 summarizes the data conside r e d in this study. T h e means of b o t h current a n d projected ratings at the onset of t w o academt: years are r e c o r d e d for three analytical categoriei self-ratings, p e r c e i v e d ratings by others, a n d actual ratings by f a c u l t y . We distinguish b e t w e e n particular others anc the g e n e r a l i z e d other. Particular others are specific social alters we assume to be saliently relatec to our respondents in their role as dental students Six categories of particular others are used: fatuity, classmates, upperclassmen, n o n d e n t a l schc: friends, parents, a n d in appropriate cases, wives.
21
2 1

W e d o n o t h a v e c o m p a r a b l e faculty ratings o f sophomcr=_

quarantelli, Cooper T A B L E 23.1. (cont.)

217

Potentially at least, these categories appear to exhaust the l i k e l y sources of major interaction w i t h i n w h i c h the process of self-identification could b e developed. F u r t h e r m o r e , a n d i m p o r t a n t to our case, we take the p e r c e i v e d responses of these others t o w a r d a salient aspect of the student self-conceptionhis position on the professional labeling scale. W e operationally define the g e n e r a l i z e d other as the aggregate of the student's perceptions of the ratings a w a r d e d to h i m by particular others. This definition of the g e n e r a l i z e d other differs f r o m the concept as it appears in the w o r k o f M i y a m o t o and D o r n b u s c h a n d i n the paper by Reeder, D o n o h u e , a n d B i b l a r z . As n o t e d above, the earlier studies exhibit a partial adher-

ence to the M e a d i a n formulation. T h e present operationalization, however, has a somewhat different focus. We assume the aggregated data to relate to the respondent's organization of ratings by others of a salient part of himself. We t h i n k this is consistent w i t h one r e a d i n g of the M e a d i a n formulation, a n d i n combination w i t h the t i m e element discussed before, may better capture the processual aspect supposedly i n v o l v e d in the emergence of salient self-conceptions. We c l a i m no more. F o l l o w i n g the analytical lead p r o v i d e d i n the two previous studies, we classify (where a p p r o p r i ate) the average ratings of our respondents i n t o " h i g h " a n d " l o w . " I n the case o f the f r e s h m e n we treat statistical means of one as " l o w , " all oth-

218 ers as " h i g h . " F o r sophomores, we classify means of three a n d over as " h i g h , " a l l b e l o w that figure as " l o w . "
2 2

P A R T III

Self

a dentist. (The poor underestimation by freshmen of h o w far along faculty m e m b e r s actually see t h e m is of course the k i n d of finding that w o u l d be anticipated by this k i n d of reasoning.) Hypothesis 2. The mean of the perceived responses by others is higher for those person; with high self-rating than for those with low self rating. T h i s hypothesis is also directly d r a w n from M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h . T h e reasoning here is that if self-conceptions are p r i m a r i l y deter m i n e d by the p e r c e i v e d responses of other; t o w a r d the person, those seeing themselves ac c o r d e d higher r a n k i n g should reflect a h i g h e r selfevaluation than those visualizing themselves less h i g h l y r e g a r d e d . In our examination of this hypothesis, we n c : only choose to focus on the p e r c e i v e d rather than the actual responses of others, b u t attempt t: strengthen the testing of the hypothesis by takinr. into account the range of others that c o u l d likely be salient to o u r students. Thus, we examine h o b o t h f r e s h m e n a n d sophomores p e r c e i v e the rat i n g a c c o r d e d t h e m b y faculty m e m b e r s , upperclassmen, classmates, nondental-school friend;, parents, wives. W i t h o u t p r e t e n d i n g that a l l possi ble others w h o m i g h t be i m p o r t a n t for every sin gle respondent is i n c l u d e d , it seems reasonable to argue that we encompass in our categories mcsr all w h o w o u l d be salientin the sense of beinr an " o t h e r " t o the mass of our students.
2 3

HYPOTHESES A N D FINDINGS Hypothesis 1. Self-conception is closer to the mean perceived response of others to the actor than to the mean actual response of others. D r a w n d i r e c t l y f r o m M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h , this hy pothesis rests on the assumption that the per c e i v e d behavior of others towards the actor has a m o r e direct influence than their actual behav ior. F o r purposes of testing this n o t i o n , we m a t c h the m e a n self-rating of f r e s h m e n against their p e r c e p t i o n of faculty rankings, as w e l l as against actual faculty rating of students. O u r data fully support the hypothesis. F r e s h m e n p e r c e i v e themselves at a m e a n of 1.33 on the scale; they t h i n k the faculty sees t h e m at 1.21; the faculty actually ranks t h e m at 1.71. Thus, there is only a m e a n difference of .12 (in the direc t i o n of a l o w e r estimate) b e t w e e n p e r c e i v e d rat i n g by faculty a n d self-rating in contrast to a m e a n difference of .38 b e t w e e n self-rating a n d actual r a t i n g by faculty members. A l t h o u g h partly dictated by its easier accessi b i l i t y , the choice of data f r o m faculty m e m b e r s to test this hypothesis is also g u i d e d by a substan t i v e consideration. In one respect, it seems rea sonable to expect that f r e s h m e n m i g h t be m o r e sensitive to faculty judgments of their relative position on the p a t h to b e c o m i n g a dentist, than they are to the j u d g m e n t of most others. T h e insti tutional structure is such that, by v i r t u e of the assignment of grades, only faculty members de cide w h e t h e r a freshman c a n m o v e t h r o u g h the professional school. This is a p o i n t sometimes ex p l i c i t l y m a d e b y students i n personal interviews. O t h e r persons m a y influence w h a t a student thinks of himself, but only faculty m e m b e r s , par ticularly in the crucial first year, decide if a fresh m a n c a n e v e n r e m a i n o n the p a t h t o becorning
a 3

As i n d i c a t e d in T a b l e 23.1 this hypothesis _= supported for each category of others (i.e., faculr etc.). H i g h self-raters p e r c e i v e all others as accord i n g t h e m a h i g h e r r a n k than do l o w self-rater; This is equally true for freshmen a n d sophomore: w i t h n o m e a n difference i n the t w e l v e compari sons made l o w e r than .80. If is of interest tha: l o w self-raters as sophomores perceive t h e m s e h r : r a n k e d h i g h e r by o n l y one other category (ncndental-school friends), than do h i g h self-raters se^ others r a n k i n g t h e m as freshmen. Whereas the previous hypotheses w e r e ccnfined to a particular p o i n t in time, the f o l l o w l n : set of hypotheses deals w i t h projections throuzr time.

T h e r a t i o n a l e f o r t r e a t i n g s o p h o m o r e s i n this f a s h i o n i s that

it gives us an approximate m e d i a n distribution of the respon d e n t s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y o u r d a t a , a s w a s also t r u e i n t h e case o f the data obtained by Miyamoto a n d D o r n b u s c h , a n d by Reeder a n d h i s c o - w o r k e r s , p r e c l u d e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f tests o f s i g n i f i c a n c e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , a s t h e y d i d , w e p r i m a r i l y s e a r c h f o r gross differences in e x a m i n i n g the validity of the hypotheses.

" M o s t o f t h e h y p o t h e s e s s a i d t o b e set f o r t h b y M i y a m o t o irjt D o r n b u s c h a r e m o r e d i r e c t l y s t a t e d also b y R e e d e r a n d his : workers.

Quarantelli, Cooper Hypothesis 3. Anticipated self-rating is closer to the mean perceived future response of others to the actor than to the mean actual future response of others. Of course this is an extension of Hypothesis 1 through t i m e . It assumes that even i n future projections, the p e r c e i v e d rather than the actual behavior of others is the m o r e important influence as far as self-conception is concerned. We again use faculty m e m b e r s as the example of the other in the test of the hypothesis. We contrast the self-ratings w h i c h the freshmen project into their sophomore year, first, w i t h their perceptions of the faculty's projected ratings, a n d seco n d , w i t h the faculty's actual anticipation. T h e m e a n anticipated self-rating is 3.18. T h e p e r c e p t i o n of the projected rating by the faculty is 3.13; the actual projected r a t i n g is 2.94. Thus, the m e a n differences b e t w e e n self a n d p e r c e i v e d projected faculty rating is .05, but it is .24 bet w e e n self and actual projected faculty rating. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported, though perhaps not as strongly as Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 4. The mean of the perceived future responses by others is higher for those persons with high present self-rating than for those with present low self-rating. This hypothesis makes the same basic assumption as is made in Hypothesis 2. It differs only in that it involves a projection into the future. T h e hypothesis assumes that those presently according themselves a h i g h self-rating c o m p a r e d w i t h those w h o visuali z e themselves as lower on the scale, w i l l project a higher future self-ranking by others. We test this hypothesis for b o t h freshmen a n d sophomores. That is, we examine the freshmen's perceptions of the faculty's projected placement of t h e m as sophomores and the sophomore's perceptions of the faculty's expectations of t h e m as juniors. F o r this hypothesis, unfortunately, we do not have p e r c e i v e d projections by the students of all possible salient others as we do have for Hypothesis 2. We find that the h i g h self-raters project a sophomore m e a n score by others of 4.36 whereas the l o w self-raters see others as only r a t i n g t h e m 2.91. This is a m e a n difference of 1.45 in the direct i o n of supporting the hypothesis. T h e same relationship holds for sophomore p e r c e i v e d projec-

219
tions by the faculty into the j u n i o r year. T h e h i g h self-raters project a j u n i o r m e a n score by the facu l t y of 5.80; the l o w self-raters see the professional staff as rating t h e m but 4.47. T h e m e a n difference here is 1.33. Thus, b o t h sets of data support H y pothesis 4. Hypothesis 5. The mean anticipated selfrating is higher for those whose present self-rating is high than for those whose present self-rating is low. This hypothesis derives f r o m some of our previous findings. We observe that the anticipated self-conception of our respondents appears to be related to their p e r c e p t i o n of the future response of others towards t h e m . L i k e w i s e , we note that the p e r c e i v e d future responses of others seems to be l i n k e d to w h e t h e r or not the respondent presently rates himself h i g h or l o w . It follows t h e n that there ought to be some relationship bet w e e n anticipated self-rating a n d present h i g h or l o w self-rating. In the light of Hypothesis 4, the proposition is stated as above. In testing this hypothesis, we examine the freshman respondents' projected self-ratings as sophomores a n d as juniors. Present h i g h selfraters project a m e a n rank of 4.90 as sophomores, whereas l o w self-raters foresee a m e a n r a n k of 2.87: the m e a n difference of 2.03 is substantial. T h e m e a n difference for projected j u n i o r r a n k i n g is also h i g h , b e i n g 1.40. T h e present h i g h selfraters give themselves an anticipated m e a n rank of 6.86, but the l o w self-raters only 5.46. T h e general hypothesis is thus supported. Similarly, the sophomores w h o are l o w self-raters project a selfrating of 4.26 as juniors, w h i l e their h i g h selfrating peers anticipate a rating of 6.14. Thus, all comparisons a l l o w e d by our data point to a relationship b e t w e e n present self-conception a n d f u ture o r i e n t e d self-expectations. Hypothesis 6. Those persons who have high self-rating have a higher mean perception of the generalized other than those with low self-rating. A l t h o u g h our f o r m u l a t i o n of the g e n e r a l i z e d other is somewhat different f r o m theirs, this hypothesis is also directly d r a w n f r o m M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h . Basically, however, the hypothesis tests the n o t i o n that self-conception is d e r i v e d f r o m m u l t i p l e perspectives, and that persons seei n g themselves accorded generally h i g h e r rank-

220 i n g should reflect a h i g h e r self-evaluation t h a n those v i s u a l i z i n g themselves as in general less h i g h l y regarded. We test this hypothesis by c o m p a r i n g s u m m a tions of the respondents' perceptions of ratings assigned to t h e m by others. In this instance, a l l other categories are u t i l i z e d in the analysis of the effects of the g e n e r a l i z e d other. B o t h freshman a n d sophomore data are e x a m i n e d . T h e results are clear-cut. T h e h i g h freshman self-raters have an aggregate m e a n score of 3.08 w h i l e the l o w self-raters have a score of 1.61. This m e a n difference of 1.47 compares w i t h a m e a n difference of 1.18 a m o n g the sophomores. In that g r o u p , the h i g h self-raters have an aggregate m e a n score of 4.01 whereas the l o w self-raters have a m e a n score of 2.83. T h u s b o t h freshman a n d sophomore h i g h self-raters p e r c e i v e t h e m selves as b e i n g r a n k e d h i g h e r f r o m m u l t i p l e perspectives than do l o w self-raters. We thus f i n d support for Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 7. Self-conception corresponds more closely to the mean perception of the generalized other than to the mean of the perceived response of particular others. A g a i n this is a hypothesis d e r i v e d f r o m M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h . Its rests on the assumption that self-conception as a w h o l e emerges f r o m i n t e r a c t i o n in d i v e r g e n t relationships. Thus, self-conception should m o r e closely reflect the way most potentially m e a n i n g f u l others are p e r c e i v e d as v i e w i n g the subject t h a n the p e r c e p t i o n of the responses of any particular collection of individuals to the actor. In testing this hypothesis, we treat the student's classmates as particular others. T h e rationale for this is that classmates represent those persons w i t h w h o m the freshman in the d e n t a l school has the most social contact, at least in the quantitative sense. (Also, in using this group we have the nearest equivalent in our study to the fraternity, sorority, a n d school class groupings M i y a m o t o a n d D o r n b u s c h used, and the w o r k teams Reeder a n d his co-workers e m p l o y e d i n their study.) F o r p u r poses of this analysis, the category of classmates is left out of the aggregated data for the generali z e d other. T h e data do nor support the hypothesis. B o t h for f r e s h m e n and sophomores the m e a n per-

P A R T III

Self

c e i v e d response of particular others (i.e., classmates) are closer to the actual self-conception cf students t h a n the m e a n p e r c e p t i o n of the generali z e d other. A m o n g f r e s h m e n the m e a n difference b e t w e e n self a n d particular others is o n l y .06, but it is .61 b e t w e e n self a n d g e n e r a l i z e d other A m o n g sophomores the m e a n difference between the self a n d g e n e r a l i z e d other is .84, whereas i: is only .20 b e t w e e n self a n d particular other. Thus, Hypothesis 7 is not supported. It is significant that b o t h p r i o r studies of w h i c h ours is a p a r t i a l r e p l i c a t i o n also encount e r e d some u n e x p e c t e d f i n d i n g s i n testing variants of this hypothesis. M i y a m o t o and D o r n b u s c h find that o n l y for the characteristic of self-confidence was there " m a r k e d deviations f r o m the exp e c t e d d i r e c t i o n . " T h a t is, the findings w e r e not m u c h better t h a n chance w h e n ratings on selfconfidence w e r e used to test the hypothesis that self-conceptions should correspond m o r e closely w i t h the g e n e r a l i z e d other than w i t h the mean of the p e r c e i v e d response of others (i.e., h o w each i n d i v i d u a l p r e d i c t e d e v e r y other m e m b e r o f h i i g r o u p i n g r a n k e d h i m as to self-confidence). As distinguished f r o m intelligence, physical attractiveness, a n d likeableness, self-confidence is the one characteristic w h i c h most closely approximates the index of self we use in our study w h e r e our subjects r a n k themselves on a dental student to dentist scale. H e n c e , the absence of a positive finding along these lines in b o t h studies m a y be m o r e t h a n a coincidence.
2 4

As part of their demonstration of the w e i g h : to be g i v e n to the p e r c e i v e d response of the gene r a l i z e d other i n accounting for self-conception, R e e d e r a n d his co-researchers c o m p a r e subject self-rating w i t h the rankings actually awarded t h e m by w o r k - r e l a t e d others. T h e y find a difference b e t w e e n h i g h a n d l o w self-raters. T h e y attribute this difference to the possibility that high self-raters have m o r e reference groups t h a n low self-raters, a n d thus are less responsive to the actual attitudes of particular others towards the self. (In their study this w o u l d be the actual attitudes of the other m e m b e r s of the w o r k crews.) F o l l o w i n g the l e a d of Reeder a n d his coworkers, we also examine our data to see if there
1 4

Miyamoto and Dornbusch,

op.

cit, p . 4 0 3 .

Quarantelli, Cooper is a similar h i g h - l o w self-rating difference. We p r o ceed as in testing Hypothesis 7, except that we divide o u r subjects into h i g h a n d l o w self-raters. T h e results are not consistent. F o r the fresh m e n we find the same difference f o u n d by R e e d e r and co-workers. T h a t is, the m e a n self-conception of the l o w self-raters corresponds m o r e closely to the p e r c e i v e d m e a n a t t r i b u t e d to particular others t h a n to the g e n e r a l i z e d other. T h e h i g h self-raters show a reverse pattern. H o w e v e r , the pattern does not h o l d for the sophomores, w h e r e the m e a n self-conception of the h i g h self-raters corresponds m o r e closely to the p e r c e i v e d m e a n attributed to particular others than to their per ceptions of ratings by the g e n e r a l i z e d other. T h e low self-raters a m o n g the sophomore students ex hibit the same pattern. These findings are not a direct test of the observation by R e e d e r a n d his co-workers (i.e., that there is considerable corre spondence b e t w e e n self-conception a n d the ac tual response of others only for persons w h o rate themselves l o w a n d not for those whose self-rating high). T h e y , h o w e v e r , do raise questions about ts generality. It is of interest that b o t h p r i o r studies a n d :urs have encountered u n h y p o t h e s i z e d results * h e n e x a m i n i n g r o u g h l y the same g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n . At least it is suggestive of the possi bility that the findings are not idiosyncratic to particular pieces of research or specific analytical procedures. It c o u l d indicate that something more f u n d a m e n t a l m a y b e i n v o l v e d . H o w e v e r ,
25

221

CONCLUSION T h e results of our study reinforce the suggestion of the earlier researchers that it is possible to test and also to find some e m p i r i c a l support for those aspects of the symbolic interactionist f r a m e w o r k examined. T h e posited relationships are clearly supported for six of the seven major hypotheses, e v e n w h e n i n our o p i n i o n a m o r e rigorous i n dex of self-conception is i n t r o d u c e d , w h e n the neglected t i m e d i m e n s i o n is i n c o r p o r a t e d into some of the data, a n d w h e n a somewhat different operational measure of the g e n e r a l i z e d other is utilized. As d i d Miyamoto and Dornbusch, we find that it is the p e r c e i v e d rather t h a n the actual re sponse of others that is the m o r e i m p o r t a n t in the f o r m a t i o n of self-conception. F u r t h e r m o r e , this holds true not only for self-conception at a g i v e n p o i n t in t i m e , b u t also for anticipated self-rating. It is the same w h e t h e r a general c o m parison is m a d e or w h e t h e r subjects are d i v i d e d into h i g h a n d l o w self-raters. F u r t h e r m o r e , the data indicate that not o n l y is self-definition chiefly d e r i v e d f r o m the p e r c e i v e d rather t h a n the actual response of others, but that it is also a re flection of the p e r c e i v e d response of the gen e r a l i z e d other. T h e latter statement, h o w e v e r , has to be qualified insofar as the k e y hypothesis c o n c e r n i n g it is not f u l l y supported. Since there have b e e n difficulties w i t h variants of this hy pothesis in p r i o r studies, the n e e d for f u t u r e re search to take this as a p r i m e p o i n t of attack is obvious. T h e possibility of attaining e m p i r i c a l results should be of some c o m f o r t to m a n y w h o , w h i l e advocating the symbolic interactionist position, have b e e n b o t h e r e d w i t h the suspicion that there was no w a y of either c o n f i r m i n g or d i s p r o v i n g the basic notions i n v o l v e d . We hope our research, c r u d e a n d gross as it is, w i l l encourage others to wards far m o r e systematic a n d m o r e rigorous e m p i r i c a l testing not o n l y of the ideas of M e a d exam i n e d i n this paper, but o f m a n y others. A f t e r a l l , w h e t h e r in the course of the d e v e l o p m e n t of soci ology, M e a d is to be eventually r a n k e d w i t h the alchemists or as a L a v o i s i e r is yet to be de cided.

w o u l d probably be most f r u i t f u l in future re search to attempt to get at the relationship be tween the generalized other a n d particular others in still some different way. F o r instance, it m a y be that the findings in a l l three studies are c o n rounded by a research failure to separate the cate gory of significant other f r o m particular others. If this is what accounts for the findings, the basic hypothesis m a y only r e q u i r e m o d i f i c a t i o n a n d may not n e e d a major alteration.

Vaughan, in a test of three hypotheses which are similar in some respects to the hypothesis in question above, also failed : find anticipated results. See T e d B. Vaughan, " G r o u p Deter minants of Self-Conception: An Empirical Assessment of Sym bolic Interaction Theory," (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Vniversity of Texas, 1964), pp. 102-6.

E d w i n D. Driver

24

Self-Conceptions in India and the United States: A Cross-Cultural Validation of the Twenty Statement Test

T h e T w e n t y Statement Test (TST) was first r e p o r t e d by K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d (1954) as a v a l i d instrument for i d e n t i f y i n g a n d measuring self-attitudes as they are defined in the self theory o f . H . Cooley, G . H . M e a d , H . S . Sullivan, T . N e w c o m b , a n d others. Since 1954 the T S T has b e e n used in studies of the general adult popula tion, businessmen, students, the professions, a n d other populations in order to l e a r n h o w self-con ceptions vary a n d h o w they are related to changes in age, the reference set, a n d other social varia bles. A l t h o u g h this instrument a n d its associated theory have b e e n assessed in several ways (see W y l i e , 1961; K u h n , 1964; K e m p e r , 1966), it has not b e e n assessed in terms of its cross-cultural adequacy in e l i c i t i n g self-conceptions. Yet, this evaluation is quite i m p o r t a n t b o t h because self theory is not v i e w e d as h a v i n g subcultural or c u l tural boundaries a n d because the users of the T S T i m p l i c i t l y suggest its rather general applicability.

PURPOSE A N D M E T H O D W e are therefore interested i n d e t e r m i n i n g the v a l i d i t y of the T S T w h e n used in India, a

E d w i n D . D r i v e r , "Self-Coneeptions i n India a n d the U n i t e d States: A C r o s s - C u l t u r a l V a l i d a t i o n o f t h e T w e n t y S t a t e m e n t s Test," The Sociological Quarterly, v o l . 10, n o . 3 ( S u m m e r 1969), p p . 341-354. R e p r i n t e d b y permission.

society whose c u l t u r a l system differs appreciably f r o m that of the U n i t e d States. T h e data for thii study w e r e collected in 1966 as a part of a larger project, i n v o l v i n g interviews w i t h a stratified sam ple of 440 adults residing in a large city, smaL t o w n , a n d three small a n d contiguous villages in South India. E x c e p t for the use of i n t e r v i e w : rather than questionnaires, we have replicated as closely as possible the procedures of K u h n and M c P a r t l a n d . In order to prevent the influence c: answers to d i r e c t questions in the i n t e r v i e w on T S T responses, the T S T material was sought a: the b e g i n n i n g of the i n t e r v i e w . T h e T S T re sponses w e r e " c o n t e n t a n a l y z e d " by the B e t a sys t e m devised b y K u h n (n.d.), w h i c h requires place m e n t of each statement of a respondent in one of the five categories: "(1) social groups a n d classi fications (the statuses a n d roles of the subject (2) ideological beliefs (his explanation of the cos mos, life, societyand his part in them); (3) inter ests (approach a n d avoidance w i t h respect to so cial objectsthe familiar adience-abience of the psychologist); (4) ambitions (status a n d role inten tions; anticipations a n d expectations respecting positions in the social system); (5) self-evaluations ('a k i n d of p r i d e or mortification over the way the subject imagines he appears to others w h : matter to h i m ' ) . " T h e second part of the "confer.: analysis" i n v o l v e d assigning the statements to ei ther the consensual group or the sub-consensuad

Driver group. T h e difference b e t w e e n t h e m is that the former type is a reference w h i c h unquestionably and p o i n t e d l y places the i n d i v i d u a l in a social system, whereas the latter type requires interpretation by the speaker before its relevance to a social system, if any, can be ascertained. In establishing the t w o groups, we have s i m p l y m e r g e d together statements of self-evaluation, ideological beliefs, ambitions, and interests to f o r m the subconsensual reference. B o t h the five-fold and the twofold systems of classifying the responses w e r e necessary in order to show the u n i q u e features of the I n d i a protocols and to examine the cross-cultural validity of the claims made for the T S T . W h a t t h e n are the claims made for the T S T and h o w do they relate to the theoretical position of the symbolic-interactionist school, as represented p r i m a r i l y b y K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d ? T h e claims (propositions) for the T S T , or what it in effect elicits, are explicitly stated in the conclusions d r a w n b y K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d (1954:7576) f r o m their study of university students: 1) T h e consensual (more d i r e c t l y socially anchored) component of the self-conception is the m o r e salient component. Stated differently, consensually supported self-attitudes are at the top of the hierarchy of self-attitudes. 2) Persons vary over a rather w i d e range in the relative v o l u m e of consensual a n d subconsensual components in their self-conceptions . . . 3) T h e variation indicated in 1) a n d 2) can be established and measured by the e m p i r i c a l techniques of attitude researchspecifically, the G u t t m a n scaling technique. This . . . furthers the p r e s u m p t i o n that the locus variable is a unitary one . . ,* 4) L o c u s scores vary w i t h differential social anchorage in (a) large, conventional . . . a n d influential groups; (b) small, weak, or . . . a m bivalently v i e w e d . . . groups; or (c) no groups at all . . .
2

223 5) Religious affiliation references are significantly m o r e salient a m o n g the self-attitudes of m e m bers of "differentistic" religious groups than a m o n g m e m b e r s of " m a j o r i t y " or conventional religious groups. 6) C o r r o b o r a t i v e l y , the religious group as a reference group appears far m o r e frequently . . . a m o n g members of "differentistic" religious groups. These conclusions seem t h e n to c o r r e s p o n d w i t h some key ideas of self theory: " m a n is an object to h i m s e l f a n object whose m e a n i n g to himself and others c a n only be d e r i v e d f r o m the system of social objects in w h i c h he is e n m e s h e d " ( K u h n , 1960:53), the most important objects b e i n g his roles a n d statuses in the social system (Conclusions 1, 2, a n d 3); individuals in a society v a r y in the ways in w h i c h "they have cast their lot w i t h i n the range of possible reference g r o u p s " ( K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d , 1954:72), a n d i n what they i n t e r i o r i z e f r o m t h e m (Conclusions 2, 4, 5, a n d 6); a n d the "self," defined as a set of attitudes (plans for action) w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l holds tow a r d himself, is o r g a n i z e d (Conclusions 1 and 3) ( K u h n and M c P a r t l a n d , 1954:69).
3

FINDINGS In order to c o n f i r m the cross-cultural validity of the T S T our I n d i a data must, then, support the above m e n t i o n e d propositions.

affiliation, a s o u r i n i t i a l v a l i d a t i o n test s h o w s , m e m b e r s o f t h e 'differentistic' religious groups h a v i n g significantly h i g h e r locus scores t h a n d o m e m b e r s o f t h e ' c o n v e n t i o n a l ' religious g r o u p s " ( K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d , 1954:75). W h a t w e h a v e g i v e n a s t h e f o u r t h c o n c l u s i o n i s the m e r g i n g o f parts o f t w o quotes f r o m K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d (1954:73,75) w h i c h w e feel c o m m u n i c a t e the larger propositions w h i c h the writers seemingly v i e w e d as central to the validation of the T S T , namely: the type of religious a f f i l i a t i o n m a y b e r e g a r d e d a s a n i n d e x o f m a j o r i t y g r o u p affiliat i o n ; persons h a v i n g m a j o r i t y g r o u p affiliation are b e l i e v e d t o

K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d p o i n t out that a r e s p o n d e n t tends to

h a v e greater social a n c h o r a g e i n g e n e r a l t h a n persons h a v i n g m i n o r i t y g r o u p affiliation; a n d i t follows, t h e r e f o r e , that p e r s o n s w h o a r e k n o w n t o h a v e m a j o r i t y r e l i g i o u s affiliation w i l l h a v e high locus scores if the TST is a valid measure of social anchorage.
3

exhaust his consensual references b e f o r e g i v i n g a n y s u b c o n s e n sual o n e s a n d i t i s t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e t o a s s i g n a s c o r e (the l o c u s variable) w h i c h indicates b o t h the n u m b e r o f c o n s e n s u a l references m a d e b y the respondent a n d their positions a m o n g the t w e n t y s t a t e m e n t s . If, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e last c o n s e n s u a l s t a t e m e n t i s h i s s e v e n t h s t a t e m e n t , t h e n i t i s v e r y p r o b a b l e (9/10 cases) t h a t t h e p r e c e d i n g six s t a t e m e n t s a r e also c o n s e n s u a l o n e s ( K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d , 1954:70-71).
a

K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d (1954:68) n o t e t h a t t h e " s e l f " h a s b e e n

c a l l e d an i m a g e , a c o n c e p t i o n , a c o n c e p t , a f e e l i n g , a s e l f l o o k i n g at oneself, a n d so o n . T h e y b e l i e v e that their c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e ' s e l f ' a s a set o f a t t i t u d e s i s m o s t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h M e a d ' s v i e w a n d f u r t h e r that i t has c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l advantages. F o r o t h e r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s o f t h e self, s e e L o w e (1961).

T h i s is the one conclusion w h i c h we h a v e drastically recon-

s t r u c t e d . I t o r i g i n a l l y r e a d : " L o c u s scores v a r y w i t h r e l i g i o u s

4 General Pattern of Responses. The total re sponses per respondent range from one for two persons to twentythe maximumfor 121 per sons, with the median number being 12.3. (The median is 17.0 in the Kuhn-McPartland study.) Responses are mainly subconsensual ones, espe cially of the self-evaluative kind (see Table 24.1), and these patterns are vivid contrasts to those observed for United States respondents. Among the Indian respondents, there are, however, wide variations in the ratios of consensual to subconsen sual responses, and this fmding confirms proposi tion two. Detailed analysis of the consensual responses suggests that the T S T has successfully elicited in

P A R T III

Self

formation on each of the five general kinds of statuses which, according to Ralph Linton (1954), are found in every society. The percentage of re spondents mentioning each of these statuses is as follows: 1) 18.7 and 12.5 for age and sex categor ies, respectively; 2) 54.7 for family groups (kin ship); 3) 12.5 and 8.4 for primary group and sec ondary group identities, respectively (voluntary association); 4) 27.9 for specialized occupational groups; 5) 27.8 and 7.5 for social class and caste identities, respectively (the ordering of individu als or prestige systems). The Pattern of Consensual Responses. Consensual statements constitute 16.9 percent

T A B L E 24.1. Percentage distribution of 440 respondents in India to the Twenty Statement Test, according to number of responses and Kuhn's five inclusive categories Consensual Statements Number of Responses 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Total Mean S.D. S.E. Social Groups and Categories 25.23 25.23 14.55 12.05 8.18 6.14 2.95 2.50 1.14 1.14 0.45 0.23 0.23 SelfEvaluative Statements 1.59 2.50 5.91 6.36 12.27 9.77 10.23 8.41 6.36 6.14 5.00 4.32 4.09 3.64 3.41 2.95 1.82 1.82 2.05 0.45 0.91 100.0 7.65 4.53 0.22

Subconsensua ' Statements Ideological Beliefs 56.36 33.64 8.18 1.36 0.23

Ambitions 83.86 12.50 2.73 0.45

Interests 39.55 18.41 10.91 7.95 4.55 5.68 4.55 2.95 2.05 1.82 1.14 0.23 0.23

Total 0.45 0.91 1.14 5.23 6.36 5.91 7.73 5.91 4.55 7.05 3.64 3.64 1.59 3.18 2.50 2.95 4.55 2.73 2.50 27.50 100.0 12.72 5.60 0.29

0.23 0.23 0.23

100.0 2.19 2.26 0.11

100.0 0.57 0.81 0.04

100.0 0.23 0.72 0.03

100.0 2.08 2.61 0.12

Driver of the total responses b u t 29.9 percent of the first responses, 22.3 percent of the second responses, a n d 20.9 percent of the t h i r d responses. Consensual references are, then, m o r e salient than are the subconsensual ones. B u t , the strength of this p a t t e r n for our I n d i a respondents is m u c h less than it is for K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d ' s respondents a n d as a result the I n d i a data do not show the same scalability (see T a b l e 24.2). These findings c o n f i r m the first proposition (the salience of consensual references), but are too w e a k statistically to support the t h i r d proposition (the scalability of consensual-subconsensual statements). T h e data also c o n f i r m the f o u r t h proposition: persons h a v i n g majority, i.e., d o m i n a n t , g r o u p affiliation have relatively h i g h locus scores. U s i n g education as an index to majority g r o u p affiliat i o n , w e f i n d that the h i g h l y educatedthe d o m i nant g r o u p h a v e appreciably h i g h e r scores than those h a v i n g less education a n d those w i t h o u t any education (see T a b l e 24.3). Religious Affiliation and Identification. " O t h e r R e l i g i o n s " C h r i s t i a n s (85.0 percent of total), M u s l i m s , Sikhs, Jains, a n d Parsisare v i e w e d by us as the m i n o r i t y or " d i f ferentistic" religious groups i n India. C o m p a r e d w i t h H i n d u i s m , they stress congregate worship and other forms of g r o u p i n g a n d they do not provide comprehensive philosophies a n d codes of l i v i n g . A s m i g h t b e expected, a n d i n support o f propositions five a n d six, m e m b e r s of the " O t h e r R e l i g i o n s " m a k e m a n y m o r e references to their religion (see T a b l e 24.4) a n d these references are more salient the difference b e t w e e n their
4 5 6

225 m e a n score of 1.500 a n d that of H i n d u s , 0.618, h a v i n g a p r o b a b i l i t y of less than .01.

DISCUSSION A N D I N T E R P R E T A T I O N T h e I n d i a data, then, c o n f i r m a l l the propositions stated b y K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d i n v a l i d a t i n g the T S T except the one relating to the scalability of responses. O n e w a y of explaining the non-scalab i l i t y of the I n d i a responses is to point to the small n u m b e r of consensual references (an average of 2.2 in contrast to the average of 10.0 in K u h n and M c P a r t l a n d ' s study) a n d to argue that scalability is, to a degree, a f u n c t i o n of the n u m b e r of consensual references. We w i l l not go i n t o the merits of this argument because the non-scalability of the I n d i a responses seems m o r e strongly to suggest r e f o r m u l a t i o n of one part of K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d ' s statement of self theory than an adequate reason for rejecting the cross-cultural a p p l i cability of the T S T . W h a t we do w i s h to consider is w h e t h e r the s m a l l n u m b e r and lesser salience of consensual statements in the I n d i a data c a n be explained either by 1) our difference w i t h K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d i n methodology; o r 2 ) the fact that consensual references are not, really, p r i m a r y aspects of self-conceptions in I n d i a to the same degree that they are in the U n i t e d States. Methodological Issues. I n the area of m e t h odology w e differ f r o m K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d i n using interviews rather than questionnaires a n d in h a v i n g to " c o n t e n t a n a l y z e " materials obtained in a b i l i n g u a l context. If our findings are associated w i t h s i m p l y the i n t e r v i e w i n g process, t h e n this w o u l d m e a n that the T S T m e r e l y elicits the attitudes w h i c h the person holds t o w a r d h i m s e l f in relation to the test administrator. We are i n c l i n e d to reject this k i n d of "situationality" as an explanation o f T S T f i n d i n g s o n the f o l l o w i n g grounds: the self-conceptions of persons in the U n i t e d States are quite similar w h e n p r e s e n t e d i n autobiographical m a t e r i a l and i n i n t e r v i e w o r questionnaire responses to the T S T ; a n d the oral a n d w r i t t e n responses of persons in I n d i a to the T S T are quite similar. T h e second methodological issue, b i l i n g u a l i s m , is a v e r y c o m p l e x matter and its possible i m -

There are high intercorrelations among education, occupation, and caste in India (See Driver, 1962; Gist, 1954).
4

Hinduism does not provide the individual with a standard form of worship or what to worship. One has a choice among 1) the Absolute (which is the highest form), 2) a personal god, 3) incarnations like Rama, Krishna, Buddha, 4) deities and sages, 5) petty forces and spirits. Further, "while fixed intellectual beliefs mark off one religion from another, Hinduism sets itself no such limits. Intellect is subordinated to intuition, dogma to experience, outer expression to inner realization. . . . Religion is a specific attitude of the self, itself, and no other, though it is mixed up generally with intellectual views, aesthetic forms, and moral valuations" (Radhakrishnan, 1927:15, 32). (See also Wach, 1944.)
5

Following K u h n and McPartland (1954:74), the score on the 'salience of religious reference' is simply the mean of the ranks of "religious reference (if any was made) on the page of twenty statements, mention of religious affiliation in first place being scored 20, mention in last place scoring 1, and omission of reference to religious affiliation arbitrarily scored zero."
6

226

P A R T III T A B L E 24.2. The scale of locus, showing scale-types, frequency, total responses* in each scale type and the coefficient of reproducibility for each scale type, United States and India United States** Scale Type 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Frequency 19 5 1 4 1 6 8 8 4 13 7 9 9 7 10 11 8 12 2 4 3 151 Total Responses 380 100 20 80 20 120 160 160 80 260 140 180 180 140 200 220 160 240 40 80 60 3020 Errors 41 13 1 7 3 24 9 19 10 21 15 19 15 9 15 24 11 24 5 8 0 293 C. R. .892 .870 .950 .913 .850 .800 .937 .875 .875 .915 .893 .895 .912 .936 .925 .891 .932 .900 .875 .900 1.000 .903

Self

pact on the T S T content can be considered here i n o n l y the most general m a n n e r . A s w e m e n t i o n e d earlier, our interviews w e r e r e c o r d e d i n E n g l i s h but the i n t e r v i e w e r e m p l o y e d E n g l i s h , T a m i l , T e l e g u , or another language c o m m o n to h i m a n d the i n t e r v i e w e e i n g i v i n g the T S T i n struction a n d clarifying statements. Thus, the oral communications m i g h t be in the mother-tongue of b o t h the i n t e r v i e w e r a n d the i n t e r v i e w e e , or neither, or of one but not the other. Bias, w h i c h in this instance means the use of terms w h i c h unintentionally connote other than the desired m e a n i n g may, therefore arise w i t h the interv i e w e e or interviewer: the f o r m e r as he translates instructions or self-conceptions f r o m the c o m m o n language into his mother-tongue, and vice versa; a n d the latter as he translates the inter vie wee's statements into his o w n mother-tongue a n d then into E n g l i s h . Bias w o u l d most often arise w h e r e

there is not equivalence b e t w e e n E n g l i s h and the other language(s) in vocabulary, i d i o m , or g r a m m a r . This c o u l d give rise to t w o kinds of distortion i n m e a n i n g . O n the one h a n d , conceptions of a consensual k i n d may appear as subconsensual statements, or vice versa; on the other
7 8
7

E x a m p l e s of the lack of equivalence b e t w e e n the E n g l i s h lan-

guage a n d the languages of India are the E n g l i s h words: uncle, a u n t , a n d c o u s i n . A s o n e w r i t e r p u t s it, t h e y " a r e t h e m o s t confusing to a H i n d u . O n e can never know what relation is meant"
8

(Karve,

1965:114).

K u h n certainly gave attention to the Sapir-Whorf-Cassirer 'lan-

g a u g e a n d c u l t u r e o r i e n t a t i o n ' b u t , i n o u r o p i n i o n , d i d n o t stress s t r o n g l y t h e s u b t l e t i e s o f l a n g u a g e w i t h i n a c u l t u r e a n d across cultures. I n a n a l y z i n g o u r d a t a w e h a v e b e c o m e a c u t e l y a w a r e that m a n y terms connote a mixture of sentiment, a n d obligation o r e x p e c t a t i o n . I t i s o u r b e l i e f t h a t this i s o n e o f t h e m o r e f r u i t f u l areas f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n b y p e r s o n s i n v o l v e d i n r e c o r d i n g a n d a n a l y z i n g T S T material. I t m a y v e r y w e l l b e that terms w h i c h are n o w classified as c o n s e n s u a l are really i n t e n d e d by the s p e a k e r t o c o n v e y p r i m a r i l y his s e n t i m e n t r a t h e r t h a n o b l i g a t i o n

227 T A B L F 24.2. (cont.) India Scale Type 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Frequency 16 16 10 14 14 8 14 11 14 10 18 20 16 17 14 15 21 21 27 30 114 440 Total Responses 320 320 200 280 280 160 280 220 280 200 360 400 320 340 280 300 420 420 540 600 2280 8800 Errors 246 217 129 184 167 80 130 103 112 77 118 129 81 73 61 44 42 25 17 0 0 2035 C. R. .23 .48 .36 .34 .40 .50 .54 .53 .60 .62 .68 .68 .75 .79 .79 .85 .90 .94 .97 1.00 1.00 .77

* We followed the p r o c e d u r e of K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d in c o u n t i n g the failure to r e s p o n d to a blank as a r e s p o n s e to t h e s u b c o n s e n s u a l t y p e . * * F r o m T a b l e 1 o f K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d (1954: 71).

h a n d , a g i v e n type of consensual or subconsensual conceptualization may appear as a different type w h e n stated verbally o r i n w r i t i n g . T h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h the latter p r o b l e m c o u l d arise m a y b e seen by reference to the terms in T a m i l for father. T h e sets of terms i n c l u d e : 1) tantai, tantay, entai,
toward another person. T h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h the sentiment c o m p o n e n t is expressed in choosing a t e r m of reference f r o m a g r o u p of terms w h i c h are usually considered to be s y n o n y m o u s i s w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d b y S c h n e i d e r a n d H o m a n s (1955). A n o t h e r w r i t e r ( G h u r y e , 1955:93) o b s e r v e s t h a t t h e s e n t i m e n t s - s y s t e m i s c l o s e l y i n t e g r a t e d w i t h e v e n affinal r e l a t i v e s i n s o m e k i n s h i p t e r m i n o l o g i e s . B u t , K a r v e (1965:242) states t h a t t h e d i c h o t o m y o f status a n d s e n t i m e n t s f o u n d i n c e r t a i n N o r t h I n d i a t e r m s i s a b s e n t i n t h e S o u t h . L a s t l y , K u h n (1960:55), a f t e r n o t i n g t h a t fifteen to t h i r t y p e r c e n t o f t h e r e s p o n s e s o f his groups were e x p l i c i t l y o f a s e l f - e v a l u a t i o n n a t u r e , states t h a t " m a n y o f t h e o t h e r r e s p o n s e s e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r r i n g t o status h a v e a n i m p l i c i t self-evaluation d i m e n s i o n . "

muntai; 2) ai, aiyan; 3) appa, appan, appu, takappan; 4) annan, anna; 5) attan, accan; 6) amman. " E x c e p t tantai a l l the words . . . seem to be used for any elderly or p o w e r f u l or respected person a n d only gradually seem to have a c q u i r e d their fairly [clear] definition. E v e n n o w the connotation is not as definite as, e.g., the w o r d pitam S a n s k r i t " (Karve, 1965:228, 230). F u r t h e r , the t e r m anna is also used to denote elder brother (Karve, 1965:245). C o n f r o n t e d w i t h the complex m e a n i n g of anna, for example, and the lack of an equivalent t e r m in the other languages of India, i n c l u d i n g E n g l i s h , the translator must decide what aspect of its m e a n i n g he wishes to convey. A correct decision in South India seems to d e p e n d , as it does i n N o r t h India, o n k n o w l e d g e o f usage b y localities and social strata ( G u m p e r z , 1958).

228

P A R T III

Self

T h e extent to w h i c h our findings are biased because of bilingualism cannot be precisely measu r e d . B u t , t w o procedures c o n v i n c e us that the bias does not nearly a p p r o a c h the h i g h l e v e l w h i c h is possible in such m a t e r i a l . First, we sometimes h a d a second i n t e r v i e w e r , w h o differed in mother-tongue f r o m the first one, r e - i n t e r v i e w various persons; a n d secondly, we have c o m p a r e d the T S T content w i t h some " k n o w n characterist i c s " (such as caste a n d m e m b e r s h i p in v o l u n t a r y associations) of the i n t e r v i e w e e . N e i t h e r proced u r e , a n d we do not c o n t e n d that they alone are adequate for the purpose at h a n d , y i e l d e d any great discrepancy b e t w e e n the t w o measurements b e i n g c o m p a r e d . Substantive Issues. W e m a y n o w t u r n to the second question w h i c h we asked at the b e g i n n i n g of this section: is the l o w f r e q u e n c y a n d salience

of consensual statements in our data related tc the fact that groups are not, really, p r i m a r y aspects of self-conceptions in I n d i a to the same degree that they are in the U n i t e d States? T h e writings o f M o r r i s , H s u , M c C l e l l a n d , a n d Coehlc suggest an affirmative answer to this question. T h e r e are sharp differences a m o n g students i n the U n i t e d States, C h i n a , a n d I n d i a i n their responses to the " W a y s of L i v i n g " d o c u m e n t dev i s e d by Charles M o r r i s . F a c t o r analysis of the t h i r t e e n " w a y s " yields the same five factors fcr a l l three societies, a n d this suggests that there m a y b e a c o m m o n " v a l u e space" for t h e m . B u t the societies differ in their rankings on the factors w i t h the U n i t e d States h a v i n g first place on factc: e , self-indulgence, a n d w i t h I n d i a h a v i n g f i r n place on factor a, social restraint a n d self-contrcl W h e n asked to give their comments on the adequacy of the d o c u m e n t , the f e w U n i t e d States

Driver students w h o c o m p l i e d showed a dissatisfaction w i t h all the " w a y s , " a rejection of all definite codes for l i v i n g , and said that the " w a y s " n e e d e d to stress m o r e "orientation to self" a n d personal possessions. T h e most general c r i t i c i s m of the docum e n t was that it d i d not stress social co-operation enough. T h e comments of the India students w e r e twice as numerous, d i d not reject any of the " w a y s " and formulated some n e w " w a y s . " T h e y , in particular, emphasized "service to one's fellow m e n " a n d the n e e d o f c o m b i n i n g the " c u l t i v a t i o n of the i n n e r life w i t h o u t w a r d and socially responsible a c t i o n " (Morris, 1956:36, 44, 46, 47, 53-54). Somewhat similar contrasts b e t w e e n persons in the two countries are p r o v i d e d by H s u (1963) and M c C l e l l a n d (1967). H s u compares t h e m i n terms of responses to Cards 1 a n d 12 BG of the Thematic A p p e r c e p t i o n Test a n d finds that the images of U n i t e d States students m o r e often show involvement with other persons (especially peers), insensitivity to the physical e n v i r o n m e n t , a n d an absence of mutability. T h e I n d i a students m o r e often p i c t u r e d themselves as being alone in general and e v e n w h e n the specific response (to C a r d 12BG) is Enjoyment. " I n a d d i t i o n . . . there is a k i n d of E n j o y m e n t response w h i c h is h i g h l y i m personal that the Indians give but the Chinese and A m e r c a n s do not g i v e " (Hsu, 1963:263-311, especially Tables A - 2 , A - 3 , A-6). U s i n g different measuring procedures, M c C l e l l a n d (1967:198) likewise finds m o r e U n i t e d States boys than India boys e m p h a s i z i n g group activity and egocentric v i r t u e M o r r i s ' self-indulgence factor. It is important to note, finally, that the i n t e r c u l t u r a l differences f o u n d by M o r r i s , H s u , and M c C l e l l a n d are based on their studies of populations w h i c h are v e r y similar in age, sex, education, and social class. Possible reasons for the consensual-subconsensual variation b e t w e e n the U n i t e d States a n d India may be adduced f r o m the writings of H s u a n d M c C l e l l a n d . H s u provides evidence of the universality of sociability, security, a n d status as p r i m a r y social needs a n d says that the type of cultural system affects the degree to w h i c h the family (the basic organization everywhere) or other organizations fulfill these needs. F u r t h e r , cultural systems may be differentiated by the degree to w h i c h they stress one of the social needs

229 over the others. A n unusual emphasis o n sociability and its corollary, m e m b e r s h i p in m a n y v o l u n tary associations, or " c l u b s , " exists in the U n i t e d States. In India a n d C h i n a , the respective c o m b i nations are caste a n d status, a n d k i n s h i p a n d security.
9

M c C l e l l a n d attributes the tendency of persons to affiliate themselves w i t h m a n y organizations, a n d quite often w i t h each one on a shortt e r m basis, w i t h the strong other-directed orientation w h i c h is n o w present in the U n i t e d States. V o l u n t a r y associations, " p a r t i c u l a r l y those in school, may serve the i m p o r t a n t social f u n c t i o n of t r a i n i n g people to pay attention to the wishes a n d opinions of others." In t u r n , the d e v e l o p m e n t of other-directedness, or the tendency of ego to be m o t i v a t e d to interact on the basis of pressures p r i m a r i l y f r o m peers, probably heightens the n e e d for sociability a n d the stress on self-developm e n t values ( M c C l e l l a n d , 1967:201). In traditional, or less other-directed, societies such as India, there is "less d e p e n d e n c e on the o p i n i o n of others, therefore less n e e d for group activities to m a k e people sensitive to such opinions, a n d correspondingly greater stress on such sociocentric v i r tues as kindness, loyalty, a n d obligations to others as defined a n d p r e s c r i b e d in traditional social i n stitutions" ( M c C l e l l a n d , 1967:201). T h e strength o f tradition i n I n d i a i s e v i d e n t f r o m the w a y i n w h i c h m a n y people e v e n today t u r n to the Ramayana, Mahabharata, a n d other classics for cultural models, norms, a n d v a l u e s .
10

T h e p r e c e d i n g evidence lends considerable support to our belief that the l o w frequency a n d salience of consensual references in the T S T protocols of respondents in I n d i a m a y actually reflect a cultural system w h i c h does not stress sociability

See H s u (1963), especially Chapter 10, "Culture pattern and human grouping." T h e contrasts have led Hsu to characterize the societies in Durkheim's terms of 'kinship solidarity' (premodern China), 'hierarchic solidarity' (India), and 'contractual solidarity' (United States). Other researchers confirm the U.S. emphasis on peer group, or nonhierarchical, relations (See, Dahlberg and Stone, 1966:589-602; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, etal, 1961:144,147). Sanskritization, or the process whereby groups low in status or groups just being assimilated into Hinduism from a tribal background adopt the ideology, rituals and customs of high castes, strengthens the traditional orientation. Sanskritization is strong today and raises questions about the actual impact of Westernization (see Srinivas, 1966).
3 10

230 as strongly as the U n i t e d States system. If culture is such a k e y variable, t h e n one m i g h t reasonably expect that l o n g exposure of a person to a n e w c u l t u r a l system w o u l d m o d i f y his self-conceptions. T h e studies of the Useems (1955: esp. C h a p ter 2, " C h a n g e in the character a n d outlook of t h e i n d i v i d u a l " ) , H s u , a n d C o e h l o (see also L a m b e r t a n d Bressler, 1956:80-89) suggest that such changes, or acculturation, do, in fact, occur after l o n g a n d intensive exposure to a different culture. H s u observes h o w the T S T responses of persons i n I n d i a w h o have e x p e r i e n c e d U n i t e d States c u l ture t h r o u g h the educational system or the IndoA m e r i c a n Society resemble those of persons in the U n i t e d States. T h e study by C o e h l o (1958) of students f r o m I n d i a presents some dramatic shifts in the d o m i n a n c e of c e r t a i n themes a n d reference groups as the exposure to U n i t e d States c u l t u r e increases. F r o m i n i t i a l contactone w e e k or lesswith the host c u l t u r e to last c o n t a c t four years or m o r e t h e r e is a d e c l i n e in themes w h i c h are d i p l o m a t i c - p o l i t i c a l , educational-cult u r a l , a n d economic-industrial, a n d a n increase i n the themes w h i c h are social-personal a n d r e l i gious-philosophical-theoretical. Persons w h o m e n t i o n e d reference groups i n the U n i t e d States i n i tially spoke of either the "average middle-class A m e r i c a n " (67 percent) or the U n i v e r s i t y G r o u p (27 percent), but at the e n d of their stay they spoke of friends (13 percent), l o c a l i z e d groups (27 percent), a n d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l g r o u p (27 percent). At the e n d , the U n i v e r s i t y G r o u p is as strong a reference as it was in the b e g i n n i n g but the undifferentiated "middle-class A m e r i c a n " disappears altogether (Coehlo, 1958:8, 21, 31, 35, 68-70). T h e shifts in the o r g a n i z a t i o n of content do not occur smoothly a n d the student customari l y experiences what E r i k E r i k s o n calls a n " i d e n tity crisis" t o w a r d the e n d of phase two, i.e., f r o m three to n i n e months in the U n i t e d States. F o r the I n d i a n students who continue their sojourn h e r e the crisis is resolved t h r o u g h a greater assim i l a t i o n of U n i t e d States culture, w i t h the result that in phase four they show the same " p r i v a t i s t i c o u t l o o k " (Coehlo, 1958:103) as do other U n i t e d States students ( D a h l b e r g a n d Stone, 1966:601). As C o e h l o (1958:88) remarks, " t h e major characteristic of Phase 4 is that the I n d i a n student devotes an intense, if not exclusive, attention to his

P A R T III

Self

social a n d personal relations w i t h those a r o u n d him."

CONCLUSIONS O u r data for respondents in India indicate, therefore, that the T S T is a v a l i d i n s t r u m e n t for eliciti n g self-conceptions i n different c u l t u r a l settings. We w e r e able to c o n f i r m five of the six propositions w h i c h K u h n a n d M c P a r t l a n d offered a s evid e n c e of the v a l i d i t y of the test for U n i t e d States respondents. T h e one proposition w h i c h is not s u p p o r t e d is not a c r u c i a l one insofar as v a l i d a t i o n is c o n c e r n e d , but its non-verification suggests that self theory, as presented by K u h n , needs to be m o d i f i e d so as to v i e w consensual (social system) references as c e n t r a l in only some c u l t u r a l systems rather t h a n universally. T h i s modification in t h e o r y f o r m u l a t i o n is suggested n o t o n l y by our data but also by an early study of K u h n ' s in w h i c h a n u n e x p e c t e d a n d glaringly h i g h percentage of A m i s h , in contrast to M e n n o n i t e s a n d " G e n t i l e s , " m e n t i o n e d abstract m o r a l a n d r e l i gious attributes rather t h a n p r i m a r y g r o u p or secondary group models w h e n asked to define ideal persons as w e l l as persons w h o m they w o u l d least l i k e to be ( K u h n , 1954:57-59, 63). In a d d i t i o n to assessing the cross-cultural val i d i t y of the T S T , o u r data have also p e r m i t t e d us to m a k e comparisons of self-conceptions in Ind i a a n d the U n i t e d States. These comparisons b r i n g out m a n y similarities w i t h respect to anchorage i n b o t h consensual a n d subconsensual types of objects a n d also the v i v i d contrast bet w e e n the t w o societies w i t h respect to emphasis o n self-evaluation a n d i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h groups.

REFERENCES Coehlo, George V. 1958. Changing Images of America. Glencoe: The Free Press. Dahlberg, Francis M. and Philip J. Stone. 1966. "Crosscultural contrasts in interpersonal structure." Pp. 589-602 in Philip J. Stone et al, The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

Driver Driver, E. D. 1962. "Caste and occupational structure in central India." Social Forces 41:26-31. Ghurye, Govind S. 1955. Family and K i n in Indo-Aryan Culture. University of Bombay Publications in Soci ology Series No. 4. Bombay: Oxford University Press. Gist, N. P. 1954. "Caste differentials in south India." American Sociological Review 19:126-137. Gumperz, J. J. 1958. "Dialect differences and social stratification in a north Indian village." American Anthropologist 60:668-682. Hsu, Francis L. K. 1963. Clan, Caste and Club. Prince ton: D. Van Nostrand Company. Karve, Irawate. 1965. Kinship Organization in India. Second Revised Edition. Bombay: Asia Publishing House. Kemper, T. D. 1966. "Self-conceptions and the expecta tion of significant others." The Sociological Quar terly 7:323-343. Kluckhohn, Florence Rockwood; Fred L. Strodtbeck, et al. 1961. Variations in Value Orientations. Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company. Kuhn, Manford H. 1964. "Major trends in symbolic in teraction theory in the past twenty-five years." The Sociological Quarterly 5:61-84. . 1960. "Self attitudes by age, sex, and professional training." The Sociological Quarterly 1:53. . 1954. "Factors in personality: socio-cultural de terminants as seen through the Amish." Pp. 4365 in Francis L. K. Hsu (ed.), Aspects of Culture and Personality. New York: Abelard-Schuman. . (n.d.) "Procedure for Content Analysis of the TST in Five Inclusive Categories." Mimeographed paper. Ames: Iowa State University.

231 Kuhn, M. H. and T. S. McPartland. 1954. " A n empirical investigation on self-attitudes." American Sociologi cal Review 19:68-77. Lambert, Richard D. and Marvin Bressler. 1956. Indian Students on an American Campus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Linton, Ralph. 1954. "What we know and what we don't know about society, culture and the individual." Pp. 187-210 in Francis L. K. Hsu (ed.), Aspects of Culture and Personality. New York: Abelard-Schu man. Lowe, . M. 1961. "The self-concept: fact or artifact?" Psychological Bulletin 58:325-336. McClelland, David C. 1967. The Achieving Society. New York: The Free Press. Morris, Charles W. 1956. Varieties of Human Value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli. 1927. The Hindu View of Life. London: George Allen and Unwin. Schneider, D. M. and G. C. Homans. 1955. "Kinship terminology and the American kinship system." American Anthropologist 57:1194-1208. Srinivas, Mysore N. 1966. Social Change in Modern In dia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Cali fornia Press. Useem, John and Ruth H i l l Useem. 1955. The West ern-Educated Man in India. New York: Dryden Press. Wach, Joachim. 1944. The Sociology of Religion. C h i cago: University of Chicago Press. Wylie, Ruth C. 1961. The Self Concept: A Critical Sur vey of Pertinent Research Literature. Lincoln: U n i versity of Nebraska Press.

]
Charles W. Tucker

25

Some Methodological Problems of Kuhn's Self Theory

M a n f o r d K u h n i n his r e v i e w o f twenty-five years of symbolic interaction theory noted that the " o r a l t r a d i t i o n " had sustained the theory d u r i n g the years p r e c e d i n g the "age of i n q u i r y . " A n d , as K u h n has accurately noted, this "age of i n q u i r y " has u t i l i z e d different subtheories and there was little consensus or " f o r m a l i z a t i o n " w h i c h p r e c e d e d the e m p i r i c a l studies. This is true for K u h n ' s o w n theory as w e l l as for the other subtheories of the orientation.
1 2

It is the purpose of this paper to correct this c o n d i t i o n for K u h n ' s theory. In d o i n g this I have brought together, in a systematic manner, the ideas, definitions, assumptions, and propositions of the w o r k of K u h n and his students. W i t h this foundation, I discuss several methodological problems of the theory w h i c h have not b e e n p r e v i ously investigated. It is h o p e d that this effort w i l l contribute to the "age of i n q u i r y " in Symbolic Interaction Theory.
3

This part includes the assumptions, propositions and terms of the theory. Initially, it is i m portant to recognize that K u h n distinguished bet w e e n the cultural-institutional v i e w and the social-psychological v i e w of h u m a n activity. He considered the latter v i e w , w h i c h he h e l d , to be a c o m p l e m e n t to the former, rather than a substitute for it. T h e social-psychological v i e w attempts to account for h u m a n behavior in situations not completely structured, w h i l e the other v i e w assumes structured or r i g i d l y normative situations. In order to p r e d i c t a person's behavior in a variety of situations it is necessary, according to K u h n , that we measure " a n individual's o w n hierarchy of identities at a t i m e of r a p i d social change." So, assuming this distinction regarding views of h u m a n behavior a n d the purpose of the socialpsychological v i e w , K u h n set out his theoretical formulation.
4 5

Charles W. Tucker, Some Methodological Problems of Kuhn's Self T h e o r y , " The Sociological Quarterly, v o l . 7, n o . 3 (Summer 1966), p p . 3 4 5 - 3 5 8 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n .
1

M a n f o r d H . K u h n , " M a j o r T r e n d s i n Symbolic Interaction T h e -

A c c o r d i n g to this theory, society as ongoing h u m a n behavior, precedes any i n d i v i d u a l . The c h i l d is b o r n into some specific family "context" where the procedures of l i v i n g are being estab4

o r y i n t h e Past T w e n t y - f i v e Y e a r s , " Sociological Quarterly, 5 : 6 1 8 4 ( W i n t e r , 1964).

2

As

the r e a d e r w i l l notice, H. Kuhn, Individuals,

I am using C. Groups,

A.

H i c k m a n and

Ibid., p. 6 3 . F o r a list o f studies b y K u h n ' s s t u d e n t s see H a r o l d A . M u l f o r d 1964). In

M.

and Economic Behavior(New

Y o r k : H o l t , R i n e h a r t a n d W i n s t o n , 1956) e x t e n s i v e l y i n t h e form u l a t i o n o f this t h e o r y . A l t h o u g h this b o o k i s s e l d o m m e n U o n e c ' in the discussions of self theory, it seems to be the most c o m p l e t e t r e a t m e n t o f this t h e o r y y e t p u b l i s h e d .
5

a n d W i n f i e l d W . S a l i s b u r y II, " S e l f - C o n c e p t i o n s i n a G e n e r a l P o p u l a t i o n , " Sociological Quarterly, 5 : 3 5 - 4 6 ( W i n t e r , n o t e s 2 0 - 2 5 , a n d 3 3 - 3 6 i n K u h n op. cit., ibid. a d d i t i o n , f o r titles o f dissertations b y K u h n ' s s t u d e n t s see foot-

H i c k m a n and K u h n ,

op.

cit.,

p.

46.

233 lished. T h e n by means of simple act symbols the c h i l d learns the appropriate behaviors f r o m oth ers. As part of this process, a c h i l d is s h o w n what to do w i t h the objects in his e n v i r o n m e n t . In fact, it is assumed that any i n t r o d u c t i o n to an object is by use of the appropriate behaviors for e m p l o y i n g that object. H e n c e , a l l objects are social before they are physical. F r o m these basic notions, the self theorist makes the f o l l o w i n g assumptions r e g a r d i n g h u man behavior:
6

of "attitudes" m a y i n c l u d e identities, in terms of roles a n d statuses, interests a n d aversions, concep tions of goals, an ideological v i e w , a n d evaluative statements. T h e phrase " a m o n g social objects" implies a "context of b e h a v i o r " or " s i t u a t i o n " in w h i c h the self-attitudes are observed. H e n c e , u n less the " s i t u a t i o n " is specified the self-attitudes g i v e n by a person are meaningless.
9

W i t h this definition of self we t u r n to a gen eral statement of the theory: A person obtains attitudes toward himself from his "orientational others." These attitudes are similar to those he has obtained regarding other social ob jects. But, the self as a social object, unlike other objects, is present in all situations. This being the case, self-attitudes are anchoring attitudes or the "common frame of reference" upon which other at titudes are founded. Therefore, the self serves as the basis from which a person makes judgements and subsequent "plans of action" toward the many other objects that appear in each specific situa tion.
10

M a n lives in a universe of events and objects which do not have mtririsic meaning for human ex perience and behavior. Rather, the universe is en dowed with meaning, by man himself, through social definitions in language. The meaning of any object is in terms of the behavior that is taken with regard to that object. "Those concatenations of events which we think of as objects have become objects as a result of structur ing by language." So, the name for an object is simply a way of collapsing the meaning for the object. "The individual is n o t a passive agent who automaticallyresponds to the group-assigned mean ing of objects. Rather, he is constantly engaged in telling himself what he must pay attention to, what he must look for, what the significance of some object is, and how he must act on the basis of the objects about h i m . " The process indicated above is commonly called "thinking." Thinking, it is assumed, is made possible through man's ability to internally manipulate lan guage symbols. These language symbols are acquired by the person through his interaction with others. Therefore, his thinking is limited by his language and further, by the "others" who have interacted with him. F r o m these assumptions we go to the basic con cepts a n d propositions of this theory. First, the definition of " s e l f " or "self-concep tion" as used in the theory is " t h e individual's attitudes (plans of action) t o w a r d his o w n m i n d and body, v i e w e d as an object"; or similarly, " t h e i n d i v i d u a l as v i e w e d (defined) by the i n d i v i d u a l , a social object a m o n g social objects." T h e classes
7 8

T w o propositions c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m this gen eral statement. T h e y are (1) a person's self is based on the behaviors that his "orientational o t h e r s " direct t o w a r d h i m ; (2) the self serves as the basis f r o m w h i c h a person's behaviors are d i r e c t e d to w a r d other objects. F r o m these propositions, w e d e r i v e a t h i r d proposition: T h e behavior of " o r i e n tational o t h e r s " that are d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a person determines his behavior r e g a r d i n g a l l objects, i n c l u d i n g h i m s e l f . N o w , the terms w h i c h s e e m to n e e d d e f i n i n g in this theory are object, atti11
9

Manford H. Kuhn, "Self-Conception," op. cit, p. 631. Hickman and Kuhn, op. cit, pp. 21-45 passim.

10

., pp.
7 8

25 f, 43.

Ibid, p. 43.

Manford H. K u h n , "Self," in A Dictionary of the Social Sci ences, ed. by J. Gould and W . L . Kolb (New York: T h e Free Press, 1964), p. 629. Most of the definitions by K u h n in this volume had previously appeared in his "Definitions in Symbolic Interaction Theory," Department of Sociology, State University of Iowa, 1955 (mimeograph), which he utilized in his teaching.

T h e difference between the above "formalization" and that of John K i n c h in "A Formalized Theory of the Self-Concept," American Journal of Sociology, 68:481-86 (Jan., 1963), is seen clearly in his third proposition, which states: " T h e individual's perception of the responses of others toward h i m reflects the actual responses of others toward h i m " (p. 482). This proposition would, it seems to me, be questionable in Kuhn's theory, for he contends that "perception is inextricably bound up with conception, the conceptions have been learned with the lan guage," therefore, "the individual acts not in terms of an intrin sically coercive and resistant outer reality, but in terms of the meanings he ascribes to units of that reality, as they are selected and defined for him by the symbols which constitute his lan guage" (Hickman and K u h n , op. cit, p. 23). So, with this asser tion there is no separation between "perceived" and "actual" which implies a dualistic notion of reality, but rather, what man conceives is reality.
11

234 tudes, a n d "orientational others." I w i l l b e g i n w i t h the most i m p o r t a n t of these: Object. As stated earlier, self theory asserts that man's experience i n the w o r l d i s i n terms of objects. A n d , according to the theory, an object w h i c h is e x p e r i e n c e d must have b e e n socially defined, a n d hence is called a "social object." It refers to any distinguishable aspect of social reality. It may be a thing, a quality, an event, or a state of affairs. A l l that is necessary is that it have been given unity and disjunctiveness from other matters by having been given a name which distinguishes it and assigns it a meaning. The sum total of one's social objects constitute his social reality.
12

P A R T III

Self

is d e p e n d e n t u p o n the behavioral relationships a n d they are the l i m i t i n g "factors" of m e a n ing. Attitudes. T h e behaviors w h i c h are observed as d i r e c t e d t o w a r d objects are called "plans o f a c t i o n . " A s K u h n states: By "plan of action" we mean considerably more than seeking out or avoiding of an object. We mean also the ways in which the object is thought to behave, for these naturally have a bearing on the individual's own behavior toward or away from the object or state of affairs in question. And, too, we mean the affects (feelings and emotions) which the individual manifests in relation to others.
16

H e n c e , it is asserted that the w o r l d m a n experiences is the w o r l d he symbolically or linguistically designates; there is no other w o r l d . A n d accordi n g l y , the w o r l d varies a c c o r d i n g to the symbolic systems of designation w h i c h are u t i l i z e d by men. R e l a t e d to the c o n c e p t i o n of social objects is the n o t i o n of " m e a n i n g " in self theory. T h e m e a n i n g of an object is " p r i m a r i l y a p r o p e r t y of behavior a n d only secondarily a p r o p e r t y of o b j e c t s . " M o r e specifically:
13

A l l behaviors that are t a k e n w i t h r e g a r d t o objects are considered as "plans of a c t i o n . " B u t not all "plans of a c t i o n " are attitudes. Attitudes are verbal statements that constitute blueprints for behavior in that they indicate the ends toward which action is directed, the justification for holding these ends, the proper feelings and evaluations regarding the degree of success and failure in achieving them.
17

The meaning of any object is only in part a set of assumptions or ascriptions regarding its naturehow it works, what it is made of, etc. It is also in part a prescription for behavior toward that objecthow much it is valued, for what kinds of activity it has meaning, what one is supposed to do with it, etc. The language which we use to define an object or an event, regardless of how abstract, general, formal or objective it is, always indicates something about the object or event.
14

T h e m a i n p o i n t is that attitudes, as used in this theory, are overt, observable behavior w h i c h are d i r e c t l y amenable to scientific investigation. T h e y are considered to be v e r b a l statements w h i c h can organize a n d direct other b e h a v i o r .
18

Orientational Others. In a r e c e n t article. K u h n " r e c o n s i d e r e d " the concept o f "reference g r o u p . " H e i n d i c a t e d that M e r t o n , H y m a n , and others have used this concept to refer to cate1 9 18

M e a n i n g is always relative to the " n o r m s " of the g r o u p i n w h i c h the activities are t a k i n g place. " T h e norms of the group constitute the relational 'plans of action' w h i c h gives m e a n i n g to (or creates) the o b j e c t . " So, the m e a n i n g of any object
15 18

Hickman and Kuhn, op. cit, p. 223.

Ibid., p. 87.

17

cit,
13

Manford H. Kuhn, "Social Object," in Gould and Kolb, op. p. 6 5 9 .

See T. Shibutani, Society and Personality (Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 9 8 f. for a discussion of these ideas. Hickman and Kuhn, op. cit, p. 24. Kuhn, "Social Object," loc. cit
14 15

Hickman and Kuhn expand on this notion in the following "Such distinctions (between opinion and attitude) seem not only useless but misleading, first, because words constitute a gres.: dealprobably mostof man's activity, and hence, cannot fcf distinguished from deeds; and secondly, because we believe Eke Merton, that nonverbal overt acts can be and frequenti;. are deceptive, as in the sense of 'posturing' or 'keeping up ; front.' Finally, if men's verbally communicated plans of actior. were not in fact fairly accurate blueprints of their action, humar. societies could not exist. Societies rest on reciprocal role-playing and consensual definitions of each situation" (p. 224). Manford H. Kuhn, "The Reference Group Reconsidered." Sociological Quarterly, 5 : 5 - 2 1 (Winter, 1964).
18 19

Tucker gories of others rather t h a n groups of others. To m a k e a clear distinction b e t w e e n groups a n d categories, he proposed a " n e w " concept w h i c h takes into account the ideas of those w h o originally p u t forth the n o t i o n of " o t h e r s " (e.g., C o o l e y , D e w e y , a n d Mead.) These " o t h e r s " h e c a l l e d " o r i entational others," w h i c h is d e f i n e d by the followi n g a t t r i b u t e s : (1) T h e t e r m refers to the others to w h o m the i n d i v i d u a l is most f u l l y , b r o a d l y a n d basically c o m m i t t e d , emotionally a n d psychologically. (2) It refers to the others w h o have p r o v i d e d h i m w i t h his general vocabulary, i n c l u d i n g his most basic a n d c r u c i a l concepts a n d categories. (3) It refers to the others w h o have p r o v i d e d a n d continue to p r o v i d e h i m w i t h his categories of self a n d other, a n d w i t h m e a n i n g f u l roles to w h i c h such assignment refer. (4) It refers to the others i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h w h o m his self-conception is basically sustained and/or changes. F r o m this class of others, K u h n specified several types or subclasses of others w h i c h c o u l d be e m p l o y e d in research. F o r example there are " c o n t e m p o r a r y others" a n d "past others"; " p r o x i m a l others" a n d " d i s t a l others"; a n d "present o t h e r s " a n d "absent others," a n d the l i k e . K u h n b e l i e v e d that i f w e approach the investigation of " o t h e r s " w i t h this n o t i o n of orientational others the e m p i r i c a l findings w i l l b e m u c h m o r e relevant t o o n g o i n g h u m a n behavior t h a n the a p p r o a c h w h i c h i s n o w b e i n g used i n social psychology. O n l y e m p i r i c a l study c a n assess the correctness of this " b e l i e f . "
20

235 clearly relate to the connection b e t w e e n the operational specifications a n d the theoretical framew o r k . These connections w i l l b e specified i n the section f o l l o w i n g the discussion of the T w e n t y Statements Test.

II First, the question a n d the administration procedures of the T w e n t y Statements Test. E a c h prospective respondent is g i v e n a sheet of p a p e r w i t h t w e n t y blank lines on it and a single question at the top of the page. T h e question usually reads as follows: In the spaces below, please give twenty different answers to the question, "Who Am I?" Give these as if you were giving them to yourself, not to somebody else. Write fairly rapidly, for the time is limited. T h e respondents usually have a l i m i t e d amount of t i m e to answer the question. A f t e r the t i m e l i m i t has elapsed, the respondents are asked to complete other questions (e.g., face-data t y p e questions), but t o l d not to r e t u r n to the self question. T h e instruments are collected after their completion. B y inspecting the question carefully w e c a n note several assumptions w h i c h are i m p l i e d by it. T h e n we c a n note w h e t h e r these assumptions are consistent w i t h the theoretical formulation. First, the respondent is asked to answer the quest i o n " W h o A m I ? " b u t h e i s t o answer this question u n d e r a special circumstance. He is asked to answer the question "as i f y o u w e r e g i v i n g t h e m (the answers) to yourself, not to anyone else." If the directions are f o l l o w e d the person should refer to h i m s e l f as an object. This specification seems to be consistent w i t h the conception of self i n this theory. W i t h f u r t h e r consideration, there is an ass u m p t i o n that the self theorist makes w h i c h is not always clearly stated. This assumption is stated by M c P a r t l a n d in a m a n u a l designed for u s i n g the T w e n t y Statements T e s t . In order to answer
22

In the above I have a t t e m p t e d to s u m m a r i z e K u h n ' s self theory b y using the H i c k m a n a n d K u h n book a n d i n c o r p o r a t i n g some o f K u h n ' s last notions r e g a r d i n g the theory. In o r d e r to discuss the methodological problems of the theory it is necessary to look at some of the studies that have e m p l o y e d the T w e n t y Statements Test as an operational specification for the c o n c e p t i o n of self. I w i l l not consider each study separately, but I consider the problems m e n t i o n e d as c o m m o n to a l l the studies w h i c h e m p l o y e d this theory a n d t e c h n i q u e . Therefore, the m a n y " t e c h n i c a l " problems w h i c h have p l a g u e d the self theorist w i l l not be considered, but only those p r o b l e m s w h i c h
21

2 0

Ibid., p . 18. See note 3, above.

21

T. S. McPartland, "Manual for the Twenty-Statements Probl e m " (Department of Research: The Greater Kansas City Mental Health Foundation, Jan. 3, 1959, mimeograph).
22

236
the question it must be assumed that the person " k n o w s " w h o he is a n d puts this " k n o w l e d g e " into words. As M c P a r t l a n d states: ". . . respondents are confronted w i t h the p r o b l e m o f i d e n t i f y i n g themselves a n d left to decide for themselves h o w this identification w i l l b e m a d e . " T h i s ass u m p t i o n is necessary for the self theorist a n d is not essentially inconsistent w i t h the theory.
2 3

P A R T III Self that the question " W h o A m I ? " i s general e n o u g h as not to elicit responses w h i c h are u n i q u e or particular to a l i m i t e d situation, especially the testing situation. If this assumption was not m a d e the responses to the question w o u l d have l i m i t e d " p r e d i c t i v e u t i l i t y . " T h a t is, one c o u l d say v e r y little about the person's behavior in a variety of circumstances w i t h the information gathered f r o m this question. This w o u l d , of course, m a k e the theory so specific as to cast doubts on its scientific utility (i.e., the ability to make general statements r e g a r d i n g h u m a n behavior). So, as in the instance m e n t i o n e d above, this final assumption seems to be r e q u i r e d w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of self theory. In summary, the f o l l o w i n g assumptions a n d assertions are m a d e by the self theorist w h e n he uses the T w e n t y Statements Test to operationali z e the concept of self: 1 . T h e person w i l l refer the question " W h o A m I ? " to himself a n d not to anyone else. 2. T h e person is aware ("knows") of h i m s e l f and he puts this " k n o w l e d g e " into words. 3. T h e person's awareness of himself is d e p e n d ent u p o n the behaviors of others in a situation a n d not a matter of " t r a i t s " or " i n s t i n c t s . " 4. T h e person's awareness of himself precludes the use of any fixed responses; the responses must be the person's o w n plans of action. 5. T h e responses to the question are not l i m i t e d to the testing situation, but have applicability in a variety of situations. It seems that each of these assumptions or assertions, taken separately, is necessary w i t h i n the theoretical f r a m e w o r k and not essentially inconsistent w i t h it. T h e other area of i m p o r t a n c e r e g a r d i n g the T w e n t y Statements Test is the procedures that have b e e n used for a n a l y z i n g the data. I w i l l discuss the procedures w h i c h have p r o v i d e d a foundation for the v a r i e t y of analysis systems that have b e e n e m p l o y e d . In this discussion, I w i l l point out several assumptions w h i c h have not b e e n m e n t i o n e d previously. As before, I w i l l assess the adequacy of these assumptions in terms of the theory. E a c h answer of the respondent is content analyzed. E v e r y statement is assigned to one of two

In a d d i t i o n to h a v i n g a rather epistemological " t o n e " to it, the above assumption is related to several others w h i c h seem to be theoretically necessary. It is assumed that the person's " k n o w l e d g e " o f himself w i l l b e d e p e n d e n t u p o n the situation in w h i c h he finds himself. As stated, this " k n o w l e d g e " comes f r o m the b e h a v i o r of the " o r ientational o t h e r s " i n various situations. T h e r e fore, it is necessary to discard the notions of m a n y personality theorists a n d "self-concept" theorists w h o e m p l o y " t r a i t " notions w i t h r e g a r d t o their concepts. T h e self theorist finds this n o t i o n contrary to his assumptions.
24

Secondly, the assumption that a person " k n o w s " w h o he is precludes the use of a set of fixed responses to obtain theoretically m e a n i n g f u l i n f o r m a t i o n regarding the self. G i v i n g the person a set of responses r e g a r d i n g himself assumes either (1) that the person does not " k n o w " w h o he is or (2) that the researcher has the " k n o w l e d g e " r e g a r d i n g the respondent's self-attitudes in this situation. T h e first alternative clearly contradicts the assumption of the self theorist, a n d the second alternative w o u l d question the necessity o f any research o n the p r o b l e m . A s K u h n states, "responses resulting f r o m suggestion have no p r e d i c t i v e utility (regarding the self as defined i n this theoretical framework) for they d o not i n d i cate the plans by w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l organizes a n d directs his b e h a v i o r . " So it is assumed that the " W h o A m I ? " question does not suggest specific answers to the respondent. T h e r e f o r e , a l l the answers that are g i v e n are the respondent's o w n "plans of a c t i o n " w h i c h can direct his subsequent behavior.
25

F i n a l l y , another assumption, related to the above is m a d e by the self theorist. It is assumed

Ibid., p. 2. and Kuhn, op. cit, p. 243.

2 4

Hickman Ibid.

2 5

"1

Tucker categories: consensual or subconsensual (this latter category is sometimes called "nonconsensual"). Consensual statements are those w h i c h " r e q u i r e no further explanation in order to be understood by the analyst, or, for that matter, by a n y o n e . " Examples are: "I am a m a n , " "I am a student," or "I am a teacher." It is assumed that there is consensus by everyone r e g a r d i n g an object w h i c h is identified by this type of statement. T h e consensus is in terms of the behavior that one w o u l d take w i t h r e g a r d to the object so identified. A n o t h e r w a y of saying this is that the object, so identified, w o u l d have a c o m m o n m e a n i n g for all concerned.
26

237 consensual statements have behaved in a greater n u m b e r of different situations. T h e y are, in other words, "socially a n c h o r e d " in a variety of situations. A n d , the n u m b e r of consensual statements "is a reflection of the degree to w h i c h a person is effectively a n c h o r e d in the m a i n (consensually agreed to) c u l t u r e " a n d has " a c h i e v e d a stable identification by, a n d in terms of, the larger c u l t u r e . " A l l o f these assumptions a n d assertions seem to be in a c c o r d w i t h the theory a n d p a r t i c u larly the concepts of "social object" a n d " m e a n i n g . " N o w , w i t h this discussion i n m i n d , the next section w i l l point out some methodological p r o b lems that appear b e t w e e n the theory a n d the p r o cedures e m p l o y e d to investigate its notions.
29

A l l statements w h i c h are not i d e n t i f i e d b y the analyst as consensual are considered to be subconsensual. These statements refer to "groups, classes, attributes, traits, or any other matters w h i c h require interpretation by the respondent to be precise or to place h i m relative to other p e o p l e . " T h e y refer t o " n o r m s w h i c h m a y v a r y and into w h i c h the analyst must i n q u i r e if he is to grasp the denotation of the statements." E x amples of this type of statement are: "I am a good student," "I am an angry p e r s o n , " a n d so on. It is asserted, in these instances, that there is little consensus of m e a n i n g w i t h r e g a r d to objects i d e n tified in a subconsensual m a n n e r . T h a t is, others w i l l not k n o w h o w to behave consistently t o w a r d objects w h i c h are identified in these terms. This, of course, is the direct opposite of the interpretation for consensual statements.
27 28

Ill
T h e first p r o b l e m to be discussed is w h a t c a n be called "situationality." This p r o b l e m is not o n l y evident in self theory but it has p l a g u e d m a n y a social scientist, especially social psychologist, for years. Essentially, the p r o b l e m of " s i t u a t i o n a l i t y " is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the question: H o w do the social factors (i.e., behavior of others), within the testing situation, affect the observable behaviors one obtains f r o m the respondent(s)? 1 t h i n k the investigation of this question c a n be shown to be c r u c i a l to the d e v e l o p m e n t of social self theory.
30

O n e can see, I trunk, h o w the above analysis procedures relate to self theory. T h e m a i n focus in these procedures is on the m e a n i n g of social objects. As m e n t i o n e d earlier, m e a n i n g is defined in terms of behavior taken w i t h r e g a r d to objects. Those objects w h i c h are identified in a consensual fashion w i l l elicit the same responses f r o m all w h o come in contact w i t h t h e m . So the person w h o has identified himself consensually can expect all others to behave t o w a r d h i m in a similar m a n n e r in a variety of situations. If that is so, it is further reasoned that those w i t h the largest n u m b e r of
2 8

F r o m the statements of the self theorists it can be seen that this p r o b l e m is clearly relevant to their theory. K u h n criticizes those w h o assume that the testing situation is " n e u t r a l , " especially in an e x p e r i m e n t a l study. He states that the researcher " m u s t d e t e r m i n e the subject's attitudes t o w a r d objects to be m a n i p u l a t e d in the experim e n t . . . i n order t o have f u l l k n o w l e d g e o f the v a r i a b l e s . " F u r t h e r , in the definitions of self a n d orientational others it is noted that these concepts
31
2 9

Robert L . Stewart a n d G l e n n M . V e r n o n , " F o u r Correlates Sociology and Social Re-

of E m p a t h y in t h e D a t i n g S i t u a t i o n , " search, 4 3 : 2 8 4 ( M a r . , 1959).

3 0

F o r a n e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e issues i n v o l v e d i n this q u e s A a r o n V. Cicourel, Free Method and Measurement in 1964), pp. 157-171. SociolThis The Press,

t i o n see Ibid., p . 2 4 4 . Manford H . K u h n and Thomas S . McPartland, " A n Empirical of Self-Attitudes," Kuhn, op. cit, p. American 244. Sociological Review,

ogy ( N e w Y o r k :

2 7

discussion should be useful to anyone c o n c e r n e d w i t h the p r o b lems of social research, especially the t y p e of research that obtains o b s e r v a t i o n s b y a s k i n g p e o p l e q u e s t i o n s .
31

Investigation

19:64 ( F e b . , 1954).
2 8

Hickman and

H i c k m a n arid

Kuhn,

op.

cit.,

p.

26.

238
are relative to the "definition of the situation." Finally, in one of Kuhn's latest articles, he points to this problem as one which has been "neg lected" in symbolic interaction theory. Yet, even with this recognition, the problem seems to have been ignored in most of the research. The question comes to mind: How could this "state of affairs" possibly have developed?
32

PART III Self ior" and are "meaningless" without the explica tion of that "context." But, in a contrary manner, it is assumed that the responses from the question "Who Am I?" are applicable to a variety of situa tions. This assumes that the others who are "pres ent" and "contemporary" are irrelevant to the person's behavior. Now, it may be the case that some of the responses are applicable to the testing situation, while other responses are relevant to a variety of situations beyond the testing situation. But, it seems to me, before we can establish this assertion, an empirical investigation of the testing situation must be conducted.
34

I think the problem developed from the "style" in which the theory was originally pre sented. The self theorist seldom attempted to or der his theory as it has been done above. When he took each assumption and assertion separately, he could not discover the contrary assumptions which appear in the theory and research relation ship. But when they are considered together the contradictions are quite noticeable. To cite a case, one can see a direct contradic tion between several ideas in self theory. First, is the idea that knowledge of the person's selfattitudes will enable an observer to predict that person's behavior in a variety of situations. This notion implies that there is a "core" self or a par ticular set of "basic self-attitudes" that a person utilizes in all, or at least a variety of, situations. This same notion is held by some "self-concept" theorists and is consistent within their framework. But, within this theoretical frame work, it is contradictory to the explicit and firm rejection of the "trait" notions of personality.
33

The second problem concerns the content analysis procedures that have been consistently used in the studies. Although this may appear to be a mere "technical" problem, I think that it can be demonstrated that these procedures are derived from the theory. This being the case, whatever problems that appear with these proce dures have definite consequences for the develop ment and utility of the theory.
35

In fact, it was one of Kuhn's expressed pur poses to devise a theory which would show that the ideas of "traits" or "instincts" in human be havior are clearly metaphysical and beyond scien tific investigation. But, it seems that the very ideas which he intended to challenge are to be found in his theory, particularly in the notion of "social anchoring" self-attitudes. This same contradiction can be noted in the research operations. This appears when two ideas are contrasted. First is the idea that self-attitudes are derived within a particular "context of behav-

The content analysis categories and their as sumptions were described briefly in the preced ing part of this paper. As stated there, the ideas for these procedures were derived from the con cepts of "meaning" and "social object." The state ments obtained on the Twenty Statements Test are expected to refer to the respondent as an ob ject. If the "meaning" of the statement has a high degree of agreement it is consensual; if not, then it is subconsensual. Now, because these proce dures are related to several important ideas of the theory, we should take a closer look at them We noted that the self theorist assumes or asserts the following: (1) that fixed responses have little predictive utility; (2) that the persons

At the present time, procedures are being devised to obtiz. observations which will be relevant to this problem. T h e r r - ~ deviation from the previous operations include the use of pes: test interview with respondents who have answered the " W h ; Am I?" question.
34

Manford H . K u h n , "Major Trends i n Symbolic Interaction Theory," p. 7 8 .

32

T h e theorists who use this type of framework are reviewed in Ruth Wylie, The Self-Concept (Lincoln: T h e University of Nebraska Press, 1961), and in C. Marshall Lowe, " T h e Self-Con cept: Fact or Artifact?" Psychological Bulletin, 5 8 : 3 2 5 - 3 3 6
33

(1961).

T h e more "technical" problems which will not be discuss?; in the text of the paper include (1) the lack of any consisterrr set of coding instructions across all of the studies using tb Twenty Statements Test, and (2) the lack of inter-coder ity procedures which are clearly specified and reported in ::e studies under consideration here. Regarding this last issue, sc-rr studies have reported figures for inter-coder reliability, but t-e procedures used to obtain these figures were never clerrrrr reported.
35

Tucker " k n o w l e d g e " of himself is contained in the re sponses on the T w e n t y Statement Test; (3) that the person's o w n perspective a n d "plans of ac t i o n " is the focus of study. It was m e n t i o n e d that the T w e n t y Statements Test does not violate any of these assumptions or assertions. B u t w h e n it comes to the analysis of these statements f r o m the T w e n t y Statements Test, the analyst imposes the meaning on each of them from his own per spective. I n m a n y theories this p r o c e d u r e w o u l d be appropriate. That is, they do not assume that the perspective or v i e w p o i n t of the respondent (actor) is the focus of study. In these theories the experience of the analyst is the focus of study. But, as the statements above point out, in self theory the experiences of the respondents are the focus of study. Therefore, the procedures e m p l o y e d in content analysis seem to contradict the assumptions a n d assertions of the theory. L e t us take a closer look at this contradiction. It seems that the self-theorist-researcher is using his notions of m e a n i n g on t w o different levels. On one l e v e l , the researcher assumes that the person knows the m e a n i n g of himself a n d obtains that i n f o r m a t i o n on the T w e n t y Statements Test. But, at another point, the researcher determines the m e a n i n g for each of these responses w i t h o u t t a k i n g the person's perspective into account. H e decides w h i c h responses have consensus in terms of another context (e.g., his o w n , the " c u l t u r e , " the " s o c i e t y , " etc.) w h i c h may be irrelevant for the person w h o made the responses. T h e analyst's standard for consensus seems to be " c o m m o n sense," but as C i c o u r e l points out, The social scientist cannot afford to rely upon his own common-sense understanding for his content analysis of communications. To do so would make it impossible for him to differentiate between what he can understand because of his theoretical frame work and what he can understand as a member of the same society (or even the same audience) in which the communication was presented.
36

239 The problem for the content analyst is to employ a theory which is sufficiently precise to enable the researcher to specify in advance what he should look for in some set of materials, how he is to identify and extract the material, how he must code it, and, finally, how its significance is to be decided.
37

E v e n though the theory, as presented here, seems to be m o r e "systematic" than others, in its o r i g i n a l f o r m it was not. If it h a d been, the self theorist m i g h t have n o t i c e d these problems. So, if these criticisms are v a l i d , it seems that the self theorist should either investigate the notion of consensus o r completely discard i t .
3 8

IV U n d o u b t e d l y , those who have w o r k e d w i t h this theory have thought of these a n d m a n y other problems. Some other problems that c o u l d be ex p l o r e d are i m p l i e d i n the f o l l o w i n g questions: 1. Is there systematic e m p i r i c a l support for the assumptions a n d assertions that the self theorist states r e g a r d i n g the "self i n d i c a t i o n process"? 2. Is there systematic e m p i r i c a l support for the " i n t e r p r e t a t i v e process" that the self theorist a n d others posit as the basic process of social action? 3. W h a t are the consequences for the theory of e m p l o y i n g different types of questions, u n d e r a variety of conditions, w h i c h ask the respon dent to refer to himself as an object? These questions are rather " o b v i o u s " for those w h o have e m p l o y e d this theory i n their research. But, as far as I k n o w , the rationale for these ques tions, a n d the other problems m e n t i o n e d in this paper, have not b e e n specified by t h e m . I t h i n k it is t i m e for the self theorist to become o p e n l y "self-conscious" about his o w n w o r k a n d l i m i t the amount of effort e x p e n d e d on c r i t i c i z i n g the other
37

A g a i n , t h i n k this p r o b l e m stems f r o m a lack o f "systematic" f o r m u l a t i o n i n the theory. I n or d e r to e m p l o y a content analysis type of proce d u r e the theory should be precise. I agree w i t h C i c o u r e l w h e n he states:
38

Ibid., p. 144.

C i c o u r e l , op. cit, p . 155.

S e v e r a l u n p u b l i s h e d e x p l o r a t o r y studies h a v e b e e n d o n e r e g a r d i n g this p r o b l e m . T h e y i n c l u d e S . C l a r k M c P h a i l , " P e r c e i v e d Consensus R e g a r d i n g Statements about t h e Self i n R e sponse t o t h e Q u e s t i o n , ' W h o A m I ? ' " r e a d a t t h e O h i o V a l l e y S o c i o l o g i c a l S o c i e t y M e e t i n g s , C o l u m b u s , O h i o , 1964; a n d Charles W. T u c k e r , " T h e Dimensions of Self-Attitudes: A W o r k i n g P a p e r " ( m i m e o g r a p h , 1965, D e p a r t m e n t o f Sociology, M i c h i g a n State U n i v e r s i t y ) .
38

240 theories of social behavior. It is h o p e d that this paper is one m i n o r step in that d i r e c t i o n . In summary, this paper has a t t e m p t e d to acc o m p l i s h several tasks. First, it organizes the v a r i ous ideas, assumptions, definitions, a n d propositions of K u h n ' s self theory. T h e n , using this as a base, it points out two major methodological problems w h i c h have not b e e n previously m e n t i o n e d or investigated by the self theorists. These problems deal w i t h the effects of the testing situation on the responses to the self question a n d the content analysis procedures w h i c h have b e e n e m p l o y e d b y the self-theorist-researchers. B y i n d i cating these problems in this w a y it is expected that further e m p i r i c a l w o r k can be done w i t h this theory on a m o r e sturdy foundation than was heretofore available.

P A R T III

Self

Attitudes in Children," The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 3 (April 1962), pp. 115-121. Uses the Twenty Statements Test to explore the relationship between family roles and individual self-image. Denzin, Norman K. "Play, Games and Interaction: The Contents of Childhood Socialization." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 16 (Autumn 1975), pp. 458-478. Observational study of socialization and interaction in early childhood. Denzin, Norman K. "The Genesis of Self in Early Childhood." Sociological Quarterly, 13 (Winter 1972), pp. 291-314. Empirical data on development of the self. Kinch, John W. "A Formalized Theory of the Self-Concept." American Sociological Review, vol. 68 (January 1963), pp. 481-486. From the basic postulates of self-theory, the author deduces their logical consequences. Mahoney, E. R. "The Processual Characteristics of SelfConception." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 14 (Autumn 1973), pp. 517-533. Uses the Twenty Statements Test to compare the validity of three views of the self. McPhail, Clark, and Charles W. Tucker. "Classification and Ordering of Responses to 'WAI'." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 13 (Summer 1972), pp. 329-347. Assessment of the "Who Am I" test in terms of certain basic principles of self theory. Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934, pp. 144-178. Mead's exposition of the genesis of the self. Merrill, Francis E. "Stendhal and the Self: A Study in the Sociology of Literature." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 66 (March 1961), pp. 446-453. Presents an interpretive humanistic inquiry into the interactionist conception of the self in Stendhal's novel, The Red and the Black. Miyamoto, S. Frank, and Sanford M. Dornbusch. "A Test of Interactionist Hypothesis of Self-Conception." American Journal of Sociology, vol. 61 (March 1956), pp. 399-403. Study of the relation of selfconceptions to the behavior of others, perception of others, and perception of the generalized other. Pfuetze, Paul E . The Social Self. New York: Bookman Associates, 1954. A comparison and synthesis of Mead's ideas on the self with those of the eminent theologian Martin Buber. Reeder, Leo G . , George A. Donohue, and Arturo Biblarz. "Conceptions of Self and Others." American

SELECTED REFERENCES PART THREE Bain, Read. "The Self-and-Other Words of a C h i l d . " American Journal of Sociology, vol. 41 (May 1936), pp. 767-775. Explores the relationship of society and self through the medium of language. Baumarm, Bedrich. "George H. Mead and Luigi Pirandello, Some Parallels Between the Theoretical and Artistic Presentation of the Social Role Concept." Social Research, vol. 34 (Autumn 1967), pp. 563607. A lengthy and, at times, difficult illustration of the convergence between artistic and scientific expositions of human behavior. Braroe, Niels Winther. Indian and White: Self-Image and Interaction in a Canadian Plains Community. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1975. Application of Goffman's perspective in an anthropological field study. Clifton, Rodney A. "Self-Concept and Attitudes: A Comparison of Canadian Indian and Non-Indian Students." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 12 (November 1975), pp. 577-584. Discrimination does not appear to have harmed self-images. Cooley, Charles Horton. "A Study of the Early Use of Self-Words by a Child." Psychological Review, vol. 15 (November 1908), pp. 339-357. Forerunner of the study described by Bain, above. Couch, Carl J. "Family Role Specialization and Self-

Tucker Journal of Sociology, vol. 66 (September 1960), pp. 153-159. Research among military personnel, comparing self-concepts with ratings by others in the group. Rosenberg, Morris. "Which Significant Others?" American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 16 (July/August 1973), pp. 57-65. The impact of valuation and credibility upon interpersonal relationships. Schaefer, Robert, Rito Braito and Joe M. Bahley. "SelfConcept and the Reactions of 'Significant Others'." Sociological Inquiry, vol. 46 (1976), pp. 57-65. Survey sample data raises questions about the reflective self-conception. Schrnitt, Raymond L. "Major Role Change and Self Change." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 7 (Summer 1966), pp. 311-322. Study of 48 girls in the process of becoming Catholic nuns.

241 Sherwood, J. J. "Self-Identity and Referent Others." Sociometry, vol. 28 (March 1965), pp. 66-81. Tests the proposition that "the individual's self-identity (and his self-evaluation) is dependent upon his subjectively held version of the peer group's actual ratings of h i m . " Simmons, Roberta G . , Florence Rosenberg, Morris Rosenberg. "Disturbance in the Self-Image at Adolescence." American Sociological Review, 38 (October 1973), pp. 553-568. Quantitative analysis of survey data reveals turmoil of adolescent development. Spitzer, Stephan P. "Test Equivalence of Unstructured Self-Evaluation Instruments." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 10 (Spring 1969), pp. 204-215. Compares fmdings for six open-ended self-conception measures.

PART four

Mind

T h e basic symbolic interactionist proposition most relevant to this Part is our fifth one, w h i c h states: Consciousness, or thinking, involves interaction with oneself. F o r symbolic interactionists, then, " m i n d " refers to the processes through w h i c h persons carry on transactions with their environment. These processes, consisting of designations to oneself by means of symbols, enable individuals to direct a n d manage their acts while performing them and to carve out the objects constituting their environment. As we stated earlier, in more terse propositional f o r m (proposition 6): H u m a n beings construct their behavior in the course of its execution. T h e concept of m i n d refers to a mental process or activity, not a physical entity like the brain. A l t h o u g h the activity is covert, it is behavior w h i c h closely resembles the overt communication between individuals. T h e inner processes of thought rely on the same symbols used in observable behavior. As we have previously indicated, thinking can be viewed as a process of internal conversationof symbolic interaction between the i n d i v i d u a l a n d himself / herself. W i l l i a m L e w i s Trover's brief article presents M e a d ' s major ideas on m i n d , stressing its social genesis a n d its adaptive, processual character. In a straightforward and compact way, he examines the internal organization of the act, the meaning of meaning, a n d the selective quality of our perceptions of objective conditions. T h e crucial role of significant symbols in " m i n d e d behavior" emerges clearly in this summary. T h e selection by J o h n D e w e y further underscores the functional view of m i n d . T h i s pragmatic, instrumental conception stands in sharp contrast to the conception of m i n d in substantive terms. W h i l e this article focuses on the relation of m i n d to behavior, D e w e y also stresses the importance of society and communication in developing the h u m a n m i n d (see his article in Part II). T h e excerpt from W i l l i a m I. T h o m a s ' book discusses the indications to oneself entailed in thought processes. T h a t h u m a n beings act on the

244

PART IV

Mind

basis of their "definitions of the situation" is, of course, axiomatic for the symbolic-interactionist perspective. U s i n g illustrations derived f r o m his classic study (with F l o r i a n Znaniecki) of The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, T h o m a s relates the individual's definition of the situation to f a m i l y a n d c o m m u n i t y sources. B o t h Robert A. Stebbins and H a r o l d Garfinkel present empirical studies of T h o m a s ' concept, while Joan P. E m e r s o n uses illustrative incidents in analyzing the same phenomena. T h e selection by Stebbins shows h o w useful the concept can be in the explanation of motivated behavior. It also distin guishes cultural, or consensual, definitions of the situation f r o m u n i q u e personal, or nonconsensual, ones. Stebbins points out that his o w n definition of the situation affected his research strategy a n d its outcome. Emerson's article deals with the p r o b l e m of maintaining shared definitions of situations. She shows that these shared definitions may p l a y an important part in the labeling of behavior as deviant. T h e article by Garfinkel applies what he calls the documentary m e t h o d of interpretation to the study of commonsense knowledge of social struc tures. By documentary method, he means an interpretive analysis, rather than a literal description, of people's statements or actions. H i s provocative experiment, so characteristic of ethnomethodology, shows h o w individuals define their situations by instilling their o w n meanings into the instructions of the experimenter. T h e crucial place of language in h u m a n thought and behavior is evi denced in the excerpt f r o m K u r t Goldstein's classic b o o k on aphasia. Study ing the speech patterns of patients with brain lesions, Goldstein uncovered some of the critical consequences of diminished symbolic capability by hu m a n beings. Language is more than a simple tool. It is the basis of our ability to name, explain, a n d understand. W i t h o u t language skills, memory, communication, a n d action are confined to the narrow boundaries of con crete sensations. T h e selections b y . Wright M i l l s a n d b y J o h n P . H e w i t t a n d R a n d a l l Stokes grapple w i t h " m o t i v e , " a concept that has proved troublesome to students of h u m a n behavior a n d relationships. It s h o u l d be recalled, inciden tally, that Stebbins' article addresses this concept. M i l l s a n d H e w i t t and Stokes indicate the usefulness of treating motives as labels, or definitions, that humans a p p l y to their o w n conduct a n d to the conduct of others. F o r M i l l s , language provides the i n d i v i d u a l with the vocabularies of motive appropriate for explaining behavior in specific situations. T h u s , one's pur pose in going to college is said to be to add to one's knowledge or to acquire a vocation. H e w i t t a n d Stokes f o l l o w up M i l l s ' point with their concept of "disclaimers," the ways that individuals interpret a n d justify their pro jected actions. T h e y are verbal techniques, built out of socially acceptable words, phrases, a n d typifications, for avoiding potential criticism or blame. T h e s e articles in Part IV should dispel the notion that m i n d is inevitably a mystical, unanalysable p h e n o m e n o n . To the symbolic interactionist, the

PART

Mind

245

term refers to an important process without w h i c h h u m a n behavior a n d society cannot be adequately understood. Indeed, understanding by social psychologists involves the same process as understanding by their subjects. T h e process of m i n d refers to the capacity of each socialized i n d i v i d u a l to communicate with himself/herself just as he/she is able to communicate with others. W h i l e inner c o m m u n i c a t i o n is not readily observable, the fol lowing articles reveal its importance a n d suggest techniques for its observa tion a n d analysis.

William Lewis Troyer

Mead's Social and Functional Theory of M i n d

T h e development of an adequate theory of m i n d in relation to nature was a central interest of the late George H e r b e r t Mead's philosophical career. H i s general position is best designated w i t h the t e r m "social b e h a v i o r i s m . " T h e basic dat u m f r o m this point of v i e w is the social act. B u t this d a t u m is by no means an obvious a n d simple e l e m e n t for observation. Before it can be used to explore a n d understand the nature and funct i o n of m i n d , supporting theories of society a n d of self r e q u i r e elaboration. H e n c e , the natural ord e r of Mead's o w n t h i n k i n g seems to have b e e n that of society-self-mind, instead of the reverse as suggested by the title of the e d i t e d v o l u m e of his famous lectures in social psychology. A w e l l - p r o p o r t i o n e d a n d discerning outline of Mead's position should c u l m i n a t e rather than beg i n w i t h his understanding o f m i n d
1

quently, the analysis of the act. T h e y failed to take f u l l account of the social character of the act, and what was worse yet, they h m i t e d analysis to fragmentary portions of the act. A thoroughgoi n g behaviorism w o u l d i n c l u d e w i t h i n its p u r v i e w the complete act, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y that p o r t i o n of it w h i c h goes on " i n the central nervous system as the b e g i n n i n g of the individual's act a n d as the organization of the act." This larger i n c l u siveness w o u l d necessarily take the investigator b e y o n d the field of direct observation, Watson's stopping point. A n earlier retort that such proced u r e goes b e y o n d science loses force in the light of a m o d e r n subatomic physics and a biochemistry of colloids and viruses.
2

THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ACT M e a d , l i k e J o h n D e w e y , was very c r i t i c a l of that f o r m of behaviorism set f o r t h by J o h n W a t s o n a n d his followers. These latter, he b e l i e v e d , h a d p l a y e d a positive role in the d e v e l o p m e n t of a science of psychology but h a d , nevertheless, greatly oversimplified the concept and, conseWffliam Lewis Troyer, "Mead's Social and Functional Theory of Mind," American Sociological Review, vol. 11 (April 1946), pp. 198-202. Reprinted by permission. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
1

Mead's c r i t i c i s m a n d his constructive d e v e l o p m e n t b o t h b e g i n w i t h the concept of the reflex, or so-called stimulus-response arc. H i s position is essentially the same as that advanced by D e w e y i n his w e l l - k n o w n article o f 1896. B o t h M e a d a n d D e w e y insisted that action is present in the l i v i n g organism from the very outset. W h a t has to be accounted for is not action but the d i r e c t i o n w h i c h action takes. T h e process of r e s p o n d i n g is present in the entire act d e t e r m i i i i n g the v e r y entertainment o f stimuli. T h e l i v i n g organism, i n other words,
3

. . . is not a sensitive protoplasm that is simply receiving these stimuli from without and then responding to them. It is primarily seeking tot certain stimuli.
a

Ibid., p. 11.

John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psychological Review, III (July 1896), 357-370.

248 . . . Whatever we are doing determines the sort of a stimulus which will set free certain responses which are merely ready for expression, and it is the attitude of action which determines for us what the stimulus will be.
4

PART IV

Mind

T h e use of the t e r m " a t t i t u d e " in this connect i o n i s h i g h l y important. M e a d r e c o g n i z e d that the f u n c t i o n i n g of the nervous system is as yet o n l y partially explored, but he r e g a r d e d the results already obtained as substantial e n o u g h to indicate an organization of the act in terms of social attitudes. Thus, he d e c l a r e d : There is an organization of the various parts of the nervous system that are going to be responsible for acts, an organization which represents not only that which is immediately taking place, but also the later stages that are to take place. If one approaches a distant object, he approaches it with reference to what he is going to do when he arrives there. If one is approaching a hammer, he is muscularly all ready to seize the handle of the hammer. The later stages of the act are present in the early stages not simply in the sense that they are ready to go off, but in the sense that they serve to control the process itself. They determine how we are going to approach the object, and the steps in our early manipulation of it.
5

of significant symbols. T h e r e is thus interposed b e t w e e n stimulus a n d response a process of selection. M e a d r e f e r r e d to this p h e n o m e n o n as " d e l a y e d r e a c t i o n . " T o h i m this seemed t o b e the basis u p o n w h i c h it is legitimate to speak of choice a n d conscious c o n t r o l of behavior. It is this p r o c ess, w h e n considered i n conjunction w i t h the dev e l o p m e n t of social attitudes, w h i c h constitutes intelligence or m i n d . Obviously, this is far rem o v e d f r o m the b e h a v i o r i s m o f W a t s o n ; y e t i t is thoroughly behavioristic. It i m p o r t s n o t h i n g from outside the act itself. It s i m p l y refuses to conceive the act n a r r o w l y as a mechanistic a n d individualistic r e a c t i o n to external pressures.
6

B I O L O G I C A L A N D S O C I A L BASES O F MIND N o w , it should be clear from the foregoing that M e a d e m p h a s i z e d the indispensability of the physiological o r g a n i s m i n his account o f m i n d . Ind i v i d u a l experience a n d behavior was, i n his thought, "physiologically basic" to social e x p e r i ence a n d behavior, a n d the processes a n d m e c h a nisms essential to the o r i g i n and c o n t i n u e d existence of society, self, a n d m i n d w e r e d e p e n d e n t u p o n the social f m i c t i o n i n g of that w h i c h is p h y s i ologically i n d i v i d u a l .
7

W h a t e v e r m a y b e f o u n d b y biological research to be the actual physiological p a t t e r n of f u n c t i o n i n g i n the nervous system, the i m p o r t a n t point e m p h a s i z e d b y M e a d p r o b a b l y w i l l not b e gainsaid; that is, that the c o m p l e t e act is present as a d e t e r m i n i n g factor in the b e g i n n i n g of the overt phase of the act. T h e attitude, as M e a d uses the t e r m , stands simply for this i n t e r n a l organization of the act. A closely associated fact, b r o u g h t to emphasis in M e a d ' s outlook, is that the central nervous syst e m , a m o n g h u m a n beings at least, provides a m e c h a n i s m of implicit response. N o t o n l y does the h u m a n organism select its s t i m u l i on the basis of attitudes, but it m a y also test out i m p l i c i t l y the various possible completions of an already i n i tiated act in advance of the actual c o m p l e t i o n of that act. This it does t h r o u g h the e m p l o y m e n t
4

The individual members of even the most advanced invertebrate societies do not possess sufficient physiological capacities for developing rninds or selves, consciousness or intelligence, out of their social relations and interactions with one another; and hence these societies cannot attain either the degree of complexity which would be presupposed by the emergence of minds and selves within them, or the further degree of complexity which would be possible only if minds and selves had emerged or arisen within them. Only the individual members of human societies possess the required physiological capacities for such development of minds and selves, and hence only human societies are able to reach the level of complexity, in their structure and organization, which becomes possible as the result of the emergence of minds and selves in their individual members.
8
8

G.

H.

Mead,

Movements of Thought in

the Nineteenth

Century

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 389-390 (italics not in the original).
5

Ibid., pp. 99-100; 117-118. Ibid., p. 236 (footnote).

4bid., pp. 1-2.

8

Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 11 (italics not in the original).

F o r M e a d the central nervous system, a n d particularly the cortex, f u r n i s h e d the physiological m e c h a n i s m by means of w h i c h the "genesis of minds and selves out of the h u m a n social processes of experience a n d b e h a v i o r o u t of the h u m a n matrix of social relations a n d interactions is made biologically possible in h u m a n i n d i v i d u als." M i n d s do not occur w i t h o u t brains. L o o k e d at f r o m the physiological angle, therefore, m i n d is an extraordinarily complex adjustment mechanism; an extension of distance receptors a n d m o : ; r effectors, a refined type of antennae, so to speak, by m o r e efficient adaptation of organism and e n v i r o n m e n t as achieved. Important as this g r o u n d i n g of m i n d a n d selfhood in physiology is, however, the repeated reference in the above quotations to social relations :nd interactions must be fully appreciated if Mead's notion of m i n d is not to be gravely misunderstood. Brains are necessary to the emergence of m i n d , but brains, per se, do not m a k e rrund. It is societysocial interactionusing brains, w h i c h makes m i n d . Intelligent h u m a n behavior is "essentially a n d fundamentally social"; . . . it involves and presupposes an ever on-going social life-process; and . . . the unity of that on-going social processor any one of its component acts is irreducible, and in particular cannot be adequately analyzed simply into a number of discrete nerve elements.
9

In his discussion of society a n d the self this inchoating process is designated as " t a k i n g the role of the o t h e r " or participation in the "conversation of attitudes." As a self can arise only in a society w h e r e there is c o m m u n i c a t i o n , so m i n d c a n arise only in a self or personality w i t h i n w h i c h this conversation of attitudes or social participation is taki n g place. It is this conversation, this symbolic interaction, interposed as an integral part of the act, w h i c h constitutes m i n d . L o o k e d a t f r o m one standpoint, it is m i n d ; f r o m another, it is cornmunication. F u n c t i o n i n g w i t h i n the organismic processes a n d social activities of the specific i n d i v i d u a l , c o m m u n i c a t i o n is m i n d . It is symbolic social interaction, the process w h i c h makes h u m a n life distinctive.
1 1

T h e concrete i m p o r t of such a theory of m i n d cannot b e better s u m m a r i z e d than i n Mead's o w n words. In defending a social theory of rnind we are defending a functional, as opposed to any form of substantive or entitative, view as to its nature. A n d in particular, we are opposing all intracranial or intraepidermal views as to its character and locus. For it follows from our social theory of mind that the field of mind must be co-extensive with, and include all the components of, the field of the social process or experience and behavior: i.e., the matrix of social relations and interactions among individuals, which is presupposed by it, and out of which it arises or comes into being. If mind is socially constituted, then the field or locus of any given individual mind must extend as far as the social activity or apparatus of social relations which constitutes it extends; and hence that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism to which it belongs.
12

If this be true, it follows that the psychologist should study social relations a n d social behavior p r i m a r i l y , rather than physiology, if he w o u l d k n o w what m i n d is a n d h o w it functions. In p u r s u i n g this l i n e of approach, M e a d took his students over g r o u n d dealing w i t h the emergence of h u m a n society a n d the self. He focused attention o n the gesture, particularly t h e vocal gesture, and especially u p o n the vocal gesture at the p o i n t w h e r e it becomes a significant symbol. He declared that mentality "resides in the ability of the organism to indicate that in the e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h answers to his responses, so that he can control these responses in various ways."
10

T h e advantage o f this v i e w o f m i n d resides i n its plausibuity as an account a n d explanation of the genesis a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of m i n d w i t h o u t postulation of supernatural e n d o w m e n t or special B e i n g . I t thoroughly naturalizes m i n d i n such a w a y as to give the concept of m i n d heuristic value in any full-fledged science of h u m a n nature. In so far as originahty can be assigned to M e a d , this achievement i n understanding, i f sustained b y later c r i t i c i s m , m a y w e l l rank w i t h those o f
1 3

11

Mead, Movements of Thought, pp. 384-385. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 223 (footnote). Ibid., pp. 223-225.

"ibid., p. 118 (footnote).

10

l a

Ibid., p. 132.

13

250 N e w t o n and mankind. Darwin in its importance to

PART IV

Mind
1 6

T H E OBJECT AS A C O L L A P S E D A C T M e a d ' s discussion of the self as an object to itself a n d also of the possibility of social responses t o w a r d inanimate objects raises a question as to the nature of objects and h o w they are k n o w n . W h i l e the ramifications of this phase of his thought are too v a r i e d for appropriate s u m m a r y here, the matter does i n v o l v e the concept of m e a n i n g and, therefore, warrants some consideration in the presentation of any r o u n d e d understanding of Mead's theory of m i n d . In M e a d ' s way of t h i n k i n g , m e a n i n g arises o n l y t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e significance of a gesture (symbol), for instance, is f o u n d in the response of others to it as a part of a social act. T h e various acts of individuals presuppose the soc i a l process, a n d . . . the gesture arises as a separable element in the social act, by virtue of the fact that it is selected out by the sensitivities of other organisms to it; it does not exist as a gesture merely in the experience of the single individual. The meaning of a gesture by one organism . . . is found in the response of another organism to what would be the completion of the act of the first organism which that gesture initiates and indicates.
14

i n i t i a t e d by the gesture of the first i n d i v i d u a l . " M e a n i n g is, therefore, thoroughly social i n o r i g i n a n d nature. A c c o r d i n g t o M e a d gestures m a y b e either significant or non-significant. B e l o w the h u m a n l e v e l of life the conversation of gestures is largely, if not c o m p l e t e l y , non-significant, n o n - m e a n i n g f u l , because it is not .seZ/'-conscious. A l o w e r organi s m acts, but its activity, f r o m its o w n standpoint, or f r o m that of any other n o n - h u m a n organism, is meaningless. T h e r e is gesture a n d response, as in the dog-fight, a n d things h a p p e n , b u t there is no self a n d no other; that is, no designation of objects. A n y such designation w o u l d i m p l y s y m bolic interaction. M e a n i n g , as the object-matter of such symbolic interaction, or thought, . . . arises in experience through the individual stimulating himself to take the attitude of the other in his reaction toward the object. Meaning is that which can be indicated to others while it is by the same process indicated to the indicating individual." This p o i n t o f v i e w m a y b e put i n other terms. M e a d l a i d emphasis, for example, u p o n the selective quality of organic activity. T h e l i v i n g organi s m , w i t h i n limits, b u t nevertheless definitely, selects or carves out its o w n e n v i r o n m e n t . A m o n g h u m a n beings this e n v i r o n m e n t is distinctive in that it is composed of objects. At first the e n v i r o n m e n t , or the w o r l d , is one of social objects, but as self a n d social other are acquired, physical objects a n d relationships may also be constructed by a process of abstraction. In this latter process the h u m a n h a n d , i n conjunction w i t h the eye, plays a major role. M e a d d i d not question that natureor the extra-human w o r l d i s objectively there r e g a r d less of our experience of it. He was a pragmatist, not a n idealist, i n philosophy. H e consequently h e l d , h o w e v e r , that a l l objects are defined as such i n a n d through h u m a n experience. Objective nature thereby comes to possess certain characteristics by virtue of its relationship to h u m a n experie n c i n g o r m i n d w h i c h i t w o u l d not possess otherwise, or apart f r o m this relationship. These
1 6

T h e relationship, in other words, b e t w e e n a stimulus as a gesture a n d the later phases of the social act constitutes the field w i t h i n w h i c h m e a n i n g originates and exists. W h a t is particularly of significance in such a statement is that m e a n i n g , as thus considered, is a d e v e l o p m e n t objectively there as a relation b e t w e e n certain phases of the social act. It is not to be thought of as a psychical a d d i t i o n " to the act. It is no mere " i d e a " in the t r a d i t i o n a l sense. M e a n i n g is i m p l i c i t w h e r e v e r there is present a c e r t a i n " t r i a d i c relation of a gesture of one i n d i v i d u a l , a response to that gesture by a second i n d i v i d u a l , and c o m p l e t i o n of the g i v e n social act
15

" Ibid., p p .
1 5

145-146.

Ibid., p . 8 1 . Ibid., p . 8 9 (italics n o t i n t h e o r i g i n a l ) .

Ibid., p p . 7 5 - 7 6 .

1 7

Troyer characteristics, M e a d h e l d , constitute the m e a n ings of objects to us, a n d to all intents a n d p u r poses, give definition a n d functional reality to the objects themselves. An object is always in this sense a " c o n s t r u c t , " a resultant, the k i n d of response w h i c h w i l l ensue after a certain type of activity. A blackboard, for example, is what it is for us, has certain properties associated w i t h w r i t i n g in black a n d w h i t e , because that is the w a y it responds to our activity. As a s y m b o l , an object, it stands for certain consequences in activity. C e r t a i n qualities are there, but as parts of an act, a n d not of some i n d e p e n d e n t l y existing "essence" or " e x t e n s i o n . " F r o m this standpoint, an object m a y be defined as a " c o l l a p s e d act"; the sign of what w o u l d h a p p e n if the act w e r e c a r r i e d to completion.
18 19

251 An object, thus, becomes a m e a n i n g f u l reality to a h u m a n b e i n g because of his ability to m a k e i n d i cations, either i m a g i n a t i v e l y to himself, or d i rectly to others. A l l objects, all symbols w i t h semantic reference, represent telescoped acts. By means of the conversation of attitudes a n d the use of significant symbolsessentially a social processthe w o r l d (both social a n d physical) of each i n d i v i d u a l comes into being. V i e w e d , i n deed, as consisting of objects a n d their relationships, the w o r l d is an out-and-out social w o r l d , as self a n d m i n d are also social, that is e m e r g e n t w i t h i n the h u m a n social process of activity itself. As Charles W. M o r r i s , to whose labors we o w e m u c h for the possession of Mead's thought in p r i n t , declares in the i n t r o d u c t i o n to the latest of the posthumous volumes, . . . M i n d , as involving the symbolic internalization of the complete or social act, and the self, as an object that has itself for an object, are on this view seen as social emergents made possible through the process of linguistic communication within the social act. . . . In man, animal impulse becomes enormously elaborated and intelligently guided, sensitivity to stimuli becomes the perception of enduring objects, manipulation is elaborated into the physical world of science, and communication shares in the elaboration of impulse and its mumination through reason. Animals live in a world of events; man lives in a world of common meaningsand meaning for Mead is socially generated and sustained.
21
2 1

F o l l o w i n g this point to its conclusion, M e a d declared: . . . The earliest objects are social objects, and all objects are social objects. Later experience differentiates the social from the physical objects, but the mechanism of the experience of things over against self as an object is the social mechanism. The identification of the individual with physical objects which appear in the effective occupation of space is a derivative of this.
20
1 8

Ibid., p . G. H.

131. Mead, The Philosophy o f the Act ( C h i c a g o : University

19

o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1938), p p . 3 6 8 - 3 7 0 .
2 9

Ibid., p p . 4 2 8 - 4 3 0 .

Ibid., p p . i x - x .

John Dewey

27

M i n d , Experience, and Behavior

L e t us begin w i t h the technical sidethe change i n psychology. W e are only just n o w c o m m e n c i n g to appreciate h o w c o m p l e t e l y e x p l o d e d is the psychology that d o m i n a t e d philosophy throughout the eighteenth and n i n e t e e n t h centuries. A c c o r d i n g to this theory, m e n t a l life origin a t e d in sensations w h i c h are separately a n d passively r e c e i v e d , and w h i c h are f o r m e d , t h r o u g h laws of retention and association, into a mosaic of images, perceptions a n d conceptions. T h e senses w e r e regarded as gateways or avenues of k n o w l e d g e . E x c e p t in c o m b i n i n g atomic sensations, the m i n d was w h o l l y passive and acquiescent i n k n o w i n g . V o l i t i o n , action, emotion, and desire follow in the wake of sensations and images. T h e intellectual or cognitive factor comes first a n d emotional and volitional life is only a consequent conjunction of ideas w i t h sensations of pleasure and pain. T h e effect of the d e v e l o p m e n t of biology has b e e n to reverse the picture. W h e r e v e r there is life, there is behavior, activity. In order that life m a y persist, this activity has to be b o t h continuous a n d adapted to the e n v i r o n m e n t . This adaptive adjustment, moreover, is not w h o l l y passive; is not a m e r e matter of the m o u l d i n g of the organi s m by the environment. E v e n a c l a m acts u p o n the e n v i r o n m e n t and modifies it to some extent. It selects materials for food and for the shell that protects it. It does something to the e n v i r o n m e n t as w e l l as has something done to itself. T h e r e is no such t h i n g in a l i v i n g creature as m e r e con-

f o r m i t y to conditions, though parasitic forms m a y approach this l i m i t . In the interests of the maintenance of life there is transformation of some elements i n the s u r r o u n d i n g m e d i u m . T h e h i g h e r the f o r m of life, the m o r e important is the active reconstruction of the m e d i u m . This increased control m a y be illustrated by the contrast of savage w i t h c i v i l i z e d m a n . Suppose the two are l i v i n g in a wilderness. W i t h the savage there is the m a x i m u m of accommodation to g i v e n conditions; the m i n i m u m of what we may call h i t t i n g back. T h e savage takes things "as they are," a n d by using caves and roots and occasional pools leads a meagre and precarious existence. T h e c i v i l i z e d m a n goes to distant mountains and dams streams. He builds reservoirs, digs channels, a n d conducts the water to what h a d b e e n a desert. He searches the w o r l d to find plants and animals that w i l l thrive. He takes native plants a n d by selection and cross-fertilization improves t h e m . H e introduces m a c h i n e r y to t i l l the soil and care for the harvest. By such means he may succeed in m a k i n g the wilderness blossom l i k e the rose. Such transformation scenes are so familiar that we overlook their m e a n i n g . We forget that the i n h e r e n t p o w e r of life is illustrated in them. Note what a change this point of v i e w entails in the traditional notions of experience. Experience becomes an affair p r i m a r i l y of doing. T h e organism does not stand about, M i c a w b e r l i k e , waiting for something to t u r n up. It does not wait passive and inert for something to impress itself u p o n it f r o m without. T h e organism acts in accordance w i t h its o w n structure, simple or complex, upon its surroundings. As a consequence the changes

F r o m Reconstruction

in

Philosophy,

pp.

84-87,

90-92,

by J o h n

D e w e y , c o p y r i g h t 1948 b y B e a c o n P r e s s .

Dewey p r o d u c e d in the e n v i r o n m e n t react u p o n the organism and its activities. T h e l i v i n g creature u n dergoes, suffers, the consequences of its o w n behavior. This close c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n d o i n g and suffering or u n d e r g o i n g forms what we call experience. D i s c o n n e c t e d d o i n g a n d disconnected suff e r i n g are neither of t h e m experiences. Suppose fire encroaches u p o n a m a n w h e n he is asleep. Part of his body is b u r n e d away. T h e b u r n does not p e r c e p t i b l y result f r o m what he has done. T h e r e i s n o t h i n g w h i c h i n any instructive w a y can be n a m e d experience. Or again there is a series of m e r e activities, l i k e twitchings of muscles in a spasm. T h e movements amount to n o t h i n g ; they have no consequences for life. O r , if they have, these consequences are not c o n n e c t e d w i t h p r i o r d o i n g . T h e r e is no experience, no learni n g , no cumulative process. B u t suppose a busy i n fant puts his finger in the fire; the d o i n g is rand o m , aimless, without i n t e n t i o n or reflection. B u t something happens i n consequence. T h e c h i l d u n dergoes heat, he suffers p a i n . T h e d o i n g a n d u n dergoing, the reaching a n d the b u r n , are connected. O n e comes to suggest a n d m e a n the other. T h e n there is experience in a v i t a l and significant sense. C e r t a i n important implications for philosop h y follow. In the first place, the i n t e r a c t i o n of organism a n d e n v i r o n m e n t , resulting i n some adaptation w h i c h secures u t i l i z a t i o n of the latter, is the p r i m a r y fact, the basic category. K n o w l e d g e is relegated to a d e r i v e d position, secondary in o r i g i n , e v e n if its i m p o r t a n c e , w h e n once it is established, is overshadowing. K n o w l e d g e is not something separate a n d self-sufficing, but is i n v o l v e d in the process by w h i c h life is sustained a n d e v o l v e d . T h e senses lose their place as gateways of k n o w i n g to take their r i g h t f u l place as s t i m u l i to action. To an a n i m a l an affection of the eye or ear is not an idle piece of i n f o r m a t i o n about s o m e t h i n g mdifferently g o i n g o n i n the w o r l d . It is an i n v i t a t i o n a n d i n d u c e m e n t to act in a n e e d e d way. It is a clue in behavior, a directive factor in adaptation of life in its smTOundings. It is u r g e n t not cognitive in quality. T h e whole controversy b e t w e e n e m p i r i c i s m a n d rationali s m as to the intellectual w o r t h of sensations is r e n d e r e d strangely obsolete. T h e discussion of sensations belongs u n d e r the head of i m m e d i a t e

253 stimulus and reponse, not u n d e r the h e a d of knowledge.

W h e n experience is aligned w i t h the fife-process a n d sensations are seen to be points of readjustment, the alleged atomism of sensations totally disappears. W i t h this disappearance is abolished the n e e d for a synthetic faculty of s u p e r - e m p i r i c a l reason to connect t h e m . Philosophy is not any longer c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the hopeless p r o b l e m of finding a w a y in w h i c h separate grains of sand m a y be w o v e n into a strong a n d coherent r o p e or into the illusion a n d pretence of one. W h e n the isolated a n d s i m p l e existences of L o c k e a n d H u m e are seen not to be truly e m p i r i c a l at a l l but to answer to certain demands of their theory of m i n d , the necessity ceases for the elaborate K a n t i a n a n d post-Kantian m a c h i n e r y of a priori concepts and categories to synthesize the alleged stuff of experience. T h e true "stuff" of experience is r e c o g n i z e d to be adaptive courses of action, habits, active functions, connections of d o i n g a n d u n d e r g o i n g ; sensori-motor co-ordinations. E x p e r i ence carries p r i n c i p l e s of connection a n d organization w i t h i n itself. These principles are none the worse because they are v i t a l a n d practical rather t h a n epistemological. Some degree of organizat i o n is indispensable to e v e n the lowest grade of life. E v e n an amoeba must have some c o n t i n u i t y in t i m e in its activity a n d some adaptation to its e n v i r o n m e n t in space. Its life a n d experience cannot possibly consist in m o m e n t a r y , atomic, a n d self-enclosed sensations. Its activity has reference to its surroundings a n d to w h a t goes before a n d what comes after. This organization intrinsic to life renders unnecessary a super-natural a n d super-empirical synthesis. It affords the basis a n d material for a positive evolution of i n t e l l i g e n c e as an o r g a n i z i n g factor w i t h i n experience. N o r is it e n t i r e l y aside f r o m the subject to p o i n t out the extent in w h i c h social as w e l l as biological organization enters into the f o r m a t i o n of h u m a n experience. Probably one t h i n g that strengthened the i d e a that the m i n d is passive a n d receptive i n k n o w i n g was the observation o f the helplessness of the h u m a n infant. B u t the observation points in quite another d i r e c t i o n . Be-

254 cause of his physical d e p e n d e n c e a n d i m p o t e n c y , the contacts of the little c h i l d w i t h nature are m e d i a t e d by other persons. M o t h e r a n d nurse, father a n d older c h i l d r e n , d e t e r m i n e w h a t experiences the c h i l d shall have; they constantly instruct h i m as to the m e a n i n g of w h a t he does a n d u n d e r goes. T h e conceptions that are socially c u r r e n t a n d i m p o r t a n t become the child's principles of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d estimation l o n g before he attains to personal a n d deliberate c o n t r o l of con-

PART IV

Mind

duct. T h i n g s c o m e t o h i m c l o t h e d i n language, not i n physical nakedness, a n d this garb o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n makes h i m a sharer in the beliefs of those about h i m . These beliefs corning to h i m as so m a n y facts f o r m his m i n d ; they f u r n i s h the centres about w h i c h his o w n personal expeditions a n d perceptions are o r d e r e d . H e r e w e have "categories" of c o n n e c t i o n a n d unification as i m p o r t a n t as those of K a n t , but e m p i r i c a l not mythological.

William I. Thomas

The Definition of the Situation

28

O n e of the most i m p o r t a n t powers gained d u r i n g the evolution of a n i m a l life is the ability to m a k e decisions f r o m w i t h i n instead of h a v i n g t h e m i m p o s e d f r o m without. V e r y l o w forms o f life do not m a k e decisions, as we understand this t e r m , but are pushed and p u l l e d by c h e m i c a l substances, heat, light, etc., m u c h as i r o n filings are attracted or r e p e l l e d by a magnet. T h e y do t e n d t o behave p r o p e r l y i n g i v e n conditionsa group of small crustaceans w i l l flee as in a panic if a bit of strychnia is p l a c e d in the basin containing t h e m a n d w i l l rush t o w a r d a d r o p of b e e f juice l i k e hogs c r o w d i n g a r o u n d s w i l l b u t they do this as an expression of organic affinity for the one substance and repugnance for the other, and not as an expression of choice or "free w i l l . " T h e r e are, so to speak, rules of behavior but these represent a sort of fortunate mechanistic adjustment

of the organism to typically r e c u r r i n g situations, a n d the organism cannot change the r u l e . O n the other h a n d , the h i g h e r animals, a n d above all m a n , have the p o w e r of refusing to obey a stimulation w h i c h they f o l l o w e d at an earlier t i m e . Response to the earlier stimulation m a y have h a d p a i n f u l consequences a n d so the rule or habit in this situation is changed. We c a l l this ability the p o w e r of i n h i b i t i o n , a n d it is d e p e n d e n t on the fact that the nervous system carries m e m o ries or records of past experiences. At this p o i n t the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of action no longer comes exclusively f r o m outside sources but is located w i t h i n the organism itself. P r e l i m i n a r y to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination a n d deliberation w h i c h we may call the definition of the situation. A n d actually not only concrete acts are d e p e n d e n t on the definition of the situation, but gradually a w h o l e life-policy and the personality of the i n d i v i d u a l himself follow f r o m a series of such definitions.

From

The

Unadjusted

Girl,

pp.

41-50, by W i l l i a m I.

Thomas

( B o s t o n : L i t t l e , B r o w n a n d C o m p a n y , 1931), r e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n o f S o c i a l S c i e n c e R e s e a r c h Council.

Thomas B u t the c h i l d is always b o r n i n t o a g r o u p of people a m o n g w h o m all the general types of situat i o n w h i c h m a y arise have already b e e n defined and c o r r e s p o n d i n g rules of conduct d e v e l o p e d , and w h e r e he has not the slightest chance of maki n g his definitions a n d f o l l o w i n g his wishes w i t h out interference. M e n have always l i v e d together in groups. W h e t h e r m a n k i n d has a t r u e h e r d i n stinct or w h e t h e r groups are h e l d together because this has w o r k e d out to advantage is of no i m p o r t a n c e . C e r t a i n l y the wishes i n general are such that they c a n be satisfied only in a society. B u t we have only to refer to the c r i m i n a l code to appreciate the variety of ways in w h i c h the wishes of the i n d i v i d u a l m a y conflict w i t h the wishes of society. A n d the c r i m i n a l code takes no account of the m a n y unsanctioned expressions of the wishes w h i c h society attempts to regulate by persuasion a n d gossip. T h e r e is therefore always a r i v a l r y b e t w e e n the spontaneous definitions of the situation m a d e b y the m e m b e r o f a n o r g a n i z e d society a n d the definitions w h i c h his society has p r o v i d e d for h i m . T h e i n d i v i d u a l tends to a hedonistic selection of activity, pleasure first; a n d society to a u t i l i t a r i a n selection, safety first. Society wishes its m e m b e r to be laborious, dependable, regular, sober, ord e r l y , self-sacrificing; w h i l e the i n d i v i d u a l wishes less of this a n d m o r e of n e w experience. A n d org a n i z e d society seeks also to regulate the conflict a n d c o m p e t i t i o n inevitable b e t w e e n its m e m b e r s in the pursuit of their wishes. T h e desire to have w e a l t h , for example, or any other socially sanct i o n e d w i s h , m a y not be a c c o m p l i s h e d at the expense of another m e m b e r of the societyby m u r der, theft, l y i n g , s w i n d l i n g , b l a c k m a i l , etc. It is in this connection that a m o r a l code arises, w h i c h is a set of rules or behavior norms, r e g u l a t i n g the expression of the wishes, a n d w h i c h is b u i l t up by successive definitions of the situat i o n . In practice the abuse arises first a n d the r u l e is m a d e to p r e v e n t its recurrence. M o r a l i t y is thus the generally accepted definition of the situation, w h e t h e r expressed i n p u b l i c o p i n i o n a n d the u n w r i t t e n l a w , i n a f o r m a l legal code, o r i n religious cornmandments a n d prohibitions. T h e f a m i l y is the smallest social u n i t a n d the p r i m a r y d e f i n i n g agency. As soon as the c h i l d has free m o t i o n a n d begins to p u l l , tear, p r y , m e d d l e ,

255 a n d p r o w l , the parents b e g i n to define the situat i o n t h r o u g h speech a n d other signs a n d pressures: " B e q u i e t , " "Sit u p straight," " B l o w your nose," " W a s h your face," " M i n d your m o t h e r , " " B e k i n d to sister," etc. This is the real significance of W o r d s w o r t h ' s phrase, "Shades of the prison house b e g i n to close u p o n the g r o w i n g c h i l d . " H i s wishes a n d activities b e g i n to be i n h i b i t e d , a n d gradually, b y definitions w i t h i n the f a m i l y , b y playmates, i n the school, i n the Sunday school, i n the c o m m u n i t y , t h r o u g h reading, b y f o r m a l instruction, by i n f o r m a l signs of a p p r o v a l a n d disapproval, the g r o w i n g m e m b e r learns the code of his society. In a d d i t i o n to the family we have the c o m m u n i t y as a d e f i n i n g agency. At present the c o m m u n i t y is so weak a n d vague that it gives us no idea of the f o r m e r p o w e r of the local group in regulati n g behavior. O r i g i n a l l y the c o m m u n i t y was practically the w h o l e w o r l d of its members. It was composed of fainilies related by b l o o d a n d marriage a n d was not so large that a l l the m e m b e r s c o u l d not c o m e together; it was a face-to-face group. I asked a P o l i s h peasant w h a t was the extent of an " o k o l i c a " or n e i g h b o r h o o d h o w far it reached. "It reaches," he said, "as far as the r e p o r t of a m a n reachesas far as a m a n is t a l k e d about." A n d i t was i n communities o f this k i n d that the m o r a l code w h i c h we n o w r e c o g n i z e as v a l i d originated. T h e customs of the c o m m u n i t y are " f o l k w a y s , " a n d b o t h state a n d c h u r c h have i n their m o r e f o r m a l codes m a i n l y r e c o g n i z e d a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d these folkways. T h e t y p i c a l c o m m u n i t y is vanishing a n d it w o u l d be n e i t h e r possible n o r desirable to restore i t i n its o l d f o r m . I t does not correspond w i t h the present d i r e c t i o n of social e v o l u t i o n a n d it w o u l d n o w b e a distressing c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h t o f i v e . B u t i n the i m m e d i a c y o f relationships a n d the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f e v e r y b o d y i n e v e r y t h i n g , i t represents a n e l e m e n t w h i c h w e have lost a n d w h i c h we shall p r o b a b l y have to restore in some f o r m of cooperation in order to secure a b a l a n c e d and n o r m a l societysome arrangement corres p o n d i n g w i t h h u m a n nature. V e r y e l e m e n t a l examples of the d e f i n i t i o n of the situation by the c o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e , corres p o n d i n g to m o b action as we k n o w it a n d to our t r i a l b y j u r y , are f o u n d a m o n g E u r o p e a n peasants.

256 T h e three documents f o l l o w i n g , a l l relating to the Russian c o m m u n i t y or mir, give some idea of the conditions u n d e r w h i c h a whole c o m m u n i t y , a p u b l i c , f o r m e r l y defined a situation. 25. We who are unacquainted with peasant speech, manners and method of expressing thoughtmimicryif we should be present at a division of land or some settlement among the peasants, would never understand anything. Hearing fragmentary, disconnected exclamations, endless quarreling, with repetition of some single word; hearing this racket of a seemingly senseless, noisy crowd that counts up or measures off something, we should conclude that they would not get together, or arrive at any result in an age. . . . Yet wait until the end and you will see that the division has been made with mathematical accuracythat the measure, the quality of the soil, the slope of the field, the distance from the villageeverything in short has been taken into account, that the reckoning has been correctly done and, what is most important, that every one of those present who were interested in the division is certain of the correctness of the division or settlement. The cry, the noise, the racket do not subside until every one is satisfied and no doubter is left. The same thing is true concerning the discussion of some question by the mir. There are no speeches, no debates, no votes. They shout, they abuse each other, they seem on the point of coming to blows. Apparently they riot in the most senseless manner. Some one preserves silence, silence, and then suddenly puts in a word, one word, or an ejaculation, and by this word, this ejaculation, he turns the whole thing upside down. In the end, you look into it and find that an admirable decision has been formed and, what is most important, a unanimous decision.
1

PARTIV

Mind

you all the substance of his soul. He does not feel embarrassment before anybody; there are no indications here of diplomacy. Further, he opens up his whole soul, and he will tell everything that he may ever have known about you, and not only about you, but about your father, grandfather, and great-grandfather. Here everything is clear water, as the peasants say, and everything stands out plainly. If any one, out of smallness of soul, or for some ulterior motive, thinks to get out of something by keeping silent, they force him out into clear water without pity. A n d there are very few such small-souled persons at important village meetings. I have seen the most peaceable, irresponsible peasants, who at other times would not have thought of saving a word against any one, absolutely changed at these meetings, at these moments of general excitement. They believed in the saying, " O n people even death is beautiful," and they got up so much courage that they were able to answer back the peasants commonly recognized as audacious. At the moment of its height the meeting becomes simply an open mutual confessional and mutual disclosure, the display of the widest publicity. At these moments when, it would seem, the private interests of each reach the highest tension, public interests and justice in turn reach the highest degree of control.
2

26. As I approached the village, there hung over it such a mixed, varied violent shouting, that no well brought-up parliament would agree to recognize itself, even in the abstract, as analogous to this gathering of peasant deputies. It was clearly a full meeting today. . . . At other more quiet village meetings I had been able to make out very little, but this was a real lesson to me. I felt only a continuous, indistinguishable roaring in my ears, sometimes pierced by a particularly violent phrase that broke out from the general roar. I saw in front of me the "immediate" man, in all his beauty. What struck me first of all was his remarkable frankness; the more "immediate" he is, the less able is he to mask his thoughts and feelings; once he is stirred up the emotion seizes him quickly and he flares up then and there, and does not quiet down till he has poured out before
1

27. In front of the volost administration building there stands a crowd of some one hundred and fifty men. This means that a volost meeting has been called to consider the verdict of the Kusmin rural commune "regarding the handing over to the [state] authorities of the peasant Gregori Siedov, caught red-handed and convicted of horse-stealing." Siedov had already been held for judical inquiry; the evidence against him was irrefutable and he would undoubtedly be sentenced to the penitentiary. In view of this I endeavor to explain that the verdict in regard to his exile is wholly superfluous and will only cause a deal of trouble; and that at the termination of the sentence of imprisonment of Siedov the commune will unfailingly be asked whether it wants him back or prefers that he be exiled. Then, I said, in any event it would be necessary to formulate a verdict in regard to the "non-reception" of Siedov, while at this stage all the trouble was premature and could lead to nothing. But the meeting did not believe my words, did not trust the court and wanted to settle the matter right then and there; the general hatred of horse-thieves was too keen. . . . The decisive moment has arrived; the head-man "drives" all the judges-elect to one side; the crowd stands with a gloomy air, trying not to look at Siedov and his wife, who are crawling before the mir on their knees. " O l d men, whoever pities Gregori, will
N. N. Zlatovratsky: "Ocherki Krestyanskoy Obshchiny'

A . N . E n g e l g a r d t : "Iz D e r e v n i : 1 2 P i s e m " ( " F r o m the C o u n t r y ;

12 L e t t e r s " ) , p. 315.

( " S k e t c h e s o f t h e P e a s a n t C o m m u n e " ) , p . 127.

Thomas remain in his place, and whoever does not forgive him will step to the right," cries the head man. The crowd wavered and rocked, but remained dead still on the spot; no one dared to be first to take the fatal step. Gregori feverishly ran over the faces of his judges with his eyes, trying to read in these faces pity for him. His wife wept bitterly, her face close to the ground; beside her, finger in mouth and on the point of screaming, stood a three-year-old youngster (at home Gregori had four more children). . . . But straightway one peasant steps out of the crowd; two years before some one had stolen a horse from him. "Why should we pity him? D i d he pity us?" says the old man, and stooping goes over to the right side. "That is true; bad grass must be torn from the field," says another one from the crowd, and follows the old man. The beginning had been made; at first individually and then in whole groups the judgeselect proceeded to go over to the right. The man condemned by public opinion ran his head into the ground, beat his breast with his fists, seized those passed him by their coat-tails, crying: "Ivan Timofeich! Uncle Leksander! Vasinka, dear kinsman! Wait, kinsmen, let me say a word. . . . Petrushenka." But, without stopping and with stern faces, the members of the mir dodged the unfortunates, who were crawling at their feet. . . . At last the wailing of Gregori stopped; around him for the space of three sazen the place was empty; there was no one to implore. A l l the judges-elect, with the exception of one, an uncle of the man to be exiled, had gone over to the right. The woman cried sorrowfully, while Gregori stood motionless on his knees, his head lowered, stupidly looking at the ground.
3

257 A less f o r m a l but not less p o w e r f u l means of defining the situation e m p l o y e d by the c o m m u nity is gossip. T h e Polish peasant's statement that a c o m m u n i t y reaches as far as a m a n is talked about was significant, for the c o m m u n i t y regulates the behavior of its members largely by talki n g about t h e m . Gossip has a bad n a m e because it is sometimes malicious and false a n d designed to i m p r o v e the status of the gossiper a n d degrade its object, but gossip is in the m a i n true a n d is an o r g a n i z i n g force. It is a m o d e of defining the situation in a g i v e n case a n d of attaching praise or blame. It is one of the means by w h i c h the status of the i n d i v i d u a l a n d of his family is fixed. T h e c o m m u n i t y also, particularly i n connection w i t h gossip, knows h o w to attach o p p r o b r i u m to persons a n d actions by using epithets w h i c h are at the same t i m e brief a n d emotional definitions of the situation. " B a s t a r d , " " w h o r e , " " t r a i t o r , " " c o w a r d , " " s k u n k " "scab," " s n o b , " " k i k e , " etc., are such epithets. In " F a u s t " the c o m m u n i t y said of Margaret, "She stinks." T h e people are here e m p l o y i n g a device k n o w n in psychology as the " c o n d i t i o n e d reflex." If, for example, y o u place before a c h i l d (say six months old) an agreeable object, a k i t t e n , a n d at the same t i m e p i n c h the c h i l d , and if this is repeated several times, the c h i l d w i l l i m m e d i a t e l y cry at the sight of the k i t t e n w i t h o u t b e i n g p i n c h e d ; or if a dead rat were always served beside a man's plate of soup he w o u l d eventually have a disgust for soup w h e n served separately. If the w o r d " s t i n k s " is associated on people's tongues w i t h Margaret, M a r g a r e t w i l l n e v e r again s m e l l sweet. M a n y e v i l consequences, as the psychoanalysts c l a i m , have resulted f r o m m a k i n g the whole of sex life a " d i r t y " subject, but the device has w o r k e d in a p o w e r f u l , sometimes a p a r a l y z i n g way on the sexual behavior of w o m e n . W i n k s , shrugs, nudges, laughter, sneers, haughtiness, coldness, " g i v i n g the once o v e r " are also language defining the situation a n d painfully felt as unfavorable recognition. T h e sneer, for example, is i n c i p i e n t v o m i t i n g , meaning, " y o u m a k e m e sick." A n d eventually the violation of the code e v e n in an act of no intrinsic importance, as in c a r r y i n g food to the m o u t h w i t h the knife, provokes cond e m n a t i o n a n d disgust. T h e fork is not a better

T h e essential point in r e a c h i n g a c o m m u n a l decision, just as in the case of our j u r y system, is u n a n i m i t y . In some cases the w h o l e c o m m u n i t y mobilizes a r o u n d a stubborn i n d i v i d u a l to conf o r m h i m t o the general w i s h . 28. It sometimes happens that all except one may agree but the motion is never carried if that one refuses to agree to it. In such cases all endeavor to talk over and persuade the stiff-necked one. Often they even call to their aid his wife, his children, his relatives, his father-in-law, and his mother, that they may prevail upon him to say yes. Then all assail him, and say to him from time to time; "Come now, God help you, agree with us too, that this may take place as we wish it, that the house may not be cast into disorder, that we may not be talked about by the people, that the neighbors may not hear of it, that the world may not make sport of us!" It seldom occurs in such cases that unanimity is not attained.
4
3

"V. V o l o s t m k h P i s a r y a k h " ("A V i l l a g e S e c r e t a r y " ) , p. 2 8 3 . F . S . K r a u s s : " S i t t e u n d B r a u c h d e r S i i d s l a v e n , " p . 103.

258 i n s t r u m e n t for c o n v e y i n g food t h a n the k n i f e , at least it has no m o r a l superiority, b u t the situation has b e e n defined in favor of the fork. To smack w i t h the lips i n eating i s b a d manners w i t h us, b u t the I n d i a n has m o r e logically d e f i n e d the situ ation i n the opposite way; w i t h h i m smacking i s a c o m p l i m e n t to the host.

P A R T

Mind

In this w h o l e connection fear is used by the group to p r o d u c e the desired attitudes in its m e m ber. Praise is used also but m o r e sparingly. A n d the w h o l e b o d y of habits a n d emotions is so m u c h a c o m m u n i t y a n d f a m i l y product that disapproval or separation is almost unbearable.

Robert A. Stebbins

29

Studying the Definition of the Situation: Theory and F i e l d Research Strategies

F o r over forty years, since Thomas a n d Z n a n i e c k i p u b l i s h e d The Polish Peasant, the phrase " t h e definition of the s i t u a t i o n " has b e e n in the A m e r i c a n sociologist's lexicon. W h a t is remark able, g i v e n this longevity, is the paucity of re search that focuses on the definitions of specific situations by groups of actors as explanations for the b e h a v i o u r of these actors in the i m m e d i a t e e n v i r o n m e n t . Those few studies that have b e e n c a r r i e d out u n d e r the n a m e of definition of the situation (for example, G o r d e n , 1952; L e r n e r a n d B e c k e r , 1962; Deutscher, 1964) have either inade quately operationalized this n o t i o n or have con sidered as the situation to be defined something far larger a n d less specific t h a n a t y p i c a l instance

R o b e r t A . Stebbins, " S t u d y i n g the D e f i n i t i o n o f the Situation: Theory Canadian and F i e l d Research Strategies." of Sociology and Reprinted from The Review Anthropology, 6:4 (1969),

of o n g o i n g social i n t e r a c t i o n . H o w e v e r , it should be n o t e d that there is one v e r y recent e x c e p t i o n to this i n d i c t m e n t , a n d we shall consider it briefly later on. It is Peter M c H u g h ' s ingenious labora tory study of the definition of the situation (1968). It seems that tradition as w e l l as genuine con ceptual a n d measurement difficulties have c o m b i n e d to p r o d u c e a reluctance to investigate, in a systematic fashion, people's definitions of situa tions. T h e m y t h , outside a n d to some extent w i t h i n the field of symbolic interactionism, that the ideas of G e o r g e H e r b e r t M e a d (and therefore those of his followers) cannot be e m p i r i c a l l y exam i n e d still fingers. T h e r e is the v e r y r e a l p r o b l e m of c o n c r e t i z i n g or establishing w o r k i n g definitions for a c o n c e p t so subjective a n d abstract as the definition of the situation. F i n a l l y , there has b e e n the t e n d e n c y to consider the definition of t h ^ situ1
1

by permission of the author a n d the publisher. T h e a u t h o r wishes t o express his g r a t i t u d e t o Professors J e a n L . Briggs, F r a n k E . Jones, a n d R o b e r t W . H a b e n s t e i n for their h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s o n various drafts o f the m a n u s c r i p t .

I t i s this l a t t e r k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h w e a r e i n t e r e s t e d .

I t has b e e n d e f i n e d m o r e f o r m a l l y b y S t e b b i n s (1967:150) a s the "subjective s i t u a t i o n " o r " t h e i m m e d i a t e social a n d p h y s i c a l surroundings a n d the current physiological a n d psychological state of t h e a c t o r . . . as seen by him."

Stebbins ation in terms of the single i n d i v i d u a l w h o holds it, a practice not conducive to the d e v e l o p m e n t of nomothetic science. W i t h respect to this last p o i n t , we must strive instead to m a k e general statements about classes of definitions used by identifiable groups of m e n in particular but recurrent situations. A l t h o u g h it w i l l be a l o n g t i m e before anyt h i n g like " g r o u n d e d " theories of the definitions of specific kinds of situations by specific categories of actors appear, it is evident that a set of research strategies must be devised to assist us in our efforts to reach this goal. T h e a i m of this paper is to offer, along w i t h certain strategies for research, some refinements in the theory of the definition of the situation that was presented in an earlier essay by the author (Stebbins, 1967). An exploratory type of field e x p e r i m e n t a l demonstration follows this discussion, and we c o n c l u d e w i t h a rev i e w of the implications of the refined theory for sociological motivation.

259 resentations; the standard meanings of events e m b e d d e d in the c o m m u n i t y culture as a w h o l e or some sub-part of it (sub-culture) that we l e a r n e i ther through p r i m a r y socialization or secondary socialization or b o t h . A g i v e n c u l t u r a l definition is consensually shared to the extent that those who are m e m b e r s of a particular group are aware that others in it recognize and utilize that definit i o n i n the same w a y that they do. Thus, i n N o r t h A m e r i c a bar rooms are generally defined as places w h e r e people d r i n k alcoholic beverages a n d talk sociably w i t h others, a n d offices at places of w o r k are typically c o n c e i v e d as locations for occupationally related a c t i v i t y t w o w i d e l y h e l d c u l t u r a l definitions. B u t sharing of the definition n e e d not be c o n sensual. T h e non-consensual sharing characteristic of the habitual personal definition refers to the circumstances in w h i c h the same category of situation holds roughly the same m e a n i n g for a particular class of actor participating in it, but in w h i c h each i n d i v i d u a l participant is m o r e or less unaware that people like h i m w h o are h a v i n g the same k i n d of experiences elsewhere define t h e m in the same way. Present research by the author into the ways teachers define certain classr o o m situations has disclosed that they are largely unaware of h o w their colleagues deal w i t h r o u t i n e instances of disorderly behaviour. T h a t J o h n n y was discovered w h i s p e r i n g the other day or that Susan was d a y d r e a m i n g this m o r n i n g are apparently not of sufficient importance to the teachers investigated so far in the project to warrant c o m m e n t to other teachers in the same k i n d of setting. Still, each teacher defined situations such as these, usually as c a l l i n g for a specific action designed to c u r b the undesirable behaviour of the student or students i n v o l v e d . H a b i t u a l definitions are the regular meanings e m p l o y e d by categories of actors in specific kinds of p e r i o d i c situations that for one reason or another (such as, the insignificance of the event or the unavailability of l i k e actors to each other w h i l e b e h a v i n g in the situation) are not c o m m u n i c a t e d . These meanings can be distinguished f r o m u n i q u e personal definitions, w h i c h refer to the person's interpretation of events rarely or n e v e r e n c o u n tered in the c o m m u n i t y . To w i t , events that occur for w h i c h , so far as he is c o n c e r n e d , no c u l t u r a l

T H E O R Y A N D R E S E A R C H STRATEGIES T h e goal of m a k i n g general statements about classes of definitions used by identifiable groups of m e n in particular but r e c u r r e n t situations, is best attained by e m p l o y i n g the f o l l o w i n g concepts. T h e groups of m e n to be studied are those in different social identities, the c o n v e n t i o n a l l y r e c o g n i z e d categories i n c o m m u n i t y f i f e into w h i c h h u m a n actors place themselves a n d others. Most of our definitions of the countless situations that we enter, whatever i d e n t i t y we are i n , m a y be classified as b e l o n g i n g to one of the f o l l o w i n g modes: cultural definitions (Wolff, 1965:182), habitual personal definitions, or unique personal definitions? T h e c h i e f difference b e t w e e n the first two lies in the distinction bet w e e n consensual and non-consensual sharing of meanings. C u l t u r a l definitions are collective r e p
2
1

" I d e n t i t y " i s p r e f e r r e d o v e r c l o s e l y r e l a t e d i d e a s s u c h a s "sta-

t u s , " " p o s i t i o n , " a n d " r a n k " b e c a u s e o f its a p p a r e n t l y b r o a d e r scope. F o r example, one c a n h a v e the identity of neighbour, b u t w e w o u l d n o t o r d i n a r i l y c a l l this a p o s i t i o n o r a status.
3

T h e s e three modes of the definition of the situation represent

a n e x p a n s i o n o f t h e " c u l t u r a l " a n d " p e r s o n a l d e f i n i t i o n s " dis c u s s e d b y t h e a u t h o r i n h i s e a r l i e r p a p e r ( S t e b b i n s , 1967:158)

260 or habitual m e a n i n g exists. Thus, he must i m p r o vise his o w n interpretation, usually basing his syn thesis on the nearest personal or collective equiv alent. Presumably, the recent earth tremors in the m i d w e s t e r n p o r t i o n o f N o r t h A m e r i c a l e d t o m a n y u n i q u e definitions of that situation. A l t h o u g h they are infrequent, u n i q u e per sonal definitions are apparently shared on a n o n consensual basis u n d e r some circumstances. a n d H a n s e n (1962:186), after e x a m i n i n g several studies c o n c e r n i n g the f a m i l y in disasters, con c l u d e d that there is a general tendency for family m e m b e r s to seek each other u n d e r these c i r c u m stances, if geographical location does not p r e v e n t this. It seems that people's definitions of disaster situations regularly include f a m i l y considerations, if their families are b e l i e v e d to be in any dan ger. T h e relationship b e t w e e n these three modes of definitions of the situation is c o m p l i c a t e d and must await e m p i r i c a l specification. Because they are m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l they cannot be p l a c e d on a single c o n t i n u u m . At this stage of the develop m e n t of the theory, they are best v i e w e d as i d e a l types, f u n c t i o n i n g heuristically to i n f o r m us h o w closely a g i v e n e m p i r i c a l case approximates the p u r e conceptualization of the p h e n o m e n o n . T h e a i m o f research i n this f i e l d should b e the d e v e l o p m e n t of " g r o u n d e d theories" of defi nitions of r e c u r r e n t situations e n c o u n t e r e d by the i n c u m b e n t s of a particular i d e n t i t y . Since c u l t u r a l a n d habitual definitions are seen as f o r m i n g the foundation on w h i c h actors b u i l d u n i q u e defi nitions, a n d since they refer to r e c u r r e n t settings, it should be clear that we must b e g i n any research p r o g r a m w i t h the a i m just suggested by concen trating initially on the first two modes of defini tions. A n d by studying the definitions of situations of those in a g i v e n identity, a theoretical l i n k to the social structure of the c o m m u n i t y is also gained, thereby p e r m i t t i n g us as w e l l to v i e w our findings in terms of their relevance at the macrosociological l e v e l of analysis.
4

PART IV

Mind

particular setting. O n c e a cultural d e f i n i t i o n is d e t e r m i n e d to be relevant for the events at h a n d , it is idiosyncratically tailored so as to better serve the user. As we shall indicate shortly, this is done, i n part, t h r o u g h activated predispositions. T h e usage of the t e r m " p r e d i s p o s i t i o n " in this p a p e r is similar to the m o d e r n conceptualization of N e w c o m b , T u r n e r , a n d Converse (1965:40-46, 67-73) a n d C a m p b e l l (1963:97-112). C a m p b e l l , w h o limits his statement strictly to a c q u i r e d states, stresses the i m p o r t a n c e of the fact that p r e dispositions (he calls t h e m " a c q u i r e d b e h a v i o u r a l dispositions") are e n d u r i n g a n d that they r e m a i n d o r m a n t u n t i l activated by situational s t i m u l i . W h e n activated, these products of past experi ence i m p i n g e u p o n our awareness, e q u i p us w i t h a specific v i e w of the w o r l d , and guide b e h a v i o u r i n the i m m e d i a t e present. T h e f o l l o w i n g sequential m o d e l indicates the location of the definition of the situation in rela tion to the i n i t i a l reaction of the i n d i v i d u a l to the setting. 1. T y p i c a l actors in a g i v e n i d e n t i t y enter a t y p i c a l setting w i t h a specific i n t e n t i o n o r action orientation i n m i n d . 2 . C e r t a i n aspects of these surroundings, some of w h i c h are r e l a t e d to the i n t e n t i o n , activate or a w a k e n some of the predispositions the actors characteristically c a r r y w i t h t h e m . 3. T h e aspects of the surroundings, the i n t e n t i o n , a n d the activated predispositions, w h e n considered together, lead to the selection of a c u l t u r a l or habitual definition. 4. This defini tion directs subsequent action in the situation, at least u n t i l a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n occurs.
5

F r o m what has b e e n said so far, it is possible to formulate two research problems to guide ac tual study. 1. W h a t c u l t u r a l or habitual definitions are available to those in a g i v e n social i d e n t i t y for use in one or m o r e specified kinds of r e c u r r i n g situations? 2. F o r classes of actors w i t h i n an i d e n tity, w h a t c o m m o n predispositions are activated by elements in the ongoing setting that influence the selection of one of these definitions instead of a n o t h e r ?
6

A c u l t u r a l definition, since it is categorical a n d impersonal, must be g i v e n additional specifi cation by the actor using it w i t h reference to any
4

T h i s is, o f c o u r s e , a h i g h l y s i m p l i f i e d v e r s i o n o f a m o r e c o m p l i

c a t e d p r o c e s s . F o r a m o r e d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f this m o d e l , see S t e b b i n s (1967).

6

M c H u g h ' s treatment of the process of " e m e r g e n c e " seems

t o c o m e closest i n m e a n i n g t o t h e c u l t u r a l a n d h a b i t u a l d e f i n i G r o u n d e d theory is theory d i s c o v e r e d " f r o m data systemati t i o n s , w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e rest o f t h e c o n c e p t s i n o u r f r a m e work. F o l l o w i n g M e a d , e m e r g e n c e refers t o the past a n d f u t u r e c a l l y o b t a i n e d f r o m s o c i a l r e s e a r c h " ( G l a s e r a n d S t r a u s s , 1967:2).

Stebbins Operationalization O n c e one discovers some of the m o r e i m p o r tant r e c u r r i n g situations for the actors in an i d e n tity (by means of some f o r m of observation), one can, if not already aware of t h e m , b e g i n to search for the c u l t u r a l or habitual definitions available for each setting. This c a n be done most efficaciously by a c o m b i n a t i o n of f u r t h e r direct observ a t i o n a n d questionnaire i n t e r v i e w i n g . H e r e observation performs a single i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n : it gives the investigator a c r u d e i d e a of the definit i o n that the subject has chosen in response to the situation at h a n d . H a v i n g a c q u i r e d this k n o w l edge it is possible for the f o r m e r to question the latter about that event, the i n t e n t i o n b e i n g to establish a m o r e detailed a n d consequently m o r e v a l i d p i c t u r e of the m e a n i n g that the i n c i d e n t h e l d for the respondent. In o r d e r to avert p r o b lems of recall, i n t e r v i e w i n g should take place as soon as possible after the situation u n d e r observat i o n has e n d e d . T h e i n t e r v i e w i n g , if it is to fulfil its function, must be c o n d u c t e d along the lines of p r o g r a m matically d e v e l o p e d statements o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g the concept of the definition of the situation, thirteen of w h i c h are listed b e l o w . E a c h of these has b e e n t h e o r i z e d a n d often e m p i r i c a l l y d e m o n strated by social psychologists to p l a y an i m p o r tant role in situationally based a n d situationally focused explanations of b e h a v i o u r . T h e m e r i t of
7

261 the theory of the d e f i n i t i o n of the situation is that it pulls together these theoretical strands, w h i c h are in themselves i n c o m p l e t e as explanations, w i t h i n a m o r e coherent a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e f r a m e w o r k (some of w h i c h we have yet to discuss). T h e r e is a degree of overlap b e t w e e n some of the statements, but for our purposes this m a y be advantageous. 1. Identification by the i d e n t i t y i n cumbents of the relevant others present (Ball, forthcoming; Foote, 1951: 17-21; M c H u g h , 1968:43; Stone, 1962:89-90; Strauss, 1959:47; T u r n e r , 1956; W e i n s t e i n a n d D e u t s c h b e r g e r , 1963; 1964). 2. T h e i n c u m b e n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the evaluation that those others have m a d e of the situation, i n c l u d i n g the m o r a l a n d e m o t i o n a l or sentimental connotations of the i m m e d i a t e sett i n g as they are established w i t h reference to the others' identification of themselves (Ball, f o r t h c o m i n g ; Jones a n d D a v i s , 1965;226-227; M c H u g h , 1968:44; N e w c o m b , 1958:180; Shand, 1920; S h i b u t a n i , 1961:332-334; Stone, 1962:97-101; Strauss, 1959:59; Thomas, 1951:69; T u r n e r , 1956:321; W e b e r , 1947:90-95). 3. T h e i n c u m bents' p e r c e p t i o n of the goals or intentions of the others w h i l e i n the setting (Ball, f o r t h c o m i n g ; Jones a n d D a v i s , 1965:222-223; Schutz, 1964:32; Strauss, 1959:59; T u r n e r , 1956; W e b e r , 1947:9095). 4. T h e i n c u m b e n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the plans of action (strategies for reaching the goals) of the relevant others (Turner, 1956:321). 5. T h e i n c u m bents' p e r c e p t i o n of the justifications or vocabularies of motives associated w i t h the others' plans of action (Mills, 1940; Schutz, 1964:32). 6. T h e i n c u m b e n t s ' evaluation of the situation (Ball, forthcoming; Cooley, 1922:183-184; Foote, 1951:20-21; M c C a l l a n d Simmons, 1966:136; Shand, 1920; Shibutani, 1961:332-334; Stone, 1962:93, 9 7 - 1 0 1 ; Strauss, 1959:59; T u r n e r , 1956:322). 7. T h e i n c u m b e n t s ' plans of action (Jones a n d T h i b a u t , 1958:158-174). 8. T h e i n c u m bents' justifications of the plans (Burke, 1945; 1950; M a c l v e r , 1964:293; M i l l s , 1940; Schutz, 1964:11).
8

influence on

contemporary

behaviour

(McHugh,

1968;24-25).

T h e process o f e m e r g e n c e p a r t l y manifests itself i n e v e r y d a y life by l e a d i n g the actor to e x p e c t a familiar " t h e m e " in all or m o s t o f h i s d e a l i n g s w i t h o t h e r s ( M c H u g h , 1968:37). T h e o t h e r major parameter of the definition of the situation found in M c H u g h ' s study is that of the "relativity" of standpoints f r o m w h i c h w e j u d g e t h e setting (1968:28, 42-45). H o w e v e r , h i s e v i d e n c e suggests t h a t r e l a t i v i t y , a s h e uses this t e r m , operates mostly w h e r e the assumption of a t h e m e breaks d o w n . T h i s approaches our notion of unique personal definition, w h i c h is p e r i p h e r a l to o u r interests h e r e . W h i l e there are several places w h e r e aspects o f the p r o c e s s o f e m e r g e n c e a n d those o f t h e cultural or habitual definition s e e m to c o r r e s p o n d , we shall retain the operational t e r m i n o l o g y d e v e l o p e d earlier. It better r e l a t e s t o t h e p r e v i o u s l y d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y a n d , b e c a u s e o f its greater c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s , b e t t e r serves field r e s e a r c h .
7

T h e phrase "situationally based a n d situationally focused expla8

n a t i o n s " refers to those propositions in social p s y c h o l o g y that f i x o n b e h a v i o u r i n the i m m e d i a t e setting a n d that are consistent w i t h t h e a s s u m p t i o n that h u m a n a c t i o n is, a t least i n p a r t , a p r o d u c t of what is h a p p e n i n g there. T h e y are clearly of a differe n t g e n r e t h a n constitutionally based or social structurally based explanations.

T h e citations at the e n d of e a c h of these statements r e f e r to

some of the relevant theoretical a n d e m p i r i c a l literature. T h e y do not, in any way, represent an exhaustive inventory of p e r t i n e n t e n t r i e s . A l s o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s t a t e m e n t s p r e s e n t e d i n this paper are occasionally couched in language rather different f r o m that f o u n d i n the w o r k s c i t e d .

262 A n d as through the l o o k i n g glass: 9. T h e i d e n tity i n c u m b e n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the identification of t h e m by the relevant others ( M c C a l l a n d Simmons, 1966:140-142; Stone, 1962:93; T u r n e r , 1956:321-323; 1962:34). 10. T h e i n c u m b e n t s ' perc e p t i o n of the evaluation of the situation i m p u t e d to t h e m by the others (Cooley, 1922:183-184; Jones, 1964; Stone, 1962:97-101; Turner, 1956:321-323; 1962:34). 11. T h e i n c u m b e n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the intentions i m p u t e d to t h e m w h i l e in the situation (Jones, 1964; T u r n e r , 1956:321323; 1962:34). 12. T h e i n c u m b e n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the plans of action i m p u t e d to t h e m (Foote, 1951; Strauss, 1959:51; T u r n e r , 1956:321-323). 13. T h e i n c u m b e n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the justifications of the plans i m p u t e d to t h e m (Mills, 1940; Schutz, 1964:32-33; Strauss, 1959:52). A l l of these perceptions by a g i v e n set of i d e n tity holders can, theoretically, be said to be part of t h e i r definitions of a particular k i n d of situation. H o w e v e r , not all of t h e m w i l l necessarily be obt a i n e d in any g i v e n investigation, for the actors m a y not be able to get such i n f o r m a t i o n for their o w n use i n the interaction. T h e y m i g h t , for example, be able to identify the relevant others, their meanings, a n d their intentions, but they m i g h t not have t i m e to reflect about their plans of action or their justifications for t h e m . M o r e o v e r , we m a y not n e e d or desire the type of knowledge contained in each of these perceptions. W e , as social persons, require only adequate\fm(m\er\ge about the others present a n d their perceptions of us so that we can act; additional information, w h i l e perhaps desirable, is less essential. Jones a n d T h i b a u t (1958:151-152) cite research demonstrating that not all i n f o r m a t i o n is equally useful in assessing other actors in the e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e y believe that m u c h of the perceiver's energy w i l l be d i r e c t e d toward his o w n future response (his p l a n of action) and not t o w a r d the stable characteristics of the others present (Jones a n d T h i b a u t , 1958:74). Ichheiser (1949:4648) points out that there is a tendency to overestimate the role of personal factors in the e n v i r o n m e n t , w h i l e underestimating the role of situa9

PART IV

Mind

tional factors. We are often b l i n d to situational factors as others see t h e m . F i n a l l y , it has b e e n suggested b y G e r t h and M i l l s (1954:115) that u n less one's anticipated behaviour is contrary to the expectations of those present, there is no felt n e e d to justify it. T h e investigator can isolate the c u l t u r a l or habitual definitions used by those in an i d e n t i t y i n certain circumstances b y c o m b i n i n g their responses to the operational statements as they appear in the questionnaire. This is exemplified in the field e x p e r i m e n t r e p o r t e d later. Such a proced u r e permits one to obtain something of the actors' organic views of the i m m e d i a t e c i r c u m stances, w h i c h is in k e e p i n g w i t h the belief that a definition or m e a n i n g of the situation is a synthesis, interpretation, a n d interrelation of predispositions, intentions, a n d elements of the setting (Stebbins, 1967:158).

Phases of the D e f i n i t i o n of the Situation In our sequential m o d e l presented earlier we stated that on the basis of the situational factors, the actors' predispositions, and their goals, a c u l tural or habitual personal mode of definition was selected. A l t h o u g h generally correct this statem e n t is oversimplified. In actuality, the choice of standard definitions seems to take place in t w o phases o c c u r r i n g in r a p i d succession. Phase I is that of i d e n t i f y i n g the ongoing events as an i n stance of some category of situation. H e r e the incumbents have a choice; (i) a set of events is for t h e m a n instance o f " X " category o f situation, or (ii) a set is not such an instance a n d therefore is an instance of another category of situation (say, situation " A , " " B , " o r " C " ) . H o w e v e r , r e c u r r e n t situations are not free f r o m associated meanings in the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d ; they do not occur as neutral, u n i n t e r p r e t e d happenings. In the v e r y process of i d e n t i f y i n g the category of setting we are i n , we have also selected a p o r t i o n of our c u l t u r a l or habitual definition because it is associated by means of socialization w i t h the events at h a n d . M o r e specifically, some or all of operational statements 1 through 5 a n d 9 through 13 appear s i m u l taneously m e r e l y f r o m i d e n t i f y i n g a set of events a s " X " o r " B " o r whatever.

Or,

lacking direct information

one

may

assume

certain

a m o u n t a b o u t t h e o t h e r s , r e l y i n g o n w h a t S i m m e l (1950:318) c a l l e d " c o n f i d e n c e " i n their m e a n i n g s , intentions, etc. T h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s a r e still p a r t o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n .

Stebbins Phase II of the selection of a c u l t u r a l or habitu a l definition amounts to choosing a standard personal evaluation, p l a n of action, and justification (operational statements 6 t h r o u g h 8). This can o n l y be done after some answers, no matter h o w tentative, have b e e n p r o v i d e d to the questions posed by the operational statements that c o m prise Phase I. T h e r e must be a m o d i c u m of i n f o r m a t i o n about the situation to evaluate, a n d to r e s p o n d to w i t h a p l a n of action. In Phase II, choice is g u i d e d by the i m m e d i a t e intentions of the actors, the actors' identification of the setting in Phase I, a n d the activated predispositions resulting f r o m this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . W h e n the i n t e n tions a n d activated predispositions play a role in the selection of a certain c u l t u r a l definition (as c o m p a r e d w i t h a habitual definition), they also d i r e c t the tailoring of that definition to the i n d i v i d u a l user. In this subjective sense the intentions a n d the predispositions are v e r y m u c h a part of the definition of the situation (both as a process a n d a product).
10

263 i n any t y p i c a l situation, then, h a v i n g observed the events there, our p r o b l e m is just as we stated earlier: to isolate the activated predispositions for classes of actors. These predispositions, w h i c h are m a n y and v a r i e d (e.g., attitudes, values, general life goals, ideal self-conceptions, i n t e r n a l i z e d role expectations, interests, a n d so f o r t h ) , can be measured in almost as m a n y diverse ways. T h e most critical p r o c e d u r a l p r o b l e m facing the researcher in this area is h o w to r e c o r d this activat i o n of predispositions. Its solution demands m u c h m o r e than simply f i n d i n g out w h i c h p e o p l e h o l d a particular attitude or self-conception. Rather it involves d e t e r m i n i n g if that disposition has p l a y e d a role in the selection of a particular c u l t u r a l or habitual definition. Fortunately, we are a i d e d by c o m m o n sense here, since it w i l l be obvious to the long-time occupants of an identity (and to the observer w h o taps their knowledge) that some predispositions are not usually associated w i t h certain social situations, w h i l e others are. Thus, teacher attitudes t o w a r d other races are not l i k e l y to be activated in an all-white classroom situation w h e r e mathematics is b e i n g taught.
11

T h e r e are a couple of formulations in the literature that speak for the tenability of conceptua l i z i n g the defining of a situation in terms of two r a p i d l y o c c u r r i n g successive phases. F o r instance, F r i t z H e i d e r (1958:76) has enunciated the general p r i n c i p l e that p e r c e p t i o n influences action by arousing motivational states in the actor. Shand's theory of emotional expression (1920) also fits our m o d e l : as manifestations of u n d e r l y i n g sentiments, behaviour-directing emotions are responses to certain kinds of settings. If I hate the m a n next door, I w i l l be r e v o l t e d w h e n I see h i m in his garden and pleased w h e n I notice that he has a flat tire. O n c e we have identified one or m o r e c o m m o n purposes for a set of identity incumbents

A p p r o p r i a t e k n o w l e d g e about an identity, then, enables us to be reasonably confident that a relevant predisposition has b e e n activated a n d has b e e n a factor in the selection of a particular definition w h e n those w h o have chosen it are f o u n d to h o l d b o t h the disposition and the definit i o n in a significantly greater p r o p o r t i o n t h a n we w o u l d expect f r o m their observed frequency i n the study sample. Parenthetically, it should be noted that any c u l t u r a l or habitual definition m a y be r e p l a c e d by another if, for some reason, the events in the setting change in some significant way. If this happens, t h e n the same processes of selection r e c u r (also see Ball's discussion of this point, f o r t h c o m ing). Major changes in the affairs of the m o m e n t have b e e n said, in fact, to signal the emergence of a n e w situation. T h e problems of establishing temporal, social, a n d physical boundaries of situa-

1 0

I n the interest o f clarity i t s h o u l d b e p o i n t e d out that the

i m m e d i a t e intentions w i t h w h i c h an actor enters the setting a n d his g e n e r a l l i f e goals o r l o n g - r a n g e goals a r e t w o d i s t i n c t , a l b e i t , r e l a t e d i d e a s . A g e n e r a l l i f e g o a l is a p r e d i s p o s i t i o n t h a t i s too c o m p l e x a n d abstract f r o m the i n d i v i d u a l ' s p o i n t o f v i e w t o b e r e a l i z e d i n o n e o r a f e w situations. T h e i m m e d i a t e i n t e n tion, on the other hand, although it m a y be in service of a long-range goal is envisaged by the actor as b e i n g r e a l i z e d in the o n g o i n g setting or in a short s e q u e n c e of s u c h settings. T h i s latter t y p e of goal is not a predisposition because it is not a n e n d u r i n g state t h a t m a y b e a c t i v a t e d f r o m t i m e t o t i m e o r that equips us w i t h a special v i e w of the w o r l d .

1 1

A l o n g e r t h o u g h still i n c o m p l e t e list i s a v a i l a b l e i n C a m p b e l l

( 1 9 6 3 : 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ) . I n fact, s o m e p h e n o m e n a t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r e d i n o b j e c t i v e t e r m s , c a n also b e t r e a t e d a s p r e dispositions. See, for e x a m p l e , the author's papers on i n t e r p e r sonal relationships a n d social networks a n d subjective career ( S t e b b i n s , 1969; 1970).

264 tions, b o t h o l d and n e w , are considered by Stebbins (1967:151-154).

PARTIV

Mind

A FIELD EXPERIMENT T h e e x p e r i m e n t was c o n d u c t e d d u r i n g a series of controversial lectures on the theory of evol u t i o n i n a n introductory sociology and anthropology course in a c o m m u n i t y w h e r e religious matters are taken seriously. A l t h o u g h there w e r e no outright contests b e t w e e n instructor a n d students, it was clear that the latter w e r e taking an unusual interest in the lecture material of the form e r , thereby i n d i c a t i n g its c o n c e r n (both positive a n d negative) to t h e m . W i t h the co-operation of the instructor, two well-dressed male sociology students, ages 22 a n d 38, e n t e r e d the lecture h a l l just before class was to b e g i n and sat in the front r o w . A f t e r the instructor h a d b e g u n s u m m a r i z i n g some of his previous lectures on evolution, one of the m e n abruptly i n t e r r u p t e d h i m w i t h a contentious question about the v a l i d i t y of his i n f o r m a t i o n . F o r approxim a t e l y five minutes a heated debate raged bet w e e n instructor and the experimenter's confederates over the merits of the b i b l i c a l versus the scientific versions of creation a n d the developm e n t o f m a n . T h e instructor, not f r o m the c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h the university is located, was b r a n d e d , a m o n g other things, an outsider, an atheist, a n d a C o m m u n i s t . He was accused of defiling the minds of students a n d i n c i t i n g p e r n i cious social change. In the e n d the interlopers w e r e expelled w i t h o u t c e r e m o n y . T h e experimenter (who was listening outside the door) appeared i m m e d i a t e l y , and disclosed the true nature of the p r e c e d i n g events. Thereu p o n each student was asked to fill in a questionnaire containing a small n u m b e r of open-ended items w h i c h w e r e constructed along the lines of some of the t h i r t e e n operational statements of the definition of the s i t u a t i o n . A l t h o u g h i n d i v i d 12

ual i n t e r v i e w i n g w o u l d have b e e n preferable, this p r o c e d u r e was successful enough to p r o v i d e some definitive i n f o r m a t i o n about their interpretation of the e x p e r i m e n t a l situation. M o s t students were able to complete the f o r m in approximately t w e n t y minutes. An h o u r later (at the second m e e t i n g of that class) each student was requested to take, in the order of their appearance here, the K u h n - M c P a r t l a n d Twenty-Statements Test, an interest r a n k i n g test, a n d a goal r a n k i n g test. These measures p r o v i d e d the e x p e r i m e n t e r w i t h a m o d i c u m of data about the predispositions of the students. T h e Twenty-Statements Test, though successfully adm i n i s t e r e d , was unusable because the numbers of respondents, e v e n in the largest cells, w e r e not sufficient for m e a n i n g f u l cross tabulation. W i t h respect to the other tests the students were asked to r a n k o r d e r six major interests: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, p o l i t i c a l , a n d r e l i gious. T h e r e w e r e also t e n general life goals to be r a n k e d (see N e w c o m b , 1961:39-40).
13

Results T h e f o l l o w i n g six operational statements w e r e used: (i) identification of the t w o m e n ; (it) their p e r c e i v e d evaluation of the class a n d its activities; (iii) their p e r c e i v e d intentions; (iv) the students' evaluation of the behaviour of the m e n : (v) the students' plans of action; a n d (vi) their justifications for t h e m . Tables 29.1 t h r o u g h 29.4 summ a r i z e the d i s t r i b u t i o n of responses to the questionnaire items constructed w i t h reference to the first four of these. These w e r e not e n o u g h responses to the items on plans of action a n d their justifications to be useful for our purposes. By cross tabulating the data in T a b l e 29.1 w i t h those in Tables 29.2 t h r o u g h 29.4, t w o cultural definitions w e r e isolated. Definition I. These two m e n are religious figures of some sort. T h e i r beliefs are b e i n g seriously threatened by the lectures, a n d as a result
1 3

" T h e instructions that a p p e a r e d at t h e t o p of the first p a g e , w h i c h w e r e also r e a d a l o u d t o t h e s t u d e n t s , r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e y r e c o r d o n l y those reactions t o t h e t w o m e n that t h e y h a d u p to the time the experimenter entered the room. By means of this p r o c e d u r e i t was h o p e d t h a t r e t r o s p e c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s w o u l d be minimized.

B o t h t h e i n t e r e s t r a n k i n g a n d g o a l r a n k i n g tests w e r e t a k e n

f r o m N e w c o m b (1961:39-40).

Stebbins

265

they w a n t t h e m either c o r r e c t e d or stopped. T h e i r activities are outrageous a n d h i g h l y resented. Definition II. These two m e n are only n o n student intruders. T h e y s o m e h o w feel that the lectures are h a v i n g a b a d influence u p o n us students, a n d as a result w a n t t h e m either c o r r e c t e d or stopped. T h e i r activities are m i l d l y disgusting. F o r D e f i n i t i o n I, 44.2 p e r c e n t of those w h o i d e n t i f i e d the t w o m e n as religious figures also felt that the lectures posed a threat to their beliefs, whereas the expected p r o p o r t i o n was o n l y 29.2 p e r c e n t as based on the m a r g i n a l totals of t h e over-all cross tabulation b e t w e e n Tables 29.1 a n d 29.2. U s i n g the chi-square one-sample test, this association c a n be expected by chance in

less t h a n 3 p e r c e n t of the cases (x 4.60; 0.025 > p > 0 . 0 1 ) . S i m i l a r l y , 52.7 p e r c e n t of those w h o i d e n t i f i e d the m e n as religious figures also i d e n t i f i e d t h e m as w a n t i n g to correct the instructor's views, w h i l e the expected p r o p o r tion was only 30.5 percent (x 4.36; 0.025 > /?>0.01). F i n a l l y , 50.0 p e r c e n t of those
2 1 4 2 =

A l l of the chi-squares reported here are one-tailed. This practice is justified by the observation that, for a cross tabulation to yield a meaningful association, it has to be of a higher frequency than expected from the margin totals. Also, in three of the chi-square tests presented in this paper, one of the expected frequencies was slightly below 5, the minimum allowed for their optimal application. T h e decision was made to use them in spite of this weakness since the research is only demonstrative, and the only alternative appeared to be the binomial test, which with our data is prohibitively laborious. See Siegel (1956:36-47).
14

266 T A B L E 29.3. Student perceptions of the men's intentions

Perceived Intentions Number

PART IV

Mind

Percent

They have come to correct the instructor's views They have come to encourage the students to reject the lectures They have come to test the student's reaction to the lectures They have come to make a disturbance, harass, or to show off They have come at the instructor's invitation to stimulate discussion Other Unable to establish any intentions Totals

21 5 7 25 5 3 54 120

17.5 4.2 5.8 20.8 4.2 2.5 45.0 100.0

T A B L E 29.4.

Student feelings about the activities of the two men Feelings Number 4 56 6 17 3 5 7 4 18 120 Percent 3.3 46.7 5.0 14.2 2.5 4.2 5.8 3.3 15.0 100.0

Ambivalence, confusion Disgust, dislike Disappointment, shame, embarrassment that this happens in our community Outrage, anger, resentment Surprise, shock Amusement More than one sentiment (sequentially) Other No answer Totals

i d e n t i f y i n g the m e n as religious figures felt that their activities a n d intentions w e r e highly outrageous, although this was expected in only 29.1 percent of those cases (x 2.53; 0.10 > p > 0 . 0 5 ) . If these proportions seem l o w , it must be r e m e m b e r e d that sizeable percentages of respondents w e r e either unable to establish m e a n i n g or i n t e n t i o n or else d i d not answer the questions. H e n c e , the proportions presented above w o u l d have been considerably higher if we h a d chosen to state t h e m in relation to the total n u m b e r of respondents w h o answered each i t e m .
2 =

w e r e a b a d influence on the students. This was expected in only 19.1 percent of the cases ( X = 1.22; 0.15 >p> 0.10). Those m a k i n g this same identification of the m e n p e r c e i v e d t h e m as i n t e n d i n g to correct the instructor's ideas in 21.1 percent of the cases, whereas this was exp e c t e d in only 15.3 percent of t h e m (x = 0.39; 0.35 > p > 0.25). T h i r t y - o n e percent of those w h o looked on the m e n as intruders h a r b o u r e d feelings of m i l d disgust t o w a r d their activities, t h o u g h this was expected in only 20.3 percent of their responses (x = 3.87; 0.025 > p> 0.01).
2 2 2

T h e association b e t w e e n the operational statements in D e f i n i t i o n II is weaker because there w e r e smaller n u m b e r s of respondents to w o r k w i t h a n d the ratios b e t w e e n observed a n d expected proportions w e r e l o w in two of the three instances. Thirty-three p e r c e n t of those w h o i d e n tified the two m e n as non-student intruders also saw t h e m as h o l d i n g the v i e w that the lectures

O n l y in the case of D e f i n i t i o n I w e r e we able to l i n k it w i t h a generally h e l d predisposition, a n d this was only partially successful. By cross-tabulati n g the responses of those w h o p l a c e d religious interests either first, second, or t h i r d (out of six possible ranks) w i t h the data presented in Tables 29.1 t h r o u g h 29.4, we w e r e able to discover t w o associations. Thus, those w h o r a n k e d religious i n -

Stebbins terest in one of these positions w e r e f o u n d to i d e n tify the two m e n as religious figures m o r e often t h a n expected; 64.0 percent w e r e observed in contrast to the 55.0 percent expected (x 0.78; 0.25 > p > 0.15). T h e y also i m p u t e d the i n t e n t i o n of w a n t i n g to correct the instructor's views bey o n d the frequency expected; 89.9 percent w e r e observed as c o m p a r e d w i t h an expected 55.0 percent (X = 5.63; 0.01 >p>0.005). A similar response pattern was f o u n d in the o r d e r i n g of the general life goal " l i v i n g i n accordance w i t h r e l i gious p r i n c i p l e s . " F o r the r a n k i n g of b o t h goals a n d interests, no association was discernible w i t h the p e r c e i v e d evaluation of the class by the two m e n or w i t h the feelings that the students had t o w a r d their activities. In conclusion, c o m m o n sense leads us to anticipate that religious predispositions w i l l be found to be l i n k e d to our four operational statements, but the data only partly bear this out. H o p e f u l l y , the use of m o r e precise data gathering techniques w o u l d eradicate this discrepancy in the findings in favour of our expectations.
2 = 2

267 as the one c o n t r i v e d here for experimental p u r poses, since outbursts by the religiously conservative are not u n c o m m o n i n this c o m m u n i t y . H o w ever, there was no p r o g r a m of observation over time that c o u l d h e l p us determine if such c u l t u r a l definitions do exist a m o n g students. F o r the sake of demonstration we have referred to the standard definitions of the situation that appeared in the experiment as c u l t u r a l definitions, despite this shortcoming. Also, only six of the t h i r t e e n operational statements w e r e e m p l o y e d because the rem a i n i n g ones w e r e c o n c e i v e d too late to incorporate t h e m into the questionnaire. O u r demonstration of the research strategies has probably raised many more questions t h a n it has solved. Space limitations allow us to deal w i t h only two of these. First of all, those engaged in studying definitions of situations e m p i r i c a l l y w i l l find themselves in something of a d i l e m m a w i t h respect to the f o r m of i n t e r v i e w i n g they choose to do. If the investigator has observed a large n u m b e r of peop l e define a situation, he is c o m m i t t e d to using some type of self-administered questionnaire in order to obviate problems of recall, since it w o u l d be impossible to interrogate each person i n d i v i d u ally. This f o r m of data collection enables one to survey a l l w h o are w i l l i n g to participate in the project in a short p e r i o d of time, perhaps m u c h closer to the actual occurrence of the event u n d e r consideration, than if a special a p p o i n t m e n t h a d to be m a d e for a face-to-face i n t e r v i e w . H o w e v e r , it does restrict one to certain operational statements. Statements 9 t h r o u g h 13 are m o r e subtle than the rest, a n d r e q u i r e additional explanation for most subjects; they w o u l d only spawn confusion in a self-administered f o r m of questionnaire. M o r e o v e r , since the investigator depends entirely u p o n the benevolence of his respondents for cooperation a n d accurate r e p o r t i n g of their views, he must take care not to antagonize t h e m . This means that he must eliriiinate not only subtle (and hence confusing) items f r o m his instruments, but also ones that appear to be repetitious because the differences are not large enough for l a y m e n to discriminate. Several of the operational statements, w h e n transformed into questionnaire items, c o u l d easily seem repetitious to the average respondent. W h e n only one or a few persons are observed

Discussion T h e field experiment presented in this sect i o n was expressly designed to demonstrate some of the research strategies discussed in the p r e c e d i n g pages. H o w e v e r , as usually happens in exploratory undertakings such as this, one learns a great deal in the process of c a r r y i n g t h e m out, the significance of w h i c h sometimes embarrasses his earl i e r ideas. This has h a p p e n e d here. T h e research strategies presented earlier are, in part, r e m o d e l l e d products of hindsight m a d e possible by the experiment. F o r example, the demonstration was p l a n n e d w i t h the n o t i o n in m i n d that it should be a startlingly different experience so that one c o u l d observe the creative defining of a situation. This strategy was adopted w h e n the author was still l a b o u r i n g u n d e r the belief that study of the innovative a n d therefore relatively idiosyncratic aspects of m t e r p r e t i n g events, that is, the study of u n i q u e personal definitions, was the best way to m a k e an initial thrust into the complexities of this area. In spite of these intentions a good case can be m a d e for cultural definitions of situations such

268 as they define situations, the author's m o r e recent experiences in this field indicate that the personal i n t e r v i e w is the m o r e desirable m e t h o d of gatheri n g i n f o r m a t i o n relating to the operational statements. H o w e v e r , this approach is m o r e t i m e cons u m i n g , although it is also m o r e t h o r o u g h since the ambiguities a n d ambivalences t y p i c a l of h u m a n definitions of situations c a n be e x a m i n e d by careful probing. T h i s d i l e m m a c o n c e r n i n g the m o r e a p p r o p r i ate k i n d of data collection c a n o n l y be solved t h r o u g h extensive research, w h e r e we have the advantage of v i e w i n g the strengths a n d weaknesses of b o t h techniques. It is true, no doubt, that the relative novelty of our e x p e r i m e n t a l situa t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d to the presence of a large v a r i ety of answers to the questions. M o r e familiar events p r o b a b l y w o u l d not i n v i t e such a range of responses. T h e second question also pertains to the a m o u n t o f n o v e l t y i n our e x p e r i m e n t . P r e s u m a b l y it was this feature of it that l e d to the large n u m ber o f " n o a n s w e r " a n d " d o n ' t k n o w " responses. Some of the students s i m p l y n e e d e d m o r e t i m e to reflect on the events that h a d just u n f o l d e d before their eyes. H a d they b e e n g i v e n this t i m e they w o u l d have, by a n s w e r i n g our questions, exp a n d e d the size of some of the substantive categories, w h i l e the size of the " n o a n s w e r " a n d " d o n ' t k n o w " cells w o u l d have shrunk. A c t u a l l y , we can expect a c e r t a i n p r o p o r t i o n of these responses in research i n v o l v i n g definitions of the situation, e v e n w h e n we are dealing w i t h r e c u r r e n t settings. F o r not all of the recurr i n g situations encountered b y those i n a n identity w i l l be equally familiar. Some reflection w i l l be n e e d e d to sort out a n d i n t e r p r e t the n o v e l elements present (which occur i n e v e r y situation i n some degree), a n d the m o r e that is r e q u i r e d the greater the n u m b e r of i n c o m p l e t e questionnaires that w i l l b e t u r n e d i n . W a i t i n g for this reflection to take place before b e g i n n i n g the i n t e r v i e w i n g or distributing the questionnaire forms is not a solution either, since there w i l l be the tendency for those w h o have already selected a definition to t h i n k further about the event, thereby changi n g its i n i t i a l m e a n i n g t h r o u g h retrospective i n terpretation. T h i s in itself is an interesting aspect of h u m a n behaviour w h i c h is w o r t h y of study.

PART IV

Mind

B u t it is the o n g o i n g definition of the situation that interests us a n d that guides behaviour in the i m m e d i a t e setting. In investigating it, it is wise to k e e p it as separate as possible f r o m subsequent redefinitions b e y o n d that setting.

IMPLICATIONS FOR A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION W h e n we speak of definition of the situation, we speak of m o t i v a t i o n according to N e l s o n F o o t e (1951:15): In a sentence, we take motivation to refer to the degree to which a human being, as a participant in the ongoing social process in which he necessarily finds himself, defines a problematic situation as calling for performance of a particular act, with more or less anticipated consummations and consequences, and thereby his organism releases the energy appropriate to performing it. Foote's p a p e r a n d a n earlier one b y C . W r i g h t M i l l s (1940) have b e e n the two most significant advances in sociology's attempt to d e v e l o p a situational theory of m o t i v a t i o n . Yet, t w o curious facts exist: the last major theoretical progress was nearly t w e n t y years ago, a n d there has b e e n v e r y little, if any, e m p i r i c a l w o r k on this a p p r o a c h to m o t i v a t i o n either before or s i n c e . T h e r e are, no doubt m a n y reasons for this situation i n c l u d i n g , perhaps, the vicissitudes of the fads of social science. T h e explanations g i v e n at the b e g i n n i n g of this paper for the lack of research on the definit i o n of the situation c o u l d also be c i t e d . F i n a l l y , there is still another reason, a n d it is this one that w e shall consider n o w .
15

It seems that, in their haste to d e n o u n c e the place of predispositions in a sociological theory o f m o t i v a t i o n , M i l l s a n d Foote w o r k e d t h e m selves, a n d consequently the possibilities for further d e v e l o p m e n t of such a theory, into a logical cul-de-sac. Foote l a u n c h e d the strongest attack. As we have just seen he looked on m o t i v a t i o n as a d e f i n i t i o n of a situation, t h o u g h it should be
1 5

T h i s statement refers only

to progress t o w a r d a theory of

m o t i v a t i o n i n the n a m e o f such a theory. T h e r e h a v e b e e n m a n y a d v a n c e s i n c l o s e l y r e l a t e d areas s u c h a s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , s i t u a tidnal studies, a n d , as I i n t e n d to show h e r e , the social p s y c h o l ogy of predispositions.

Stebbins a d d e d that he placed special emphasis on the process of identification of self a n d others w i t h i n that setting. Predispositions w e r e a l l o w e d into this scheme only a s " m e m o r y . . . b y v i r t u e o f w h i c h we call up in the present images of past consummations of acts" (1951:20). M e m o r y plus organic m o b i l i z a t i o n (after the definition of the situation) w e r e said to equal m o t i v a t i o n . This reaction against the i n c l u s i o n of predis positions was reasonable fifteen years ago, b u t re cent thought on their nature a n d on their location in a theory of the definition of the situation makes such a position untenable today. Foote (and Mills) appeared to be reacting to the organismically based, situation-free models of predispositions a n d motivation. B u t i n this paper, f o l l o w i n g C a m p b e l l (1963), their p r i o r activation by s t i m u l i w i t h i n the situation is taken as essential for their influence on behaviour. H e r e predispositions are v i e w e d as d e v e l o p i n g from past experience, and once activated they are seen to i m p i n g e u p o n our awareness as specialized views of the w o r l d . T h e r e is little in this conceptualization w i t h w h i c h a sociologist can disagree. Nevertheless, the sociologist m i g h t assert that there is still no place in the theory of the definition of the situation for predispositions. Foote, for ex a m p l e , b e l i e v e d that "definitions of the situation account for attitudes, not the r e v e r s e " (1951:15). O u r earlier discussion, h o w e v e r , indicates that de fining a situation is a c o m p l i c a t e d process that takes place in two phases; a n d that predispositions do enter into the second phase, b o t h in d i r e c t i n g the selection of the cultural definition and in tai l o r i n g that definition to the peculiar requirements of the i n d i v i d u a l . Predispositions as they have b e e n incorpo rated into the m o d e l used in this paper are consid erably m o r e than just general " m e m o r y " of past acts. T h e y are those peculiar (activated) perspec tives in any i m m e d i a t e present so characteristic of the interchanges a m o n g m e n , although, of course, m e m o r y serves to m a k e t h e m available to us in the ongoing setting. Because they are e n d u r i n g states, their r e c u r r e n t activation also helps explain w h y h u m a n beings are m o t i v a t e d in the same way in the same class of situation at various points in t i m e . Predisposing orienta tions such as attitudes of racial prejudice or ideals

269 such as fair play or self-conceptions such as "I am a competent g o l f e r , " are impossible to ignore in any theory of m o t i v a t i o n . It is d o u b t f u l that M i l l s or Foote i n t e n d e d to do this either, but the state of k n o w l e d g e about predispositions at that t i m e l e d t h e m t o w a r d a b l i n d alley. T h e p r o b l e m of m o t i v a t i o n is " t o account for the patterning, timing, and direction of behavior, especially for persistent m o v e m e n t t o w a r d a g o a l " (Shibutani, 1961:181). T h e r e is good reason to believe that the theory of the d e f i n i t i o n of the situation is the best solution available; that is, as l o n g as we i n c l u d e an adequate up-to-date state m e n t about the nature a n d location of predisposi tions w i t h i n it.
16

IN

SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSIONS C o n t r a r y to some long-established beliefs, the definition of the situation can be studied e m p i r i cally. T h a t is, it c a n be studied w i t h the a i d of a certain n u m b e r of research strategies, w h i c h it has b e e n the objective of this paper to p r o v i d e . T w o problems should guide the investigator in this field. 1. W h a t cultural or habitual personal definitions are available to those in a g i v e n social identity for use in one or m o r e specified kinds of r e c u r r i n g situations? 2. F o r classes of actors w i t h i n an identity, what predispositions are acti vated by elements in the ongoing setting that lead to the selection of one of these definitions instead of another? Observation is an indispensable part of any research p r o g r a m focusing on definitions of situations. W h e n c a r r i e d out over time it gives the social scientist a r o u g h idea of the standard definitions i d e n t i t y incumbents have to choose f r o m in t y p i c a l situations. L a t e r it facilitates p r e c i sion in the i n t e r v i e w i n g w h e n one begins to sharpen his p i c t u r e of these definitions by ques t i o n i n g the actors along the lines of the various operationalizations w i t h respect to specific ongo i n g settings. C u l t u r a l and habitual definitions are
1 8

T h e use o f " p r e d i s p o s i t i o n " h e r e i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the g e n

eral scheme presented by Shibutani. He includes u n d e r the section h e a d i n g of " m o t i v a t i o n " discussion of self-concept, refer e n c e groups as perspectives, a n d the internalization of social c o n t r o l (1961:179-319). A l l o f these h a v e predispositional quali ties a b o u t t h e m .

270 constructed by combining the responses to these questions. Theoretically, it is believed that se lecting such definitions occurs in two rela tively distinct temporal phases occurring in rapid succession. At its present stage of technical development and theoretical accumulation, research on the definition of the situation can amount to little more than a program of description. Without knowledge of the cultural and habitual definitions available to sets of actors within an identity and without knowledge of their patterns of choice of these definitions in given kinds of situations, we have little on which to base prediction or higherorder explanation. Until such substantive proposi tions are established, we can only provide descrip tive data. Through time and in conjunction with the general theory of the definition of the situa tion, bodies of descriptive data will form the bases for grounded theories of definitions of situations for particular identities. Description of standard definitions and recur rent situations is probably best carried out by means of some type of field research. However, once a substantive theory begins to take shape, experimentation as a mode of testing hypotheses becomes a feasible alternative. But until we know a particular kind of situation in sufficient detail, it will be impossible to simulate it adequately in the laboratory. We also need an elementary knowledge of the possible cultural and habitual definitions available to the incumbents in such a situation so that we know which variables we wish to control. This discussion of the definition of the situa tion has certain implications for a sociological the ory of motivation. There is good reason to believe that the theory of the definition of the situation is the best explanation for motivated behaviour that is available; that is, as long as we include an adequate and contemporary statement about the nature and location of predispositions within it.

PART IV

Mind

quences of taking W. I. Thomas seriously," in J. D. Douglas (ed.), Existential Sociology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Burke, K. 1945. A Grammar of Motives. New York: Prentice-Hall. . 1950. A Rhetoric of Motives. New York: Pren tice-Hall. Campbell, D. T. 1963. "Social attitudes and other ac quired behavioral dispositions." Pp. 94-172 in S. Koch (ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science, vol. 6. New York: McGraw-Hill. Cooley, . H. 1922. Human Nature and the Social Or der. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Deutscher, I. 1964. "The quality of postparental life: definitions of the situation." Journal of Marriage and the Family 26:52-59. Foote, N. N. 1951. "Identification as the basis for a the ory of motivation." American Sociological Review 16:14-21. Gerth, H. and C. W. Mills. 1954. Character and Social Structure. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Glaser, B. G. and A. L. Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago: Aldine. Gorden, R. L. 1952. "Interaction between attitude and the definition of the situation in the expression of opinion." American Sociological Review 17:5058. Heider, F. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Rela tions. New York: John Wiley. Hill, R. and D. A. Hansen. 1962. "Families in Disaster," pp. 185-221 in G. W. Baker and D. W. Chapman (eds.), Man and Society in Disaster. New York: Basic Books. Ichheiser, G. 1949. "Misunderstandings in human rela tions." American Journal of Sociology 55 (Septem ber, Part II): 1-70. Jones, E. E. 1964. Ingratiation. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. Jones, E. E. and . E. Davis. 1965. "From acts to disposi tions." Pp. 220-266 in L. Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press. Jones, E. E. and J. W. Thibaut. 1958. "Interaction goals as bases of inference in interpersonal perception." Pp. 151-178 in R. Tagiuri and L. Petrullo (eds.), Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Lerner, M. J. and S. Becker. 1962. "Interpersonal choice as a function of ascribed similarity and definition of the situation." Human Relations 15:27-34.

REFERENCES Ball, D. W. Forthcoming. "The definition of the situa tion: some theoretical and methodological conse

Stebbins McCall, G. J. and J. L. Simmons. 1966. Identities and Interactions. New York: The Free Press. McHugh, P. 1968. Denning the Situation. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Maelver, . M. 1964. Social Causation (rev. ed.). New York: Harper & Row. Mills, C. W. 1940. "Situated actions and vocabularies of motives." American Sociological Review 5:904913. Newcomb, . M. 1958. "The cognition of persons as cognizers." Pp. 179-190 in R. Tagiuri and L. Petrullo (eds.), Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. . 1961. The Acquaintance Process. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. Newcomb, . M., R. H. Turner, and P. E. Converse. 1965. Social Psychology: The Study of Human Rela tions. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Schutz, A. 1964. Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Shand, A. F. 1920. The Foundations of Character. Lon don: Macmillan, Ltd. Shibutani, T. 1961. Society and Personality. Englewood Clifis, N.J.: Prentice-HalL Siegel, S. 1956. Nonparametric Statistics for the Be havioral Sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill. Simmel, G. 1950. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: The Free Press. Stebbins. R. A. 1967. "A theory of the definition of the

271 situation." The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 4:148-164. . 1969. "Social network as a subjective construct: a new application for an old idea." The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 6:1-14. . 1970. "Career: the subjective approach." The Sociological Quarterly, formcoming. Stone, G. P. 1962. "Appearance and the self." Pp. 86118 in A. M. Rose (ed.), Human Behavior and Social Processes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Strauss, A. L. 1959. Mirrors and Masks. New York: The Free Press. Thomas, W. I. 1951. Social Behavior and Personality, ed., E. H. Volkart. New York: Social Science Re search Council. Turner, R. H. 1956. "Role-taking, role standpoint, and reference-group behavior." American Journal of Sociology 61:316-328. . 1962. "Role-taking: process versus conformity." Pp. 20-40 in A. M. Rose (ed.), Human Behavior and Social Processes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Weber, M. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Oxford University Press. Weinstein, E. A. and P. Deutschberger. 1963. "Some dimensions of altercasting." Sociometry 26:454466. . 1964. "Tasks, bargains, and identities in social interaction." Social Forces 42:451456. Wolff, . H. 1964. "Definition of the situation." P. 182 in J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (eds.), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences. New York: The Free Press.

Toan P. Emerson

30

"Nothing Unusual Is Happening"

T h e societal reaction theory of deviance, disp u t i n g earlier approaches w h i c h assumed d e v i ance to be an intrinsic quality of behavior, stresses the interaction b e t w e e n actor and audience. A deviant label is the product of an exchange bet w e e n an actor and someone w h o charges the actor w i t h rule violations, perhaps w i t h ratificat i o n by t h i r d parties. H o w is social reality constructed by the participants so that an event comes to constitute a rule violation?
1

a n a t u r e " ; (2) " W e recognize a p r o h i b i t i o n on acts of this k i n d " ; (3) " T h e r e f o r e , y o u have c o m m i t t e d a p r o h i b i t e d act." T h e validity of the labeler's premises m a y be challenged in terms of the k i n d of act that took place, the actor's responsibility for it, the existence of the rule, or the applicability of the rule. H o w e v e r , it m a y be m o r e effective to p r e v e n t the establishment of the prerequisite " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " framework. This paper w i l l consider the " n o t h i n g unusual is h a p p e n i n g " stance as it affects the l a b e l i n g of deviance. T h e central hypothesis is that social i n teraction has intrinsic properties that routinely bias negotiations t o w a r d the " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance; this bias inhibits the application of deviant labels. T h e paper w i l l suggest circumstances u n der w h i c h the " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance is ass u m e d and examine in detail two examples of negotiation. F i n a l l y , it w i l l explore the structure of interaction affecting the outcome of such negotiations.

Participants in any encounter take stances on the expectedness of the events; these stances are r e f e r r e d to in this paper as " n o t h i n g unusual is h a p p e n i n g " and " s o m e t h i n g unusual is happeni n g . " These orientations are expressed t h r o u g h a person's demeanor and do not necessarily reflect his private assessment of the situation. A m e m b e r of the audience w h o undertakes labeling first must establish that " s o m e t h i n g unusual is happeni n g " in order to define an event as a rule v i o l a t i o n . This stance sets the appropriate tone, just as the participants m i g h t effuse gaiety or bei n g emotionally touched to carry off other events. In the f r a m e w o r k of " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l , " the labeler must establish the f o l l o w i n g propositions: (1) " Y o u have c o m m i t t e d an act of such-and-such
2

THE "NOTHING UNUSUAL" STANCE In m a n y situations persons assume a stance routinely. B u t at times it is not clear w h i c h stance to assume, or persons m a y not agree on h o w to proceed. T h e r e are two sets of circumstances relevant to labeling in w h i c h the stance is negotiated. First, persons m a y confront events w h i c h are particularly suitable for labeling w i t h i n an acknowle d g e d f r a m e w o r k of rules. Second, persons m a y negotiate to transform an encounter f r o m one normative f r a m e w o r k to another.

Joan P. Emerson, "Nothing Unusual Is Happening." F r o m Human Nature and Collective Behavior: Papers in Honor of Herbert Blumer, edited by Tamotsu Shibutani (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentiee-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 208-222. Cf. Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1963); and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966). Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies," American Journal of Sociology, L X I (1956), 420-24.
1 1

Emerson Persons a c k n o w l e d g i n g a f r a m e w o r k of rules must decide w h e t h e r or not each particular event constitutes a violation. A l t h o u g h any event m a y be i n t e r p r e t e d as a violation, for some events the i n t e r p r e t i v e w o r k a n d w i n n i n g of acceptance for the definition are easier. F o r such labeling-prone events the " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance is particul a r l y i m p o r t a n t . F o r example, a m a n f e i g n i n g accid e n t b u t deliberately caressing the body of a strange w o m a n in a c r o w d trades on the woman's embarrassment, should she p u b l i c l y i n v o k e a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. Rather than call att e n t i o n to the situation at such a h i g h p r i c e , the w o m a n m a y cooperate by p r e t e n d i n g she thinks the t o u c h i n g is m e r e l y an accident unavoidable in such a tightly p a c k e d c r o w d . T h e m o r e a person c a n influence the e v o l v i n g definition of what is h a p p e n i n g , the m o r e he c a n w o r k the system by u n d e r t a k i n g action h e thinks w o u l d b e a p p r o p r i ately defined as deviant a n d deliberately creating an alternate definition. W h e n others believe that the actor d i d not i n t e n d to break a rule, they m a y be especially r e a d y to ignore potential violations. In any situat i o n w h e r e a person reveals i n f o r m a t i o n about himself w h i c h challenges the image he is projecti n g , loses his self-control, or violates body decor u m , others m a y tactfully act as if n o t h i n g unusual w e r e h a p p e n i n g . I n another example, d y i n g patients typically are treated as though they had as assured a future as anyone else; B a r n e y Glaser a n d A n s e l m Strauss speak of "situation as n o r m a l " interaction tactics in this c o n n e c t i o n .
3 4

273 w e r e too y o u n g to have the m o n e y to pay; w h e n a senile w o m a n asked a young nurse, " W a s the meat done w h e n y o u looked a t i t ? " ; a n d w h e n an elderly m a n after a stroke said he was a boyscout a n d made a tent of his b e d sheet. On an obstetrics w a r d of another hospital, nurses a d vised the w r i t e r not to contradict a patient w h o c l a i m e d J o h n the Baptist as the father of her baby. In everyday life as w e l l people are i n c l i n e d to acquiesce to statements w h i c h sound i n c r e d i b l e or p a r a n o i d . Cautious because of uncertainty about what the behavior means, persons a v o i d a fuss by c o n t i n u i n g their " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance e v e n in response to bizarre gestures. So far negotiations about interpretations of particular events have b e e n discussed. Negotiations about the system of interpretation itself, however, have m o r e radical i m p o r t . W h e n persons are i n v i t e d to change their n o r m a t i v e framework, interpretations of numerous events m a y be affected over a l o n g p e r i o d of time. T h e most c o m m o n circumstance i n w h i c h a person is i n v i t e d to change his n o r m a t i v e framew o r k occurs d u r i n g socialization into an u n f a m i l iar subculture. As persons m o v e into n e w settings, they meet u n a n t i c i p a t e d experiences w h i c h i n i tially they m a y r e g a r d as undesirable. Novices l e a r n that the experiences are b o t h customary a n d desirable i n the n e w situation. M e m b e r s o f the subculture exhort, perhaps i m p l i c i t l y : " N o w y o u see what we actually do here; I urge y o u to go along e v e n t h o u g h y o u w e r e n ' t p r e p a r e d to g o along w i t h such matters w h e n y o u e n t e r e d the situation." T h e " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance is often a c l a i m of expertise: " W e k n o w m o r e about what usually happens in this situation t h a n y o u do because we have b e e n here t i m e a n d t i m e again w h e n y o u have n o t . " A g o o d illustration is H o w a r d Becker's article on h o w e x p e r i e n c e d d r u g users present a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " d e f i n i t i o n to comrades u n d e r g o i n g d r u g - i n d u c e d experiences w h i c h the latter are t e m p t e d to i n t e r p r e t as insanity. In settings w h e r e homosexuals are dancing, flirting, a n d caressing, participants a n d heterosexual observers
5

Surprisingly, persons also m a y react to b i z a r r e behavior, such as delusional statements, w i t h similar tact. T h e w r i t e r repeatedly observed staff m e m b e r s respond b l a n d l y to t e m p o r a r i l y diso r i e n t e d , senile, and brain-damaged patients on a medical-surgical w a r d of a general hospital and later gossip about the patients' " w e i r d " behavior. T h e staff sustained an o r d i n a r y demeanor w h e n a patient in a leg cast a n d traction c l a i m e d to have w a l k e d a r o u n d the w a r d ; w h e n a 90 year o l d patient refused x-rays because her c h i l d r e n
E r v i n g Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957).
3

Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, "Awareness Contexts and Social Interaction." American Sociological Review, X X I X (1964), 672.
4

Howard S. Becker, "History, Culture and Subjective Experience: An Exploration of the Social Bases of Drug-Induced Experiences," Journal of Health and Social Behavior, VIII (1967), 163-76.
5

274 act as if n o t h i n g r e m a r k a b l e w e r e o c c u r r i n g . V i s i tors at nudist camps r e m a r k that it seems just l i k e an ordinary resort a n d that everyone seems to feel natural about not w e a r i n g clothes in p u b l i c . M e m b e r s of occult groups, w h e n exp o u n d i n g beliefs about magic, reincarnation, c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h other planets, a n d other matters outrageous to c u r r e n t scientific o p i n i o n , speak w i t h the same casualness they use for generally accepted topics.
6 7

PART IV

Mind

C o n s i d e r the p r e v a i l i n g d e m e a n o r i n n i g h t clubs a n d topless bars. Risque e n t e r t a i n m e n t derives its i m p a c t f r o m t r i f l i n g w i t h customary taboos, particularly about exposure of the body. Yet, w h i l e s u r r o u n d e d b y n u d i t y , participants strive to suggest a situation that is no different than it w o u l d b e w e r e all fully clothed. I n bars w h e r e p i c k u p s occur, the participants' "situation as norm a l " style implies that they w o u l d b e a m a z e d to l e a r n that the modes of i n t r o d u c t i o n they w e r e p r a c t i c i n g w o u l d not be acceptable to E m i l y Post. B u t it is not only in words generally r e g a r d e d as offbeat that newcomers m e e t a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. Observers in any setting, such as the m e d i c a l w o r l d , find the same t h i n g . A patient m a y look u p o n his m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n a n d the techn i c a l procedures it elicits as h i g h l y unusual events, w h i l e the staff is reassuringly nonchalant. In a gynecological examination, for example, the staff m e m b e r s do not acknowledge as applicable the taboo exhibited in most other situations about p r i vate parts of the body; they act as though the p r o c e d u r e w e r e as matter-of-course as an examination of the ear.
8

they m a k e to others are n o r m a l in a subculture w h e n in fact this is not the case. This m a y h a p p e n w h e n persons are r e c r u i t e d for situations they are hesitant to enter; it also m a y h a p p e n w h e n two or m o r e persons e v o l v e private understandings. F o r example, the visibly h a n d i c a p p e d , l e a r n i n g to manage the uneasiness of others' responses to t h e m , attempt to negotiate a stance of " n o t h i n g unusual is h a p p e n i n g . " Persons m a y approach each other i n ways w h i c h m a y not f i t the elaborate set of conventions s u r r o u n d i n g introductions and the i n i t i a t i o n of encounters. Prostitutes and clients, disattending the c o m m e r c i a l aspect of their transaction, m a y attribute their encounter to friendship.
9

Moreover, much of the interaction of "John" (client) with girl (prostitute) is specifically oriented toward the reduction of the stigma attached to both roles, each pretending that the other is fulfilling a role more obscure than that which is apparent.
10

Because people so f r e q u e n t l y meet a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance f r o m others they accept as legitimate socializing agents, they are p r e p a r e d by analogy to accede to the stance u n d e r less legitimate circumstances. T h e " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance is a c l a i m about the standpoint of a subculture. Persons m a y insinuate that the suggestions
8

Y e t participants i n these settings r e m a i n aware o f the outsider's perspective. Thus: " N u d ists envision themselves as b e i n g labeled deviant by m e m b e r s of the c l o t h e d s o c i e t y . " " F r i n g e (occult) group m e m b e r s as usually k e e n l y aware of the fact that the larger culture disagrees w i t h their v i e w of the w o r l d . . . . " It is difficult to forget the outsider's perspective w h e n one must continually engage i n practices w h i c h i m p l i c i t l y acknowledge it. F o r example, nudist camps discourage the presence of single m e n , r e q u i r e c i v i l inattention to n u d e bodies, p r o h i b i t b o d i l y contact, a n d regulate p h o t o g r a p h y .
11 l z 13

U n d e r l y i n g the overt " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance m a y be simultaneous cues a c k n o w l e d g i n g " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l . " Participants m a y devote elaborate attention to e n f o r c i n g a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " definition, thus intensifying their interac8

Fred

Davis,

"Deviance

Disavowal:

The

Management

of

S t r a i n e d I n t e r a c t i o n b y t h e V i s i b l y H a n d i c a p p e d , " Social ProbM a r t i n W e i n b e r g , " B e c o m i n g a N u d i s t , " in Deviance: eds. Earl Rubington and Martin The InWeinlems, I X (1961), 1 2 0 - 3 2 .
1 0

teractionist Perspective, p p . 240-51.

7

James B r y a n , " O c c u p a t i o n a l Ideologies a n d I n d i v i d u a l A t t i G i r l s , " in Rubington and W e i n b e r g , op. cit, p . op. 249. 284. op. cit, p .

b e r g ( N e w Y o r k : T h e M a c m i l l a n C o m p a n y , P u b l i s h e r s , 1968),

tudes of C a l l 294. Weinberg,

L e o n Festinger, H e n r y Riechen, a n d Stanley Schachter.

When

11

Prophesy Fails ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w , P u b l i s h e r s , 1964).

8

1 2

J . L . Simmons, " M a m t a i n i n g Deviant Beliefs," i n Rubington cit, p . M a r t i n W e i n b e r g , "Sexual M o d e s t y a n d the N u d i s t C a m p , "

J o a n E m e r s o n , " S o c i a l F u n c t i o n s of H u m o r in a H o s p i t a l Set-

and Weinberg,
1 3

ting" (Doctoral dissertation, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a at B e r k e l e y , 1963), c h a p . 4 .

i n R u b i n g t o n a n d W e i n b e r g , op. cit, p p . 2 7 5 - 7 7 .

Emerson tive alertness, guardedness, a n d calculation. T h e behavior b e i n g defined as " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " m a y b e c o m e the intensive focus of attention, as w h e n a person breaks d o w n in tears in a setting (such as a psychotherapeutic one) w h i c h claims to tolerate such behavior. E v e n a v e r b a l a c k n o w l e d g m e n t o f " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " m a y occur, often a c c o m p a n i e d by a negation. F o r example, a m a n p i c k i n g up a w o m a n in a coffee house m a y rem a r k , "I w o u l d n ' t be d o i n g this except that I've b e e n d r i n k i n g all a f t e r n o o n . " O r before a n d after the event the participants m a y take a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance, as in the strained k i d d i n g w h i c h m a y accompany the decision to visit a topless bar a n d the e v e n m o r e f o r c e d j o l l i t y o r the a w k w a r d silence on exit. A l l parties m a y f i n d i t c o n v e n i e n t t o adopt a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance, a n d yet the alternate d e f i n i t i o n presses for some k i n d of r e c o g n i t i o n . At other times it m a y be possible to c o n v i n c e someone to accept a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance o n l y if it is qualified by " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " cues. S u c h cues m a y serve as a b a r g a i n i n g concession by those adamant about constructing a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance.

275 w o m a n balks at one of her first p e l v i c examinations; rarely do patients c o m p l a i n about unpleasant features of the hospital to this degree. This particular encounter m a y be v i e w e d as a c o n t i n u a l negotiation about w h e t h e r to take a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " or " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. T h e parties c o m e to no resolution d u r i n g the p r o c e d u r e , although shortly a f t e r w a r d the patient indicates to the nurse a p a r t i a l capitulation. T h e patient's d e m e a n o r disconcerts the staff, especially the doctor (actually a f o u r t h year m e d i cal student), so that the staff m e m b e r s p r o c e e d t h r o u g h the episode in a guarded fashion, especially alerted to social as opposed to t e c h n i c a l aspects, h a n d l i n g the patient w i t h k i d gloves, a n d cooperating m o r e closely w i t h each other. Thus, w h i l e the staff m e m b e r s overtly assert "a n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance, their guardedness conveys an underlying countertheme of "something unu s u a l . " A c t u a l l y , the nurse partially acknowledges a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance at one p o i n t w h e n the patient demonstrates p a i n . This a c k n o w l e d g m e n t serves as a b a r g a i n i n g offer to the patient: " O k a y , w e ' l l g o along w i t h y o u a t this p o i n t , i f y o u ' l l go along w i t h us the rest of the t i m e . " T h e patient refuses this offer, for otherwise she i m p l i c itly w o u l d be agreeing that the unusual e l e m e n t was the p a i n rather t h a n the invasion of p r i v a c y in a gynecological examination. Six excerpts f r o m the writer's field notes on this examination w i l l n o w be analyzed. At 8:50 p.m. the doctor enters, says "hi" in a friendly, nonprofessional way. PATIENT TO DOCTOR: gushing out of me." "The blood is just "Gushing out?"

T H E PROCESS O F N E G O T I A T I O N E x a m i n i n g the process of negotiation a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance m a y p r o v i d e insight into h o w definitions of reality are constructed a n d sust a i n e d i n social interaction. I n most settings novices quietly cooperate w i t h seasoned participants in sustaining a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. In the instance described below, h o w e v e r , the n o v i c e d e c l i n e d to cooperate. As a result, the process of negotiation about the f r a m e w o r k for the interaction is m o r e explicit t h a n in most encounters.

D O C T O R , W I T H SURPRISE:

Shortly after this the doctor remarks to the nurse that the patient has her period. T h e doctor opens w i t h a casual g r e e t i n g w h i c h asserts a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. T h e p a tient counters w i t h a r e m a r k i m p l y i n g that her body is in a state n o n r o u t i n e to the staff. At several other points the patient makes remarks ("Shouldn't I wash before he examines m e ? T h e doctor w o n ' t be able to examine me w i t h such a heavy flow of blood"), w h i c h hint that, because

Incident I. Gynecological Examination T h e w r i t e r observed a h i g h l y atypical examin a t i o n on the gynecological w a r d of a general hospital. A twenty-six year o l d u n m a r r i e d
14
1 4

F o r t h e c o m p l e t e f i e l d a c c o u n t o f this i n c i d e n t see E m e r s o n ,

loc. cit.

276 the staff members are mistakenly d e f i n i n g her b o d y state as routine, they are n e g l e c t i n g to take action w h i c h is essential if they are to cope w i t h her m e d i c a l condition. In response the doctor expresses surprise at a m o v e contrary to his p r o posed definition, a t t e m p t i n g to discount the patient's stance. L a t e r the doctor discounts the patient's stance more forcefully by defining her b o d y state as routine, as he also does elsewhere i n the episode. P A T I E N T TO D O C T O R : this every day?" DOCTOR: PATIENT: DOCTOR: "What?" "This examining." "Oh yes." "Do you go through

PART IV

Mind

T h e doctor establishes a f r a m e w o r k for the patient to report neutrally about discomfort. T h e patient ignores the suggested f r a m e w o r k a n d offers a negative c o m m e n t on the event in strong, emotional language. (At several other points the patient does the same t h i n g ; earlier she has said to the nurse: "I hate this. I w i s h I c o u l d go home.") T h e doctor ignores the patient's m o v e a n d attempts to reassert his definition by n e u t r a l technical instructions a n d explanations. DOCTOR: "Okay, this is the speculum and it's going to feel a little cold." PATIENT: DOCTOR: "Oh. " " 'Oh' what?"

T h e patient suggests the possibility that gynecological examinations are n o n r o u t i n e to the staff. T h e doctor, by failing to c o m p r e h e n d a m o v e so contrary to his proposed definition, refuses to validate the patient's " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. W h e n the patient supplies clarification, the doctor e x p l i c i t l y denies the patient's suggestion. DOCTOR: tell you what I'm going to do. I'm going to take a Pap smear. This is a routine test we do in this clinic." PATIENT: "Do you take anything out?" The nurse explains.

NURSE T O PATIENT: "Okay, take a few deep breaths and try to concentrate on something else. I know it's hard; that's sort of a focal point." DOCTOR: PATIENT: "Does that hurt very much?" "Yes, very much." "/ won't be "You underAIR: "How

SOON T H E PATIENT REMARKS: able to sit down for a week." N U R S E W I T H A N A M U S E D AIR: estimate yourself." DOCTOR, WITH AN AMUSED will you go home?"

T h e doctor identifies the steps of the technical procedure beforehand, as he does at numerous other points, and directly states that the proced u r e is routine. T h e patient asks a w o r r i e d quest i o n about the technical p r o c e d u r e , a question w h i c h implies, " A m I safe i n your hands?" This m o v e counters the " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. T h e nurse attempts to reinstate " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " by a reassuring explanation. DOCTOR: PATIENT: "You have some pain already, huh?" "It's just that I hate this."

DOCTOR: "Okay, try to spread your legs apart. Okay, I'm going to try to touch this and see where it is."

T h e doctor offers a brief explanation of the technical p r o c e d u r e in a casual style. T h e patient t h e n demonstrates discomfort in a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " style. To negate this, the doctor claims that he fails to c o m p r e h e n d the patient's m o v e . T h e nurse reinforces the doctor's stance by g i v i n g technical instructions, but her style a n d sympathetic r e m a r k constitute a c o m p r o m i s e in the d i r e c t i o n of " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l , " a m o v e that the patient has already rejected earlier. T h e doctor again establishes a f r a m e w o r k for the patient to report n e u t r a l l y about discomfort, a n d again the patient repudiates it, this time by an overt statement of p a i n in a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " style. T a k i n g the offensive, the patient hints that the staff is m u t i l a t i n g her body. T h e staff attempts to discount the hint by c o u c h i n g the message, " Y o u exaggerate," in a j o k i n g framework.

Emerson DOCTOR: PATIENT: "I'm going to do a rectal exam. " "No, no, no."

277 to hold up a party of thirty-six prominent, middleaged women, but couldn't get anybody to believe they were for real. One of the women actually grabbed the gun held by one of the youths. " W h y , " she said, "that's not wood or plastic. It must be metal." " L a d y , " pleaded the man. "I've been trying to tell you, it IS real. This is a holdup." " A h , you're putting me on," she replied cheerfully. The robbers' moment of frustration came about 9 P.M . at the home of Mrs. Florence Tout, wife of a prominent Stockton tax attorney, as she was enter taining at what is called a "hi-jinks" party. Jokes and pranks filled the evening. Thus not one of the ladies turned a hair when the two men, clad in black, walked in. " A l l right now, ladies, put your rings on the ta ble," ordered the gunman. "What for?" one of the guests demanded. "This is a stickup. I'm SERIOUS!" he cried. A l l the ladies laughed. One of them playfully shoved one of the men. He shoved her back. As the ringing laughter continued, the men looked at each other, shrugged, and left emptyhanded.
16

DOCTOR: "We have to do it; it's part of the examination." PATIENT: first?" "Why can't you give me a sedative

T h e doctor announces the next step of the technical procedure. T h e patient protests this step in a h i g h l y emotional style. T h e doctor claims that b o t h he a n d the patient are c o m p e l l e d by the standards of good m e d i c a l practice: "I am m e r e l y an agent f o l l o w i n g the p r e s c r i b e d rules of the system," he suggests. He further e m p h a sizes the routine nature of the p r o c e d u r e . T h e patient attempts to u n d e r m i n e the doctor's stance by suggesting directly h o w the technical proce d u r e should be conducted. By asking that she be m a d e insensitive to the experience v i a a d r u g , the patient implies that the staff is i m p o s i n g u n necessary discomfort on her. In each excerpt one sees a struggle over the stance to be taken. T h e patient insists that "some t h i n g unusual is h a p p e n i n g , " a n d the staff tells h e r h o w routine it is. At one p o i n t the patient i m p l i e s the event is unusual by asking, " D o a lot of w o m e n go t h r o u g h this?" Several times she challenges the staff definition by explicit refer ences to topics taboo w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k the staff is asserting. F o r example, she wonders if her b o d y odor w i l l r e p e l others. T h e staff m e m b e r s attempt to establish the m e d i c a l f r a m e w o r k by discussing nonchalantly technical e q u i p m e n t a m o n g themselves, asking the patient technical questions in a casual style, a n d directly assuring the patient it w i l l not be as b a d as she anticipates. Incident . A t t e m p t e d H o l d u p Sometimes persons n e e d to establish a "some t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance in o r d e r to b r i n g off a per formance. T h e audience's " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance in the f o l l o w i n g newspaper account under mines the robbers' performance so m u c h that it collapses. T H E I R STORY JUST D I D N T H O L D U P StocktonThe worst possible fate befell two young masked robbers here last night. They tried

In order to p r o c e e d , the robbers must crack the j o k i n g f r a m e w o r k already established in the setting; if they h a d b e e n w i l l i n g to escalate, as by shooting someone, the outcome w o u l d have b e e n different. T w o sequences i n this story w i l l be analyzed. In the first sequence, the lady w h o grabs the g u n expresses surprise that the g u n is metal. D e fining the h o l d u p as make-believe, the lady checks out a piece of evidence. In a make-believe h o l d u p the guns are also make-believe, perhaps m a d e of w o o d or plastic; in a r e a l h o l d u p the guns are real, m a d e of m e t a l . By expressing surprise at e v i dence contrary to her definition, the lady at tempts to negate the challenge to h e r proposal. T h e robber i m m e d i a t e l y issues another challenge by d i r e c t l y stating the contrary definition: " L a d y , I've b e e n t r y i n g to tell y o u , it IS real. This is a h o l d u p . " T h e lady tries to negate this attempt by c l a i m i n g the other is not really c o m m i t t e d to the definition he is asserting: " A h , you're p u t t i n g me on." In the second sequence, the robber opens w i t h , " A l l right n o w , ladies, put your rings o n
15

San

Francisco

Examiner,

April

4,

1968.

278 the t a b l e . " Thus, he performs an act w h i c h w o u l d logically flow f r o m the d e f i n i t i o n he is asserting. T h e response, " W h a t f o r ? " asks for a clarification of this act, suggesting that the act is meaningless because the proposed d e f i n i t i o n f r o m w h i c h it is supposed to follow is not accepted. T h e r o b b e r provides clarification by a direct statement of his definition: " T h i s is a stickup. I ' m S E R I O U S ! " By l a u g h i n g , the ladies propose a humorous framew o r k for the robber's assertion a n d succeed in d i s c o u n t i n g the definition of the situation as a holdup. T h e process of negotiating the stances of "something unusual" and "nothing unusual" consists of direct assertions a n d counterassertions, i m plications a n d counterimplications. It also i n volves the establishment of frameworks for the other's subsequent moves a n d techniques for disc o u n t i n g the other's moves. S u c h techniques i n clude i n c o m p r e h e n s i o n , surprise, h u m o r , a n d accusing the other of a lack of i n v e s t m e n t in his o w n m o v e . In the r e m a i n d e r of this discussion, conditions biasing the negotiations t o w a r d a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance w i l l b e explored.

PART IV

Mind

the easiest w a y out. " N o t h i n g u n u s u a l " provides a definite p r e s c r i p t i o n for behavior: just continue to act in a r o u t i n e m a n n e r . Actors can a v o i d the effort of creating a u n i q u e response. A " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " d e f i n i t i o n m a y call for unpleasant emotions w h i c h p e o p l e p r e f e r to avoidembarrassm e n t a n d i n d i g n a t i o n , for example. P e o p l e are often n o n p l u s e d b y events w h i c h c o u l d b e defined as unusual, a n d they are i n e x p e r i e n c e d in managi n g such events. So they m a y be w i l l i n g to take cues f r o m others. If one person firmly commits h i m s e l f to a stand, others are l i k e l y to acquiesce. An effective strategy is to m a k e a firm c o m m i t m e n t to a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance i m m e d i a t e l y , w i t h o u t enteri n g negotiations. An alternate strategy is to wait but decline the other's i m p l i c i t " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " offers, so the other concedes to " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " to a v o i d a deadlock. T h e a m b i g u i t y of events provides one c o n d i t i o n f a v o r i n g a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. C o n v e n t i o n s about m a m t a i n i n g social o r d e r p r o v i d e another. M o s t social interaction is p r e d i c a t e d on the desirability of a v o i d i n g a fuss. M a n y social practices rest on the assumption that it is wise to acquiesce to a person in his presence, regardless of one's private o p i n i o n . If a person has i n vested h i m s e l f h e a v i l y in a certain d e f i n i t i o n of reality, others a v o i d c h a l l e n g i n g it. In particular, persons are reluctant to challenge another's c l a i m about himself. Since persons generally a i m to m a i n t a i n order in a particular situation, they i n v o k e p a r t i c u lar rules as relevant to the process of m a i n t a i n i n g this situationally located order. D e f i n i n g an event as a r u l e v i o l a t i o n m a y shatter the v i e w of reality that the participants have taken for granted. So, if i n v o k i n g a particular rale w o u l d create disorder instead of m a i n t a i n i n g order, it makes no sense to i n v o k e the r u l e in that instance. A third condition favoring a "nothing unu s u a l " stance is the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the w o u l d be labeler to adverse consequences f r o m his m o v e . If the labeler's w o r d must be w e i g h e d against the actor's, it m a y be difficult to c o n v i n c e t h i r d parties that a violation has o c c u r r e d . In this as w e l l as other cases, the would-be labeler's m o v e opens h i m to counterdenunciation. Suppose, as in a C a n d i d C a m e r a sequence, a g i r l asks a m a n to h e l p her carry a suitcase. T h e g i r l acts as if it

NEGOTIATING A C C E P T A N C E OF A "NOTHING UNUSUAL" STANCE W h o e v e r performs a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance has some advantage, because his dramatic intensity is difficult to ignore. B u t m a i n t a i n i n g the stance of " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " q u i c k l y becomes u n tenable unless all participants corroborate it. D e spite this advantage for " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l , " h o w e v e r , observation suggests that a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance m o r e often prevails in a p r o b l e m a t i c situation. W h y is this so? T h e " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " advocate capitalizes on the ambiguity of events. In the movies the music swells up to signal " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l , " the w e a t h e r m a y change dramatically, a n d the c r o w d starts m o v i n g t o w a r d the focus of attention. Should the audience miss these cues, they can h a r d l y miss the camera z o o m i n g in u p o n the actors' reactions to the u n e x p e c t e d event. In r e a l life p e o p l e almost expect the concomitants f o u n d in the movies, a n d their absence creates uncertainty about the m e a n i n g of the situation. In the face of uncertainty, the actor m a y take

Emerson w e r e an ordinary suitcase, but actually it is rilled w i t h m e t a l . If the m a n remarks, " T h i s suitcase is too heavy for anyone to c a r r y , " the g i r l m i g h t respond, " N o , y o u must be a weak m a n because I have carried it myself for three b l o c k s . " Thus, a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " c l a i m can be countered by, " N o , it is y o u who cannot cope w i t h this o r d i nary situation." N o t only is a charge of inadequacy possible but, should someone persist in taking a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance, he c o u l d be labeled " e m o t i o n a l l y d i s t u r b e d " for displaying a demeanor too i n v o l v e d and for m a k i n g the occasion into one m o r e momentous than it really is.
16

279 f o l l o w i n g his lead, a n d the less respect they have for his j u d g m e n t ; a n d (8) the less drastic the action r e q u i r e d by the " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance.

T H E D E V I A N T AS A MONSTER In the p r e c e d i n g section some factors i n h i b i t i n g m o v e m e n t o f the interaction i n the d i r e c t i o n of a " s o m e t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance a n d l a b e l i n g w e r e described. L a b e l i n g results f r o m the a p p l i cation of a set of procedures for assessing situations and d e c i d i n g h o w to proceed. F r o m a closer examination of this set of procedures, an a d d i tional explanation for the structural i n h i b i t i o n against labeling emerges. T h e explanation is based on the inadequacy of certain commonsense conceptualizations to handle actual experience w i t h potentially deviant behavior. T h e set of procedures for assessing situations includes steps for r e c o g n i z i n g divergent behavior. As a practical necessity any workable set of i n structions singles out a f e w relevant features of a situation a n d ignores the rest. F o r g e t t i n g that this selection has o c c u r r e d , persons t h e n c o m e to think of the entire event as composed of the few features in focus. So the commonsense m o d e l has black a n d w h i t e categories for deviance. B o t h events a n d persons are v i e w e d as either entirely deviant or entirely coriforming. A p r o b l e m a t i c act w h i c h persons m i g h t negotiate to define as deviant occurs in the context of numerous acts taken for granted as conf o r m i n g . In a bar p i c k u p , for instance, the o n l y questionable element may be the m o d e of introduction, w h i l e conduct w i t h i n the exchange m a y be seen as entirely c o n f o r m i n g to p r o p e r behavior for striking up an acquaintance w i t h a stranger at a party. W h e n one thinks about the situation in a commonsense perspective, one focuses on the offense a n d v i r t u a l l y ignores the norm-conf o r m i n g context.
1 7

E v e n if the labeler escapes counterdenunciation a n d succeeds in defining an event as a rule violation, this definition may reflect negatively on himself. A c k n o w l e d g i n g the rule violation may i n v o l v e a loss of face or self-derogation for the labeler. A n y deviant act raises the question for observers: " W h o am I that this should h a p p e n a r o u n d m e ? " M a n y deviant acts are taken as an insult to others. To avoid the insult, what c o u l d be defined as a deviant act m a y be i n t e r p r e t e d otherwise. B u t u n d e r certain conditions others are less l i k e l y to assent to a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance. If a m a n comes home and discovers his wife in b e d w i t h another m a n , he is not i n c l i n e d to accept their nonchalant invitation to j o i n t h e m in the l i v i n g r o o m for coffee. T h e f o l l o w i n g factors press for noncompliance: (1) the m o r e persons are overw h e l m e d w i t h emotion a n d cannot m a i n t a i n the casual demeanor r e q u i r e d ; (2) the m o r e complex the performance expected if they cooperate w i t h the " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " stance (civil inattention is m o r e feasible than active participation); (3) the m o r e certain they are of the definition of the situat i o n that "something unusual is h a p p e n i n g " ; (4) the m o r e c o m m i t t e d they are to u p h o l d i n g rules w h i c h they think are b e i n g violated; (5) the m o r e experienced they are at i m p o s i n g the definition " s o m e t h i n g unusual is h a p p e n i n g " in similar situations; (6) the less favorably disposed they are to the " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " advocate; (7) the higher their status is compared w i t h the " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " advocate, the less they are accustomed to
Cited in Eugene Webb, Donald Campbell, Richard Schwartz, and L e e Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company,
18

Because in the light of the commonsense perspective a person has been l e d to expect an ofIn discussing factors which impede the labeling process, Yarrow, et al, make a similar point by calling the behavior of the candidate for the mental illness label a "fluctuating stimulus," at times symptomatic and at times ordinary. Marian Yarrow, Charlotte Schwartz, Harriet Murphy, and Leila Deasy, ' T h e Psychological Meaning of Mental Illness in the Family," in Rubington and Weinberg, op. cit, p. 38.
17

1966), p. 156.

280 fense to stand out m a r k e d l y a n d overshadow any n o r m - c o n f o r m i n g elements present, he is surp r i s e d at h o w comparatively d w a r f e d the possible v i o l a t i o n is. Those pressing for a " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " definition take advantage of this i n i t i a l surprise a n d the m o m e n t of uncertainty it entails. Inasmuch as a person revises his expectation to take into account the n o r m - c o n f o r m i n g context, he still m i g h t expect all facets of the exchange to be m o d i f i e d to correspond w i t h the n o r m - v i o l a t i n g note. Thus, in a bar p i c k u p he m i g h t expect a n exaggerated behavior b e t w e e n the couple, i n w h i c h allusions to sex are blatant, the exchange has a w i l d , u n c o n t r o l l e d quality, a n d gestures of respect for the other person are suspended. W h e n these expectations are contradicted by actual exp e r i e n c e in a bar, a person's assessment procedures are t h r o w n into confusion. U s i n g o r d i n a r y procedures for assessing w h e t h e r behavior is d i v e r g e n t he is l e d to the conclusion the behavior is not divergent because it is obscured by n o r m conforming elements.
18

PARTIV

Mind

Suppose an actor has earned a r e p u t a t i o n as a n acceptable h u m a n b e i n g before h e c o m m i t s a labeling-prone act. E v e n w i t h o u t such a r e p u t a t i o n , suppose he presents his act in a c o n f o r m i n g context w i t h " n o t h i n g u n u s u a l " cues. S u c h an event is e x p e r i e n c e d as not fitting the deviant-as-monster assumption. To r e c o n c i l e the discrepancy, people c a n h o l d one of the f o l l o w ing: 1. the actor is a monster; 2. the " d e v i a n t is a m o n s t e r " assumption is not correct; 3. the actor is not deviant; or 4. the actor is deviant, but the case is an exception to the " d e v i a n t is a m o n s t e r " assumption. Alternatives 3 a n d 4 cause the least social disrupt i o n a n d therefore have the lowest cost. Thus, the person r e s p o n d i n g is i n c l i n e d to choose 3 or 4. If he decides the actor is not deviant, t h e n the actor escapes l a b e l i n g entirely. If he decides the actor is deviant b u t not a monster, t h e n the actor's total i d e n t i t y is not discredited. To s u m m a r i z e , definitions of reality, such as " n o t h i n g unusual is h a p p e n i n g " a n d " s o m e t h i n g unusual is h a p p e n i n g , " are negotiated. A m b i g u i t y allows m o r e scope for negotiations. A m b i g u i t y is p r o d u c e d by over-simplified conceptual schemes contradicted b y experience. T h e m o r e difficult it is to use the p r e v a i l i n g conceptual scheme to m a k e sense of experience, the m o r e the social situation w i l l b e t h r o w n into confusion a n d left to ad hoc negotiations. Negotiations p r o v i d e the o p p o r t u n i t y for persons to elude l a b e l i n g w h e n otherwise these persons m i g h t be sanctioned. B l a c k a n d w h i t e categories about deviance may at times serve to discourage behavior w h i c h risks labeling by exaggerating the horrors of crossi n g the line f r o m good to b a d . B u t w h e n the categories are u n d e r m i n e d , risky behavior m a y flourish. A n d the m o r e s i m p l e any system of categories, the m o r e l i k e l y it is to be u n d e r m i n e d by the complexity of events.

T h e commonsense perspective leads a person to expect that a deviant, at least in the setting w h e r e h e engages i n norm-violations, behaves i n a w a y an ordinary person w o u l d not behave. Thus, v i c t i m s d o not suspect c o n m e n . " A deviant c o u l d not possibly be a person l i k e y o u a n d m e " is an u n d e r l y i n g assumption. O n the contrary, the d e v i ant is a monster w i t h w h o m we have n o t h i n g in c o m m o n a n d w h o is so grotesque as to be i n c o m prehensible to u s .
19
1 8

J a c k s o n m a k e s this p o i n t a b o u t l a b e l i n g t h e a l c o h o l i c o v e r a " T h e inaccuracies of the cultural stereotype

period of time.

o f t h e a l c o h o l i c p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t h e i s i n a c o n s t a n t state o f inebriationalso contribute to the family's rejection of the i d e a of alcoholism as the husband seems to demonstrate f r o m time t o t i m e t h a t h e c a n c o n t r o l his d r i n k i n g . " J o a n J a c k s o n , " T h e A d j u s t m e n t o f the F a m i l y t o the Crisis o f A l c o h o l i s m , " i n R u bington and Weinberg,
19

op.

cit, p . 56.

G a r f i n k e l suggests this v i e w i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r a

successful degradation c e r e m o n y : " F i n a l l y , the d e n o u n c e d person must be ritually separated f r o m a place in the legitimate o r d e r , i.e., he m u s t be d e f i n e d as s t a n d i n g at a p l a c e o p p o s e d t o it. H e m u s t b e p l a c e d 'outside,' h e m u s t b e m a d e ' s t r a n g e . ' " Garfinkel, op. cit, p. 423.

Harold Garfinkel

Common Sense Knowledge of Social Structures: The Documentary Method of Interpretation

Sociologically speaking, " c o m m o n c u l t u r e " refers to the socially sanctioned grounds of inference a n d action that people use in their everyday affairs a n d w h i c h they assume that other m e m bers of the group use in the same way. Sociallysanctioned - facts - of - life - in - society - that - anyb o n a - fide - m e m b e r - of - the - society - knows depict such matters as conduct of f a m i l y life; m a r k e t organization; distributions of honor, competence, responsibility, g o o d w i l l , i n c o m e , motives a m o n g m e m b e r s ; frequency, causes of, a n d remedies for trouble; a n d the presence of good a n d e v i l purposes b e h i n d the apparent workings of things. S u c h socially sanctioned facts of social life consist
1

of descriptions f r o m the point of v i e w of the collectivity m e m b e r ' s interests i n the management of his practical affairs. Basing our usage u p o n the w o r k o f A l f r e d S c h u t z , w e shall call such k n o w l edge of socially o r g a n i z e d environments of c o n certed actions " c o m m o n sense k n o w l e d g e of social structures." T h e discovery of c o m m o n culture consists of the discovery from within the society by social scientists of the existence of common-sense k n o w l e d g e of social structures, and the treatment by social scientists of k n o w l e d g e , a n d of the procedures that societal m e m b e r s use for its assembly,
2 3
2

T h e c o n c e p t o f " c o l l e c t i v i t y m e m b e r s h i p " i s i n t e n d e d i n strict The Social System, T h e a n d in Theories o f N e w York, 1951,

R e p r i n t e d w i t h p e r m i s s i o n o f M a c m i l l a n P u b l i s h i n g C o . , Inc. from Theories o f the Mind e d i t e d b y J o r d a n Scher. Copyright 1 9 6 2 b y T h e F r e e Press o f G l e n c o e , a D i v i s i o n o f T h e M a c m i l lan Company. T h i s investigation was s u p p o r t e d by a S e n i o r R e s e a r c h F e l l o w ship SF-81 f r o m the U.S. P u b l i c H e a l t h Service. T h e materials f o r this p a p e r a r e t a k e n f r o m a b o o k i n p r e p a r a t i o n b y t h e author, Common-Sense Actions I w i s h to thank these as my Topic and Features Egon due of SocioBittner, to Peter logical Inquiry. versations colleagues Thanks are

a c c o r d w i t h T a l c o t t Parsons' usage in F r e e Press of G l e n c o e , 1961, p p . 239-240.

3

Society, V o l . I , P a r t T w o , T h e F r e e P r e s s o f G l e n c o e , N e w Y o r k , Alfred Schutz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau dersozialen Welt, Verlag

v o n Julius Springer, W i e n ,

1932; " T h e p r o b l e m o f r a t i o n a l i t y 1943,10:130-149; Philosophy and "Some leadPhenomenological of ac1951, 1953,

i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d , " Economica, 97; "On multiple 1945, Philosophy action," Journal realities," and

i n g c o n c e p t s i n p h e n o m e n o l o g y , " Social Research, 1 9 4 5 , 1 2 : 7 7 Research, tion," man 4:533-575; "Choosing a m o n g projects Research,

A a r o n V . C i c o u r e l , a n d E l e a n o r B e r n e r t S h e l d o n for m a n y conabout materials. M c H u g h for his h e l p w i t h the e x p e r i m e n t a n d for m a n y useful ideas i n his r e p o r t .
1

Phenomenological and

12:161-184; " C o m m o n sense a n d scientific i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h u Philosophy Phenomenological Research, 1954, 51:257-274; 14:1-37; " C o n c e p t a n d t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n i n t h e social s c i e n c e s , " American reality, of Philosophy, "Symbol, a n d society," Symbols and Society, F o u r t e e n t h S y m p o -

T h e c o n c e p t " e v e r y d a y affairs" i s i n t e n d e d i n strict a c c o r d and and Phenomenological Phenomenological Research, Research, 1945, 1953, 4:533-575; 14:1-37.

w i t h A l f r e d S c h u t z ' u s a g e i n his a r t i c l e s , " O n m u l t i p l e r e a l i t i e s , " Philosophy Philosophy " C o m m o n sense a n d scientific i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h u m a n a c t i o n , "

sium of the C o n f e r e n c e of Science, Philosophy, a n d Religion, e d i t e d b y L y m a n B r y s o n a n d others, H a r p e r a n d Brothers, N e w Y o r k , 1955, p p . 135-202.

282 test, management, and transmission as objects of m e r e theoretical sociological interest. This paper is c o n c e r n e d w i t h common-sense k n o w l e d g e of social structures as an object of theoretical sociological interest. It is c o n c e r n e d w i t h descriptions of a society that its members, sociologists included, as a c o n d i t i o n of their enforceable rights to manage a n d communicate decisions of m e a n i n g , fact, m e t h o d , a n d causal texture w i t h o u t interference, use and treat as k n o w n i n c o m m o n w i t h other members, and w i t h other m e m b e r s take for granted. As an object of theoretical sociological interest, such k n o w l e d g e is both a topic as w e l l as a feature of sociological i n q u i r y . O n e facet of this assertion w i l l be treated in this paper. Its interests are d i r e c t e d to a description of the w o r k w h e r e b y decisions of m e a n i n g and fact are managed, and a b o d y of factual knowledge of social structures is assembled in common-sense situations of choice.

PART IV

Mind

matters of fact, hypothesis, conjecture, fancy, and the rest despite the fact that in the calculable sense of the t e r m " k n o w , " he does not a n d even cannot " k n o w " what he is d o i n g prior to or while he is doing it. F i e l d workers, most particularly those d o i n g ethnographic and linguistic studies in settings w h e r e they cannot presuppose a k n o w l e d g e of social structures, are perhaps best acquainted w i t h such situations, but other types of professional sociological i n q u i r y are not exempt. Nevertheless, a body of k n o w l e d g e of social structures is somehow assembled. S o m e h o w decisions of m e a n i n g , facts, m e t h o d , and causal texture are made. H o w , in the course of the i n q u i r y d u r i n g w h i c h such decisions must be made, does this occur? In his c o n c e r n for the sociologist's p r o b l e m of achieving an adequate description of cultural events, an i m p o r t a n t case of w h i c h w o u l d be W e ber's familiar "behaviors w i t h a subjective meani n g attached and g o v e r n e d thereby i n their course," K a r l M a n n h e i m furnished a n approximate description of one process. M a n n h e i m called it "the d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . " It contrasts w i t h the methods of literal observation, yet it has a recognizable fit w i t h what m a n y sociological researchers, lay and professional, actually do.
4

THE DOCUMENTARY METHOD OF INTERPRETATION T h e r e are innumerable situations of sociological i n q u i r y i n w h i c h the investigatorwhether he be a professional sociologist or a person undertaking an i n q u i r y about social structures in the interests of managing his practical everyday affairscan assign witnessed actual appearances to the status of an event of conduct only by i m p u t i n g biography and prospects to the appearances, w h i c h he does by e m b e d d i n g the appearances in presupposed knowledge of social structures. Thus it frequently happens that in order for the investigator to decide what he is n o w l o o k i n g at he must wait for future developments, only to find that these futures in t u r n are i n f o r m e d by their history and future. By w a i t i n g to see what w i l l have h a p p e n e d he learns what it was that he previously saw. E i t h e r that, or he takes i m p u t e d history and prospects for granted. M o t i v a t e d actions, for example, have exactly these troublesome properties. It, therefore, occurs that the investigator frequently must elect among alternative courses of interpretation and inquiry to the e n d of d e c i d i n g

A c c o r d i n g to M a n n h e i m , the documentary m e t h o d involves the search for ". . . a n identical, homologous pattern u n d e r l y i n g a vast variety of totally different realizations of m e a n i n g . " T h e m e t h o d consists of treating an actual appearance as "the d o c u m e n t of," as " p o i n t i n g t o , " as "standing on behalf o f " a presupposed underlyi n g pattern. N o t only is the u n d e r l y i n g pattern d e r i v e d f r o m its i n d i v i d u a l documentary evidences, the i n d i v i d u a l documentary evidences, in their t u r n , are i n t e r p r e t e d on the basis of " w h a t is k n o w n " about the u n d e r l y i n g pattern. E a c h is used to elaborate the other.
5

T h e m e t h o d is recognizable for the everyday necessities of r e c o g n i z i n g what a person is "talk4

K a r l M a n n h e i m , " O n t h e interpretation o f Weltanschauung,"

on the Sociology of Knowledge, translated and edited

Essays

b y P a u l K e c s k e m e t i , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, N e w Y o r k , 1952, pp. 5 3 - 6 3 .

5

Ibid., p. 5 7 .

Garfinkel i n g about" g i v e n that he doesn't say exactly what he means, or in r e c o g n i z i n g such c o m m o n occurrences as m a i l m e n , friendly gestures, a n d p r o m ises. It is recognizable as w e l l in d e c i d i n g the sociologically analyzed occurrence of events l i k e Goffman's strategies for the m a n a g e m e n t of i m pressions, Erikson's i d e n t i t y crises, Riesman's types of conformity, F l o r e n c e K l u c k h o h n ' s value premises, Malinowski's m a g i c a l practices, Bales' i n t e r a c t i o n counts, M e r t o n ' s types of deviance, Lazarsfeld's latent structure of attitudes, a n d the U.S. Census' occupational categories. H o w is it done by the investigator that f r o m replies to a questionnaire he finds the respondent's " a t t i t u d e " ; that v i a i n t e r v i e w s w i t h office personnel he reports their "bureaucratically org a n i z e d activities"; that by consulting crimes k n o w n to the police, estimates are m a d e of the parameters of " r e a l c r i m e " ? M o r e literally, what is the w o r k w h e r e b y the investigator sets the observed occurrence and the i n t e n d e d occurrence into a correspondence of m e a n i n g such that the investigator finds it reasonable to treat witnessed actual appearances as evidences of the event he means to be studying? To answer these questions it is necessary to d e t a i l the w o r k of the d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d . To this e n d a demonstration of the d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d was designed to exaggerate the features of this m e t h o d in use and to catch the w o r k of "fact p r o d u c t i o n " i n flight.

283 experimenter-counselor h e a r d the questions a n d gave his answers f r o m an adjoining r o o m , v i a an i n t e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n system. A f t e r describing his p r o b l e m a n d f u r n i s h i n g some b a c k g r o u n d to it, the subject asked his first question. A f t e r a stand a r d pause, the e x p e r i m e n t e r a n n o u n c e d his answer, " y e s " or " n o . " A c c o r d i n g to instructions, the subject t h e n r e m o v e d a w a l l p l u g c o n n e c t i n g h i m w i t h the counselor so that the "counselor w i l l not hear y o u r r e m a r k s " a n d tape-recorded his comments on the exchange. A f t e r these w e r e c o m p l e t e d , the subject p l u g g e d the m i c r o p h o n e in a n d asked his next question. A f t e r he r e c e i v e d the answer, he again r e c o r d e d his comments, a n d thus p r o c e e d e d t h r o u g h at least t e n questions a n d answers. T h e subject h a d b e e n t o l d , " M o s t p e o p l e want to ask at least t e n questions." T h e sequence of answers, evenly d i v i d e d bet w e e n yes's a n d no's, was p r e d e c i d e d w i t h a table of r a n d o m numbers. A l l subjects asking the same n u m b e r of questions w e r e administered the same series of yes a n d no answers. F o l l o w i n g the exchange of questions a n d answers the subject was asked to s u m m a r i z e his impressions of the entire exchange. A n i n t e r v i e w f o l l o w e d . T h e f o l l o w i n g are illustrative u n e d i t e d p r o tocols.

Case 1 SUBJECT: Ok, this is the situation that I am presented with. I happen to he of the Jewish faith and I have been dating a Gentile girl now for about two months. My dad is not directly opposed to this situation, but I feel at the same time that he is not exactly pleased with it. Mother feels that as long as dad is not directly opposed to this situation that I should go ahead and continue dating until he makes some direct statement to the contrary. My reason for feeling why he is not too pleased with this is that he has never said don't date her, but at the same time he will come up with digs and sayings that make me feel very ill at ease about dating the girl. My question is, do you feel under the present circumstances that I should continue or stop dating this girl? Let me put that in a positive way. Do you feel that I should continue dating this girl?

AN EXPERIMENT T e n undergraduates w e r e solicited b y t e l l i n g t h e m that research was b e i n g done in the D e p a r t m e n t of Psychiatry to explore alternative means to psychotherapy "as a w a y of g i v i n g persons advice about their personal p r o b l e m s " [sic]. E a c h subject was seen i n d i v i d u a l l y by an experimenter w h o was falsely represented as a student counselor in training. T h e subject was asked to first discuss the b a c k g r o u n d to some serious p r o b l e m on w h i c h he w o u l d l i k e advice, a n d t h e n to address to the " c o u n s e l o r " a series of questions each of w h i c h w o u l d p e r m i t a " y e s " o r " n o " answer. T h e subject was p r o m i s e d that the " c o u n s e l o r " w o u l d attempt to answer to the best of his ability. T h e

284 EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

PART IV Mind
Even though he might have said go ahead and date her I perhaps would feel guilty in knowing that he really did not want me to continue to date her. Though I don't know that it would actually help the situation any. So, well, perhaps we will look into this further and that is another question. I am ready for the fourth question now. If after having this discussion with Dad and getting a positive answer from him but at the same time felt that this was not his honest opinion do you think that it would be proper for me tc have my mother have a serious talk with him and therefore try and get a truer reaction to Dad's opinion on the situation? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes. SUBJECT: Well this seems fair to me. I feel perhaps that he would be honester with Mother about the situation. Of course that might present a problem. Would Mother come back and be completely honest with me? She seems to be more liberal than Dad, not to say that Mother would lie abdut it, but she would be a little more liberal about things like this and perhaps in her course of conversation with Dad she would try and present my side to him and therefore once again I get two answers. If I look at it that way I don't think that I am going to get to first base anyway, but at least I feel that we are moving along some way. I am ready for my fifth question now. Do you think I should tell this Gentile girl who I am dating the problem that I am having with my folks at home or should I wait until well that is another question. Do you feel that I should tell the girl that I am dating the problems that I am having at home over her religion? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no. SUBJECT: Well once again I am surprised. Of course, that might depend on how much you care for the girl and how much longer I feel that I am going to be dating her. But I personally feel that it is only right to tell her for if she is perhaps thinking more serious than I am, she might, it might be best for us to understand the full situation and if she feels that this will be a block then I feel perhaps that would end the situation right there without telling her. I feel that perhaps I am going to show this in different ways and she will be unaware of what the real situation

SUBJECT: No. Well, that is kind of interesting. I kindafeel that there is really no great animosity between Dad and I but well perhaps he feels that greater dislike will grow out of this. I suppose or may be it is easier for an outsider to see certain things that I am blind to at this moment. I would like to ask my second question now. EXPERIMENTER: Okay. SUBJECT: Do you feel that I should have a further discussion with Dad about this situation or not? Should I have further discussion with Dad over this subject about dating the Gentile girl? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes. SUBJECT: Well I feel that it is reasonable but I really don't know what to say to him. I mean he seems to be not really too understanding. In other words he seems to be afraid really to discuss the situation. I mean at least it appears that way to me so far. But I guess if it is worthwhile to me, if I really want to continue to date her that I will go on and have this discussion with Dad. I really don't know what to say because I mean I am dating her. I am not in love with her or anything but I really never know what is going to come out. I guess we should have a discussion based on what the future possibilities might be and how he would feel about that. He may not be too strongly opposed now because we are only dating but perhaps he sees future complications that he would really like to get off his chest at the moment. I am ready for my third question now. If after having my conversation with Dad and he says to continue dating her but at the same time he gives me an impression that he is really not, he really does not want me to date her, but he is only doing it because he wants to be a good dad, should under these conditions, should I still date the girl? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes. SUBJECT: Well I am actually surprised at the answer. I expected a no answer on that. Perhaps this is because you are not quite aware of my dad and his reactions and he seems to be the type of person that is sensitive and therefore he is very careful in the way that he will handle things.

Garfinkel is and perhaps react back to me in a certain way spoiling our dating and everything else like that. I am ready for my sixth question. If I was to fall in love with this girl and want to make plans for marriage do you feel that it is fair that I should ask her to change her reli gion over to my belief? E X P E R I M E N T E R : My answer is no. SUBJECT: Well, no. Well, this has me stymied. No. Well, I honestly feel that I have been brought up in a certain way and I believe that she has too, and I feel pretty strong about the way that I believe. Not that I am completely orthodox or anything, but of course there is always family pressure and things like that. And lam quite sure that she feels, unfortunately I have never seen a family with a split in religion that really has been able to make a success out of it. So I don't know. I think that perhaps I would be tempted to ask her to change. I don't think that I would be able to really. I am ready for number seven. Do you feel that it would be a better situation if we were to get married and neither one of us were willing to talk about the religious difference or to give in on either one side, that we bring our children up in a neutral religion other than the two that we believe in? E X P E R I M E N T E R : My answer is yes. SUBJECT: Well perhaps this would be a solu tion. If we could find a religion that would incor porate our two beliefs to a certain extent. I realize that perhaps this might be literally impossible to do. Perhaps in a sense this neutral religion might be something almost made up by ourselves because I honestly feel that religious training no matter which belief it is if not carried to extremes is good, for everyone should have a certain amount of religious training along these lines. Perhaps this might be a solution to the problem. I guess I should follow this along a little bit fur ther and see exactly what happens. I am ready for number eight. If we were to get married would it be best for us to live in a new community where we will not be in contact with our parents if we were getting a lot of family pressure over religious differences? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

285 SUBJECT: Well, I kinda tend to agree with this answer. I feel that you wouldn't be accomplishing too much by running away from the issue and that perhaps it would be one of those things in life that eventually you would just be willing to accept it and that the families and we would get along harmoniously together. At least I hope it would work out if that situation comes about. I think it would be best for both families together that we are not going to work it out if we run away from our problem. So we best remain there and try and work it out. I am ready for number nine. If we did get married and were to raise our children do you think that we should explain and tell our children that we once had this religious difference or would we just bring them up in this new religion, that is their religion, that we talked about, and let them believe that that is what we originally believe in? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: Once again I kinda agree with this. I think they should be told because undoubtedly they will find out. And if they did find out that there was this difference that we once had they would feel that we were sneaking or trying to hide something from them and this would not be the best situation either. So I believe this would be the best situation. I am ready for number ten. Do you feel that our children, if there were any, would have any religious problems them selves because of us the parents and our difficulties? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: Well I really don't know if I agree with that or not. Perhaps they would have trouble if confusion set in and they were to feel that they did not know which is right and which is wrong or what side to pick if they did not want to stick with their religion. But I kinda feel that if their religion was a wholesome one which supplied the needs of a religion and that which a religion does supply that there would not beany problems with them. But I suppose that only time will tell if such problems would come about. I am finished with my comments now. EXPERIMENTER: Okay, I will be right in.

286 The experimenter appeared in the room with the subject, handed him a list of points that he might comment on, and left the room. The subject commented as follows. SUBJECT: Well the conversation seemed to be one-sided because I was doing it all. But, I feel that it was extremely difficult for Mr. McHugh to answer these questions fully without having a complete understanding of the personalities of the different people involved and exactly how in volved the situation was itself. The answers I re ceived I must say that the majority of them were answered perhaps in the same way that I would answer them to myself knowing the differences in types of people. One or two of them did come as a surprise to me and I felt that the reason per haps he answered these questions the way he did is for the reason that he is not aware of the person alities involved and how they are reacting or would react to a certain situation. The answers that I received were most of them I felt that he was for the most part aware of the situation as we moved along in that I was interpreting his answers even though they were yes or no answers as fully meditating over these situations that I presented to him and they had a lot of meaning to me. I felt that his answers as a whole were helpful and that he was looking out for the bene fit to the situation for the most part and not to curtail it or cut it short in any means. I heard what I wanted to hear in most of the situations presented at time. Perhaps I did not hear what I really wanted to hear but perhaps from an objec tive standpoint they were the best answers be cause someone involved in a situation is blinded to a certain degree and cannot take this objective viewpoint. And therefore these answers may dif fer from the person who is involved in the situa tion and the person who is outside and can take an objective viewpoint. I honestly believe that the answer that he gave me, that he was completely aware of the situation at hand. Perhaps I guess that should be qualified. Perhaps when I said should I talk to Dad for instance he was not posi tive. When I said should I talk to Dad for instance he was not positive what I was going to talk to Dad about. In a full capacity. He knew the gen eral topic but he is not aware how close I am to

PART IV

Mind

Dad or how involved the conversation might get. And if his saying "do talk" in knowing that Dad will not listen, well this perhaps isn't best, or if Dad is very willing to listen he says it may not help. Or don't talk. Well this once again is bring ing in personalities which he is not aware of. The conversation and the answers given I believe had a lot of meaning to me. I mean it was perhaps what I would have expected for someone who fully understood the situation. And I feel that it had a lot of sense to me and made a lot of sense. Well I felt that the questions that I asked were very pertinent and did help in understand ing the situation on both sides, that is myself and the answerer and my reaction to the answers like I have stated before were mostly in agree ment. At times I was surprised but understood that because he is not fully aware of the situation and the personalities involved. H e r e is another protocol.

Case 2 SUBJECT: / would like to know whether or not I should change my major at the present time. I have a physics major with quite a deficit in grade points to bring up to get my average in physics. I would like to switch over to mathematics. I have a title difficulty in it but I think maybe I could handle it. I have failed several math courses here at U.C.L.A. but I have always repeated them and had C's. I have come close to getting in math in one specific course because I studied a little more than in others but my question is still should I change my major? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no.

SUBJECT: Well he says no. And if I don't then I will have to make up my deficit in grade points which will be awfully difficult because I am not doing too well this semester. If I pull through this semester with seven units of A then I can count on possibly going on to get my degree in physics in February but then I have this stigma of nuclear physics facing me. I thoroughly dislike the study of nuclear physics. Nuclear Physics 124 will be one of my required courses to get a degree in physics.

287 ciently good study habits and incentive to actu ally achieve developing those habits such that I wouldn't have to stay up late at night and not get the work done in the first place? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no. SUBJECT: He says no. I can't develop the study habits properly to be able to pull myself through. If you don't think that I can develop the proper study habits and carry them through to reach my goal do you on the basis of this still believe that I can get a degree in physics? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no. SUBJECT: According to that I won't get a de gree. What should I do? Are you still there?

Do you think I could get a degree in physics on the basis of this knowledge that I must take Physics 124? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes. SUBJECT: He says yes. I don't see how I can. Iam not that good of a therorist. My study habits are horrible. My reading speed is bad, and I don't spend enough time studying. Do you think that I could successfully im prove my study habits? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes. SUBJECT: He says that I can successfully im prove my study habits. I have been preached to all along on how to study properly but I don't study properly. I don't have sufficient incentive to go through physics or do I? Do you think I have sufficient incentive to get a degree in physics? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes. SUBJECT: He says my answer is yes. I think possibly so ifldidn't have a bad scholastic record behind me to follow me up. It would be awfully difficult to get that degree. Do you think I could successfully do my stud ying while trying to keep happy relations at home with my wife and still get my work done? I don't do my studying well at school and I don't have much incentive to study when I am at home. But when my wife comes home, I like to study. Yet this keeps us from doing things, and whenever she doesn't do things, it gets on my nerves because there is all this work piling up. Do you think I could successfully do my studying at home? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no. SUBJECT: He says no. I don't think so either. Should I come to school every night after sup per and do my studying? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no. SUBJECT: He says I shouldn't come to school and study. Where should I go? Should I go to the library on campus to do my studying? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes. SUBJECT: He says I should go to the library to do my studying. Which library? They may not have all the references there that I may need but that is not always necessary. I need at least three more questions. Do you think I can develop suffi

EXPERIMENTER:

Yes, I am.

SUBJECT: If you don't think I will make the achieve the necessary goal of improving my study habits and getting a degree in physics do you recommend that I quit school? EXPERIMENTER: SUBJECT: still there? My answer is yes. He says I should quit school. Are you

E X P E R I M E N T E R : Yes.
SUBJECT: / have one more question. I would like to get a commission in the Air Force. I have completed the Air Force R.O.T.C. training pro gram but to get a commission I need a degree. If I don't get the degree the chances are very strong that I may not get the commission al though there are in's and out's that there is still some possibility that I may still get a commission without a degree, although this is not desirable. The question is, will I get a commission in the Air Force? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is yes.

SUBJECT: He says I will get a commission in the Air Force and that is what I am looking for ward to, but will I ever get a degree? If I get a commission without a degree will I ever get a degree in anything? EXPERIMENTER: My answer is no. SUBJECT: This leaves me somewhat unhappy although I don't really need a degree in the type of work that I desire to do. Are you there? Come back in.

288 T h e subject c o m m e n t e d as follows. W e l l , as far as w h a t I got f r o m the conversation, it is rather foolish for me to pursue my w o r k any f u r t h e r as far as getting a degree in a n y t h i n g . A c t u a l l y I have felt a l l along that the type of w o r k I am interested in w h i c h is i n v e n t i n g is not s o m e t h i n g that requires a degree necessarily. It requires a c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e of m a t h a n d physics but it doesn't r e q u i r e a degree to do i n v e n t i n g . F r o m the conversation I gather that I should just q u i t school a n d go ahead a n d get my commission but h o w I don't k n o w . B u t it w o u l d be awfully nice to have a degree. T h a t degree w o u l d be able to get me into other schools. O t h e r w i s e I w i l l have the statement that I w e n t t h r o u g h college but I n e v e r got out. I also get the impression that my study habits w i l l never i m p r o v e as m u c h as I w o u l d like t h e m to anyway. I w i l l not get a degree. I w i l l get a commission a n d it is fruitless for me to study either at h o m e or at school. E s p e c i a l l y in the e v e n i n g . I w o n d e r if I should do any studyi n g at all, or if I should l e a r n to do all my studying at school. W h a t to do? I have the feeling that m y parents w o u l d b e v e r y u n h a p p y and also m y wife's parents w o u l d be v e r y u n h a p p y if I never d i d get a degree or at least especially right n o w . I have the feeling that this past conversation is based on what one should have l e a r n e d to do years ago, that is, as a g r o w i n g c h i l d . To ask themselves questions and give h i m s e l f an answer of some type, yes or no, a n d to t h i n k out reason w h y either yes or no holds or m i g h t h o l d a n d u p o n the validity or the anticipation of the v a l i d i t y of that answer what one should do accomplish his goal or just exist. I personally t h i n k I can do better in m a t h than I can in physics. B u t I w o n ' t k n o w u n t i l the e n d of the summer.

PART IV

Mind

B. Answers were perceived as "answers-toquestions." 1. T y p i c a l l y the subjects h e a r d the experimenter's answers as answers-to-the-question. P e r c e p t u a l l y , the experimenter's answers w e r e m o t i v a t e d by the question. 2. Subjects saw d i r e c t l y " w h a t the adviser had i n m i n d . " T h e y h e a r d " i n a g l a n c e " what he was t a l k i n g about, i.e., what he meant, a n d not w h a t h e h a d uttered. 3. T h e t y p i c a l subject assumed over the course of the exchange, a n d d u r i n g the post-experim e n t a l i n t e r v i e w , that the answers w e r e adv i c e to the p r o b l e m , a n d that this advice as a solution to the p r o b l e m was to be f o u n d v i a the answers. 4. A l l r e p o r t e d the " a d v i c e that they h a d b e e n g i v e n " a n d addressed their appreciation a n d c r i t i c i s m to that " a d v i c e . " C. There were no pre-programed questions; the next question was motivated by the retrospective-prospective possibilities of the present situation that were altered by each actual exchange. 1. No subject administered a p r e - p r o g r a m e d set of questions. 2. Present answers altered the sense of p r e v i ous exchanges. 3. O v e r the course of the exchange the ass u m p t i o n seemed to operate that there was an answer to be obtained, a n d that if the answer was not obvious, that its m e a n i n g c o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d by active search, one part of w h i c h i n v o l v e d asking another question so as to f i n d out what the adviser " h a d in mind." 4. M u c h effort was d e v o t e d to l o o k i n g for meanings that w e r e i n t e n d e d but w e r e not e v i d e n t f r o m the i m m e d i a t e answer to the question. 5. T h e present answer-to-the-questions m o t i v a t e d the succeeding set of possibilities f r o m a m o n g w h i c h the next question was selected. T h e next question e m e r g e d as a p r o d u c t of reflections u p o n the previous course of the conversation and the presupposed u n d e r l y i n g p r o b l e m as the topic whose features each actual exchange d o c u m e n t e d a n d extended. T h e u n d e r l y i n g " p r o b l e m " was elaborated in its features as a f u n c t i o n of the exchange. T h e sense of the p r o b l e m was progressively accommo-

Findings A n examination o f the protocols r e v e a l e d the following: A. Getting through the exchange. N o n e of the subjects h a d difficulty in accomp l i s h i n g the series of t e n questions, a n d in summ a r i z i n g a n d evaluating the advice.

289 he was not sufficiently acquainted w i t h the intricacies of the p r o b l e m , or the fault was in the question so that another phrasing was r e q u i r e d . Incongruous answers were resolved by i m p u t i n g k n o w l e d g e a n d intent to the adviser. Contradictories faced the subject w i t h electing the real question that the answer answered w h i c h they d i d b y f u r n i s h i n g the question w i t h additional meanings that fit w i t h the meanings " b e h i n d " w h a t the ad viser was advising. In the case of contradictory answers m u c h effort was d e v o t e d to r e v i e w i n g the possi b l e intent of the answer so as to r i d the answer of c o n t r a d i c t i o n or meaninglessness, a n d to r i d the answerer of untrustworthiness. M o r e subjects entertained the possibility of a trick t h a n tested this possibility. A l l suspicious subjects w e r e reluctant to act u n d e r the belief that there was a t r i c k i n v o l v e d . Suspicions w e r e q u i e t e d if the ad viser's answers made " g o o d sense." Suspi cions w e r e most u n l i k e l y to continue if the answers accorded w i t h the subject's p r e v i ous thought about the matter a n d w i t h his p r e f e r r e d decisions. Suspicions transformed the answer into an event of " m e r e s p e e c h " h a v i n g the ap pearance o f coincidental occurrence w i t h the occasion of the questioner's question. Subjects f o u n d this structure difficult to m a i n t a i n a n d manage. M a n y subjects saw the sense of the answer " a n y w a y . " Those w h o became suspicious simultane ously, t h o u g h temporarily, w i t h d r e w their wiliingness to continue.

dated to each present answer, w h i l e the an swer m o t i v a t e d fresh aspects of the under lying problem. 6. T h e u n d e r l y i n g p a t t e r n was elaborated a n d c o m p o u n d e d over the series of exchanges a n d was accommodated to each present " a n s w e r " so as to m a i n t a i n the "course of a d v i c e , " to elaborate what has " r e a l l y b e e n a d v i s e d " previously, a n d to motivate the n e w possibilities as e m e r g i n g features of the problem. D. Answers in search of questions. 1. O v e r the course of the exchange, subjects sometimes started w i t h the r e p l y as an an swer a n d altered the previous sense of their question to accommodate this to the r e p l y as the answer to the retrospectively revised question. 2. T h e identical utterance was capable of an swering several different questions simulta neously, a n d of constituting an answer to a c o m p o u n d question that in terms of the strict logic of propositions d i d not per m i t either a yes or no or a single yes or no. 3. T h e same utterance was used to answer several different questions separated in t i m e . Subjects r e f e r r e d to this as " s h e d d i n g n e w l i g h t " on the past. 4. Present answers p r o v i d e d answers to fur ther questions that w e r e n e v e r asked. E. Handling incomplete, inappropriate, and con tradictory answers. 1. W h e r e answers w e r e unsatisfying or i n complete, the questioners w e r e w i l l i n g to wait for later answers in order to decide the sense of the previous ones. 2. Incomplete answers w e r e treated by sub jects as i n c o m p l e t e because of the " d e f i ciencies" of this m e t h o d of g i v i n g advice. 3. Answers that w e r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e w e r e i n appropriate for "a reason." If the reason was f o u n d , the sense of the answer was t h e r e u p o n d e c i d e d . If an answer made " g o o d sense" this was l i k e l y to be what the answerer h a d " a d v i s e d . " 4. W h e n answers w e r e incongruous or con tradictory, subjects w e r e able to continue b y f i n d i n g that the " a d v i s e r " h a d l e a r n e d m o r e in the m e a n t i m e , or that he h a d de c i d e d to change his m i n d , or that perhaps

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

F.

"Search" for and perception of pattern. 1. T h r o u g h o u t , there was a c o n c e r n a n d search for pattern. P a t t e r n , h o w e v e r , was p e r c e i v e d f r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g . P a t t e r n was l i k e l y to be seen in the first e v i d e n c e of the " a d v i c e . " 2. Subjects f o u n d it v e r y difficult to grasp the implications of randomness in the utter ances. A p r e d e t e r m i n e d utterance was treated as deceit in the answers instead of as an utterance that was d e c i d e d before h a n d a n d that o c c u r r e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the subject's questions a n d interests. 3. W h e n the possibility of d e c e p t i o n o c c u r r e d

290 to the subjects, the adviser's utterance docu m e n t e d the pattern of the deceit instead of the p a t t e r n of advice. Thus the relationship of the utterance to the u n d e r l y i n g patt e r n as its d o c u m e n t r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d . G. Answers were assigned a scenic source. 1. Subjects assigned to the adviser as his adv i c e the thought f o r m u l a t e d in the subject's questions. F o r example, w h e n a subject asked, " S h o u l d I c o m e to school every night after supper to do my s t u d y i n g , " and the e x p e r i m e n t e r said, " M y answer is n o , " the subject in his comments said, " H e said I shouldn't come to school a n d s t u d y . " This was v e r y c o m m o n . 2. A l l subjects were surprised to f i n d that they c o n t r i b u t e d so actively a n d so heavily to the " a d v i c e that they h a d r e c e i v e d f r o m the adviser." 3 . U p o n b e i n g told about the d e c e p t i o n the subjects w e r e intensely chagrined. In most cases they revised their opinions about the p r o c e d u r e to emphasize its inadequacies for the experimenter's purposes (which they understood still to be an exploration of means of g i v i n g advice). H. The vagueness of every present situation of further possibilities remained invariant to the clarification furnished by the exchanges of questions and answers. 1. T h e r e was vagueness (a) in the status of the utterance as an answer, (b) in its status as an answer-to-the-question, (c) in its status as a d o c u m e n t of advice w i t h respect to the u n d e r l y i n g pattern, a n d (d) in the u n d e r l y i n g p r o b l e m . W h i l e , after the course of an exchange, the utterances furnished " a d v i c e about the p r o b l e m , " their f u n c t i o n of advice also elaborated the entire scheme of problematic possibilities so that the overa l l effect was that of a transformation of the subject's situation in w h i c h the vagueness of its horizons r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d a n d " p r o b l e m s still r e m a i n e d u n a n s w e r e d . " I. In their capacity as members, subjects consulted institutionalized features of the collectivity as a scheme of interpretation. 1. Subjects made specific reference to the soc i a l structures in d e c i d i n g the sensible a n d

PART IV

Mind

w a r r a n t e d character of the adviser's advice. Such references, h o w e v e r , w e r e not made to any social structures w h a t e v e r . In the eyes of the subject, if the adviser was to k n o w a n d demonstrate to the subject that he k n e w what he was t a l k i n g about, a n d if the subject was to consider seriously the adviser's descriptions of his circumstances as grounds of the subject's further thoughts a n d management of these circumstances, the subject d i d not p e r m i t the adviser, n o r was the subject w i l l i n g to entertain, any m o d e l of the social structures. References that the subject s u p p l i e d w e r e to social structures w h i c h he treated as actually or potentially k n o w n in c o m m o n w i t h the adviser. A n d t h e n , not t o any social structures k n o w n in c o m m o n , but to n o r m a t i v e l y v a l u e d social structures w h i c h the subject as a collectivity m e m b e r accepted as conditions that his decisions, w i t h respect to his o w n sensible a n d realistic grasp of his circumstances a n d the " g o o d " character of the adviser's advice, h a d to satisfy. These social structures consisted of n o r m a t i v e features of the social system seen from within w h i c h , for the subject, w e r e definitive of his m e m b e r ships in the various collectivities that w e r e r e f e r r e d to. 2. Subjects gave little indication, p r i o r to the occasions of use of the rules for d e c i d i n g fact a n d nonfact, what the definitive norm a t i v e structures w e r e t o w h i c h their i n terpretations w o u l d m a k e reference. T h e rules for d o c u m e n t i n g these definitive norm a t i v e orders seemed to come i n t o play only after a set of n o r m a t i v e features h a d b e e n m o t i v a t e d in their relevance to his i n t e r p r e t i v e tasks, a n d t h e n as a f u n c t i o n of the fact that the activities of interpretation were underway. 3. Subjects presupposed k n o w n - i n - c o m m o n features of the collectivity as a b o d y of common-sense k n o w l e d g e subscribed to b y both. T h e y d r e w u p o n these presupposed patterns in assigning to w h a t they h e a r d the adviser talking about, its status of d o c u m e n t a r y evidence of the definitive n o r m a t i v e features of the collectivity settings of the experiment, family, school, h o m e , occupation, to w h i c h the subject's interests w e r e d i r e c t e d . These evidences a n d the collectivity features w e r e r e f e r r e d

I
Garfinkel back a n d forth to each other, w i t h each elaborating a n d b e i n g thereby elaborated in its possibilities. J. Deciding warrant was identical with assigning the advice its perceivedly normal sense. T h r o u g h a retrospective-prospective rev i e w , subjects justified the "reasonable" sense a n d sanctionable status of the advice as grounds for managing their affairs. Its "reasona b l e " character consisted of its compatability w i t h n o r m a t i v e orders of social structures pres u m e d to be subscribed to a n d k n o w n b e t w e e n subject a n d adviser. T h e subject's task of dec i d i n g the w a r r a n t e d character of what was b e i n g advised was i d e n t i c a l w i t h the task of assigning to what the adviser proposed (1) its status as an instance of a class of events; (2) its l i k e l i h o o d of occurrence; (3) its c o m p a r a b i l i t y w i t h past and future events; (4) the c o n d i tions of its occurrence; (5) its place in a set of means-ends relationships; a n d (6) its necessity according to a n a t u r a l (i.e., moral) order. T h e subjects assigned these values of typicality, l i k e l i h o o d , comparability, causal texture, technical efficacy, a n d m o r a l requiredness w h i l e using the institutionalized features of the collectivity as a scheme of interpretation. T h u s , the subject's task of d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r or not what the adviser advised was " t r u e " was i d e n t i c a l w i t h the task of assigning to what the adviser proposed its p e r c e i v e d l y n o r m a l values. Perceivedly normal values were not so much "assigned" as managed. T h r o u g h the w o r k of d o c u m e n t i n g i . e . , by searching for a n d d e t e r m i n i n g pattern, by treating the adviser's answers as m o t i v a t e d by the i n t e n d e d sense of the question, by w a i t i n g for later answers to clarify the sense of p r e v i ous ones, by finding answers to unasked questionsthe p e r c e i v e d l y n o r m a l values of w h a t was b e i n g advised w e r e established, tested, rev i e w e d , retained, restored; i n a w o r d , m a n aged. It is misleading, therefore, to t h i n k of the documentary m e t h o d as a p r o c e d u r e w h e r e b y the advice was a d m i t t e d to m e m b e r ship in a common-sense corpus in the same w a y that the rule of observation is a p r o c e d u r e w h e r e b y propositions are accorded m e m b e r ship in an i d e a l scientific corpus. Rather the d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d d e v e l o p e d the advice so as to be continually " m e m b e r s h i p p i n g " it. EXAMPLES IN SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 291

K.

Examples of the use of the documentary m e t h o d can be cited f r o m e v e r y area of sociological investigation. Its obvious application occurs in c o m m u n i t y studies w h e r e w a r r a n t is assigned to statements by the c r i t e r i a of " c o m p r e h e n s i v e des c r i p t i o n " a n d " r i n g of t r u t h . " Its use is f o u n d also on the m a n y occasions of survey research w h e n the researcher, i n r e v i e w i n g his i n t e r v i e w notes or in e d i t i n g the answers to a questionnaire, has to decide " w h a t the respondent h a d in m i n d . " W h e n a researcher is addressed to the " m o t i v a t e d character" of an action, or a theory, or a person's compliance to a legitimate order and the l i k e , he w i l l use w h a t he has actually observed to " d o c ument" an "underlying pattern." The documentary m e t h o d is used w h e n e v e r selected features of an object are used to e p i t o m i z e the object. F o r example, just as the lay person m a y say of somet h i n g that " H a r r y " says, "Isn't that just l i k e H a r r y ? " the investigator may use some observed feature of the t h i n g he is r e f e r r i n g to as a charact e r i z i n g indicator o f the i n t e n d e d matter. C o m plex scenes l i k e industrial establishments, c o m munities, or social movements are f r e q u e n t l y described w i t h the a i d o f " e x c e r p t s " f r o m protocols a n d n u m e r i c a l tables w h i c h are used to e p i t o m i z e the i n t e n d e d events. T h e d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d is used w h e n e v e r the investigator constructs a life history or a " n a t u r a l h i s t o r y . " T h e task of h i s t o r i c i z i n g the person's biography consists of using the d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d to select a n d order past occurrences so as to furnish the present state of affairs its relevant past a n d prospects.
6

T h e use of the d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d is not confined to cases of "soft" procedures a n d " p a r t i a l descriptions." It occurs as w e l l in cases of rigorous
6

I n his a r t i c l e , " O n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Weltanschauung,"

M a n n h e i m a r g u e d that the d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d i s p e c u l i a r t o t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s . T h e r e exist i n t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s m a n y t e r m i n o l o g i c a l w a y s o f r e f e r r i n g t o it, v i z . , " t h e m e t h o d o f u n derstanding," "sympathetic introspection," " m e t h o d of insight," "method of intuition," "interpretive method," "clinical method," "emphatic understanding," and so on. Attempts by sociologists t o i d e n t i f y s o m e t h i n g c a l l e d " i n t e r p r e t i v e s o c i o l o g y " i n v o l v e t h e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d o c u m e n t a r y m e t h o d a s the basis f o r e n c o u n t e r i n g a n d w a r r a n t i n g its f i n d i n g s .

292 procedures w h e r e descriptions are i n t e n d e d to exhaust a definite field of possible observables. In r e a d i n g a j o u r n a l account for the purpose of l i t e r a l replication, researchers w h o attempt to reconstruct the relationship b e t w e e n the r e p o r t e d procedures and the results frequently encounter a gap of insufficient i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e gap occurs w h e n the reader asks h o w the investigator dec i d e d the correspondence b e t w e e n what was actually observed and the i n t e n d e d event for w h i c h the actual observation is treated as its evidence. T h e reader's p r o b l e m consists of h a v i n g to decide that the r e p o r t e d observation is a literal instance of the i n t e n d e d occurrence, i.e., that the actual observation and the i n t e n d e d occurrence are i d e n t i c a l in sense. Since the relationship b e t w e e n the t w o is a sign relationship, the reader must consult some set of g r a m m a t i c a l rules to decide this correspondence. This g r a m m a r consists of some theory of the i n t e n d e d events on the basis of w h i c h the decisions to code the actual observations as findings are r e c o m m e n d e d . It is at this point that the reader must furnish the account an investment of i n t e r p r e t i v e w o r k and an ass u m p t i o n of " u n d e r l y i n g " matters "just k n o w n in c o m m o n " about the society in terms of w h i c h , what the respondent said, is treated as synonymous w i t h what the observer meant. C o r r e c t correspondence is apt to be meant a n d read on reasonable grounds. C o r r e c t correspondence is the p r o d u c t of the w o r k of investigator and reader as m e m b e r s of a c o m m u n i t y of cobelievers. Thus, e v e n in the case of rigorous methods, if a researcher is to r e c o m m e n d , and the reader is to appreciate, published findings as members of the corpus of sociological fact, the w o r k of the docum e n t a r y m e t h o d is e m p l o y e d .

P A R T IV

Mind

instead of c o m i n g to terms w i t h a situation in w h i c h factual k n o w l e d g e of social structuresfactual in the sense of w a r r a n t e d grounds of further inferences and actionsmust be assembled a n d made available for potential use despite the fact that the situations it purports to describe are, in any calculable sense, u n k n o w n ; in their actual a n d i n t e n d e d logical structures are essentially vague; and are m o d i f i e d , elaborated, extended, if not i n deed created, by the fact and m a n n e r of b e i n g addressed. If m a n y of the features of our subject's documentary w o r k are recognizable in the w o r k of professional sociological fact p r o d u c t i o n , similarly m a n y situations of professional sociological i n q u i r y have precisely the features that our subjects' situations had. Such features of situations of pro-, fessional sociological i n q u i r y m a y be m o r e exactly specified as follows. 1. In the course of an i n t e r v i e w an investigator is l i k e l y to find himself addressing a series of present situations whose future states that a contemplated course of treatment will produce are characteristically vague o r e v e n u n k n o w n . W i t h o v e r w h e l m i n g frequency these as of hereand-now possible future states are only sketchily specifiable p r i o r to u n d e r t a k i n g the action that is i n t e n d e d to realize t h e m . T h e r e is a necessary distinction b e t w e e n a "possible future state of affairs" a n d a "how-to-bring-it-about-future-froma-present-state-of-affairs-as-an-actual-point-of-dep a r t u r e . " T h e "possible future state of affairs" may be v e r y clear i n d e e d . B u t such a future is not the matter of interest. Instead we are conc e r n e d w i t h the " h o w to b r i n g it about f r o m a here-and-now f u t u r e . " It is this statefor c o n v e n ience, call it an "operational future"that is characteristically vague or u n k n o w n . An illustration. A trained survey researcher can describe w i t h remarkable clarity and definiteness what questions he wishes answers to in a questionnaire. H o w actual replies of actual subjects are to be evaluated as "replies to the questions" are incorporated in a set of p r o c e d u r a l decisions k n o w n as " c o d i n g rules." A n y distrib u t i o n of replies to the questions that is possible under the c o d i n g rules is a "possible future state of affairs." A f t e r suitable exploratory w o r k such distributions are clearly a n d definitely imaginable to trained field workers. B u t w i t h o v e r w h e l m i n g

SOCIOLOGICAL SITUATIONS OF INQUIRY AS COMMON-SENSE SITUATIONS O F C H O I C E It is not unusual for professional sociologists to speak of their "fact p r o d u c t i o n " procedures as processes of "seeing t h r o u g h " appearances to an u n d e r l y i n g reality; of brushing past actual appearances to "grasp the i n v a r i a n t . " W h e r e our subjects are concerned, their processes are not a p p r o p r i ately i m a g i n e d as "seeing t h r o u g h , " but consist

Garfinkel frequency it occurs that e v e n late in the actual course of the i n q u i r y the questions a n d answers that w i l l in effect have b e e n asked and answered u n d e r the various ways of evaluating actual subjects' responses as "replies to the q u e s t i o n , " g i v e n the practical exigencies that must be accommodated in accomplishing the actual w o r k of the i n q u i r y , r e m a i n sketchy and o p e n to "reasonable d e c i s i o n " e v e n up to the point of composing the results of the i n q u i r y for p u b l i c a t i o n . 2. G i v e n a future, any future, that is k n o w n in a definite way, the alternative paths to actualize the future state as a set of stepwise operations u p o n some b e g i n n i n g present state are characteristically sketchy, incoherent, and unelaborated. A g a i n it is necessary to stress the difference bet w e e n an inventory of available proceduresinvestigators can talk about these quite definitely a n d c l e a r l y a n d the deliberately p r e - p r o g r a m e d stepwise procedures, a set of p r e d e c i d e d " w h a t to-do-in-case-of" strategies for the m a n i p u l a t i o n of a succession of actual present states of affairs in their course. In actual practices such a p r o g r a m is characteristically an unelaborated one. F o r example, one of the tasks i n v o l v e d in " m a n a g i n g r a p p o r t " consists of m a n a g i n g the stepwise course of the conversation in such a way as to p e r m i t the investigator to c o m m i t his questions in profitable sequence w h i l e r e t a i n i n g some c o n t r o l over the u n k n o w n a n d undesirable directions in w h i c h affairs, as a f u n c t i o n of the course of the actual exchange, m a y actually m o v e . C h a r acteristically the researcher substitutes for a prep r o g r a m e d stepwise solution, a set of ad hoc tactics for adjusting to present opportunity, w i t h these tactics only generally g o v e r n e d by what the investigator w o u l d hope to have finally f o u n d out by the e n d of the conversation. U n d e r these circumstances, it is m o r e accurate to talk of i n vestigators acting in fulfillment of their hopes, or in avoidance of their fears, than of acting in the deliberate and calculated realization of a plan.
7

293 retrospective search t h e r e i n for their d e c i d e d character. Insofar as the decision that was taken is assigned by the w o r k of the retrospective search, the outcome of such situations can be said to occur before the decision. Such situations occur w i t h dramatic frequency at the t i m e the j o u r n a l article is b e i n g w r i t t e n . 4. P r i o r to his actually h a v i n g to choose a m o n g alternative courses of action on the basis of anticipated consequences, the investigator, for various reasons, is frequently unable to anticipate the consequences of his alternative courses of action a n d m a y have to r e l y u p o n his actual i n v o l v e m e n t in order to l e a r n what they m i g h t be. 5. F r e q u e n t l y , after encountering some actual state of affairs, the investigator m a y count it as desirable, a n d t h e r e u p o n treat it as the goal toward w h i c h his previously taken actions, as he reads t h e m retrospectively, w e r e d i r e c t e d " a l l a l o n g " o r "after a l l . " 6. It frequently occurs that only in the course of actually m a n i p u l a t i n g a present situation, a n d as a f u n c t i o n of his actual m a n i p u l a t i o n , does the nature of an investigator's future state of affairs become clarified. Thus, the goal of the investigat i o n m a y be progressively defined as the consequence of the investigator's actually taking action t o w a r d a goal whose features as of any present state of his investigative action he does not see clearly. 7. Characteristically such situations are ones of i m p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e result is that the investigator is unable to assess, let alone calculate, the difference that his ignorance in the situation makes u p o n the accomplishment of his activities. N o r , p r i o r to h a v i n g to take action, is he able either to evaluate their consequences or to assess the value of alternative courses of action. 8. T h e i n f o r m a t i o n that he possesses, that serves h i m as the basis for the election of strategies, is rarely codified. H e n c e , his estimates of the l i k e l i h o o d of success or failure characteristically have little i n c o m m o n w i t h the rational mathematical concept of probability. In their investigative activities, investigators characteristically must manage situations w i t h the above features, g i v e n the f o l l o w i n g additional conditions: that some action must be taken; that the action must be taken by a t i m e a n d in pace, duration, and phasing that is coordinate w i t h the

3. It frequently occurs that the investigator takes an action, and only u p o n the actual occurrence of some product of that action do we find h i m r e v i e w i n g the accomplished sequences in a

Cf. Robert K. M e r t o n a n d Patricia L. K e n d a l l , " T h e focused American Journal of Sociology, 1946, 51:541-557.

interview,"

294 actions of others; that the risks of unfavorable outcomes must somehow be managed; that the actions taken a n d their products w i l l be subject to r e v i e w by others and must be justified to t h e m ; that the elections of courses of action a n d the resultant outcome must be justified w i t h i n the procedures of "reasonable" r e v i e w ; a n d that the entire process must occur w i t h i n the conditions of, a n d w i t h his motivated c o m p l i a n c e to, corporately o r g a n i z e d social activity. In their "shop t a l k " investigators refer to these features of their actual situations of i n q u i r y a n d to the necessity for m a n a g i n g t h e m as their " p r a c t i c a l c i r c u m stances." Because their features are so easily recogn i z e d in the activities of daily life, situations w i t h such features m a y appropriately be called " c o m mon-sense situations of c h o i c e . " T h e suggestion is r e c o m m e n d e d that w h e n researchers call u p o n "reasonableness" in assigning the status of " f i n d i n g s " to their research results, they are i n v i t i n g the use of such features as these as a context of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n for d e c i d i n g sensibility a n d w a r rant. F i n d i n g s as outcomes of d o c u m e n t a r y w o r k , d e c i d e d u n d e r circumstances of common-sense situations of choice, define the t e r m "reasonable findings."

PART IV

Mind

1. F r o m the decision-maker's p o i n t of v i e w there exists as a feature of each of his herea n d - n o w states of affairs a recognizable goal w i t h specifiable features. W h e r e sociological i n q u i r y is c o n c e r n e d , this goal consists of the investigator's present p r o b l e m for the solution to w h i c h the investigation w i l l have b e e n u n d e r t a k e n . T h e goal's specifiable features consist of the c r i t e r i a w h e r e b y , as of any present state of affairs, he decides the adequacy w i t h w h i c h his p r o b l e m has b e e n f o r m u l a t e d . In their terms, too, the event, "adequate s o l u t i o n , " is defined as one of a set of possible occurrences. 2. T h e decision-maker is c o n c e i v e d to have set for himself the task of devising a p r o g r a m of manipulations u p o n each successive present state of affairs that w i l l alter each present state so that over their succession they are brought into conf o r m i t y w i t h an anticipated state, i.e., the goal, the solved p r o b l e m .
9

THE PROBLEM M u c h of "core sociology" consists of "reasonable f i n d i n g s . " M a n y , if not most, situations of sociologi c a l i n q u i r y are common-sense situations of choice. Nevertheless, textbook a n d j o u r n a l discussions of sociological methods rarely give recognit i o n to the fact that sociological inquiries are carr i e d out u n d e r common-sense auspices at the points where decisions about the correspondence between observed appearances and intended events are being made. Instead, available descriptions and conceptions of investigative decision-making and p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g assign to the decision-maker's situation contrasting features as follows.
8
8

These features m a y be restated in terms of the rules of e v i d e n c e . As a calculable state of affairs, an investigator's p r o b l e m m a y be r e g a r d e d as a proposition whose " a p p l i c a t i o n " for m e m b e r ship, i.e., whose w a r r a n t e d status, is u n d e r r e v i e w . T h e rules of p r o c e d u r e w h e r e b y its w a r r a n t e d status is d e c i d e d t h e r e b y operationally define what is meant by "adequate s o l u t i o n . " In i d e a l scientific activities an investigator is r e q u i r e d to decide the steps that define an adequate solution p r i o r to his t a k i n g the d e c i d e d steps. He is req u i r e d to m a k e this decision before he carries out the operations w h e r e b y the possibilities that the proposition proposes w i l l be d e c i d e d as to their h a v i n g actually o c c u r r e d or not. T h e task of d e c i d i n g an adequate solution thereby has logical p r e c e d e n c e o v e r the actual observation. T h e observation is said thereby to be " p r o g r a m e d , " or, alternatively, t h e i n t e n d e d event is g i v e n an " o p e r a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n , " or, alternatively, the conditions for the occurrence of an i n t e n d e d event are f u r n i s h e d , or, alternatively, a " p r e d i c t i o n " is m a d e .

I n s o m e cases, s t u d e n t s o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g h a v e b e e n i n t e r -

1 wish to thank Drs. Robert Boguslaw and M y r o n A. Robinson

e s t e d i n those p r o g r a m s that r e p r e s e n t f u l l y c a l c u l a t e d solutions t o t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s p r o b l e m s . I n o t h e r cases s t u d i e s h a v e a d d r e s s e d t h e fact that t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r m a y i n v o k e p r o b a bilistic rules to d e c i d e the differential l i k e l i h o o d that alternative c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n w o u l d a l t e r a p r e s e n t state o f affairs i n t h e desired direction.

of the System D e v e l o p m e n t Corporation, Santa M o n i c a , Californ i a , f o r the m a n y hours o f discussion that w e h a d about calcul a b l e a n d n o n c a l c u l a b l e situations o f c h o i c e w h e n w e w e r e t r y i n g together to w o r k t h r o u g h the p r o b l e m of h o w consistently successful p l a y in chess is possible.

Garfinkel A prominent argument on behalf of this emphasis is that the documentary method is a scientifically erroneous procedure; that its use distorts the objective world in a mirror of subjective prejudice; and that where common-sense situations of choice exist they do so as historical nuisances. Protagonists for methods such as those used in survey research and laboratory experimentation, for example, assert their increasing exemption from situations with common-sense characteristics and documentary dealings with them. After World War II a flood of textbooks on methods was written to provide remedies for such situations. These methods are intended to depict the ways of transforming common-sense situations into calculable ones. Most particularly, the use of mathematical models and statistical schemes of inference are invoked as calculable solutions to the problems of deciding sensibility, objectivity, and warrant in a rigorous way. Immense sums of foundation money, criteria defining adequate research designs, and many careers rest on the conviction that this is so. Yet it is common knowledge that in the overwhelming number of researches that are methodologically acceptable, and, paradoxically, precisely to the extent that rigorous methods are used, dramatic discrepancies are visible between the theoretical properties of the intended sociological findings of inquirers and the mathematical assumptions that must be satisfied if the statistical measures are to be used for the literal description of the intended events. The result is that statistical measurements are most frequently used as indicators, as signs of, as representing or standing on behalf of the intended findings rather than as literal descriptions of them. Thus, at the point where sociological findings must be decided from statistical results, rigorous methods are being asserted as solutions to the tasks of literal de10

295 scription on the grounds of "reasonable" considerations. Even if it is demonstrable that these features are present, let alone prominent, in sociological inquiries, is it not nevertheless true that a situation of inquiry might receive documentary treatment and still the factual status of its products would be decided differently? For example, is it not the case that there are strictures against ex post facto analysis? A n d is it not so that a field worker who learned after he consulted his notes what problems he had " i n the final analysis" obtained answers to, might reapply for a grant to perform a "confirmatory study" of the "hypotheses" that his reflections had yielded? Is there, therefore, any necessary connection between the features of common-sense situations of choice, the use of documentary method, and the corpus of sociological fact? Must the documentary method necessarily be used by the professional sociologist to decide sensibility, objectivity, and warrant? Is there a necessary connection between the theoretical subject matter of sociology, as this is constituted by the attitude and procedures for "seeing sociologically" on the one hand, and the canons of adequate description, i.e., evidence, on the other? Between the methods of literal observation and the work of documentary interpretation the investigator can choose the former and achieve rigorous literal description of physical and biological properties of sociological events. This has been demonstrated on many occasions. Thus far the choice has been made at the cost of either neglecting the properties that make events sociological ones, or by using documentary work to deal with the "soft" parts. The choice has to do with the question of the conditions under which literal observation and documentary work necessarily occur. This involves the formulation of, and solution to, the problem of sociological evidence in terms that permit a descriptive solution. Undoubtedly, scientific sociology is a "fact," but in Felix Kaufmann's sense of fact, i.e., in terms of a set of procedural rules that actually govern the use of sociologists' recommended methods and asserted findings as grounds of further inference and inquiries. The problem of evidence consists of the tasks of making this fact intelhgible.

T h e term "results" is used to refer to the set of mathematical events that are possible when the procedures of a statistical test, like chi square, for example, are treated as grammatical rules for conceiving, comparing, producing, etc., events in the mathematical domain. T h e term "findings" is used to refer to the set of sociological events that are possible when, under the assumption that the sociological and mathematical domains correspond in their logical structures, sociological events are interpreted in terms of the rules of statistical inference.
10

Kurt Goldstein

32

Speech and Thinking

T h e i m p a i r m e n t of the abstract attitude is clearly revealed i n characteristic changes i n the speech o f patients w i t h b r a i n lesions. W e k n o w various forms of speech defects in such patients a n d usually class t h e m together as aphasia. No other pathological material can teach us so m u c h about the organization of the h u m a n b e i n g . Since we cannot deal w i t h all the various types of aphasia, I shall confine the discussion to a special f o r m , k n o w n a s amnesic aphasia, w h i c h i n m y o p i n i o n is particularly w e l l suited to give us an insight into the nature of m a n .
1 2

If one examines a patient w i t h this type of aphasia one observes as a s t r i k i n g s y m p t o m that he is totally or partially unable to find names for concrete things. This is especially noticeable in cases w h e r e he has the task of n a m i n g presented objects, but it is also apparent in his spontaneous language, w h i c h is conspicuously l a c k i n g in nouns a n d verbs. Usually this s y m p t o m is considered as the characteristic change, but closer examination shows that other changes also occur. M a n y circumlocutions are used w h e r e we w o u l d use single
R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n o f t h e p u b l i s h e r s f r o m Human Nature in the Light of Psyche-pathology, by K u r t H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, Henry York, Head, 1926); (New 1927). Psychologische AnalyKurt II, Goldstein, 1936; II Ernst Aphasia York, Goldstein, Cambridge, 1968 by Mass:
1

words. A patient s h o w n a c u p , for example, may respond w i t h , " T h i s is for d r i n k i n g , " or say, on seeing a p e n h o l d e r , " T h a t is for w r i t i n g , " etc. In another case, a patient of m i n e said, " T h a t is something for the r a i n , " i n a situation i n w h i c h we should m e r e l y say, " T h a t is an u m b r e l l a . " Or she said: "I must have it for the r a i n , " or, "I have three umbrellas at h o m e . " In the last sentence she used the right w o r d in her periphrasis, yet she was unable to repeat it in r e p l y to a repeated question, " W h a t is that?" soon afterward. E v i dently such a patient has not lost the w o r d itself but for some reason is unable to use it in n a m i n g an object. F u r t h e r , his entire behavior shows peculiarities. A l l his acting a n d t h i n k i n g seems to center, to an unusual degree, a r o u n d his o w n personality a n d its relation to the w o r l d . He is acting i n the w o r l d rather t h a n t h i n k i n g o r speaking about it. H i s speech is accompanied to a m a r k e d degree by expressive movements. V e r y often we observe that he seems unable to express his meani n g by words but c a n do so quite w e l l by movements. T h e change i n v o l v i n g the whole behavior appears still m o r e strikingly in special examinations. I shall b e g i n by presenting the results of one exa m i n a t i o n w i t h a sorting test because the results seem p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l suited to carry us into the core of our p r o b l e m , namely, the basic change i n patients w i t h amnesic aphasia. We place before the patient a heap of colored w o o l e n skeinsHolmgren's w e l l - k n o w n samples used for testing color efficiency. We ask h i m to p i c k out a l l the r e d skeins and put t h e m together. (There are, of course, m a n y different shades of

Copyright and Kindred Kurt

1940,

the President a n d Fellows of H a r v a r d College. See Disorders and of Speech Uber (New Theodore Weisenburg 1935); Katherine

McBride,

Aphasia

Goldstein,

Aphasie ( Z u r i c h ,
a

See K u r t Goldstein and A d h e m a r G e l b , himpathologischer Falle (Leipsig, 1920);

sen

" T h e P r o b l e m o f the M e a n i n g o f W o r d s B a s e d u p o n O b s e r v a t i o n of A p h a s i e P a t i e n t s , " Journal of Psychology, v o l . Cassirer, 1928). Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, vol. (Berlin,

Goldstein red.) Or we p i c k out one particular skeinfor example, a dark r e d o n e a n d ask h i m to choose strands of the same and similar colors. In the first task a n o r m a l person w i t h good color efficiency usually selects a great n u m b e r of different shades of the same g r o u n d colorthat is, for example, different reds, w i t h o u t regard to intensity, p u r i t y , lightness, etc. In the same task patients w i t h amnesic aphasia behave quite differently, a n d exhibit v a r y i n g types of behavior. F o r example, w h e n he is t o l d to choose all the skeins that are similar to a g i v e n skein, one patient chooses only skeins of the v e r y same or of a closely similar shade. T h o u g h u r g e d to go on he chooses a small n u m b e r because there are only a few v e r y similar ones in the heap. A n o t h e r patient matches a g i v e n bright shade of r e d w i t h a blue skein of similar brightness. At first such a patient may seem to be color-blind, but it c a n be demonstrated b e y o n d doubt that his color efficiency is n o r m a l a n d that he is able to differentiate v e r y distinctly b e t w e e n colors that are m u c h alike. M o r e precise observations disclose that in this case the choice is d e t e r m i n e d by a particular color attribute of the g i v e n skein, its brightness. We observe, further, that the choice may be d e c i d e d by a n u m b e r of different attributesat one t i m e by brightness, at another by softness, or coldness, w a r m t h , etc. H o w e v e r a n d this is a v e r y a m a z i n g t h i n g a patient w h o seems to be choosing a c c o r d i n g to a certain attribute is not able to follow this proced u r e voluntarily if it is d e m a n d e d of h i m t h a t is, if he is asked to choose only b r i g h t skeins, etc. F u r t h e r , we observe that he does not seem to be able to h o l d to a certain procedure. He has chosen, for instance, some b r i g h t skeins. Suddenly he begins selecting on the basis of another attributethe coldness of the color or some other factor. In another case, the patient arranges the skeins as if g u i d e d by a scale of brightness. He begins w i t h a v e r y bright r e d , t h e n adds one less bright, a n d so on to a d u l l one. B u t if we ask h i m to place the skeins in a succession a c c o r d i n g to their brightness he shows h i m s e l f incapable of the performance, e v e n if it is demonstrated to h i m . To understand the behavior of our patients, it is necessary to examine the p r o c e d u r e of n o r m a l persons in such tasks. If we n o r m a l persons want

297 to choose a color, we select various nuances, e v e n though we see that they have various attributes not e q u a l to one another, because we recognize that they b e l o n g together in respect to their basic quality. T h e several shades are merely examples of this quality, a n d we treat the skeins not as different i n d i v i d u a l things but as representatives of that one basic color. F o r the m o m e n t we ignore all differences in shade and disregard all singular attributes. We are able to do this because we can abstract and because we can h o l d fast to a proced u r e once initiated. T h e r e is another approach, h o w e v e r , w h i c h is o p e n to the n o r m a l person. We can start w i t h one particular skein a n d m o v e it about over the heap, passively s u r r e n d e r i n g ourselves to the i m pressions that emerge. T h e n either of two things w i l l take place. If we find skeins resembling our sample in all attributes, all these i m m e d i a t e l y cohere in a unitary sensory experience w i t h t h e sample. If we find skeins w h i c h m a t c h our sample in some respects, we experience a characteristic unrest c o n c e r n i n g the heap, and an alternating sense of relationship b e t w e e n skeins in the heap a n d the sample, according to different attributes. N o matter w h e t h e r w e experience r i v a l r y o r m a t c h i n g , the coherence we feel results d i r e c t l y f r o m sense data a n d takes place passively; we do not experience a definite attitude t o w a r d any attribute. T h e r e is an essential difference b e t w e e n the m o r e passive k i n d of approach a n d the f o r m e r , in w h i c h we definitely choose a particular color. In the one, a definite o r d e r i n g p r i n c i p l e determines our actions; in the other, there is no such p r i n c i p l e , a n d our actions are passively determ i n e d by outer impressions. These t w o kinds of behavior c o r r e s p o n d to what we have c a l l e d abstract a n d concrete behavior a n d what w e m a y n o w call categorical a n d concrete behavior. A particular k i n d of language belongs to each of these types of behavior. O u r behavior is abstract w h e n we give a n a m e to an object. W h e n we speak of " t a b l e " we do not m e a n a special g i v e n table w i t h a l l its accidental properties; we m e a n table in general. T h e w o r d is used as a representative of the category " t a b l e " e v e n w h e n n a m i n g a particular table. Thus, if we are asked to group together a l l reds, u p o n hearing the w o r d

298 " r e d " w e are i n i m e d i a t e l y p r e p a r e d t o select col ors in a categorical fashion. In this approach l a n guage plays a great role, a n d the particular f o r m i t takes here m a y b e designated b y K a r l Buehler's t e r m , darstellende Sprache, w h i c h m a y be trans l a t e d as "representative s p e e c h . " In the second f o r m of behavior language does not p l a y m u c h of a role at all. O u r words m e r e l y a c c o m p a n y our acts a n d express a p r o p e r t y of t h e object itself, l i k e other properties, such as color, size, etc. This fact is s h o w n in the particular k i n d o f words w e use i n such situations. T h e words are especially adapted to the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of the g i v e n object. W e use words l i k e " r o s e - r e d , " " v i o l e t " ; w e d o not say " r e d , " but " p i n k , " " d a r k r e d , " " s t r a w b e r r y - r e d , " " s k y - b l u e " ; not g r e e n b u t "grass-green," etc. O f t e n w e have n o w o r d for n a m i n g a g i v e n object, a n d t h e n we do it in a roundabout way. Words are used h e r e less as rep resentative of categories t h a n as i n d i v i d u a l p r o p erties w h i c h , l i k e other properties, b e l o n g to the object i n question. W e c a l l such words " i n d i v i d u a l " words. N o w t h e n w e consider the behavior o f the patient in the light of these elucidations we m a y say that it is similar to the second approach of n o r m a l persons. He is able to assume only the m o r e concrete, the m o r e realistic, attitude. T h e r e f o r e he chooses i d e n t i c a l skeins or skeins w h i c h are similar i n a n outstanding p r o p e r t y , such as brightness. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n finds confirma t i o n in the greater concreteness of the patient's general behavior, i n the p r e d o m i n a n c e o f acting o v e r t h i n k i n g , i n the a c c o m p a n i m e n t o f speech by expressive movements. O u r assumption is finally substantiated by the results of another type of sorting test. If a n o r m a l person tries to arrange a n u m b e r of objects l y i n g before himsay, on the w r i t i n g table of a v e r y busy m a n h e m a y do it in various ways, accord i n g t o various attitudes. H e m a y arrange t h e m by size, by color, by function, by the i m p o r t a n c e of their situation, in terms of activity, of thought, etc. F u r t h e r , he is able b o t h to shift f r o m one attitude a n d one k i n d of order to another as the situation demands it, and to effect a particular a r r a n g e m e n t on d e m a n d . A patient w i t h amnesic aphasia, c o n f r o n t e d w i t h miscellaneous objects w i t h the instruction t o group t h e m , w i l l exhibit

P A R T

Mind

the same b e h a v i o r as in the color test. He is ca pable of p r o c e e d i n g o n l y in a m a n n e r that i n d i cates that he is g u i d e d by concrete p r o m p t i n g s . A p a r t i c u l a r l y instructive example is the fol l o w i n g . A m o n g a n u m b e r of different objects there w e r e p l a c e d on a table before a patient a corkscrew a n d a bottle w i t h a cork loosely set in its neck. T h e patient, asked to arrange these, d i d not p u t the bottle a n d the corkscrew together. A s k e d if these t w o objects d i d not b e l o n g to gether, h e said, " N o , " v e r y positively, b a c k i n g his answer up w i t h the explanation, " T h e bottle is already o p e n e d . " U n d e r these circumstances most n o r m a l p e o p l e w o u l d pay no attention to the fact that the c o r k was not fast. F o r the i m m e diate taskthe g r o u p i n g together of objects that b e l o n g togetherit is quite i n c i d e n t a l a n d u n i m portant w h e t h e r the cork is loose or fast. W i t h the abstract attitude, in a f o r m of sorting w h i c h involves g r o u p i n g objects according to categories, we assume that bottle a n d corkscrew b e l o n g to gether, i n d e p e n d e n t l y of their o c c u r r e n c e in any particular situation. B u t for the patient w h o is able to take the objects o n l y as they are g i v e n in sense experience, the corkscrew does not be l o n g to the bottle a n d the cork if the cork is al ready loose. F r o m this a n d similar cases it is p l a i n that he takes the concrete attitude t o w a r d objects as w e l l w e m a y say t o w a r d a l l objects, t o w a r d the w o r l d i n its entirety. O u r conclusion is that the patient's i n a b i l i t y to n a m e objects is a consequence of his i n a b i l i t y to assume the abstract attitude, for this is a prere quisite for the n a m i n g of objects. As we have s h o w n in the example of the u m b r e l l a , he has not lost the words themselves, but he is unable to use t h e m in situations w h i c h d e m a n d their use as categories. O f t e n a patient, asked to n a m e a color presented to h i m , calls out over a n d over various color names: r e d , blue, y e l l o w , etc. He m a y e v e n utter the appropriate n a m e , but i n spite of this he is still unable to connect it w i t h the color itself. F u r t h e r m o r e , it does not h e l p h i m w h e n we say the different color names for h i m to repeat after us. B u t what makes these words unsuitable for use i n connection w i t h objects i n the n o r m a l waythat is, as names? W h y can they not be used as symbols for objects? This m a y be disclosed in

Goldstein observations of patients w h o utter appropriate words in connection w i t h some objects but, as closer analysis shows, do not use t h e m in a n o r m a l categorical fashion. H e r e we l e a r n that the patients have the same concrete attitude t o w a r d the words that they have t o w a r d objects they are asked to sort. A s k e d to m e n t i o n the names of several different kinds of animals, the patient m a y be at first unable to do so. In one case it was not u n t i l we h a d g i v e n a patient such examples as dog, cat, mouse, that she r e p l i e d to the question at all. T h e n suddenly she said: "A polar bear; a b r o w n bear; a l i o n ; a t i g e r . " A s k e d w h y she n a m e d these particular animals, she said, " I f we enter the zoological gardens, we come at first to the polar bear a n d t h e n to the other a n i m a l s . " O b v i o u s l y she h a d recalled the animals as they w e r e situated in the zoological gardens, and h a d used the words only as belonging to the concrete situation, not as names for objects. It was v e r y characteristic that she d i d not simply say " b e a r , " a w o r d w h i c h represents the category of all bears, a n d w h i c h we w o u l d use w h e n asked to n a m e animals, but that instead she selected the words " p o l a r bear," " b r o w n b e a r . " T h e same fact appeared w h e n the patient was asked to recite different female first names. She said: " G r e t e , Paula, C l a r a , M a r t h a , " a n d , asked w h y she had m e n t i o n e d these particular names, answered, "These are all G s"
3

299 and f o r k . " T h e w o r d " k n i f e " alone she n e v e r uttered spontaneously, a n d w h e n she was asked, " C o u l d we not always call it simply 'knife?' " she replied promptly, " N o . " W i t h different m e n t a l sets the same w o r d m a y m e a n for the n o r m a l person different things. F o r example, in G e r m a n the w o r d Anhanger is used for a lavalier w h i c h hangs on a c h a i n a r o u n d a girl's neck, or for a follower of a personage, or for the second car w h i c h is customarily attached to a street-car in G e r m a n y . O u r patient was unable to use the w o r d in m o r e than one sense or in connection w i t h m o r e than one object. If she understood the w o r d in a particular sense she c o u l d not understand that it c o u l d be used in another sense. This observation shows clearly that the words themselves are qualitatively different f r o m such patients as c o m p a r e d w i t h n o r m a l people, by w h o m the same w o r d can be used for various totally different objects. By patients w i t h amnesic aphasia they can be used o n l y in a concrete way, for they seem to have lost the characteristic that is necessary if they are to be used in a categorical sensethat is, as symbols. T h e y m a y be useful as properties belonging to a definite object, but they have become unfit to serve as symbols for ideas. They have lost their meaning. It has usually b e e n assumed, e v e n by those authors w h o recognize that these patients have lost the categorical attitude toward objects, that the cause of this lack is the loss of words, or a difficulty in e v o k i n g works. This cannot be the case. T h e r e is no doubt that words p r o v i d e a v e r y i m p o r t a n t means of h e l p i n g us to assume the categorical attitude a n d of stabilizing concepts, but, as we have explained, our patients have not really lost the words. Instead, the words have lost their character of b e i n g usable in the abstract, a n d this change in language is only one expression of the basic change in our patients, the lack of the capacity to create any sort of abstraction. These observations are i m p o r t a n t for understanding the character of the capacity for n a m i n g objects. This apparently simple performance does not represent a superficial connection b e t w e e n a t h i n g a n d a w o r d ; n a m i n g objects presupposes the abstract attitude and is an expression of a v e r y h i g h m e n t a l f u n c t i o n . B u t these observations reveal another point still m o r e important for our

(G was her family name), a n d w e n t o n , " o n e sister d i e d of a heart neurosis." T h e last sentence demonstrates very clearly that the patient d i d not recite names but only u t t e r e d words w h i c h belonged to a particular concrete situation, namely, to her family situation. H o w v e r y concretely such words are appreh e n d e d m a y be demonstrated by the f o l l o w i n g example. W h e n , to such a patient of ours, a knife was offered w i t h a p e n c i l , she called the k n i f e a " p e n c i l sharpener"; w h e n the knife was offered w i t h an apple, it was to her an " a p p l e p a r e r " ; w h e n offered w i t h a potato, it was a "potato p e e l e r " ; in company w i t h a piece of bread, it became a " b r e a d k n i f e " ; and w i t h a fork it was " k n i f e
3

E v a Rothmann,

" U n t e r s u c h u n g eines Falles v o n umschrieSchweizer Archiv fur Neurologie und Psychia-

bener H i r n s c h a d i g u n g mit Storungen auf verschiedenen Leistungsgebieten," trie, v o l . X X X I I I , 1933.

300 discussion. T h e y show that speech is one of the essential characteristics of h u m a n nature, inasm u c h as it is t i e d to man's highest capacity, the capacity for abstract behavior. A n o t h e r significant p o i n t appears. T h e patients we have b e e n discussing have not lost the capacity to use words in a concrete way, a n d f r o m the advantage this type of speech gives t h e m we c a n i n f e r w h a t role i t m a y p l a y i n n o r m a l life. A patient of m i n e c o u l d n a m e p u r e colors w i t h their respective color n a m e s r e d , blue, a n d so o n b u t she d e c l i n e d to e x t e n d the same w o r d to the several shades of a g i v e n color. T h e words w e r e at her disposal only as i n d i v i d u a l , concrete things b e l o n g i n g to definite objects. In the course of t i m e , after repeated examinations, she came to call various shades by the same name; for i n stance, she w o u l d use the w o r d " r e d " for a l l shades of r e d . Superficially she seemed to behave l i k e a n o r m a l person. O n e m i g h t have thought that she h a d i m p r o v e d , that she h a d r e g a i n e d the meaning of the words. B u t it was not so. A s k e d w h y she n o w called a l l these different shades by the same w o r d , she answered, " T h e doctors have t o l d me that all these colors are n a m e d r e d . T h e r e f o r e I called t h e m a l l r e d . " A s k e d if this was not correct, she laughed a n d said, " N o t one of these colors is r e d , but I am t o l d to call t h e m by this w o r d . " It is clear that she h a d not used the words as symbols but h a d l e a r n e d to b u i l d a quite external connection b e t w e e n one w o r d and a diversity of things, a quite meaningless connect i o n , w h i c h , however, because she h a d a good m e m o r y , h e l p e d her to carry out a task, if only in a v e r y external way. T h u s we must distinguish v e r y definitely bet w e e n two ways o f using words i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h objects: r e a l n a m i n g , w h i c h is an expression of the categorical attitude t o w a r d the w o r l d i n general, a n d pseudo-naming of objects, w h i c h is simp l y a use of words h e l d in m e m o r y . T h e i n c i d e n c e of this pseudo-naming depends on the extent of the individual's verbal possessions. In it words are used as properties of objects just as other propertiescolor, size, hueare used; they b e l o n g to concrete behavior. To this type of words belong the speech automatisms of o r d i n a r y peoplethe alphabet, numbers in series, the days of the week, a n d m a n y other longer or shorter speech expres-

PART IV

Mind

sions of everyday l i f e . This use of words plays a great role in o r d i n a r y speech. In l e a r n i n g a fore i g n language, for example, as l o n g as we have no r e a l c o n c e p t i o n of it as a language, we possess its words o n l y by such superficial connections w i t h the words of our o w n language. If we u n d e r s t a n d their m e a n i n g w i t h i n the r e a l m o f the f o r e i g n language itself, t h e n the words achieve an absolutely different character; t h e n they b e c o m e r e p resentative of a category. Important as these speech possessions are for our everyday language, they obtain t h e i r significance o n l y f r o m their position against a backg r o u n d of representational, m e a n i n g f u l speech. This m a y be gathered f r o m the fact that to a cert a i n extent speech automatisms are d e v e l o p e d only if a h u m a n b e i n g possesses the f u n c t i o n of m e a n i n g . C e r t a i n l y a c h i l d acquires m a n y automatisms b y repeated i m i t a t i o n o f his o w n speech a n d that of others. If he is not able to use t h e m later i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h m e a n i n g f u l speech, h o w ever, his l e a r n i n g of these words is l i m i t e d , a n d he forgets m a n y that he has learned. We k n o w that c h i l d r e n w i t h a n i n b o r n deficiency i n the attitude t o w a r d the abstract are not able to dev e l o p speech automatisms to any extent, a n d that they forget t h e m , in spite of a good m e m o r y , if the words are not p r a c t i c e d constantly. In the same way, patients w i t h a loss of categorical behavior m a y lose t h e i r speech automatisms if they are not continuously k e p t in use by the demands of concrete situations. Thus, for example, if the m e a n i n g of n u m b e r s is lost, these patients lose the ability to count a n d the k n o w l e d g e of the simple m u l t i p l i c a t i o n table, w h i c h are usually r e g a r d e d as well-established possessions of m e mory. Speech automatisms m a y be designated as " t o o l s , " but it is false to consider language in g e n eral as a m e r e tool. E v e n speech automatisms are d e p e n d e n t u p o n the categorical attitude b o t h i n their b u i l d i n g a n d in their use. This p o i n t is most important. T h e use of speech automatisms alone is not r e a l language. O u r patients, despite t h e i r lack of the categorical attitude, m a y be able to use speech automatisms w h i c h they a c q u i r e d at a t i m e w h e n they w e r e capable of the categorical attitude, but the fact that their speech lacks the spontaneity a n d f l u i d i t y w h i c h characterizes nor-

Mills m a l language, a n d that they are not able to use the w o r d s as symbols, demonstrates v e r y clearly that language without a categorical b a c k g r o u n d is not r e a l language. W h e n e v e r h u m a n beings use language to establish n a t u r a l connections be t w e e n themselves a n d the w o r l d , particularly w i t h their fellow m e n , language is not m e r e l y a tool. It is not m e r e l y a superficial means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , not a simple n a m i n g of objects t h r o u g h words; it represents a particular w a y of b u i l d i n g up the w o r l d n a m e l y , by means of ab stractions. " L a n g u a g e , " said W i l h e h n v o n H u m boldt, " n e v e r represents objects themselves but the concepts w h i c h the m i n d has f o r m e d of t h e m i n the autonomous activity b y w h i c h i t creates

language." It is this that makes language so i m p o r tant, so essential to the d e v e l o p m e n t of a culture. It becomes a manifestation b o t h of a l l that is h u m a n , the h u m a n b e i n g at his deepest, a n d of man's psychic b o n d w i t h his fellows; in none of his c u l t u r a l creations does m a n r e v e a l himself so f u l l y as in the creation of language itself. It w o u l d be impossible for animals to create a language, be cause they do not have this conceptual a p p r o a c h t o w a r d the w o r l d . I f they h a d , they w o u l d b e not animals but h u m a n beings. N o t h i n g brings this h o m e to us m o r e strikingly than observing in pa tients w i t h amnesic aphasia the parallelism be t w e e n the changes w h i c h occur i n personality a n d the loss of the m e a n i n g of words.

C. Wright Mills

33

Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive

T h e major reorientation of recent theory a n d observation in sociology of language e m e r g e d w i t h the overthrow o f the W u n d t i a n n o t i o n that language has as its f u n c t i o n the " e x p r e s s i o n " of p r i o r elements w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . T h e postu late u n d e r l y i n g m o d e r n study of language is the simple one that we must a p p r o a c h Hnguistic be havior, not by r e f e r r i n g it to private states in i n d i viduals, but by observing its social f u n c t i o n of co o r d i n a t i n g diverse actions. Rather than expressing s o m e t h i n g w h i c h i s p r i o r a n d i n the person, l a n -

guage is taken by other persons as an indicator of future actions. W i t h i n this perspective there are suggestions c o n c e r n i n g problems of m o t i v a t i o n . It is the p u r pose of this p a p e r to outline an analytic m o d e l for the explanation of motives w h i c h is based on a sociological theory of language a n d a sociological psychology.
1 2

See

C.

Wright Mills,

"Bibliographical Appendices," Section

I, 4 : " S o c i o l o g y o f L a n g u a g e " i n Contemporary Social Theory, E d . b y B a r n e s , B e c k e r & B e c k e r , N e w Y o r k , 1940.

2

See G. H. M e a d , "Social Psychology as C o u n t e r p a r t of Physio 1909; K a r l

C. W r i g h t Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of M o t i v e , " American Sociological Review, v o l . 5 ( D e c e m b e r 1940), p p . 9 0 4 913. R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n . R e v i s i o n of a paper read to T h e Society for Social Research, U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o , A u g u s t 1 6 - 1 7 , 1940.

l o g i c a l P s y c h o l o g y , " Psychol. Bui., V I : 4 0 1 - 4 0 8 ,

M a n n h e i m , Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, N e w Y o r k , 1 9 4 0 ; L . V . W i e s e - H o w a r d B e c k e r , Systematic Sociology, p a r t I , N e w Y o r k , 1932; J . D e w e y , " A l l p s y c h o l o g y i s e i t h e r b i o l o g i c a l o r s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y , " Psychol. Rev., v o l . 2 4 : 2 7 6 .

302
As over against the inferential conception of motives as subjective " s p r i n g s " of action, motives m a y be considered as typical vocabularies h a v i n g ascertainable functions in d e l i m i t e d societal situations. H u m a n actors do vocalize and i m p u t e motives to themselves and to others. To explain behavior by r e f e r r i n g it to an i n f e r r r e d a n d abstract " m o t i v e " is one thing. To analyze the observable l i n g u a l mechanisms of m o t i v e i m p u t a t i o n and avowal as they function in conduct is quite another. Rather than fixed elements " i n " a n i n d i v i d ual, motives are the terms w i t h w h i c h interpretat i o n of conduct by social actors proceeds. This i m p u t a t i o n and avowal of motives by actors are social p h e n o m e n a to be explained. T h e differing reasons m e n give for their actions are not themselves without reasons. First, we must demarcate the general conditions under w h i c h such m o t i v e i m p u t a t i o n and avowal seem to occur. Next, we must give a characterization of motive in denotable terms and an explanatory p a r a d i g m of w h y certain motives are v e r b a l i z e d rather than others. T h e n , we must i n dicate mechanisms of the linkage of vocabularies of m o t i v e to systems of action. W h a t we want is an analysis of the integrating, controlling, and specifying function a certain type of speech fulfils in socially situated actions.
3

P A R T IV

Mind

usually elicits another verbal action, not a motor response. T h e question is an element in conversation. C o n v e r s a t i o n may be concerned w i t h the factual features of a situation as they are seen or b e l i e v e d to be or it may seek to integrate a n d promote a set of diverse social actions w i t h reference to the situation and its normative pattern of expectations. It is in this latter assent and dissent phase of conversation that persuasive and dissuasive speech and vocabulary arise. F o r m e n live in i m m e d i a t e acts of experience and their attentions are directed outside themselves u n t i l acts are in some way frustrated. It is then that awareness of self and of m o t i v e occur. T h e " q u e s t i o n " is a l i n g u a l index of such conditions. T h e avowal and i m p u t a t i o n of motives are features of such conversations as arise in " q u e s t i o n " situations. Motives are i m p u t e d or avowed as answers to questions i n t e r r u p t i n g acts or programs. M o tives are words. G e n e r i c a l l y , to what do they refer? T h e y d o not denote any elements " i n " i n d i viduals. T h e y stand for anticipated situational consequences of questioned conduct. Intention or purpose (stated as a " p r o g r a m " ) is awareness of anticipated consequence; motives are names for consequential situations, and surrogates for actions leading to t h e m . B e h i n d questions are possible alternative actions w i t h their t e r m i n a l consequences. " O u r introspective words for motives are rough, shorthand descriptions for certain t y p i cal patterns of discrepant and conflicting stimuli."
5

T h e generic situation i n w h i c h i m p u t a t i o n a n d avowal of motives arise, involves, first, the social conduct or the (stated) programs of languaged creatures, i.e., programs a n d actions orie n t e d w i t h reference to the actions a n d talk of others; second, the avowal a n d i m p u t a t i o n of motives is concomitant w i t h the speech f o r m k n o w n as the " q u e s t i o n . " Situations back of questions typically i n v o l v e alternative or unexpected programs or actions w h i c h phases analytically denote " c r i ses." T h e question is distinguished in that it
4

T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f this i n i t i a l task f o r r e s e a r c h i s c l e a r . M o s t

r e s e a r c h e s o n t h e v e r b a l l e v e l m e r e l y ask a b s t r a c t q u e s t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t i f w e c a n t e n t a t i v e l y d e l i m i t t h e situations i n w h i c h c e r t a i n m o t i v e s may b e v e r b a l i z e d , w e c a n use t h a t delimitation in the construction o f situational q u e s t i o n s , and w e s h a l l b e testing d e d u c t i o n s f r o m o u r t h e o r y . * O n t h e " q u e s t i o n " a n d " c o n v e r s a t i o n , " see G . A . D e L a g u n a , Speech: Its Function and Development, 37 (and index), New

T h e m o d e l of purposive conduct associated w i t h D e w e y ' s n a m e may briefly be stated. Individuals confronted w i t h "alternative acts" perf o r m one or the other of t h e m on the basis of the differential consequences w h i c h they anticipate. This n a k e d l y utilitarian schema is i n adequate because: (a) the "alternative acts" of social conduct " a p p e a r " most often i n lingual f o r m , as a question, stated by one's self or by another; (b) it is m o r e adequate to say that i n d i v i d u als act in terms of anticipation of n a m e d consequences.
s

K.

Burke,

Permanence

and

Change,

45,

New

York,

1936.

H a v e n , 1927. F o r m o t i v e s i n crises, see J . M . W i l l i a m s , The Foundations of Social Science, 4 3 5 ff, N e w Y o r k , 1920.

a m i n d e b t e d t o this b o o k f o r s e v e r a l leads w h i c h a r e s y s t e m a tized into the present statement.

Mills A m o n g such names a n d i n some technologically oriented lines of action there may appear such terms as " u s e f u l , " " p r a c t i c a l , " "serviceable," etc., terms so " u l t i m a t e " to the pragmatists, a n d also to certain sectors of the A m e r i c a n population in these d e l i m i t e d situations. H o w e v e r , there are other areas of population w i t h different vocabularies of motives. T h e choice of lines of action is accompanied by representations, and selection a m o n g t h e m , of their situational t e r m i n i . M e n disc e r n situations w i t h particular vocabularies, and it is in terms of some d e U m i t e d vocabulary that they anticipate consequences of c o n d u c t . Stable vocabularies of motives l i n k anticipated consequences and specific actions. T h e r e is no n e e d to i n v o k e " p s y c h o l o g i c a l " terms l i k e " d e s i r e " or " w i s h " as explanatory, since they themselves must be explained socially. A n t i c i p a t i o n is a subvocal or overt n a m i n g of t e r m i n a l phases and/or social consequences of conduct. W h e n an i n d i v i d u a l names consequences, he elicits the behaviors for w h i c h the name is a redintegrative cue. In a societal situation, i m p l i c i t i n the names for consequences is the social d i m e n s i o n of motives. T h r o u g h such vocabularies, types of societal controls operate. Also, the terms in w h i c h the quest i o n is asked often w i l l contain b o t h alternatives: " L o v e o r D u t y ? " "Business o r Pleasure?" Institutionally different situations have different vocabularies of motive a p p r o p r i a t e to their respective behaviors.
6 7

303 t i o n a n d its t y p i c a l vocabulary of motives, i.e., those w h i c h conventionally accompany that type situation and f u n c t i o n as cues and justifications for normative actions in it. It has b e e n i n d i c a t e d that the question is usually an index to the avowal and i m p u t a t i o n of motives. M a x W e b e r defines m o t i v e as a complex of m e a n i n g , w h i c h appears to the actor himself or to the observer to be an adequate g r o u n d for his c o n d u c t . T h e aspect of m o t i v e w h i c h this conception grasps is its intrinsically social character. A satisfactory or adequate m o t i v e is one that satisfies the questioners of an act or p r o g r a m , whether it be the other's or the actor's. As a w o r d , a motive tends to be one which is to the actor and to the other members of a situation an unquestioned answer to questions concerning social and lingual conduct. A stable m o t i v e is an u l t i mate i n justificatory conversation. T h e words w h i c h in a type situation w i l l fulfil this f u n c t i o n are c i r c u m s c r i b e d by the vocabulary of motives acceptable for such situations. Motives are acc e p t e d justifications for present, future, or past programs or acts.
10

To t e r m t h e m justification is not to d e n y their efficacy. O f t e n anticipations of acceptable justification w i l l c o n t r o l conduct. ("If I d i d this, what c o u l d I say? W h a t w o u l d they say?") Decisions may be, w h o l l y or in part, d e l i m i t e d by answers to such queries. A m a n may b e g i n an act for one m o t i v e . In the course of it, he may adopt an ancillary m o t i v e . This does not m e a n that the second apologetic m o t i v e is inefficacious. T h e v o c a l i z e d expectation of an act, its " r e a s o n , " is not only a m e d i a t i n g condition of the act but it is a proximate a n d controlling c o n d i t i o n for w h i c h the t e r m "cause" is not inappropriate. It may strengthen the act of the actor. It m a y w i n n e w allies for his act. W h e n they appeal to others i n v o l v e d in one's act, motives are strategies of action. In m a n y
10

This sociological conception of motives as r e l atively stable l i n g u a l phases of d e h m i t e d situations is quite consistent w i t h Mead's p r o g r a m to approach conduct socially a n d f r o m the outside. It keeps clearly in m i n d that " b o t h motives and actions v e r y often originate not f r o m w i t h i n but f r o m the situation i n w h i c h individuals f i n d themselves. . . . " It translates the question of " w h y " into a " h o w " that is answerable in terms of a situa8 9

See such experiments as C. N. Rexroad's "Verbalization in Multiple Choice Reactions," Psychol. Rev., V o l . 33: 458, 1926.
6 7

Cf. J. Dewey, 'Theory of Valuation," Int. Ency. Science, New York, 1939. K. Mannheim, Man and Society, 249, London,

of Unified

Wirtschaft

und

Gesellschaft,

5,

Tubingen,

1922,

" 'Mo-

1940.

Conventionally answerable by reference to "subjective factors" within individuals. R. M. Maclver, " T h e Modes of the Question Why," /. ofSoc. Phil, April, 1940. Cf. also his ' T h e Imputation of Motives," Amer. J. Sociol, July, 1940.
9

tiv' heisst ein Sinnzusammenhang, Welcher dem Handelnden selbst oder dem Beobachtenden als sinnhafter ' G r a n d ' eines Verhaltens in dem Grade heissen, als die Beziehung seiner Bestandteile von uns nach den durchschnittlichen Denk-und Geffihlsgewohnheiten als typischer (wir pfiegen in sagen: 'richtiger') Sinzusammenhang bejaht W i r d . "

304
social actions, others must agree, tacitly or explicitly. T h u s , acts often w i l l be a b a n d o n e d if no reason c a n b e f o u n d that others w i l l accept. D i p l o m a c y i n choice o f m o t i v e often controls the d i p l o m a t . D i p l o m a t i c choice of m o t i v e is part of the attempt to motivate acts for other m e m b e r s in a situation. Such p r o n o u n c e d motives u n d o snarls a n d integrate social actions. Such d i p l o m a c y does not necessarily i m p l y i n t e n t i o n a l lies. It m e r e l y indicates that an appropriate vocabulary of motives w i l l be u t i l i z e d t h a t they are conditions for certain lines of c o n d u c t .
11

PART IV Mind
t r o l , is vocabularies of acceptable motives. F o r example, a business m a n joins the Rotary C l u b a n d proclaims its p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d v o c a b u l a r y . If this m a n cannot act out business conduct w i t h o u t so d o i n g , it follows that this vocabulary of motives i s a n i m p o r t a n t factor i n his b e h a v i o r . T h e l o n g acting out of a role, w i t h its appropriate motives, w i l l often i n d u c e a m a n to b e c o m e w h a t at first he m e r e l y sought to appear. Shifts in the vocabularies of m o t i v e that are u t i l i z e d later by an i n d i v i d u a l disclose an i m p o r t a n t aspect of various integrations of his actions w i t h concomitantly various groups.
14 15

W h e n a n agent vocalizes o r imputes motives, h e is n o t t r y i n g to describe his e x p e r i e n c e d social action. He is not m e r e l y stating "reasons." He is i n f l u e n c i n g othersand himself. O f t e n he is f i n d i n g n e w "reasons" w h i c h w i l l mediate action. T h u s , we n e e d not treat an. action as discrepant f r o m " i t s " v e r b a l i z a t i o n , for i n m a n y cases, the v e r b a l i z a t i o n is a n e w act. In such cases, there is not a discrepancy b e t w e e n an act a n d " i t s " verb a l i z a t i o n , b u t a difference b e t w e e n two disparate actions, motor-social a n d v e r b a l . This additional (or "ex post facto") l i n g u a l i z a t i o n m a y i n v o l v e a p p e a l to a vocabulary of motives associated w i t h a n o r m w i t h w h i c h b o t h m e m b e r s of the situation are in agreement. As such, it is an integrative factor in future phases of the o r i g i n a l social action o r i n other acts. B y resolving conflicts, motives are efficacious. O f t e n , if "reasons" w e r e not g i v e n , an act w o u l d not occur, nor w o u l d diverse actions be integrated. M o t i v e s are c o m m o n grounds for m e d i a t e d behaviors.
1 2

P e r r y s u m m a r i l y states the F r e u d i a n v i e w of motives "as the v i e w that the r e a l motives of cond u c t are those w h i c h we are ashamed to a d m i t either to ourselves or to o t h e r s . " O n e can cover the facts by m e r e l y saying that scruples (i.e., moral vocabularies of motive) are often efficacious a n d that m e n w i l l alter a n d deter their acts i n terms of such motives. O n e of the components of a " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r , " as a m e c h a n i s m of societal c o n 13

T h e motives actually used i n justifying o r criti c i z i n g an act definitely l i n k it to situations, integrate one man's action w i t h another's, a n d line u p c o n d u c t w i t h norms. T h e societally sustained motive-surrogates of situations are b o t h constraints a n d i n d u c e m e n t s . It is a hypothesis w o r thy a n d capable of test that t y p i c a l vocabularies of motives for different situations are significant determinants of conduct. As l i n g u a l segments of social action, motives orient actions by e n a b l i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e t w e e n their objects. Adjectives such a s " g o o d , " " p l e a s a n t , " a n d " b a d " p r o m o t e action or deter it. W h e n they constitute c o m p o nents of a vocabulary of motives, i.e., are t y p i c a l a n d relatively unquestioned accompaniments of t y p a l situations, such words often f u n c t i o n as d i rectives a n d incentives by virtue of their b e i n g the j u d g m e n t s of others as anticipated by the actor. In this sense motives are "social instruments, i.e., data b y m o d i f y i n g w h i c h the agent w i l l b e able to influence [himself or o t h e r s ] . " T h e " c o n t r o l " of others is not usually direct b u t rather t h r o u g h m a n i p u l a t i o n of a field of objects. We influence a m a n by n a m i n g his acts or i m p u t i n g motives to t h e m o r to " h i m . " T h e motives acc o m p a n y i n g institutions of w a r , e.g., are not " t h e causes" of war, but they do p r o m o t e c o n t i n u e d
16

1 4

Ibid.,

392.

O f c o u r s e , since m o t i v e s are c o m m u n i c a t e d , t h e y m a y b e lies; b u t this m u s t b e p r o v e d . V e r b a l i z a t i o n s are n o t lies m e r e l y because t h e y are socially efficacious. I a m h e r e c o n c e r n e d m o r e w i t h t h e social f u n c t i o n o f p r o n o u n c e d m o t i v e s , t h a n w i t h the s i n c e r i t y o f those p r o n o u n c i n g t h e m . S e e F. Z n a n i e c k i , Social Actions, 30, N e w Y o r k , 1936.
11 u
13

T h e " p r o f i t s m o t i v e " o f classical e c o n o m i c s m a y b e t r e a t e d as an i d e a l - t y p i c a l v o c a b u l a r y of m o t i v e s f o r d e l i m i t e d e c o n o m i c situations a n d b e h a v i o r s . F o r late phases o f m o n o p o l i s t i c a n d r e g u l a t e d c a p i t a l i s m , this t y p e r e q u i r e s m o d i f i c a t i o n ; t h e p r o f i t and c o m m e r c i a l vocabularies have acquired other ingredients. See N . R . D a n i e l i a n ' s AT&T, N e w Y o r k , 1940, f o r a suggestive account of t h e noneconomic b e h a v i o r a n d m o t i v e s of business bureaucrats.
15
16

General

Theory

o f Value,

292-293,

New

York,

1936.

Social

Actions,

73.

Mills i n t e g r a t e d participation, a n d they v a r y f r o m one w a r to the next. W o r k i n g vocabularies of m o t i v e have careers that are w o v e n t h r o u g h c h a n g i n g institutional fabrics. Genetically, motives are i m p u t e d by others before they are a v o w e d by self. T h e m o t h e r controls the c h i l d : " D o not do that, it is g r e e d y . " N o t only does the c h i l d l e a r n w h a t to do, what not to do, but he is g i v e n standardized motives w h i c h p r o m o t e prescribed actions a n d dissuade those proscribed. A l o n g w i t h rules a n d n o r m s o f action for various situations, we l e a r n vocabularies of motives appropriate to t h e m . These are the motives we shall use, since they are a part of our language a n d components of our behavior. T h e quest for " r e a l m o t i v e s " suppositiously set over against " m e r e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " is often i n f o r m e d by a metaphysical v i e w that the " r e a l " motives are i n some w a y biological. A c c o m p a n y i n g such quests for s o m e t h i n g m o r e r e a l a n d back of rationalization is the v i e w h e l d by m a n y sociologists that language is an external manifestation or concomitant of something p r i o r , m o r e genuine, a n d " d e e p " i n the i n d i v i d u a l . " R e a l attitudes" versus " m e r e v e r b a l i z a t i o n " o r " o p i n i o n " i m p l i e s that at best we only i n f e r f r o m his language w h a t " r e a l l y " is the individual's attitude or m o t i v e . N o w w h a t could we possibly so infer? Of p r e cisely whatis verbalization symptomatic? We cannot infer physiological processes f r o m l i n g u a l phenomena. A l l we can infer and empirically check is another v e r b a l i z a t i o n of the agent's w h i c h w e believe was o r i e n t i n g a n d c o n t r o l l i n g behavior at the t i m e the act was p e r f o r m e d . T h e only social items that can " h e d e e p e r " are other lingual forms. The "Real Attitude or M o t i v e " i s not something different i n k i n d f r o m the verbali z a t i o n or the " o p i n i o n . " T h e y t u r n out to be o n l y relatively a n d temporally different.
17 18

305
t h e n posit t h e m in individuals as elements. T h e phrase is i n f o r m e d by persistence of the unnecessary a n d unsubstantiated notion that " a l l action has a m o t i v e , " a n d it is p r o m o t e d by the observation of gaps in the relatively frequent v e r b a l i z a tion i n everyday situations. T h e facts t o w h i c h this phrase is supposedly addressed are c o v e r e d by the statements that m e n do not always explicitly articulate motives, a n d that all actions do not p i v o t a r o u n d language. I have already i n d i c a t e d the conditions u n d e r w h i c h motives are typically avowed and imputed. W i t h i n the perspective u n d e r consideration, the v e r b a l i z e d m o t i v e is not used as an index of something i n the i n d i v i d u a l but as a basis of inference for a typal vocabulary of motives of a situated action. W h e n we ask for the " r e a l a t t i t u d e " rather than the " o p i n i o n , " for the " r e a l m o t i v e " rather than the " r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , " all w e c a n m e a n i n g f u l l y be asking for is the c o n t r o l l i n g speech f o r m w h i c h was i n c i p i e n t l y o r o v e r t l y presented in the p e r f o r m e d act or series of acts. T h e r e is no w a y to p l u m b b e h i n d v e r b a l i z a t i o n into a n i n d i v i d u a l a n d d i r e c t l y check our m o t i v e m o n g e r i n g , but there i s a n e m p i r i c a l w a y i n w h i c h w e c a n guide a n d l i m i t , i n g i v e n historical situations, investigations of motives. That is by the construction of typal vocabularies of motives that are extant in types of situations and actions. I m p u t a tion of motives m a y be controlled by reference to the t y p i c a l constellation of motives w h i c h are observed to be societally l i n k e d w i t h classes of situated actions. Some of the " r e a l " motives that have b e e n i m p u t e d to actors w e r e not e v e n k n o w n to t h e m . As I see it, motives are c i r c u m scribed by the vocabulary of the actor. T h e only source for a t e r m i n o l o g y of motives is the vocabularies of motives actually a n d usually v e r b a l i z e d by actors in specific situations. Individualistic, sexual, hedonistic, a n d p e c u niary vocabularies of motives are apparently n o w d o m i n a n t i n m a n y sectors o f twentieth-century u r b a n A m e r i c a . U n d e r such a n ethos, v e r b a l i z a tion of alternative conduct in these terms is least l i k e l y to be challenged a m o n g d o m i n a n t groups. In this m i l i e u , i n d i v i d u a l s are skeptical of R o c k f e l ler's a v o w e d religious motives for his business c o n duct because such motives are not now terms of the vocabulary conventionally a n d p r o m i n e n t l y

T h e phrase "unconscious m o t i v e " is also u n fortunate. A l l it can m e a n is that a m o t i v e is not explicitly v o c a l i z e d , but there is no n e e d to infer unconscious motives f r o m such situations a n d
" Of course, we could infer or interpret constructs posited in the individual, but these are not easily checked and they are n o t explanatory. W h i c h is not to say that, physiologically, there may not be cramps in the stomach wall or adrenalin in the blood, etc., but t h e character of the "relation" of such items to social action is quite moot.
18

306 a c c o m p a n y i n g situations of business enterprise. A m e d i e v a l m o n k writes that he gave food to a poor but pretty w o m a n because it was " f o r the glory of G o d a n d the eternal salvation of his s o u l . " W h y d o w e t e n d t o question h i m a n d i m p u t e sexu a l motives? Because sex is an influential and w i d e s p r e a d m o t i v e i n our society and time. R e l i gious vocabularies of explanation and of motives are n o w on the wane. In a society in w h i c h r e l i gious motives have b e e n d e b u n k e d on rather w i d e scale, certain thinkers are skeptical of those w h o ubiquitously p r o c l a i m t h e m . Religious m o tives have lapsed f r o m selected portions of m o d e r n populations a n d other motives have become " u l t i m a t e " and operative. B u t f r o m the monasteries of m e d i e v a l E u r o p e we have no evidence that religious vocabularies w e r e not operative in m a n y situations. A labor leader says he performs a certain act because he wants to get h i g h e r standards of l i v i n g for the workers. A business m a n says that this is rationalization, or a he; that it is really because he wants m o r e m o n e y for himself f r o m the workers. A radical says a college professor w i l l not engage in radical movements because he is afraid for his job, and besides, is a " r e a c t i o n a r y . " T h e college professor says it is because he just likes to f i n d out h o w things w o r k . W h a t is reason for one m a n is rationalization for another. T h e variable is the accepted vocabulary of motives, the ultimates of discourse, of each man's dominant group about whose opinion he cares. Determination of such groups, their location and character, would enable delimitation and methodological control of assignment of motives for specific acts. Stress on this idea w i l l lead us to investigations of the c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z a t i o n of operative motives in personalities according to situation and the general types and conditions of vocabularies of motives in various types of societies. T h e motivational structures of individuals a n d the patterns of their purposes are relative to societal frames. We might, e.g., study motives along stratified or occupational lines. M a x W e b e r has observed: . . . that in a free society the motives which induce people to work vary with . . . different social classes.

PARTIV

Mind

. . . There is normally a graduated scale of motives by which men from different social classes are driven to work. When a man changes ranks, he switches from one set of motives to another.
19

T h e l i n g u a l ties w h i c h h o l d t h e m together react on persons to constitute frameworks of disposition a n d m o t i v e . Recently, Talcott Parsons has i n d i cated, by reference to differences in actions in the professions a n d in business, that one cannot leap f r o m " e c o n o m i c analysis to ultimate m o t i v a tions; the institutional patterns always constitute one c r u c i a l element of the p r o b l e m . " It is my suggestion that we m a y analyze, index, a n d gauge this element by focusing u p o n those specific verbal appendages of variant institutionalized actions w h i c h have b e e n r e f e r r e d to as vocabularies of motive.
2 0

In folk societies, the constellations of motives connected w i t h various sectors of behavior w o u l d t e n d to be typically stable and r e m a i n associated only w i t h their sector. In typically p r i m a r y , sacred, and r u r a l societies, the motives of persons w o u l d b e regularly c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d . V o c a b u laries of motives o r d e r e d to different situations stabilize a n d guide behavior and expectation of the reactions of others. In their appropriate situations, v e r b a l i z e d motives are not typically q u e s t i o n e d . In secondary, secular, a n d u r b a n structures, v a r y i n g a n d c o m p e t i n g vocabularies of motives operate coterminously a n d the situations to w h i c h they are appropriate are not clearly demarcated. M o t i v e s once unquestioned for de21
1 9

P a r a p h r a s e d b y K . M a n n h e i m , op. cit, 3 1 6 - 3 1 7 . " T h e M o t i v a t i o n o f E c o n o m i c A c t i v i t i e s , " 67, i n C . W . M . Essays in Sociology, Toronto, 1940. A m o n g the ethnologists, R u t h B e n e d i c t has c o m e u p t o the

2 0

Hart,
2 1

edge of a genuinely sociological view of motivation. H e r view r e m a i n s v a g u e b e c a u s e s h e has n o t s e e n c l e a r l y t h e i d e n t i t y of differing " m o t i v a t i o n s " in differing cultures w i t h the v a r i e d extant a n d a p p r o v e d vocabularies o f m o t i v e . ' T h e intelligent u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o his s o c i e t y . . . i n v o l v e s always the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the types of h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n s a n d c a p a c i t i e s c a p i t a l i z e d i n his s o c i e t y . . Jan.-Mar. 1932; s e e also: Patterns of Culture, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 , ." " C o n Boston, f i g u r a t i o n s o f C u l t u r e i n N o r t h A m e r i c a , " Amer. Anthrop., 2 5 , 1935. S h e t u r n s this o b s e r v a t i o n i n t o a q u e s t f o r t h e u n i q u e " g e n i u s " o f e a c h c u l t u r e a n d stops h e r r e s e a r c h b y w o r d s l i k e " A p o l l o n i a n . " If she w o u l d attempt constructively to o b s e r v e the vocabularies of motives which precipitate acts to perable f o r m , i m p l e m e n t programs, a n d furnish a p p r o v e d motives for them in circumscribed to state observation. situations, and she w o u l d b e b e t t e r precise problems to answer t h e m by further

Mills fined situations are n o w questioned. Various mo tives c a n release similar acts in a g i v e n situation. H e n c e , variously situated persons are confused a n d guess w h i c h m o t i v e " a c t i v a t e d " the person. S u c h questioning has resulted intellectually in such movements as psychoanalysis w i t h its dogma of rationalization a n d its systematic m o t i v e - m o n gering. Such intellectual p h e n o m e n a are under l a i d by split a n d conflicting sections of an i n d i v i d u ated society w h i c h is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the existence of c o m p e t i n g vocabularies of m o t i v e . Intricate constellations of motives, for example, are components of business enterprise in A m e r ica. S u c h patterns have encroached on the o l d style vocabulary of the virtuous relation of m e n a n d w o m e n : duty, love, kindness. A m o n g certain classes, the romantic, virtuous, a n d p e c u n i a r y m o tives are confused. T h e asking of the question: " M a r r i a g e for love or m o n e y ? " is significant, for tine XjetuTiiary is new and aktrrost TOibiquitous m o t i v e , a c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r of m a n y others.
22

307 couches of F r e u d , patients used the only vocabu lary of motives they k n e w ; F r e u d got his h u n c h and g u i d e d further talk. M i t t e n z w e y has dealt w i t h similar points at l e n g t h . W i d e l y diffused in a postwar e p o c h , psychoanalysis was n e v e r p o p ular in F r a n c e w h e r e c o n t r o l of sexual behavior is not p u r i t a n i c a l . To c o n v e r t e d individuals w h o have become accustomed to the psychoanalytic terminology of motives, all others seem selfdeceptive.
23 24 25

I n l i k e m a n n e r , t o m a n y believers i n M a r x ism's t e r m i n o l o g y of p o w e r , struggle, a n d eco n o m i c motives, a l l others, i n c l u d i n g F r e u d ' s , are due t o hypocrisy o r ignorance. A n i n d i v i d u a l w h o has assimilated thoroughly only business con geries of motives w i l l attempt to a p p l y these m o tives to a l l situations, h o m e and w i f e i n c l u d e d . It should be n o t e d that the business terminology of motives has its intellectual articulation, e v e n as psytnt^aiialysis a n d M a r x i s m na"ve. It is significant that since the Socratic p e r i o d many "theories o f m o t i v a t i o n " have b e e n l i n k e d w i t h ethical a n d religious terminologies. M o t i v e is that in m a n w h i c h leads h i m to do good or e v i l . U n d e r the aegis of religious institutions, m e n use vocabularies of m o r a l motives: they call acts a n d programs " g o o d " a n d " b a d , " and i m p u t e these qualities to the soul. Such l i n g u a l behavior is part of the process of social control. Institutional practices a n d their vocabularies of motives exer cise c o n t r o l over d e l i m i t e d ranges of possible situ ations. O n e c o u l d m a k e a typal catalog of religious motives f r o m w i d e l y r e a d religious texts, a n d test its explanatory p o w e r in various denominations a n d sects.
26

Back o f " m i x e d m o t i v e s " a n d " m o t i v a t i o n a l conflicts" are c o m p e t i n g or discrepant situational patterns a n d their respective vocabularies of m o tive. W i t h shifting and interstitial situations, each of several alternatives m a y b e l o n g to disparate systems of action w h i c h have differing vocabu laries of motives appropriate to t h e m . S u c h con flicts manifest vocabulary patterns that have o v e r l a p p e d in a m a r g i n a l i n d i v i d u a l a n d are not easily c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d in clear-cut situa tions. Besides g i v i n g promise of e x p l a i n i n g an area of l i n g u a l a n d societal fact, a f u r t h e r advantage of this v i e w of motives is that w i t h it we should be able to give sociological accounts of other theo ries (terminologies) of m o t i v a t i o n . This is a task for sociology of knowledge. H e r e I c a n refer only to a f e w theories. I have already r e f e r r e d to the F r e u d i a n terminology of motives. It is apparent that these motives are those of an u p p e r bourgeois patriarchal group w i t h strong sexual a n d i n d i v i d ualistic orientation. W h e n introspecting o n the
** Also motives acceptably imputed and avowed for one system of action may be diffused into other domains and gradually come to be accepted by some as a comprehensive portrait of the motive of men. This happened in the case of the economic man and his motives.

I n m a n y situations o f contemporary A m e r i c a , conduct is c o n t r o l l e d a n d integrated b y hedo nistic language. F o r large p o p u l a t i o n sectors in certain situations, pleasure a n d p a i n are n o w u n questioned motives. F o r g i v e n periods a n d socieKuno Mittenzwey, " Z u r Sociologie der psychoanalystischer Erkenntnis," in Max Scheler, ed., Versuche zu einer Sociologie des Wissens, 365-375, Munich, 1924.
33

This fact is interpreted by some as supporting Freudian theo ries. Nevertheless, it can be just as adequately grasped in the scheme here outlined.
24 25

See K. Burke's acute discussion of Freud, op. cit, Part I.

Moral vocabularies deserve a special statement. Within the viewpoint herein outlined many snarls concerning "value-judg ments," etc., can be cleared up.
28

308 ties, the situations should be e m p i r i c a l l y determ i n e d . Pleasures and p a i n should not be reified a n d i m p u t e d to h u m a n nature as u n d e r l y i n g p r i n ciples of a l l action. N o t e that h e d o n i s m as a psychological and an ethical doctrine gained impetus i n the m o d e r n w o r l d a t about the t i m e w h e n older moral-religious motives w e r e b e i n g d e b u n k e d a n d s i m p l y discarded b y " m i d d l e class" thinkers. B a c k of the hedonistic t e r m i n o l o g y lay an emergent social p a t t e r n a n d a n e w vocabulary of motives. T h e shift of u n c h a l l e n g e d motives w h i c h g r i p p e d the c o m m u n i t i e s o f E u r o p e was c l i m a x e d w h e n , i n reconciliation, the older religious a n d the hedonistic terminologies w e r e identified: the " g o o d " is the "pleasant." T h e cond i t i o n i n g situation was similar in the H e l l e n i s t i c w o r l d w i t h the h e d o n i s m o f the Cyrenaics a n d Epicureans. W h a t is n e e d e d is to take a l l these terminologies of m o t i v e a n d locate t h e m as vocabularies of m o t i v e in historic epochs a n d specified situations. Motives are of no value apart f r o m the d e l i m i t e d societal situations for w h i c h

PART IV

Mind

they are the appropriate vocabularies. T h e y must be situated. At best, socially unlocated terminologies of motives represent u n f i n i s h e d attempts to block out social areas of m o t i v e i m p u t a tion a n d avowal. M o t i v e s vary i n content a n d character w i t h historical epochs a n d societal structures. Rather than i n t e r p r e t i n g actions a n d l a n guages as external manifestations of subjective a n d deeper l y i n g elements i n individuals, the research task is the locating of particular types of action w i t h i n t y p a l frames of n o r m a t i v e actions a n d socially situated clusters of m o t i v e . T h e r e is no explanatory value in subsuming various vocabularies of motives u n d e r some terminology or list. Such p r o c e d u r e m e r e l y confuses the task of exp l a i n i n g specific cases. T h e languages of situations as g i v e n must be considered a valuable p o r t i o n of the data to be i n t e r p r e t e d and related to their conditions. To s i m p l i f y these vocabularies of m o tive into a socially abstracted t e r m i n o l o g y is to destroy the legitimate use of m o t i v e in the explanation of social actions.

John P. H e w i t t & R a n d a l l Stokes

34

Disclaimers

INTRODUCTION P r o b l e m a t i c events of v a r y i n g seriousness occ u r in the concrete situations of everyday life: people are embarrassed by their o w n a n d others'
J o h n P . H e w i t t a n d R a n d a l l S t o k e s , " D i s c l a i m e r s , " American Sociological Review,vol. 4 0 , F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 5 , p p . 1 - 1 1 . R e p r i n t e d by permission. W e a r e i n d e b t e d t o R o b F a u l k n e r f o r his h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s on an e a r l i e r d r a f t of this p a p e r .

faux pas; serious a n d trivial departures f r o m role obligations are n o t i c e d ; rules are b r o k e n (or, m o r e p r o p e r l y , certain actions are treated as r u l e violations); extraordinary, disturbing, or seemingly inexplicable behavior is observed in self or others. Such p r o b l e m a t i c events are i m p o r t a n t for two reasons. First, they affect the course a n d outc o m e of social interaction. People gear their w o r d s and deeds to the restoration a n d m a i n t e nance of situated a n d cherished identities. W h e n

Hewitt, Stokes the violation of rules fractures the context of interaction, or w h e n the emergent m e a n i n g of a situat i o n is disrupted, people endeavor to repair the breaks and restore m e a n i n g . Thus, if the d i r e c t i o n of social interaction in a g i v e n situation is to be w e l l understood, adequate concepts for h a n d l i n g such events are necessary. Second, a conceptual grasp of the problematic features of identity, social interaction a n d emergent m e a n i n g is c r u c i a l to an understanding of the classic p r o b l e m of social order and cultural continuity. W h i l e the sociological treatment of the p r o b l e m is conventionally anchored in socialization and the internalization of culture, there are several difficulties w i t h such a formulation, most notably that little routine action appears g u i d e d by deeply i n t e r n a l i z e d norms. A discussion of problematic events aids in the reformulation of the l i n k b e t w e e n culture a n d behavior, for it is in relation to such problematic occasions that culture most clearly enters the consciousness of actors, shapes the m e a n i n g of their conduct, becomes fundamental to their identities, a n d is thus m a d e visible and re-affirmed. Several concepts have b e e n d e v e l o p e d to deal w i t h the p r o b l e m of h o w actors restore disr u p t e d m e a n i n g , repair fractured social interact i o n , a n d re-negotiate damaged identities. C. W r i g h t M i l l s ' (1940) conception of "vocabularies o f m o t i v e " ; M a r v i n Scott a n d Stanford L y m a n ' s (1968) "accounts"; and J o h n H e w i t t and Peter H a l l ' s (1970, 1973) "quasi-theories" each comes to grips w i t h an important aspect of the d u a l probl e m of social interaction a n d culture in problematic situations. F o r M i l l s , the most i m p o r t a n t feature of motives is that they arise in talk, whether as states of m i n d the person imputes to others or avows for himself. " A s a w o r d , a m o t i v e tends to be one w h i c h is to the actor a n d to the other members of a situation an unquestioned answer to questions c o n c e r n i n g social a n d l i n g u a l c o n d u c t " (Mills, 1940:906). M o t i v e talk is thus i m p o r t a n t to the ongoing construction of m e a n i n g in social interaction, since the continuity of b o t h is sustained (in part) by people's ability to attribute their o w n a n d others' acts to "reasons" or " m o t i v e s . " W h i l e M i l l s addresses himself to the issue of h o w disr u p t e d m e a n i n g is restored, his discussion lacks generality, since motive talk, w h i l e central to so-

309 cial interaction, is not the only means of dealing w i t h disrupted m e a n i n g . T h e concepts of accounts and quasi-theories are also addressed, each in a particular way, to problematic m e a n i n g . Accounts are the justifications a n d excuses people offer w h e n the course of interaction has b e e n disrupted by an act or w o r d . Quasi-theories are explanations people construct in social interaction to account for various kinds of problematic situations. B o t h concepts point to observable features of social interaction in w h i c h m e a n i n g is restored by efforts undertaken for that purpose. B u t these concepts are l i m i t e d because their v i e w of m e a n i n g a n d its reconstruction is largely retrospectivethey deal w i t h the definition of the past in the present. N e i ther deals adequately, nor is it i n t e n d e d to do so, w i t h the anticipation of events, w i t h the prospective construction of m e a n i n g for words and deeds that may be problematic. This paper introduces, defines and discusses a n e w concept, the " d i s c l a i m e r . " Its l e v e l is that of the account a n d the quasi-theory: a process that occurs i n social interaction i n w h i c h problematic events that may disrupt emergent m e a n i n g are defined a n d dealt w i t h . U n l i k e accounts a n d quasi-theories, w h i c h are retrospective in their effect, disclaimers are prospective, defining the future in the present, creating interpretations of potentially problematic events i n t e n d e d to m a k e t h e m u n p r o b l e m a t i c w h e n they occur.

The Disclaimer

In order to define the disclaimer a n d describe its forms we must first attend to some major features of problematic m e a n i n g . As individuals in social interaction f o r m their conduct in response to one another, m e a n i n g in their situation is created a n d m a i n t a i n e d . T h e i n d i v i d u a l organizes m e a n i n g thematically: as behavior in the situation emerges he seeks to " f i t " events to " t h e m e " ( M c H u g h , 1968). T h e relationship b e t w e e n the theme that organizes m e a n i n g a n d the specific acts or events that fit the t h e m e is a reflexive one: events take on m e a n i n g w h e n pattern i m p u t e d to t h e m ; p a t t e r n is visible

310 o n l y in the concrete events it is used to interpret. W h e n events or acts no longer seem u n derstandable in terms of the patterns i m p u t e d to t h e m , individuals examine discrepant events w i t h some care, seeking to d e t e r m i n e w h a t has gone w r o n g w i t h their u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the situation. C e n t r a l to the themes used to organize meani n g are identities. W h e t h e r defined on the basis of conventional, n a m e d social roles (father, policem a n , teacher) or interpersonal roles established b y specific individuals over t i m e i n relation t o one another (friend, follower, enemy), situated identities are established a n d k n o w n to interactants. Indeed, the thematic organization of m e a n i n g b y interactants usually depends u p o n their ability to interpret each others' actions as manifestations of particular identities. It follows that w h e n events fail to fit themes in interaction, i d e n tities m a y c o m e into focus as problematic: if the acts of another fail to appear sensible in light of his i d e n t i t y in the situation, perhaps he is not w h o he appears to be. T h e crucial place of identities in the organizat i o n of m e a n i n g points m o r e generally to the i m portance of the process of t y p i f y i n g and the fact of typification in social i n t e r a c t i o n (Schutz, 1964). In their relations w i t h one another, people search for a n d m a k e use of specific cues f r o m others as a means of t y p i f y i n g t h e m , i.e., of treating t h e m as kinds of persons. Socialized individuals carry w i t h t h e m a vast store of i n f o r m a t i o n as to h o w various types of persons w i l l behave, what they are l i k e , their typical motives a n d values, h o w to d e a l w i t h t h e m , etc. In concrete situations they search for cues f r o m others, i n v o k e a typification that appears relevant to those cues a n d r e l y u p o n the store of information o r g a n i z e d by the typificat i o n i n their subsequent i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the other, filling in the " g a p s " in the other's self-presentation w i t h the typification. Some typifications are essentially identical in content to c o n v e n tional and interpersonal roles (thus we carry t y p i fications of fathers, enemies, policemen), w h i l e others cut across the grain of roles, p o i n t i n g to other " t y p e s " that m a y , in g i v e n cases, be i m p o r tant, e v e n c o n t r o l l i n g in social interaction (so, for example, we carry typifications of the p r e j u d i c e d , stupid, incompetent, m e n t a l l y i l l , etc.).

PART IV

Mind

C r u c i a l to the concept of the disclaimer is the fact that individuals know their o w n acts serve as the basis for t y p i f y i n g t h e m ; they k n o w that specific acts they undertake w i l l be treated by others as cues for typification. T h e y k n o w this, in the simplest sense, because they do it t h e m selves, seeking in others' acts the " k e y s " that w i l l u n l o c k the secrets of their behavior. M o r e o v e r , w i t h v a r y i n g degrees of awareness, i n d i v i d u a l s seek to present others w i t h cues that w i l l l e a d to desired typifications of themto present t h e m selves in ways that w i l l lead others to grant t h e i r situated i d e n t i t y claims. This awareness of typification (in general, if not in specific cases) plays an i m p o r t a n t role in the imaginative preconstructions of c o n d u c t that g o o n continuously i n the m e n t a l life o f the i n d i v i d u a l . A s i n d i v i d u a l s construct their acts i n i m a g i nation, they anticipate the responses of others, i n c l u d i n g the typificatory uses to w h i c h their acts w i l l be put. F o r the i n d i v i d u a l , any g i v e n act is potentially a basis on w h i c h others can t y p i f y h i m . P u t another way, as the i n d i v i d u a l anticipates the response to his conduct, he m a y see it either as in l i n e w i t h an established identity or as s o m e h o w discrepant, in w h i c h case it m a y be taken as a cue for some n e w typification, possibly a negative one, possibly a m o r e favorable one. Individuals' anticipation of others' typifications of t h e m are not g o v e r n e d , h o w e v e r , by any simple p r i n c i p l e of seeking positive a n d a v o i d i n g negative typifications. L i f e is filled w i t h occasions on w h i c h individuals find it necessary to engage in acts that u n d e r m i n e the emergent m e a n i n g of situations and m a k e probable the destruction o f their identities i n t h e m . E v e n i f they d o not feel constrained to act in such ways, i n d i v i d u a l s m a y p e r c e i v e o p p o r t u n i t i e s e v e n legitimate onesin lines of action they k n o w others w i l l take exception to. A n d on some occasions, individuals may sense the possibility of b e i n g typified in ways they w o u l d l i k e to a v o i d , but find themselves w i t h out any certain w a y of anticipating the response. U n d e r such circumstances as these a n d others, disclaimers are i n v o k e d . A disclaimer is a v e r b a l device e m p l o y e d to w a r d off a n d defeat i n advance doubts a n d negative typifications w h i c h m a y result f r o m i n t e n d e d conduct. Disclaimers seek to define f o r t h c o m i n g

Hewitt, Stokes conduct as not relevant to the k i n d of identitychallenge or re-typification for w h i c h it m i g h t ord i n a r i l y serve as the basis. E x a m p l e s a b o u n d and serve to m a k e the abstract concrete: "I k n o w this sounds stupid, b u t . . ."; " I ' m not p r e j u d i c e d , because some of my best friends are Jews, b u t . . ."; " T h i s is just off the top of my head, s o . . ."; " W h a t I ' m going to do may seem strange, so bear w i t h m e . " " T h i s m a y m a k e y o u u n h a p p y , but . . ."; "I realize I ' m b e i n g a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c . . . ." In each of the foregoing examples, i n d i v i d u als display in their speech the expectation of possible responses of others to their i m p e n d i n g conduct. In each example, a specific utterance calls the other's attention to a possible xmdesired typification a n d asks forbearance. E a c h phrase, in effect, disclaims that the w o r d or d e e d to follow should be used as a basis for i d e n t i t y challenge a n d re-typification. T h e user's clear h o p e is that his i n t e n d e d act w i l l not disrupt the c u r r e n t relationship, n o r undesirably shift the e m e r g e n t defin i t i o n of the situation. E a c h disclaimer is thus a device used to sustain interaction, to manage the flow of m e a n i n g in situations, to negotiate a social order in w h i c h people can treat one another's acts w i t h discretion, w i t h good j u d g m e n t , a n d w i t h deserved good w i l l .

311 expression is an i n t e n t i o n a l signal of m i n i m a l c o m m i t m e n t to the i m p e n d i n g line of conduct, an i n d i c a t i o n of willingness to receive discrepant i n formation, change opinions, be persuaded otherwise or be better i n f o r m e d . P u t otherwise, such an expression indicates the tentative nature of f o r t h c o m i n g action. Second, the tentative or negotiable coloration g i v e n subsequent conduct i n dicates a measure of uncertainty about the l i k e l y response to the act. F r o m the standpoint of the i n d i v i d u a l constructing his act, what he is about to say m a y be taken seriously a n d i m p o r t a n t l y by others, thus c o n f i r m i n g his identity; or it maybe taken by others as d a m a g i n g to his i d e n t i t y , e v e n as the basis for some n e w , c o n t r o l l i n g typification o f h i m . H e does not k n o w . T h i r d , the retypification that m a y occur is at least potentially serious. W h i l e the i n d i v i d u a l may suspect that the worst that can h a p p e n is that he w i l l be thought i l l - i n f o r m e d or wrong-headed, he faces the possib i l i t y that his act m a y fundamentally transform h i m i n the eyes o f the other. M i n i m a l c o m m i t m e n t a n d u n c e r t a i n response are the defining conditions u n d e r w h i c h h e d g i n g takes place. W h e r e an i n d i v i d u a l does not k n o w h o w his act w i l l be r e c e i v e d a n d simultaneously does not t h i n k a positive response to his act is essential to his i d e n t i t y or his ends, he w i l l hedge b y d i s c l a i m i n g i n advance the i m p o r t a n c e of the act to his identity. " I ' m no e x p e r t " is a phrase that conveys to others the idea that no expert i d e n t i t y is b e i n g c l a i m e d ; if no expertise is, in fact, s h o w n , no c l a i m needs to be d e f e n d e d . T h e phrase signals to hearers that they should treat factually faulty statements or deeds that have the w r o n g effects as the n o r m a l prerogative of people w h o are not a n d do not c l a i m to be expert in what they are d o i n g . A t the same t i m e , variability i n feared seriousness of response makes for variability w i t h i n the category of h e d g i n g . At one extreme, a person may fear his words or deeds w i l l drastically recast h i m in the eyes of others, a n d thus m a k e attainment of his ends difficult. Persons w h o are expert, therefore, w i l l often appeal to faulty m e m ory, possible misunderstanding or over-specialization if they fear an i m p e n d i n g act w i l l l e a d to their re-typification as incompetent. Persons w h o occupy central, leadership positions i n adminis-

T y p e s of Disclaimers T h e examples cited above, as w e l l as others, can best be analyzed by sorting disclaimers into several types, each of w h i c h reflects a different set of conditions of use. Hedging. T h e r e are countless situations in w h i c h individuals preface statements of fact or o p i n i o n , positions in arguments or expressions of belief w i t h disclaimers o f the f o l l o w i n g k i n d : " I ' m no expert, of course, b u t . . ."; "I c o u l d be w r o n g on my facts, but I think . . ."; "I really haven't thought this through v e r y w e l l , but . . ."; " I ' m not sure this is going to w o r k , b u t let's give it a t r y " ; " L e t ' s play devil's advocate here. . . ." W h a t does the use of disclaimers of this type indicate about the individual's conduct a n d his expectations about others' responses? First, each

312 trative organizations often adopt the practice of p l a y i n g devil's advocate of positions they genui n e l y support, since they fear o p e n a n d c o m m i t t e d advocacy of position m i g h t erode their p o w e r a n d authority. At the other extreme, w h e r e people feel they have little to fear in the w a y of drastic re-typification, h e d g i n g is m o r e like insurance, a n d often m o r e like ritual; a way of r e m i n d i n g people that no great emphasis should be put on their success or failure, accuracy or error, in what they are about to say or do. CredenHaling. Expressions of a different sort are e m p l o y e d w h e n the i n d i v i d u a l knows the outcome of his act w i l l be discrediting, but is nevertheless strongly c o m m i t t e d to the act. C r e d e n tialing encompasses a group of expressions of this k i n d exemplified b y the f o l l o w i n g : " I k n o w what I ' m g o i n g to say seems a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c , but . . ."; " I ' m not prejudicedsome of my best friends are Jews, b u t . . ."; " D o n ' t get me w r o n g , I l i k e your work, but. . . . In credentialing individuals seek to avoid an undesired typification they are certain w i l l follow f r o m an i n t e n d e d act. T h e expressions of credent i a l i n g try to accomplish this by establishing for the actor special qualifications or credentials that, he implies, p e r m i t h i m to engage in the act w i t h out h a v i n g it treated in the usual way as a cue for typification. In the classic "some of my best f r i e n d s " example, the speaker acknowledges that someone w h o says what he is about to say m i g h t be typified as a p r e j u d i c e d person, but implies his friendships put h i m in a protected category of people w h o cannot be so typified. T h e m a n w h o sees h u m a n qualities in his dogs knows that speaking of t h e m in an a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c way w i l l m a k e h i m seem foolish, and so seeks to avoid the typification by announcing he knows it could be made. In this second example, knowledge of the negative aspects of an act is central to the establ i s h m e n t of a right to engage in the act anyway. K n o w l e d g e is a credential because it establishes the actor as one w h o may have purpose in what he is d o i n g , so that others cannot easily regard h i m as an u n k n o w i n g representative of a particular negative type. O n e w h o has purpose may have good purpose, whereas one w h o acts in b l i n d igno-

PART IV

Mind

rance of the implications of his act is presumed not to. Sin Licenses. A n o t h e r category of expressions is e m p l o y e d w h e n the actor is c o m m i t t t e d to a l i n e of conduct and is certain of a negative response, but does not fear some specific undesired typification. In some instances of social interaction, actors anticipate that their acts w i l l be treated as rule violations. Instead of a specific t y p i fication (e.g., racist, fool), the actor fears destruction of his identity as a "responsible m e m b e r " of the encounter and the substitution of a " r u l e b r e a k e r " or "irresponsible m e m b e r " typification of h i m . T h e focus of his talk and his c o n c e r n is u p o n the rule w h i c h he fears w i l l be i n v o k e d as a rebuke to his action. H e n c e the f o l l o w i n g examples: "I realize y o u m i g h t think this is the w r o n g t h i n g to do, but . . ."; "I k n o w this is against the rules, b u t . . ."; " W h a t I ' m going to do is contrary to the letter of the l a w but not its spirit. . . . " I n v o k i n g the sin licensing disclaimer is equivalent to stipulating in advance that an act to follow m i g h t ordinarily be d e e m e d a violation of a rale, a n d thus disruptive of the interaction that is taki n g place. T h e disclaimer is an effort to i n v o k e in a specific situation the more general a n d c o m m o n l y r e c o g n i z e d p r i n c i p l e that there are occasions on w h i c h rules may legitimately be violated without questioning the status of those w h o v i o late t h e m . Just as accounts are i n v o k e d retrospectively as a way of placing rule violations in such a category, sin licensing disclaimers are i n v o k e d prospectively as a way of defining the conduct in advance. (But clearly there is less flexibility in the disclaimersome excuses are good retrospectively but not prospectively.) In many instances the sin licensing disclaimer is i n v o k e d seriously; that is, its user genuinely fears typification as a rule breaker. In other cases, however, w h e r e rules are routinely b r o k e n and participants aware of this fact, licenses to sin are requested a n d g r a n t e d on a pro forma basis. In either case, the license to sin pays due respect to the rules e v e n w h i l e establishing the conditions under w h i c h they may be broken. Cognitive Disclaimers. In routine social i n teraction, participants seldom have occasion to

Hewitt, Stokes question one another's e m p i r i c a l grasp of the situation in w h i c h they are present. Participants generally assume substantive congruency b e t w e e n their o w n and others' grasp of the situation. Yet u n d e r l y i n g any situation is the possibility that the words or deeds of one participant w i l l be construed by others as l a c k i n g sense, as out of touch w i t h e m p i r i c a l reality, as somehow i n d i c a t i n g the individual's failure to perceive the situation adequately and correctly. W h i l e individuals generally assume that others w i l l assume their acts m a k e e m p i r i c a l sense, they k n o w that some acts may be misconstrued, a n d that this misconstrual m a y lead to their o w n re-typification as l a c k i n g sense, as out of touch, as disengaged w h e n they should be engaged, as irrational. U n d e r conditions w h e r e they t h i n k their acts m a y be so questioned, i n d i viduals use cognitive disclaimers such as the foll o w i n g : " T h i s may seem strange to y o u . . ."; " D o n ' t react right away to w h a t I ' m going to d o . " "I k n o w this sounds crazy, but I t h i n k I saw. . . ." C o g n i t i v e disclaimers anticipate doubts that m a y be expressed c o n c e r n i n g the speaker's capacity to recognize adequately the e m p i r i c a l facts of the situation in w h i c h he finds himself. By antici p a t i n g doubt, the disclaimer seeks to reassure others that there is no loss of cognitive capacity, that there is still agreement on the facts of the situation. In this f o r m of d i s c l a i m i n g , as in the others, knowledge is a key element: by d e m o n strating in advance k n o w l e d g e of a possible basis for re-typification, the i n d i v i d u a l establishes purpose for acts that m i g h t otherwise be taken as h a v i n g no purpose, as reflecting a loss of cognitive control. Appeals for the Suspension of Judgment. If m u c h social interaction is p u r s u e d in situations i n w h i c h people have c o m m o n ends a n d w o r k to achieve consensus on t h e m a n d the means of attaining t h e m , still i n such interaction individuals r e c o g n i z e that on occasion their acts m a y offend e v e n their friends. T h a t is, people are aware that w h a t they say a n d do m a y be offensive, angering or d i s m a y i n g to those w i t h w h o m they interact, unless a n d u n t i l they c a n place the act in a p r o p e r context, give it the " c o r r e c t " m e a n i n g so far as the exchange is concerned. U n d e r such c i r c u m stances, individuals appeal to their fellows to sus-

313 p e n d j u d g m e n t u n t i l the f u l l m e a n i n g of the act can be made k n o w n . "I don't want to m a k e y o u angry by saying this, but . . ."; " D o n ' t get me w r o n g , but . . ."; " H e a r me out before y o u exp l o d e . " are illustrative of appeals individuals make for the suspension of j u d g m e n t . F r e q u e n t l y such appeals take the f o r m of appeals for the suspension of affect, in effect asking the other to h o l d back on what the actor fears w i l l be a p o w e r f u l affective response u n t i l f u l l m e a n i n g can be transmitted. In other cases (e.g., " D o n ' t react u n t i l I get this all out") the appeal is not to suspend specific affect, but m e r e l y to await f u l l m e a n i n g . In either case, the d i s c l a i m i n g i n d i v i d u a l realizes that what he is about to do may disrupt the social situation, p a r t l y because the assumption of c o m m o n purpose m a y be questioned, partly because it may p r o m o t e his o w n re-typification as an " e n e m y " or " t u r n c o a t " a n d not a comrade, f r i e n d or colleague.

Responses to Disclaimers T h e discussion has so far e m p h a s i z e d users' perspectives, g r o u n d i n g its classification in the i n tentions and expectations of those w h o disclaim. B u t the picture is i n c o m p l e t e u n t i l we grasp h o w it is that others respond to disclaimers a n d h o w their responses affect the course of social interaction. F r o m the user's standpoint, the disclaimer is an effort to dissociate his identity f r o m the specific content of his words or deeds. Take, for example, the f o l l o w i n g use of credentialing: " I ' m no racist, because I have a lot of black friends a n d associates, but I t h i n k black people w a n t too m u c h , too soon." In this a n d similar instances, two f u n d a m e n t a l claims are made: first, there is an identity claimspecifically, a negative typification as a racist is disclaimed, and so the opposite, v a l u e d i d e n t i t y is c l a i m e d ; second, there is a substantive claimspecifically, an expressed belief that blacks want i m p r o v e m e n t s m o r e q u i c k l y than they can or should be p r o v i d e d . P e o p l e use disclaimers in o r d e r to secure the success of substantive claims, but w i t h o u t the possible negative implications for their i d e n t i t y claims. By the phrase substantive c l a i m we refer to

314 the fact that every w o r d or d e e d has implications for the e m e r g i n g definition of a situation a n d the j o i n t action it contains. In the above illustration the substantive c l a i m is a factual c l a i m , that is, a statement that certain conditions are true of blacks. In other instances, substantive claims have to do w i t h m o r a l i t y (e.g., "It is right to do what I am u r g i n g we do."), technical efficiency (e.g., " T h i s is an appropriate w a y of d o i n g things.") a n d the l i k e . E v e r y w o r d o r d e e d operates, i n effect, as a c l a i m that the situation should be defined in a certain way, or that it can be best defined in that w a y or that for all practical purposes that is the w a y to define it. W h i l e claims are not always (nor, perhaps, often) expressed in so m a n y words, they operate to the same effect. This distinction is c r u c i a l to our discussion of responses, for b o t h uses of a n d responses to disclaimers p r o c e e d on these p a r a l l e l levels of i d e n t i t y a n d substance. O n one h a n d , others m a y either accept or reject the i d e n t i t y p o r t i o n of the disclaimer, either attributing to the user the i d e n tity he seeks to a v o i d or s u p p o r t i n g his existing i d e n t i t y i n the situation. O n the other h a n d (and somewhat i n d e p e n d e n t l y of their response on the issue of identity), others m a y accept or reject the user's substantive claims, agreeing or disagreeing w i t h his statements, r e g a r d i n g his actions as useful or dangerous, m o r a l l y acceptable or p r o h i b i t e d . F r o m the user's point of v i e w , a disclaimer is fully successful if it allows b o t h types of c l a i m to be accepted; the other concedes the substantive i m p o r t of the user's actions or expressions a n d makes no undesired re-typification of h i m . In the example c i t e d above, factual claims about blacks w o u l d be granted a n d no re-typification as a racist w o u l d take place. U n d e r such a c o n d i t i o n of " f u l l success," we m a y assume, interaction proceeds on its coursea potential disturbance has b e e n successfully skirted. Less desirable, but still to be c o u n t e d a partial success, is the c o n d i t i o n w h e r e a substantive c l a i m is rejected, but w h e r e a possible re-typification is not made. F o l l o w i n g the same example, a result such as the f o l l o w i n g illustrates partial success: "I tiiink you're w r o n g about the pace of black progress but, of course, I k n o w y o u are not a raci s t . " In this condition, w h i l e the user has failed to define the situation in the hoped-for m a n n e r ,

PART IV

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he has at least succeeded in preserving his i d e n tity i n the situation a n d avoiding re-typification. In either of the above conditions, we c a n speak of the acceptance of a disclaimer in the sense that the user's i d e n t i t y is p r e s e r v e d intact. A disclaimer is said to be rejected w h e n its user is typified by another in a negative way, w h a t e v e r his response to the substantive c l a i m . On one h a n d , it seems l i k e l y that most rejected disclaimers i n v o l v e a rejection of b o t h claims: the use of credentialing, as in the above example, w o u l d lead b o t h to a d e n i a l of the factual c l a i m b e i n g m a d e and to the re-typification of the user as a racist. On the other h a n d , there is at least the logical possibility that a substantive c l a i m w i l l be granted, but that simultaneously the user w i l l be re-typified. " B e i n g r i g h t for the w r o n g reasons" is an illustration of a c o n d i t i o n w h e r e factual claims are g r a n t e d in the v e r y process of a l t e r i n g a user's i d e n t i t y . T h e acceptance or rejection of disclaimers is, h o w e v e r , a m o r e c o m p l e x a n d u n c e r t a i n p r o c ess t h a n our e l l i p t i c a l discussion indicates. We have glossed over, thus far, the process of inference a n d signaling that is c r u c i a l to the o u t c o m e of a g i v e n disclaimer. T h e appropriate questions are the f o l l o w i n g : H o w is it that users infer acceptance or rejection of their claims? H o w is it that others signal acceptance or rejection of users' claims? T h e questions of inference and signaling are, in the course of r e a l social interaction, b o u n d closely together; i n d e e d , there is m u c h reflexivity b e t w e e n the t w o . W h e t h e r a signal is, in fact, a signal is not concretely a matter of fact, b u t depends u p o n the i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n the user's i n ference a n d the other's intent. W h a t is i n t e n d e d to be a signal m a y be falsely construed or not construed at a l l , a n d what is not i n t e n d e d as a signal m a y be so construed, either favorably or unfavorably to the user's hopes. A n d part of the m a k i n g of an inference involves its b e i n g m a d e k n o w n to the other that an inference has b e e n made, a linkage that is always subject to possible slippage. F o r analytical purposes, h o w e v e r , w e must separate inference a n d signaling. T h e f o r m e r c a n be discussed by p a y i n g attention to the rules or procedures i n v o k e d b y the user, w h e t h e r i n -

Hewitt, Stokes w a r d l y or overtly, in an effort to d e t e r m i n e the success of his disclaimer. In the most e l e m e n t a r y sense prima facie e v i d e n c e of a disclaimer's success is to be sought in the other's overt response: if the response the user h o p e d to a v o i d is not f o r t h c o m i n g , he has e v i d e n c e that his tactic has succeeded. If an interactant credentials his p r e j u d i c i a l statement, he m a y infer the success of his c r e d e n t i a l i n g if no charge of prejudice is f o r t h c o m i n g . T h i s w i l l be so at the l e v e l of his i d e n t i t y c l a i m , w h a t e v e r the response g i v e n the substance of his action. T h e possibility always exists, of course, that others w i l l w i t h h o l d cues that w o u l d enable the interactant to j u d g e the success of his disclaimer. W h i l e m u c h o f our i m a g e r y o f r o l e p l a y i n g a n d role t a k i n g suggests that actors are always forthc o m i n g about their t r u e j u d g m e n t s , there is no reason to assume that awareness contexts are t y p i cally o p e n . C l o s e d , pretense or suspicion awareness contexts m a y characterize the use a n d response to disclaimers as m u c h as any other f o r m of interaction. Thus, we must observe, inferences about success based on prima facieevidence must always be, for the actors w h o m a k e t h e m , somew h a t tentative. E v e r y use of a disclaimer risks the possibility that a user's i d e n t i t y m a y be d a m aged w i t h o u t his i m m e d i a t e l y d i s c o v e r i n g the damage. M o r e positively, users m a y infer acceptance or rejection f r o m cues p r o v i d e d by others. Such cues, insofar as they are m e a n t to signal acceptance, m a y take a variety of forms. T h e other m a y , for example, address himself e x p l i c i t l y to the issue raised by the disclaimer: "I realize y o u are no expert."; " I k n o w y o u aren't p r e j u d i c e d . " ; " I u n derstand what y o u m e a n . " These examples suggest responses that m o r e or less e x p l i c i t l y signal the legitimacy of the disclaimer in the situation at h a n d . Sometimes the positive response m a y i n c l u d e the sharing o f the disclaimer, w h i c h e n tails the other using an expression that indicates that he, also, shares the p o i n t of v i e w of the user, that he too m i g h t , in similar circumstances, use the same disclaimer. W e m a y assume that w h e n others p r o v i d e users w i t h positive cues, inferences are m a d e w i t h m o r e confidence a n d i n t e r a c t i o n continues o n its course. E v e n here, h o w e v e r , there is slippage b e t w e e n i n t e n t a n d inference,

315 a n d a n o d of the h e a d that signifies to the user the acceptance of his v i e w p o i n t m a y be to the other a means of g i v i n g the user m o r e rope w i t h w h i c h to h a n g himself. T h e question of inference a n d signaling also turns on the degree to w h i c h those w h o use disclaimers p r o v i d e an o p p o r t u n i t y for response. Social interaction is not always c o n d u c t e d w i t h f u l l attention to the etiquette of turn-taking; i n d e e d , users of disclaimers m a y intentionally " r a s h " their i n t e r a c t i o n sequences in such a way that others are " l e f t b e h i n d " a n d , h a v i n g h a d n o o p p o r t u n i t y to object, are in the position of h a v i n g agreed b y default. A n i n t e r a c t i o n sequence m a y b e rushed by a refusal to y i e l d the floor to another for a response or a refusal to " s e e " that the floor is w a n t e d by another. A sequence m a y also be rushed w h e r e deeds f o l l o w so q u i c k l y u p o n words that c o m m i t m e n t s are m a d e that cannot subseq u e n t l y be escaped. O p p o r t u n i t i e s for negative responses to disclaimers m a y also be l i m i t e d if users are able to "finesse" interaction sequences. O n the one h a n d , actors c a n "get away w i t h " words a n d deeds that are gross threats to their identities if they u n d e r take t h e m i n small steps, i n v o k i n g seemingly m i n o r disclaimers along the way. T h a t is, small disclaimers are h o n o r e d m o r e readily, w e m a y suggest, t h a n large ones, but a series of small disclaimers m a y result in a major behavioral cue bei n g treated as i r r e l e v a n t to the actor's identity. On the other h a n d , it is not unreasonable to suppose that actors m a y on occasion m a k e a disclaimer o f far greater m a g n i t u d e t h a n their i m p e n d i n g act calls for, k n o w i n g the other m a y thus b e m o r e l i k e l y t o accept it. O n any occasion w h e r e a disclaimer m i g h t be used, the user has some discretion in terms of associating his i m p e n d i n g act w i t h a possible negative typification of h i m . By exaggerating the possibly negative typification, a n d t h e n p r o c e e d i n g w i t h his w o r d o r d e e d , he hopes to secure acceptance by v i r t u e of contrast. T h e net outcome of successful disclaimers, w h e t h e r the acceptance is voluntary or reflects the user's successful rushing or finessing of the i n t e r a c t i o n sequence, is that the user's i d e n t i t y in the situation is at least t e m p o r a r i l y sustained. N o re-typification i n negative terms takes place,

316 no d i s r u p t i o n in the emergence of m e a n i n g occurs. N o t only this, acceptance of a disclaimer, a n d particularly the acceptance of a series of disclaimers, c o m m i t s b o t h participants to the rec i p r o c a l identities b e i n g b u i l t u p . As a situation proceeds a n d as disclaimers are e m p l o y e d successfully, we can hypothesize that it becomes m o r e difficult for participants to reject subsequent disclaimersthe progressive sohdification of identities lays the g r o u n d w o r k for easier disclaimi n g a n d , at some stage, makes it possible for actors to assume disclaimers and acceptances of one another rather than h a v i n g to m a k e each one explicitly. H o w , then, are disclaimers rejected? W h a t cues are sought or p r o v i d e d ? W h a t procedures are used to m a k e inferences about acceptance? A g a i n , i n the simplest sense, prima facie evidence of rejection is to be f o u n d if the other explicitly avows w h a t the disclaimer h a d sought to avoid. Rejection is certain if the other affirms that the v e r y re-typification that the user feared is, in fact, t o b e m a d e o f h i m . " Y o u should b e a n expert i n this area!" " Y o u ' v e had p l e n t y of t i m e to w o r k on a p r o p o s a l . " "If y o u k n o w it's anthropom o r p h i c , w h y are y o u saying i t ? " Expressions such as these are used as counters to disclaimers, i n d i cating to the user in direct terms that his tactic has not w o r k e d , that he w i l l be re-typified unless he c a n adduce evidence to show w h y he should not be. T h e failure of a disclaimer makes its user subject to re-typification in the v e r y terms his disc l a i m e r p r o v i d e d to the other. This fact is both a weakness a n d a strength. It is a weakness, of course, because the use of a g i v e n disclaimer provides other interactants w i t h a ready-made issue i n terms o f w h i c h the n o w - d i s r u p t e d m e a n i n g o f the context can be managed. W h e r e h e d g i n g has b e e n used, the issue is the i d e n t i t y of the user: thus, for example, a disclaimer of devil's advocacy m a y be m e t w i t h a denial that only devil's advocacy is meant, that, in fact, the user is concealing his true purpose or goals, i.e., his true identity. W h e r e credentialing has b e e n e m p l o y e d , the issue becomes one of purpose or intent, specifically of g o o d or bad intent, since the use of credentiali n g rests largely u p o n the i m p l i c a t i o n that since the user knows the possibly e v i l connotations of

PART IV

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w h a t he is about to do or say, he m a y have other t h a n e v i l intent. Thus charges of e v i l purpose a n d identity concealment m a y also be made. W h e r e sin licensing has b e e n i n v o k e d , the issue turns on the applicability of a g i v e n rule to the act in question. W h e r e cognitive disclaimers are used, the issue becomes one of fact a n d its interpretation. W h e r e the appeal is to suspend j u d g m e n t , the issue is w h e t h e r , in the e n d , m e a n i n g was in fact clarified d u r i n g the suspension. To say that " t h e issue" turns u p o n this or that point is to say that the focus of interaction itself turns u p o n the disclaimer, its user's i d e n t i t y a n d the associated act. Since the user has, v i a his disclaimer, a n n o u n c e d the problematic quality of his words or deeds, he has placed ready-made weapons at the disposal of the other. T h e question that arises at this point, therefore, is h o w interact i o n progresses w h e n it focuses u p o n the disclaimer. It is w o r t h n o t i n g that up to this point, the user has sought to manage his o w n i d e n t i t y in the eyes of the other, whatever the outcome w i t h respect to substantive claims. N o w the issue is, basically, his identity, a n d what is i m p o r t a n t to the user is h o w that i d e n t i t y m a y be sustained. W h i l e the tactics of identity maintenance in such circumstances is a matter of e m p i r i c a l discovery, it seems l i k e l y that altercasting w i l l play an i m p o r tant role in the proceedings. Altercasting (Weinstein a n d Deutschberger, 1 9 6 3 ) is a process in w h i c h actors endeavor to regulate the identities of others: going on the offensive in an argument, treating a particular c h i l d as the " b a b y of the f a m i l y , " creating a "straw m a n " and i d e n t i f y i n g a n opponent w i t h i t are illustrations of the technique of altercasting. In each case, another's identity is g o v e r n e d , or an effort is m a d e to have it be governed, by an actor's actions. (Altercasting is to be understood in contrast w i t h i d e n t i t y as a p h e n o m e n o n an actor m a n ages for himself.) T h e significance of altercasting in the disc l a i m i n g process lies in the fact that an i d e n t i t y established for another has implications for the i d e n t i t y of the altercaster. Identities are reciprocal, w h i c h is to say that participants in social interaction establish identities for themselves a n d each other in a m u t u a l l y related texture w h e r e the

Hewitt, Stokes position of one has implications for the position of another. In the disclaiming process, altercasting w o u l d appear to be significant because it offers the user a "last c h a n c e " to salvage his o w n identity by t r y i n g to establish for the rejecting other an i d e n t i t y that w i l l reflect favorably on the rejected user. H a v i n g failed to disclaim an i d e n t i t y i m p l i e d in his actions and utterances, the user m a y att e m p t to salvage his identity by m o r e or less forcib l y w o r k i n g on the identity of the other, seeking to portray the other in a light that makes his o w n discredit less serious, or e v e n makes it disappear. Thus, to illustrate, the user m a y act towards the other as if the latter, too, shared in the discredit: f o l l o w i n g our example of the c r e d e n t i a l i n g racist, the user m a y seek to apply the l a b e l racist to the other, perhaps by c i t i n g or alleging m o r e serious violations on the part of the latter. In a d d i t i o n to altercasting, the user m a y t u r n to various accounts (Scott a n d L y m a n , 1968) as a w a y of extracting himself f r o m his predicament. As a disclaimer is used a n d meets a negative response, it passes into the i m m e d i a t e past, a n d so becomes a proper object of an account. T h e user m a y excuse his conduct, thus defusing its relevance to his identity by accepting its undesirable nature by d e n y i n g responsibility. Or he m a y att e m p t a justification, accepting responsibility but a r g u i n g for the irrelevance of his act to his identity. T h e possible outcomes of rejected disclaimers, in terms of the course of the interaction and the identities of participants, are m a n y , and difficult to s u m m a r i z e or generalize. U n d e r l y i n g all outcomes, however, is the basic fact that issues of substance have become transformed into issues of participants' identities. In effect, w h e n disclaimers are rejected, a situation is transformed, w i t h possibly unpleasant short a n d l o n g - t e r m consequences for the actor whose i d e n t i t y claims have b e e n destroyed. That a rejected disclaimer does not inevitably i m p l y the loss of a desirable situated identity, a n d m a y in fact be a strength to the user, turns on the fact that a user m a y u n d e r some conditions seek to have his disclaimer rejected. If some actors are genuinely c o n c e r n e d w i t h their identities i n the eyes of others, others m a y be c y n i c a l in the use of disclaimers. Just as an i n d i v i d u a l m a y use

317 a disclaimer that is far out of p r o p o r t i o n to the " r e a l " implications of his conduct in the hopes that it w i l l be m o r e easily accepted, he m a y look ahead, construct alternative scenarios of the conversation on w h i c h he is e m b a r k e d a n d choose disclaimers in such a w a y that discussion turns on issues he can best argue. If his disclaimer is accepted, he is able to pursue the l i n e of conduct he h a d in m i n d . If it is rejected, he is in a relatively strong position to argue his case, to portray his partner's characterization of h i m as a " s t r a w m a n , " e v e n t h o u g h he is himself the source of the characterization.

CONCLUSION: THE DISCLAIMER A N D SOCIAL THEORY T h e disclaimer a n d the broader c u r r e n t of thought of w h i c h it is a part have significance for a long-standing p r o b l e m in social theory. This is the question of h o w culture enters i n d i v i d u a l action or, m o r e broadly, h o w social order a n d continuity are m a i n t a i n e d . C u l t u r e , i n most f o r m u l a tions, is the root of continuity. Parsons, (1966:57) for example, visualizes culture as a k i n to the genetic code of physical organisms. Just as the genetic p o o l of a species provides the parameters for i n d i v i d u a l phenotypes, so does culture p r o v i d e the persisting i d e n t i t y for i n d i v i d u a l actions and interaction. Yet, the crucial question of h o w c u l ture enters i n d i v i d u a l action has not b e e n satisfactorily answered. T h e most i m p o r t a n t l i n k b e t w e e n culture a n d action is generally seen to be the socialization process. F o l l o w i n g Mead's seminal account of the generalized other, a n d de-emphasizing his conc e r n for emergence, heaviest stress has b e e n placed on internalization as the means by w h i c h culture is transmitted and becomes influential u p o n action. F r o m this perspective, internalization constitutes a functional equivalent to instinct in other a n i m a l species; the bee's dance is g u i d e d by a genetic template and man's by a deeply intern a l i z e d n o r m a t i v e structure. A l t h o u g h the origins of c o n t r o l are different, the consequences are the same. In b o t h cases, the direction a n d substance of action are p r o v i d e d by a precognitive a n d i n voluntary hierarchy of preferences. In those (rela-

318 t i v e l y rare) situations w h e r e deviance does occur, the reason is seen to be i n c o m p l e t e or faulty soc i a l i z a t i o n a n d the l i n k of c u l t u r e to behavior is t h e n m a i n t a i n e d by mechanisms of external cont r o l in the f o r m of sanctions. T h e perspective sketched, or perhaps caricat u r e d , above has b e e n seriously questioned in recent years. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l root of such quest i o n i n g is e m p i r i c a l . W h i l e it is clear that certain c u l t u r a l elements are deeply i n t e r n a l i z e d , particu l a r l y language-based logical and inferential canons, p r i m a l esthetic preferences a n d so o n , relat i v e l y little of routine social action appears to be g u i d e d b y deeply i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m a t i v e structures. M a n does not act l i k e a w e l l - p r o g r a m m e d social robot; i n d e e d , i n m u c h o f everyday social action, variation f r o m n o r m a t i v e l y p r e s c r i b e d behavior is statistically " n o r m a l . " This p o i n t has b e e n m a d e f r o m a n u m b e r of different theoretical perspectives. D e n n i s W r o n g (1961) has argued f r o m a psychoanalytical perspective that sociologists typically e r r by v i e w i n g m a n as " o v e r - s o c i a l i z e d . " Sociology, he claims, has historically failed to take account of residual a n d unsocialized l i b i d i n a l energy, w h i c h c o n t i n ues to exert a d y n a m i c a n d " u n s o c i a l " influence o n i n d i v i d u a l action. D a v i d R i e s m a n (1950) a n d A l l e n W h e e l i s (1958), w h i l e they don't dispute that traditional views of the l i n k b e t w e e n action a n d c u l t u r e m a y have fitted some earlier t i m e , c o n t e n d that such models are increasingly inapp r o p r i a t e for contemporary society. M o d e r n m a n , they argue, is g i v e n by his socialization a diffuse capacity to read social cues a n d to m a k e situationally appropriate responses, rather than any deeply i n t e r n a l i z e d normative set. A t h i r d i m p o r t a n t critique of i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n as the l i n k b e t w e e n action a n d culture has e m e r g e d f r o m the interactionist a n d neo-phenom e n o l o g i c a l traditions. In radical contrast to structural theorists w h o t e n d to v i e w culture as g i v e n , interactionist and neo-phenomenological theorists are most concerned w i t h the creative a n d p r o b l e m a t i c aspects of the relationship bet w e e n action a n d culture. E r v i n g Goffman's (1959) vision of the presentation of self as an often laborious a n d conscious " f i t t i n g " of one's line of conduct to cultural norms, R a l p h T u r n e r ' s (1962) substitution of " r o l e - m a k i n g " for " r o l e - p l a y i n g , "

P A R T IV

Mind

a n d the ethnomethodological explications of the et cetera rule a n d similar subroutines (cf. C i c o u r e l , 1970) all convey the same essential point: c u l t u r e is largely exterior to the person a n d often problematic. T h e foregoing questions a n d reconceptualizations have m a d e the issue of c u l t u r a l , a n d thus social, continuity particularly pressing. If i n d e e d there is m i n i m a l d e e p internalization of c u l t u r e , at least in c o n t e m p o r a r y society, h o w do we account for social order? H o w is it, faced w i t h the ambiguities a n d contradictions of a complex society, that n o r m a t i v e continuity a n d m e a n i n g are sustained in the actions of diverse a n d i n d i v i d u a l istic actors? F o r a start, it w o u l d be w e l l to v i e w c u l t u r e as l e a r n e d , a n d only approximately so, instead of as i n t e r n a l i z e d . Rather than b e i n g somehow a k i n to instinct, culture is best seen as a k i n d of shifting cognitive m a p of the social order a n d largely w i t h i n the awareness of the actor. F r o m this p o i n t of v i e w , culture is e n v i r o n m e n t a l to action. It constitutes one of several sets of parameters w i t h i n w h i c h action is f r a m e d . A l t h o u g h there is considerable openness to action, culture, m e a n i n g h e r e situationally appropriate norms, meanings a n d j u d g m e n t a l standards, must be taken into account as the actor constructs his l i n e of conduct. T h e disclaimer, along w i t h accounts a n d vocabularies of motives, are a m o n g the means by w h i c h actors "take a c c o u n t " of culture. In the interests of p r e serving cathected identities, of m a k i n g situations sensible, a n d of facilitating interaction, actors exp l i c i t l y define the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n their questionable c o n d u c t a n d p r e v a i l i n g norms. C o l l e c tively these m i g h t be called " a l i g n i n g actions" in the sense that they are i n t e n d e d to serve as means of b r i n g i n g problematic conduct into l i n e w i t h c u l t u r a l constraints. T h e net consequence of a l i g n i n g actions is to perpetuate n o r m a t i v e ord e r a n d m e a n i n g in the face of lines of c o n d u c t w h i c h are objectively at variance w i t h situational norms a n d understandings.

REFERENCES Cicourel, Aaron. "Basic and Normative Rules in the negotiation of Status and Role." Recent Sociology: 11.

Hewitt, Stokes Edited by Hans Peter Dreitzel. New York: Macmillan, 1970, pp. 4-45. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City: Anchor, 1959. Hall, Peter M . , and John P. Hewitt. "The Quasi-theory of Communication and the Management of Dissent." Social Problems 18 (Summer 1970): 17-27. Hewitt, John P. and Peter M. Hall. "Social Problems, Problematic Situations, and Quasi-Theories." American Sociological Review 38 (June 1973): 367-74. McHugh, Peter. Defining the Situation. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968. Mills, C. Wright. "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive." American Sociological Review 5 (October 1940):904-13. Parsons, Talcott. Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1966. Riesman, David. The Lonely Crowd. Garden City: Anchor, 1950. Schutz, Alfred. Collected Papers: II. Edited by Maurice Natanson. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964. Scott, Marvin B. and Stanford M. Lyman. "Accounts." American Sociological Review 33 (February 1968): 46-62. Turner, Ralph. "Role-taking: Process Versus Conformity." Human Behavior and Social Process. Edited by Arnold Rose. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962. Weinstein, Eugene and Paul Deutschberger. "Some Dimensions of Altercasting." Sociometry 26 (December 1963):454-66. Wheelis, Allen. The Quest for Identity. New York: Norton, 1958. Wrong, Dennis. "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology." American Sociological Review 26 (April 1961):183-93.

319 Blumer, Herbert. "Attitudes and the Social Act." Social Problems, vol. 3 (October 1955), pp. 59-65. A critique of "attitude," one of the most widely used concepts in social psychology. Burke, Kenneth. Permanence and Change. New York: New Republic, 1936, pp. 30-53. An early statement on the relation between language and motives. Burke is also the author of the more recent The Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice-hall, Inc., 1945) and The Rhetoric of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), which present this relationship in much greater detail. Carroll, John B. (ed.). Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., and the Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956. Includes articles on the role of language in shaping perception and thought. Cassirer, Ernst. An Essay on Man. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944, pp. 27-56. Expounds the nature and function of symbols, which account for the evolution "from animal responses to human responses." Foote, Nelson N. "Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation." American Socological Review, vol. 16 (February 1951), pp. 14-21. A useful companion piece to the selection in this part by Mills. Langer, Suzanne. Philosophy in a New Key. New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1942, pp. 42-63. On the logic of signs and symbols. Levy, David M. "The Act as a Unit." Psychiatry, vol. 25 (November 1962), pp. 295-309. A psychiatrist adapts Mead's concept of the act to the analysis of mental disorder. McCall, George J., and J. L . Simmons. Identities and Interactions: An Examination of Associations in Everyday Life. New York: The Free Press, 1966. A "refined version of symbolic interaction theory and the exchange theory of interaction." Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1934, pp. 67-74 and 94-125. Descriptions of the development of significant symbols and the process of minded behavior. Miyamoto, S. Frank. "The Social Act: Re-examination of a Concept." Pacific Sociological Review, vol. 2 (Fall 1959), p. 51-55. Emphasizes the need for research on "the organized character of the interactional process." Perinbanayagam, R. S. "The Definition of the Situation: An Analysis of the Ethnomethodological and Dramaturagical Views." Sociological Quarterly, vol. 15

SELECTED REFERENCES PART FOUR Berger, Peter L . , and Thomas Luckman. The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966. A valuable theoretical bridge between the sociology of knowledge and social psychology.

320
(Autumn 1974), pp. 521-541. A comparison of two viewpoints in definitions of situations. Scott, Marvin ., and Stanford M. Lyman. "Accounts." American Socological Review, vol. 33 (December 1968), pp. 46-52. Concerned with the "acceptable utterances" people make in accounting for their untoward actions. Stebbins, Robert H. "Putting People on: Deception of Our Fellowman in Everyday L i f e . " Sociology and Social Research, 59 (April 1975), p. 189-200. Dramatistic interpretation. Stewart, Kenneth L. " O n 'Socializing' Attitudes: A Sym bolic Interactionist V i e w . " Sociological Focus, 8 (January 1975), pp. 37-46. Attitudes as part of acts. Strauss, Anselm L. Mirrors and Masks. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959. Examines some of the rela tionships between the definitions we apply to per sons or other objects and our "plans of action" to ward them.

PART IV

Mind

Strong, Samuel W. "A Note on George H. Mead's 'The Philosophy of the A c t ' " American Journal of Soci ology, vol. 45 (July 1939), pp. 71-76. A good but difficult summary of the concept "the act." Vigotsky, L. S. "Thought and Speech." Psychiatry, vol. 2 (February 1939), pp. 29-52. Argues for the indentity of thought and speech, as opposed to the con ception of speech as merely the means for express ing thought. White, Leslie T. " M i n d Is Minding." Scientific Monthly, vol. 48 (1939), pp. 169-171. An eminent anthropolo gist views mind as behavior, paralleling the func tionalist views of Dewey and Mead. Williams, Robin M . , Jr. "A Neglected Form of Symbolic Interactionism in Sociological Work: Book Talks Back to Author," The American Sociologist, vol. 11 (May 1976), pp. 94-103. An imaginative depiction of the "internal conversation" involved in writing a book.

PART five

Research Implications and Applications

At this point, we depart f r o m the prior emphasis on an exposition of the basic principles of symbolic interactionism. W h i l e the preceding material analyzed the concepts and propositions of the perspective, in this section the readings present heuristic implications a n d illustrative analysis docu menting the broad range of symbolic interactionist research. T h e topics in c l u d e , among other things, family life, courtroom procedures, marihuana users, visible handicaps, mental patients, etc. Whether using qualitative or quantitative techniques of analysis, the researchers adhere to the basic meth odological proposition: An understanding of h u m a n conduct requires study of the actors' covert behavior. Consequently, we find examinations of the meanings, definitions, images, a n d self-conceptions involved in both individ ual behavior and social interaction. T h e article by S h e l d o n Stryker does m u c h to refute the w i d e l y h e l d view that symbolic interactionism does not generate researchable hypothe ses. N o t o n l y does he indicate some of the questions on the f a m i l y that emerge f r o m the theory but also he suggests the k i n d of answers such research can provide. O n e of the important questions he raises is, W h y are some fathers more committed to this role than others? A possible an swer involves the relationship of significant others to differential selfidentification. T h e British courtroom is the focus of the article by Pat C a r l e n . D r a w i n g u p o n the dramaturgic perspective, C a r l e n views the magistrates' court as a theater of the absurd. He shows h o w j u d i c i a l personnel stage impressive, ritualistic performances a i m e d at convincing defendants, witnesses, a n d other observers of their credibility. In his view, the outcome is a senseless procedure of scant relevance to justice.

322

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

A l t h o u g h some critics of symbolic interactionism have argued that it is relevant only to understanding " n o r m a l " behavior, a substantial research literature is dispelling that notion. Symbolic interactionist research has contributed greatly to understanding the sociology a n d social psychology of deviance. T h e next four articles are cases in point. T h e y deal with the specific ways deviant behavior is learned f r o m others, i n c l u d i n g the various influences u p o n an individual's interpretations of personal experience and the effects of derogatory labels u p o n self-conceptions and social relationships. H o w a r d S. Becker's widely cited article describes how individuals learn to define the use of marihuana in terms favoring the continuation of such use. F r o m fifty interviews with marihuana users, Becker derives a generalized sequence of stages culminating in the ability to enjoy marihuana use. Interviews also s u p p l y the basic data of the selection by Teresa E. L e v i tin. A l t h o u g h m a n y studies of the labeling process stress its negative effects u p o n the individual, she is concerned with the active efforts of the visibly handicapped to resist the deviant role and self-image. L e v i t i n indicates that there are differing modes of resistance by the permanently h a n d i c a p p e d from those used by the temporarily disabled. In both circumstances, however, her data reveal that their behaviors are not mechanical and inflexible responses to others, but are meaningful efforts to maintain personal identity and wholeness. C l e a r support for the symbolic interactionist perspective, specifically in the study of deviant or disvalued behavior, is evident in the study by W i l l i a m R. Rosengren. H i s research, conducted over a period of six months, combines direct observation with several types of questionnaires. H i s data show that changes in self-conception tend to be associated with changes in the overt behavior of a small sample of emotionally disturbed boys. E r v i n g Goffman's earlier article (in Part III) is a useful preface to his study of the moral career of the mental patient. A l t h o u g h the concept of career is usually restricted to the professions, G o f f m a n demonstrates its utility for explaining the changes in the self-conception of the patient in a mental institution. H i s article provides a detailed analysis of these changes as they take place during the pre-patient, in-patient, and ex-patient phases of this career. A r l e n e K. Daniels, author of the c o n c l u d i n g article in this Part, describes her article as "radical symbolic interactionism." A p p a r e n t l y influenced by the phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists, this paper examines the ways in w h i c h the label "mental illness" is assigned by military psychiatrists. T h e method and perspective of this paper attest to the viability and modifiability of symbolic interactionism. A recurring criticism of symbolic interactionism has been its putative nonempirical character. A l o n g with the selections in the preceding parts of this book, the articles in Part V may offset such criticism, although they represent only a small portion of the expanding b o d y of symbolic interactionist research.

Sheldon Stryker

35

Symbolic Interaction as an Approach to Family Research

Various commentators have stated that the ideas c o v e r e d by the label symbolic interaction are part of the intellectual baggage of almost all w h o c o n c e r n themselves w i t h h u m a n behavior. O n the other hand, persons i d e n t i f y i n g t h e m selves as symbolic interactionists c o m m o n l y h o l d that this theory suffers f r o m general, albeit certainly undeserved, neglect. T h e r e is a good deal of v a l i d i t y in both views. M a n y social psychologists have made at least some of the ideas of symbolic interaction part of their theoretical e q u i p m e n t , w h e t h e r or not they are aware of their debt. Y e t the implications of this theoretical scheme are not always p e r c e i v e d a n d appreciated e v e n by m e n c a l l i n g themselves symbolic interactionists. T h e p r o b l e m seems to be that at least some of the once-novel ideas of the theory have become, for m a n y , simple commonplaces or platitudes, a n d like most platitudes, m o r e l i k e l y to defeat thought than to stimulate it. T h i s paper is above all an attempt at a straightforward r e v i e w of symbolic interaction theory. Its a i m is to stimulate r e n e w e d interest in a simple, but relatively p o w e r f u l , set of ideas w h i c h remains largely unexploited. It is perhaps particularly in the family field that these are o p e n to exploitation.
Sheldon Stryker, "Symbolic Interaction as an A p p r o a c h to F a m ily Research," pp. Marriage and Family Living, v o l . 21 (May 1959), 1 1 1 - 1 1 9 . C o p y r i g h t 1959 b y N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l o n F a m i l y

T h e theory b e i n g dealt w i t h has a venerable tradition, b e g i n n i n g at least as far back as H e g e l . M o d e r n formulations have their roots i n A m e r i can pragmatism, in the writings of P e i r c e a n d James. Suggestions contained here w e r e elaborated a n d systematized b y James M a r k B a l d w i n , J o h n D e w e y , Charles H o r t o n C o o l e y a n d , most i m p o r t a n t o f a l l , G e o r g e H e r b e r t M e a d . Specifically i n the family f i e l d , Waller, Burgess, H i l l , a n d Foote represent persons whose w o r k , to i m p o r tant degree, stems f r o m this f r a m e w o r k . T h e r e is no single orthodoxy w h i c h is symbolic interaction theory. T h e r e is certainly a h a r d core of agreement, a n d there are certainly i m p o r tant differences, a m o n g representatives of the position. Some see it as no m o r e t h a n a set of concepts serving to sensitize one to aspects of social life, some as a general theory of h u m a n behavior. T h e present discussion proceeds on another v i e w , w h i c h sees the theory as addressing itself to a relatively modest series of questions. T h e o r y can be t a k e n to m e a n a set of assumptions or postulates w i t h w h i c h one approaches some part of the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d , a set of concepts in terms of w h i c h this part of the w o r l d is described, a n d a set of propositions, e m e r g i n g f r o m the assumptions a n d relating the concepts, about the way this part of the w o r l d " w o r k s " w h i c h are c h e c k e d against observations of that w o r l d . This presentation begins by n o t i n g briefly the general questions to w h i c h symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n theory is addressed, a n d turns successively to the assumptions u n d e r l y i n g the theory, the concepts

Relations. R e p r i n t e d by permission. A slightly a m e n d e d version of a p a p e r p r e s e n t e d to the 21st G r o v e s Gonference on M a r r i a g e a n d t h e F a m i l y , W a s h i n g ton, D . C . , A p r i l 15, 1958.

324 p r o v i d e d by the theory, a n d illustrative instances of the propositions w h i c h are the answers to its questions. It concludes by considering some of the implications of the theory for f a m i l y research.

PART V Research Implications and Applications ASSUMPTIONS T h e i n i t i a l assumption is that, insofar as interests are social psychological, m a n must be studied on his o w n l e v e l . T h e position of symbolic interact i o n i s m is anti-reductionist; it argues that v a l i d principles of h u m a n social psychological behavior cannot be d e r i v e d f r o m , or i n f e r r e d f r o m , the study of n o n - h u m a n forms. This assertion rests on the p r i n c i p l e of emergence. E m e r g e n c e suggests the existence of qualitative differences as w e l l as quantitative continuities a m o n g the precipitates of the evolutionary process. If m a n is qualitatively different in some respects f r o m other a n i m a l forms, it follows that principles d e r i v e d f r o m other forms cannot completely account for his behavior. T h e task of at least some social psychologists is to focus on that w h i c h is different in man. A second assumption is that the most f r u i t f u l approach to man's social behavior is t h r o u g h an analysis of society. This assumption involves no assertion of some metaphysical p r i o r i t y of society over the i n d i v i d u a l . Social psychologists of one stripe have argued that society is the ultimate reality; social psychologists of another variety give ontological p r e c e d e n c e to the i n d i v i d u a l , d e n y i n g the reality of society. E i t h e r position leads to confusion a n d contradiction. Symbolic interaction has not resolved the argument; but it has bypassed it. It has done so by b e g i n n i n g its analyses w i t h the social act. Its basic u n i t of observation is interaction, and f r o m interaction b o t h society a n d i n d i v i d u a l d e r i v e . It is w o r t h n o t i n g that this f o r m u l a t i o n permits an articulation b e t w e e n sociology a n d social psychology w h i c h alternative frameworks can forge, if at all, only w i t h great difficulty. B o t h b e g i n w i t h the same " b u i l d i n g b r i c k s " : social actions. Sociology builds in one d i r e c t i o n to the behavior of collectivities. Social psychology builds in another d i r e c t i o n to the behavior of individuals. Those whose problems b r i d g e the two fields, as is true of m a n y students of the family, are p r o v i d e d w i t h a f r a m e w o r k facilitating m o v e m e n t f r o m one l e v e l to the other, a l l o w i n g systematic transactions b e t w e e n the two levels. A t h i r d assumption concerns the e q u i p m e n t w i t h w h i c h the n e w b o r n enters life. T h e h u m a n

THE PROBLEMS TO W H I C H THE T H E O R Y IS A D D R E S S E D As a social psychological theory, symbolic i n teraction addresses a set of interrelated questions, most of w h i c h take their place in the context of t w o major problems. T h e first is that of socializat i o n : h o w the h u m a n organism acquires the ways of behaving, the values, n o r m s a n d attitudes of the social units of w h i c h he is a part. T h e focus here is on developmentthat w h i c h happens over t i m e to the h u m a n neophyte: the infant, the r e c r u i t entering the army, the student e n t e r i n g the university, the b r i d e e n t e r i n g a n e w set of f a m i l y relationships. T h e t w i n of the p r o b l e m of socialization is that of personality: the organization of persistent behavior patterns. Such organization cannot be assumed but must be demonstrated and acc o u n t e d for. T h e task of a social psychology is to account for such organization insofar as it depends u p o n social relationships. It should be a d d e d that symbolic interaction addresses itself largely to the n o r m a l p e r s o n i n the sense of the person w i t h o u t gross physical, physiological, or psychological defect. To say that this position is o r i e n t e d to the n o r m a l person is not to say that it is c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h personal organization, for the theory seeks to explore personal disorganization as w e l l . As a matter of fact, one of the strengths of this position is that it treats personal organization a n d personal disorganization as facets of the same p r o b l e m , rather than different problems, a n d that it c a n p r o v i d e answers to b o t h w i t h o u t i n v o k i n g principles l y i n g outside its theoretical scheme. These are the major problems w h i c h symbolic interaction theory seeks to resolve. T h e y have b e e n stated in general f o r m , for m o r e specific f o r m u l a t i o n depends on the assumptions and concepts w i t h w h i c h the theory approaches the parts of the w o r l d in w h i c h it has interest.

Stryker infant is, f r o m this point of v i e w , neither social n o r antisocial, but rather asocial. It has the potentialities for social development. It is an active organism, it has " i m p u l s e s , " but these impulses are not c h a n n e l i z e d or d i r e c t e d t o w a r d any specific ends. O r i g i n a l nature is amorphous a n d plastic; it lacks organization. A last assumption is that the h u m a n b e i n g is actor as w e l l as reactor. T h e h u m a n b e i n g does n o t simply r e s p o n d to s t i m u l i o c c u r r i n g outside himself, In fact, what is a stimulus depends on the activity in w h i c h the organism is engaged: objects b e c o m e s t i m u l i w h e n they serve to l i n k impulses w i t h satisfactions. T h e e n v i r o n m e n t o f the organism is a selected segment of the " r e a l " w o r l d , the selection o c c u r r i n g in the interests of behavior w h i c h the h u m a n b e i n g himself has i n i t i ated. It is the assumption w h i c h leads to the f u n d a m e n t a l methodological p r i n c i p l e of symbolic interactions the d e m a n d that the investigator see the w o r l d f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of the subject of his investigation. These seem to be the assumptions u n d e r l y i n g symbolic interaction theory. N o t an assumption, but closely related to those discussed, is a p r e d i l e c t i o n on the part of adherents of this theory to stay close to the w o r l d of e v e r y d a y experience. T h e v i e w p o i n t develops out of such experience, a n d it is w i t h such experience that it seeks to deal.

325 over t i m e , they have a history. This makes possible the appearance of gestures, d e f i n e d as any part of the act w h i c h stands for, or comes to be a sign of, those parts of the act yet to occur. Thus, in r e s p o n d i n g to one another, individuals m a y be i n v o l v e d in what M e a d called a "conversation of gestures": they m a y come to use early stages of one anothers' acts as indicators of later stages. S u c h gestures have m e a n i n g . V o c a l sounds c a n serve as gestures, a n d they too may have m e a n i n g . T h e m e a n i n g of a gesture (an early stage of an act) is the behavior w h i c h follows it (the later stages of the act): m e a n i n g is, by definition, behavior. Some gestures have an additional p r o p e r t y . T h e y may m e a n the same t h i n g , i m p l y the same set of subsequent behaviors, to the organism w h i c h produces the gesture and that w h i c h perceives it. W h e n this occurs, the gesture becomes a significant symbol. To illustrate: the c r y of the infant m a y serve as a sign of hunger to the m o t h e r , a n d she responds by feeding the infant. T h e cry is a gesture whose m e a n i n g lies in the parental response. At a later stage, the c h i l d m a y call out " m i l k ! " a n d , unless the appropriate parental response is m a d e , protest vigorously. T h e w o r d " m i l k " is here a significant symbol. Language, basically, is a system of significant symbols. This is equivalent to asserting that language is a system of shared meanings, a n d this in t u r n implies that language is a system of shared behavior. C o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n h u m a n beings presupposes these characteristics of language symbols. Retreat is necessary before going f o r w a r d . Symbols arise in the context of social acts, a n d they f u n c t i o n in c o m p l e t i n g acts: they reflect the interests f r o m w h i c h the acts stem. We respond to symbols as predicters of further behavior, our o w n as w e l l as that of others. Since these symbols p r e d i c t later behavior, they p r o v i d e a basis for adjusting our activity before that later behavior has o c c u r r e d . Thus symbols may be said to funct i o n in the context of the act in place of that w h i c h they symbolize, a n d m a y further be said to organi z e behavior w i t h reference to that w h i c h is s y m b o l i z e d . Symbols entail a p l a n of action. To illustrate a n d s u m m a r i z e : Thus if one hunter shouts to another, "A duck!" the second hunter immediately looks into the air and

MAJOR CONCEPTS A n assumption o f this theory, again, i s emergence. T h e p r i n c i p l e e m e r g e n t o n the h u m a n l e v e l is language behavior. T h e i n i t i a l c o n c e r n i n this r e v i e w o f concepts thus must b e w i t h language a n d its correlatives. T h e starting point is w i t h the act: behavior b y a n organism s t e m m i n g f r o m a n i m p u l s e r e q u i r i n g some adjustment to appropriate objects in the external w o r l d . A social act is one i n w h i c h the appropriate object is another i n d i v i d u a l . B u t another i n d i v i d u a l does not " s t a n d s t i l l " ; he, too, acts w i t h reference to the first actor. T h u s every social act implicates at least t w o individuals, each of w h o m takes the other into account in the processes of satisfying impulses. Since such acts occur

326 makes appropriate preparations for shooting at a bird on the wing. If the first hunter shouts, "Rabbit!" his partner responds in a different manner. Language symbols do not merely stand for something else. They also indicate the significance of things for human behavior, and they organize behavior toward the thing symbolized.
1

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications person we are l e d to expect certain behaviors f r o m h i m a n d w e behave t o w a r d h i m o n the basis of these expectancies. To the expectations w i t h r e g a r d to behavior attached to a position the t e r m " r o l e " is g i v e n . These expectations are social in the same sense symbolic behavior is always social: the ultimate m e a n i n g of the positions to w h i c h these expectations a p p l y is shared behavior. T h e y are social in another and most i m p o r t a n t sense, namely, that it is impossible to talk about a position without reference to some context of other positions: one cannot talk about the behavior of father except w i t h reference to the positions of m o t h e r , c h i l d , a n d so on. Thus every position assumes some counter-position, and every role presumes some counter-role. To use the t e r m " r o l e " is necessarily to refer to an interpersonal relation. T h e discussion of categories has b e e n couched in terms of an actor responding to objects in the external w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g people, by classif y i n g t h e m i n functionally relevant ways. U n d e r certain circumstances, an actor m a y apply such categories to himself: he m a y respond to himself as he responds to other people, by n a m i n g , defini n g , classifying himself. T o engage i n this k i n d of behavior is to have a self. Self can be d e f i n e d in various ways, each calling attention to slightly different aspects of the same activity. M e a d defined the self as that w h i c h is an object to itself. Others have discussed the self as a set of responses of an organism serving to organize other responses of the same organism. It is useful in the present context to define the self in terms of categories one applies to himself, as a set of self-identifications. H o w e v e r defined, self refers to activity, to reflexive activity, a n d not to an object, t h i n g , or essence. It is a necessary concept, f r o m the standpoint of the symbolic interactionist, but it is one fraught w i t h the dangers of reification. As Robert W . W h i t e notes:
3

Some symbols represent generalizations of b e h a v i o r t o w a r d objects; these are categories. To categorize is to apply a class t e r m to a n u m b e r of objects, to signify that a n u m b e r of different things are, for certain purposes, to be treated as the same k i n d of thing. Classification or categoriz a t i o n is essential to activity, for life w o u l d be impossible if one w e r e f o r c e d to respond to every object in the w o r l d as unique. Class terms, or categories, are of course symbols, and as such they share the characteristics of symbols. T h e y have m e a n i n g , they are cues to behavior, and they organize behavior. H u m a n s respond to a classified w o r l d , one whose salient features are n a m e d and p l a c e d into categories i n d i c a t i n g their significance for behavior. In short, humans do not r e s p o n d to the e n v i r o n m e n t as physically g i v e n , but to an env i r o n m e n t as it is m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h s y m b o l s to a symbolic environment. Persons f r e q u e n t l y enter situations in w h i c h their behavior is problematic. Before they can act, they must define the situation, that is, represent it to themselves in symbolic terms. T h e products of this defining behavior are termed "definitions of the situations." A particularly i m p o r t a n t k i n d of category is that called " p o s i t i o n . " Positions are socially reco g n i z e d categories of actors, any general category serving to classify persons: father, sergeant, teacher are positions by this usage, as are playboy, intellectual, blacksheep. T h e significance of such categories is that they serve to organize behavior t o w a r d persons so categorized. An equivalent assertion is that in attaching one of these position designations to a
2
1

A l f r e d R . L i n d e s m i t h a n d A n s e l m L . Strauss,

Social Psychol-

ogy, N e w Y o r k : D r y d e n P r e s s , 1956, p . 63.

2

O t h e r s h a v e used the t e r m "status" here. I prefer " p o s i t i o n "

i n o r d e r t o a v o i d t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f status. P o s i t i o n s m a y c e r t a i n l y b e h i e r a r c h i z e d , b u t h i e r a r c h y a n d p o s i t i o n are conceptually distinct a n d it is i m p o r t a n t to distinguish b e t w e e n them.

3

The necessity of using the concept of self does not. confer the privilege of misusing it. As we use concepts in our thinking, they tend to get firmer and harder. Thought about fluid events tends to curdle
R o b e r t W. White, The Abnormal Personality, New York: Ron-

a l d P r e s s , 1948, p . 140.

Stryker and form solid clots. Before long we begin to think of the self as if it were a lump in the personality. It becomes a region, an institution, an entity. . . . In the end the self is standing like a solid boulder of granite in the midst of personality, and one's thinking about it is as flexible as granite. T h e self is defined in terms of socially recogn i z e d categories and their corresponding roles. Since these roles necessarily i m p l y relationships to others, the self necessarily implies such relations. One's self is the way one describes to h i m self his relationships to others in a social process. T h e discussion thus far has p r e s u m e d but not m a d e explicit the concept of " r o l e - t a k i n g , " or alternatively, " t a k i n g the role of the o t h e r . " Roletaking refers to anticipating the responses of others i m p l i c a t e d w i t h one in some social act. T h e m e a n i n g of the concept can best be elucidated t h r o u g h illustration. Consider the classroom i n structor w h o presents to his students an especially difficult conception. He perhaps finds that the words o r d i n a r i l y used to cover the topic do not allow the discussion to p r o c e e d b e y o n d the i m m e diate issue. He then casts about for words w h i c h w i l l allow h i m to clarify the conception, a n d so allow h i m to m o v e b e y o n d it to further materials. H o w shall he select such words? P r e s u m a b l y he w i l l do so in terms of what he knows or guesses about the backgrounds or experiences of the students before h i m . H e w i l l , i n other words, attempt to put himself in the place of the students; he w i l l attempt to anticipate their responses to the words he w i l l use. He takes the role of the other. Role-taking may i n v o l v e the anticipation of responses of some particular other. M o r e frequently, it involves the anticipation of responses o f what M e a d called the " g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r . " T o r e v e r t to the classroom illustration, the instructor must deal w i t h the class not as discrete individuals but as an organized unit, the m e m b e r s of w h i c h c a n be expected to behave in differentiated yet related ways. To take the role of the generalized other is to see one's behavior as taking place in the context of a defined system of related roles. T h e concept of reference g r o u p , as it is currently used, represents partially a restatement a n d partially an extension of the generalized other concept. In comparatively recent w o r k , the concept

327 of "significant o t h e r " has come into use. This concept represents the recognition that, in a fragm e n t e d a n d differentiated w o r l d , not a l l the persons w i t h w h o m one interacts have i d e n t i c a l or e v e n c o m p a t i b l e perspectives; and that, therefore, in order for action to proceed, the i n d i v i d u a l must give greater weight or priority to the perspectives of certain others. To speak, then, of significant others is to say that g i v e n others occupy h i g h rank on an " i m p o r t a n c e " c o n t i n u u m for a given i n d i v i d u a l . O n e last set of concepts must be m e n t i o n e d . Symbolic interaction makes unashamed use of " m e n t a l " concepts such as t h i n k i n g , v o l i t i o n , and self-consciousness. T h e case can be p u t in stronger fashion; its j u d g m e n t is that any scheme w h i c h rules out such concepts distorts the facts of h u m a n experience. H o w e v e r , its usage of these terms is not traditional. W h e r e frequently these concepts are defined in such way as to place t h e m outside the bounds of scientific discourse, symbolic interaction defines these terms behavioristically a n d , in so doing, permits their treatment w i t h i n the conventions of scientific procedure. Thus, thinki n g is defined as the i n t e r n a l i z e d m a n i p u l a t i o n of language symbols. V o l i t i o n becomes the process of selecting a m o n g alternatives symbolically present i n the experience o f the i n d i v i d u a l . A n d self-consciousness is the activity of v i e w i n g oneself f r o m the standpoint of others.

T H E ANSWERS PROVIDED BY T H E T H E O R Y : I L L U S T R A T I V E CASES It w i l l be impossible, g i v e n limitations of space, to do f u l l justice to the complexities of the problems raised or the explanations p r o v i d e d by symbolic interaction theory; all that can be done is to r e v i e w these in barest outline. T h e p r o b l e m of socialization has a n u m b e r of interrelated facets, a m o n g t h e m questions of h o w meanings are obtained by the h u m a n infant, h o w the self develops a n d is structured, a n d h o w t h i n k i n g a n d objectivity arises in the course of experience. T h e h u m a n infant, active but u n o r g a n i z e d , is b o r n into an o n g o i n g set of social relationships. Such relationships are p r e m i s e d u p o n a set of

328 shared meanings. T h e infant acts, but r a n d o m l y : he thrashes his arms, he exercises his vocal cords. T h e adult responds to these actions, say the c r y i n g of the infant, by d o i n g something to the i n f a n t he feeds it, or changes it, or turns it over on its stomach. H e w i l l eventually f i n d that response w h i c h w i l l complete the act in a desired way, that is, stop the c r y i n g . T h e r e is in this situation an " i m p u l s i v e " act w h i c h is, i n c i p i e n t l y , a gesture, a n d there is incipient m e a n i n g as w e l l . T h e i n c i p i e n t m e a n i n g is that part of the act s u p p l i e d by the adult. In time, b o t h the c r y of the infant a n d the response of the adult become specialized; w h e n this occurs, the c r y is a gesture in the p r e v i ously-defined sense. T h e significant p o i n t is that, since it is the adult w h o completes the act, it is he w h o supplies the m e a n i n g of the gesture. W h a t kinds of completions w i l l he supply? He is, of course, l i m i t e d by the r e p e r t o r y of meanings available in the social u n i t of w h i c h he is a part. F u r t h e r , the adult w i l l have defined the situation, i n c l u d i n g his positional relationship to the infant, for example, that of father to son, a n d this definit i o n w i l l i n v o k e the set of expected behaviors we call the role of the father. If the father is a m i d d l e class A m e r i c a n , and if he takes the c r y of the infant to m e a n that the infant is thirsty, his response w i l l be to supply m i l k or w a t e r b u t not w i n e or whiskey. T h e meanings attached to the gestures of the infant are social meanings, a n d they are supplied through his relationships w i t h already socialized participants in an ongoing society. T h e early activity o f the c h i l d w i l l i n c l u d e r a n d o m vocalization. E v e n t u a l l y , too, h e w i l l i m i tate sounds others make. Others respond to the initially r a n d o m vocalization by selecting out particular sounds and r e s p o n d i n g to these. T h e y respond to the imitated sounds as w e l l by acts w h i c h contain the adult meanings of these sounds. F o r the c h i l d , the correspondence b e t w e e n sound a n d m e a n i n g w i l l b e initially vague, but i n the process of interaction over time the correspondence w i l l b e c o m e m o r e pronounced. So, for example, the c h i l d m a y use the sound " b a " to refer to any app r o x i m a t e l y r o u n d object a n d , h a v i n g p l a y e d this game w i t h daddy, may be l e d to r o l l any such objectball, orange, eggaround the floor. T h e response of parent to the r o l l i n g of an eggespe-

PART V Research Implications and Applications cially an u n c o o k e d o n e w i l l soon m a k e clear that an egg is not a " b a " a n d thus is not to be r o l l e d on the floor. In the course of time, c h i l d a n d parent w i l l come to agree on what is a n d is not a ball, a n d thus a significant symbol w i l l have c o m e into existence. A sound, initially meaningless to the c h i l d , comes to m e a n for the c h i l d w h a t it already means for the adult. T h e " s e l f " comes into existence i n the same way. Just as the sound " b a " took on m e a n i n g t h r o u g h the responses of others, so too the h u m a n organism as an object takes on m e a n i n g t h r o u g h the behavior of those w h o respond to that organism. W e c o m e t o k n o w what w e are t h r o u g h others' responses to us. Others supply us w i t h a n a m e , a n d they p r o v i d e the m e a n i n g attached to that symbol. T h e y categorize us in particular waysas an infant, as a boy, et cetera. On the basis of such categorization, they expect p a r t i c u lar behaviors f r o m us; on the basis of these expectations, they act t o w a r d us. T h e m a n n e r in w h i c h they act towards us defines our "self," we c o m e to categorize ourselves as they categorize us, a n d we act in ways appropriate to their expectations. T h e e v o l u t i o n of the self is, of course, gradual; moreover, it is continual. This d e v e l o p m e n t is one of increasing c o m p l e x i t y , in a sense, for as the c h i l d moves into the social w o r l d he comes i n t o contact w i t h a variety of persons in a variety of self-relevant situations. He comes, or m a y come, into contact w i t h differing expectations c o n c e r n i n g his behavior, a n d differing identities o n w h i c h these expectations are based. Thus he has, t h r o u g h the role-taking process, a variety of perspectives f r o m w h i c h to v i e w a n d evaluate his o w n behavior, a n d he can act w i t h reference to self as w e l l as w i t h reference to others. In short, the socialization process as described makes possible the appearance of objectivity. F u r t h e r m o r e , since these processes may be i n t e r n a l i z e d t h r o u g h the use of language symbols, it also makes possible the appearance of self-control. T h e i n d i v i d u a l , at the same time a n d t h r o u g h t i m e as w e l l , occupies a variety of positions in sets of social relationships. If he responded in each of these in terms of u n i q u e sets of role-expectations and self-definitions, his behavior w o u l d be discontinuous. Usually, however, there is a contin u i t y and organization a m o n g the behaviors of

Stryker a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l . T h e question is h o w such personal organization can be accounted for. T h e basic answer p r o v i d e d by symbolic interaction theory uses the concepts of self, role, a n d definition of the situation. On entering an ongoing social situat i o n , one responds to that situation by defining it. This definition includes the assignment of positions to others, and thus the setting up of expectations c o n c e r n i n g their behavior. It, further, i n cludes an assessment of self, that is, the assignment of positional identities to oneself. O t h ers in the situation are, of course, engaged in the same k i n d of activity. T h e behavior that ensues is a f u n c t i o n of such definitions. A c r u c i a l question thus becomes one of the congruence of definitions, situation, role a n d self, of the interacting persons. C o n g r u e n c e permits efficient, organized behavior. E x p a n d i n g this, again n o t i n g that the i n d i v i d u a l moves through a variety of interpersonal situations, the congruence of definitions, and so the behavioral expectations these i m p l y , is fundamental to continuity of behavior. Personal organization is thus seen as a function, not simply of that w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l carries a r o u n d w i t h h i m , but of the relationship b e t w e e n that w h i c h he carries w i t h h i m i n the f o r m of self-conceptsand the situations in w h i c h he interacts w i t h others as these are m e d i a t e d symbolically. W h e n one asks what kinds of social conditions foster or p e r m i t such congruence, the generalized answer is that w h e n meanings are w i d e l y shared in a society, or among those persons w i t h i n a society w i t h w h o m one actually interacts, congruence is likely. W h a t happens w h e n meanings are diverse among the others w i t h w h o m one interacts? Reversing the above process, but m a i n t a i n i n g the same explanatory p r i n c i p l e , it may be said that incongruities in definition a n d so incongruities in expectations w i l l result, a n d that personal disorganization is the outcome. A n u m b e r of possible types of incongruity may be suggested: conflicts or lack of coordination b e t w e e n self concepts a n d the expectations of others; conflicts a m o n g aspects of self called into play in the same situation; the t e m p o r a l succession of expectations w h i c h do not articulate, and so on. It may be w o r t h w h i l e to take one type of incongruity, say lack of coordination b e t w e e n self

329 concepts and expectations of others, a n d note more closely its relevance to personal disorganization. At the same t i m e , the question can be raised: u n d e r what circumstances do identities change? Suppose one enters a situation w i t h a set of self identifications w h i c h i n c l u d e the n a m e "professor," and suppose he defines the situationfor example, as a classroomin such a way that this identity i s appropriate. H e w i l l then presumably conduct himself in ways indicated by that i d e n tity. He speaks in judicious, measured tones, he adopts a knowledgeable air, and so on. He c a n behave this way o n l y so long as his audience accepts this definition of himself and so responds in such ways as validate his behavior, by taking notes, b y concentrating attention u p o n h i m , b y d i r e c t i n g questions at h i m . Suppose, h o w e v e r , the audience fails to accept this definition; they t h i n k h i m a fool rather than a professor (although perhaps the t w o are not completely incompatible). T h e y disregard w h a t he is saying, they challenge his competency, they pay m o r e attention to friends in class than they do to h i m . In short, they fail to validate his self identification. H o w w i l l he behave? It is h i g h l y probable that behaviors o r d i narily inappropriate to the classroom w i l l ensue. He w i l l l i k e l y lose his judicious tones a n d become emotional. He is l i k e l y to act confused, uncertain, embarrassed, ambivalent. At the same t i m e , since persons typically have considerable investment in identities, he v e r y probably w i l l attempt to def e n d himself. He may do so by r e d o u b l i n g his efforts to act the complete professor, by dismissing the i n c i d e n t as a joke, by regarding the audience as consisting of morons. B u t if, persistently, his identity as professor fails to be validated by others, he cannot retain that identity. Others validate identities by b e h a v i n g in appropriate ways, ways w h i c h p r o v i d e cues on the basis of w h i c h further performance in terms of the identity is possible. If these cues are not p r o v i d e d , t h e n such p e r f o r m ance is no longer possible, and the identity w i l l fade.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILY RESEARCH Rather than attempt to detail implications of symbolic interaction for family research, a f e w

330 b r i e f indications of researchable questions stimu lated by this theory w i l l be presented. O n e question, or set of questions, has to do w i t h differential c o m m i t m e n t to family identities. It is obvious, for example, that not all persons w h o are objectively fathers are equally c o m m i t t e d to such an identity. W h a t accounts for such differentials, for the fact that for one m a n identity as father supersedes all other ways in w h i c h he sees himself, w h i l e for another the father identity is relatively l o w on the self t o t e m pole? T h e the ory suggests that this w i l l be a f u n c t i o n of the extent to w h i c h one is defined by significant oth ers as a father. It also suggests that the degree of congruence of definitions by significant others w i l l be of i m p o r t . B o r r o w i n g a phrase f r o m studies of political behavior, c o u l d the presence or ab sence of "cross-pressures" d e r i v i n g f r o m others w i t h w h o m one interacts account for this differen tial c o m m i t m e n t , at least in some degree? Perhaps of greater significance to students of the family is the question of the consequences of differential c o m m i t m e n t to f a m i l i a l identities. F o o t e has contended that differences in m o t i v a t i o n of role performances m a y fruitfully be seen in these terms. Political apathy seems to be in .good part a consequence of lack of c o m m i t m e n t to a clear-cut political identity; it seems reason able to suspect that apathetic familial behavior has a similar source. It is also quite possible that, for example, the p r e d i c t i o n of divorce w o u l d be o n sounder g r o u n d w h e n questions dealing w i t h c o m m i t m e n t to family identities are i n c l u d e d in batteries of p r e d i c t i v e items.
4

V Research Implications and Applications i s h l y , " but m a y s i m p l y b e acting i n a c c o r d w i t h his c o n c e p t i o n of self as family b r e a d w i n n e r . It is certain that one's extra-familial identities oper ate w i t h i n the f a m i l y situation. W h i c h i d e n t i ties so operate, their specific mode of articulation w i t h family identities, a n d their consequences for family relationships are questions of obvious importance. A n o t h e r set of questions can be phrased a r o u n d the relationship of crises to identity. Crises w i l l always threaten identifications, for the latter d e p e n d on stable activities of others w i t h refer ence to oneself; and crises are likely to be i m p o r tant in the process by w h i c h identities change. It m a y be that adaptation in crisis situations is a f u n c t i o n of the ease w i t h w h i c h identities alter; adaptation to the death of a spouse, for example, might profitably be approached in these terms. Yet that ease w i t h w h i c h identities are altered is not always functional is suggested by H i l l ' s re search on w a r separation and r e t u r n ; in such multi-phased crises it m a y be that, at least for some, easy alteration of identity at one point cre ates problems at still another point. Such ques tions, too, are w o r t h the research energies of stu dents of the family.
5

Closely related to these questions is another set. A r e there extra-familial identities w h i c h are i n v a r y i n g degree compatible w i t h f a m i l i a l i d e n t i ties? W h a t are the effects of identities d e r i v i n g f r o m diverse spheres of activity on one another, a n d on behavior in these diverse spheres? Some one has suggested that the deviant behavior of a m a n in a w o r k situation w h i c h appears to be idiosyncratic w h e n v i e w e d i n this l i m i t e d context, m a y rather be a consequence of his position and role w i t h i n his family. That is, for example, the rate-buster on the job m a y not be acting "self4

A different k i n d of question suggested by the theory m a y be prefaced by relating an o v e r h e a r d conversation. A y o u n g lady was speaking of her relationships w i t h her boy f r i e n d . T h e t w o w e r e , apparently, sufficiently i n v o l v e d to talk about marriage and their future. But, it seems, they ar g u e d w h e n they engaged in such talk. T h e basis for the a r g u m e n t was this: she labelled such talks " p l a n s , " h e called t h e m " d r e a m s , " and each b r i d l e d at the other's c o n c e p t i o n of their conversa tions. Nonsense? A r g u i n g over m e r e words? N o t w h e n one has in m i n d the significance of d e f i n i n g behavior and the consequences of classification. P l a n implies a greater stake in a projected course of action than does d r e a m . D r e a m s suggest free d o m of action, plans a c o m m i t m e n t . Suggested here is the potential fertility of studying the court ship process, m a r i t a l role relationships, parentc h i l d relationships, and so on, in terms of rolel i n k e d symbolic behavior: for example, the investigation of possible sex-linked differences in

N e l s o n N . F o o t e , " I d e n t i f i c a t i o n a s t h e Basis f o r a T h e o r y o f American Sociological Review, 16 (Feburary,

5

Motivation,"

1951), p p . 1 4 - 2 1 .

R e u b e n H i l l , Families Under Stress, N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r s , 1 9 4 9 .

Carlen d e f i n i n g family situations, a n d the consequences of such differential definitions as m a y exist. F i n a l l y , the theory suggests that studies focusi n g on the role-taking process m a y be r e w a r d i n g . R o l e - t a k i n g is a variable; anticipation of the responses of others is not always correct. F o o t e a n d his associates have c o n d u c t e d an impressive series of studies designed to u n c o v e r means by w h i c h role-taking ability c a n b e i m p r o v e d , o n the assumption that role-taking ability, or e m p a t h y in their language, is one aspect of interpersonal competence. W h i l e this m a y w e l l b e justified, some research indicates that if one expects that interpersonal adjustment w i l l always result f r o m accurate role-taking, he is l i k e l y to be disapp o i n t e d . B u t this still leaves o p e n questions of
6 7
6

331 the specific consequences, u n d e r v a r y i n g c o n d i tions, of role-taking accuracy. A r e the consequences the same, for example, w h e n husband a n d w i f e share the same value f r a m e w o r k a n d w h e n they do not? M i g h t it not be that accurate role-taking differs in its consequences as role relationships change, w h e n a couple moves t h r o u g h the sequential stages of courtship, early m a r i t a l experience, a n d later f a m i l y experience? These, too, are questions w o r t h raising a n d answering. O n e final r e m a r k : symbolic interaction is not a general theory of h u m a n behavior. T h a t is, it does not incorporate a l l the variables p r e s u m a b l y i m p o r t a n t i n accounting for h u m a n behavior, b u t rather selects f r o m these a f e w for concentrated attention. Thus it w o u l d not do to d e n y the c o n tributions of alternative theoretical views f r o m w h i c h h u m a n behavior can be approached. It is c o n t e n d e d , h o w e v e r , that alternative views can be e n r i c h e d by t a k i n g into account the set of ideas w h i c h have b e e n d e v e l o p e d .

Nelson A

N.

Foote,

Editor,

Developing Family

Interpersonal Life Educators,

Compeun-

tence:

Manual

of Procedures for

published manuscript.
7

See for example, Sheldon Stryker, " R o l e - T a k i n g A c c u r a c y a n d

A d j u s t m e n t , " Sociometry, 2 0 ( D e c e m b e r , 1957), p p . 2 8 6 - 2 9 6 .

Pat Carlen

36

The Staging of Magistrates' Justice

M e t a p h o r i c critiques of j u d i c i a l proceedings have b e e n done b y m a i n l y A m e r i c a n writers: G a r finkel (1956), E m e r s o n (1967) a n d B l u m b e r g (1967), for instance, have a l l used d r a m a t u r g i c a l or game i m a g e r y in analyses of c o u r t r o o m interact i o n . I n E n g l a n d , o n the other h a n d the c o n c e r n

Pat C a r l e n , University of Keele, E n g l a n d , " T h e Staging of Magistrates J u s t i c e , " British Journal of Criminology, vol. 16 (January 1976), p p . 4 8 - 5 5 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n .

has been different, and largely reformative. Analyses of sentencing patterns (Hood, 1962; K i n g , 1972), surveys of the availability of legal a i d (Patterson, 1971) and assessment of b a i l i n g procedures (Bottomley, 1970; D e l l , 1970)all have c o n t r i b u t e d t o the current c o n c e r n w i t h i m p r o v i n g , m a i n l y by increasing the availability of legal aid, the quality of justice in general a n d the quality of magistrates' justice in particular. Difficult though i t w o u l d b e t o d e n y the i m -

332 mense contributions of the aforementioned studies, b o t h the A m e r i c a n theorists and the E n g l i s h investigators have tended either to ignore or to take for granted other, equally consequential, d i mensions of socio-legal control: the coercive structures of dread, awe and uncertainty depicted by Gamus and K a f k a ; the coercive structures of resentment, frustration and absurdity d e p i c t e d by L e w i s C a r r o l l and N . F . Simpson. T h a t the masterly descriptions of a K a f k a or a C a m u s are u n l i k e l y to be bettered by sociologists is obvious. T h e idea, however, that such surrealism and psychic coercion properly belong to the w o r l d of the F r e n c h n o v e l , rather than to the local magistrates' court in the H i g h Street, is erroneous. In this paper, based on two years' observation of the M e t r o p o l i t a n magistrates' courts, I shall argue that the staging of magistrates' justice in itself infuses the proceedings w i t h a surrealism w h i c h atrophies defendants' ability to participate in t h e m .

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

can be set up as b e i n g either m u n d a n e (i.e. constitutive of and reflecting everyday realities) or p u z z l i n g (i.e. constitutive of and reflecting alternative everyday realities) or, less often, as bei n g both m u n d a n e and p u z z l i n g (i.e. surrealistic). In hierarchically organised social institutions, however, certain people can monopolise a n d m a nipulate the scenic and scheduling arrangements of the most i m p o r t a n t p u b l i c settings so that a coercive control, often spurious to the professed aims of the institution, can be maintained. W i t h i n the courtrooms of the magistrates' courts tacit c o n t r o l of their spatial and t e m p o r a l properties is the m o n o p o l y of the police a n d the j u d i c i a l personnel. In practice both the staging and the prosecution of the c r i m i n a l business becomes the responsibility of the police. This renders absurd the j u d i c i a l rhetoric of an adversary justice, w h e r e , so the story goes, both prosecution and defence stand as equals before the law. Indeed, w i t h i n the courtrooms of the magistrates' courts the ideal of adversary justice is subjugated to an organisational efficiency in whose service b o d y - m o v e m e n t and body-presentation are carefully c i r c u m s c r i b e d a n d regulated, b e w i l d e r m e n t and embarrassment are openly fostered a n d aggravated, and uncertainty is callously observed and manipulated. H u m a n creativity is there, certainly, but it is celebrated as m u c h in the covert d e p l o y m e n t of tacit control techniques as it is in the innovative j u d i c i a l action. Whereas, therefore, Goffman's dramaturgical analyses have focused on the everyday realities of the cinema verite, these notes on the staging of magistrates' justice w i l l focus on the surrealist dimensions of the theatre of the absurd.

T H E MAGISTRATES' C O U R T AS A THEATRE OF THE ABSURD

Traditionally and situationally, j u d i c i a l proceedings are dramatic. Aristotle noted the i m p o r tance of forensic oratory as a special device of legal rhetoric; playwrights as diverse as Shakespeare a n d Shaw appreciated the dramatic value of a trial scene; lawyers have always b e e n cognisant of rhetorical presentations. In 1950, n i n e years before Goffman's The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, a l a w y e r , Jerome F r a n k , discussed the conventional ascription of character w h i c h occurs in law courts and w h i c h is dependent u p o n the tacit dimensions of interpersonal knowledge. Such analyses are nowadays the familiar stuff of the dramaturgical perspectives in sociology. Yet people do not only ascribe character to each other. F u r n i t u r e , stageprops, scenic devices, tacit scheduling programmes, etiquettes of r i t u a l address and refe r e n c e i n short, all the paraphernalia of social occasionsare, both immediately a n d documentar i l y , i n d e x e d w i t h consequential social meanings ( M a n n h e i m , 1952; Schutz, 1970). These meanings

STAGING T H E ABSURD T h o u g h structurally opposed, the theatre of the absurd and the court of law have several phenomenological features i n c o m m o n . T h e i r central divergence inheres in their opposed structural functions. Thus, whereas dramatists of the absurd intentionally a n d overtly utilise the plausible a n d the m u n d a n e to construct the overtly senseless and absurd, the mandarins of justice intentionally

Carlen and covertly utilise the plausible and m u n d a n e to construct the covertly senseless and absurd. In magistrates' courts, as in the theatre of the absurd, mundane and conventional ways of organising and c o m m u n i c a t i n g the operative meanings of social occasions are simultaneously exploited and denied. Yet their outcomes are situationally authenticated a n d the intermeshed structures of surrealism a n d psychic coercion are difficult to locate. This is because police and j u d i c i a l personnel systematically present their coercive devices as b e i n g n o t h i n g m o r e than the traditional, conventional and commonsensical ways of organising and synchronising j u d i c i a l proceedings.

333 realise a structure of tacit coercion w h i c h makes nonsense of recent claims that j u d i c i a l proceedings are loaded in favour of the defendant ( C L R C , 1972; M a r k , 1973). In the c o u r t r o o m spatial dominance is achieved by structural elevation and the magistrate sits raised up f r o m the rest of the court. T h e defendant is also raised up to p u b l i c v i e w but the dock is set lower than the magisterial seat, whilst the rails s u r r o u n d i n g it are symbolic of the defendant's captive state. Of all the m a i n protagonists the defendant is the one w h o is p l a c e d farthest away f r o m the magistrate. B e t w e e n the defendant and the magistrate sit clerk, solicitors, probation officers, social workers, press reporters, police, and any others d e e m e d to be assisting the court in the discharge of its duties. Spatial arrangements, h o w e v e r , w h i c h m i g h t signify to the onlooker a guarantee of an orderly display of justice, are too often experienced by participants as b e i n g generative of a k i n d of theatrical autism w i t h all the actors t a l k i n g past each other. Difficulties of h e a r i n g are e n d e m i c to magistrates' courts. At one court w h e r e m i c r o p h o n e s are used they distort voices so badly that most people i n the c o u r t r o o m laughingly w i n c e w h e n they are t u r n e d o n , a n d visibly sympathise w i t h the lady magistrate w h o always has t h e m t u r n e d off because " t h e y m a k e us sound l i k e D o n a l d D u c k . " A t other courts they have microphones but do not use t h e m . Magistrates a n d clerks can go to elaborate lengths to explain the m e a n i n g of legal phraseology to defendants w h o either do not hear t h e m a n d say " P a r d o n , sir?" or w h o n o d in the " d a z e d " or " b l a n k " w a y n o t e d by so m a n y p o l i c e m e n a n d p r o b a t i o n officers. Acoustics, however, cannot bear total responsibility for the chronic b r e a k d o w n of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in magistrates' courts. T h e p l a c i n g a n d spacing of people w i t h i n the c o u r t r o o m is a further cause of the series of " p a r d o n s " and " b l a n k stares" w h i c h characterise a n d punctuate j u d i c i a l proceedings. It has already b e e n stressed that, in the courtr o o m , defendants a n d magistrates are set w e l l apart f r o m each other. Distances b e t w e e n b e n c h and dock vary f r o m court to court but in all courts such distances are certainly greater than those usually, a n d voluntarily, chosen for the disclosure

Space T h e spacing and p l a c i n g of people on p u b l i c occasions is strategic to their ability to participate effectively i n t h e m . E v e n u p o n i n f o r m a l social occasions temporary spacing arrangements w i l l at least decide w h i c h conversations can be h e a r d by w h o m . On the most f o r m a l social occasions spacing arrangements, b e i n g m o r e r i g i d , w i l l , i n a d d i t i o n to d e t e r m i n i n g the m o d e a n d range of v e r b a l interaction, emphasise the relative status of the people present. On r i t u a l occasions, the rules of spacing a n d p l a c i n g w i l l , additionally, define the specific territorial rights a n d duties of those designated as occupiers of particular social space. A magistrates' court is a v e r y f o r m a l a n d ritualistic social setting; in it social space is pref o r m e d and distributed by the fixtures a n d fittings w h i c h comprise its definitive physical dimensions. T h e conditional essence of formality is the m a i n tenance of existing social forms; the raison d'etre of the c r i m i n a l law is an assumption of the vulnerability of existing social forms. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that, in the courts, not e v e n the usually i m p l i c i t rules of spacing and placing are left to chance interpretation. Instead, j u d i c i a l violation of the m u n d a n e expectations w h i c h usually enable fully adult people to cope w i t h unfamiliar situations, j u d i c i a l tolerance of flawed c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems, a n d a j u d i c i a l perversion of the accepted modes of conversational practice,

334 of i n t i m a t e details of sexual habits, personal relationships and financial affairs. C e r t a i n c o m munications, as E d w a r d H a l l has stressed, are conventionally presented as intimate c o m m u n i c a tions, a n d b o t h their t i m i n g a n d situating are d e l i cately arranged. Indeed, " t h e r e are certain things w h i c h are difficult to talk about unless one is w i t h i n the p r o p e r conversational z o n e " ( H a l l , 1959). In magistrates' courts, w h e r e the vast majori t y of defendants do not have a solicitor as a " m o u t h p i e c e , " defendants are set up in a g u a r d e d dock a n d then, at a distance artificially stretched b e y o n d the familiar boundaries of face-to-face c o m m u n i c a t i o n , are asked to describe or c o m m e n t on intimate details of their lives; details w h i c h do not in themselves constitute infractions of any l a w but w h i c h are o p e n to p u b l i c investigat i o n once a person has b e e n accused of b r e a k i n g the l a w . F u r t h e r , d u r i n g such sequences of interrogat i o n , defendants' embarrassed stuttering is often aggravated by j u d i c i a l violation of another takenfor-granted conversational practice. F o r i n conv e n t i o n a l social practice the chain-rule of question-answer sequence (Sacks, 1967; Schegloff, 1972) is also accompanied by the assumption that it is the interrogator w h o demands an answer. In magistrates' courts, however, defendants often find that they are continually r e b u k e d , either for not addressing their answers to the magistrate, or for d i r e c t i n g their answers to their interrogators in such a way that the magistrate cannot hear t h e m . As a result, defendants are often in the position of h a v i n g to synchronise their answers a n d stances in a way quite d i v o r c e d f r o m the conventions of everyday life outside the c o u r t r o o m . F o r defendants w h o often do not i m m e d i ately distinguish b e t w e e n magistrate and clerk, for defendants w h o do not c o m p r e h e n d the separate symbolic functions of d o c k a n d witness-box, for defendants who m a y have already spent up to three hours w a i t i n g a r o u n d the squalid e n v i rons of the courtroomthe surrealistic d i m e n sions of m e a n i n g , emanating f r o m j u d i c i a l exploitation of c o u r t r o o m p l a c i n g and spacing, can have a paralysing effect. A senior probation officer s u m m e d u p the present situation i n the M e t r o p o l itan magistrates' courts v e r y w e l l w h e n she c o m -

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications m e n t e d : " M a n y of t h e m don't e v e n go into the witness-box because they can't face w a l k i n g r o u n d there. T h e y ' r e too n e r v o u s . "

Time T h o u g h it is u n l i k e l y that absolute c o n t r o l of the situation can be obtained in a c r a m p e d c o u r t r o o m w h i c h m a y have 30 to 40 p e o p l e in its m a i n area, a n d over that n u m b e r in its p u b l i c gallery, officials, as I have already argued, appear to be w e l l aware of h o w to facilitate c o n t r o l t h r o u g h exploitation of the courtroom's physical dimensions. C o u r t r o o m c e r e m o n y is m a i n t a i n e d partly to facilitate physical c o n t r o l of defendants a n d any others w h o m a y step out of place, and partly to refurbish the historically sacred m e a n ings attached to law. Yet, because of the v o l u m e of c r i m i n a l business dealt w i t h by magistrates' courts, c o n t r o l of the proceedings is often p r e c a r i ous. Continuous inroads on the putative sanctity of the c o u r t r o o m are m a d e by the daily wear a n d tear of j u d i c i a l proceedings w h i c h m a y i n v o l v e the consecutive appearances of 20 or 30 d e f e n d ants at one court session. A series of brief but complex scenes have to be w e l d e d into a fastm o v i n g but j u d i c i a l l y satisfying d o c u m e n t a r y . L i n e s of spatial d e m a r c a t i o n p r o v i d e the baselines for the o v e r a l l performance; once the action starts the m o v e m e n t of documents a n d persons f r o m the various regions of the court has to be synchronised by the m a i n l y backstage activities of the police. In the management of social occasions, t i m e , l i k e place, always belongs to somebody or some group. D u r i n g f o r m a l social occasions certain persons are a p p o i n t e d to oversee the t i m i n g of events, to ensure b o t h the continuity a n d p u n c t u ation o f performances. D u r i n g j u d i c i a l proceedings in magistrates' courts the t i m i n g of events is monopolised by the police. T h e y are the ones w h o set up the proceedings; it is their responsibility to see that a l l defendants arrive at court; it is their job to d r a w up the charge sheets; it is their j o b to ensure that all relevant documents are in the hands of the clerk of court. A n d policem e n are v e r y jealous of their c o m p e t e n c e in p r o g r a m m i n g the c r i m i n a l business. L i k e other

Carlen occupational groups d o i n g a c o m p l e x j o b p u b l i c l y a n d u n d e r constant c r i t i c i s m they have d e v e l o p e d plausible accounts to "demonstrate the rationali t y " (Moore, 1974) of the court's timetable. F o r instance, w h e n I talked w i t h h i m , a court inspector appealed to commonsense w h e n he insisted that it was " o n l y sensible" to hear contested cases last: " T h i n k o f i t f r o m your o w n p o i n t o f v i e w : i f y o u ' d p l e a d e d guilty y o u w o u l d n ' t want t o h a n g a r o u n d a l l afternoon for something that was going to take t w o m i n u t e s . " Yet, for the majority of defendants, the court experience is characterised by l o n g periods of w a i t i n g u n p u n c t u a t e d by any official explanations about the cause of the delays. Worse, because cases c a n be arbitrarily switched f r o m c o u r t r o o m to c o u r t r o o m , a defendant can have his case heard in one c o u r t r o o m w h i l e his friends (among t h e m , potential witnesses) sit u n suspectingly in the p u b l i c gallery of an adjacent c o u r t r o o m . D u r i n g the l o n g hours o f w a i t i n g , m a n y defendants become m o r e a n d m o r e nervous, h a r b o u r i n g fears (usually unfounded) that they w i l l be sent to p r i s o n a n d , in the majority of courts, unable to get either refreshments or the p r i v a c y in w h i c h to talk to their solicitors or p r o b a t i o n officers. So, defendants, t o l d to arrive at court at 10 A . M . , m a y wait one, t w o o r e v e n three hours before their cases are " c a l l e d o n , " but the police do the court lists a c c o r d i n g to a rationality w h i c h is rooted in two strands of situational logic. First, they calculate the t i m e a case w i l l take f r o m their experience of the past p e r f o r m i n g times of the p r e s i d i n g magistrate a n d clerk. Secondly, they treat as an organisational n o r m their assumption that quicker business should take precedence over longer business. W h a t the p o l i c e m e n successfully present as commonsense, h o w e v e r , also has a symbolic pay-off. If, early on in the proceedings, it is established that the court dispenses a swift a n d sure justice, untarnished by the a m b i g u i t y w h i c h characterises the later contested cases, t h e n the contested case can, structurally, be presented as the deviant case, the one w h i c h needs special justification a n d management. Successful assertion by the police of their c l a i m to present these cases in their " o w n t i m e " displays a basic feature of their control over the c o u r t r o o m situation. PRESENTATIONS

335

Agencies w h i c h routinely handle large n u m bers of people usually develop strategies for prom o t i n g their d i s c i p l i n e d m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n a n d w i t h i n regions. C o n v e n t i o n a l l y , organisational traffic is facilitated by sign-posting, i n f o r m a t i o n desks, p r i n t e d rubrics a n d organisational maps. In magistrates' courts, h o w e v e r , such i n f o r m a t i o n is almost non-existent. A r r o w s indicate courtr o o m , gaoler's office a n d various other offices, but i n q u i r i n g of first-time defendants are p r e d o m i nantly d e p e n d e n t u p o n the oral a n d tactile directions of the police. Defendants are escorted into the c o u r t r o o m by the p o l i c e m a n c a l l i n g the cases. O n c e the defendant is in the dock the escort acts as a k i n d o f personal choreographer t o h i m . H e tells h i m w h e n to stand up a n d w h e n to sit d o w n (often in c o n t r a d i c t i o n of the magistrates' directions!), w h e n to speak a n d w h e n to be quiet, w h e n to leave the dock at the e n d of the hearing. D u r i n g the h e a r i n g the p o l i c e m a n can tell the defendant to take his hands out of his pockets, c h e w i n g - g u m out of his m o u t h , his hat off his head a n d the smile off his face. Thus, e v e n at the outset, a series of physical checks, aligned w i t h a battery of c o m mands and counter-commands, inhibits the defendant's presentational style. O n c e he is in the distraught state of m i n d w h e r e he just "wants to get it o v e r , " j u d i c i a l fears that the defendant m i g h t slow d o w n the proceedings by b e i n g " a w k w a r d " are d i m i n i s h e d . In contrast to their unceremonious a n d coercive presentation of defendants, magistrates, pol i c e m e n , solicitors a n d other court personnel all project visual images of themselves, and v e r b a l l y embellished images of each other w h i c h are designed to personify the absolute p r o p r i e t y of their situated (judicial) actions. Most court-workers are c o n c e r n e d w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g c r e d i b i l i t y w i t h the magistrate, but magistrates themselves argue that their o w n authority is invested in the place rather than in their trans-situational status as magistrates. T h e y , nonetheless, see the degrees of respect s h o w n for the court as reflections of, and on, the image of the b e n c h , a n d m a n y of the organisational and cerem o n i a l strategies of stage-management centre

336 a r o u n d the presentation of the magistrate. H i s entrance to the c o u r t r o o m is b o t h staged a n d heralded. T h e o p e n i n g of the court is signalled by the usher calling " A l l s t a n d " a n d "Silence i n c o u r t . " O n c e everybody in the c o u r t r o o m is standing in silence, the magistrate enters, his appearance b e i n g staged via the door of w h i c h he has the exclusive use, and w h i c h appears to seal off those innermost areas of the court to w h i c h the p u b l i c never has access. T h r o u g h o u t the court h e a r i n g the usher ensures that the magistrate is granted deference, interposing himself b e t w e e n those w h o , without further i n t e r m e d i a r y , w o u l d try to h a n d documents or letters directly into the magistrate's hands. E a c h magisterial entrance and exit is m a r k e d by the same ceremony. Inter-professionally a n d collusively a concerted portrayal of authority a n d w i s d o m is m a i n t a i n e d by the ceremonial courtesies of c o m p l i m e n t a r y addresses and reference. F r o z e n in the rhetoric of their o w n self-justificatory vocabulary the magistrate becomes " Y o u r W o r s h i p " and " Y o u r H o n o u r " ; the clerk of the court becomes the " l e a r n e d c l e r k " ; p o l i c e m e n become " p u b l i c servants"; probation officers and social workers become "these experts w h o can h e l p y o u . " W h a t in vulgar parlance m i g h t be called the "scratch m y b a c k " syndrome becomes i n court the rhetor i c a l e m b r o i d e r y o n the j u d i c i a l backcloth. B y contrast, the defendant too often becomes just "this m a n , " unentitled, " S m i t h . "

PART V Research Implications and Applications inability of m a n y of those present to participate in what is going on (Dell, 1970). G i v e n the coercion i m m a n e n t i n the v e r y staging of magistrates'justice, what is one to m a k e of the c u r r e n t arguments that increased legal a i d w i l l substantially protect defendants' interests? W h a t is one to m a k e of the suggestion that the advice of a d u t y solicitor should be available to every defendant? A most interesting feature of " r e f o r m i s t " socio-legal analyses is that all proposed changes in j u d i c i a l organisation centre on the defendant. He w i l l be assisted, g u i d e d , spoken for, represented m o r e often; he w i l l be h e l p e d to present a m o r e plausible case. If, however, such reforms are t r u l y meant to elevate the defendant f r o m marionette to co-star status, it is arguable, f r o m the analyses presented here, that they must either be accomp a n i e d or be p r e c e d e d by radical changes in the staging of magistrates' justice.

REFERENCES Bottomley, A. K. (1970). Prison Before Trial. London: Bell. Blumberg, Abraham (1967). "The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game." Law and Society Review, Vol. I. Camus, Albert (1969). The Outsider. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin. Carroll, Lewis (1971). Alice in Wonderland. London: Oxford University Press. Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972). Eleventh Report. London: H.M.S.O. Dell, S. (1970). Silent in Court. London: Bell. Emerson, R. M. (1967). Judging Delinquents. Chicago: Aldine. Frank, Jerome (1950). Courts on Trial. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Garfinkel, H. (1956). "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies." American Journal of Sociology LXI. Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. Hall, E. T. (1959). The Silent Language. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. Hood, Roger (1962). Sentencing in Magistrates' Courts. London: Stevens and Sons.

DISCUSSION P e o p l e who w o r k in a place usually have m o r e control over its particular rules of placing, spacing a n d ritual etiquettes than do those w h o pass through it; magistrates' courts are not u n usual in these respects. Most defendants do not find it o d d or disturbing that the court has its o w n routine. W h a t they do find frustrating is that, at the v e r y times w h e n they are both subject to a n d object of its rules, a fog of mystification permeates the court (Grigg, 1965). To speak plainly, the major existential attribute of court proceedings is that they do p r o c e e d , regardless of the structural inability of m a n y of those present to hear what is going on, and despite the structural

Becker Kafka, Franz (1972). The Trial. Harmondsworth, Mid dlesex: Penguin. King, M. (1972). Bail or Custody. London: The Cobden Trust. Mannheim, K. (1952). Essays in the Sociology of Knowl edge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Mark, Robert (1973). Richard Dimbleby Lecture. London: B.B.C. Publications. Moore, Michael (1974). "Demonstrating the Rationality of an Occupation." Sociology, 8, 1, January.

337 Patterson, A. (1971) Legal Aid as a Social Service. London: Cobden Trust. Sacks, H. (1967). Transcribed Lectures. Mimeo. Schegloff, E. A. (1972). Notes on a Conversational Prac tice Formulating Place, in D. Sudnow, Studies in Social Interaction. New York: Free Press. Schutz, A. (1970). Reflection on the Problems of Rele vance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Simpson, N. (1960). One Way Pendulum. London: Faber.

Howard S. Becker

37

Becoming a Marihuana User

T h e use of m a r i h u a n a is a n d has b e e n the focus of a good deal of attention on the part of b o t h scientists and l a y m e n . O n e of the major problems students of the practice have addressed themselves to has been the identification of those i n d i v i d u a l psychological traits w h i c h differentiate m a r i h u a n a users f r o m nonusers and w h i c h are assumed to account for the use of the d r u g . T h a t approach, c o m m o n in the study of behavior cate g o r i z e d as deviant, is based on the premise that the presence of a g i v e n k i n d of behavior in an i n d i v i d u a l can best be e x p l a i n e d as the result of
H o w a r d S. Becker, " B e c o m i n g a M a r i h u a n a User." Reprinted from The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 59 (November 1953), p p . 2 3 5 - 2 4 2 , b y p e r m i s s i o n o f T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press. C o p y r i g h t 1953 b y t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o . P a p e r r e a d at the meetings of the M i d w e s t Sociological Society i n O m a h a , N e b r a s k a , A p r i l 25, 1953. T h e research on w h i c h

some trait w h i c h predisposes or motivates h i m to engage in the behavior. This study is likewise concerned w i t h ac c o u n t i n g for the presence or absence of m a r i huana use in an individual's behavior. It starts, however, f r o m a different premise: that the pres ence of a g i v e n k i n d of behavior is the result of a sequence of social experiences d u r i n g w h i c h the person acquires a conception of the m e a n i n g of the behavior, a n d perceptions a n d judgments of objects and situations, all of w h i c h make the activity possible a n d desirable. Thus, the m o t i v a tion or disposition to engage in the activity is b u i l t up in the course of l e a r n i n g to engage in it a n d does not antedate this l e a r n i n g process. F o r such
1

S e e , a s e x a m p l e s o f this a p p r o a c h , t h e f o l l o w i n g : E l i M a r c o v i t z War Medicine, V I ( D e c e m b e r , 1944), 3 8 2 - 9 1 ; H e r b e r t s . G a s k i l l ,

this p a p e r i s b a s e d was d o n e w h i l e I w a s a m e m b e r o f t h e staff o f t h e C h i c a g o N a r c o t i c s S u r v e y , a s t u d y d o n e b y t h e C h i cago A r e a Project, Inc., u n d e r a grant f r o m the N a t i o n a l M e n t a l H e a l t h Institute. M y t h a n k s t o S o l o m o n K o b r i n , H a r o l d F i n e s t o n e , H e n r y M c K a y , a n d A n s e l m Strauss, w h o r e a d a n d d i s c u s s e d w i t h m e e a r l i e r v e r s i o n s o f this p a p e r .

a n d H e n r y J . M e y e r s , " T h e M a r i h u a n a A d d i c t i n the A r m y , " "Marihuana, "Personality an Intoxicant," American Journal of Psychiatry, American Journal

( S e p t e m b e r , 1945), 2 0 2 - 4 ; S o l C h a r e n a n d L u i s P e r e l m a n , Studies of M a r i h u a n a Addicts," o f Psychiatry, (March, 1946), 6 7 4 - 8 2 .

338 a v i e w it is not necessary to identify those " t r a i t s " w h i c h " c a u s e " the behavior. Instead, the p r o b l e m becomes one of describing the set of changes in the person's conception of the activity and of the experience it provides for h i m . T h i s paper seeks to describe the sequence of changes in attitude and experience w h i c h lead to the use of marihuana for pleasure. M a r i h u a n a does not p r o d u c e addiction, as do alcohol and the opiate drugs; there is no w i t h d r a w a l sickness a n d no ineradicable c r a v i n g for the d r u g . T h e most frequent pattern of use m i g h t be t e r m e d "recrea t i o n a l . " T h e d r u g is used occasionally for the pleasure the user finds in it, a relatively casual k i n d o f behavior i n comparison w i t h that con n e c t e d w i t h the use of a d d i c t i n g drugs. T h e t e r m "use for pleasure" is meant to emphasize the n o n c o m p u l s i v e and casual character of the behavior. It is also meant to eliminate f r o m consideration here those few cases in w h i c h m a r i h u a n a is used for its prestige value only, as a s y m b o l that one is a c e r t a i n k i n d of person, w i t h no pleasure at all b e i n g d e r i v e d f r o m its use.
2 3

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications in the individual's c o n c e p t i o n of the d r u g as is the existence of " n o r m a l " users. T h e study a t t e m p t e d to arrive at a general statement of the sequence of changes in i n d i v i d ual attitude and experience w h i c h have always o c c u r r e d w h e n the i n d i v i d u a l has become w i l l i n g a n d able to use m a r i h u a n a for pleasure a n d w h i c h have not o c c u r r e d or not b e e n p e r m a n e n t l y m a i n tained w h e n this is not the case. This generaliza t i o n is stated in universal terms in order that nega tive cases m a y be discovered and used to revise the explanatory hypothesis.
5

T h e analysis presented here is c o n c e i v e d of as demonstrating the greater explanatory useful ness of the k i n d of theory o u t l i n e d above as opposed to the predispositional theories n o w current. This m a y be seen in t w o ways: (1) predis positional theories cannot account for that group of users (whose existence is a d m i t t e d ) w h o do not exhibit the trait or traits considered to cause the behavior a n d (2) such theories cannot account for the great variability over t i m e of a g i v e n i n d i vidual's behavior reference to the d r u g . T h e same person w i l l at one stage be unable to use the d r u g for pleasure, at a later stage be able and w i l l i n g to do so, and still later, again be unable to use it in this way. These changes, difficult to explain f r o m a predispositional or m o t i v a t i o n a l theory, are r e a d i l y understandable in terms of changes
4

F i f t y interviews w i t h m a r i h u a n a users f r o m a variety of social backgrounds a n d present posi tions in society constitute the data f r o m w h i c h the generalization was constructed a n d against w h i c h it was tested. T h e interviews focused on the history of the person's experience w i t h the d r u g , seeking major changes in his attitude to w a r d it a n d in his actual use of it, and the reasons for these changes. T h e final generalization is a statement of that sequence of changes in attitude w h i c h o c c u r r e d i n every case k n o w n t o m e i n w h i c h the person c a m e to use m a r i h u a n a for pleasure. U n t i l a negative case is f o u n d , it m a y be considered as an explanation of all cases of m a r i h u a n a use for pleasure. In addition, changes f r o m use to nonuse are s h o w n to be r e l a t e d to similar changes in conception, and in each case it is possible to explain variations in the i n d i v i d u al's behavior in these terms.
6

This paper covers only a p o r t i o n of the natu ral history of an individual's use of m a r i h u a n a , starting w i t h the person h a v i n g a r r i v e d at the point of willingness to try marihuana. He k n o w s that others use it to "get h i g h , " but he does not k n o w what this means in concrete terms. He is curious about the experience, ignorant of w h a t it m a y t u r n out to be, a n d afraid that it m a y be m o r e t h a n he has bargained for. T h e steps out7

T h i s a p p r o a c h stems f r o m G e o r g e H e r b e r t M e a d ' s d i s c u s s i o n in Mind, Adams, Self, and Society ( C h i c a g o : Bulletin University New of York

T h e m e t h o d u s e d i s that d e s c r i b e d b y A l f r e d R . L i n d e s m i t h Opiate Addiction (Bloomington: Principia Press, 1947),

o f objects Cf. Cf.

in h i s

C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1934), p p . 2 7 7 - 8 0 .
3

c h a p . . I w o u l d l i k e also t o a c k n o w l e d g e t h e i m p o r t a n t r o l e of the Lindesmith's w o r k played in shaping my thinking about the g e n e s i s o f m a r i h u a n a use.

6

Roger

"Marihuana,"

Academy
4

of Medicine,

XVIII

(November

1942),

705-30. II (July CXIII

L a w r e n c e K o l b , " M a r i h u a n a , " Federal Probation, Journal of the American Medical Association,

Most of the interviews w e r e d o n e by the author. I am grateful

1938), 2 2 : 2 5 ; a n d W a l t e r B r o m b e r g , " M a r i h u a n a : A P s y c h i a t r i c Study," ( J u l y 1, 1939), 11.

t o S o l o m o n K o b r i n a n d H a r o l d Finestone for a l l o w i n g m e t o m a k e use o f i n t e r v i e w s d o n e b y t h e m .

7

1 h o p e t o d i s c u s s e l s e w h e r e o t h e r stages i n this n a t u r a l h i s t o r y .

Becker l i n e d bel6w, if he undergoes t h e m all a n d m a i n tains the attitudes d e v e l o p e d in t h e m , leave h i m w i l l i n g and able to use the d r u g for pleasure w h e n the opportunity presents itself.

339 ual learns the p r o p e r way to smoke the d r u g . This may occur t h r o u g h direct teaching: I was smoking like I did an ordinary cigarette. He said, " N o , don't do it like that." He said, "Suck it, you know, draw in and hold it in your lungs till you . . . for a period of time." I said, "Is there any limit of time to hold it?" He said, " N o , just till you feel that you want to let it out, let it out." So I did that three or four times. M a n y n e w users are ashamed to a d m i t ignorance and, p r e t e n d i n g to k n o w already, must learn through the m o r e indirect means of observation and imitation: I came on like I had turned on [smoked marihuana] many times before you know. I didn't want to seem like a punk to this cat. See, like I didn't know the first thing about ithow to smoke it, or what was going to happen, or what. I just watched him like a hawkI didn't take my eyes off him for a second, because I wanted to do everything just as he did it. I watched how he held it, how he smoked it, and everything. Then when he gave it to me I just came on cool, as though I knew exactly what the score was. I held it like he did and took a poke just the way he did. No person c o n t i n u e d marihuana use for pleasure w i t h o u t l e a r n i n g a technique that supp l i e d sufficient dosage for the effects of the d r u g to appear. O n l y w h e n this was l e a r n e d was it possible for a c o n c e p t i o n of the d r u g as an object w h i c h c o u l d be used for pleasure to emerge. W i t h out such a c o n c e p t i o n marihuana use was considered meaningless a n d d i d not continue.

I T h e novice does not o r d i n a r i l y get h i g h the first t i m e he smokes marihuana, a n d several attempts are usually necessary to i n d u c e this state. O n e explanation of this may be that the d r u g is not smoked " p r o p e r l y , " that is, in a way that i n sures sufficient dosage to p r o d u c e real symptoms of intoxication. Most users agree that it cannot be smoked like tobacco if one is to get h i g h : Take in a lot of air, you know, and . . . I don't know how to describe it, you don't smoke it like a cigarette, you draw in a lot of air and get it deep down in your system and then keep it there. Keep it there as long as you can. W i t h o u t the use of some such t e c h n i q u e the d r u g w i l l produce no effects, a n d the user w i l l be unable to get h i g h :
8

The trouble with people like that [who are not able to get high] is that they're just not smoking it right, that's all there is to it. Either they're not holding it down long enough, or they're getting too much air and not enough smoke, or the other way around or something like that. A lot of people just don't smoke it right, so naturally nothing's gonna happen. If n o t h i n g happens, it is manifestly impossible for the user to develop a conception of the d r u g as an object w h i c h can be used for pleasure, and use w i l l therefore not continue. T h e first step in the sequence of events that must occur if the person is to become a user is that he must learn to use the p r o p e r smoking technique in order that his use of the d r u g w i l l produce some effects in terms of w h i c h his conception of it can change. Such a change is, as m i g h t be expected, a result of the individual's participation in groups i n w h i c h marihuana i s used. I n t h e m the i n d i v i d 8

II E v e n after he learns the p r o p e r s m o k i n g technique, the n e w user m a y not get h i g h a n d thus not f o r m a c o n c e p t i o n of the d r u g as somet h i n g w h i c h can be used for pleasure. A r e m a r k made by a user suggested the reason for this difficulty in getting h i g h a n d p o i n t e d to the next necessary step on the road to b e i n g a user: I was told during an interview, "As a matter of fact, I've seen a guy who was high out of his mind and didn't know it."

A p h a r m a c o l o g i s t n o t e s t h a t this r i t u a l i s i n f a c t a n e x t r e m e l y Marihuana: America's New Drug Problem [Phil-

e f f i c i e n t w a y o f g e t t i n g t h e d r u g i n t o t h e b l o o d s t r e a m (R. P . Walton, a d e l p h i a : J . B . L i p p i n c o t t , 1938], p . 48).

340 I expressed disbelief: " H o w can that be, man?" The interviewee said, " W e l l , it's pretty strange, I'll grant you that, but I've seen it. This guy got on with me, claiming that he'd never got high, one of those guys, and he got completely stoned. A n d he kept insisting that he wasn't high. So I had to prove to him that he was." W h a t does this mean? It suggests that b e i n g h i g h consists of two elements: the presence of symptoms caused by m a r i h u a n a use a n d the reco g n i t i o n of these symptoms a n d their c o n n e c t i o n by the user w i t h his use of the d r u g . It is not e n o u g h , that is, that the effects be present; they alone do not automatically p r o v i d e the experience of b e i n g h i g h . T h e user must be able to point t h e m out to himself and consciously connect t h e m w i t h his h a v i n g smoked m a r i h u a n a before he can have this experience. O t h e r w i s e , regardless of the actual effects p r o d u c e d , he considers that the d r u g has h a d no effect on h i m : "I figured it either h a d no effect on me or other p e o p l e w e r e exaggerating its effect on t h e m , y o u k n o w . I thought it was probably psychological, see." Such persons believe that the w h o l e t h i n g is an illusion a n d that the wish to be h i g h leads the user to deceive himself into b e l i e v i n g that something is h a p p e n i n g w h e n , in fact, n o t h i n g is. T h e y do not continue m a r i h u a n a use, feeling that " i t does n o t h i n g " for them. T y p i c a l l y , however, the n o v i c e has faith (dev e l o p e d f r o m his observation of users w h o do get high) that the d r u g actually w i l l p r o d u c e some n e w experience a n d continues to e x p e r i m e n t w i t h it u n t i l it does. H i s failure to get h i g h worries h i m , and he is l i k e l y to ask m o r e experienced users or provoke comments f r o m t h e m about it. In such conversations he is m a d e aware of specific details of his experience w h i c h he m a y not have n o t i c e d or may have n o t i c e d but failed to identify as symptoms of b e i n g h i g h :

PART V Research Implications and Applications stooland he said, " L e t your feet hang," and then when I got down my feet were real cold, you know. A n d I started feeling it, you know. That was the first time. A n d then about a week after that, sometime pretty close to it, I really got on. That was the first time I got on a big laughing kick, you know. Then I really knew I was on. O n e s y m p t o m of b e i n g h i g h is an intense h u n ger. In the next case the n o v i c e becomes aware of this a n d gets h i g h for the first t i m e : They were just laughing the hell out of me because like I was eating so much. I just scoffed [ate] so much food, and they were just laughing at me, you know. Sometimes I'd be looking at them, you know, wondering why they're laughing, you know, not knowing what I was doing. [Well, did they tell you why they were laughing eventually?] Yeah, yeah, I come back, "Hey, man, what's happening?" Like, you know, like I'd ask, "What's happening?" and all of a sudden I feel weird, you know. " M a n , you're on you know. You're on pot [high on marihuana]." I said, " N o , am I?" Like I don't know what's happening. T h e l e a r n i n g m a y occur i n m o r e i n d i r e c t ways: I heard little remarks that were made by other people. Somebody said, " M y legs are rubber," and I can't remember all the remarks that were made because I was very attentively listening for all these cues for what I was supposed to feel like. T h e n o v i c e , t h e n , eager to have this feeling, picks up f r o m other users some concrete referents of the t e r m " h i g h " a n d applies these notions to his o w n experience. T h e n e w concepts m a k e i t possible for h i m to locate these symptoms a m o n g his o w n sensations a n d to point out to h i m s e l f a " s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t " in his experience that he connects w i t h d r u g use. It is only w h e n he can do this that he is h i g h . In the next case, the contrast b e t w e e n two successive experiences of a user makes clear the c r u c i a l i m p o r t a n c e of the awareness of the symptoms in b e i n g h i g h and re-emphasizes the i m p o r t a n t role of interaction w i t h other users in a c q u i r i n g the concepts that m a k e this awareness possible: [Did you get high the first time you turned on?] Yea, sure. Although, come to think of it, I guess I really didn't. I mean, like that first time it was

I didn't get high the first time . . . I don't think I held it in long enough. I probably let it out, you know, you're a little afraid. The second time I wasn't sure, and he [smoking companion] told me, like I asked him for some of the symptoms or something, how would I know, you know. . . . So he told me to sit on a stool. I sat onI think I sat on a bar

Becker more or less of a mild drunk. I was happy, I guess, you know what I mean. But I didn't really know I was high, you know what I mean. It was only after the second time I got high that I realized I was high the first time. Then I knew that something different was happening. [How did you know that?] How did I know? If what happened to me that night would of happened to you, you would've known, believe me. We played the first tune for almost two hoursone tune! Imagine, man! We got on the stand and played this one tune, we started at nine o'clock. When we got finished I looked at my watch, it's a quarter to eleven. Almost two hours on one tune. A n d it didn't seem like anything. I mean, you know, it does that to you. It's like you have much more time or something. Anyway, when I saw that, man, it was too much. I knew I must really be high or something if anything like that could happen. See, and then they explained to me that that's what it did to you, you had a different sense of time and everything. So I realized that that's what it was. I knew then. Like the first time, I probably felt that way, you know, but I didn't know what's happening. It is only w h e n the n o v i c e becomes able to get h i g h in this sense that he w i l l continue to use m a r i h u a n a for pleasure. In every case in w h i c h use continued, the user h a d a c q u i r e d the necessary concepts w i t h w h i c h to express to h i m self the fact that he was e x p e r i e n c i n g n e w sensations caused by the d r u g . T h a t is, for use to cont i n u e , it is necessary not only to use the d r u g so as to p r o d u c e effects but also to l e a r n to p e r c e i v e these effects w h e n they occur. In this w a y m a r i h u a n a acquires m e a n i n g for the user as an object w h i c h can be used for pleasure. W i t h increasing experience the user develops a greater appreciation of the drug's effects; he continues to learn to get h i g h . He examines succ e e d i n g experiences closely, l o o k i n g for n e w effects, m a k i n g sure the o l d ones are still there. O u t of these there grows a stable set of categories for experiencing the drug's effects whose presence enables the user to get h i g h w i t h ease. T h e ability to perceive the drug's effects must be m a i n t a i n e d if use is to continue; if it is lost, m a r i h u a n a use ceases. T w o kinds of evidence supp o r t this statement. First, p e o p l e w h o become heavy users of alcohol, barbiturates, or opiates do not continue to smoke m a r i h u a n a , largely because

341 they lose the ability to distinguish b e t w e e n its effects a n d those of the other d r u g s . T h e y no longer k n o w w h e t h e r the m a r i h u a n a gets t h e m h i g h . Second, i n those few cases i n w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l uses m a r i h u a n a in such quantities that he is always h i g h , he is apt to get this same f e e l i n g that the d r u g has no effect on h i m , since the essential element of a noticeable difference b e t w e e n feeling h i g h a n d f e e l i n g n o r m a l is missing. In such a situation, use is l i k e l y to be g i v e n up c o m p l e t e l y , but t e m p o r a r i l y , in order that the user m a y once again be able to p e r c e i v e the difference.
9

Ill
O n e m o r e step is necessary if the user w h o has n o w l e a r n e d to get h i g h is to continue use. He must l e a r n to enjoy the effects he has just l e a r n e d to experience. M a r i h u a n a - p r o d u c e d sensations are not automatically or necessarily pleasurable. T h e taste for such experience is a socially a c q u i r e d one, not different i n k i n d f r o m a c q u i r e d tastes for oysters or d r y martinis. T h e user feels d i z z y , thirsty; his scalp tingles; he misjudges t i m e and distances; and so on. A r e these things pleasurable? He isn't sure. If he is to continue m a r i h u a n a use, he must decide that they are. O t h e r w i s e , gett i n g h i g h , w h i l e a real e n o u g h experience, w i l l be an unpleasant one he w o u l d rather avoid. T h e effects of the d r u g , w h e n first p e r c e i v e d , m a y be physically unpleasant or at least ambiguous: It started taking effect, and I didn't know what was happening, you know, what it was, and I was very sick. I walked around the room, walking around the room trying to get off, you know; it just scared me at first, you know. I wasn't used to that kind of feeling. In addition, the novice's naive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what is h a p p e n i n g to h i m m a y f u r t h e r confuse
9

" S m o k e r s h a v e r e p e a t e d l y stated that the c o n s u m p t i o n of

whiskey w h i l e s m o k i n g negates the p o t e n c y o f the d r u g . T h e y f i n d i t v e r y difficult t o get ' h i g h ' w h i l e d r i n k i n g w h i s k e y a n d b e c a u s e o f that s m o k e r s w i l l n o t d r i n k w h i l e u s i n g t h e ' w e e d ' " (cf. N e w Y o r k C i t y M a y o r ' s C o m m i t t e e o n M a r i h u a n a , The Marihuana Problem in the City of New C a t t e l P r e s s , 1944], p . 13.) York [ L a n c a s t e r , P a . : J a c q u e s

342 a n d f r i g h t e n h i m , particularly if he decides, as m a n y do, that he is going insane:

I felt I was insane, y o u k n o w . E v e r y t h i n g p e o p l e d o n e to me just w i g g e d m e . I c o u l d n ' t h o l d a conversation, a n d my m i n d w o u l d be w a n d e r i n g , a n d I was always thinking, oh, I don't k n o w , w e i r d things, like h e a r i n g m u s i c different. . . . I get the feeling that I can't talk to anyone. I'll goof c o m p l e t e l y .

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications ber of ways, teach the novice to find pleasure in this experience w h i c h is at first so f r i g h t e n i n g . T h e y m a y reassure h i m as to the temporary character of the unpleasant sensations a n d m i n i m i z e their seriousness, at the same t i m e calling attention to the more enjoyable aspects. An experienced user describes h o w he handles newcomers to marihuana use:
10

G i v e n these typically f r i g h t e n i n g a n d u n pleasant first experiences, the beginner w i l l not continue use unless he learns to redefine the sensations as pleasurable:
It was offered to m e , a n d I t r i e d it. I'll tell y o u o n e t h i n g . I n e v e r d i d enjoy it at all. I m e a n it was just n o t h i n g that I c o u l d enjoy. [ W e l l , d i d y o u get h i g h w h e n y o u t u r n e d on?] O h , y e a h , I got d e f i n i t e f e e l ings f r o m it. B u t I d i d n ' t enjoy t h e m . I m e a n I got plenty of reactions, but they w e r e mostly reactions of fear. [You w e r e frightened?] Yes, I d i d n ' t enjoy it. I c o u l d n ' t s e e m to relax w i t h it, y o u k n o w . If y o u can't relax w i t h a t h i n g , y o u can't enjoy it, I don't think.

In other cases the first experiences were also definitely unpleasant, but the person d i d become a m a r i h u a n a user. This o c c u r r e d , h o w e v e r , only after a later experience enabled h i m to redefine the sensations as pleasurable:
[This man's f i r s t e x p e r i e n c e was e x t r e m e l y u n pleasant, i n v o l v i n g distortion of spatial relationships a n d sounds, violent thirst, a n d p a n i c p r o d u c e d b y these symptoms.] A f t e r the first t i m e I d i d n ' t t u r n o n f o r a b o u t , I ' d say, t e n m o n t h s t o a y e a r . . . . I t wasn't a m o r a l thing; it was because I'd gotten so frightened, bein' so high. A n ' I didn't want to go t h r o u g h that again, I m e a n , my r e a c t i o n was, " W e l l , if this is w h a t t h e y c a l l b e i n ' h i g h , I d o n ' t d i g [like] i t . " . . . So I d i d n ' t t u r n on for a y e a r almost, a c c o u n t a that. . . . W e l l , my friends started, an' consequently I started again. But I didn't have any more, I d i d n ' t h a v e that same initial reaction, after I started t u r n i n g on again. [In i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h his f r i e n d s h e b e c a m e able t o f i n d p l e a s u r e i n t h e effects o f t h e d r u g a n d e v e n t u a l l y b e c a m e a r e g u l a r user.]

W e l l , t h e y get p r e t t y h i g h sometimes. T h e a v e r a g e p e r s o n isn't r e a d y for that, a n d it is a little f r i g h t e n i n g to t h e m sometimes. I mean, they've been high on lush [alcohol], a n d they get h i g h e r that w a y t h a n they've ever been before, and they don't k n o w what's h a p p e n i n g to them. Because they think they're g o i n g to k e e p g o i n g u p , u p , up t i l l they lose their m i n d s or b e g i n d o i n g w e i r d things or something. Y o u have to like reassure t h e m , e x p l a i n to t h e m that they're not really flipping or a n y t h i n g , that they're g o n n a be all right. Y o u have to just talk t h e m out o f b e i n g afraid. K e e p t a l k i n g t o t h e m , reass u r i n g , t e l l i n g t h e m it's a l l r i g h t . A n d c o m e o n w i t h y o u r o w n story, y o u k n o w : " T h e same t h i n g h a p p e n e d to m e . Y o u ' l l get to l i k e that after a w h i l e . " K e e p c o m i n g o n l i k e that; p r e t t y soon y o u talk t h e m o u t o f b e i n g s c a r e d . A n d besides t h e y see y o u d o i n g it a n d n o t h i n g h o r r i b l e is h a p p e n i n g to y o u , so that gives t h e m m o r e confidence.

T h e more e x p e r i e n c e d user m a y also teach the novice to regulate the amount he smokes more carefully, so as to avoid any severely u n c o m fortable symptoms w h i l e retaining the pleasant ones. F i n a l l y , he teaches the n e w user that he can "get to like it after a w h i l e . " He teaches h i m to regard those ambiguous experiences f o r m e r l y defined as unpleasant as enjoyable. T h e older user in the f o l l o w i n g i n c i d e n t is a person whose tastes have shifted in this way, a n d his remarks have the effects of h e l p i n g others to make a similar redefinition:

I n no case w i l l use continue without such a redefinition of the effects as enjoyable. This redefinition occurs, typically, in interact i o n w i t h m o r e experienced users who, in a n u m -

A n e w u s e r h a d h e r first e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e effects of marihuana and became frightened and hysterical. She "felt l i k e she was half in a n d half out of the r o o m " and experienced a number of alarming physical s y m p t o m s . O n e o f the m o r e e x p e r i e n c e d users p r e s e n t s a i d , " S h e ' s d r a g g e d b e c a u s e she's h i g h l i k e that. I'd g i v e a n y t h i n g to get that h i g h myself. I h a ven't b e e n that h i g h in years."
C h a r e n a n d P e r e l m a n , op. cit., p . 679.

10

Becker In short, what was once f r i g h t e n i n g a n d distasteful becomes, after a taste for it is built u p , pleasant, desired, and sought after. E n j o y m e n t is i n t r o d u c e d by the favorable definition of the experience that one acquires f r o m others. W i t h out this, use w i l l not continue, for marihuana w i l l not be for the user an object he can use for pleasure. In a d d i t i o n to b e i n g a necessary step in bec o m i n g a user, the pleasure represents an i m p o r tant c o n d i t i o n for c o n t i n u e d use. It is quite c o m m o n for experienced users suddenly to have an unpleasant or frightening experience, w h i c h they cannot define as pleasurable, either because they have used a larger amount of m a r i h u a n a than usual or because it turns out to be a higher-quality m a r i h u a n a t h a n they expected. T h e user has sensations w h i c h go b e y o n d any conception he has of what b e i n g h i g h is a n d is in m u c h the same situation as the novice, uncomfortable and frighte n e d . H e m a y blame i t o n a n overdose a n d simply b e m o r e careful i n the future. B u t h e m a y m a k e this the occasion for a r e t h i n k i n g of his attitude t o w a r d the d r u g and decide that it no longer can give h i m pleasure. W h e n this occurs a n d is not f o l l o w e d by a redefinition of the d r u g as capable of p r o d u c i n g pleasure, use w i l l cease. T h e l i k e l i h o o d of such a redefinition occurr i n g depends on the degree of the individual's participation w i t h other users. W h e r e this particip a t i o n is intensive, the i n d i v i d u a l is q u i c k l y talked out of his feeling against m a r i h u a n a use. In the next case, on the other h a n d , the experience was v e r y disturbing, a n d the aftermath of the i n c i d e n t cut the person's participation w i t h other users to almost zero. Use stopped for three years a n d began again only w h e n a c o m b i n a t i o n of c i r c u m stances, i m p o r t a n t a m o n g w h i c h was a resumpt i o n of ties w i t h users, m a d e possible a redefinition of the nature of the d r u g :

343 I walked outside, and it was five below zero, and I thought I was dying, and I had my coat open; I was sweating. I was perspiring. My whole insides were all . . . , and I walked about two blocks away, and I fainted behind a bush. I don't know how long I laid there. I woke up, and I was feeling the worst, I can't describe it at all, so I made it to a bowling alley, man, and I was trying to act normal, I was trying to shoot pool, you know, trying to act real normal, and I couldn't lay and I couldn't stand up and I couldn't sit down, and I went up and laid down where some guys that spot pins lay down, and that didn't help me, and I went down to a doctor's office. I was going to go in there and tell the doctor to put me out of my misery . . . because my heart was pounding so hard, you know. . . . So then all weekend I started flipping, seeing things there and going through hell, you know, all kinds of abnormal things. . . . I just quit for a long time then. [He went to a doctor who defined the symptoms for him as those of a nervous breakdown caused by "nerves" and "worries." Although he was no longer using marihuana, he had some recurrences of the symptoms which led him to suspect that "it was all his nerves."] So I just stopped worrying, you know; so it was about thirty-six months later I started making it again. I'd just take a few pokes, you know. [He first resumed use in the company of the same user-friend with whom he had been involved in the original incident.] A person, then, cannot b e g i n to use m a r i huana for pleasure, or continue its use for pleasure, unless he learns to define its effects as enjoyable, unless it becomes and remains an object w h i c h he c o n c e i v e d of as capable of p r o d u c i n g pleasure.

IV In s u m m a r y , an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be able to use m a r i h u a n a for pleasure only w h e n he goes t h r o u g h a process of l e a r n i n g to conceive of it as an object w h i c h c a n be used in this way. No one becomes a user w i t h o u t (1) l e a r n i n g to smoke the d r u g in a way w h i c h w i l l p r o d u c e real effects; (2) l e a r n i n g to recognize the effects a n d connect t h e m w i t h d r u g use (learning, in other words, to get high); a n d (3) l e a r n i n g to enjoy the sensations he perceives. In the course of this process he develops a disposition or m o t i v a t i o n to use m a r i huana w h i c h was not a n d c o u l d not have b e e n present w h e n he began use, for it involves a n d

It was too much, like I only made about four pokes, and I couldn't even get it out of my mouth, I was so high, and I got real flipped. In the basement, you know, I just couldn't stay in there anymore. My heart was pounding real hard, you know, and I was going out of my mind; I thought I was losing my mind completely. So I cut out of this basement, and this other guy, he's out of his mind, told me, "Don't, don't leave me, man. Stay here." A n d I couldn't.

344 depends o n conceptions o f the d r u g w h i c h c o u l d o n l y g r o w out of the k i n d of actual experience d e t a i l e d above. On c o m p l e t i o n of this process he is w i l l i n g a n d able to use m a r i h u a n a for pleasure. He has learned, in short, to answer " Y e s " to the question: "Is it f u n ? " T h e d i r e c t i o n his further use of the d r u g takes depends on his b e i n g able to continue to answer " Y e s " to this question and, in a d d i t i o n , on his b e i n g able to answer " Y e s " to other questions w h i c h arise as he becomes aware of the implications of the fact that the society as a whole disapproves of the practice: "Is it e x p e d i e n t ? " "Is it m o r a l ? " O n c e he has a c q u i r e d the ability to get enjoyment out of the d r u g , use w i l l continue to be possible for h i m . Considerations of m o r a l i t y and expediency, occasioned by the reactions of society, m a y interfere and i n h i b i t use, b u t use continues to be a possibility in terms of his conception of the d r u g . T h e act becomes impossible only w h e n the ability to enjoy the exp e r i e n c e of b e i n g h i g h is lost, t h r o u g h a change in the user's conception of the d r u g occasioned by c e r t a i n kinds of experience w i t h it. In c o m p a r i n g this theory w i t h those w h i c h ascribe m a r i h u a n a use to motives or predispositions rooted deep i n i n d i v i d u a l behavior, the e v i d e n c e makes it clear that m a r i h u a n a use for pleasure c a n occur only w h e n the process described above is undergone a n d cannot occur w i t h o u t it. This is apparently so w i t h o u t reference to the nature of the individual's personal m a k e u p , or psychic problems. Such theories assume that people have stable modes of response w h i c h predeter-

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

m i n e the w a y they w i l l act in relation to any particular situation or object a n d that, w h e n they come in contact w i t h the g i v e n object or situation, they act i n the w a y i n w h i c h their m a k e u p predisposes t h e m . T h e analysis of the genesis of m a r i h u a n a use shows that the individuals w h o come in contact w i t h a g i v e n object m a y respond to it at first in a great variety of ways. If a stable f o r m of n e w behavior t o w a r d the object is to emerge, a transf o r m a t i o n o f meanings must occur, i n w h i c h the person develops a n e w conception of the nature of the object. This happens in a series of c o m m u nicative acts in w h i c h others point out n e w aspects of his experience to h i m , present h i m w i t h n e w interpretations o f events, a n d h e l p h i m achieve a n e w c o n c e p t u a l organization of his w o r l d , w i t h o u t w h i c h the n e w behavior is not possible. Persons w h o do not achieve the p r o p e r k i n d of conceptualization are unable to engage in the g i v e n behavior a n d t u r n off i n the d i r e c t i o n of some other relationship to the object or activity.
11

This suggests that behavior of any k i n d m i g h t fruitfully b e studied developmentally, i n terms of changes in meanings and concepts, their organization a n d reorganization, a n d the w a y they channel behavior, m a k i n g some acts possible w h i l e e x c l u d i n g others.

1 1

C f . A n s e l m Strauss, " T h e D e v e l o p m e n t a n d T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Meanings in the Child," American Sociological Re-

of M o n e t a r y

view, X V I I ( J u n e 1952), 2 7 5 - 8 6 .

Teresa E. Levitin

38

Deviants as Active Participants in the Labeling Process: The Visibly Handicapped

What is a handicap in social terms? It is an imputation of difference from others; more particularly, imputation of an undesirable difference. By definition, then a person said to be handicapped is so defined because he deviates from what he himself or others believe to be normal or appropriate. (Freidson, 1965:72) M u c h of the literature of the last 15 years on social deviance has b e e n w r i t t e n f r o m a labeli n g perspective (Becker, 1963; C i c o u r e l , 1968; E r ikson, 1962; Gibbs, 1966; Kitsuse, 1962,1972; K i t suse a n d C i c o u r e l , 1963; L e m e r t , 1951; Scheff, 1966; Schur, 1965). This perspective emphasizes the process by w h i c h actors b e c o m e defined a n d treated as deviant. Since social norms are seen as problematic a n d no behavior is assumed to be i n h e r e n t l y deviant, definitions of deviance vary w i t h the actors w h o are observing a n d defining the activities. Indeed, the u n i q u e c o n t r i b u t i o n of this perspective had b e e n to assume that reactions to behavior, rather than any behavior itself, i d e n tify a n d define that w h i c h is deviant. T h e conceptualization of deviance as a process by w h i c h members of a g r o u p , c o m m u n i t y , or society 1) interpret certain behaviors as d e v i ant, 2) label persons w h o so behave as a certain k i n d of deviant, a n d 3) accord t h e m the treatment

considered appropriate to such deviants has clarified the active role of conventional a n d c o n f o r m i n g actors (Kitsuse, 1962). H o w e v e r , the role of the deviant in this process has often b e e n understated or i g n o r e d entirely: those engaged in the deviant behavior t e n d to be presented as passive or reactive, rather than as active agents in the labeling process. (See Filstead, 1972; or R u b i n g t o n a n d W e i n b e r g , 1968 for comprehensive collections of readings.) Thus, w h e n a leading exponent of the l a b e l i n g perspective critically assesses it, he only suggests that " t h e self-conceptions of the d e v i a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l should be considered a c r u cial d e p e n d e n t variable, to w h i c h we should pay m o r e attention than to the d e v i a t i n g behavior i t s e l f " (Schur, 1969:311). M i g h t not the self-conceptions of the d e v i a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l also be conside r e d a c r u c i a l independent variable?
1

T h e purpose here is to demonstrate that, i n deed, those labeled deviant because of a physical handicap often take an active part in the l a b e l i n g process: they initiate self-definitions; they insist that others define t h e m in p r e f e r r e d ways, and the strategies they choose to negotiate a n d settle labeling issues vary w i t h the social context in w h i c h such l a b e l i n g occurs.
2
1

E x c e p t i o n s t o this t e n d e n c y m a y b e f o u n d i n t h e w o r k o f D a v i s , Goffman, 1963; Lorber, 1967; Matza, 1969; Sykes and 1957; a n d W i l l i a m s a n d W e i n b e r g , 1970.

1961; T e r e s a E. L e v i t i n , "Deviants as A c t i v e Participants in the L a b e l ing Process: The Visibly Handicapped," Social Problems 2 2 : 4 ( A p r i l 1975), p p . 5 4 8 - 5 5 7 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n .

Matza,
2

A s T u r n e r (1972) h a s s u g g e s t e d , d e v i a n t l a b e l s r e f e r t o r o l e s ,

n o t i s o l a t e d acts. T h e l a b e l " h e r o i n a d d i c t s , " f o r e x a m p l e , h a s

346 U n s t r u c t u r e d interviews w i t h adults w h o had recently become physically h a n d i c a p p e d through accident or illness were c o n d u c t e d over a several m o n t h p e r i o d i n the physical therapy w a i t i n g r o o m of a large hospital. A l l respondents w e r e outpatients w h o regularly came to the hospital for physical therapy; their handicaps ranged f r o m the e v i d e n t (loss of a limb) to the p u b l i c l y invisible (mastectomy), f r o m the p e r m a n e n t (paralysis) to the m o r e temporary (whiplash). This paper focuses on those w i t h evident or visible handicaps only. Since the author was u n d e r g o i n g physical therapy, problems i n gaining cooperation w e r e mhiimal.
3

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

b o u n d feet of a Chinese n o b l e w o m a n w e r e a physical i m p a i r m e n t that p r e v e n t e d her f r o m w a l k i n g easily, but she was not, by this definition, physically h a n d i c a p p e d . M a n y different ways of classifying physical handicaps have b e e n u t i l i z e d (Barker, et al., 1953; D e m b o , L e v i t o n , a n d W r i g h t , 1956; F r e i d s o n , 1965; Goffman, 1963; L o r b e r , 1967). Since a d e v i ant role cannot be attributed u n t i l the act or state that violates social expectations is p e r c e i v e d , h o w evident the handicap is to others is a crucial classificatory dimension.
4 5

PHYSICAL HANDICAPS AS A TYPE OF D E V I A N C E T h e label " d e v i a n t " a n d the associated devaluation of an actor thus labeled are applicable to the physically handicapped. In a society that values physical health a n d attractiveness, the handic a p p e d are less than fully acceptable. F r o m a lab e l i n g perspective what is problematic is not w h e t h e r a handicap w i l l , in general, be defined as a type of deviance, but, rather, h o w specific attempts to apply that deviant label a n d role are i n i t i a t e d either by the disabled or by the n o r m a l a n d are negotiated i n interaction. T h e terms physical handicap and disability are often interchangeably used (Meyers, 1965; W r i g h t , 1960). I n this study, b o t h terms w i l l refer to someone w h o perceives himself/herself a n d is p e r c e i v e d by others as unable to m e e t the demands or expectations of a particular situation because of some physical i m p a i r m e n t i . e . , an anatomical and/or a physiological abnormality. This definition is consonant w i t h a labeling perspective: the concept h a n d i c a p p e d has m e a n i n g only w i t h i n a social context, w h e n the expectations and demands of others are taken into account. T h e
a n e l a b o r a t e set o f r o l e s r a n g i n g f r o m , f o r m a n y , t h i e f t o , f o r s o m e , m u s i c i a n , a s s o c i a t e d w i t h it. T h e l a b e l i s a s u m m a r y statem e n t a b o u t a n u m b e r o f e x p e c t e d behaviors o r roles, a n d w i l l b e u s e d a s s u c h i n this p a p e r .
3

Physiological i m p a i r m e n t s are not always i m mediately evident. A l t h o u g h hemophiliacs cannot participate in contact sports, they can carefully structure their social lives so that these i m p a i r ments do not become w i d e l y k n o w n social facts. O t h e r types of deviance may also be selectively h i d d e n : no one at w o r k may k n o w that an e m ployee is a homosexual, although it is k n o w n to friends. In short, those to w h o m the deviancy is evident m a y represent only a small segment of the deviant's social w o r l d . O n e l i m i t a t i o n of the labeling perspective is that too little attention has b e e n g i v e n to those arenas of life and to those subgroups w h e r e l a b e l i n g as deviant does not occur because the deviant states or behaviors are not evident. In the case of the physically handic a p p e d i n t e r v i e w e d for this paper, however, the stigma was evident to friends, family, m e d i c a l personnel, and the deviants themselves. F o r some, the p e r m a n e n t l y disabled, the i m p a i r m e n t was irrevocable, in that p r i o r social roles w o u l d n e v e r be filled as before. F o r others, the m o r e temporarily disabled, there w o u l d be an eventual r e t u r n to prior role expectations and obligations.

A p h y s i c a l l y h a n d i c a p p e d p e r s o n is not c o n c e p t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l

to a person w i t h a physical handicap. T h e former phrase conn o t e s a n a c t o r w h o c a n n o t m e e t any e x p e c t a t i o n s o r d e m a n d s ( a m o s t u n l i k e l y c i r c u m s t a n c e ) , w h i l e t h e l a t t e r suggests a n a c t o r w i t h a n y n u m b e r of characteristics, one of w h i c h is a p h y s i c a l h a n d i c a p . T h e s h o r t e r p h r a s e i s easier t o use a n d t h e r e f o r e w i l l be e m p l o y e d here; b u t it is i m p o r t a n t to r e m e m b e r that e v e n severe i m p a i r m e n t s , d e p e n d i n g o n the situation, m a y n o t b e handicaps.
5

T h e l a b e l i n g p e r s p e c t i v e has b e e n c r i t i c i z e d ( G i b b s , 1966; L o r -

b e r , 1967) f o r t h e c o n c e p t o f " s e c r e t d e v i a n t s " ( B e c k e r , 1963), those w h o s e d e v i a n c e has n o t b e e n d i s c o v e r e d . T h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n is a l o g i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n . B e c k e r (1971) s u b s e q u e n t l y used t h e t e r m " p o t e n t i a l l y d e v i a n t " t o describe those e n g a g e d in activities l i k e l y to be d e f i n e d as d e v i a n t by others.

T h i s p a p e r does not deal w i t h the p r o f o u n d p a i n b o t h psychoOf concern here is the more social fate of the

logical a n d physicalmany respondents experienced and described. handicapped.

Levitin T W O D I F F E R E N T TYPES OF SOCIAL SITUATIONS A N D I N T E R A C T I O N GOALS B o t h the p e r m a n e n t l y a n d the m o r e temporarily physically h a n d i c a p p e d share a c o m m o n c o n c e r n . T h e y do not want their deviance to bec o m e the keystone for definitions of themselves. T h e y do not want others to believe a n d to act as though the deviant part of self is the entire self, obscuring other more positive, socially v a l u e d aspects of that self, no matter h o w evident or perm a n e n t the handicap may be. Yet, as a psychologist describing the physically h a n d i c a p p e d notes, there is a tendency for judgments of " i n f e r i o r i t y on one scale to spread to total i n f e r i o r i t y of the p e r s o n " (Wright, 1960:8). Similarly, a sociologist points out that " w h e n deviant roles are c o m p a r e d w i t h other roles, the most s t r i k i n g difference lies in the extent to w h i c h the role is identified w i t h the person rather t h a n the actor (Turner, 1972:312). Or in the m o r e poignant words of an amputee: " I ' m not just 'that person w i t h o u t legs'; I ' m a whole person. I d i d n ' t lose my whole personality w h e n I lost my legs; I just lost my legs." G o f f m a n (1963:132-133) has n o t e d that " t h e painfulness, then, of sudden stigmatization can come not f r o m the individual's confusion about his i d e n tity, but f r o m his k n o w i n g too w e l l what he has become." W h a t one becomes is d e t e r m i n e d not only by others but also by the self. D e n i a l that any change has o c c u r r e d is folly; the handicap is too e v i d e n t for persistent claims that one has not c h a n g e d to be believed by anyone. G i v e n the i n eluctable i m p u t a t i o n of some deviant identity and role, the challenge to the disabled is to establish a social identity that is m o r e favorable than the i d e n t i t y of a totally devaluated person and to obtain the most positive social statuses or outcomes possible. H o w e v e r , the t e m p o r a r i l y and the permanently disabled differ in the k i n d of definition a n d elaboration they insist be g i v e n to their evident handicap. T h e definition of self that the temp o r a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d actively promote is one that states "this deviance w i l l not always be m e . " I n contrast, the definition of self actively presented by the permanently h a n d i c a p p e d is one that states "this deviance is not all of m e . "

347 T w o different types of situations in w h i c h deviants asserted their p r e f e r r e d social labels and roles in interaction w i t h normals w e r e observed: sociable encounters and encounters w i t h agents of social control, physical therapists. Sociable encounters are those face-to-face contacts v i v i d l y described by Goffman (1959) i n w h i c h actors w h o are relatively u n k n o w n to each other project definitions of themselves, a n d in w h i c h a " w o r k i n g consensus" about those definitions of self and the situation may or m a y not emerge. D a v i s (1961) has described face-to-face encounters that are somewhat but not too p r o longed, f r i e n d l y but not intimate, r i t u a l i z e d but not completely predictable as sociable encounters. P . T . A . meetings, business lunches, classrooms, professional conventions, parties, w e d dings, a n d airplane lounges are a few settings w h e r e sociable interaction occurs. T h e o p p o r t u n i ties for i n f o r m a l , sociable contact b e t w e e n the physically h a n d i c a p p e d and the n o r m a l are legion. A second, a n d m o r e l i m i t e d , class of situations in w h i c h deviant a n d n o r m a l interact occurs because of the deviance itself. Since the purpose of these encounters is to treat or to r e f o r m or to p u n i s h the deviant, often regardless of the d e v i ant's wishes, the normals can be seen as agents of social control. Different types of agents, often represented by different occupations, are i n v o l v e d in the detection, evaluation, and response to different types of deviance (Stoll, 1968). D o c tors, vocational therapists, nurses, social workers, and physical therapists are all agents of social cont r o l routinely encountered by the physically handicapped. B o t h as m e m b e r s of a larger society that values physical health and attractiveness and as professionals in a particular occupational role, such agents try to r e t u r n the deviant as m u c h as possible to former, valued social roles.

SOCIABLE ENCOUNTERS WITH T H E PERMANENTLY AND THE TEMPORARILY DISABLED T h e social consequences of a physical handicap have b e e n described in detail by D a v i s (1961), G o f f m a n (1963), and W r i g h t (1960). A l l agree that

348 sociable encounters b e t w e e n the disabled a n d the n o r m a l are strained, i n h i b i t e d , a n d uncomfortable for b o t h parties because of uncertainty about h o w , if at a l l , the stigma ought to be a c k n o w l e d g e d . D a v i s (1961) postulates the m e c h a n i s m of deviance disavowal as a way the h a n d i c a p p e d can manage strained interaction w i t h normals. If successful, this process permits the n o r m a l a n d the deviant to engage in o p e n a n d spontaneous sociable interaction, for the obvious disability is recogn i z e d rather than d e n i e d , but not m a d e central or disruptive to the encounter. D a v i s ' examples are p r i m a r i l y d r a w n f r o m those w h o w e r e visibly disabled by polio; a n d his concept of deviance disavowal is central to understanding h o w the p e r m a n e n t l y disabled handle social encounters. T h e m o r e t e m p o r a r i l y disabled, h o w e v e r , behave differently. T h e i r visible stigma sets the stage for the same sort of strained a n d superficial interaction the p e r m a n e n t l y disabled face. Paradoxically, the t e m p o r a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d t e n d to manage this interaction tension a n d project the definition of self they w a n t accepted by avowing their deviance. Since their disability is e v i d e n t but the prognosis is not, the t e m p o r a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d are active, often aggressive, in maki n g certain they are not g i v e n a label a n d role that has social consequences far m o r e serious than those of a temporary stigma. It is not s i m p l y a matter of disavowing the label " p e r m a n e n t l y h a n d i c a p p e d , " but, rather, of t r y i n g to see that the n o r m a l has no opportunity e v e n to contemplate such a label. E v e n w i t h i n a m o m e n t or two of m e e t i n g someone in a sociable encounter, the temporarily h a n d i c a p p e d m a y avow their deviance. T h e y may describe their accident or injury in great detail, p r o v i d e unsolicited facts about their therapy, a n d note their prognosis. B o t h politeness and curiosity usually keep the n o r m a l f r o m t r y i n g to stop these avowal revelations. Thus, the deviant is able to continue to d r a w attention to his or her handicap, a n d it remains a central theme u n t i l the n o r m a l indicates acceptance of the identity the deviant is presenting a n d acknowledges the temporariness of the disability. A statement such as " W e l l , I ' m glad y o u ' l l be OK again s o o n " is evidence that the desired message has b e e n conveyed. O n c e the n o r m a l indicates

PART V Research Implications and Applications belief in the temporariness of the evident physical handicap, the b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h stage analogous to that in the deviance disavowal process has occurred. T h e final stage of D a v i s ' disavowal process, that of establishing a n o r m a l i z e d relationship, alse. occurs in the avowal process; but the content of the n o r m a l i z e d definition of self is different. Those w h o have successfully disavowed t h e i r deviance have c o m m u n i c a t e d a definition of self that says this h a n d i c a p is o n l y a small part of w h o I a m . Those w h o have successfully a v o w e d their deviance have c o m m u n i c a t e d a definition of self that say this h a n d i c a p is o n l y a temporary part of w h o I a m . T h e r e are m a n y ways the e v i d e n t l y handicapp e d p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n about p r e f e r r e d definitions. T h e p e r m a n e n t l y disabled b e g i n to use props to i n t r o d u c e an u n b l e m i s h e d aspect of self. A book, a p o l i t i c a l b u t t o n , a religious s y m b o l are n e w l y a c q u i r e d cues to their other, m o r e socially v a l u e d labels a n d roles. O n e patient said "I b r i n g along my k n i t t i n g . Someone's b o u n d to ask what I ' m m a k i n g or I ' l l say ' I ' m k n i t t i n g a s c a r f or whatever a n d t h e n I ' l l talk about all m y other hobbies t o o . " In contrast, the t e m p o r a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d b e g i n to use props to call attention to their stigma. O n e patient p a i n t e d " H o u d i n i " on his wheelchair, a clever w a y of setting the stage for his explanation that it w o u l d soon disappear. Several of the p e r m a n e n t l y disabled n o t e d that they w e r e n o w m u c h m o r e apt to ask normals about their interests and activities than before they w e r e h a n d i c a p p e d . Such p r o b i n g sometimes seemed m o t i v a t e d less by a genuine interest in that other's life than by the deviant's o w n desire to find shared concerns that w o u l d say, in effect: since I can do a lot of the things y o u do, I am obviously m o r e than this stigma. Several of the temporarily disabled n o t e d that they w e r e n o w m u c h m o r e apt to ask normals about their past illnesses and injuries than before they w e r e h a n d i c a p p e d . R e m i n d i n g normals e i ther of their o w n temporary deviance or that of their friends and f a m i l y w o u l d p e r m i t the h a n d i c a p p e d to say, in effect: like y o u or others y o u have k n o w n , I am only temporarily h a n d i c a p p e d . O n e respondent was shocked at discovering h i m -

Levitin self insisting on a discussion of such events at a formal d i n n e r . Deviants other than the physically handicapp e d also find that their deviant aspects or roles often become the central social facts used in defining a n d evaluating t h e m . Someone labeled an alcoholic may find that m a n y other accomplishments are evaluated w i t h the preface, " f o r an alc o h o l i c " or "despite his (her) a l c o h o l i s m , " e v e n though these accomplishments m i g h t have b e e n exactly the same if the person w e r e not an alcoholic. A n outstanding, positively evaluated quality m a y also be taken as the focal point for labeling a n d evaluating the entire person. T h e v e r y beaut i f u l a n d the v e r y brilliant may be h e a r d to lament the fact that no one attends to their " t r u e selves." In terms of social evaluation the beauty is v e r y different f r o m the beast, but in terms of h o w those social labels d e h u m a n i z e each, they are, i n d e e d , similar. In sum, it is usually the case that spontaneous a n d comfortable sociable interaction b e t w e e n n o r m a l a n d deviant w i l l not occur unless a n d u n t i l labeling issues have b e e n settled in ways palatable to the handicapped, unless and u n t i l the p e r m a nently h a n d i c a p p e d have successfully disavowed a n d the temporarily h a n d i c a p p e d have successfully a v o w e d the m e a n i n g and content of their deviant label and role.

349 describe themselves fully in terms of their disabilities and to cooperate in m a k i n g those disabilities the c o n t i n u i n g focus of the encounter; the h a n d i capped n e e d the skillful ministrations of their therapists and must p r o v i d e the i n f o r m a t i o n about their disabilities that is n e e d e d for the exercise of those therapeutic skills. G i v e n b o t h the inevitable symbiotic relationship and the different goals for the interaction, interesting patterns of accommodation b e t w e e n physical therapists a n d their t e m p o r a r i l y a n d p e r m a n e n t l y disabled patients evolve. Those defined as p e r m a n e n t l y h a n d i c a p p e d by themselves a n d their therapists try to present a definition of self l i k e the definition presented in sociable interactions, one that says this h a n d i cap is not all of w h o I a m . To accomplish this interaction goal in therapy, the p e r m a n e n t l y disab l e d find ways of i n t r o d u c i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about untainted parts of themselves. Those defined as temporarily h a n d i c a p p e d by themselves and their therapists try to present a definition of self like the definition presented in sociable interaction, one that says this handicap w i l l not always be w h o I a m . T o emphasize the temporary nature of that deviance, they often act as though they have already recovered. T h e y try to change the encounter to one of interaction bet w e e n two normals by encouraging their therapists to behave in a self-disclosing and non-professional m a n n e r , by altercasting t h e m into the role of f r i e n d (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1963, 1964). In effect, the p e r m a n e n t l y h a n d i c a p p e d c o m municate that they w i l l be " g o o d patients" for their therapists only if they also can be " w h o l e h u m a n b e i n g s " to t h e m . A few w e r e quite explicit about their demands: one said that if he w e r e treated like a piece of damanged meat, he w o u l d be goat's (i.e. tough) meat. Since the therapists themselves t e n d to speak in very general terms about d e a l i n g w i t h patients i n w a r m a n d compassionate ways and about treating the person, not just the disability, there is usually a r e c e p t i v i t y or willingness to relate to patients as multifaceted people. B u t it is the p e r m a n e n t l y disabled t h e m selves w h o t e n d to initiate the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a n d to p r o v i d e the content for these other n o n tainted or n o r m a l roles. T h e mechanisms are v e r y

ENCOUNTERS WITH AGENTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL In contrast, a handicap is not a potential threat to interaction in physical therapy; rather, it is the reason for that encounter. Physical therapy, therefore, provides another type of social sett i n g in w h i c h the h a n d i c a p p e d actively shape the content and centrality of a deviant label and role. In physical therapy situations, just as in sociable encounters, the h a n d i c a p p e d do not want to be defined and evaluated only in terms of their deviance. Yet, both the avowal a n d disavowal strategies of sociable encounters are i n a p p r o p r i ate to and incongruent w i t h the demands a n d expectations of therapy: therapists n e e d information about h o w their patients are responding to treatment; they expect patients to be w i l l i n g to

350 similar to those used by the p e r m a n e n t l y h a n d i c a p p e d in sociable situations: props b e g i n to be used, conversations are initiated, a n d topics are doggedly p u r s u e d u n t i l r e c o g n i t i o n a n d l e g i t i m a t i o n f r o m the therapist of these v a l u e d identities a n d roles are f o r t h c o m i n g . Some patients arrange to have their f a m i l y a n d friends p i c k t h e m u p , not i n the hospital waiti n g r o o m , but right i n the physical therapy area itself, e v e n though the w a i t i n g r o o m is the design a t e d area. Patients w i l l engage their therapists a n d friends or family in conversation, often prol o n g i n g the encounter u n t i l the therapist has i n d i cated adequate interest i n a n d agreement w i t h the patient's activities w i t h f a m i l y a n d friends. O n e patient brought in her photo a l b u m to show her therapist. L a t e r that week, another patient b r o u g h t i n her a l b u m t o share w i t h her therapist, a n d others soon f o l l o w e d suit. A n o t h e r patient b r o u g h t in samples of products he m e r c h a n d i z e d , b u t he made his sales p i t c h o n l y to his therapist, not to other patients or therapists w h o w e r e also p o t e n t i a l customers. Occasionally the demands to be labeled as m o r e valuable than one's presence i n therapy m i g h t suggest w e r e blatantly m a n i p u l a t i v e : a p a tient changed her therapist's t e p i d interest in h e a r i n g about her (the patient's) son's w e d d i n g by saying something about her previous therapist not b e i n g interested a n d not b e i n g a v e r y good therapist either. T h e d u r a t i o n of that therapy session was d e v o t e d to a discussion of the w e d d i n g , a n d of examples of what a good m o t h e r the patient b o t h was a n d c o n t i n u e d to be despite her p e r m a n e n t handicap. It is w i t h the t e m p o r a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d , h o w ever, that serious problems in negotiating an i d e n tity acceptable to both therapist a n d patient are apt to occur, for the t e m p o r a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d t e n d to insist on definitions unacceptable to the therapist. To emphasize that they w i l l soon be w e l l , a n d in anticipation of that t i m e , they try to altercast the therapist into the role of f r i e n d , almost suggesting that they have already rec o v e r e d , a n d are only in therapy because they enjoy sociable visits w i t h their therapists. O n e patient e v e n said that since he w o u l d not n e e d to practice his exercises m u c h longer, he w o u l d practice b e i n g a f r i e n d .

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications In order to i n d u c e their therapists to step out of their professional roles a n d disclose personal aspects of themselves, the t e m p o r a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d m a y ask personal questions, i n q u i r i n g about their therapists' families, asking h o w other patients are progressing, or generally p r e s u m i n g the k i n d of easy i n t i m a c y that occurs b e t w e e n people w h o are personally i n v o l v e d w i t h each other. T h e therapists strongly resist these attempts at i n t i m a c y , b e l i e v i n g that they cannot d o their w o r k p r o p e r l y i f they b e c o m e too i n v o l v e d w i t h their patients. T h e y insist that their patients must face their handicaps a n d d e a l w i t h t h e m realistically, h o w e v e r t e m p o r a r y those handicaps m i g h t be, a n d that therapy is the place w h e r e patients, h o w e v e r m a n y other v a l u e d labels a n d roles they m a y have, are, ultimately, patients, not intimates. Thus, altercasting attempts are usually squelched: patients w h o i n v i t e their therapists to parties or to d i n n e r find that their therapists neither accept these invitations n o r ask t h e m to their o w n homes. O n e respondent was " g r a v e l y w o u n d e d " w h e n she f o u n d that she h a d not b e e n i n v i t e d to a shower her therapist h a d g i v e n for another therapist because, as she i n sisted, they should be " g o o d f r i e n d s . " A patient w h o was t o l d that the staff coffee r o o m was off limits to h i m was p e r p l e x e d , chagrined, a n d felt rejected. C l e a r l y there is m o r e r o o m for negotiation b e t w e e n patient a n d therapist than the f o r m a l structure of the hospital, norms, or roles suggest. Since the therapist's o w n successful p e r f o r m a n c e depends, to some extent, on the co-operation of the patient, patients are able to negotiate f r o m a position of some strength. P a r t i c i p a t i o n in therapy is voluntary, a n d the patient can, as a last resort, terminate contact w i t h a therapist w h o is not adequately sympathetic. I n d e e d several patients m e n t i o n e d that there h a d b e e n a therapist so c o l d a n d unsympathetic to their needs that patients refused to d e a l w i t h her. H e r tenure at the hospital was brief. It is p r i m a r i l y in the early stages of physical therapy that patients are most active in t r y i n g to define themselves in relation to their therapists. W h e n the therapy is of l o n g duration, the modus vivendi established usually seems to be the cordial but distant relationship p r e f e r r e d by the thera-

Levitin pists, w h o are m o r e experienced a n d m o r e skilled than their patients in structuring the encounter in p r e f e r r e d ways. Since m a n y of the t e m p o r a r i l y h a n d i c a p p e d n e e d only a short p e r i o d of therapy, tension a n d conflict rather than stable patterns of interaction a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n are m o r e often observed.

351 T h e physically handicapped, as one class of deviants, are particularly interesting. Since there is general agreement about the devalued status of a handicap, attention can be focused on the active ways in w h i c h such deviants assert t h e m selves, e v e n w i t h i n the rather n a r r o w range of choices or identities and roles that their h a n d i c a p has left t h e m . A t t e n t i o n to the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the disabled in the labeling process provides a n e e d e d a d d i t i o n to the labeling perspective.

SUMMARY T h e e v i d e n t l y disabled adults i n t e r v i e w e d i n this study r e c o g n i z e d the d e v a l u e d statuses their recent illness or injury h a d brought t h e m , but they vigorously and systematically t r i e d to influ ence the content of their deviant label a n d role in ways most favorable to themselves. A major social p r o b l e m for the h a n d i c a p p e d is that nor mals t e n d to organize their perceptions a n d evalu ations a r o u n d the disability a n d to ignore the handicapped's m a n y v a l u e d aspects a n d i d e n t i ties. These h a n d i c a p p e d actively resisted such a social fate, but their p r e f e r r e d definitions a n d strategies v a r i e d w i t h the d u r a t i o n of the disabil ity (temporary or more permanent) a n d the type of encounter (sociable encounters a n d encounters w i t h agents of social control). T r y i n g to negotiate a p r e f e r r e d definition of self is l i m i t e d neither to the h a n d i c a p p e d n o r to other types of deviants, though examples of their behaviors are the basis of this paper. To the con trary, the active bargaining for p r e f e r r e d defini tions, the attempts to negotiate a situation to one's o w n advantage, the subtle, a n d not so subtle, proc esses through w h i c h people agree to become w h o they are to each other are a m o n g the most basic elements of social life (see for example Carson, 1969; E m e r s o n , 1969; G a r f i n k e l , 1967; G o f f m a n , 1959, 1963; M c C a l l a n d Simmons, 1966; Shibu tani, 1970). It is, however, instructive to examine h o w those apt to be labeled deviant initiate a n d direct these processes. In some sense, they have the most to lose. To be labeled as a particular k i n d of deviant may m e a n to i n c u r a n u m b e r of adverse consequences, such as p u n i s h m e n t or iso lation. Therefore, deviants i n encounters w i t h normals may be m o r e active than normals en c o u n t e r i n g normals in t r y i n g to legitimate pre f e r r e d definitions.

REFERENCES Barker, R., Wright, ., Myerson, L. and Gonick, M. Adjustment to Physical Handicap and Illness: A Survey of the Social Psychology of Physique and Disability. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1953. Becker, H. S. Outsiders. Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. . "Labeling Theory Reconsidered." Proceedings of the British Sociological Association, 1971. Carson, R. C. Interaction Concepts of Personality. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. Cicourel, A. The Social Organization ofJuvenile Justice. New York: Wiley, 1968. Davis, F. "Deviance Disavowal: The Management of Strained Interaction by the Visibly Handicapped." Social Problems 9 (1961):120-132. Dembo, ., Leviton, G. and Wright, B. "Adjustment for Misfortunea Problem of Social-Psychological Rehabilitation." Artificial Limbs 3 (1956):4-62. Emerson, J. "Negotiating the Serious Import of Humor." Sociometry 32 (1969):169-181. Erikson, K. "Notes on the Sociology of Deviance." Social Problems 9 (1962):307-314. Filstead, W. (ed.). An Introduction to Deviance. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1972. Freidson, E. "Disability as Social Deviance." Sociology and Rehabilitation. Edited by M. Sussman. Wash ington, D . C . : American Sociological Association, 1965, pp. 71-99. Garfinkel, H. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Gibbs, J. "Conceptions of Deviant Behavior: The Old and the N e w . " Pacific Sociological Review 9 (1966):9-14.

352 Goffman, E. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959. . Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1963. Kitsuse, J. I. "Societal Reaction to Deviant Behavior: Problems of Theory and Method." Social Problems 9 (1962):247-256. . "Deviance, Deviant Behavior, and Deviants: Some Conceptual Problems." An Introduction to Deviance. Edited by W. Filstead. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1972, pp. 233-243. Kitsuse, J. I. and Cicourel, A. "A Note on the Uses of Official Statistics." Social Problems 12 (1963):131139. Lemert, E. Social Pathology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951. Lorber, J. "Deviance as Performance: The Case of Illness." Social Problems 14 (1967):302-310. McCall, G . J. and Simmons, J. L . Identities and Interactions. New York: The Free Press, 1966. Matza, D. Becoming Deviant. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969. Meyers, J. "Consequences and Prognoses of Disability." Sociology and Rehabilitation. Edited by M. Sussman. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1965, pp. 35-51. Rubington, E. and Weinberg, M. (eds.). Deviancethe

PART V

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Interactionist Perspective New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968. Scheff, T. Being Mentally III. Chicago: Aldine, 1966. Schur, E. Crimes Without Victims. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965. . "Reactions to Deviance: A Critical Assessment." American Journal of Sociology 75: (1969):309322. Shibutani, T. Human Nature and Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970. Stoll, C. "Images of Man and Social Control." Social Forces 47 (1968):119-127. Sykes, G. and Matza, D. "Techniques of Neutralization." American Sociological Review 22 (1957):664-670. Turner, R. "Deviance Avowal as Neutralization of Commitment." Social Problems 19 (1972):308-321. Weinstein, E. and Deutschberger, P. "Some Dimensions of Altercasting." Sociometry 26 (1963):454-466. . "Tasks, Bargains, and Identities in Social Interaction." Social Forces 42 (1964):451-455. Williams, C. and Weinberg, M. "Being Discovered: A Study of Homosexuals in the Military." Social Problems 18 (1970):217-227. Wright, B. Physical Disabilitya Psychological Approach. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960.

William R. Rosengren

39

The Self in the Emotionally Disturbed

1

A s George H . M e a d has p o i n t e d out, h u m a n beings t e n d to act on the basis of their inferences about the probable behavior of others t o w a r d t h e m . M o r e o v e r , our feelings about ourselves are m e d i a t e d by h o w we t h i n k others feel about us. This is to say that m u c h of our behavior is g u i d e d by what we t h i n k others are t h i n k i n g a n d by our confidence in what we judge to be the readiness of others to act u p o n what we t h i n k they i m p u t e to us. In brief, it is axiomatic in Mead's psychology that there are functional relationships b e t w e e n h o w we see ourselves, h o w we see others, and h o w we think others see us. Similarly, basic to Mead's theory is the idea that such relationships have i m p o r t a n t consequences in overt behavior and are also p h e n o m e n a of interpersonal perception.
2

pirically functional relationships a m o n g the self processes. Ideally, changes in the self w o u l d occur over a relatively l o n g p e r i o d of t i m e d u r i n g w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l moves sequentially through the stages of the play, the game, and the generalized other. M o r e o v e r , once h a v i n g d e v e l o p e d to that stage of socialization, most persons m a i n t a i n a rather stable and c o n t i n u i n g set of relationships among the functions of the self. In terms of the consequences in overt behavior, Sullivan has referred to such stability as "the repeated situations w h i c h characterize a h u m a n l i f e . " W h a t e v e r the terminology, h o w e v e r , the behavior of persons becomes relatively stable and predictable insofar as there is some convergence b e t w e e n h o w they see themselves, h o w they see others, a n d h o w they t h i n k others see t h e m .
3

W h i l e it may be logically reasonable to set f o r t h such principles, the occasion to validate t h e m by means of operational procedures is less frequently at hand. F o r it seems i m p l i c i t in Mead's theory that it is necessary to take t e m p o r a l changes into account in o r d e r to demonstrate e m W i l l i a m R . Rosengren, " T h e Self i n the E m o t i o n a l l y D i s t u r b e d . " Reprinted (March cago.
1

from pp.

The

American

Journal

of Sociology,

vol.

66

In the case of persons u n d e r g o i n g intensive psychiatric treatment, however, basic changes in interpersonal behavior frequently occur v e r y rapidly. Therefore, the study of emotionally dist u r b e d persons m a y offer opportunities to put to the test some aspects of Mead's theory w h i c h , u n der n o r m a l circumtances, w o u l d r e q u i r e either m a n y years to do or c o u l d be done only by c l i n i c a l or retrospective analysis. W i t h the exception of c l i n i c a l descriptions of distorted self-concepts of i n d i v i d u a l psychiatric patients, little e m p i r i c a l evidence is available
3

1961),

454-462, by permission of T h e U n i v e r -

sity o f C h i c a g o Press. C o p y r i g h t 1961 b y T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i P a r t of a four-year project in social p s y c h i a t r y u n d e r G r a n t

O M - 2 1 f r o m the N a t i o n a l Institute o f M e n t a l H e a l t h , U n i t e d States P u b l i c H e a l t h S e r v i c e .

2

Harry

Stack

Sullivan,

Conceptions

of

Modern

Psychiatry

George Herbert Mead,

Mind,

Self, and Society ( C h i c a g o : U n i -

(Washington, D . C . : W i l l i a m Alanson W h i t e Psychiatric F o u n d a t i o n , 1947), p . v i .

v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1934).

354 T A B L E 39.1. Interpersonal qualities Hostile-rejecting Selfish Bad Mean Dumb Cruel Afraid Dirty Ugly

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications and physical aggression, short attention span, a n d inability to delay gratifications, and they t e n d to have histories of interpersonal difficulties w i t h both adults a n d peers. At the time of the first testing, all of the boys h a d l i v e d together twentyfour hours a day for at least one year, a n d some for as l o n g as t w o years.

Friendly-accepting Generous Good Nice Smart Kind Brave Clean Well-liked Honest Strong Neat

PROCEDURES Interpersonal Perceptions In September, 1958, an " i n f e r e n c e - i m p u t a t i o n " test was a d m i n i s t e r e d to the subjects along w i t h tests of several other criteria. This "Self-defin i t i o n T e s t " i n v o l v e d n i n e t e e n interpersonal qualities w h i c h w e r e d i c h o t o m i z e d i n t o those w h i c h are " f r i e n d l y - a c c e p t i n g " a n d those w h i c h are "hostile-rejecting" in nature; these are s h o w n L i T a b l e 39.1. T w o days p r i o r to the i n d i v i d u a l testing sessions, each boy was asked the f o l l o w i n g "nears o c i o m e t r i c " questions: (1) " W h i c h of the boys (in the unit) do y o u l i k e best of a l l ? " (2) " W h i c h do y o u dislike the m o s t ? " (3) " W h i c h do y o u t h i n k likes y o u the m o s t ? " a n d (4) " W h i c h do y o u t h i n k dislikes y o u the m o s t ? " F o r ease in administration, each quality was p r i n t e d in I n d i a i n k on a 5 X 7-inch c a r d . E a c h boy t h e n sorted the cards at least five times: (1) a description of himself (self-definition), (2) a description of the boy he h a d chosen as the one he l i k e d best (imputation), (3) a description of the boy he h a d chosen as the most d i s l i k e d (imputation), (4) a description of himself f r o m the point of v i e w of the boy w h o m he thought l i k e d h i m (inference), a n d (5) a description of h i m s e l f f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the boy w h o m h e thought d i s l i k e d h i m (inference). Those boys w h o h a d b e e n chosen by others as either "I t h i n k he likes m e " o r " I t h i n k h e dislikes m e " w e r e t h e n asked to describe the individuals w h o h a d chosen t h e m i n those ways. O n e year later, in September, 1959, the boys u n d e r w e n t the i d e n t i c a l sociometric a n d inference-imputation procedures.

about the processes of self-definition, inference, a n d i m p u t a t i o n a m o n g persons w h o have b e e n institutionalized for emotional disturbance. T h e purpose of this paper is to report the findings of a study of interpersonal inference a n d i m p u t a t i o n a m o n g a group of institutionalized emotionally disturbed c h i l d r e n whose chief reason for hospitalization was inadequate r e c i p r o c i t y w i t h others. A major a i m is to demonstrate e m p i r i c a l l y changes in the functional relationships of the processes of the self, before a n d after l o n g - t e r m residential treatment, and to report their relationships to other indexes of changed behavior.
4

T h e subjects w e r e ten boys, r a n g i n g in age f r o m t e n t o twelve years, w h o w e r e r e c e i v i n g l o n g - t e r m residential treatment in a private psychiatric hospital for c h i l d r e n . T h e total patient p o p u l a t i o n n u m b e r e d fifty-six, of w h i c h the subjects constituted one of six units. T h e y h a d all r e c e i v e d c l i n i c a l diagnoses of "Passive-Aggressive PersonalityAggressive T y p e " a n d w e r e the only patients in the institution w h o w e r e homogeneously g r o u p e d on the basis of diagnosis a n d symptomatology. Such patients are m o r e c o m m o n l y r e f e r r e d to as "acting-out"; their overt beh a v i o r is generally typified by spontaneous v e r b a l

T h e m o s t r e c e n t p u b l i s h e d a t t e m p t t o p u t t o test o p e r a t i o n a l

a s p e c t s o f t h e s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y o f M e a d is, p e r h a p s , C a r l J . C o u c h ' s "Self-attitudes a n d D e g r e e o f A g r e e m e n t w i t h I m m e d i ate 96. Others," American Journal of Sociology, LXIII (1958), 491-

Rosengren T A B L E 39.2. Scale for behavior of rating "acting-out" patients Non-symptomatic Behaviors Relevant: Goal-directed activity Passive: Restrained, inexpressive, inactive behavior Affiliative: Associates with others; responds to and initiates interactions Other-oriented: Shows interest in others, positively or negatively Submissive: Submits to domination, control, and direction by others Nurturant: Gives help, assistance, support, and affection Blame avoidance: Withdraws from or otherwise avoids aggression-eliciting situations Endurance: Foregoes immediate satisfactions for future gratifications Deliberation: Hesitant, cautious, and reflectful behavior Verbal: Much talking either of affiliative or rejecting type

355

Symptomatic Behaviors Irrelevant: Diffuse and random activity Active: Mobile, labile, expressive behavior Rejecting: Disassociates from others; rejects interactions Narcissistic: "Exclusive" interest in self Dominant: Attempts to dominate, control, and direct Succorant: Seeks help, assistance, support, and affection Aggressive: Attempts to destroy, humiliate, and degrade Immediacy: Seeks for immediate gratification Impulsive: Spontaneous and unreflectful behavior Non-verbal: Little talking of affiliative or rejecting type

Observation O v e r a six-month p e r i o d f r o m O c t o b e r , 1958, to M a r c h , 1959the subjects w e r e observed by a non-participant observer in a variety of situations for a total of sixty hours of direct observation. T h e overt b e h a v i o r of the t e n boys was r a t e d on a "moreness-lessness" basis using the qualities of interaction listed in T a b l e 39.2. Those on the left of the r a t i n g scale are symptom a t i c forms of behavior, w h i l e those on the right are non-symptomatic for this diagnostic category of patients. T h e methods, procedures, a n d findings of this part of the study are r e p o r t e d elsewhere.
5

not used, severe physical h a r m w o u l d result. I n such instances the acting-out patient is p l a c e d alone in a l o c k e d r o o m u n t i l his behavior becomes physically tolerable. A c c u r a t e records are m a i n tained of the use of this means of restraint in the institution. These data w e r e accumulated for e a c h of the t e n subjects at the e n d of one year.

Institutional Expectations In b o t h 1958 a n d 1959 the subjects responded to a test of " i n s t i t u t i o n a l expectations." This consisted o f t e n story completions i n w h i c h a boy was d e p i c t e d as engaging in some m o d e r ately acting-out f o r m of behavior in an institutional setting. T h e boys responded to each story b y d e s c r i b i n g events w h i c h they expected w o u l d follow the i n c i d e n t w h i c h was presented. O n e , for example, r e a d as follows: " B o b is supposed to take pills in the m o r n i n g a n d in the afternoon. B u t h e doesn't swallow t h e m h e throws t h e m
6
8

Control-eliciting Behavior T h e behavior of patients of this type occasionally becomes so dangerous either to themselves or to others that, if some means of restraint w e r e
8

See W i l l i a m R. Rosengren, " T h e Social F i e l d in Relation to Sociometry

T h i s w a s a n a d a p t i o n o f a s i m i l a r set o f s t o r y c o m p l e t i o n s r e in W. and J. McCord, Psychopathy and Delinquency

the Behavior of Emotionally Disturbed C h i l d r e n , " (in press).

ported

( N e w Y o r k : G r u n e & S t r a t t o n , I n c . , 1957).

356 out the w i n d o w . O n e day the nurse f o u n d out about it a n d then . . ." T h e subjects' responses w e r e classified as i n v o l v i n g either hostile or ben i g n institutional responses. An example of a hostile expectation is, "She (the nurse) drags h i m to the r o o m a n d gives h i m needles a n d he gets s i c k e r . " An example of a b e n i g n expectation is, "She tells h i m that the pills h e l p h i m so he takes t h e m . " T y p i c a l l y , the m o r e severely disturbed the patient, the m o r e hostile are his expectations a n d , presumably, his anticipatory responses to them.

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, w i t h probability levels d e r i v e d d i r e c t l y f r o m the value of T . In all cases the one-tailed test was used because the d i r e c t i o n of change was p r e d i c t e d . T h e f o l l o w i n g classification was used for c o m p a r i n g the boys' patterns of interpersonal definition w i t h the other indexes of change: F r e q u e n c y distributions w e r e made for the total quantity of p r o p o r t i o n a l change u n d e r each p e r c e p t u a l relationship for each subject. Those whose total p r o p o r t i o n of change in self functions was one standard d e v i a t i o n or m o r e above the m e a n for the ten subjects w e r e classified as " h i g h self-changers." Those whose extent of change was one standard d e v i a t i o n or m o r e b e l o w the m e a n are ref e r r e d to as " l o w self-changers." In these terms there w e r e three h i g h a n d three l o w selfchangers.
7

TREATMENT OF DATA Interpersonal Perceptions Sums of " f r i e n d l y - a c c e p t i n g " a n d "hostile-rej e c t i n g " choices w e r e c o m p u t e d on the first (1958) a n d second (1959) series of self-definition tests on each of the dimensionsinference-imputation, definition-inference, a n d definition-imputation. T h e study was chiefly c o n c e r n e d w i t h changes i n the similarity a n d dissimilarity i n choices o f qualities in the one year. Because the total n u m ber of choices was not the same for all the subjects on either the first or the second series, changes w e r e measured in terms of proportions rather t h a n r a w choice scores. C o m p a r i n g , for example, the similarity of self-definitions a n d inferences, a " s i m i l a r " choice was r e g a r d e d as one in w h i c h the subject defined himself as generous a n d exp e c t e d (inferred) that others (either the l i k e d or d i s l i k e d person) w o u l d also define h i m as generous. T h e r e w e r e two possibilities for " d i s s i m i l a r " choices; (1) the subject defined himself as generous but felt that the referent person w o u l d not so define h i m ; or (2) the subject d i d not ascribe the quality of generosity to himself but felt that the referent person w o u l d define h i m as generous. Proportions of each similar inference-imputation, definition-inference, a n d definition-imputation d i m e n s i o n w e r e c o m p u t e d i n that fashion for each subject on the first a n d t h e n on the second testing. T h e significance of p r o p o r t i o n a l change was c o m p u t e d t h r o u g h the use of the W i l c o x o n

O t h e r Indexes of C h a n g e At the e n d of the six-month p e r i o d of observation, frequency distributions w e r e m a d e of the extent of change in overt behavior as i n d i c a t e d by the rating scale (Table 39.2). T h e extent of change was d e t e r m i n e d by the difference bet w e e n the sums of scores on the left side of the scale d u r i n g the first three months a n d the s u m of scores on the left side d u r i n g the second three months. T h r e e of the boys h a d undergone significant changes f r o m symptomatic to non-symptomatic behavior (one standard deviation or m o r e above the mean), a n d three h a d experienced c o m paratively little change in behavior (one standard d e v i a t i o n or m o r e b e l o w the mean). Similar frequency distributions w e r e m a d e of the n u m b e r of "isolations" w h i c h each boy h a d e l i c i t e d by his physically intolerable behavior d u r i n g the first six months as c o m p a r e d w i t h the seco n d . F i n a l l y , computations w e r e m a d e o n b o t h the first a n d second testings of the n u m b e r of " b e n i g n " [and] the [number of] " h o s t i l e " expectations of the institution w h i c h each boy h a d expressed.
7

T h i s statistic i s d e s c r i b e d a n d p r o b a b i l i t y tables p r e s e n t e d i n Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences

S.

( N e w Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l B o o k C o . , 1956).

Rosengren SOME EXPECTATIONS F R O M MEAD'S THEORY C l i n i c a l k n o w l e d g e c o n c e r n i n g the disturbance syndrome of the patients as w e l l as p a r t i c i pant observation for a year a n d a half f o r m e d the chief basis of the general hypotheses; Mead's p r i n c i p l e s of the interrelatedness of self-definit i o n , inferences of others, a n d imputations by others u n d e r l a y each expectation. It was expected that on the first test the boys w o u l d define themselves quite differently f r o m the ways i n w h i c h they thought others w o u l d define t h e m , as c o m p a r e d w i t h the second test. M o r e o v e r , it was anticipated that the inferences they m a d e of others on the first test w o u l d be different f r o m others' actual imputations, as c o m p a r e d w i t h the second test. M o r e specifically i n M e a d ' s terms, it was expected that after one year the subjects w o u l d t e n d to " c a l l out in themselves the responses w h i c h they think they call out in others" a n d that they w o u l d " c a l l out i n others responses similar to those w h i c h they think they call out i n others." F u r t h e r m o r e , it was anticipated that inferences of others w o u l d be less contingent u p o n the " l i k e d - d i s l i k e d " distinction on the second test as c o m p a r e d w i t h the first. M o r e specifically, it was expected that the boys w o u l d infer more friendly-accepting qualities of d i s l i k e d persons a n d less friendly-accepting qualities of l i k e d persons on the second test as c o m p a r e d w i t h the first. B o t h of these related hypotheses w e r e i n t e n d e d to serve as a means of e m p i r i c a l l y demonstrating w h e t h e r the boys w o u l d m a k e inferences conc e r n i n g the ways in w h i c h they thought others v i e w e d t h e m w i t h regard to a g e n e r a l i z e d conc e p t i o n of others' points of v i e w w h a t m i g h t be r e f e r r e d to as the " g e n e r a l i z e d others"or w o u l d persist i n m a k i n g inferences w i t h reference t o specific others in the e n v i r o n m e n t . T h i r d , it was expected that the boys w o u l d t e n d to make different inferences c o n c e r n i n g l i k e d a n d disliked persons on the first test a n d m o r e similar inferences on the second. Specifically, it was anticipated that inferences concerni n g d i s l i k e d persons' imputations w o u l d be less accurate on the first test as c o m p a r e d w i t h the second. M o r e o v e r , it was expected that inferences

357 c o n c e r n i n g l i k e d persons' imputations w o u l d also be less accurate on the first test than on the seco n d , that is, that the boys w o u l d tend to " t a k e the role of specific others" in regard to themselves in an inaccurate fashion on the first test a n d the " r o l e of the g e n e r a l i z e d o t h e r " in a m o r e accurate fashion on the second test. Last, it was expected that the boys w o u l d t e n d to define themselves m o r e sirnilarly to the ways i n w h i c h they thought others defined t h e m on the second test as c o m p a r e d w i t h the first. Specifically, the subjects w o u l d define themselves significantly m o r e as they thought the d i s l i k e d persons defined t h e m . It was also anticipated that a similar change w o u l d take place w i t h r e g a r d to the l i k e d persons. These two propositions w e r e designed to test the expectation that the subjects w o u l d t e n d to define themselves m o r e in terms of a c o n c e p t i o n of a generalized other than in terms of a consideration of specific individuals about w h o m they h a d contrasting attitudes themselves. In general, therefore, the data w e r e a n a l y z e d w i t h a v i e w to d e t e r m i n i n g the extent of convergence w i t h some basic principles of Mead's social psychology. First, it was expected that on the first test the subjects w o u l d t e n d to define themselves differently f r o m the ways i n w h i c h they thought others defined t h e m , w h i l e on the second test selfdefinitions a n d inferences of others' imputations w o u l d be m o r e similar. This expectation was borne out w i t h respect to disliked as w e l l as l i k e d persons (Table 39.3). T h e r e was significantly m o r e similarity b e t w e e n h o w the boys defined t h e m selves a n d h o w they thought b o t h l i k e d a n d disl i k e d persons w o u l d define t h e m on the second test as c o m p a r e d w i t h the first. Second, it was expected that a comparison of the responses on the first a n d second tests w o u l d r e v e a l an increased tendency for the boys to define themselves m o r e as others actually defined t h e m . T h i s expectation was also borne out w i t h r e g a r d b o t h t o l i k e d and disliked persons, although w i t h somewhat greater confidence i n relation to the l i k e d persons (Table 39.4). In general, the data suggested that on the second test the subjects defined themselves m o r e l i k e the ways i n w h i c h they thought others w o u l d define

358

PART V

Research I m p l i c a t i o n s a n d A p p l i c a t i o n s

T A B L E 39.3. S i m i l a r self-definitions a n d inferences o f others' i m p u t a t i o n s : signed-ranks proportions for first a n d second tests

Inference Liked and disliked persons Disliked persons only Liked persons only

N* 10 10 10

T 3 9 8

Less Frequent Sign

P (One-tailed Test) >.005 >.025 >.025

* R e f e r s t o t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t i e d p r o p o r t i o n s b e t w e e n p a i r s . L e v e l s o f s i g n i f i c a n c e for N ' s less t h a n 2 5 are d e t e r m i n e d directly f r o m the m a g n i t u d e o f T .

T A B L E 39.4. S i m i l a r inferences o f others and i m p u t a t i o n s b y others: signed-ranks proportions for first a n d second tests

Person Making Imputation by Liked and disliked Disliked only Liked only
* S e e n. to T a b l e 3.

N* 10 10 10

T 2 8 0

Less Frequent Sign

P (One-tailed Test) >.01 >.025 >.005

T A B L E 39.5. " F r i e n d l y - a c c e p t i n g " qualities i n f e r r e d o f specific others: signed-ranks proportions for first a n d second tests

Referent Disliked person Liked person

* S e e n. to T a b l e 3.

N* 10 10

T 1 0

Less Frequent Sign

P (One-tailed Test) >.005 >.005

4-

t h e m . M o r e o v e r , there was a t e n d e n c y for the " o t h e r s " actually to i m p u t e those qualities w h i c h the boys thought w o u l d be i m p u t e d to t h e m . F u r t h e r m o r e , it was p r e d i c t e d that the subjects w o u l d be less l i k e l y to infer hostile-rejecting qualities of the disliked persons a n d friendly-acc e p t i n g qualities of the l i k e d persons on the seco n d test t h a n they d i d a year earlier (Table 39.5). T h e r e was, in fact, a tendency for the boys to infer, proportionately, m o r e f r i e n d l y - a c c e p t i n g qualities of the persons w h o m they d i s l i k e d a n d

less hostile-rejecting qualities on the second test. M o r e o v e r , they also t e n d e d to expect p r o p o r t i o n ately less f r i e n d y - a c c e p t i n g imputations by l i k e d persons on the second test. These findings m a y indicate that on the second test the subjects m a d e inferences on the basis of a somewhat m o r e gene r a l i z e d v i e w of themselves rather t h a n of a c o n c e p t i o n of specific persons' probable views of them. T h e f o u r t h general expectation was r e l a t e d to the issue of the subjects' accuracy in m a k i n g

Rosengren T A B L E 39.6. Similar inferences and implications: signed-ranks proportions for first and second tests Less Frequent Sign

359

Referent and Inference-Imputation A l l persons, all qualities A l l persons, "friendly" A l l persons, "hostile" Liked persons, all qualities Liked persons, "friendly" Disliked persons, all qualities Disliked persons, "friendly" Disliked persons, "hostile" Liked persons, "hostile"
* S e e n. to T a b l e 3.

N* 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 6

T 2 1 1 0 6
8

P (One-tailed Test) >.01 >.005 >.005 >.005 >.025 >.025 >.005 >.005 <.025

1 0
3

inferences about other persons' imputations to t h e m . Was there, in other words, a tendency for the boys increasingly to " c a l l out f r o m others the responses w h i c h they thought they called out in others?" T h e findings w i t h r e g a r d to person refere n t l i k e d a n d disliked-and type of qualities i n f e r r e d f r i e n d l y or hostileare r e p o r t e d in Table 39.6. As Table 39.6 indicates, the most discriminati n g differentiation was that in w h i c h the referent person i n v o l v e d as w e l l as the distinction b e t w e e n f r i e n d l y a n d hostile qualities w e r e controlled. T h e most significant change b e t w e e n the first a n d seco n d test was w i t h respect to the disliked rather t h a n the l i k e d persons. Specifically, the subjects t e n d e d to infer qualities of disliked persons m o r e similar to those w h i c h w e r e actually i m p u t e d to t h e m by disliked persons on the second test, as c o m p a r e d w i t h the f i r s t . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h i l e there was increased similarity c o n c e r n i n g inferences of f r i e n d l y imputations by l i k e d persons w h i c h was not statistically significant, the changes w h i c h d i d appear were i n the p r e d i c t e d direction. W i t h this qualification, the data do suggest two tentative conclusions. First, the boys w e r e m o r e accurate in i n f e r r i n g those qualities w h i c h others actually i m p u t e d to t h e m . Second, this m i g h t i n d i cate that on the first test the boys a t t e m p t e d to define themselves f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of specific others, a n d to do this in a comparatively inaccurate way. On the second test, h o w e v e r , they

seemed to define themselves f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of a m o r e g e n e r a l i z e d frame of reference w h i c h resulted, i n fact, i n considerably greater accuracy i n i n f e r r i n g imputations b y specific others. F i n a l l y , it was anticipated that on the second test the boys w o u l d be m o r e l i k e l y to define t h e m selves in the same terms as they thought both the l i k e d and d i s l i k e d persons w o u l d define t h e m . That is, greater similarity b e t w e e n self-definitions and inferences was expected. As can be seen in Table 39.7, significant changes c o u l d best be i d e n tified w h e n the referent person a n d the type of interpersonal quality w e r e controlled. Specifically, the boys d i d t e n d to define themselves somewhat m o r e as they thought the disliked persons w o u l d define t h e m , but only w i t h r e g a r d to the hostile-rejecting qualities. M o r e o v e r , w h i l e the increased similarity in this regard relative to the l i k e d persons was not b e y o n d what c o u l d have b e e n expected by chance alone, it was in the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n . It m i g h t be c o n c l u d e d , therefore, that on the first test the boys defined themselves as they thought both l i k e d a n d disl i k e d persons w o u l d do, but only w i t h regard to friendly-accepting qualities. On the second test, however, they showed an increased i n c l i n a t i o n to i n c l u d e hostile-rejecting qualities in the similarities b e t w e e n h o w they defined themselves a n d h o w they thought significant others w o u l d define them.

360

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications

W h e n one contrasts the responses of the subjects on the first test w i t h those on the second, several distinct patterns appear. On the first test they t e n d e d to define themselves dissimilar to the ways i n w h i c h they thought others defined t h e m . Second, b o t h l i k e d a n d d i s l i k e d persons t e n d e d to i m p u t e to the subjects qualities dissimilar to those w h i c h the subjects expected w o u l d be i m p u t e d to t h e m . F u r t h e r m o r e , the subjects t e n d e d to expect that l i k e d persons w o u l d i m p u t e significantly m o r e f r i e n d l y - a c c e p t i n g qualities a n d that d i s l i k e d persons w o u l d i m p u t e significantly m o r e hostile-rejecting qualities. T h i s is to say that their inferences about themselves appeared to be m a d e w i t h reference t o particular persons i n their i m mediate experience. F o u r t h , they w e r e comparatively inaccurate i n i n f e r r i n g w h a t qualities othersboth l i k e d a n d d i s l i k e d p e r s o n s w o u l d actually i m p u t e to t h e m . Last, they t e n d e d to def i n e themselves differently f r o m the ways i n w h i c h they thought both l i k e d a n d d i s l i k e d persons w o u l d define t h e m w i t h an a c c o m p a n y i n g t e n d e n c y for t h e m to be somewhat m o r e sensit i z e d to friendly-accepting t h a n to hostile-rejecti n g attributes. O n the second test, o n the other h a n d , they t e n d e d to define themselves m o r e as they thought others defined t h e m . Second, b o t h the l i k e d a n d the d i s l i k e d persons t e n d e d to i m p u t e those qualities w h i c h the i n f e r r i n g subjects thought the oth-

ers w o u l d . T h i r d , the boys t e n d e d to expect that l i k e d persons w o u l d i m p u t e significantly m o r e hostile-rejecting qualities a n d that the d i s l i k e d persons w o u l d i m p u t e m o r e f r i e n d l y - a c c e p t i n g qualities. F o u r t h , they w e r e somewhat m o r e accurate in i n f e r r i n g those qualities others actually i m p u t e d to t h e m . Last, they t e n d e d to define themselves somewhat m o r e as they thought b o t h the l i k e d a n d d i s l i k e d persons w o u l d define t h e m a n d w e r e increasingly accurate in r e g a r d to hostile-rejecting qualities. In terms of M e a d ' s theory of the self, it w o u l d appear that on the first test the boys t e n d e d to (1) call out in themselves responses u n l i k e those w h i c h they thought they called out in others, (2) call out in others responses u n l i k e those w h i c h they thought they c a l l e d out in others, (3) m a k e inferences f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of specific others rather than of a g e n e r a l i z e d other, a n d (4) define themselves in terms of specific other persons. O n the second test, o n the other h a n d , t h e y t e n d e d to (1) c a l l out in themselves responses m o r e l i k e those w h i c h they thought they c a l l e d out in others, (2) call out in others responses m o r e l i k e those w h i c h they thought they c a l l e d out i n others, (3) make inferences f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of a generalized other rather t h a n of specific others, a n d (4) define themselves in terms of a genera l i z e d other rather t h a n of specific others.

Rosengren RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER INDEXES OF CHANGE A l t h o u g h these findings may w e l l suggest that b o t h the functions a n d the content of the self c h a n g e d significantly in the one year, it is of further interest to k n o w to what extent a n d in what ways such patterns m i g h t be associated w i t h other indexes of change. First, the three " h i g h self-changers" w e r e also the three boys whose overt behavior changed most significantly f r o m symptomatic to non-symptomatic d u r i n g the six months in w h i c h observational ratings of behavior w e r e m a d e : the boys whose self functions m o r e nearly a p p r o x i m a t e d Mead's ideal w e r e those w h o e x p e r i e n c e d increasi n g l y fewer difficulties w i t h b o t h their peers and the adults w o r k i n g w i t h t h e m . Conversely, those whose self processes c h a n g e d the least along lines of Mead's expectations w e r e those w h o c o n t i n u e d b o t h to initiate symptomatic interactions a n d reacted to others in a significantly s y m p t o m a t i c fashion. Second, w i t h r e g a r d to h i g h l y disruptive beh a v i o r w h i c h necessitated isolation of the patient, the three h i g h self-changers w e r e also those w h o w e r e significantly less often isolated in the one year than formerly. On the other h a n d , those boys whose self processes changed the least w e r e also the ones w h o w e r e isolated either significantly more often, or as often, in the one year. Last, w i t h regard to expectations of the institution, the three h i g h self-changers w e r e also the boys whose expectations of the institution's actions t o w a r d t h e m c h a n g e d most significantly f r o m " h o s t i l e " at the b e g i n n i n g of the year to " b e n i g n " at the e n d . C o n v e r s e l y , the " l o w self-

361 changers" c o n t i n u e d comparatively often to expect hostile action a n d seldom to expect b e n i g n action in the one year. On the basis of these findings it is c o n c l u d e d that, in the boys studied, changes in the functions a n d content of the self w e r e associated w i t h overt changes in behavior as w e l l as w i t h changes in a somewhat m o r e basic orientation t o w a r d their i m m e d i a t e social e n v i r o n m e n t .

CONCLUSIONS This paper has r e p o r t e d an attempt to relate data f r o m a test of interpersonal inferences, i m p u tations, a n d self-definitions to some of the c h i e f assertions of M e a d ' s social psychology. T h e findings are tentative, a n d the conclusions a n d interpretations w h i c h have b e e n made are best regarded as only suggestive. Because of the small n u m b e r of subjects i n v o l v e d and the difficulties characteristic of studies of interpersonal p e r c e p t i o n , b o t h the findings a n d the conclusions are best r e g a r d e d as a p r e l i m i n a r y effort.
8

T h e concept of the self as used in the social psychology of M e a d is one that continues to be an i n t r i g u i n g basis for m u c h speculation a n d interpretation. It also continues, h o w e v e r , to present m a n y difficulties for e m p i r i c a l investigation a n d validation. T h e l i m i t e d f i e l d study r e p o r t e d i n this paper is an attempt to put the concept of the self to e m p i r i c a l test w i t h a v i e w to further elabor a t i n g its i m p o r t a n c e i n h u m a n behavior.
8

S e e , e.g., L . J . C r o n b a e h , " P r o p o s a l L e a d i n g t o A n a l y t i c T r e a t Person, Perception and Interpersonal Behavior ( S t a n f o r d ,

m e n t of Social Perception Scores," in R. T a g i u r i a n d L. Petrullo (eds.), C a l i f . : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958), p p . 3 5 3 - 7 8 .

Erving Goffman

40

The Moral Career of the Mental Patient

Traditionally the t e r m career has b e e n re served for those w h o expect to enjoy the rises l a i d out w i t h i n a respectable profession. T h e t e r m is c o m i n g to be used, however, in a broadened sense to refer to any social strand of any person's course through life. T h e perspective of natural history is taken: unique outcomes are neglected in favor of such changes over t i m e as are basic a n d c o m m o n to the members of a social category, although occurring i n d e p e n d e n t l y to each of t h e m . Such a career is not a t h i n g that can be b r i l l i a n t or disappointing; it can no m o r e be a success than a failure. In this light, I want to con sider the m e n t a l patient, d r a w i n g m a i n l y u p o n data collected d u r i n g a year's participant observa t i o n of patient social life in a p u b l i c m e n t a l hospi t a l , w h e r e i n an attempt was m a d e to take the patient's point of view.
1

O n e value of the concept o f c a r e e r is its twosidedness. O n e side is l i n k e d to i n t e r n a l matters h e l d dearly and closely, such as image of self and felt identity; the other side concerns official posi tion, j u r a l relations, and style of life, and is part of a p u b l i c l y accessible institutional complex. T h e concept of career, then, allows one to m o v e back and forth b e t w e e n the personal and the p u b l i c , b e t w e e n the self a n d its significant society, w i t h out h a v i n g overly to rely for data u p o n what the person says he thinks he imagines himself to be. This paper, then, is an exercise in the institu tional approach to the study of self. T h e m a i n concern w i l l be w i t h the moral aspects of c a r e e r that is, the regular sequence of changes that ca reer entails in the person's self and in his frame work of imagery for j u d g i n g himself and others. T h e category " m e n t a l patient" itself w i l l b e understood in one strictly sociological sense. In this perspective, the psychiatric v i e w of a person becomes significant only in so far as this v i e w itself alters his social fatean alteration w h i c h seems to become f u n d a m e n t a l in our society w h e n , and only w h e n , the person is put through the process of hospitalization. I therefore exclude certain
2 3
3

E r v i n g Goffman, " T h e M o r a l Career o f the M e n t a l Patient," Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes, v o l . 2 2 ( M a y 1959), p p . 1 2 3 - 1 4 2 . C o p y r i g h t 1 9 5 9 b y T h e W i l l i a m A l a n s o n W h i t e P s y c h i a t r i c F o u n d a t i o n , Inc. R e p r i n t e d by special permission of T h e W i l l i a m A l a n s o n W h i t e Psychiatric F o u n d a t i o n , Inc.
1

T h e s t u d y was c o n d u c t e d d u r i n g 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s I am grateful to the L a b o r a t o r y

of the L a b o r a t o r y of S o c i o - e n v i r o n m e n t a l Studies of the N a t i o n a l Institute of M e n t a l H e a l t h . Chief, John A. Clausen, and to D r . W i n f r e d Overholser, Superin t e n d e n t , a n d t h e late D r . J a y H o f f m a n , t h e n F i r s t A s s i s t a n t P h y s i c i a n o f Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , for the ideal cooperation they freely p r o v i d e d . A p r e l i m i n a r y report is contained in Goffman, "Interpersonal Persuasion," pp. 117193,in Group Processes: Transactions of the Third Conference, e d i t e d b y B e r t r a m S c h a f f n e r ; N e w Y o r k , J o s i a h , Jr. F o u n d a t i o n , 1957. A s h o r t e r v e r s i o n o f this p a p e r w a s p r e s e n t e d a t t h e A n n u a l M e e t i n g o f the A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i c a l S o c i e t y , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , A u g u s t , 1957.

M a t e r i a l on m o r a l career c a n be f o u n d in early social a n t h r o p o

l o g i c a l w o r k o n c e r e m o n i e s o f status t r a n s i t i o n , a n d i n classic social p s y c h o l o g i c a l descriptions of those spectacular changes i n o n e ' s v i e w o f self t h a t c a n a c c o m p a n y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s o c i a l m o v e m e n t s a n d sects. R e c e n t l y n e w k i n d s o f r e l e v a n t d a t a h a v e b e e n suggested b y p s y c h i a t r i c interest i n the p r o b l e m o f " i d e n tity" and sociological studies of work careers and "adult socialization."
3

T h i s p o i n t has r e c e n t l y b e e n m a d e b y E l a i n e a n d J o h n C u m Closed Ranks; Cambridge, Commonwealth Fund, Har-

ming,

Goffman

363 that this social r e w o r k i n g can be done u p o n what is perhaps the most obstinate diversity of h u m a n materials that can be brought together by society. H e r e there lacks o n l y the frequent f o r m i n g of a protective group-life by ex-patients to illustrate in f u l l the classic cycle of response by w h i c h d e v i ant subgroupings are psychodynamically f o r m e d i n society. This general sociological perspective is heavily r e i n f o r c e d by one key finding of sociologically o r i e n t e d students in m e n t a l hospital research. As has b e e n repeatedly shown in the study of nonliterate societies, the awesomeness, distastefulness, and barbarity of a foreign culture can decrease in the degree that the student becomes familiar w i t h the point of v i e w to life that is taken by his subjects. Similarly, the student of m e n t a l hospitals can discover that the craziness or "sick beh a v i o r " c l a i m e d for the m e n t a l patient is by a n d large a product of the claimant's social distance f r o m the situation that the patient is i n , a n d is not p r i m a r i l y a product of m e n t a l illness. W h a t ever the refinements of the various patients' psychiatric diagnoses, a n d whatever the special ways in w h i c h social life on the " i n s i d e " is u n i q u e , the researcher can find that he is p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a c o m m u n i t y not significantly different f r o m any other he has s t u d i e d . Of course, w h i l e restricting himself to the off-ward grounds c o m m u n i t y of par o l e d patients, he m a y feel, as some patients do, that life in the l o c k e d wards is bizarre; a n d w h i l e on a l o c k e d admissions or convalescent w a r d , he may feel that c h r o n i c " b a c k " wards are socially crazy places. B u t he n e e d only m o v e his sphere of sympathetic participation to the " w o r s t " w a r d in the hospital, a n d this too can come i n t o social focus as a place w i t h a livable a n d continuously m e a n i n g f u l social w o r l d . This i n n o w a y denies that he w i l l find a m i n o r i t y in any w a r d or patient group that continues to seem quite b e y o n d the capacity to follow rules of social organization, or that the orderly fulfilment of n o r m a t i v e expectations in patient society is partly m a d e possible by strategic measures that have somehow come to be institutionalized in m e n t a l hospitals.
6

n e i g h b o r i n g categories: the undiscovered candidates w h o w o u l d be j u d g e d " s i c k " by psychiatric standards but who never come to be v i e w e d as such by themselves or others, although they may cause everyone a great deal of t r o u b l e ; the office patient w h o m a psychiatrist feels he can handle w i t h drugs or shock on the outside; the m e n t a l client w h o engages in psychotherapeutic relationships. A n d I i n c l u d e anyone, h o w e v e r robust in temperament, w h o somehow gets caught up in the heavy machinery of m e n t a l hospital servicing. In this way the effects of b e i n g treated as a m e n t a l patient can be kept quite distinct f r o m the effects u p o n a person's life of traits a c l i n i c i a n w o u l d v i e w as psychopathological. Persons w h o become m e n t a l hospital patients vary w i d e l y i n the k i n d and degree of illness that a psychiatrist w o u l d i m pute to t h e m , and in the attributes by w h i c h laym e n w o u l d describe t h e m . B u t once started o n the way, they are confronted by some i m p o r t a n t l y similar circumstances a n d respond to these in some i m p o r t a n t l y similar ways. Since these similarities do not come f r o m m e n t a l illness, they w o u l d seem to occur in spite of it. It is thus a tribute to the p o w e r of social forces that the u n i f o r m status of m e n t a l patient can not only assure an aggregate of persons a c o m m o n fate a n d eventually, because of this, a c o m m o n character, but
4 5

v a r d U n i v . Press, 1957; p p . 101-102. " C l i n i c a l e x p e r i e n c e supports the i m p r e s s i o n that m a n y p e o p l e d e f i n e m e n t a l illness as ' T h a t c o n d i t i o n for w h i c h a p e r s o n is treated in a m e n t a l hospital.'. . . M e n t a l illness, it s e e m s , is a c o n d i t i o n w h i c h afflicts p e o p l e w h o must go to a m e n t a l institution, but u n t i l they do almost a n y t h i n g t h e y d o i s n o r m a l . " L e i l a D e a s y has p o i n t e d out t o m e the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e h e r e w i t h the situation i n w h i t e c o l l a r c r i m e . O f t h o s e w h o a r e d e t e c t e d i n this a c t i v i t y , o n l y the ones w h o do not m a n a g e to avoid g o i n g to prison find t h e m selves a c c o r d e d t h e s o c i a l r o l e o f t h e c r i m i n a l . * C a s e records in m e n t a l hospitals are just n o w c o m i n g to be exploited to show the incredible a m o u n t of trouble a person m a y cause for h i m s e l f a n d others before a n y o n e begins to think about h i m psychiatrically, let alone take psychiatric action 11:25against h i m . See J o h n A . C l a u s e n a n d M a r i a n R a d k e Y a r r o w , "Paths to the M e n t a l Hospital," / Social Issues (1955) 1958; p p . 32; A u g u s t B . H o l l i n g s h e a d a n d F r e d r i c k C . R e d l i c h , Social Class and Mental Illness; N e w Y o r k , W i l e y ,
5

173-174.

A n i l l u s t r a t i o n o f h o w this p e r s p e c t i v e m a y b e t a k e n t o a l l 1951; see e s p e c i a l l y p p . 7 4 -

f o r m s o f d e v i a n c y m a y b e f o u n d i n E d w i n L e m e r t , Social Pathology; N e w Y o r k , M c G r a w - H i l l , 76. A s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n t o m e n t a l d e f e c t i v e s m a y b e f o u n d i n Stewart E . Perry, " S o m e T h e o r e t i c P r o b l e m s o f M e n t a l D e f i c i e n c y a n d T h e i r A c t i o n I m p l i c a t i o n s , " Psychiatry (1954) 7 3 ; s e e e s p e c i a l l y p . 68. 17:45Conscientious objectors w h o voluntarily w e n t to jail sometimes example, Alfred Hassler, Diary of a Self-made Convict;

a r r i v e d at the same conclusion r e g a r d i n g c r i m i n a l inmates. See, for Chicago, Regnery, 1954; p . 74.

364 T h e career of the m e n t a l patient falls p o p u larly a n d naturalistically into three m a i n phases: the p e r i o d p r i o r to e n t e r i n g the hospital, w h i c h I shall call the prepatient phase; the p e r i o d i n the hospital, the inpatient phase; the p e r i o d after discharge f r o m the hospital, should this occur, n a m e l y , the ex-patient phase? This paper w i l l d e a l only w i t h the first two phases.

PART V Research Implications and Applications to discover w h e t h e r others too have discovered t h e m . H e r e I w a n t to stress that p e r c e p t i o n of losing one's m i n d is based on culturally d e r i v e d and socially e n g r a i n e d stereotypes as to the significance of symptoms such as h e a r i n g voices, losing t e m p o r a l a n d spatial orientation, a n d sensing that one is b e i n g f o l l o w e d , a n d that m a n y of the most spectacular a n d c o n v i n c i n g of these symptoms in some instances psychiatrically signify m e r e l y a t e m p o r a r y e m o t i o n a l upset in a stressful situation, h o w e v e r t e r r i f y i n g to the person at the t i m e . S i m i larly, the anxiety consequent u p o n this p e r c e p tion of oneself, a n d the strategies devised to reduce this anxiety, are not a p r o d u c t of a b n o r m a l psychology, b u t w o u l d b e exhibited b y any p e r s o n socialized into our c u l t u r e w h o came to conceive of h i m s e l f as someone losing his m i n d . Interestingly, subcultures i n A m e r i c a n society apparently differ i n the a m o u n t o f ready imagery a n d encouragement they s u p p l y for such self-views, l e a d i n g to differential rates of se/^referral; the capacity to take this d i s i n t e g r a t i v e v i e w of oneself w i t h o u t psychiatric p r o m p t i n g seems to be one of the questionable c u l t u r a l privileges of the u p p e r classes.
9 10

T H E PREPATIENT PHASE A relatively small group of prepatients come i n t o the m e n t a l hospital w i l l i n g l y , because of their o w n i d e a of what w i l l be good for t h e m , or because of w h o l e h e a r t e d agreement w i t h the relevant m e m b e r s of their f a m i l y . P r e s u m a b l y these recruits have f o u n d themselves acting in a way w h i c h is evidence to t h e m that they are losing t h e i r m i n d s or losing c o n t r o l of themselves. This v i e w of oneself w o u l d seem to be one of the most pervasively threatening things that can h a p p e n to the self in our society, especially since it is l i k e l y to occur at a t i m e w h e n the person is in any case sufficiently troubled to exhibit the k i n d of sympt o m w h i c h he himself c a n see. As S u l l i v a n described it, What we discover in the self-system of a person undergoing schizophrenic changes or schizophrenic processes, is then, in its simplest form, an extremely fear-marked puzzlement, consisting of the use of rather generalized and anything but exquisitely refined referential processes in an attempt to cope with what is essentially a failure at being humana failure at being anything that one could respect as worth being.
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F o r the person w h o has come to see h i m s e l f w i t h w h a t e v e r justificationas m e n t a l l y u n b a l anced, entrance to the m e n t a l hospital c a n sometimes b r i n g relief, perhaps in part because of the sudden transformation in the structure of his basic social situations; instead of b e i n g to h i m s e l f a questionable person t r y i n g to m a i n t a i n a role as a f u l l one, he can become an officially questioned person k n o w n to h i m s e l f to be not so questionable as that. In other cases, hospitalization can m a k e matters worse for the w i l l i n g patient, c o n f i r m i n g by the objective situation what has theretofore b e e n a matter of the p r i v a t e experience of self. O n c e the w i l l i n g prepatient enters the hospital, he may go t h r o u g h the same routine of experiences as do those w h o enter u n w i l l i n g l y . In any
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C o u p l e d w i t h the person's disintegrative reevaluation of himself w i l l be the n e w , almost equally pervasive circumstance of a t t e m p t i n g to conceal f r o m others what he takes to be the n e w f u n d a m e n t a l facts about himself, a n d a t t e m p t i n g
7

T h i s m o r a l e x p e r i e n c e c a n be contrasted w i t h that of a p e r s o n

l e a r n i n g to b e c o m e a m a r i h u a n a addict, whose discovery that T h i s simple picture is complicated by the somewhat special to the hospital, this b e i n g t h e Clinical recidivist in or "repatient" edited h e c a n b e ' h i g h ' a n d still ' o p ' effectively w i t h o u t b e i n g d e t e c t e d a p p a r e n t l y l e a d s t o a n e w l e v e l o f use. S e e H o w a r d S . B e c k e r , "Marihuana Use and Social Control," Social Problems (1955) 3:3544; s e e e s p e c i a l l y p p . 4 0 - 4 1 . Stack Sullivan, Studies Psychiatry;
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experience of roughly a third of ex-patientsnamely, readmission phase.

6

Harry

See footnote 2;

Hollingshead a n d Redlich, p.

187, T a b l e 6 ,

by H e l e n Swick Perry, Mary L a d d Gawel, and Martha Gibbon; N e w Y o r k , N o r t o n , 1956; p p . 1 8 4 - 1 8 5 .

w h e r e r e l a t i v e f r e q u e n c y i s g i v e n o f s e l f - r e f e r r a l b y s o c i a l class grouping.

Goffman

365 over, that for e v e r y offense that leads to an effective c o m p l a i n t , there are m a n y psychiatrically similar ones that n e v e r do. No action is taken; or action is taken w h i c h leads to other extrusory outcomes; or ineffective action is taken, l e a d i n g to the m e r e p a c i f y i n g or p u t t i n g off of the person w h o complains. Thus, as Clausen and Y a r r o w have nicely s h o w n , e v e n offenders w h o are eventually hospitalized are l i k e l y to have had a l o n g series of ineffective actions taken against t h e m .
1 2

case, it is the latter that I m a i n l y w a n t to consider, since in A m e r i c a at present these are by far the m o r e numerous k i n d . T h e i r approach t o the i n stitution takes one of three classic forms: they c o m e because they have b e e n i m p l o r e d by their f a m i l y or threatened w i t h the abrogation of family ties unless they go " w i l l i n g l y " ; they c o m e by force u n d e r police escort; they c o m e u n d e r misapprehension purposely i n d u c e d by others, this last restricted m a i n l y to y o u t h f u l prepatients.
1 1

T h e prepatient's career m a y b e seen i n terms of an extrusory m o d e l ; he starts out w i t h relationships a n d rights, and ends u p , at the b e g i n n i n g of his hospital stay, w i t h h a r d l y any of either. T h e m o r a l aspects of this career, t h e n , typically b e g i n w i t h the experience of abandonment, disloyalty, a n d e m b i t t e r m e n t . This is the case e v e n t h o u g h to others it m a y be obvious that he was in n e e d o f treatment, a n d e v e n t h o u g h i n the hospital h e m a y soon c o m e to agree. T h e case histories of most m e n t a l patients d o c u m e n t offense against some arrangement for face-to-face l i v i n g a domestic establishment, a w o r k place, a semipublic organization such as a c h u r c h or store, a p u b l i c r e g i o n such as a street or park. O f t e n there is also a r e c o r d of some complainant, some figure w h o takes that action against the offender w h i c h eventually leads to his hospitalization. This m a y not be the person w h o makes the first m o v e , but it is the person w h o makes what turns out to be the first effective m o v e . H e r e is the social b e g i n n i n g of the patient's career, regardless of w h e r e one m i g h t locate the psychological b e g i n n i n g of his m e n t a l illness. T h e kinds of offenses w h i c h l e a d to hospitaliz a t i o n are felt to differ in nature f r o m those w h i c h lead to other extrusory consequencesto i m p r i s o n m e n t , d i v o r c e , loss of job, d i s o w n m e n t , regional exile, noninstitutional psychiatric treatment, a n d so f o r t h . B u t little seems k n o w n about these differentiating factors; a n d w h e n one studies actual c o m m i t m e n t s , alternate outcomes f r e q u e n t l y appear to have b e e n possible. It seems true, m o r e -

Separating those offenses w h i c h c o u l d have b e e n used as grounds for hospitalizing the offender f r o m those that are so used, one finds a vast n u m b e r of w h a t students of o c c u p a t i o n call career c o n t i n g e n c i e s . Some of these contingencies in the m e n t a l patient's career have b e e n suggested, if not e x p l o r e d , such as socio-economic status, visibility of the offense, p r o x i m i t y to a m e n tal hospital, amount of treatment facilities available, c o m m u n i t y r e g a r d for the type of treatment g i v e n i n available hospitals, a n d s o o n . F o r i n f o r m a t i o n about other contingencies one must rely on atrocity tales: a psychotic m a n is tolerated by his w i f e u n t i l she finds herself a boy f r i e n d , or by his adult c h i l d r e n u n t i l they m o v e f r o m a house to an apartment; an alcoholic is sent to a m e n t a l hospital because the j a i l is f u l l , a n d a d r u g addict because he declines to avail himself of psychiatric treatment on the outside; a rebellious adolescent daughter can no longer be m a n a g e d at h o m e because she n o w threatens to have an o p e n affair w i t h an unsuitable c o m p a n i o n ; a n d so o n . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y there is an equally i m p o r t a n t set of contingencies causing the person to by-pass this fate. A n d should the person enter the hospital, still another set of contingencies w i l l h e l p determ i n e w h e n he is to obtain a dischargesuch as the desire of his f a m i l y for his r e t u r n , the availability of a " m a n a g e a b l e " job, a n d so on. T h e society's
13 1 4

1 2

C l a u s e n a n d Y a r r o w ; see f o o t n o t e 4 . A n e x p l i c i t a p p l i c a t i o n o f this n o t i o n t o t h e f i e l d o f m e n t a l Social Control," Sociology and Social Research (1946)

1 3

health m a y b e f o u n d i n E d w i n M . L e m e r t , " L e g a l C o m m i t m e n t and 30:370-378.

1 1

T h e distinction e m p l o y e d here b e t w e e n willing a n d unwilling

1 4

F o r example, J e r o m e K . M e y e r s a n d Leslie Schaffer, "Social Sociological Rev. 402-403. (1954) 19:307-310. L e m e r t , see 1941;

p a t i e n t s cuts across t h e l e g a l o n e , o f v o l u n t a r y a n d c o m m i t t e d , since s o m e persons w h o are g l a d to c o m e to t h e m e n t a l hospital m a y b e legally c o m m i t t e d , a n d o f those w h o c o m e o n l y because of strong familial pressure, some m a y sign themselves in as volu n t a r y patients.

Stratification a n d Psychiatric Practice: A Study of an O u t p a t i e n t C l i n i c , " Amer. footnote 5, pp. Patients in Mental Institutions,

W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , D e p a r t m e n t o f C o m m e r c e , B u r e a u o f the C e n s u s , 1941; p. 2.

366
official v i e w is that inmates of m e n t a l hospitals are there p r i m a r i l y because they are suffering f r o m m e n t a l illness. H o w e v e r , i n the degree that the " m e n t a l l y i l l " outside hospitals n u m e r i c a l l y approach or surpass those inside hospitals, one c o u l d say that m e n t a l patients distinctively suffer not f r o m m e n t a l illness, but f r o m contingencies. C a r e e r contingencies occur i n conjunction w i t h a second feature of the prepatient's c a r e e r the circuit of agentsand agenciesthat participate fatefully in his passage f r o m c i v i l i a n to patient status. H e r e is an instance of that increasi n g l y i m p o r t a n t class of social system whose elements are agents and agencies, w h i c h are brought into systemic c o n n e c t i o n t h r o u g h h a v i n g to take up and send on the same persons. Some of these agent-roles w i l l be c i t e d n o w , w i t h the understanding that in any concrete circuit a role m a y be filled m o r e than once, a n d a single person may fill m o r e than one of t h e m .
15

PART V

Research Implications a n d A p p l i c a t i o n s

a n d the significant agent has become the hospital administrator. W h i l e the complainant usually takes action in a lay capacity as a c i t i z e n , an employer, a neighbor, or a k i n s m a n , mediators t e n d to be specialists a n d differ f r o m those they serve in significant ways. T h e y have experience i n h a n d l i n g trouble, a n d some professional distance f r o m w h a t they handle. E x c e p t in the case of p o l i c e m e n , a n d perhaps some clergy, they t e n d to be m o r e psychiatrically o r i e n t e d than the lay public, and w i l l see the n e e d for treatment at times w h e n the p u b l i c does n o t .
1 6

First is the next-of-relationthe person w h o m the prepatient sees as the most available of those u p o n w h o m he should be able to most d e p e n d in times of trouble; in this instance the last to doubt his sanity and the first to have done e v e r y t h i n g to save h i m f r o m the fate w h i c h , it transpires, he has been approaching. T h e patient's next-of-relation is usually his next of k i n ; the special t e r m is i n t r o d u c e d because he n e e d not be. Second is the complainant, the person w h o retrospectively appears to have started the person on his way to the hospital. T h i r d are the mediatorsthe sequence of agents a n d agencies to w h i c h the prepatient is r e f e r r e d and through w h i c h he is relayed and processed on his way to the hospital. H e r e are i n c l u d e d police, clergy, general m e d i c a l practitioners, office psychiatrists, personnel in p u b l i c clinics, lawyers, social service workers, school teachers, a n d so on. O n e of these agents w i l l have the legal mandate to sanction c o m m i t m e n t and w i l l exercise it, a n d so those agents w h o precede h i m i n the process w i l l b e i n v o l v e d in something whose outcome is not yet settled. W h e n the mediators retire f r o m the scene, the prepatient has become an inpatient,

An interesting feature of these roles is the functional effects of their interdigitation. F o r example, the feelings of the patient w i l l be influe n c e d by w h e t h e r or not the person w h o fills the role of complainant also has the role of next-ofrelationan embarrassing c o m b i n a t i o n m o r e prevalent, apparently, in the higher classes than in the l o w e r . Some of the emergent effects w i l l b e considered n o w .
1 7 1 8

In the prepatient's progress f r o m h o m e to the hospital he m a y participate as a t h i r d person in what he may c o m e to experience as a k i n d of alienative coalition. H i s next-of-relation presses h i m into c o m i n g to "talk things o v e r " w i t h a m e d i cal practitioner, an office psychiatrist, or some other counselor. D i s i n c l i n a t i o n on his part m a y be m e t by threatening h i m w i t h desertion, diso w n m e n t , or other legal action, or by stressing the joint a n d explorative nature of the i n t e r v i e w . B u t typically the next-of-relation w i l l have set the i n t e r v i e w u p , in the sense of selecting the professional, arranging for t i m e , telling the professional something about the case, a n d so on. This m o v e effectively tends to establish the next-of-relation as the responsible person to w h o m pertinent findings can be d i v u l g e d , w h i l e effectively establish-

1 6

See C u m m i n g , footnote 3; p. 92. 187.

" H o l l i n g s h e a d a n d R e d l i c h , footnote 4; p.
1 8

F o r an analysis of s o m e of these circuit i m p l i c a t i o n s for the Mental Patient and the Hospital Psychiatrist," / Social

i n p a t i e n t , see L e i l a C . D e a s y a n d O l i v e W . Q u i n n , " T h e W i f e of the Issues ( 1 9 5 5 ) 11:49-60. A n interesting illustration of this k i n d Social Problems ( 1 9 5 6 ) 4 : 6 8 - 7 5 . in Robert Merton, British J . "The Sociology

o f analysis m a y also b e f o u n d i n A l a n G . G o w m a n , " B l i n d n e s s a n d the R o l e of C o m p a n i o n , "

1 S

F o r o n e c i r c u i t o f a g e n t s a n d its b e a r i n g o n c a r e e r c o n t i n g e n Sociology ( 1 9 4 8 ) 53:227-336.

general

statement

may

be

found

c i e s , s e e O s w a l d H a l l , " T h e S t a g e s o f a M e d i c a l C a r e e r , " Amer. J.

R o l e Set: P r o b l e m s in S o c i o l o g i c a l T h e o r y , " (1957) 8 : 1 0 6 - 1 2 0 .

Goffman
i n g the other as the patient. T h e prepatient often goes to the i n t e r v i e w w i t h the understanding that he is going as an equal of someone w h o is so b o u n d together w i t h h i m that a t h i r d person c o u l d not come b e t w e e n t h e m in f u n d a m e n t a l matters; this, after all, is one way in w h i c h close relationships are defined in our society. U p o n a r r i v a l at the office the prepatient suddenly finds that he a n d his next-of-relation have not b e e n accorded the same roles, and apparently that a p r i o r understanding b e t w e e n the professional and the nextof-relation has b e e n put in operation against h i m . In the extreme but c o m m o n case the professional first sees the prepatient alone, in the role of examiner a n d diagnostician, a n d t h e n sees the nextof-relation alone, in the role of advisor, w h i l e carefully a v o i d i n g talking things over seriously w i t h t h e m b o t h t o g e t h e r . A n d e v e n i n those nonconsultative cases w h e r e p u b l i c officials must forcibly extract a person f r o m a f a m i l y that wants to tolerate h i m , the next-of-relation is l i k e l y to be i n d u c e d to "go a l o n g " w i t h the official action, so that e v e n here the prepatient m a y feel that an alienative coalition has b e e n f o r m e d against h i m .
19

367
T h e d e p t h to w h i c h the patient m a y feel betrayed by his next-of-relation seems to be i n creased by the fact that another witnesses his betrayala factor w h i c h is apparently significant in m a n y three-party situations. A n offended person may w e l l act forbearantly a n d accommodatively t o w a r d an offender w h e n the two are alone, choosing peace ahead of justice. T h e presence of a witness, h o w e v e r , seems to a d d something to the implications of the offense. F o r t h e n it is bey o n d the p o w e r of the offended a n d offender to forget about, erase, or suppress what has happ e n e d ; the offense has become a p u b l i c social f a c t . W h e n the witness is a m e n t a l health c o m mission, as is sometimes the case, the witnessed betrayal can verge on a "degradation cerem o n y . " In such circumstances, the offended patient m a y feel that some k i n d of extensive reparative action is r e q u i r e d before witnesses, if his honor a n d social weight are to be restored.
20 2 1

T h e m o r a l experience o f b e i n g t h i r d m a n i n such a coalition is l i k e l y to embitter the prepatient, especially since his troubles have already probably l e d to some estrangement f r o m his nextof-relation. After he enters the hospital, c o n t i n u e d visits by his next-of-relation can give the patient the " i n s i g h t " that his o w n best interests w e r e bei n g served. B u t the i n i t i a l visits m a y t e m p o r a r i l y strengthen his feeling of abandonment; he is l i k e l y to beg his visitor to get h i m out or at least to get h i m m o r e privileges a n d to sympathize w i t h the monstrousness of his p l i g h t t o w h i c h the visitor ordinarily can respond only by t r y i n g to m a i n t a i n a hopeful note, by not " h e a r i n g " the requests, or by assuring the patient that the m e d i cal authorities k n o w about these things a n d are d o i n g what is medically best. T h e visitor t h e n n o n chalantly goes back into a w o r l d that the patient has l e a r n e d is i n c r e d i b l y thick w i t h f r e e d o m and privileges, causing the patient to feel that his nextof-relation is m e r e l y a d d i n g a pious gloss to a clear case of traitorous desertion.
1 9

T w o other aspects of sensed betrayal should be m e n t i o n e d . First, those w h o suggest the possib i l i t y of another's e n t e r i n g a m e n t a l hospital are not l i k e l y to p r o v i d e a realistic picture of h o w i n fact i t may strike h i m w h e n h e arrives. O f t e n he is t o l d that he w i l l get r e q u i r e d m e d i c a l treatm e n t a n d a rest, a n d may be out in a few months or so. In some cases they may thus be concealing what they k n o w , but I think, in general, they w i l l be t e l l i n g what they see as the t r u t h . F o r here there is a quite relevant difference b e t w e e n patients a n d m e d i a t i n g professionals; mediators, m o r e so than the p u b l i c at large, may conceive of m e n t a l hospitals as short-term m e d i c a l establishments w h e r e r e q u i r e d rest and attention can be voluntarily obtained, and not as places of coerced exile. W h e n the prepatient finally arrives he is l i k e l y to l e a r n quite q u i c k l y , quite differently. H e t h e n f i n d s that the i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n h i m about life in the hospital has h a d the effect of his h a v i n g put up less resistance to e n t e r i n g than he n o w sees he w o u l d have put up h a d he k n o w n the facts. W h a t e v e r the intentions of those w h o p a r t i c i p a t e d in his transition f r o m person to patient, he m a y sense they have in ef2 0

A paraphrase f r o m K u r t Riezler, " T h e Social P s y c h o l o g y o f Sociology (1943) 48:458. See H a r o l d G a r f i n k e l , " C o n d i t i o n s o f Successful D e g r a d a t i o n Sociology (1956) 61:420424.

1 h a v e o n e case r e c o r d o f a m a n w h o c l a i m s h e t h o u g h t h e

S h a m e , " Amer. J.
2 1

was t a k i n g his w i f e t o see t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t , n o t r e a l i z i n g u n t i l too late that his w i f e h a d m a d e t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s .

C e r e m o n i e s , " Amer. J.

368
feet " c o n n e d " h i m into his present p r e d i c a m e n t . I am suggesting that the prepatient starts out w i t h at least a p o r t i o n of the rights, liberties, a n d satisfactions of the c i v i l i a n a n d ends up on a psychiatric w a r d stripped of almost e v e r y t h i n g . T h e question here is how this s t r i p p i n g is managed. This is the second aspect of betrayal I want to consider. As the prepatient m a y see it, the c i r c u i t of significant figures can f u n c t i o n as a k i n d of betrayal funnel. Passage f r o m p e r s o n to patient m a y be effected through a series of l i n k e d stages, each m a n a g e d by a different agent. W h i l e each stage tends to b r i n g a sharp decrease in adult free status, each agent m a y try to m a i n t a i n the f i c t i o n that n o further decrease w i l l occur. H e m a y e v e n manage to t u r n the prepatient over to the next agent w h i l e sustaining this note. F u r ther, t h r o u g h words, cues, a n d gestures, the prepatient is i m p l i c i t l y asked by the c u r r e n t agent t o j o i n w i t h h i m i n sustaining a r u n n i n g l i n e o f polite small talk that tactfully avoids the administrative facts of the situation, b e c o m i n g , w i t h each stage, progressively m o r e at odds w i t h these facts. T h e spouse w o u l d rather not have to cry to get the prepatient to visit a psychiatrist; psychiatrists w o u l d rather not have a scene w h e n the p r e p a tient learns that he and his spouse are b e i n g seen separately a n d in different ways; the police infreq u e n t l y b r i n g a prepatient to the hospital in a strait jacket, finding it m u c h easier all a r o u n d to give h i m a cigarette, some k i n d l y words, a n d freed o m to relax in the back seat of the patrol car; a n d finally, the a d m i t t i n g psychiatrist finds he can do his w o r k better in the relative quiet a n d l u x u r y of the "admission suite" w h e r e , as an i n c i d e n t a l consequence, the n o t i o n c a n survive that a m e n t a l hospital is i n d e e d a c o m f o r t i n g place. If the prepatient heeds all of these i m p l i e d requests a n d is reasonably decent about the w h o l e t h i n g , he can travel the whole circuit f r o m h o m e to hospital w i t h o u t f o r c i n g anyone to look d i r e c t l y at what is h a p p e n i n g or to deal w i t h the r a w e m o t i o n that his situation m i g h t w e l l cause h i m to express. H i s s h o w i n g consideration for those w h o are m o v i n g h i m t o w a r d the hospital allows t h e m to show consideration for h i m , w i t h the j o i n t result that these interactions can be sustained w i t h some of the protective h a r m o n y characteristic of o r d i n a r y

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

face-to-face dealings. B u t should the n e w patient cast his m i n d back over the sequence of steps leading to hospitalization, he may feel that everyone's current comfort was b e i n g busily sustained w h i l e his long-range welfare was b e i n g u n d e r m i n e d . This realization may constitute a m o r a l experience that further separates h i m for the t i m e f r o m the people on the o u t s i d e .
22

I w o u l d n o w l i k e to look at the c i r c u i t of career agents f r o m the point of v i e w of the agents themselves. Mediators in the person's transition f r o m c i v i l to patient statusas w e l l as his keepers, once he is in the hospitalhave an interest in establishing a responsible next-of-relation as the patient's d e p u t y or guardian; should there be no obvious candidate for the role, someone m a y be sought out a n d pressed into it. Thus w h i l e a p e r s o n is gradually b e i n g transformed into a patient, a next-of-relation is gradually b e i n g transformed into a guardian. W i t h a guardian on the scene, the w h o l e transition process can b e k e p t t i d y . H e is l i k e l y to be familiar w i t h the prepatient's c i v i l involvements a n d business, a n d can tie up loose ends that m i g h t otherwise be left to entangle the hospital. Some of the prepatient's abrogated c i v i l rights c a n be transferred to h i m , thus h e l p i n g to sustain the legal fiction that w h i l e the prepatient does not actually have his rights he somehow actually has not lost t h e m . Inpatients c o m m o n l y sense, at least for a t i m e , that hospitalization is a massive unjust d e p r i vation, a n d sometimes succeed in c o n v i n c i n g a few persons on the outside that this is the case. It often turns out to be useful, then, for those identified w i t h i n f l i c t i n g these deprivations, h o w ever justifiably, to be able to point to the cooperation a n d agreement of someone whose relation2 2

C o n c e n t r a t i o n c a m p practices provide a good example of the

function of the betrayal f u n n e l in i n d u c i n g cooperation a n d r e d u c i n g s t r u g g l e a n d fuss, a l t h o u g h h e r e t h e m e d i a t o r s c o u l d not b e said t o b e a c t i n g i n the best interests o f t h e i n m a t e s . Police p i c k i n g up persons f r o m their homes w o u l d sometimes j o k e g o o d - n a t u r e d l y a n d offer to wait w h i l e coffee was b e i n g served. Gas chambers w e r e fitted out like delousing rooms, a n d v i c t i m s t a k i n g off t h e i r c l o t h e s w e r e t o l d t o n o t e w h e r e t h e y w e r e l e a v i n g t h e m . T h e sick, a g e d , w e a k , o r insane w h o w e r e selected for extermination w e r e sometimes d r i v e n away in R e d Cross ambulances to camps referred to by terms such as "observ a t i o n h o s p i t a l . " S e e D a v i d B o d e r , I Did Not Interview the Dead; U r b a n a , U n i v . o f I l l i n o i s P r e s s , 1949; p . 81; a n d E l i e A . C o h e n , Human 1954; Behavior pp. 32, 37, in the 107. Concentration Camp; London, Cape,

Goffman

369 professionals, and be defined by t h e m as a m o r a l duty, relieves the next-of-relation of some of the guilt he may f e e l . It is a poignant fact that an adult son or daughter may be pressed into the role of mediator, so that the hostility that m i g h t otherwise be d i r e c t e d against the spouse is passed on to the c h i l d . O n c e the prepatient is in the hospital, the same g u i l t - c a r r y i n g f u n c t i o n may become a significant part of the staff's job in regard to the nexto f - r e l a t i o n . These reasons for feeling that he himself has not betrayed the patient, e v e n though the patient m a y t h e n think so, can later p r o v i d e the next-of-relation w i t h a defensible l i n e to take w h e n visiting the patient in the hospital a n d a basis for h o p i n g that the relationship can be reestablished after its hospital m o r a t o r i u m . A n d of course this position, w h e n sensed by the patient, can p r o v i d e h i m w i t h excuses for the next-of-relation, w h e n and if he comes to look for t h e m .
25 2 6 27 2 8

ship to the patient places h i m above suspicion, firmly defining h i m as the person most l i k e l y to have the patient's personal interest at heart. If the guardian is satisfied w i t h what is h a p p e n i n g to the n e w inpatient, the w o r l d ought to b e . N o w it w o u l d seem that the greater the legitimate personal stake one party has in another, the better he can take the role of guardian to the other. B u t the structural arrangements in society w h i c h lead to the a c k n o w l e d g e d m e r g i n g of t w o persons' interests lead to additional consequences. F o r the person to w h o m the patient turns for help)for protection against such threats as involuntary c o m m i t m e n t i s just the person to w h o m the mediators a n d hospital administrators logically t u r n for authorization. It is understandable, then, that some patients w i l l come to sense, at least for a time, that the closeness of a relationship tells n o t h i n g of its trustworthiness.
2 3

T h e r e are still other functional effects emergi n g f r o m this c o m p l e m e n t of roles. If a n d w h e n the next-of-relation appeals to mediators for help in the trouble he is h a v i n g w i t h the prepatient, hospitalization may not, in fact, be in his m i n d . He m a y not e v e n perceive the prepatient as m e n tally sick, or, if he does, he may not consistently h o l d to this v i e w . It is the c i r c u i t of mediators, w i t h their greater psychiatric sophistication and their belief in the m e d i c a l character of m e n t a l hospitals, that w i l l often define the situation for the next-of-relation, assuring h i m that hospitalization is a possible solution a n d a good one, that it involves no betrayal, but is rather a m e d i c a l action taken in the best interests of the prepatient. H e r e the next-of-relation m a y l e a r n that d o i n g his duty to the prepatient may cause the prepatient to distrust a n d e v e n hate h i m for the t i m e . B u t the fact that this course of action may have had to be p o i n t e d out a n d prescribed by
2 4

Thus w h i l e the next-of-relation can p e r f o r m important functions for the mediators and hospital administrators, they i n t u r n can p e r f o r m i m portant functions for h i m . O n e f i n d s , then, a n e m ergent u n i n t e n d e d exchange or reciprocation of functions, these functions themselves b e i n g often unintended. T h e final point I want to consider about the prepatient's m o r a l career is its p e c u l i a r l y retroactive character. U n t i l a person actually arrives at the hospital there usually seems no w a y of k n o w i n g for sure that he is destined to do so,

2 5

T h i s guilt-carrying f u n c t i o n i s f o u n d , o f course, i n other role-

complexes. T h u s , w h e n a middle-class couple engages in the process of legal separation or d i v o r c e , e a c h of their lawyers u s u a l l y takes t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t his j o b i s t o a c q u a i n t his c l i e n t w i t h a l l o f t h e p o t e n t i a l c l a i m s a n d r i g h t s , p r e s s i n g his c l i e n t i n t o d e m a n d i n g these, i n spite o f a n y n i c e t y o f feelings a b o u t the r i g h t s a n d honorableness o f the ex-partner. T h e client, i n a l l g o o d f a i t h , c a n t h e n say t o s e l f a n d t o t h e e x - p a r t n e r t h a t t h e d e m a n d s a r e b e i n g m a d e o n l y b e c a u s e t h e l a w y e r insists it is b e s t to do so.
2 6

2 3

I n t e r v i e w s c o l l e c t e d b y t h e C l a u s e n g r o u p a t N I M H suggest

that w h e n a wife c o m e s to be a g u a r d i a n , the responsibility m a y disrupt previous distance f r o m in-laws, l e a d i n g either to a n e w supportive coalition w i t h t h e m or to a m a r k e d withdrawal from them.
2 4

R e c o r d e d i n the C l a u s e n data. T h i s p o i n t i s m a d e b y C u m m i n g , see f o o t n o t e 3 ; p . 129. T h e r e i s a n interesting contrast here w i t h the m o r a l career

2 7

2 8

F o r a n analysis o f t h e s e n o n p s y c h i a t r i c k i n d s o f p e r c e p t i o n ,

o f the tuberculosis p a t i e n t . I a m t o l d b y Julius R o t h that t u b e r c u lous p a t i e n t s a r e l i k e l y t o c o m e t o t h e h o s p i t a l w i l l i n g l y , a g r e e i n g w i t h their next-of-relation about treatment. L a t e r in their hospital c a r e e r , w h e n t h e y l e a r n h o w l o n g t h e y y e t h a v e t o stay a n d h o w d e p r i v i n g a n d irrational some of the hospital rulings a r e , t h e y m a y s e e k t o l e a v e , b e a d v i s e d a g a i n s t t h i s b y t h e staff a n d b y relatives, a n d o n l y t h e n b e g i n t o feel b e t r a y e d .

see M a r i a n R a d k e Y a r r o w , C h a r l o t t e G r e e n S c h w a r t z , H a r r i e t S. M u r p h y , and Leila Calhoun Deasy, " T h e Psychological M e a n i n g o f M e n t a l Illness i n t h e F a m i l y , " / Social Issues (1955) 1 1 : 1 2 24; Charlotte Green Schwartz, of their "Perspectives Husbands' on Deviance: Illness,"

Wives'

Definitions

Mental

Psychiatry (1957)

20:275-291.

370 g i v e n the determinative role of career contingencies. A n d u n t i l the point of hospitalization is reached, he or others m a y not conceive of h i m as a person w h o is b e c o m i n g a m e n t a l patient. H o w e v e r , since he w i l l be h e l d against his w i l l in the hospital, his next-of-relation a n d the hospital staff w i l l be in great n e e d of a rationale for the hardships they are sponsoring. T h e m e d i c a l elements of the staff w i l l also n e e d e v i d e n c e that they are still in the trade they w e r e t r a i n e d for. These problems are eased, no doubt u n i n t e n t i o n ally, but the case-history construction that is p l a c e d on the patient's past life, this h a v i n g the effect of demonstrating that all along he had b e e n b e c o m i n g sick, that he finally became v e r y sick, a n d that i f h e h a d not b e e n hospitalized m u c h worse things w o u l d have h a p p e n e d to h i m a l l of w h i c h , of course, m a y be true. Incidentally, if the patient wants to m a k e sense out of his stay in the hospital, and, as already suggested, keep alive the possibility of once again c o n c e i v i n g of his next-of-relation as a decent, w e l l - m e a n i n g person, t h e n he too w i l l have reason to believe some of this psychiatric w o r k - u p of his past. H e r e is a v e r y ticklish point for the sociology of careers. An important aspect of every career is the v i e w the person constructs w h e n he looks b a c k w a r d over his progress; in a sense, h o w e v e r , the w h o l e of the prepatient career derives f r o m this reconstruction. T h e fact of h a v i n g had a prepatient career, starting w i t h an effective c o m plaint, becomes an i m p o r t a n t part of the m e n t a l patient's orientation, but this part can b e g i n to be p l a y e d only after hospitalization proves that what he h a d b e e n h a v i n g , but no longer has, is a career as a prepatient.

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

not to be k n o w n to anyone as a person w h o c o u l d possibly be r e d u c e d to these present c i r c u m stances, or as a person w h o c o n d u c t e d h i m s e l f i n the w a y h e d i d p r i o r t o c o m m i t m e n t . Consequently, he m a y a v o i d talking to anyone, m a y stay b y himself w h e n possible, a n d m a y e v e n b e " o u t of c o n t a c t " or " m a n i c " so as to avoid r a t i f y i n g any i n t e r a c t i o n that presses a politely r e c i p r o c a l role u p o n h i m a n d opens h i m u p t o w h a t h e has b e c o m e in the eyes of others. W h e n the next-ofrelation makes an effort to visit, he m a y be rej e c t e d by m u t i s m , or by the patient's refusal to enter the v i s i t i n g r o o m , these strategies sometimes suggesting that the patient still clings to a r e m n a n t of relatedness to those w h o m a d e up his past, a n d is p r o t e c t i n g this r e m n a n t f r o m the final destructiveness of dealing w i t h the n e w peop l e that they have b e c o m e .
29

Usually the patient comes to give up this taxi n g effort at a n o n y m i t y , at not-hereness, a n d begins to present h i m e l f for conventional social i n teraction to the hospital c o m m u n i t y . T h e r e a f t e r he w i t h d r a w s only in special waysby always usi n g his n i c k n a m e , by signing his c o n t r i b u t i o n to the patient w e e k l y w i t h his i n i t i a l only, or by using the innocuous " c o v e r " address tactfully p r o v i d e d by some hospitals; or he withdraws only at special times, w h e n , say, a flock of n u r s i n g students makes a passing tour of the w a r d , or w h e n , p a r o l e d to the hospital grounds, he suddenly sees he is about to cross the p a t h of a c i v i l i a n he happens to k n o w f r o m h o m e . Sometimes this m a k i n g of oneself available is c a l l e d " s e t t l i n g d o w n " by the attendants. It marks a n e w stand openly taken a n d supported by the patient, a n d resembles the " c o m i n g o u t " process that occurs i n other groupings.
30
2 9

T H E INPATIENT PHASE T h e last step in the prepatient's career can i n v o l v e his realization-justified or notthat he has b e e n deserted by society a n d t u r n e d out of relationships by those closest to h i m . Interestingly enough, the patient, especially a first admission, may manage to keep himself f r o m c o m i n g to the e n d of this trail, e v e n t h o u g h in fact he is n o w i n a l o c k e d m e n t a l hospital w a r d . O n e n t e r i n g the hospital, he may v e r y strongly feel the desire

T h e inmate's initial strategy o f h o l d i n g h i m s e l f aloof f r o m

r a t i f y i n g contact m a y p a r t l y a c c o u n t for the relative lack o f g r o u p - f o r m a t i o n a m o n g i n m a t e s in p u b l i c m e n t a l hospitals, a c o n n e c t i o n that has b e e n suggested t o m e b y W i l l i a m R . S m i t h . T h e desire t o a v o i d p e r s o n a l b o n d s that w o u l d g i v e l i c e n s e t o t h e a s k i n g o f b i o g r a p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s c o u l d also b e a f a c t o r . I n m e n t a l h o s p i t a l s , o f c o u r s e , a s i n p r i s o n e r c a m p s , t h e staff m a y consciously break u p i n c i p i e n t group-formation i n o r d e r t o a v o i d collective rebellious action a n d other w a r d disturbances.
3 0

A c o m p a r a b l e c o m i n g out occurs i n the homosexual w o r l d ,

w h e n a p e r s o n finally c o m e s frankly to present h i m s e l f to a " g a y " g a t h e r i n g n o t as a tourist b u t as s o m e o n e w h o is " a v a i l able." See Evelyn Hooker, "A Preliminary Examination of G r o u p B e h a v i o r of H o m o s e x u a l s , " / . Psychology (1956) 4 2 : 2 1 7 -

225; especially p. 221. A g o o d fictionalized t r e a t m e n t m a y be

Goffman O n c e the prepatient begins to settle d o w n , the m a i n outlines of his fate t e n d to follow those of a w h o l e class of segregated establishments jails, concentration camps, monasteries, w o r k camps, and so o n i n w h i c h the i n m a t e spends the w h o l e r o u n d of life on the grounds, a n d marches through his r e g i m e n t e d day in the i m m e diate c o m p a n y of a group of persons of his o w n institutional status.
31

371 w i l l receive stringent punishments expressed i n terms of loss of privileges; for obedience he w i l l eventually be a l l o w e d to reacquire some of the m i n o r satisfactions he took for granted on the outside. T h e institutionalization of these radically different levels of l i v i n g throws light on the i m p l i c a tions for self of social settings. A n d this in t u r n affirms that the self arises not m e r e l y out of its possessor's interactions w i t h significant others, but also out of the arrangements that are e v o l v e d in an organization for its members. T h e r e are some settings w h i c h the person easily discounts as an expression or extension of h i m . W h e n a tourist goes s l u m m i n g , he m a y take pleasure in the situation not because it is a reflect i o n of h i m but because it so assuredly is not. T h e r e are other settings, such as l i v i n g rooms, w h i c h the person manages o n his o w n a n d e m ploys to influence in a favorable d i r e c t i o n other persons' views o f h i m . A n d there are still other settings, such as a w o r k place, w h i c h express the employee's occupational status, but over w h i c h he has no final c o n t r o l , this b e i n g exerted, h o w ever tactfully, by his e m p l o y e r . M e n t a l hospitals p r o v i d e an extreme instance of this latter possibility. A n d this is due not m e r e l y to their u n i q u e l y d e g r a d e d l i v i n g levels, but also to the u n i q u e way in w h i c h significance for self is made explicit to the patient, p i e r c i n g l y , persistently, a n d thoroughly. O n c e l o d g e d on a g i v e n w a r d , the patient is firmly instructed that the restrictions a n d d e p r i vations he encounters are not due to such things as tradition or e c o n o m y a n d hence dissociable f r o m selfbut are intentional parts of his treatment, part of his n e e d at the time, a n d therefore an expression of the state that his self has fallen to. H a v i n g every reason to initiate requests for better conditions, he is told that w h e n the staff feels he is "able to m a n a g e " or w i l l be " c o m f o r t able w i t h " a higher w a r d l e v e l , then appropriate action w i l l be taken. In short, assignment to a g i v e n w a r d is presented not as a r e w a r d or p u n i s h ment, but as an expression of his general l e v e l of social f u n c t i o n i n g , his status as a person. G i v e n the fact that the worst w a r d levels p r o v i d e a r o u n d of life that inpatients w i t h organic b r a i n damage can easily manage, and that these quite l i m i t e d h u m a n beings are present to p r o v e it, one

L i k e the neophyte i n m a n y o f these "total institutions," the n e w inpatient finds himself cleanly stripped of m a n y of his accustomed affirmations, satisfactions, a n d defenses, and is subj e c t e d to a rather f u l l set of m o r t i f y i n g experiences: restriction of free m o v e m e n t ; c o m m u n a l l i v i n g ; diffuse authority of a w h o l e e c h e l o n of peop l e ; a n d so o n . H e r e one begins to l e a r n about the l i m i t e d extent to w h i c h a c o n c e p t i o n of oneself c a n be sustained w h e n the usual setting of supports for it are suddenly r e m o v e d . W h i l e u n d e r g o i n g these h u m b l i n g m o r a l experiences, the inpatient learns to orient himself i n terms o f the " w a r d s y s t e m . " I n p u b l i c m e n t a l hospitals this usually consists of a series of g r a d e d l i v i n g arrangements built a r o u n d wards, administrative units called services, a n d parole statuses. T h e " w o r s t " l e v e l involves often n o t h i n g but w o o d e n benches to sit o n , some quite indifferent food, a n d a small piece of r o o m to sleep i n . T h e " b e s t " l e v e l m a y i n v o l v e a r o o m of one's o w n , g r o u n d and t o w n privileges, contacts w i t h staff that are relatively u n d a m a g i n g , a n d what is seen as g o o d food a n d ample recreational facilities. F o r disobeying the pervasive house rules, the i n m a t e
32

found

in James

Baldwin's

Giovanni's Room;

New

York,

Dial,

1956; p p . 4 1 - 6 3 . A f a m i l i a r i n s t a n c e o f t h e c o m i n g o u t p r o c e s s is no doubt to be been left in an f o u n d a m o n g prepubertal children at the huff and derives by injured from amour-propre. a for The their m o m e n t o n e o f t h e s e a c t o r s sidles back i n t o a r o o m t h a t h a d angered arranged phrase itself once presumably rite-de-passage

ceremony

upper-class

mothers

daughters. Interestingly e n o u g h , i n large m e n t a l hospitals the patient sometimes s y m b o l i z e s a c o m p l e t e c o m i n g out by his first active participation in the hospital-wide patient dance.
3 1

See G o f f m a n , "Characteristics o f T o t a l Institutions," p p . 4 3 in Proceedings 1959. Human Problems of a State Mental 164. Hospital; New of the Symposium of Preventive and Social

84;

Psychiatry; W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , W a l t e r R e e d A r m y I n s t i t u t e o f Research,
3 2

A g o o d description o f the w a r d system m a y b e f o u n d i n Ivan 1956; see e s p e c i a l l y p .

Belknap,

York, M c G r a w - H i l l ,

372
can appreciate some of the m i r r o r i n g effects of the h o s p i t a l . T h e w a r d system, then, is an extreme i n stance of h o w the physical facts of an establish m e n t can be explicitly e m p l o y e d to frame the conception a person takes of himself. In addition, the official psychiatric mandate of m e n t a l hospi tals gives rise to e v e n m o r e direct, e v e n m o r e blatant, attacks upon the inmate's v i e w of himself. T h e m o r e " m e d i c a l " and the m o r e progressive a m e n t a l hospital isthe m o r e it attempts to be therapeutic and not m e r e l y custodialthe m o r e he m a y be confronted by h i g h - r a n k i n g staff argu i n g that his past has been a failure, that the cause of this has been w i t h i n himself, that his attitude to life is w r o n g , and that if he wants to be a person he w i l l have to change his way of dealing w i t h people and his conceptions of himself. O f t e n the m o r a l value of these verbal assaults w i l l be brought h o m e to h i m by r e q u i r i n g h i m to practice taking this psychiatric v i e w of himself in arranged confessional periods, w h e t h e r in private sessions or group psychotherapy.
33

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications sad tale is appropriate. Interestingly enough, the m o r e the person's past forces h i m out of apparent alignment w i t h central m o r a l values, the m o r e often he seems c o m p e l l e d to tell his sad tale in any c o m p a n y in w h i c h he finds himself. Perhaps he partly responds to the n e e d he feels in others of not h a v i n g their sense of proper life courses affronted. In any case, it is a m o n g convicts, ' w i no's,' and prostitutes that one seems to obtain sad tales the most r e a d i l y . It is the vicissitudes of the m e n t a l patient's sad tale that I want to con sider n o w .
34

N o w a general point may be made about the m o r a l career of inpatients w h i c h has bearing on m a n y m o r a l careers. G i v e n the stage that any per son has reached in a career, one typically finds that he constructs an image of his life c o u r s e past, present, and f u t u r e w h i c h selects, ab stracts, and distorts in such a way as to p r o v i d e h i m w i t h a v i e w of himself that he can usefully e x p o u n d in current situations. Q u i t e generally, the person's line c o n c e r n i n g self defensively brings h i m into appropriate alignment w i t h the basic values of his society, and so m a y be called an apologia. If the person can manage to present a v i e w of his current situation w h i c h shows the operation of favorable personal qualities in the past and a favorable destiny awaiting h i m , it m a y be called a success story. If the facts of a person's past a n d present are extremely dismal, then about the best he can do is to show that he is not respon sible for what has become of h i m , and the t e r m

In the m e n t a l hospital, the setting and house rules press h o m e to patient that he is, after all, a m e n t a l case w h o has suffered some k i n d of social collapse on the outside, h a v i n g failed in some over-all way, and that here he is of little social weight, b e i n g hardly capable of acting l i k e a f u l l fledged person at all. These humiliations are l i k e l y to be most keenly felt by middle-class patients, since their previous condition of life little i m m u nizes t h e m against such affronts; but all patients feel some d o w n g r a d i n g . Just as any n o r m a l m e m ber of his outside subculture w o u l d do, the patient often responds to this situation by a t t e m p t i n g to assert a sad tale p r o v i n g that he is not " s i c k , " that the " l i t t l e t r o u b l e " he d i d get into was really somebody else's fault, that his past life course had some honor a n d rectitude, and that the hospital is therefore unjust in forcing the status of m e n t a l

3 4

In regard to convicts, London, Wingate,

s e e A n t h o n y H e c k s t a l l - S m i t h , Eighteen 1954; pp. 52-53. For Vino's' see

Months;

the discussion i n H o w a r d G . B a i n , " A Sociological Analysis o f the C h i c a g o S k i d - R o w L i f e w a y ; " u n p u b l i s h e d M . A . thesis, D e p t . o f S o c i o l o g y , U n i v . o f C h i c a g o , S e p t . , 1950; e s p e c i a l l y " T h e R a tionale of the S k i d - R o w D r i n k i n g G r o u p , " pp. 141-146. Bain's n e g l e c t e d thesis is a u s e f u l s o u r c e of m a t e r i a l on m o r a l careers. A p p a r e n t l y one of the occupational hazards of prostitution is that clients a n d other professional contacts sometimes persist in e x p r e s s i n g s y m p a t h y by a s k i n g for a defensible d r a m a t i c ex planation for the fall f r o m grace. In h a v i n g to bother to h a v e a sad tale r e a d y , p e r h a p s t h e prostitute is m o r e to be p i t i e d than damned. in G o o d examples of prostitute sad his Women London Bohn, Labour and and Cox, the 1862. by London . tales m a y b e Poor, H . Vol. 4; f o u n d i n Sir H e n r y M a y h e w , " T h o s e that W i l l N o t W o r k , " p p . 210-272; London, source, see Griffin, For a contemporary Rolph; Lon

of the Streets,

edited

d o n , Z e c k e r a n d W a r b u r g , 1955; especially p. 6. " A l m o s t always,

3 3

H e r e is one w a y in w h i c h m e n t a l hospitals can be worse than

h o w e v e r , after a f e w c o m m e n t s on the police, the g i r l w o u l d b e g i n to e x p l a i n h o w it was that she was in the life, usually in terms of self-justification." Lately, of course, the psychological e x p e r t has wald, Call helped out the profession Ballantine, in the construction of w h o l l y r e m a r k a b l e sad tales. See, for e x a m p l e , H a r o l d G r e e n Girl; N e w Y o r k , 1958.

concentration camps a n d prisons as places in w h i c h to " d o " time; in the latter, self-insulation f r o m the symbolic implications o f t h e settings m a y b e easier. I n fact, self-insulation f r o m h o s p i t a l settings m a y be so difficult that patients h a v e to e m p l o y devices f o r this w h i c h staff i n t e r p r e t a s p s y c h o t i c s y m p t o m s .

Goffrnan patient u p o n h i m . This self-respecting tendency is heavily institutionalized w i t h i n the patient society w h e r e o p e n i n g social contacts typically i n v o l v e the participants' v o l u n t e e r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about their current w a r d location a n d l e n g t h of stay so far, but not the reasons for their stay such interaction b e i n g c o n d u c t e d i n the m a n n e r of small talk on the o u t s i d e . W i t h greater f a m i l i arity, each patient usually volunteers relatively acceptable reasons for his hospitalization, at the same t i m e accepting without o p e n i m m e d i a t e question the lines offered by other patients. Such stories as the following are g i v e n and overtly accepted.
35

373 cally sustained fictions. F o r these face-to-face n i ceties t e n d to be qualified by behind-the-back gossip that comes only a degree closer to the "object i v e " facts. H e r e , of course, one can see a classic social function of i n f o r m a l networks of equals: they serve as one another's audience for self-supp o r t i n g talestales that are somewhat m o r e solid than p u r e fantasy and somewhat t h i n n e r than the facts. B u t the patient's apologia is called forth in a u n i q u e setting, for few settings c o u l d be be destructive of self-stories except, of course, those stories already constructed along psychiatric lines. A n d this destructiveness rests on m o r e than the official sheet of paper w h i c h attests that the patient is of unsound m i n d , a danger to himself a n d othersan attestation, incidentally, w h i c h seems to cut deeply into the patient's p r i d e , a n d into the possibility of his h a v i n g any. C e r t a i n l y the degrading conditions of the hospital setting belie m a n y of the self-stories that are presented by patients; and the v e r y fact of b e i n g in the m e n t a l hospital is evidence against these tales. A n d of course, there is not always sufficient patient solidarity to p r e v e n t patient discredi t i n g patient, just as there is not always a sufficient n u m b e r of " p r o f e s s i o n a l i z e d " attendants to prevent attendant discrediting patient. As one patient i n f o r m a n t repeatedly suggested to a fellow patient: If you're so smart, how come you got your ass in here? T h e m e n t a l hospital setting, however, is m o r e treacherous still. Staff has m u c h to gain through discreditings of the patient's storywhatever the felt reason for such discreditings. If the custodial faction in the hospital is to succeed in m a n a g i n g his daily r o u n d w i t h o u t complaint or trouble f r o m h i m , t h e n it w i l l p r o v e useful to be able to p o i n t out to h i m that the claims about h i m s e l f u p o n w h i c h he rationalizes his demands are false, that he is not what he is c l a i m i n g to be, a n d that in fact he is a failure as a person. If the psychiatric faction is to impress u p o n h i m its views about his personal make-up, then they must be able to show in detail h o w their version of his past a n d their version of his character h o l d up m u c h better

I was going to night school to get a M.A. degree, and holding down a job in addition, and the load got too much for me. The others here are sick mentally but I'm suffering from a bad nervous system and that is what is giving me these phobias. I got here by mistake because of a diabetes diagnosis, and I'll leave in a couple of days. [The patient had been in seven weeks.] I failed as a child, and later with my wife I reached out for dependency. My trouble is that I can't work. That's what I'm in for. I had two jobs with a good home and all the money I wanted.
36

T h e patient sometimes reinforces these stories by an optimistic definition of his occupational status: A m a n w h o managed to obtain an audition as a radio announcer styles himself a radio announcer; another w h o w o r k e d for some months as a copy boy a n d was then g i v e n a j o b as a reporter on a large trade journal, but fired after three weeks, defines himself as a reporter. A w h o l e social role in the patient c o m m u n i t y m a y be constructed on the basis of these recipro3 5

A s i m i l a r s e l f - p r o t e c t i n g r u l e has b e e n o b s e r v e d i n p r i s o n s .

T h u s , H a s s l e r , see footnote 6, in d e s c r i b i n g a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h a f e l l o w - p r i s o n e r ; " H e d i d n ' t say m u c h a b o u t w h y h e was s e n t e n c e d , a n d I d i d n ' t ask h i m , t h a t b e i n g t h e a c c e p t e d b e h a v i o r i n p r i s o n " (p. 76). A n o v e l i s t i c v e r s i o n f o r t h e m e n t a l h o s p i t a l m a y be f o u n d in J. man's Story of His York, Greenberg,
3 6

Kerkhoff, Own

How Thin Crack-up

the

Veil: A

NewspaperNew

Mental

and

Recovery;

1952; p . 27.

F r o m t h e writer's f i e l d notes o f i n f o r m a l i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h p a -

tients, t r a n s c r i b e d as n e a r v e r b a t i m as he was able.

374 t h a n his o w n . If both the custodial a n d psychiatr i c factions are to get h i m to cooperate in the various psychiatric treatments, t h e n it w i l l p r o v e useful to disabuse h i m of his v i e w of their purposes, a n d cause h i m to appreciate that they k n o w what they are doing, and are d o i n g what is best for h i m . In brief, the difficulties caused by a patient are closely tied to his version of what has b e e n h a p p e n i n g to h i m , a n d if cooperation is to secured, it helps if this version is discredited. T h e patient must " i n s i g h t f u l l y " c o m e to take, or affect to take, the hospital's v i e w of himself.
3 7

PART V
38

Research Implications and Applications

T h e staff also has ideal m e a n s i n a d d i t i o n to the m i r r o r i n g effect of the settingfor d e n y i n g the inmate's rationalizations. C u r r e n t psychiatric d o c t r i n e defines m e n t a l disorder as something that c a n have its roots in the patient's earliest years, show its signs throughout the course of his life, a n d invade almost every sector of his current activity. No segment of his past or present n e e d to be defined, then, as b e y o n d the j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d mandate of psychiatric assessment. M e n t a l hospitals bureaucratically institutionalize this ext r e m e l y w i d e mandate by f o r m a l l y basing their treatment of the patient u p o n his diagnosis a n d hence u p o n the psychiatric v i e w of his past. T h e case r e c o r d is an i m p o r t a n t expression of this mandate. This dossier is apparently not regularly used, however, to r e c o r d occasions w h e n the patient showed capacity to cope honorably a n d effectively w i t h difficult life situations. N o r is the case r e c o r d typically used to p r o v i d e a r o u g h average or s a m p l i n g of his past conduct. O n e of its purposes is to show the ways in w h i c h the patient is " s i c k " and the reasons w h y it was right to c o m m i t h i m and is right c u r r e n t l y to keep h i m c o m m i t t e d ; and this done b y extracting f r o m his w h o l e life course a list of those incidents that have or m i g h t have h a d " s y m p t o m a t i c " sigT h e process o f e x a m i n i n g a p e r s o n psychiatrically a n d t h e n

n i f i c a n c e . T h e misadventures of his parents or siblings that m i g h t suggest a " t a i n t " m a y be c i t e d . E a r l y acts in w h i c h the patient appeared to have shown b a d j u d g m e n t or emotional disturbance w i l l be r e c o r d e d . Occasions w h e n he acted in a w a y w h i c h the l a y m a n w o u l d consider i m m o r a l , sexually p e r v e r t e d , w e a k - w i l l e d , childish, i l l - c o n sidered, i m p u l s i v e , a n d crazy m a y b e described. Misbehaviors w h i c h someone saw as the last straw, as cause for i m m e d i a t e action, are l i k e l y t o b e r e p o r t e d i n detail. I n addition, the r e c o r d w i l l describe his state on a r r i v a l at the h o s p i t a l a n d this is not l i k e l y to be a t i m e of t r a n q u i l i t y a n d ease for h i m . T h e r e c o r d m a y also r e p o r t the false l i n e taken by the patient in answering e m barrassing questions, s h o w i n g h i m as someone w h o makes claims that are obviously contrary to the facts: Claims she lives with oldest daughter or with sisters only when sick and in need of care; otherwise with husband, he himself says not for 12 years. Contrary to the reports from the personnel, he says he no longer bangs on the floor or cries in the morning. . . . conceals fact that she had her organs removed, claims she is still menstruating. At first she denied having had premarital sexual experience, but when asked about Jim she said she had forgotten about it 'cause it had been unpleasant.
39

W h e r e contrary facts are not k n o w n by the recorder, their presence is often left scrupulously an o p e n question: The patient denied any heterosexual experiences nor could one trick her into admitting that she had
3 8

W h i l e m a n y kinds o f organizations maintain records o f their

m e m b e r s , in almost all of these s o m e socially significant attrib3 7

utes c a n o n l y b e i n c l u d e d i n d i r e c t l y , b e i n g officially i r r e l e v a n t . B u t since m e n t a l hospitals h a v e a legitimate c l a i m to d e a l w i t h t h e ' w h o l e ' p e r s o n , t h e y n e e d officially r e c o g n i z e n o l i m i t s t o what they consider relevant, a sociologically interesting license. It is an o d d historical fact that persons c o n c e r n e d w i t h p r o m o t i n g c i v i l l i b e r t i e s i n o t h e r areas o f l i f e t e n d t o f a v o r g i v i n g t h e psychiatrist c o m p l e t e discretionary p o w e r over the patient. A p p a r e n t l y it is felt that the m o r e p o w e r possessed by m e d i c a l l y q u a l i f i e d administrators a n d therapists, the better t h e interests o f the patients w i l l b e s e r v e d . Patients, t o m y k n o w l e d g e , h a v e n o t b e e n p o l l e d o n this m a t t e r .
3 B

a l t e r i n g o r r e d u c i n g his status i n c o n s e q u e n c e i s k n o w n i n h o s p i t a l a n d p r i s o n p a r l a n c e a s bugging, t h e a s s u m p t i o n b e i n g t h a t o n c e y o u c o m e t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e testers y o u e i t h e r w i l l automatically be l a b e l e d crazy or the process of testing itself w i l l m a k e y o u c r a z y . T h u s p s y c h i a t r i c staff a r e s o m e t i m e s s e e n not as discovering w h e t h e r you are sick, but as making y o u sick; a n d " D o n ' t b u g m e , m a n , " c a n m e a n , " D o n ' t pester m e t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e I ' l l g e t u p s e t . " S h e l d o n M e s s e n g e r has s u g g e s t e d t o m e t h a t this m e a n i n g o f b u g g i n g i s r e l a t e d t o t h e o t h e r c o l l o q u i a l m e a n i n g , of w i r i n g a r o o m w i t h a secret m i c r o p h o n e to collect i n f o r m a t i o n usable for d i s c r e d i t i n g the speaker.

V e r b a t i m t r a n s c r i p t i o n s o f h o s p i t a l case r e c o r d m a t e r i a l .

Goffman ever been pregnant or into any kind of sexual indulgence, denying masturbation as well. Even with considerable pressure she was unwilling to engage in any projection of paranoid mechanisms. No psychotic content could be elicited at this time.
40

375 are felt to have a r i g h t to k n o w those aspects of the patient's past conduct w h i c h , e m b e d d e d in the reputation he develops, p u r p o r t e d l y m a k e it possible to manage h i m w i t h greater benefit to himself and less risk to others. F u r t h e r , all staff levels typically have access to the n u r s i n g notes kept on the w a r d , w h i c h chart the daily course of each patient's disease, and hence his conduct, p r o v i d i n g for the near-present the sort of i n f o r m a t i o n the case r e c o r d supplies for his past. I t h i n k that most of the i n f o r m a t i o n gathered in case records is q u i t e true, although it m i g h t seem also to be t r u e that almost anyone's life course c o u l d y i e l d up enough denigrating facts to p r o v i d e grounds for the record's justification of c o m m i t m e n t . In any case, I am not c o n c e r n e d here w i t h questioning the desirability of m a i n t a i n i n g case records, or the motives of staff in k e e p i n g t h e m . T h e point is that these facts about h i m bei n g true, the patient is certainly not r e l i e v e d f r o m the n o r m a l c u l t u r a l pressure to conceal t h e m , a n d is perhaps all the m o r e threatened by k n o w i n g that they are neatly available, and that he has no control over w h o gets to l e a r n t h e m . A m a n l y
4 3

A n d i f i n n o m o r e factual way, d i s c r e d i t i n g statements often appear in descriptions g i v e n of the patient's general social m a n n e r in the hospital: When interviewed, he was bland, apparently selfassured, and sprinkles high-sounding generalizations freely throughout his verbal productions. Armed with a rather neat appearance and natty little Hitlerian mustache, this 45 year old man, who has spent the last five or more years of his life in the hospital, is making a very successful hospital adjustment living within the role of a rather gay liver and jim-dandy type of fellow who is not only quite superior to his fellow patients in intellectual respects but who is also quite a man with women. His speech is sprayed with many multi-syllabled words which he generally uses in good context, but if he talks long enough on any subject it soon becomes apparent that he is so completely lost in this verbal diarrhea as to make what he says almost completely worthless.
41

T h e events r e c o r d e d in the case history are, then, just the sort that a l a y m a n w o u l d consider scandalous, defamatory, a n d discrediting. I think it is fair to say that a l l levels of m e n t a l hospital staff fail, in general, to d e a l w i t h this material w i t h the m o r a l neutrality c l a i m e d for m e d i c a l statements a n d psychiatric diagnosis, but instead participate, b y intonation a n d gesture i f b y n o other means, in the lay reaction to these acts. This w i l l occur i n staff-patient encounters a s w e l l as in staff encounters at w h i c h no patient is present. In some m e n t a l hospitals, access to the case r e c o r d is technically restricted to m e d i c a l a n d h i g h e r n u r s i n g levels, but e v e n h e r e i n f o r m a l access or relayed i n f o r m a t i o n is often available to l o w e r staff l e v e l s . In a d d i t i o n , w a r d personnel
42

t h e i r o w n f i l e s ; o f i n m a t e s w h o h a d e l i t e status i n t h e e n v i r o n i n g c o m m u n i t y ; a n d o f i n m a t e s w h o m a y take legal a c t i o n against the hospital a n d h e n c e h a v e a special reason to m a n e u v e r access to their records. S o m e hospitals e v e n h a v e a "hot-hot file," k e p t i n t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s office. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p a t i e n t ' s p r o f e s sional title, e s p e c i a l l y if it is a m e d i c a l o n e , is s o m e t i m e s p u r p o s e l y o m i t t e d f r o m his f i l e c a r d . A H o f t h e s e e x c e p t i o n s t o the general r u l e for h a n d l i n g information show, of course, the institution's realization of s o m e of the implications of k e e p i n g mental hospital records. F o r a f u r t h e r e x a m p l e , see Harold Taxel, "Authority Structure in a Mental Hospital W a r d , " u n p u b l i s h e d M . A . thesis, D e p t o f S o c i o l o g y , U n i v . o f C h i c a g o , 1953; p p . 11-12.
4 3

T h i s i s the p r o b l e m o f " i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l " that m a n y groups from to varying degrees. See Goffman, "Discrepant 4, p p . 8 6 - 1 0 6 ; in Presentation o f Self i n Everyday

suffer

Roles," C h .

Life; M o n o g r a p h N o . 2 , U n i v . o f E d i n b u r g h , S o c i a l S c i e n c e R e s e a r c h C e n t r e , 1 9 5 6 . A s u g g e s t i o n o f this p r o b l e m i n r e l a t i o n t o case r e c o r d s i n p r i s o n s i s g i v e n b y J a m e s P e c k i n h i s s t o r y , 'The Ship that N e v e r 1950. H i t Port," in Prison Etiquette, edited b y H o l l e y C a n t i n e a n d D a c h i n e Rainer; Bearsville, N . Y . , T h e R e t o r t Press, " T h e h a c k s o f c o u r s e h o l d a l l t h e aces i n d e a l i n g w i t h a n y p r i s o n e r because they c a n always write h i m u p for i n e v i t a b l e p u n i s h m e n t . E v e r y infraction of the rules is n o t e d in the p r i s o n er's j a c k e t , a f o l d e r w h i c h records all the details of t h e m a n ' s life b e f o r e a n d d u r i n g i m p r i s o n m e n t . T h e r e are g e n e r a l reports written by the work detail screw, the cell block screw, or some other screw w h o m a y h a v e overheard a conversation. Tales p u m p e d f r o m s t o o l p i g e o n s a r e also i n c l u d e d . " A n y letter w h i c h interests t h e authorities goes i n t o t h e jacket. T h e m a i l censor m a y m a k e a photostatic c o p y of a p r i s o n -

4 0

V e r b a t i m transcriptions o f hospital case r e c o r d m a t e r i a l . V e r b a t i m t r a n s c r i p t i o n s o f h o s p i t a l case r e c o r d m a t e r i a l . H o w e v e r , s o m e m e n t a l h o s p i t a l s d o h a v e a " h o t f i l e " o f se-

4 1

4 1

lected records w h i c h can be taken out only by special permission. T h e s e m a y be records of patients w h o w o r k as administration-office messengers a n d m i g h t otherwise s n a t c h glances at

376 l o o k i n g y o u t h w h o responds to m i l i t a r y i n d u c t i o n b y r u n n i n g away f r o m the barracks a n d h i d i n g himself in a h o t e l r o o m clothes closet, to be f o u n d there, c r y i n g , by his mother; a w o m a n w h o travels f r o m U t a h to Washington to w a r n the President of i m p e n d i n g doom; a m a n w h o disrobes before three y o u n g girls; a boy w h o locks his sister out of the house, striking out two of h e r teeth w h e n she tries to come back in t h r o u g h the w i n d o w each of these persons has done something he w i l l have v e r y obvious reason to conceal f r o m others, a n d v e r y good reason to t e l l lies about. T h e f o r m a l and i n f o r m a l patterns of c o m m u n i c a t i o n l i n k i n g staff m e m b e r s t e n d to a m p l i f y the disclosive w o r k done by the case r e c o r d . A discreditable act that the patient performs d u r i n g one part of the day's routine in one part of the hospital c o m m u n i t y is l i k e l y to be r e p o r t e d back to those w h o supervise other areas of his life, w h e r e he i m p l i c i t l y takes the stand that he is not the sort of person who c o u l d act that way. Of significance here, as in some other social establishments, is the increasingly c o m m o n practice of all-level staff conferences, w h e r e staff air their views of patients and develop collective agreement c o n c e r n i n g the line that the patient is t r y i n g to take and the l i n e that should be taken to h i m . A patient w h o develops a " p e r s o n a l " relat i o n w i t h an attendant, or manages to m a k e an attendant anxious by eloquent and persistent accusations of malpractice can be p u t back into his place by means of the staff m e e t i n g , w h e r e the attendant is g i v e n w a r n i n g or assurance that the patient is " s i c k . " Since the differential image of himself that a person usually meets f r o m those of various levels around h i m comes here to be u n i f i e d b e h i n d the scenes into a c o m m o n approach, the patient m a y find himself faced w i t h a k i n d of collusion against h i m a l b e i t one sincerely thought to be for his o w n ultimate welfare. In addition, the f o r m a l transfer of the patient

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications f r o m one w a r d or service to another is l i k e l y to be a c c o m p a n i e d by an i n f o r m a l description of his characteristics, this b e i n g felt to facilitate the w o r k of the e m p l o y e e w h o is n e w l y responsible for h i m . F i n a l l y , at the most i n f o r m a l of levels, the l u n c h t i m e and coffee-break small talk of staff often turns u p o n the latest d o i n g of the patient, the gossip l e v e l of any social establishment b e i n g here intensified by the assumption that everyt h i n g about h i m is in some way the p r o p e r business of the hospital employee. Theoretically there seems to be no reason w h y such gossip should not b u i l d up the subject instead of tear h i m d o w n , unless one claims that talk about those not present w i l l always t e n d to be c r i t i c a l in order to m a i n t a i n the integrity and prestige of the circle in w h i c h the t a l k i n g occurs. A n d so, e v e n w h e n the i m p u l s e of the speakers seems k i n d l y and generous, the i m p l i c a t i o n of their talk is typically that the patient is not a complete person. F o r example, a conscientious group therapist, sympathetic w i t h patients, once a d m i t t e d to his coffee companions:
I've h a d about t h r e e g r o u p disrupters, o n e m a n i n p a r t i c u l a r a l a w y e r [sotto v o c e ] J a m e s W i l s o n v e r y b r i g h t w h o just m a d e things miserable for m e , but I w o u l d always t e l l h i m to get on the stage a n d do something. W e l l , I was getting desperate a n d then I b u m p e d into his therapist, w h o said that r i g h t n o w b e h i n d the man's bluff a n d front he needed the g r o u p v e r y m u c h a n d that i t p r o b a b l y m e a n t m o r e t o h i m t h a n a n y t h i n g else h e was g e t t i n g out o f t h e h o s p i t a l h e just n e e d e d the support. W e l l , that m a d e me feel altogether different about h i m . He's out n o w .

er's e n t i r e l e t t e r , o r m e r e l y c o p y a passage. O r h e m a y pass the letter on to the w a r d e n . O f t e n an inmate called out by t h e w a r d e n o r p a r o l e officer i s c o n f r o n t e d w i t h s o m e t h i n g h e w r o t e s o l o n g a g o h e h a d f o r g o t t e n a l l a b o u t it. I t m i g h t b e a b o u t his p e r s o n a l l i f e o r his p o l i t i c a l v i e w s a f o r l a t e r u s e " (p. 66). fragment of t h o u g h t t h a t t h e p r i s o n a u t h o r i t i e s f e l t was d a n g e r o u s a n d f i l e d

In general, then, m e n t a l hospitals systematically p r o v i d e for circulation about each patient the k i n d of i n f o r m a t i o n that the patient is l i k e l y to try to hide. A n d in various degrees of detail this i n f o r m a t i o n is used daily to p u n c t u r e his claims. At the admission and diagnostic conferences, he w i l l be asked questions to w h i c h he must give w r o n g answers in order to m a i n t a i n his selfrespect, and t h e n the true answer m a y be shot back at h i m . An attendant w h o m he tells a version of his past and his reason for being in the hospital may smile disbelievingly, or say, "That's not the way I h e a r d i t , " in l i n e w i t h the practical psychia-

Goffman try of b r i n g i n g the patient d o w n to reality. W h e n he accosts a physician or nurse on the w a r d a n d presents his claims for m o r e privileges or for discharge, this may be c o u n t e r e d by a question w h i c h he cannot answer truthfully w i t h o u t calling up a t i m e in his past w h e n he acted disgracefully. W h e n he gives his v i e w of his situation d u r i n g group psychotherapy, the therapist, taking the role of interrogator, m a y attempt to disabuse h i m of his face-saving interpretations a n d encourage an interpretation suggesting that it is he himself w h o is to blame and w h o must change. W h e n he claims to staff or fellow patients that he is w e l l a n d has never been really sick, someone m a y give h i m graphic details of how, only one m o n t h ago, he was p r a n c i n g around like a g i r l , or c l a i m i n g that he was G o d , or d e c l i n i n g to talk or eat, or p u t t i n g g u m i n his hair. E a c h time the staff deflates the patient's claims, his sense of what a person ought to be a n d the rules of peer-group social intercourse press h i m to reconstruct his stories; a n d each t i m e he does this, the custodial a n d psychiatric interests of the staff may lead t h e m to discredit these tales again. B e h i n d these verbally instigated ups and downs of the self, is an institutional base that rocks just as precariously. C o n t r a r y to popular o p i n i o n , the " w a r d system" insures a great amount of i n ternal social m o b i l i t y in m e n t a l hospitals, especially d u r i n g the inmate's first year. D u r i n g that t i m e he is likely to have altered his service once, his w a r d three or four times, and his parole status several times; and he is likely to have experienced moves in bad as w e l l as good directions. E a c h of these moves involves a v e r y drastic alteration in l e v e l of l i v i n g and in available materials out of w h i c h to b u i l d a self-confirming r o u n d of activities, an alteration equivalent in scope, say, to a m o v e up or d o w n a class in the w i d e r class system. M o r e o v e r , fellow inmates w i t h w h o m he has partially identified himself w i l l similarly be m o v i n g , b u t in different directions and at different rates, thus reflecting feelings of social change to the person e v e n w h e n he does not experience t h e m d i rectly. As previously i m p l i e d , the doctrines of psychiatry can reinforce the social fluctuations of the w a r d system. Thus there is a c u r r e n t psychiatric

377 v i e w that the w a r d system is a k i n d of social hothouse in w h i c h patients start as social infants a n d e n d u p , w i t h i n the year, on convalescent wards as resocialized adults. This v i e w adds considerably to the w e i g h t a n d p r i d e that staff can attach to their w o r k , a n d necessitates a certain amount of blindness, especially at higher staff levels, to other ways of v i e w i n g the w a r d system, such as a m e t h o d for d i s c i p l i n i n g u n r u l y persons through punishment and r e w a r d . In any case, this resocialization perspective tends to overstress the extent to w h i c h those on the worst wards are incapable of socialized conduct and the extent to w h i c h those on the best wards are ready a n d w i l l i n g to play the social game. Because the w a r d system is something m o r e than a resocialization chamber, inmates find m a n y reasons for "messing u p " or getting into trouble, and m a n y occasions, then, for d e m o t i o n to less p r i v i l e g e d w a r d positions. These demotions m a y be officially i n t e r p r e t e d as psychiatric relapses or m o r a l backsliding, thus protecting the resocialization v i e w of the hospital, and these interpretations, by i m p l i c a t i o n , translate a m e r e i n f r a c t i o n of rules and consequent d e m o t i o n into a fundamental expression of the status of the culprit's self. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , p r o motions, w h i c h m a y c o m e about because of w a r d population pressure, the n e e d for a " w o r k i n g pat i e n t , " or for other psychiatrically irrelevant reasons, m a y be built up into something c l a i m e d to be profoundly expressive of the patient's w h o l e self. T h e patient himself m a y be expected by staff to make a personal effort to "get w e l l , " in somet h i n g less than a year, and hence may be c o n stantly r e m i n d e d to think in terms of the self's success and f a i l u r e .
44

In such contexts inmates can discover that deflations in m o r a l status are not so bad as they had i m a g i n e d . A f t e r all, infractions w h i c h lead to these demotions cannot be accompanied by legal sanctions or by r e d u c t i o n to the status of m e n t a l patient, since these conditions already p r e v a i l . F u r t h e r , no past or current delict seems to be horrendous enough in itself to e x c o m m u n i cate a patient f r o m the patient c o m m u n i t y , a n d

4 4

F o r this a n d o t h e r s u g g e s t i o n s , I a m i n d e b t e d t o C h a r l o t t e

G r e e n Schwartz.

378 hence failures at right l i v i n g lose some of their stigmatizing m e a n i n g . A n d f i n a l l y , i n accepting the hospital's version of his fall f r o m grace, the patient can set himself up in the business of "straightening u p , " a n d m a k e claims of sympathy, privileges, and indulgence f r o m the staff in o r d e r to foster this. L e a r n i n g t o l i v e u n d e r conditions o f i m m i n e n t exposure and w i d e f l u c t u a t i o n i n r e g a r d , w i t h little c o n t r o l over the granting or w i t h h o l d i n g of this regard, is an i m p o r t a n t step in the socialization of the patient, a step that tells somet h i n g i m p o r t a n t about what it is like to be an i n m a t e in a m e n t a l hospital. H a v i n g one's past mistakes and present progress u n d e r constant m o r a l r e v i e w seems to m a k e for a special adaptation consisting of a less-than-moral attitude to egoideals. One's shortcomings and successes become too central and fluctuating an issue in life to allow the usual c o m m i t m e n t of c o n c e r n for other persons' views of t h e m . It is not v e r y practicable to try to sustain solid claims about oneself. T h e i n mate tends to learn that degradations and reconstructions of the self n e e d not be g i v e n too m u c h weight, at the same t i m e l e a r n i n g that staff a n d inmates are ready to v i e w an inflation or deflation of a self w i t h some indifference. He learns that a defensible picture of self can be seen as somet h i n g outside oneself that can be constructed, lost, a n d rebuilt, all w i t h great speed and some equan i m i t y . He learns about the viability of taking up a standpointand hence a selfthat is outside the one w h i c h the hospital can give and take away from him.
45

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications of h a v i n g to show pleasure w h e n h e l d by troops of his o w n , a n d w e a r y of h a v i n g to show displeasure w h e n h e l d b y the e n e m y . O n c e h e learns what it is l i k e to be defined by society as not havi n g a viable self, this threatening definitionthe threat that helps attach people to the self society accords themis w e a k e n e d . T h e patient seems to gain a n e w plateau w h e n he learns that he can survive w h i l e acting in a w a y that society sees as destructive of h i m . A f e w illustrations of this m o r a l looseness a n d m o r a l fatigue m i g h t be g i v e n . In state m e n t a l hospitals c u r r e n t l y a k i n d of " m a r r i a g e m o r a t o r i u m " appears to be accepted by patients a n d m o r e or less c o n d o n e d by staff. Some i n f o r m a l peer-group pressure may be brought against a patient w h o "plays a r o u n d " w i t h m o r e than one hospital partner at a t i m e , b u t little negative sanction seems to be attached to taking u p , in a t e m p o r a r i l y steady way, w i t h a m e m b e r of the opposite sex, e v e n though b o t h partners are k n o w n to be marr i e d , to have c h i l d r e n , a n d e v e n to be regularly visited by these outsiders. In short, there is license in m e n t a l hospitals to begin c o u r t i n g a l l o v e r again, w i t h the understanding, h o w e v e r , that n o t h i n g v e r y p e r m a n e n t or serious can come of this. L i k e shipboard or vacation romances, these entanglements attest to the way in w h i c h the hospital is cut off f r o m the outside c o m m u n i t y , b e c o m i n g a w o r l d of its o w n , operated for the benefit of its o w n citizens. A n d certainly this m o r a t o r i u m is an expression of the alienation and hostility that patients feel for those on the outside to w h o m they w e r e closely related. B u t in a d d i tion, one has evidence of the loosening effects of l i v i n g in a w o r l d w i t h i n a w o r l d , u n d e r c o n d i tions w h i c h m a k e it difficult to give f u l l seriousness to either of t h e m . T h e second illustration concerns the w a r d system. O n the worst w a r d l e v e l , discreditings seem to occur the most frequently, in part because of lack of facilities, in part t h r o u g h the m o c k e r y a n d sarcasm that seem to be the occupational n o r m of social control for the attendants and nurses w h o administer these places. At the same t i m e , the paucity of e q u i p m e n t and rights means that not m u c h self can be built u p . T h e patient finds himself constantly toppled, therefore, but w i t h v e r y little distance to fall. A k i n d

T h e setting, then, seems to engender a k i n d of cosmopolitan sophistication, a k i n d of civic apathy. In this unserious yet o d d l y exaggerated m o r a l context, b u i l d i n g up a self or h a v i n g it destroyed becomes something of a shameless game, and l e a r n i n g to v i e w this process as a game seems to m a k e for some demoralization, the game being such a fundamental one. In the hospital, then, the inmate can learn that the self is not a fortress, b u t rather a small o p e n city; he can become weary

4 5

In the hospital I studied there d i d not seem to be a kangaroo

c o u r t , a n d so, f o r e x a m p l e , a n e n g a g i n g a l c o h o l i c , w h o m a n a g e d to get t w o v e r y well-liked student nurses sent h o m e for d r i n k i n g w i t h h i m , d i d n o t a p p a r e n t l y suffer m u c h for his b e t r a y a l o f the desires of the peer group.

Goffman of jaunty gallows h u m o r seems to d e v e l o p in some of these wards, w i t h considerable f r e e d o m to stand up to the staff and r e t u r n insult for insult. W h i l e these patients can be p u n i s h e d , they cannot, for example, be easily slighted, for they are a c c o r d e d as a matter of course few of the niceties that people must enjoy before they can suffer subtle abuse. L i k e prostitutes in connection w i t h sex, inmates on these wards have v e r y little reputation or rights to lose and can therefore take certain liberties. As the person moves up the w a r d syst e m , he can manage m o r e and m o r e to avoid i n c i dents w h i c h discredit his c l a i m to be a h u m a n being, and acquire m o r e a n d m o r e of the v a r i e d ingredients of self-respect; yet w h e n eventually he does get t o p p l e d a n d he doesthere is a m u c h further distance to fall. F o r instance, the p r i v i l e g e d patient lives in a w o r l d w i d e r than the w a r d , made u p o f recreation workers w h o , o n request, can dole out cake, cards, table-tennis balls, tickets to the movies, a n d w r i t i n g materials. B u t in absence of the social control of p a y m e n t w h i c h is typically exerted by a recipient on the outside, the patient runs the risk that e v e n a warm-hearted functionary may, on occasion, tell h i m to wait u n t i l she has finished an i n f o r m a l chat, or teasingly ask w h y he wants w h a t he has asked for, or respond w i t h a dead pause a n d a c o l d look of appraisal. M o v i n g u p a n d d o w n the w a r d system means, then, not o n l y a shift in self-constructive e q u i p m e n t , a shift in reflected status, but also a change in the calculus of risks. A p p r e c i a t i o n of risks to his self-conception is part of everyone's m o r a l experience, but an appreciation that a g i v e n risk l e v e l is itself merely a social arrangement is a rarer k i n d of experience, a n d one that seems to h e l p to disenchant the person w h o has it. A t h i r d instance of m o r a l loosening has to do w i t h the conditions that are often associated w i t h the release of the inpatient. O f t e n he leaves u n d e r the supervision a n d j u r i s d i c t i o n of his nextof-relation or of a specially w a t c h f u l employer. If he misbehaves w h i l e u n d e r their auspices, they c a n q u i c k l y obtain his readmission. He therefore finds himself u n d e r the special p o w e r of persons w h o o r d i n a r i l y w o u l d not have this k i n d of p o w e r over h i m , a n d about w h o m , moreover, h e may have h a d p r i o r cause to feel quite bitter. In order

379 to get out of the hospital, however, he m a y conceal his displeasure in this arrangement, and, at least u n t i l safely off the hospital rolls act out a willingness to accept this k i n d of custody. These discharge procedures, then, p r o v i d e a b u i l t - i n lesson in overtly taking a role w i t h o u t the usual covert c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d seem further to separate the person f r o m the worlds that others take seriously. T h e m o r a l career of a person of a g i v e n social category involves a standard sequence of changes in his w a y of c o n c e i v i n g of selves, i n c l u d i n g , i m portantly, his o w n . These half-buried lines of dev e l o p m e n t can be f o l l o w e d by studying his m o r a l experiencesthat is, happenings w h i c h m a r k a t u r n i n g point i n the way i n w h i c h the person views the w o r l d a l t h o u g h the particularities of this v i e w m a y be difficult to establish. A n d note can be taken of overt tacks or strategiesthat is, stands that he effectively takes before specifiable others, w h a t e v e r the h i d d e n and variable nature of his i n w a r d attachment to these presentations. By taking note of m o r a l experiences a n d overt personal stands, one can obtain a relatively objective tracing of relatively subjective matters. E a c h m o r a l career, a n d b e h i n d this, each self, occurs w i t h i n the confines of an institutional syst e m , w h e t h e r a social establishment such as a m e n t a l hospital or a c o m p l e x of personal a n d p r o fessional relationships. T h e self, then, can be seen as something that resides in the arrangements p r e v a i l i n g in a social system for its members. T h e self in this sense is not a p r o p e r t y of the person to w h o m it is attributed, but dwells rather in the pattern of social c o n t r o l that is exerted in connection w i t h the person by himself and those a r o u n d h i m . This special k i n d of institutional arrangem e n t does not so m u c h support the self as constitute it. In this paper, two of these institutional arrangements have b e e n considered, by p o i n t i n g to what happens to the person w h e n these rulings are w e a k e n e d . T h e first concerns the felt loyalty of his next-of-relation. T h e prepatient's self is described as a f u n c t i o n of the way in w h i c h three roles are related, arising and d e c l i n i n g in the kinds of affiliation that occur b e t w e e n the nextof-relation a n d the mediators. T h e second con-

380 cerns the protection r e q u i r e d by the person for the version of himself w h i c h he presents to others, a n d the way in w h i c h the w i t h d r a w a l of this protection can f o r m a systematic, if u n i n t e n d e d , aspect of the w o r k i n g of an establishment. I w a n t to stress that these are only t w o kinds of institutional rulings f r o m w h i c h a self emerges for the participant; others, not considered in this paper, are equally important. In the usual cycle of adult socialization one expects to find alienation a n d mortification foll o w e d by a n e w set of beliefs about the w o r l d a n d a n e w way of c o n c e i v i n g of selves. In the

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications case of the m e n t a l hospital patient, this r e b i r t h does sometimes occur, taking the f o r m of a strong belief in the psychiatric perspective, or, briefly at least, a d e v o t i o n to the social cause of better treatment for m e n t a l patients. T h e m o r a l career of the m e n t a l patient has u n i q u e interest, h o w ever; it can illustrate the possibility that in casting off the raiments of the o l d selfor in h a v i n g this cover t o r n awaythe person n e e d not seek a n e w robe a n d a n e w audience before w h i c h to c o w e r . Instead he can learn, at least for a t i m e , to practice before all groups the amoral arts of shamelessness.

Arlene K a p l a n Daniels

41

The Social Construction of Military Psychiatric Diagnoses

INTRODUCTION This paper analyzes the process of constructi n g psychiatric diagnoses in the m i l i t a r y setting. T h e purpose of this case study is to examine the process of diagnosis in order to see h o w it contributes to the management of deviants. T h e particular m e t h o d of deviance m a n a g e m e n t is d e p e n d ent u p o n the m e a n i n g of specific diagnostic categories in a variety of special contexts. T h e focus of this presentation is u p o n h o w restrictions
F r o m " T h e Social Construction o f M i l i t a r y Psychiatric D i a g n o s e s " b y A r l e n e K a p l a n D a n i e l s , p p . 1 8 1 - 2 0 5 i n Recent Sociology No. 2 , e d i t e d b y H a n s P e t e r D r e i t z e l , c o p y r i g h t 1970. R e p r i n t e d by permission of the author.
1

1 w o u l d like t o thank R a c h e l K a h n - H u t for h e l p i n e d i t i n g

this p a p e r .

in a specific setting affect the use of these diagnostic categories. In s t u d y i n g the process by w h i c h these categories b e c o m e useful we m a y l e a r n about b o t h the application of deviant labels a n d the social construction of meanings. This approach rests u p o n the theoretical perspective that Thomas P. W i l s o n has t e r m e d " t h e interpretive v i e w of social i n t e r a c t i o n " or " r a d i c a l symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n i s m . " In this v i e w definitions of situations a n d actions are never assumed to be settled once a n d for all by some lateral application of traditional or previously established standards. Instead one always expects that the m e a n ings of situations a n d actions are d e p e n d e n t u p o n particular interpretations that are influenced by b o t h the context of particular occasions a n d the participants i n v o l v e d i n that interaction. A c c o r d -

Daniels i n g l y meanings are always subject to r e f o r m u l a t i o n on subsequent occasions. U s i n g this theoretical approach, then, it is not surprising that psychiatric diagnoses w i l l not " h o l d s t i l l " but w a v e r , change, a n d adjust to circumstances. T h e diagnosis of m e n t a l illness is d e p e n d e n t not o n l y u p o n the symptoms of the patient; but also u p o n the doctor's awareness of the consequences that a specific diagnostic label m a y have for the career of the patient. T h e doctor's use of this k n o w l e d g e in his a p p l i c a t i o n of specific labels is what is meant w h e n we speak of " t h e social construction of psychiatric diagnoses." T h r o u g h an examination of the process of diagnosis in one context, we can discover some of the c r u c i a l social factors influencing or d e t e r m i n i n g the nature of any psychiatric diagnoses.
2

381 t h e m w e r e c o n d u c t e d i n A r m y settings, a f e w come f r o m A i r F o r c e and N a v y psychiatric services to ensure applicability of the analysis to any m i l i t a r y psychiatry setting. In the course of the interviews, i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g diagnostic procedures in the m i l i t a r y was obtained. Questions about these matters w e r e c o u c h e d i n the m i l i t a r y psychiatric language. Some examples of questions specifically d i r e c t e d to residents in the m i l i t a r y psychiatry t r a i n i n g programs are:
5

METHOD T h e data gathered for this study c o m e f r o m informants p r a c t i c i n g m i l i t a r y psychiatry. ( A l l quotations i n this paper are f r o m v e r b a t i m transcripts of interviews that I personally c o n d u c t e d . Biophrasing, w h e r e used, is i n d i c a t e d by brackets.) M o s t of the informants w e r e p r a c t i c i n g in large m i l i t a r y hospitals a n d h a d in-patient responsibilities. B u t m a n y w e r e also in w h a t is called M e n t a l H y g i e n e o r C o m m a n d Consultation a t regular posts a n d bases. G e n e r a l l y the process of m i l i t a r y psychiatric diagnosis begins h e r e in the psychiatric dispensaries or field units. Routinely, M e n t a l H y g i e n e w i l l screen all potential psychiatr i c cases c o m i n g to official attention in an area of m i l i t a r y jurisdiction. Those cases that are seen as serious or problematic are t h e n sent to the m a jor m i l i t a r y m e d i c a l centers for m o r e specialized consideration. O v e r t w o h u n d r e d interviews have b e e n collected since 1964. W h i l e most of
3 4

1. W h a t do y o u t h i n k of the diagnostic c o m p e tency of the referral agencies? 2. Since all referrals are in-patients for r e l a t i v e l y serious problems, h o w do y o u d e t e r m i n e w h o returns to d u t y a n d w h o does not? 3. W h a t percentage of the cases r e f e r r e d to y o u do y o u feel are s i m p l y r e f e r r e d for the purpose of administratively getting someone out of the way? 4 . H o w often d o y o u m a k e direct contacts w i t h u n i t commanders t o h e l p y o u i n d e c i d i n g f i n a l disposition? These questions refer to some of the c r u c i a l decisions w h i c h m i l i t a r y psychiatrists are asked to m a k e in the services. M e n whose future careers i n the m i l i t a r y are i n any w a y p r o b l e m a t i c are ultimately r e v i e w e d or e x a m i n e d by the psychiatrist. H i s decision m a y be a major factor in the m i l i t a r y decision to release or retain a m a n , to allow h i m special consideration or to w i t h h o l d it. T h e psychiatrist is expected to use his professional j u d g m e n t i n evaluating each particular case. H o w e v e r the parameters of the psychiatric w o r l d o r the d e f i n i t i o n of w h e r e such professional j u d g m e n t s are appropriateare set by the m i l i t a r y regulations. T h e y define what is to be considered m e n t a l illness and what is not; a n d t h e n they indicate h o w the psychiatrist is to a p p l y these interpretations. M i l i t a r y regulations also define the consequences w h i c h may befall any per-

T. P. W i l s o n , " C o n c e p t i o n s of Interaction a n d F o r m s of Socio1969.

logical Explanation," presented at the A m e r i c a n Sociological Association A n n u a l Meeting, San Francisco, September,
3

A. K. Daniels, " M i l i t a r y Psychiatry: T h e E m e r g e n c e of a Sub1970). (No. R O l H D 0 2 7 7 6 - 1 0 BS), a n d a n N I M H post-doctoral fellowship to study the relationship b e t w e e n military psychiatry a n d military legal p r o c e d u r e s , 1F3-8885-01.
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s p e c i a l t y , " i n E . F r e i d s o n a n d J . L o r b e r (eds.), Reader i n Medical Sociology ( N e w Y o r k : A t h e r t o n P r e s s ,

4

T h e r e s e a r c h o f w h i c h this s t u d y i s a p a r t h a s b e e n c o n d u c t e d

u n d e r various auspices: T h e U . S . A r m y R e s e a r c h a n d D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m a n d ( N o . D A - M D - 4 9 - 1 9 3 - 6 6 - G 9 2 0 9 & 2212), t h e N a t i o n a l Institute o f C h i l d H e a l t h a n d H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t

1 w o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k C o l o n e l R o y E . C l a u s e n , Jr., M . C . for

his assistance i n c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e i n t e r v i e w s c h e d u l e .

382 son w h o is certified as fitting w i t h i n one or the other of these categories. T h e m i l i t a r y regulations about psychiatric d i agnoses also p r o v i d e a relatively neutral or m i d d l e g r o u n d for cases that are difficult to classify. A n d the consequences that m a y follow f r o m this classi fication are similarly o p e n for negotiation. So w h e n the psychiatrist labels a m a n as: 1) mentally i l l ; 2) l o o k i n g mentally i l l at least for the m o m e n t ; or 3) clearly not i l l e v e n if s h o w i n g bizarre or disturbing behavior, he becomes an i m p o r t a n t decision-maker in d e t e r m i n i n g the fate of the patient at the hands of the m i l i t a r y system. Thus, the psychiatrist has three major alternatives f r o m w h i c h to choose in any specific diagnosis. T h e alternatives p r o v i d e the labels a n d indicate the consequences that follow f r o m their applica tion. T h e f o l l o w i n g three sections present the dis tinctions b e t w e e n m e n t a l illness a n d the other m a i n diagnostic alternatives as they are under stood w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y context. T h e r e m a i n i n g sections present a discussion of the application of these distinctions. T h e psychiatrist takes the consequences of each label into account w h e n constructing a diagnosis. He has to consider what he hopes to accomplish for the patientand then he applies the appropriate label w h i c h is likely to gain that end.

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

o n d reason for not diagnosing m e n t a l illness stems from the particular nature of the m i l i t a r y organi zation's responsibility to its members. First, those m e n t a l illnesses that are recognized as diseases are considered m e d i c a l disabilities equivalent to physical disabilities. A c c o r d i n g l y , the m i l i t a r y offers compensation, particularly if disability oc c u r r e d d u r i n g , or was aggravated by, service ac tivities " i n the line o f d u t y " ( L O D , yes). I n a d d i tion, the finding of illness usually outweighs other considerations for any soldier w h o is in d i s c i p l i nary difficulties that may otherwise lead to legal action in the m i l i t a r y court martial system: d e m o tion, fines, or i m p r i s o n m e n t . So w h i l e the m e n t a l illness label does carry some stigma, it can offer advantages w h i c h m a y outweigh that disadvan tage. F r o m the standpoint of the m i l i t a r y organi zation, the use of the disease label also offers bene fits and liabilities. T h e organization benefits through r e m o v a l of a p r o b l e m ; it demonstrates to the society at large that appropriate restitution has occurred. H o w e v e r it is expensive to offer such compensation. Thus it may be said that the mental-illness label offers b o t h benefits and l i a b i l i ties to a l l parties concerned. T h e r e is an additional feature about m e n t a l illness disability that makes application of this la bel e v e n m o r e restrictive than that for physical disability. W h e r e accidents or illnesses have b e e n clearly a n d physically disabling, the rationale for the w h o l e p r o c e d u r e is m u c h easier to grasp a n d m o r e acceptable to everyone in the m i l i t a r y than w h e r e the illness is " m e n t a l . " Thus questions are not as likely to arise over these contractual re sponsibilities accepted by the m i l i t a r y organiza tion. Consequently, m i l i t a r y psychiatrists must carefully consider the merits of the case to be made for illness, a n d the merits of the m a n to receive the mental-illness label. It is harder for a psychiatrist to c o n v i n c e a physical evaluation board () to accept an expensive decision than it is for other M D ' s to do so.

1. W h o Is M e n t a l l y 111? M i l i t a r y regulations use a v e r y restrictive def i n i t i o n of m e n t a l illness. This definition includes only the psychoses (paranoia, schizophrenia, and chronic depression are examples w i t h i n that cate gory). Restrictive definitions of illness are c o m m o n in the military for t w o reasons. First, the A r m e d Forces have the mission to "preserve the fighting strength." This usually means: retain m e n in the field. T h e psychiatrist, as other m e d i c a l ex aminers, should try to select those m e n in service w h o can recover sufficiently to serve again. T h e r e f o r e one of the important functions of the psychiatrist is to not diagnose, for the m e n t a l i l l ness diagnosis is likely to result in H m i t e d duty assignment or discharge f r o m the service. A sec6
6

2. W h o Appears to Be M e n t a l l y 111 B u t Is N o t A second category of patients appearing be fore the psychiatrist are those w h o exhibit b i z a r r e

A. K. D a n i e l s ,

op.

cit.

Daniels or symptomatic behavior that m i g h t look like m e n t a l illness but that does not fit the restrictive definitions of m e n t a l illness applicable in m i l i t a r y settings. Such behavior is considered w i t h i n two residual or borderline categories. O n e b o r d e r l i n e diagnosis is meant to suggest that a particular behavior is i n t e r p r e t e d as a reaction to a unique stress situation rather than a stable personality pattern. (These diagnoses i n c l u d e such categories as "situational stress" and variants like "a stress r e a c t i o n , " " a d u l t situational reaction.") T h e other b o r d e r l i n e category suggests that a behavior looks l i k e m e n t a l illness {e.g., schizoid-affective type) b u t is n o t really m e n t a l illness {e.g., schizophrenia). T h e y are not officially m e n t a l illness but they suggest it. T h e y carry overtones of the m e n t a l illness categories w i t h o u t necessarily prov i d i n g their range of benefits. These diagnoses may be used w i t h greater f r e e d o m than those designating m e n t a l illness since they m a k e no clear diagnosis of m e n t a l illness a n d carry no attendant obligations u p o n the m i l i t a r y organization for disability benefits. These diagnoses are useful because they p r o v i d e the psychiatrist w i t h the greatest leeway in that they are the least consequential in the initiation of further administrative action for or against the patient. T h e value o f the diagnosis is that it shares w i t h m e n t a l i l l ness diagnoses the potential for excuse or mitigat i o n . That is, it may be argued that the servicem a n is not responsible for his behavior a n d so the m i l i t a r y organization should not p u n i s h h i m for any misdeeds. H o w e v e r , this is not an automatic interpretation of the m e a n i n g of the diagnosis. W h e n he makes this diagnosis, the psychiatrist is not d e t e r m i n i n g the consequences for the man's service career. H i g h e r administrative boards eventually decide this questiontaking into account the particular manifestations of behavior and the outcome that is seen as most advantageous for the service and the m a n . D e p e n d i n g u p o n the decision of these boards, the m a n m a y leave without heavy penalty or r e m a i n in the service.
7

383 3. W h o Is D e f i n i t e l y N o t M e n t a l l y 111? This category is the one most often used by m i l i t a r y psychiatrists. It is a p p l i e d to a variety of disruptive behaviors w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y context (constant q u a r r e l i n g , m a n y absences w i t h o u t leave, m i n o r but chronic disobedience are examples). It also includes such " s o c i a l " problems as alcoholism a n d homosexuality. T h e label usually g i v e n is the "character and b e h a v i o r " diagnosis, or rather quasidiagnosis, w h i c h carries no i m p l i c a tion of m e n t a l illness w i t h i n official m i l i t a r y regulations. It also offers absolutely no exonerative connotations for those caught up in disciplinary proceedings. T h e benefit for the serviceman is that no stigma of psychosis attaches to the label. T h e liability is that the diagnosis does not p r o v i d e any excuse that the m a n so identified should not be considered responsible for his action. Thus far we have considered the d e l i m i t a tions p l a c e d u p o n the psychiatrist's w o r l d by m i l i tary definitions. N o w let us consider h o w the psychiatrist comes to terms w i t h these delimitations. W h e n p l a c i n g a label on an actual patient, the psychiatrist takes into account both the recogn i z e d consequences of the label w i t h i n the m i l i tary a n d the particular outcome he thinks most desirable and possible w i t h i n the value system of the military. G i v e n his understanding of h o w the label w i l l be translated into legal a n d administrative terms, the psychiatrist evaluates each case that he sees. He has to decide what he wants to do and what he m a y do. W h a t he may do depends u p o n social considerations not directly related to the diagnosis. Such considerations i n c l u d e the m i l itary v i e w of the presenting s y m p t o m , the context in w h i c h it o c c u r r e d , the amount of t i m e already served in the m i l i t a r y by the patient, the previous pattern of his career, a n d the nature of his relations w i t h his c o m m a n d i n g officers. A n y or all of these considerations may have to be w e i g h e d in addition to those criteria i n v o l v e d in the definition of the diagnosis.

Of course, it m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d that no p s y c h i a t r i c l a b e l or

SOCIAL CONDITIONS A N D VALUES W H I C H A F F E C T DIAGNOSES In order to built an argument for one or another diagnosis, the psychiatrist raises such con-

d i a g n o s i s i s totally w i t h o u t c o n s e q u e n c e s i n t h e m i l i t a r y o r g a n i zation, a n d any statement f r o m a psychiatrist can ultimately b e u s e d b y s o m e official a s a basis f o r r e q u e s t i n g t h a t a r e f e r r a l receive some k i n d of administrative action.

384 siderations as presenting s y m p t o m , context, a n d p r i o r history of the patient. He weighs such considerations as " e v i d e n c e " w h i c h suggests the feasib i l i t y of one or the other of these labels. H e r e is h o w one informant v i e w e d the process. Phobic or conversion symptoms or genuine suicide attempt, the [service] is more tolerant of than the aggressor. If you see someone whose marriage is disrupted, and acts outdepending on how deviant, in a social sensehe can be labeled as "character and behavior" disorder, situational reaction, a neurotic [depressive] or schizophrenic [psychotic]. These are the labels. Then you worry about the manifestations. If depressed, suicidal, delusional and drinkingthe crucial thing is: In what context? In what setting did he engage in the symptoms? Now we can . . . taking these into account . . . call him psychotic, and show we are worried about him [because this is a mental illness category]. We can say he is a situational reaction. In this case, we say the problem doesn't exist. In m a k i n g such distinctions, then, the psychiatrist places an evaluation u p o n the case in m i l i tary terms a n d offers a m e t h o d of dealing w i t h the p r o b l e m it presents. W i t h i n this context he understands that the amount of leeway available to h i m in using the disease diagnosis is most clearly affected by the m i l i t a r y m e r i t of the m a n a n d the l e n g t h of his service. These limitations reflect the values of the m i l i t a r y system. T h e y also reflect understandings about rules for retent i o n of employees applicable in the larger society. O n e psychiatrist explained the rationale u n d e r w h i c h h e w o r k e d i n this way. . . . The military psychiatrist has to serve two masters, in a waythe service and the patient. . . . You want to [retain] a guy . . . who can (1) function adequately, and (2) probably not get into trouble again, who will not be a burden. . . . You also want to keep in mind that you may make a big difference to the individual in sending him back. . . . Suppose he had some kind of an associative reaction. A very brief kind of upset.. . . He was in a bar and suddenly he went crazy and started hitting people, and somebody said he was psychotic and sent him to you. You can help this person make a good adjustment if you feel that he has a good chance . . . if he has a good character structure underneath what problems there may be. . . . The ones we chose to send back to duty were those who were in for several years . . . made good progression in rank, and had done a good job.

P A R T V Research Implications and Applications If the m a n returns to duty, he loses the discharge benefit possibilities; but he also avoids the l a b e l of one w h o is seriously m e n t a l l y i l l . A n d he receives a second chance to " m a k e g o o d " in his m i l i t a r y job. . . . How do we decide if the real psychotic patients stay or get out? If they have a long period of service, I consider them for going back to duty; if they don't, I think they ought to go out. . . . A n d this is sort of the directive we have had. If a person has a long period of service, and a year or two might make the difference for him; it might make all the difference to his pride and his self-image if he can complete twenty-year service and get out with an honorable discharge rather than a medical discharge with just as much disabilityactually morewhen you consider it is tax free. . . . He really wants to go back, then I go ahead and give him a chance. If you get these in-between people, they are under fifteen years and they are more than five, I think they ought to go out on a medical discharge. Thus the doctor considers the p r o b l e m of an employer's responsibility for his employees in add i t i o n to an absolute evaluation of the s y m p t o m . M i l i t a r y organizations thus shoulder some of the welfare responsibilities w h i c h most e m p l o y i n g organizations today are expected to take. A n d , as is true for most e m p l o y i n g organizations, the m i l i tary responsibility for employees is less w h e r e the l e n g t h of t i m e in service is less. T h e psychiatrist provides the diagnosis w h i c h supports this generally v a l u e d position. . . . Psychotic (diagnoses) . . . a legitimate illness in our setting. But also a means of disposing. You could take someone with a full-blown psychotic picture and by soft pedaling or omission could bring in a diagnosis of "situational reaction" or neurosis if time in service or value to service warrants. Or play it the other wayif[we] felt [the condition existed prior to service] and so [we] could get rid of him easily [without paper work and expense connected with the medical discharge]. These considerations affect the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n the psychiatrist makes for the disposition (i.e., separation f r o m the service or r e t u r n to duty) of anyone f o u n d to be m e n t a l l y i l l . Thus, the seriousness of a psychiatric illness l a b e l i n terms of the responsibility of the m i l i tary organization to the labeledis considerably

Daniels mitigated when the mentally ill person has been in the service a very short time. The illness label can be given; but social conditions suggest that the situation can be reasonably allowed to have occurred prior to service (EPTS [existed prior to service], L O D [line of duty], no) and therefore the types and amounts of disability benefits may be sharply curtailed. If the problem is seen by the psychiatrist as service-aggravated, i.e., occurring during the line of duty (EPTS, L O D , yes), then he must build a strong case for this view in his diagnoses and explanation. The organizational tendency is to "expect" the psychiatrist to find the opposite (EPTS, L O D , no). Therefore, a somewhat stronger case must be built by the psychiatrist if he sees the former occurring rather than the latter. The psychiatrist has to build this argument in military terms using arguments that are valid within that value system. I had one rather severe paranoid schizophrenic in the clinic.. . . This was a kind of. . . unusual situation because he was in intelligence. . . . The job he had when he had his psychotic break entailed sitting long, long hours in the dark room, bugging another roomhearing and seeing everything that went on in the room while he himself was sitting in the dark. And, it is a kind of psychotic existence; and we kind of pushed this point . . . to justify our "line of duty" estimation that the problem was service aggravated [even though the medical board decision was that the problem Existed Prior to Service]. In general, then, the problem for the psychiatrist may be to decide whether, in any particular situation, the medical discharge or return to duty is the most humane and reasonable alternative. Then he must decide how to present his evaluation in the most persuasive manner possible. Another social condition delimiting the leeway of the military psychiatrist is the particular policy set by each post or hospital commander. The psychiatrist will then have to take these "guidelines" set by his commander into account as well. Some commanders are very lenient in their acceptance of psychiatric use of the mental illness diagnosis {e.g., offer medical discharges easily and recommend partial disability even for short terms of service). Other commanders are less lenient about the matter of mental disability

385 a n d suggest alternatives that are not l i k e l y to offer benefits {e.g., use the m e d i c a l discharge sparingly, but freely r e c o m m e n d the administrative discharge). S t i l l other commanders d e m a n d a v e r y strict i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of m e n t a l illness a n d are not at all lenient or permissive about those l e a v i n g service {e.g., use n e i t h e r type of discharge readily, l e a v i n g discharge decisions, if they arise, to other m o r e p u n i t i v e types of authorities). T h e m i l i t a r y psychiatrist thus faces a n u m b e r of v a r y i n g a n d c h a n g i n g constraints, peculiar to this type of institutional setting, w h e n searching for a n d diagnosi n g m e n t a l illness. A n d so he argues his cases w i t h these contingencies i n m i n d .
8

Such diagnoses as "stress" a n d " s c h i z o i d react i o n " or " b o r d e r l i n e schizoid p e r s o n a l i t y " can aff o r d the psychiatrist some leeway in what exactly i s meant. A n d they p e r m i t h i m t o engage i n evasive tactics. He m a y transfer a m a n f r o m one jurisd i c t i o n to another by sending a patient to a distant hospital for further observation.

A [psychiatrist] has been seeing a soldier who is going A W O L . He goes to the commander [and says, "this man is an] immature kid, impulse ridden, he acts out. I think you should administratively separate h i m . " The C O . says, " N o . . . I'm not going to allow anybody to get away with that business" . . . and put[s] him in the stockade for court martial (proceedings as a prelude to a somewhat more punitive separation than that suggested by the psychiatrist). The patient then chooses another route of impulse . . . suicide gesture or threat. The [psychiatrist] is made very anxious by this, as are the (stockade authorities). They [informally indicate to the psychiatrist] if you want to call him sick and deal with him that way, you can have him. Otherwise, we are going to go ahead and court martial him. [The psychiatrist returns to the patient's] commander saying . . . "This commander is adamant. The [psychiatrist] feels that it is best for the whole situation to diagnose (the patient) . . . as a depressive reaction or something like that . . . and send him to the hospital.

T h e psychiatrist m a y intervene i n these ways, i n o r d e r to a i d the p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g of the m i l i t a r y organization as he sees it. He may also i n t e r v e n e , quite s i m p l y , for m e r c y . Labels of the situational
' A . K . D a n i e l s , " T h e C a p t i v e Professional: Bureaucratic L i m i t a tions in the Practice Vol. of M i l i t a r y 10, No. 4, P s y c h i a t r y , " Journal o f Health December 1969. and Social Behavior,

386 or stress variety, and labels that suggest the possib i l i t y of psychosis but do not take f u l l consequences for that type of label may be used by the psychiatrist w h e n he feels that he ought to protect a m a n f r o m punishment. We see a borderline schizoid personality kid who had gone A W O L . He had been gone for months . . . went back to the farm. He liked to talk to the cows. . . . He finally turned himself in because he began to feel guilty about [the absence]. The company wanted to boot him, and make an example of him because he had been gone for so long. I'm sure he's a better candidate than most to have a schizoid break. I really went to bat to get this man out. "A lot of other people you can make examples of. Let this poor boy go home." Spoke to a Colonel of Special Troops about it. In the psychiatrist's v i e w , his professional u n derstanding of the patient's m o t i v a t i o n is c r u c i a l i n diagnosis. A n d therefore h e m a y p i t his o w n understanding of the m o t i v a t i o n a n d capability of an i n d i v i d u a l against the v i e w of some other m i l i t a r y officer. By so doing, he exceeds his technical authority. B u t he does so w i t h the techniques that he has b e e n g i v e n by the organization (e.g., diagnosistransfer to hospital at a distant post). A n d so it m a y be said that this area of j u d g m e n t is i m p l i c i t l y delegated to the psychiatrist by m i l i tary authorities.

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

of the character a n d behavior disorder, or "c a n d b" as it is often called. This diagnosis is generally elicited w h e n behavior by the person e x a m i n e d has b e e n so disturbing, aggravating, or b i z a r r e as to cause c o m m e n t or trouble w i t h i n the m i l i tary system. Some justification that this person really is not m e n t a l l y i l l seems to be r e q u i r e d . A n d so this diagnostic category is offered as a sort of explanation or rationale for w h y considerations s u r r o u n d i n g m e n t a l illness diagnosis n e e d not arise. In effect, the psychiatrist refuses to intervene on behalf of the patient; he may e v e n i m p l i c itly or explicitly support the m i l i t a r y organization's c l a i m against the patient. Thus the w o r l d w h i c h the psychiatrist constructs t h r o u g h his diagnoses bears m a n y resemblances to the w o r l d of everyday life w i t h its common-sense value judgments. T h e psychiatrist examines i n d i v i d u a l cases a n d assesses responsibility for behavior. In this activity he may see himself as a simple administrator or personnel manager m a k i n g considered judgments about e m p l o y m e n t risks. If he takes this v i e w , his diagnostic w o r k merely expedites organizational procedures w h e r e b y m e n m a y be dismissed or " s e p a r a t e d " f r o m their jobs. Such m e n should be dismissed because, w i t h i n the general " c and b " category, they are diagnosed as "emotionally unstable." " I n stability" and " i m m a t u r i t y reactions" are also l i k e l y labels. His past history was one of running away, delinquent behavior, distaste with the Army. His diagnosis was emotionally unstable personality, aggressive type, chronic moderate. Oh, he was one of these guys who was offered the Army or jail. . . . His history of running away, delinquent behavior and enuresis indicate a personality which is chronically unstable. He is not motivated to serve. It is very likely that retention on active duty will result in further immature and aggressive acts. A n d [so] I recommend that he be separated under [an administrative regulation]. In general, the diagnosis reflects the psychiatric acceptance of the idea that the m i l i t a r y organization has " t h r o w n up its hands," so to speak, a n d is ready to reject the m a n . This category tends to encompass the group that rocks the system. [The certificate recommending an administrative separation says] "No impairment," [so

VALUE JUDGMENTS INVOLVED IN F I N D I N G NO DIAGNOSIS OF M E N T A L ILLNESS W h e n the psychiatrist cannot find any reason for diagnosing m e n t a l illness or something like m e n t a l illness, he is in effect w i t h h o l d i n g his ability to negotiate on behalf of the patient. W i t h i n the m i l i t a r y system, this often means that the i n i t i ation of some disciplinary action or some other action that the patient does not w i s h to occur, has no further i m p e d i m e n t . T h e psychiatrist may s i m p l y report that no psychiatric disease or m e n tal illness is present. (A notation of " N P D " [no psychiatric diagnosis] or " N M I " [no m e n t a l i l l ness] w i l l t h e n be all that he w i l l w r i t e about the case w h e n he signs his name.) B u t he m a y also describe the patientor diagnose h i m i n terms

Daniels it is a] law enforcement rather than [a] psychiatric problem. [This type of separation allows for nice distinctions in the allotment of responsibility. The patient is either] unsuitable for our system [or] unfit for military service. . . . These people make waves, either [the] stormy A W O L way, or withdrawn or passive way. A l l of this behavior is kind of manipulative and disruptive. Military [authority] is less willing to keep these people than some of the sicker [in psychiatric terms, but who are not disruptive to the military system]. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n is that, as far as psychiatry is concerned, punishment for such behavior m a y be just and deserved; however, it is not w i t h i n the psychiatric province to consider the matter. Because the disorder is considered unappealing a n d unbeatable, military psychiatrists are w i l l i n g to diagnose but u n w i l l i n g to give m u c h attention to the " c and b . " My rationalization for [facilitating] discharges through character and behavior (diagnoses) is: I can't be of help. [The] line [commanders] can't hold them or they wouldn't get here. A n d so an added i m p l i c a t i o n suggested here is that the psychiatrist has no control in such matters, but he does possess evidence that such cases probably deserve the fate that befalls t h e m . It is sometimes assumed that the whole referral and hospitalization system for the m e n t a l l y i l l really should not be put at the disposal of "c and b" cases w h o m a y really belong, quite simply, in jail. I feel that [Fort X] should keep its own character disorders, and take care of them down there. And a guy who is tearing up the place, and you think he is a character disorder, then you call the MP and have him thrown in the stockade. A person who is felt to be a character disorder, who is not . . . sick and has been seen by a competent psychiatrist, does not have to be sent to another hospital to control his behavior. There are plenty of jails where people who behave miserably are controlled. A final assumption i m p l i c i t w i t h i n the use of this category is that sometimes psychiatrists w i l l fully accept their part in j u d g i n g such symptomatic behavior pejoratively and consider it right and p r o p e r to do so. B u t often psychiatrists t e n d to feel harassed

387 and disgruntled w h e n forced to spend m u c h t i m e w i t h such cases. T h e y feel b u r d e n e d w h e n pressed by exigencies of military life to go b e y o n d simple diagnosis. I regard a lot of the character and behavior disorders as a waste of time because, although they may be sick, I don't have the slightest idea what to do for them. And they're just making paper work for me. And they make lots of it. I've got a court martial coming up Monday that I have to testify at. . . . We sent him over to Medicine to have another disease worked up. He thought maybe they were using him for a guinea pig, so he got drunk, threatened suicide, and got back in our ward. After a couple of weeks, he bled all over me and I let him go out on pass. And he came back from pass drunk, a day late, pulled a gun on a nurse, demanded some Seconaland from there on, the paper work really started to pile up. . . . And to me, it was just a total waste of time 'cause whatever his disorder is, it's not amenable to the type of psychiatry we're practicing right now. Perhaps the i m p l i c a t i o n here is that the psychiatrist really does not wish to enter into any extended negotiations about these cases once he has indicated his i n i t i a l disinterest in t h e m . H o w e v e r , the exigencies of m i l i t a r y life sometimes restrict his leeway in these matters. A n d the reality that the psychiatrist constructs m e r e l y takes account of this restriction w i t h o u t m u c h further c o m m e n t . To summarize, the use of the "c a n d b" label is a p p l i e d by the psychiatrist to persons the psychiatrist accepts as disagreeable, aggravating, or otherwise unattractive to the m i l i t a r y system. T h e y have been g i v e n their chance for an evaluation to uncover some mental illness that m i g h t explain or excuse their behavior. If they h a d h a d a m e n t a l illness, an honorable " o u t " w o u l d have b e e n p r o v i d e d . H o w e v e r , if a psychiatrist attests that they have no m e n t a l illness (but only a " q u i r k " or a " s t r e a k " of meanness, cowardice, depravity, hostility, or some other character flaw, as such are c o n c e i v e d in common-sense, lay evaluations) t h e n they m a y take the consequences, as laid d o w n i n regulations, for whatever w r a t h they have i n c u r r e d . T h e psychiatrist certifies that no moral, m e d i c a l , or generally humanitarian considerations n e e d mitigate the course of justice w h e n h e diagnoses " c a n d b . " In this area, t h e n , there are m a n y similarities

388 b e t w e e n the psychiatric, the military, a n d the common-sense construction of judgments a n d the attribution of motives. B u t this general category of character a n d behavior disorder also includes some p r o b l e m s w h e r e these three perspectives are not so clearly parallel. S u c h problems as alcoholism a n d homosexuali t y are usually categorized as "c a n d b . " B u t there are a variety of special understandings to consider on behalf of such sufferers (or c u l p r i t s d e p e n d i n g u p o n point o f view). T h e exigencies w h i c h spur these considerations are peculiar to m i l i t a r y settings a n d clearly illustrate the social pressures affecting a diagnosis. A c c o r d i n g l y , each of these problems is e x a m i n e d separately b e l o w .

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

years experience. It is written all over his [medical] chart, b u t . . . in black and white. It's inferred. They write all around and give you a diagnosis of [something else]. They don't what to ruin his career. Actually, they would probably do him a favor by saying it. Sometimes the alcoholics or their intermediaries w h o come to argue this point are h i g h - r a n k i n g a n d p o w e r f u l officers. E v e n w h e n there are n o such pressures, the possible injustice or hardship i n v o l v e d i n " f i r i n g " a m a n , and s o d e p r i v i n g h i m o f a n expected r e t i r e m e n t pension, m a y w e i g h h e a v i l y w i t h the psychiatrist. A major was hospitalized as a depressive. A n d the guy was a chronic alcoholic. . . . For ten years, on and off, he would get hospitalized every two or three years. . . . Once [he] got evacuated from Europe to Walter Reed. . . . A l l the time [for] depression, [and] the guy is an alcoholicwithout question. He's also a very decorated soldier. . . . When sober, a very effective guy; when drunk, inadequate and couldn't stop. . . . A n d wouldn't show up for work. A n d people would cover up for him. . . . On the post . . . it became very obvious that the problem was alcohol and nothing else, (even though) alcohol never, never came up . . . on his records. And he denied it. The only reason I wondered about it was that he showed up, the first time I saw him, . . . an hour late and drunkand it was 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning. . . . I asked his commanding officer, "does this guy have a drinking problem?" [The colonel told me] " H e drinks beer occasionally, but I've never seen him drunk." Nobody said he was an alcoholic. Well, the guy obviously was. I don't think they knew, or they weren't willing to go that far in facing [the] alcoholic [question]. He admitted it himself. It got to the point. I hospitalized him twice: once for a short term, and saw him as an outpatient (afterward); put him on Antabuse, and I said, well this is a compromise. . . . The third hospitalization . . . I got him in A A . But this time it came to post attention. The senior major and the colonel. . . . This was too much . . . too . . . many repeated instances of . . . not showing up for w o r k . . . . I evacuated him to [a large military hospital], and I called [the hospital] and said, "Keep him and reassign h i m " . . . to save him from [the action that was beginning to start rolling on him]. I hospitalized him [with a diagnosis of] depression. These considerations that the psychiatrist must w e i g h suggest that alcoholism m a y be associated w i t h m o r e " h o n o r a b l e " disabilities. A n d the alco-

Alcoholism A l c o h o l i s m is specifically e x e m p t e d f r o m the m e n t a l illness categories in the m i l i t a r y psychiatr i c nosology. Thus alcoholics should be dismissed or " s e p a r a t e d " f r o m service. B u t in this case, the tendency i n f o r m a l l y encouraged by the m i l i t a r y organization is to protect a n d excuse alcoholics rather than to use the f u l l array of sanctions techn i c a l l y available. T h e v i e w i s e m b o d i e d i n the f o l l o w i n g expressions: " G i v e t h e m another chance; try t o rehabilitate t h e m ; suggest A A and other therapeutic devices to c o n t r o l the p r o b l e m w h i l e the m a n remains o n d u t y . " W h e r e these contradictions b e t w e e n regulation a n d i n f o r m a l p o l i c y exist, the negotiations over diagnoses can be seen most clearly. To facilitate opportunities for second chances, alcoholics or their i n t e r m e d i aries often request that the psychiatrist w i t h h o l d the diagnosis of alcoholism in order to protect the offender f r o m the f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t of p r o m p t administrative separation. T h e argument for this e x e m p t i o n is usually m a d e in terms of n u m b e r of years the offender has already served. As in other types of diagnosis, l e n g t h of service is an i m p o r t a n t consideration w h e n f o r m u l a t i n g a diagnosis. B u t alcoholism m a y also be excused or i g n o r e d throughout the entire p e r i o d of service. People don't want to get down and write "alcoholic" [on a man's record], . . . The man's usually had 18

Daniels holic is m o r e easily " m a n a g e d " w i t h i n the system t h a n other deviants m o r e abhorrent w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y f r a m e w o r k (as the homosexual). T h e v i e w that d r i n k i n g is an i m p o r t a n t a n d m a n l y pastime for a soldier is part of m i l i t a r y culture. Thus, though the f o r m a l rules are similar in r e g a r d to b o t h homosexuality a n d alcoholism, i n f o r m a l u n derstandings require differing decisions or evaluations f r o m the psychiatric practitioner.

389 of m a n a g i n g cases so that diagnosis and disposition are m o r e palatable to both doctor and patient. A n often-mentioned technique i n negotiating t o escape the diagnosis of homosexuality is s i m p l y t o w i t h h o l d i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e C I D m a y f i n d itself in difficulty about p r o d u c i n g evidence w h e r e homosexuality cannot be p r o v e n . T h e psychiatrist m a y refuse to k e e p notes so there is n o t h i n g to subpoena; or he m a y destroy any notes that have i n c r i m i n a t i n g evidence. A n o t h e r alternative is that he m a y k e e p records in such vague a n d a m biguous language that no evidence is p r o v i d e d by t h e m . P a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n evaluating referrals w h o have fears about potential homosexuality, the psychiatrist has the greatest leeway to influence disposition t h r o u g h his diagnosis. H e r e he is only l i m i t e d in his discretion by the discretion of the referral. H e r e are examples of policy in this matter f r o m an A r m y a n d then a N a v y psychiatrist.

Homosexuality A far greater bone of contention for m a n y psychiatrists is created by the r e q u i r e m e n t that they diagnose homosexuality. Homosexuality is also specifically exempted f r o m the m e n t a l illness or disease categories in the m i l i t a r y regulations. If the psychiatrist makes this diagnosis, it is l i k e l y to result in a special p u n i t i v e administrative separation (the A r m y regulations n u m b e r i s A R 6 3 5 89) w h i c h m a y then result in an undesirable discharge. Officially, then, the evaluation of homosexuality in the m i l i t a r y is a pejorative j u d g m e n t e v e n though a m e d i c a l doctor diagnoses it. Psychiatrists m a y refuse to use the diagnosisor e v e n to see the p a t i e n t u n t i l the C I D ( C r i m i n a l Investigation Department) m e n d o their h o m e w o r k . In effect, they become the diagnostic agents. W h e n finally diagnosed by the psychiatrist, the p r o b l e m is to get the patient q u i c k l y out of the service. Separation rather than treatment is the m i l i t a r y expectation whatever the personal or professional v i e w of the psychiatrist w h o expedites this process. A guy comes in here and says, "I'm queer." So I send in a report that says this guy tells me that he is queer. CID are the ones that do all this. They . . . get all the statements and take all the pictures. I personally think that, except the obvious security risk involved, I don't see any reason why a homosexual can't be in the (service). Most of them. . . soldier fairly well. H o w e v e r , less p u n i t i v e types of administrative separations than the " 8 9 " m a y be arranged. In these situations, where the psychiatrist feels the m i l i t a r y expectations contradict his o w n views of what is professionally appropriate, there are ways

. . . we specifically recommend [one of the other administrative discharges] and fought for no "89" [separations] unless a guy confessed [homosexuality] and [put it] in black and white, and there was no choice. . . . If a company commander has it in for a guy, and has a guy cold [on grounds of homosexuality], you don't go down the line for someone who has been nailed cold. Don't try to change reality, but use it [your discretion to be less punitive] when you have a chance of succeeding. A young sailor comes in and saysI think with a tremendous amount of painthat he's a homosexual. You have got to decide whether he's homosexual and in a panic, or manipulating the decision [i.e., trying to get out of the service on that pretext]. One way [to decide] is to indicate the dangers of this diagnosis and what's going to happen to him. Maybe a B C D [Bad Conduct Discharge] or DD [Dishonorable Discharge] if you confess, or if you dispute [the charge] they find you guilty. I never said homosexual [made the diagnosis] unless he had already told someone. My first question always was: "Who else have you told?" When I went to my chief officer, his first question was: "Who else have you told?" [If the homosexual suspect had not told anyone] we would put him on the hospital ward for some length of time, and write up some sort of character disorder, EPTS [Existing Prior to Service] to get him out.

T h e p o w e r of the psychiatrist to effect the outcome t h r o u g h diagnosis is also e n h a n c e d by his o w n j u d g m e n t about how to " s t r e t c h " an evalua-

390 t i o n in cases w h i c h come to trial. By judicious commission of his speculations to the r e c o r d , a psychiatrist can influence the outcome in the d i r e c t i o n h e desires. A n e x - A i r F o r c e psychiatrist described his tactics in the f o l l o w i n g m a n n e r . A man in delivering cargo overseas got drunk and made a definite homosexual advance toward a member of his crew. I was called to give expert testimony. They wanted to know whether or not he was a homosexual. In my heart, I thought he was; but didn't take that position . . . what I did say was impossible to attack. I pointed out the vast quantity of alcohol the man had consumed. Enough to knock a man flat. I pointed out that a man coming out of anesthesia behaves in a way not regular [or usual]. [And I managed to get him off.] Sometimes, to attain what he considers the appropriate e n d , the psychiatrist w i l l enter i n d i rect private negotiation w i t h the patient. K e e p i n g a w a r y eye on what i n c r i m i n a t i n g evidence m a y already have b e e n collected, w h a t antagonisms have already b e e n p r o v o k e d , a n d what chances yet r e m a i n for the m a n to " m a k e i t " in the service, the psychiatrist offers the best " d e a l " that he can. I haven't given anybody an "89." I have had two candidates for it, and I have talked to both of them and told them: "You have trouble. If you get caught, they will anchor you with this for life. You can get out on an administrative separation right now. Why don't you take it?" They always jump at it.

PART V Research Implications and Applications other h a n d , it cannot be forgotten that the psychiatrist is also negotiating on behalf of the system, taking into account its coercive and regulatory powers over b o t h the patient a n d himself. T h e powers of that system, the margins or boundaries to its regulations w h i c h cannot be transgressed, the rulings that must be supportedthese are a l l realities that the psychiatrist translates into c o n crete, practical suggestions or recommendations w h e n he signs certificates and presents diagnoses. In this system, problems of diagnosis are inextricably m i x e d w i t h questions about appropriate disposition. This confusion of area arises because psychiatry has always faced problems of circular reasoning in its explanations of h u m a n b e h a v i o r . In situations w h e r e diagnostic procedures carry clear consequences for disposition of cases, the p r i n c i p l e seems to be: T e l l me what is feasible or reasonable to do w i t h this person a n d I w i l l give y o u a diagnosis w h i c h can explain, justify, or in some cases, m o d i f y that disposition.
9

CONCLUSIONS T h e p r e c e d i n g discussions of the m a n a g e m e n t of specific types of deviance suggest h o w deviant categories are socially constructed. Special social contexts, like that p r o v i d e d by the m i l i t a r y sett i n g , show very clearly that the psychiatrist keeps w e l l in m i n d a variety of contingencies that must be taken into account in f o r m u l a t i n g a diagnosis. T h e diagnosis may become the tangible representation of the way in w h i c h the psychiatrist negotiates w i t h or for the patient. T h e psychiatrist m a y use his diagnostic p o w e r to negotiate for the patient w i t h the systembuying time, o p e n i n g the way for leniency in the management of a case, suggesting a way out of some difficulty. On the

These principles are by no means l i m i t e d to the m i l i t a r y setting. Circumscriptions also exist in courts of l a w w h e r e psychiatrists for the defense a n d the prosecution each have a vested i n terest in a type of diagnosis that either does or does not p e r m i t further legal action against an accused. A n d diagnoses have just such m e a n i n g in these settings. S u c h problems also exist in prison psychiatry w h e r e the amount of l e n i e n c y that can be i n t r o d u c e d by psychiatrists t h r o u g h the range of diagnoses is quite c u r t a i l e d . (Powelson a n d B e n d i x , 1955.) In these settings the p r e d o m i n a n c e of p u n i t i v e a n d custodial values makes it difficult to present diagnoses w h i c h suggest lenient dispositions. This pattern is f o u n d in m i l i t a r y prisons as w e l l . T h e effect of the prison or custodial establishment is to encourage the psychiatrist to diagnose in certain directions only. As one psychiatrist serving in a m i l i t a r y p r i s o n explained the situation, the psychiatrist c a n only diagnose p u n i t i v e l y .
10

S e e T. S. S z a s z , in K.

The Myth of Mental Illness ( N e w Y o r k : H o e b e r Lynn (ed.), The Professions in America

H a r p e r , 1961), a n d N . Z i n b e r g , " P s y c h i a t r y : A P r o f e s s i o n a l D i lemma" ( C a m b r i d g e : H o u g h t o n M i f f l i n C o m p a n y , 1965), p p . 1 5 4 - 1 6 9 .

1 0

See H . Powelson a n d R . Bendix, "Psychiatry i n Prisons" i n Rose (ed.) Mental Health and Mental Disease (New York:

W . W . N o r t o n , 1955), p p . 4 5 9 - 4 8 1 .

Daniels They [command authorities] give us the kiss of death for negative recommendations [to their policies]. . . . They use the psychiatrist for their own purposeso he gets blamed [if the decision should later come up for unfavorable review on an appeal]. To hell with the psychiatrist when he goes against their wishes. . . . T h e categories that the psychiatrist uses do not exist in a v a c u u m . T h e y are not i n d e p e n d e n t of the circumstances in w h i c h they arise. A n d the m o r e c i r c u m s c r i b e d the system i n w h i c h h e operates, the m o r e influenced he is in the d i r e c t i o n taken by his evaluations of the behavior he examines. Thus one can anticipate that the bureaucratic expectations of p r i s o n or prisonlike total institutions w i l l b e reflected i n certain tendencies or trends of psychiatric diagnoses a n d dispositions. These comparisons in settings for practice suggest, of course, that psychiatry may be adaptable, that n e w methods and theories may be d e v e l o p e d out of adversity. H o w e v e r , they also suggest that the construction of psychiatric reality m a y be almost entirely social. T h e actual disease base or the actual significance of the presentation of symptoms may be of such slight i m p o r t a n c e in the f o r m u l a t i o n of diagnoses as to warrant our rephrasing of Marx's dicta once again. B e i n g determines consciousness, a n d social pressures det e r m i n e psychiatric nosology.

391 Denzin, Norman K. "The Methodological Implications of Symbolic Interactionism for the Study of Deviance," British Journal of Sociology, 25 (September 1974), pp. 269-282. An application of the "labeling encounter." Deutscher, Irwin. "Words and Deeds: Social Science and Social Policy." Social Problems, vol. 13 (Winter 1966), pp. 235-254. A careful consideration of the implications of research findings on inconsistencies between verbalized attitudes and overt behavior. Applies the perspective of symbolic interactionism in explaining the findings. Elkin, Frederick. The Child and Society. New York: Random House, 1960, pp. 25-30. Describes the role of significant others in early socialization. Faris, Ellsworth. "The Retrospective Act and Education." Journal of 'Educational Sociology, vol. 14 (October 1940), pp. 79-91. A contemporary of Mead's at the University of Chicago analyzes some educational implications of a common form of human behavior: viewing one's own past behavior. Gecas, Viktor, and Roger Libby. "Sexual Behavior as Symbolic Interaction." The Journal of Sex Research, vol. 12 (February 1976), pp. 33-49. An effort to organize research findings on sexual behavior in terms of the symbolic interactionist frame of reference. Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss. "Awareness Contexts and Social Interaction," American Sociological Review, vol. 29 (October 1964), pp. 669-679. Considers the identities actors assign themselves and their co-actors among terminally i l l patients in hospitals. Goffman, Erving. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963. Analyzes feelings toward self and others of such "discredited and discreditable" persons as the physically deformed, the exmental patient, the drug addict, the prostitute, and the ugly. Hall, Peter. "A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics," Sociological Inquiry, vol. 42 (no. 3-4, 1972), pp. 35-75. Argues against the view that symbolic interactionism is inherently apolitical. Haskell, Martin R. "Toward a Reference Group Theory of Juvenile Delinquency." Social Problems, vol. 8 (Winter 1960-1961), pp. 220-230. Exemplifies a growing tendency to incorporate symbolic interactionism into theories of delinquent and criminal behavior.

SELECTED REFERENCES PART FIVE Becker, Howard S. Outsiders. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963, pp. 1-18. Shows how responses to deviation shape deviant behavior. This reference should be compared with the one by Lemert, below. Brooks, Richard S. "The Self and Political Role: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach to Political Ideology," The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 10 (Winter 1969), pp. 22-31. Uses the TST to analyze left-wing and right-wing political roles. Cohen, Albert K. "The Sociology of the Deviant A c t . " American Sociological Review, vol. 30 (February 1965), pp. 5-14. An effort to integrate anomie theory with Mead's role theory.

392 Lemert, Edwin M . Social Pathology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951, pp. 75-78. Introduces the concept "secondary deviation" to describe how the reactions of others reinforce the individual's deviance. Lindesmith, Alfred R. "Problems in the Social Psychology of Addiction." In D. M. Wilner and G. C. Kassebaum (ed.) Narcotics. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965. The author is a prominent student of drug addiction, which he views from the perspective of symbolic interactionism. Lofland, John. Deviance and Identity. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. A symbolic interactionist approach to the subject. Marshall, Victor W. "Socialization for Impending Death i n a Retirement Village." American Journal of Sociology, 80 (March 1975), pp. 1124-1145. Participant observation and interviewing used to explore legitimations of dying. Martin, Wilfred B. W. The Negotiated Order of the School. Canada: Macmillan, 1976. Application of the "negotiation framework" to teacher-pupil and teacher-teacher interaction. Petras, John W . Sexuality in Society. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973. Sex, gender, and sexuality viewed by a symbolic interactionist. Plummer, Kenneth. Sexual Stigma: An Intractionist Account. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. A consideration of sex as deviance. Schwartz, Michael, Gordon F. N. Fearn, and Sheldon Stryker. "Note on Self Conception and the Emotionally Disturbed Role," Sociometry, vol. 29 (Sep-

PART V

Research Implications and Applications

tember 1966), pp. 300-305. A study of the deviant as role-maker. Spitzer, Stephan P., and Norman K. Denzin (eds.). The Mental Patient: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968. Emphasizes the symbolic interactionist tradition. Stebbins, Robert A. Teachers and Meaning: Definitions of Classroom Situations. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975. How teachers in two schools deal with the meaning of disorderly behavior, academic performance, and tardiness. Stryker, Sheldon. "Role-Taking Accuracy and Adjustment," Sociometry, vol. 20 (December 1957), pp. 286-296. Hypothesizes that "the adjustment of the individual is a function of the accuracy with which he can take the role of the other(s) implicated with him in some social situation." Turner, Ralph H. "Self and Other in Moral Judgment." American Sociological Review, vol. 19 (June 1954, pp. 249-259. Responses of 88 individuals and their friends toward the respondent's hypothetical involvement in a theft. Turner, Rormy E., and Charles Edgley. "Death as Theatre: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the American Funeral." Sociology and Social Research, vol. 60 (July 1976), pp. 377-392. A useful complement to the article by Carlen (Selection 36). Vercors (Jean Bruller). You Shall Know Them. New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1955. A novel that raises the question: What are the attributes which most clearly distinguish humans from other living forms?

PART six

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

T h e basic concepts a n d principles of symbolic interactionism focus attention u p o n the ongoing, constructed activities constituting h u m a n society a n d conduct. T h e utility of the perspective has been evidenced by its power to explain a broad range of conduct in a variety of contexts. Symbolic interactionists should not need to be reminded, however, that their ideas are, themselves, social constructions o p e n to evaluation both from their o w n perspective a n d f r o m the perspectives of other social psychologies. Some of our earlier readings (e.g., Selections 1, 3, 15, 20, 25) include a few such evaluations. Appraisals of symbolic interactionism are neither new nor uninfluential. Decades ago, Herbert B l u m e r a n d M a n f o r d H . K u h n placed the imprint of their o w n ideas and assessments u p o n the viewpoints of their predecessors. To m a n y outside the perspective, however, symbolic interactionism has appeared to be a somewhat monolithic embodiment of sectarian truths. Cavalier disregard by many symbolic interactionists for the theories a n d data of various psychological schools of social psychology lends some support to this position. H o w e v e r , such insulation appears to be m u t u a l , for psychologically oriented social psychologists have tended to ignore symbolic interactionism. T h e spread of symbolic interactionism from its source at the University of Chicago has h e l p e d to diminish its insularity. A large and growing number of scholars, located throughout a n d b e y o n d the U n i t e d States, have assessed and modified older viewpoints. Increments to this knowledge p r o d u c e d by the dramaturgical a n d ethnomethodological approaches have also encouraged this development. It has seemed appropriate in this revised edition,

394

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

therefore, to give special attention to the major points of the critics. T h e readings in this Part, along with others cited in the Selected References, can enrich a n d advance our understanding of b o t h symbolic interactionism a n d the h u m a n condition. A brief excerpt f r o m a recent book by R a n d a l l C o l l i n s deals w i t h symbolic interactionism and related perspectives as examples of an "aesthetic orientation." Such an orientation, he holds, aims at producing "intellectual work the experience of w h i c h is a value in itself," a k i n to art a n d literature. W h i l e emphasizing the necessity of insight, this orientation slights the quest for causal generalizations that are required by an explanatory sociology. Jonathan H. T u r n e r opens with a summary of symbolic interactionism's advantages over other theoretical perspectives. Still, his m a i n concern is its neglect of social structure a n d organizations. W h i l e small groups a n d interindividual relationships are important, he points out, symbolic interactionists have not come to terms with the major collective units of the m o d e r n social w o r l d . J o h n Lofland's article attacks the "conceptually impoverished symbolic interactionist tradition at the University of C h i c a g o in the late forties a n d early fifties" for generating some of the present weaknesses of the perspective. These weaknesses tend to center around a frequent failure to carry out systematic, cumulative analyses of interesting research findings. Symbolic interactionists have tended to interrupt their analyses short of formulating articulate a n d orderly generalizations that transcend the specific data. T h e article by Joan H u b e r questions the pragmatic criteria of knowledge u n d e r l y i n g symbolic interactionism, contending that they introduce certain ideological and epistemological biases w h i c h distort its image of collective social life. She contends that by failing to spell out clearly the nature of its theoretical postulates a n d methodology, the adherents of the perspective rely too heavily u p o n the emergence of truth f r o m the views of the interactants under study. T h u s , she claims that the researches of symbolic interactionism are too concerned with discovering the perspectives of people a n d not sufficiently concerned with formulating a n d a p p l y i n g its o w n theoretical and methodological perspective. Contrary views are available in rebuttals to her article by B l u m e r , Schmitt, a n d Stone et al., w h i c h are cited in the Selected References of this Part. T h e selection by Herbert B l u m e r is a review of a book by E r v i n g Goffman, a leading exponent of the dramaturgical perspective. W h i l e agreeing with m a n y of Goffman's procedures and interpretations, B l u m e r challenges Goffman's preoccupation excusively with face-to-face interaction. A l s o , he challenges Goffman's restriction of his work to the expressive forms of encounters, to the exclusion of the substantive content of the encounters. A n d , finally, B l u m e r questions the apparent assumption that h u m a n interaction is always organized a n d stable, w h i c h overlooks the dynamic, unstructured, a n d problematic character of many interpersonal situations. C o m p a r i n g and contrasting H a r o l d Garfinkel's ethnomethodological

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395

perspective with the perspectives of G o f f m a n , on the one h a n d , a n d Talcott Parsons, on the other, A l v i n W. G o u l d n e r attacks a l l three. H i s acerbic criticisms of Garfinkel's work cover substantive, methodological, a n d ideological matters. Illustrative of G o u l d n e r ' s strictures are his assertions that ethnomethodology is ahistorical (ignoring the question of h o w definitions of social reality become established) a n d astructural (scanting the importance of conflicting interest groups in society). As George Herbert M e a d is the dominant figure in symbolic interactionism, a n d as the first selection in this book deals with his contributions to it, it is perhaps fitting to c o n c l u d e with an appraisal of his efforts. E d w i n H. L e m e r t , a founder of the societal reaction approach to deviance, offers criticisms of Mead's position a n d some positive suggestions for m o v i n g "bey o n d M e a d . " A l t h o u g h the concept of societal reactions has h e l p e d to clarify the sources and nature of deviant behavior, its ties to symbolic interactionism, the dramatistic metaphor, a n d ethnomethodology have fostered an excessive emphasis u p o n the labeling process. L e m e r t suggests that renewed attention to group structures w o u l d h e l p in the study of deviance.

Randall Collins

42

Interpretive Social Psychology

A n o t h e r sociological approach w h i c h falls into the category of romanticist social science is the analysis of the flow of i n d i v i d u a l experience. T h e r e are various types of such analysis: symbolic interactionism, social phenomenology and ethnomethodology, and sociological existentialism; all of t h e m go back ultimately to the G e r m a n idealist tradition. Some of thesee.g., L y m a n and Scott's (1970) Sociology of the Absurdexplicitly set an aesthetic a i m : to capture the pathos or d r a m a of h u m a n existence, especially the existential tragedy of m a n imposing fragile meanings on a meaningless w o r l d . Others, such as ethnomethodology, are far f r o m overtly humanistic in style or content. Ethnomethodology and phenomenology t e n d to exist in symbiosis w i t h a counterimage of positivistic science w h i c h is a constant target of attack. A h i d d e n r i v a l r y to science comes to the surface in the ethnomethodologist's m o r e posi t i v e a i m , w h i c h is to p u r i f y research procedures. In this respect, ethnomethodology is reminiscent of a h y p e r c r i t i c a l positivist methodology taken as an e n d in itself. Some of the same r i v a l r y is found in symbolic interactionism, w h i c h , although ext r e m e l y critical of positivist formulations, often puts itself f o r w a r d as the basis for a truer scientific explanation of social behavior. Nevertheless, all of the i n t e r p r e t i v e sociologies seem to be basically o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d an aesthetic approach to their subject matter. T h e emphasis on the subjectivity of the h u m a n actor, the t i m e - b o u n d processes of behavior a n d experi-

ence, and the d e n i a l of external structure a n d of the scientific i d e a l of explanationall of these leave the i n t e r p r e t i v e sociologist in the position of n e e d i n g some c r i t e r i o n for organizing what he is going to say. T h e scientific ideal of progressively m o r e p o w e r f u l causal explanation is explicitly den i e d as a v a l i d goal, although the ideal of " t r u l y " scientific k n o w l e d g e is sometimes smuggled back in to defend the critics against the charge that they are purely negativistic. T h e i n t e r p r e t i v e sociologists can also find an exterior purpose through their utility in attacking the political premises assumed in positivist treatments of " d e v i a n c e " and "social p r o b l e m s " generally. B u t the core of the appeal of C o o l e y a n d George H e r b e r t M e a d , Schutz and M e r l e a u Ponty, G a r f i n k e l , L y m a n and Scott, and others is the experience of insight that they give into social reality. T h e interpretive sociologies are truer to life than structuralist models. T h e y attempt to capture the flow of our o w n experience just as it is a n d to demonstrate that all else is a m y t h built u p f r o m i n d i v i d u a l performances. Since science must be about reality, i n t e r p r e t i v e sociologists c l a i m to be the real basis for any scientific sociology, in contrast to theories d e r i v e d f r o m reified ideals about structures, attitudes, norms, and values. B u t this promise (or threat) is n e v e r really l i v e d up to, for the interpretive sociologists do not develop and expand a body of testable generalizations. T h e scope of application may expand, as symbolic interactionist interpretations have been g i v e n of various kinds of deviance, career mobility, ethnic relations and so on. B u t this is a matter of repeating the insight so that

Randall Collins,

Conflict Sociology. ( N e w Y o r k : A c a d e m i c P r e s s ,

I n c . , 1975), p p . 3 0 - 3 4 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n .

398 one sees h o w each of these is a processual phen o m e n o n b u i l t up by the i n d i v i d u a l actors. This has b e e n the case w i t h the symbolic interactionism; ethnomethodologyinsofar as it moves b e y o n d p u r e l y philosophical discussionsoften seems to tread the same p a t h , w i t h its o w n pec u l i a r sophistication but substantively similar results. This emphasis on an insight experience is the h a l l m a r k of an aesthetic orientation. N e g a t i v e l y , it is set off against the c o l d , uninsightful, a n d hence u n r e a l constructions of positivist science w h i c h i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology constantly criticizes. Positively, its o w n c l a i m to value is the experience it gives of showing h o w things really are, not t h r o u g h the cumulative results of explanatory research, b u t all at once w i t h a v i s i o n of the u n i v e r sal processes of h u m a n experience. L i k e great literature (especially in the romanticist version), it captures the particularity of i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n existence, the pathos of its boundedness in t i m e , the subjectivity that gives m a n his f r e e d o m but also cuts h i m off f r o m fully e n c o u n t e r i n g others. At the same time, it approaches the classical literary i d e a l in demonstrating the universality of these p h e n o m e n a , g i v i n g the experience of recogn i z i n g the universal in the particular. It is the constant potential for r e c r e a t i n g these experiences in the reader that keeps i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology alive through endless repetitions, m u c h as a Shakespearian play can r e t u r n for a n infinite n u m ber of engagements. T h e ambiguity of this position must be faced. On the one h a n d , i n t e r p r e t i v e sociologists are quite right that a science must be true to the basic e m p i r i c a l reality it is t r y i n g to explain. A scientific sociology w i l l have to be b u i l t on an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the enacted, subjectivistic, i n t e r p r e t i v e nature o f h u m a n experience. " O r ganizations," "societies," a n d so on must be seen t h r o u g h a n d through as the e p h e m e r a l creations of r e a l m e n in the flux of constructing a g r e e d - u p o n realities, w h i c h often are not really agreed-upon but inalterably p l u r a l . B u t h a v i n g p e r f o r m e d b o t h a critical a n d a potentially reconstructive service for scientific sociology, the interp r e t i v e sociologists stop dead in their tracks. T h e aesthetic o r i e n t a t i o n w h i c h p r o v i d e d f r o m the

P A R T VI Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism w e a l t h of the romanticist-idealist t r a d i t i o n b o t h the c r i t i q u e of positivist social science a n d an alternative image of manbecomes an obstacle to m o v i n g any further. E v e n w h e r e it proposes to reorient the foundations of scientific sociology, ethnomethodology has jealously g u a r d e d its boundaries, refusing to allow generalizations f r o m outside its o w n precincts e v e n in tentative status. It has m a i n t a i n e d an absolutist, nonpragmatist ideal of t r u t h as a stick that only itself escapes b e i n g beaten w i t h and this only because it usually fails to attempt serious generalizations. Symbolic interactionism, o n the other h a n d , has l i v e d i n p r o x i m i t y w i t h A m e r i c a n positivism for half a century n o w , a n d has a c c o m m o d a t e d by p r e t e n d i n g m o r e d i r e c t l y to u n d e r p i n a science of its o w n . Y e t this has not c o m e about, e v e n w i t h several decades of e m p i r i cal research i n f o r m e d by the symbolic interactionist tradition. It has described occupations, careers, a n d deviance (and has c o n t r i b u t e d to the d o w n f a l l of positivist theories in the latter area based on projections of political values), but it has b u i l t no g e n e r a l i z e d explanatory theory bey o n d a r e p e t i t i o n of the same fundamentals. T h e g e n e r a l i z i n g efforts o f H u g h D a l z i e l D u n c a n (1962) a n d A n s e l m Strauss (1971) p o i n t up the failures: a great d e a l of material is subsumed u n der the m o d e l , but f o r m u l a t i o n never moves to testable generalizations about the causes of variations i n behavior. It is the aesthetic orientation that brings t h e m up short. F o r to state causal generalizations in this context w o u l d be to introduce the c o l d , u n a m biguous, a n d " e x t e r n a l " qualities into h u m a n experience w h i c h the subjective, interpretist app r o a c h tries to o v e r c o m e . D e s p i t e its occasional pretensions to d e v e l o p a n e w science, i n t e r p r e tive sociology is b e n t on protecting a r o m a n t i c version o f h u m a n experience f r o m science. A m b i guity is of the essence in romantic literature, for it is in the reader's responses to a c o m p l e x of suggestions that its experience of d r a m a is f o u n d . T h e processual quality of our lives, in the same way, derives its d r a m a f r o m the a m b i g u i t y of o u r future at any g i v e n t i m e . To l i m i t that a m b i g u i t y w i t h causal p r i n c i p l e s is to circumscribe our sense of f r e e d o m a n d to risk losing the dramatic experi-

Collins ence that symbolic interactionists m e a n to convey. W h a t k i n d of sociology one wishes to do, of course, is a value choice that everyone makes for himself. Explanatory, practical, ideological, aestheticthere is no one type that can arbitrarily be called right and the others w r o n g , but they are different modes of discourse and there is no excuse for confusing t h e m . My c o n c e r n at this m o m e n t is for a successful scientific sociology. To b u i l d this, I have argued, we must free ourselves f r o m practical and ideological orientations and their aftereffects, and f r o m aesthetic concerns as w e l l . In the last case, however, there are i m p o r tant things to be b o r r o w e d for scientific sociology. T h e aesthetic critique has b e e n c r u c i a l in freeing ourselves f r o m the practical a n d ideological projections that have p r o p p e d up a p r e t e n d e d , an unsuccessful, positivist science. T h e interpretive sociologists give us a firmer basis on w h i c h to build.
1

399 experience favored by an aesthetic orientation may d e p e n d on such advances, for the insights of interpretive sociology have a way of p a l l i n g . T h e flash of recognition, w h i c h hopeful sociology teachers have sought for decades to m a k e their students experience w h e n they are brought to see the v e r y w o r l d they live in as enacted a n d i n t e r p r e t e d , has b e e n all too ephemeral. T h e general idea of the social nature of our w o r l d has crept into the p u b l i c w o r l d v i e w . Symbolic interactionists, for all their self-image as proponents of freshness and life in sociology, are themselves largely responsible for the feeling that sociologists give other names to what everybody already knows. E t h n o m e t h o d o l o g y left to itself seems likely to suffer the same fate. It is only by produci n g explanations that give the conditions for w h y one t h i n g happens rather than another that sociology can recover some of its magic. T h o u g h there are dangers here of t u r n i n g sociology into a drab d e t e r m i n i s m , any scientific sociology built up f r o m a n interpetive perspective w i l l have built into it its o w n foil. It is the c o m b i n a t i o n of determ i n i s m and f r e e d o m , after all, that constitutes the greatest art; advances in scientific sociology can m o v e its aesthetics b e y o n d a t i r e d r o m a n t i cism, hopefully into something greater.
2

B u t we cannot linger forever a d m i r i n g the insight. In order to b u i l d explanatory sociology, we must w o r k at b u i l d i n g , r e c o g n i z i n g all the tentativeness and pragmatics of our formulations but not using these as an excuse for abandoning the enterprise. Ironically, e v e n the fate of the insight
1

T o take just o n e e x a m p l e : the c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t s o f D a v i d (1969) for the i m p o r t a n c e of consciousness, drift, and

2

Matza

R i c h a r d B r o w n has p o i n t e d o u t t o m e t h a t t h e r e a r e n o n r o m a n -

t h e o n g o i n g s e l f - s h a p i n g o f e x p e r i e n c e c o m e u p against a l i m i t of their o w n m a k i n g ; consciousness is i n v o k e d as an arbitrary r e a l m b e y o n d causality, w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g w h a t k i n d o f determ i n a n t s m i g h t b e l o c a t e d a t this v e r y l e v e l . A n a p p r o a c h t o causal e x p l a n a t i o n of the o n g o i n g process of n e g o t i a t i n g cognit i v e r e a l i t i e s i s p r e s e n t e d i n C h a p t e r 3 i n this v o l u m e .

ticist a e s t h e t i c s , e s p e c i a l l y i n c o n t e m p o r a r y C o n t i n e n t a l l i t e r a r y criticism, that d o not f i t the f o r e g o i n g characterization. W h e t h e r they c a n m a i n t a i n a l i n k to a truly scientific sociology r e m a i n s t o b e s e e n ; s o far, F r e n c h s t r u c t u r a l i s m c o n n e c t s a l l too r e a d i l y w i t h the n o n c a u s a l systems m o d e l s f r o m w h i c h scientific sociolo g y has b e e n t r y i n g t o d i s e n t a n g l e itself.

Jonathan H. Turner

43

Symbolic Interactionism and Social Organization

SOME SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS T h e assumptions, causal imagery, a n d e v e n the research and theory-building strategies of B l u m e r a n d others point to the fact that the basic social process f r o m w h i c h personality a n d social structures are constructed is symbolic interaction. W h e t h e r attention is d r a w n to the structure of personality or society, symbolic interaction a m o n g actors is the formative process that creates, sustains, and changes these e m e r g e n t structures. A l t h o u g h the patterned aspects of personality or of social structure can enter into the course of interaction as "objects" of the situation w h i c h shape the interpretative, evaluational, definitional, a n d m a p p i n g processes of actors, symbolic interaction appears to be c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y w i t h the process of interaction, per se. T h e p r o d ucts of such interactionpersonality a n d social structurehave r e c e i v e d v a r y i n g degrees of substantive c o n c e r n in the literature, w h e r e the structuring of different types of personality has
1

b e e n g i v e n m o r e substantive attention than the structuring of various patterns of social organization. T h e substantive c o n c e r n w i t h the process of interaction offers a n u m b e r of advantages over other theoretical perspectives. First, it w o u l d appear to correct for the i m p u t e d inattention of perspectives such as functionalism a n d conflict theory to the symbolic processes that u n d e r l i e the construction a n d maintenance of patterns of social organization. Second, the concepts of symbolic interaction " t h e o r y " are probably m o r e generic than the specific types of interaction advocated by other perspectives, w i t h the result that conceptssuch as exchange, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d i n f o r m a t i o n c a n be subsumed by the concepts of symbolic interaction. T h i r d , symbolic interactionist concepts can be used to embrace the f u l l range of h u m a n relationshipssuch as conflict, cooperation, and dominationso that, in p r i n c i p l e at least, symbolic interactionism w o u l d m a k e unnecessary the construction of separate " t h e o r i e s " of each type of h u m a n relationship. H o w e v e r , as p r o m i s i n g as these facts w o u l d m a k e the symbolic interactionist perspective appear, several substantive deficiencies r e m a i n . M u c h of symbolic interaction consists of gallant assertions that "society is symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n , " w i t h o u t i n d i c a t i n g what types of emergent structures are created, sustained, and changed by w h a t types of interaction in what types of contexts. M u c h l i k e the critics' allegations about Parsons's "social s y s t e m " or D a h r e n d o r f ' s " i m p e r a t i v e l y coordinated associations," social structural p h e n o m -

Reprinted Theory b y J .

with

permission

from

The

Structure

of Sociological

H . T u r n e r ( H o m e w o o d , 111.:

T h e D o r s e y Press,

1974), p p . 1 8 9 - 1 9 2 .
1

T h e l o n g tradition of speculation a n d research on the process

of socialization in the symbolic interactionist literature d o c u m e n t s this c o n t e n t i o n . T h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y s p a r s e c o n c e r n w i t h h o w groups, organizations, a n d other forms of collective organiz a t i o n e m e r g e a n d are sustained s h o u l d d o c u m e n t the lack o f c o n c e r n w i t h patterns o f social o r g a n i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r , i n the a r e a o f c o l l e c t i v e b e h a v i o r c r o w d s , m o b s , riots, a n d s o f o r t h s y m b o l i c interactionists have m a d e a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s . A n d y e t , this l i t e r a t u r e o n s u c h t r a n s i t o r y c o l l e c t i v e p h e n o m e n a m a k e s the lack o f attention o n m o r e stable patterns o f social o r g a n i z a t i o n e v e n m o r e e v i d e n t .

Turner e n a emerge somewhat mysteriously and are t h e n sustained or changed by vague references to i n teractive processes. T h e vagueness of the links b e t w e e n the interaction process a n d its social structural p r o d u c t s leaves symbolic interactioni s m w i t h a legacy of assertions, but little in the w a y of carefully d o c u m e n t e d statements about h o w , w h e n , where, a n d w i t h w h a t probability i n teraction processes operate to create, sustain, a n d change v a r y i n g patterns of social organization.
2

401 may be applicable to only those levels of analysis w h e r e individuals are the interacting units. If such is the case, the current inability of symbolic interaction to d o c u m e n t just h o w interaction creates, sustains, a n d changes social structures m a y be due, in part at least, to the fact that its concepts denote only a l i m i t e d range of m i c r o p h e n o m e n a . U n t i l these problems are resolved by other than confident assertions about the nature of reality a n d of the causal processes such reality reveals, symbolic interactionism w i l l leave u n a n s w e r e d the i m p o r t a n t substantive question: Social reality is constructed t h r o u g h a process called symbolic interaction, but just h o w does such interaction create, m a i n t a i n , a n d change different features of social reality?

A c c o r d i n g l y , symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n i s m represents a vision of the social w o r l d w h i c h u n d e r e m phasizes social structures, except as "objects" of actors' orientations or as " t h i n g s " that somehow just emerge f r o m interaction. W i t h o u t l i n k i n g , except by assertion, social processes a n d social structure, symbolic interaction offers a p i c t u r e of a constantly flowing and fluctuating w o r l d , w i t h actors symbolically i n t e r p r e t i n g , evaluating, defining, a n d m a p p i n g respective lines of action. W h i l e this v i s i o n certainly captures c r u c i a l social features, it w o u l d appear to do so at the expense of i g n o r i n g the structures that c h a n n e l the symbolic processes of actors. A n o t h e r related p r o b l e m w i t h the symbolic interactionist perspective is its c u r r e n t inability to p r o v i d e a useful set of concepts that can describe the interaction a m o n g collective organizations. W h i l e B l u m e r has b e e n insistent that the same processes of interpretation, evaluation, defin i t i o n , and m a p p i n g w h i c h characterize the interactions among individuals also p e r t a i n to interactions a m o n g collective units, he a n d other interactionists have yet to d o c u m e n t just h o w this is so. At a v e r y general l e v e l , it is quite l i k e l y that e m e r g e n t social units do " s i z e u p " a situation a n d " t h e n m a p " a line of action; h o w e v e r , it c a n be questioned whether this says v e r y m u c h about the w a y collective units interact a n d articulate w i t h one another to f o r m complex patterns of social organization. It seems l i k e l y that it w i l l be necessary to d e v e l o p additional concepts to account for these m o r e c o m p l e x linkages a m o n g larger social units; to the extent that this is necessary, t h e n the concepts of symbolic interaction
* W i t h respect to the structuring of personality, symbolic intera c t i o n i s m has d o n e a m u c h b e t t e r j o b o f i n d i c a t i n g h o w a n d in w h a t ways symbolic interaction leads to the e m e r g e n c e of certain types of personality.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS Symbolic interactionism advocates a clear-cut strategy for b u i l d i n g sociological theory. T h e e m phasis on the i n t e r p r e t i v e , evaluative, definitional, a n d m a p p i n g processes of actors has c o m e to dictate that it is only through i n d u c t i o n f r o m these processes that sociological theory c a n be built. F u r t h e r , the ever-shifting nature of these symbolic processes necessitates that the concepts of sociological theory be " s e n s i t i z i n g " rather than " d e f i n i t i v e , " w i t h the result that d e d u c t i v e t h e o r i z i n g should be replaced by an i n d u c t i v e approach. Thus, w h e t h e r as a p r e f e r r e d strategy or as a logical "necessity," the symbolic interactionist strategy is to i n d u c e generic statements, e m p l o y i n g sensitizing concepts, f r o m the o n g o i n g s y m bolic processes of individuals in concrete interaction situations. Such a strategy is l i k e l y to keep t h e o r i z i n g attuned to the processual nature of the social w o r l d . C u r r e n t l y , h o w e v e r , this approach has not b e e n able to l i n k conceptually the processes of symbolic interaction to the formation of different patterns of social organization. F u r t h e r m o r e , the utility of i n d u c t i o n f r o m the symbolic exchanges a m o n g i n d i v i d u a l s for the analysis of i n t e r a c t i o n a m o n g m o r e macro, collective social units has yet to be demonstrated. Unless these p r o b l e m s c a n be resolved, it does not seem wise to follow exclu-

402 sively the strategy of B l u m e r a n d others of his persuasion. U n t i l symbolic interactionists d e m o n strate in a m o r e c o m p e l l i n g m a n n e r than is curr e n t l y the case that the i n d u c t i v e approach, u t i l i z i n g sensitizing concepts, can account for m o r e complex forms of social organization, pursuit of its strategy w i l l preclude t h e o r i z i n g about m u c h of the social w o r l d . Symbolic interactionism does call attention to some important substantive a n d theoretical issues that are often ignored. First, it is necessary that sociological t h e o r i z i n g be m o r e w i l l i n g to u n dertake the difficult task of l i n k i n g conceptually structural categories to classes of social processes that u n d e r l i e these categories. To this task, symbolic interactionism has p r o v i d e d a w e a l t h of suggestive concepts. Second, macro sociological theor i z i n g has traditionally r e m a i n e d detached f r o m the processes of the social w o r l d it attempts to describe. M u c h of the detachment stems f r o m a failure to define concepts clearly a n d p r o v i d e operational clues about what processes in the e m p i r -

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

ical w o r l d they denote. To the extent that symbolic interactionist concepts can supplement such theorizing, they w i l l potentially p r o v i d e a b r i d g e to actual e m p i r i c a l processes and thereby h e l p attach sociological theory to the events it purports to explain. As should be obvious, it is one t h i n g to note that symbolic interactionism has great potential for correcting the past inadequacies of sociological theory and another t h i n g to demonstrate exactly how this corrective influence is to be exerted. It may be w e l l advised for symbolic interactionists to cease defining away the b u l k of sociological theory a n d begin the difficult task of demonstrating in specific theoretical context (other than in socialization and personality theory) the utility of their perspective for supplem e n t i n g (or replacing) other theoretical perspectives. In particular, symbolic interactionism needs to demonstrate w i t h e m p i r i c a l evidence the u t i l ity of its tenets, especially in p r e d i c t i n g variation i n macro structural phenomena.

John Lofland

4 4

Interactionist Imagery and Analytic Interruptus

W h a t I want to say may first be said in summary. I am going to suggest that in m a n y instances w e interactionists have b e e n too " h u n g u p " o n our general imagery and have not seriously gotten
J o h n L o f l a n d , "Interactionist Imagery a n d A n a l y t i c Interruptus." From Human Nature and Collective Behavior: Papers in Honor of Herbert Blumer, by permission. e d i t e d by T a m o t s u Shibutani (Engle-

w o o d C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1970), p p . 3 5 - 4 5 . R e p r i n t e d

on to the m a i n w o r k that we have set for ourselves. As a result, at least one variety of interactionism is conceptually impoverished. O n e w a y i n w h i c h this i m p o v e r i s h m e n t m i g h t b e corrected is for those of us w h o use an i m p l i c i t p a r a d i g m of strategic analysis to stop engaging in w h a t I shall call "analytic i n t e r r u p t u s " and get on w i t h the h a r d work. L e t me be clear that the friendly flagellation

Lofland to follow is also self-flagellation. I feel free to t h r o w stones because I l i v e in an identical glass house.

403 m e r a l o n g w i t h his predecessors such as George H e r b e r t M e a d , W i l l i a m I . Thomas and Robert E . Park and his contemporaries such as E v e r e t t H u g h e s t h e descendants have w a n t e d to trans late such imagery into m o r e concrete accomplish ments. Such a mission of translation has m o v e d in at least three directions that are of interest here. First, some descendants have been o v e r w h e l m e d by the task a n d have taken to a doctrinaire reitera tion of the masters' teachings, w r i t i n g v e r y little b e y o n d a doctoral dissertation. A l t h o u g h rarely m e n t i o n e d i n p r i n t , the research and w r i t i n g " h a n g - u p s " of m a n y i m b u e d w i t h the interaction ist vision are w e l l k n o w n in the oral tradition of sociology. Second, the mission of translation has resulted in a body of general books a n d essays w h i c h attempt to m a k e slightly m o r e specific the general imagery a n d to apply it loosely to m o r e specific substantive topics. Contributors to this line of w o r k have i n c l u d e d , aside f r o m B l u m e r and H u g h e s themselves, A n s e l m Strauss, H o w a r d S. Becker, A l f r e d L i n d e s m i t h , Tamotsu Shibutani, G r e g o r y Stone a n d e v e n C . W r i g h t M i l l s i n his early social psychological phase. In r e m a i n i n g quite general, such books and essays f u n c t i o n to " p u t one on t o p " of a topic, but they have fallen short in the task of detailed translation. T h i r d , there has e m e r g e d an affinity between descriptive case studies a n d interactionism. Indeed, the quali tative case study has become identified as the research m e t h o d of that variety of interactionism that here concerns us. H o w e v e r , because the i n teractionist perspective has r e m a i n e d so abstract, the e m p i r i c a l case studies flowing out of it have often seemed little better than the k i n d of de scriptions that can be p r o d u c e d by conscientious journalists or literate laymen.
4

INTERACTIONIST IMAGERY A N D WORK O n e orientation w i t h i n the interactionist per spective is particularly e n a m o r e d of what is seen as the m o v i n g , ever changing, processual, con structive character of social life. H e r b e r t B l u m e r has perhaps b e e n foremost in c h a m p i o n i n g this i m a g e r y of ordered flux. A g a i n and again, in a variety of contexts a n d on a variety of topics, he has p o u n d e d home the image and the vision. Action is built up in coping with the world instead of merely being released from a preexisting psycho logical structure by factors playing upon that struc ture. By making indications to himself and by inter preting what he indicates, the human being has to forge or piece together a line of action.
1

Under the perspective of symbolic interaction, social action is lodged in acting individuals who fit their respective lines of action to one another through a process of interpretation; group action is the collec tive action of such individuals. . . . Human society is to be seen as consisting of acting people, and the life of the society is to be seen as consisting of their actions.
2

A consciously directed and organized movement cannot be explained merely in terms of the psycho logical disposition or motivation of people, or in terms of the diffusion of an ideology. Explanations of this sort have a deceptive plausibility, but overlook the fact that a movement has to be constructed and has to carve out a career in what is practically always an opposed, resistant, or at least indifferent world.
3

A n d there have been large numbers of scholars who believe that he and others w e r e correct in this emphasis. Inspired by the abstract a n d charis matic imagery sponsored by figures such as B l u 1

CONCEPTUAL POVERTY In v i e w i n g this accumulated material, a pe culiar feature begins to stand out, at least for m e . That feature is the degree to w h i c h this material
4

Herbert Blumer, Herbert

"Sociological Mead,"

Implications of the T h o u g h t LXXI

of G e o r g e (1966), 5 3 6 .
2

American Journal o f Sociology,

H e r b e r t B l u m e r , " S o c i e t y a s S y m b o l i c I n t e r a c t i o n , " i n Human and Social Process: An Interactionist Approach, ed.

Behavior

A r n o l d R o s e ( B o s t o n : H o u g h t o n M i f f l i n C o m p a n y , 1962), p . 186.
3

C f . t h e i n t e r a c t i o n i s t a n t h o l o g i e s b y A r n o l d R o s e , op. cit.; a n d Reader in Social Psychology ( B o s t o n : A l l y n a n d B a c o n ,

H e r b e r t B l u m e r , " C o l l e c t i v e B e h a v i o r , " in

Review o f Sociol

J e r o m e G . M a n i s a n d B e r n a r d N . M e l t z e r , e d s . , Symbolic Inter action: A I n c . , 1967).

ogy, e d . J o s e p h B . G i t t l e r ( N e w Y o r k : J o h n W i l e y & S o n s , Inc., 1957), 147. Italics i n t h e o r i g i n a l .

404 seems conceptually i m p o v e r i s h e d . It is characteri z e d by (1) a general stance t o w a r d social life a n d (2) detailed descriptive i n f o r m a t i o n about this or that social location. B u t it seems sadly l a c k i n g in w h a t one m i g h t call " m i n i - c o n c e p t s " w h i c h are d e v e l o p e d a n d treated w i t h some care. T h e r e occ u r , certainly, encompassing conceptions such as " p e r s p e c t i v e , " "negotiated social o r d e r , " " i m pression m a n a g e m e n t , " a n d classic conceptions of the " a c t , " the "self," " i n t e r a c t i o n , " a n d the l i k e , b u t there is v e r y little attempt to d e v e l o p l i m i t e d a n d precise notions of microscopic social processes. It is instructive, i n d e e d , to peruse what are c u r r e n t l y perhaps the two l e a d i n g texts of the t r a d i t i o n L i n d e s m i t h a n d Strauss, a n d Shibut a n i i n terms of the p r o p o r t i o n of sensitizing rhetoric they contain in relation to the n u m b e r of carefully explicated a n d articulated concepts of social process that are c o n v e y e d . (It is also instructive to contemplate h o w f e w distinctively interactionist textbooks have e v e n b e e n produced.) Recent anthologies of interactionist w r i t ings seem to display a similar p r o b l e m of surplus sensitizing rhetoric as distinct f r o m clear conceptual construction.
5

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

p o u n d e d a f e w such theories. T h e f o r m e r m a d e hardly any call a t all a n d p r o p o u n d e d m a n y " m i d dle-range" concepts. Indeed, as one scholar has half-humorously c o m m e n t e d , G o f f m a n has m o r e concepts than there are referents. O n the consumer side, the attentiveness of interactionists to G o f f m a n has, in part, to do w i t h their lack of v e r y m u c h else to w h i c h to attend. Rather than h a v i n g to m a k e his w a y in the midst of intense c o m p e t i tion a m o n g an o u t p o u r i n g of mini-concepts of an interactionist cast, G o f f m a n has filled a v i r t u a l void. A second d e v e l o p m e n t w i t h i n interactionism that seems symptomatic of conceptual p o v e r t y is the occurrence of, a n d attention g i v e n to, the v o l u m e c a l l e d The Discovery of Grounded Theory by B a r n e y Glaser a n d Strauss. N o n - i n t e r a c t i o n ists have t e n d e d to r e a d this book as a license for subjectivism a n d a r e l i n q u i s h i n g of p r o p e r scientific p r o c e d u r e . S u c h a v i e w seems to me not only to be erroneous but to miss what I take to be the m o r e general a n d u n d e r l y i n g thrust: a p l e a for the d e v e l o p m e n t of mini-concepts. T h e book is about procedures by means of w h i c h such concepts c a n be i n v e n t e d , or, as the authors p u t it, discovered. T h e p r o c e d u r e , called "constant c o m parative analysis," is the means by w h i c h they apparently hope the conceptual landscape of i n teractionism (and sociology m o r e generally) c a n be m a d e m o r e lush. T h e y attempt to p r o v i d e us w i t h something l i k e a m a n u a l for the g e r m i n a t i o n and care of concepts in our intellectual garden. T h e y are, in a sense, agricultural extension agents b r i n g i n g h e l p to us interactionist farmers. T h e i m p o r t a n t point is that agricultural extension servicesliteral or metaphoricalget i n v e n t e d only because a n e e d for t h e m is felt. T h e n e e d felt by Glaser a n d Strauss apparently arose in the context of a specific research project on d y i n g . T h e Discovery v o l u m e is, rather incongruously, one of a four v o l u m e series, the other three of w h i c h deal w i t h social aspects of d y i n g .
6

It is against this b a c k g r o u n d of conceptual i m p o v e r i s h m e n t that I t h i n k we c a n best u n d e r stand t w o recent developments w i t h i n interactionism. T h e first is the occurrence of, a n d attent i o n to, the p h e n o m e n o n that is E r v i n g Goffman. I t h i n k that it is of m o r e than casual interest to k n o w that at least part of his intellectual developm e n t o c c u r r e d in the context of the conceptually i m p o v e r i s h e d social psychological tradition at the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago in the late forties a n d early fifties. Goffman's subsequent emergence as the c h a m p i o n i n v e n t o r of the m i n i - c o n c e p t seems, at least in part, explicable as a response to the barrenness of the conceptual landscape of interactionist sociology. T h e r e is a sense in w h i c h Goffm a n has b e e n to C h i c a g o interactionism what R o b e r t K . M e r t o n was t o H a r v a r d functionalism. T h e latter m a d e a l o u d call for " m i d d l e - r a n g e theo r y " in a similarly i m p o v e r i s h e d context, and pro-

A l f r e d R . L i n d e s m i t h a n d A n s e l m L . Strauss, Social Psychology Society and Personality: An Interactionist Approach N.J.: Prentice-Hall, to Inc.,

This allegation of conceptual p o v e r t y m i g h t be taken as grounds for despairas past defectors have so construed i t b u t I t h i n k there r e m a i n ample grounds for hope. It is not my i n t e n t i o n

( N e w Y o r k : H o l t , R i n e h a r t & W i n s t o n , I n c . , 1968); T a m o t s u S h i butani, 1961). Social Psychology ( E n g l e w o o d Cliffs,

6

B a r n e y G l a s e r a n d A n s e l m Strauss,

The Discovery of Grounded

Theory ( C h i c a g o : A l d i n e P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y , 1967).

Lofland here, however, to explore these in a general explication. I w a n t n o w , rather, to n a r r o w the focus quite drastically a n d to m a k e some suggestions for the i m p r o v e m e n t of a single l i n e of h o p e f u l endeavor w i t h i n the interactionist t r a d i t i o n .
7

405 ysis of means of c o p i n g w i t h social locations. Thus, i n The Hobo, A n d e r s o n is partly c o n c e r n e d w i t h " H o w the H o b o Meets H i s P r o b l e m " a n d " ' G e t t i n g b y ' in H o b o h e m i a , " the latter b e i n g a classification a n d d e s c r i p t i o n of "the various devices that are e m p l o y e d in a c c o m p l i s h i n g " m o r e than a "coffee-and" l e v e l of l i v i n g . In the f l o w e r i n g of occupational case studies a m o n g Chicago interactionists in the fifties, there appears a repeated c o n c e r n w i t h ways i n w h i c h that w h i c h i s phenomenologically problematic is managed. So, for example, we find the janitor w r i t t e n about partly in terms of " t h e various means by w h i c h he 'trains' tenants . . ." a n d four ". . . method[s] o f overt c u t t h r o a t i n g " a m o n g j a n i t o r s .
9 10

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS In m a n y interactionist case studies a simple b u t p o w e r f u l p a r a d i g m of sorts has b e g u n to crystallize. W i t h v a r y i n g degrees of explicitness, interactionists use an operating orientation t o w a r d their materials that seems to offer at least one w a y i n w h i c h social life can b e a n a l y z e d w h i l e (1) still b e i n g faithful to the g e n e r a l i m a g e r y we seek to sponsor and (2) also b e i n g m o r e articulate i n analysis b y means o f explicitly d e v e l o p e d m i n i concepts. A t t u n e d as interactionists are to social life as a constructed p r o d u c t of active h u m a n s , a n u m b e r of similar terms a n d styles that refer to a single stance have b e g u n to creep i n t o their studies a n d essays. T e r m s that denote this stance have i n c l u d e d the f o l l o w i n g : management, strategies, tactics, devices, mechanisms, maneuvers, strategems, practices. These terms are used vis a vis those aspects of social locations, m o r e or less amenable to control, that are acted u p o n or tow a r d by persons so as to effect some desired outcome. In other words, there is h e r e a s t r i p p e d d o w n a n d modest version o f game theory. H o w ever, it is a game theory that is not c a r r i e d away by its i n t e r n a l logic into the mystic regions of hypothetical possibilities, but one that is attentive to the in situ details of social life. F o l l o w i n g Schelli n g , such a modest and substantively o r i e n t e d version m i g h t be called s i m p l y "strategic analysis."
8

M o r e recently, such an orientation to ongoi n g strategic adaptation to, or m a n a g e m e n t of, problematic circumstances has become a v i r t u a l l y r a m p a n t p a r a d i g m in interactionist case studies. A l m o s t regardless of the overt a n d central themes, at the section a n d paragraph levels, a m o r e or less explicit strategic analysis is the operating p r i n c i p l e of organization. H e r e are a few examples. Simmons, " O n Maintaining Deviant Belief Systems": Five "processes or 'mechanisms' facilitate the maintenance of divergent beliefs: 1. Selective attention. . . . 2 . Active structuring. . . . 3 . [Confirming] interpretation. . . . 4. Differential association. . . . 5. Ambivalence of the divergent larger culture. . . . " " Scott, The Racing Game: "Whatever the order, the jockey must at least appear to be riding energetically and cleanly. To bring off these appearances the jockey has developed certain communication strategiesdramatic accentuation and concealment or a combination of b o t h . "
13

At least f r o m the heyday of Park, there appears in interactionist case studies a persistent c o n c e r n w i t h ways i n w h i c h people qua interactants actually put together their lives. In the early twenties, observers such as Nels A n d e r son w e r e already o r i e n t i n g themselves to an anal7

Dalton, Men Who Manage: "Staff Counter Tactics." "Actual or probable rejection of their ideas provokes Staff groups to (1) strengthen ties with top line; (2) adhere to the staff role, but 'lean over backward'
9

Nels Anderson,

The Hobo ( C h i c a g o : T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o

P r e s s , 1923), P a r t I V a n d C h a p . i v .
1 0

R a y m o n d L . G o l d , " I n the B a s e m e n t T h e A p a r t m e n t - B u i l d -

i n g J a n i t o r , " i n The Human Shape o f Work, e d . P e t e r L . B e r g e r ( N e w Y o r k : T h e M a c m i l l a n C o m p a n y , P u b l i s h e r s , 1964), p p . 20-26, 34-36.

1 1

A m o n g m a n y h o p e f u l lines o f e n d e a v o r I w i l l not h e r e discuss,

p a r t i c u l a r m e n t i o n s h o u l d b e m a d e o f interactionist analyses o f b e c o m i n g , careers, a n d phase m o d e l s o f interaction.

8

J. L. Simmons,

" O n Maintaining Deviant Belief Systems," (1964), p p . 250-56. The Bating Game ( C h i c a g o : A l d i n e P u b l i s h -

Social Problems, X I " M a r v i n B. S c o t t ,

T h o m a s C. Schelling, "Strategic Analysis a n d Social P r o b l e m s , " XII (1965), 367-79.

Social Problems,

i n g C o m p a n y , 1968), p . 4 3 .

406 to avoid troubles down the line that can reverberate to the top; and (3) compromise with the line below the top levels."
13

P A R T VI

Appraisals o f Symbolic Interactionism

Bittner, "Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of Mentally 111 Persons": "In this paper we have tried to describe briefly certain practices of dealing with mentally ill persons." These include a set of "nonofficial ways of dealing with mentally ill persons" under the headings "restitution of control," "psychiatric first aid," and "continuing care."
14

Roth, Timetables: Strategies used by patients to "move along faster through the hospital": have pressures applied by influentials outside the hospital; threaten to leave the hospital; threaten or undertake a "medication strike."
15

Sudnow, Passing On: The morgue attendant's ". . . chief and daily problem was going about the hospital without, wherever he went, appearing to others to be working." His problem ". . . generally, [was] how to enter into any form of ordinary discourse without his affiliation with dead bodies intruding as a prominent way others attended to h i m . " In response, "he attempted to convey a sense of not being at work by developing clear styles. . . ." ". . . one way. . . ." "A general strategy. . . . "
16

A s i d e f r o m case study efforts, the general frameworks spawned by interaction theorists such as G o f f m a n have rested heavily upon a strategic i m a g e r y . Presentation of Self in Everyday Life is thus largely o r i e n t e d to specifying the sources of discredited impressions and " c o m m o n techniques that persons e m p l o y to sustain . . . impressions." H i s essay " O n C o o l i n g the M a r k O u t " seeks to specify six strategies for " c o o l i n g o u t " people w h o have failed, c o m b i n e d w i t h four strategic responses possibly available to " m a r k s " w h o refuse to be cooled. A n d Stigma is e v e n subtitled " N o t e s on the M a n a g e m e n t of Spoiled I d e n t i t y . " O t h e r m o r e or less general frameworks have likewise b e e n so attuned, as in Glaser and Strauss' awareness p a r a d i g m w h e r e " t h e tactics of various interactants as they attempt to manage changes of awareness context" ranks as one of six major e l e m e n t s . Weinstein's important essay is explicitly entitled, " T o w a r d a T h e o r y of Interpersonal Tactics."
19 20 21

Glaser and Strauss, Awareness of Dying: In order to sustain a closed awareness context, " . . . the staff members . . . use tactics intended to encourage the patient to make his own interpretations inaccurately optimistic."
17

Becker, Geer and Hughes, Making the Grade: "In this chapter [number 6], we observe students as they go about the task of finding out what the rules are and where they stand with respect to them." "If the problems [of students] are similar . . . , students can develop a generalized set of a c t i o n s . . . to which their own particular actions can be referred. It is this sort of individual action based on group perspectives that we discuss in the first section of this chapter [number 7]."
18
13

This k i n d of orientation appears to me to m a k e a p r o m i s i n g start toward the w o r k of translating interactionist imagery, such as that prom o t e d b y B l u m e r , into a n actuality i n d e p i c t i n g and understanding the social order. A n important source of conceptual i m p o v e r i s h m e n t has resided, however, in the fact that although there are m a n y studies w i t h a strategic orientation, not m a n y have p r o c e e d e d to truly strategic analysis.

ANALYTIC INTERRUPTUS Interactionists of a strategic bent have been prone, rather, to what m i g h t be called "analytic i n t e r r u p t u s . " This label is i n t e n d e d to denote the practice of starting out to p e r f o r m a certain task but failing to follow through to the i m p l i e d , logi19

Melville Dalton,

Men

Who

Manage ( N e w

York: John

Wiley

& S o n s , I n c . , 1959), p. 101.

1 4

E g o n Bittner, "Police Discretion i n E m e r g e n c y A p p r e h e n Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life

s i o n of M e n t a l l y 111 P e r s o n s , " Social Problems, X I V (1967), 2 9 2 , 285-90.

15

( G a r d e n C i t y , N e w Y o r k : D o u b l e d a y & C o m p a n y , I n c . , 1959), A. Roth, Treatment Timetables: and Structuring Careers The the Passage of Time The of Dyp . 15; " O n C o o l i n g t h e M a r k O u t : S o m e A s p e c t s o f A d a p t a t i o n t o F a i l u r e , " Psychiatry, X V (1952), 4 5 1 - 6 3 ; a n d Stigma ( E n g l e w o o d C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1963).
2 0

Julius

in

Hospital David

Other On:

(Indianapolis: Organization

B o b b s - M e r r i l l C o m p a n y , I n c . , 1963), p p . 4 8 - 5 4 .
16

Sudnow,

Passing

Social

B a r n e y G . G l a s e r a n d A n s e l m L . Strauss, " A w a r e n e s s C o n t e x t s Social Interaction," American Sociological Review, XXIX

ing ( E n g l e w o o d C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1967), p p . 54ff.

1 7

and

Barney G.

Glaser a n d A n s e l m L.

Strauss, Awareness o f Dying

(1964), 6 7 1 .
2 1

( C h i c a g o : A l d i n e C o m p a n y , 1964), p p . 36ff.
1 8

Eugene A.

Weinstein, " T o w a r d a T h e o r y of Interpersonal Problems i n Social Psychology, eds. C a r l W. Back-

H o w a r d S. Becker, Blanche Geer, and Everett C. Hughes, the Grade: The Academic Side of College Life (New

T a c t i c s , " in

Making

m a n and Paul F . Secord (New York: M c G r a w - H i l l B o o k C o m p a n y , 1966), p p . 3 9 4 - 9 8 .

Y o r k : J o h n W i l e y & S o n s , Inc., 1968), p p . 80, 93.

Lofland cal, or entailed conclusion. T h e l a b e l connotes the failure to reach an i n i t i a l l y i m p l i e d climax. M a n y of the studies cited above, a n d m a n y others, suffer f r o m analytic interruptus because they i m p l y an analysis of mechanisms, devices, strategies, a n d the l i k e but they neglect actually to do it. T h e presentations r e m a i n unsystematic, elusive, a n d s i m p l y suggestive of what g i v e n sets of such m e c h anisms, etc. m i g h t be as they have e v o l v e d in some concrete social location. In short, there is too frequently a failure to follow through. By actu ally f o l l o w i n g through I m e a n m o r e specifically that the investigator goes to the t i m e a n d trouble (1) to assemble self-consciously a l l his materials on h o w a g i v e n phenomenologically problematic topic is dealt w i t h by the persons u n d e r study, (2) to tease out the variations a m o n g his assembled range of instance of strategies, (3) to classify t h e m into an articulate set of what appear to h i m to be generic or p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l types of strate gies, and (4) to present t h e m to the reader in some o r d e r l y and preferably n a m e d a n d n u m b e r e d m a n n e r . T h e result of such careful w o r k can be a set of mini-concepts relating to the con struction of social life and social order. Such exer cises w o u l d be, at m i n i m u m , articulate depictions of little rivulets of constancy in the flux of social life. F o r a concrete sense of v a r y i n g degrees of analytic interruptus, the reader m a y r e v i e w the little capsule pieces of the eight studies g i v e n above, w h i c h are r a n k e d , roughly, in terms of the degree to w h i c h analytic interruptus is present. (Let me be clear. This r a n k i n g is in terms of the degree of analytic interruptus i n d i c a t e d in the capsule only. No j u d g m e n t of any study in its en tirety or of the substantive m e r i t or e m p i r i c a l v i a b i l i t y of the content is intended.) A m o n g t h e m , the one by B e c k e r , G e e r a n d H u g h e s is of particu lar note. T h e e m e r g i n g but i m p l i c t p a r a d i g m of strategic analysis is apparently reaching the p o i n t w h e r e at least footnote reference must be made of the fact that investigators are not fully engaging i n it. It would be possible to study the kinds of actions students devise in response to particular problems of academic work, in the same way that one might, as we have already suggested, study the kind of in formation-seeking students devise in response to par

407 ticular faculty practices, using the model of a game of strategy. We have not undertaken such a detailed analysis and confine ourselves to the generalized set of actions, developed in response to the generalized problems the college creates for all students, of which the particular actions developed for particular circumstances are special cases.
22

As I said at the outset, I too live in a glass house and the same kinds of rocks can a n d should b e t h r o w n i n m y direction. Thus, i n a w o r k o n a religious group, I blithely oriented the reader to a strategic analysis but throughout engaged m e r e l y a vague strategic orientation, constantly d r a w i n g back f r o m the implications of the task set. Indeed, at one point I announced the i n t e n t i o n to analyze " t h e devices adopted [by m e m bers] to manage [the] m i s i n v o l v e m e n t " of outsid ers w i t h the group, but then i g n o r e d the task altogether.
23

O u t of this discussion there arises, of course, the question of w h y there is a relatively h i g h fre quency o f analytic interruptus. M y o w n surmise about myself a n d others is a simple one. It is easier and takes less t i m e to be vague than to be articu late. Strategic analysis prolongs the gap b e t w e e n research a n d publication. If it is possible to achieve a reasonable sense of c o m p l e t i o n a n d to p u t the material in p r i n t without going very far, t h e n there is a propensity to do so. D e t a i l e d analy sis of qualitative material is tedious and difficult, and promises no sure result. L i t t l e patches of ar ticulate statements of strategy and management may appear in studies, but a thoroughgoing pur suit of t h e m throughout can appear a less t h a n i n v i t i n g task. A n d , too, the unsystematic materials assembled in qualitative studies m a y reveal, at the t i m e of analysis, enormous gaps. It is easier to slough over such gaps by means of a r a n d o m assortment of examples than to go back into the field w i t h an eye to intensive observation on a topic that m a y constitute but a few pages in the published report. M o r e o v e r , g i v e n the v i r t u a l lack of codified concepts to d r a w u p o n , strategic analysis requires f r o m the analyst considerable effort at creative discernment. It requires that he pore over his
22

B e c k e r , G e e r a n d H u g h e s , op. cit., p . 93, f o o t n o t e 1 . John Lofland, Doomsday Cult (Englewood ClifFs, N.J.:

23

P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1966), C h a p , a n d p . 143.

408 materials w i t h great intensity, v e r y m u c h on the m o d e l o f procedure o u t l i n e d b y Glaser a n d Strauss. A n d it requires that he take the risk of i n v e n t i n g names for strategies, etc., o p e n i n g h i m s e l f to the charge of "needless j a r g o n . " U n fortunately, analytic interruptus is faster a n d easier. In terms of the v i e w taken here, h o w e v e r , it is also considerably less i n f o r m a t i v e . Case studies of an analytic interruptus sort give us a " f e e l " for some sector of social life a n d they p r o v i d e us w i t h a "sense" of " w h a t it is l i k e . " B u t we surely want m o r e than feelings and senses, e v e n though these qualities are not in themselves to be disparaged. W e want i n a d d i t i o n e x p l i c i t n a m e d , codified, d o c u m e n t e d r e n d e r i n g of the little practices that make up that diffuse t h i n g we call social life or interaction. It is to this task that we slovenly interactionists have barely b e g u n to address ourselves, e v e n though m a n y of us have flirted w i t h the possibility.

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

have a resemblance to those used by c h i l d r e n in a v o i d i n g or d e c l i n i n g the assignment of tasks by parents, we b e g i n to get on the track of generic features of social locations in terms of similarities and differences i n their strategic constitution. W e b e g i n to get on the track of locating a n d c o d i f y i n g translocational interaction strategies a n d enter u p o n the task of d i s c e r n i n g various sets of strategies vis a vis generically delineated features of types of social locations. T h e strain t o w a r d such generic a n d comparative theories of strategic constitution is already manifest in works w h i c h proceed d i r e c t l y to construct such frameworks. T h e most conspicuous i n stance of this is, again, the w o r k of E r v i n g Goffm a n . H e and others have proceeded, h o w e v e r , in the absence of a solid body of studies a n d concepts of the k i n d I here counsel. T h e y have m a d e up the conceptual substance as they have gone along, rather than b e i n g able to collate a n d carefully b u i l d u p o n a w i d e range of d e l i m i t e d analyses. In h a v i n g to short circuit the process of theory b u i l d i n g they create magnificent structures that lack solid foundations, deal w i t h a n a r r o w range of possible concerns, and likely strike v e r y w i d e of the l o n g t e r m target. It is ironic a n d a bit sad that the same theorist w h o at one p o i n t tweaks other theorists for failure to treat sociological concepts " w i t h affection," comes h i m s e l f to participate in the same fate: I think that at present, if sociological concepts are to be treated with affection, each must be traced back to where it best applies, followed from there wherever it seems to lead, and pressed to disclose the rest of its family. Better, perhaps, different coats to clothe the children well than a single splendid tent in which they all shiver.
24

T H E L A R G E R VISION T h e a d m o n i t i o n that interactionist case studies follow through on what they are already d o i n g in a halfhearted way is, in effect, a request for a m u l t i t u d e of little lists of n a m e d strategies growi n g out of a n d attached to a likewise large n u m b e r of case studies of particular social locations a n d situations. W h a t can conceivably be accomplished t h r o u g h the creation of such a b o d y of m i n i - c o n cepts and e m p i r i c a l documentation? In longest a n d broadest terms one looks f o r w a r d to a time w h e n we w i l l have carefully b u i l t back up to the large, abstract and magnificent imageries prov i d e d by people such as B l u m e r . T h e " b u i l d i n g back u p " can begin to occur w h e n it is possible to engage in comparative analysis of interaction strategies as they evolve in various settings, b e i n g attuned to h o w the construction of superficially quite different social worlds c a n be, in terms of strategic constitution, quite similar. Thus, w h e n we b e g i n to see the possibility that strategies e m p l o y e d b y A r m y Reserve enlisted m e n t o avoid a n d decline the assignment of tasks by superiors

B y p r o c e e d i n g carefully and i n small ways w i t h affectionate c o n c e r n for the d e v e l o p m e n t of m i n i concepts in strategic analysis, it w i l l hopefully become possible to have both splendid tents a n d well-clothed children.
24

Erving

Goffman,

Asylums:

Essays

on

the York:

Social

Situation

of &

Mental

Patients and

Other Inmates ( N e w

Doubleday

C o m p a n y , I n c . , 1961), p . x i v .

Joan Huber

45

Symbolic Interaction as a Pragmatic Perspective: The Bias of Emergent Theory

As a socially-based approach to the relation of the i n d i v i d u a l a n d society, symbolic interaction (SI) has always been an i m p o r t a n t perspective in A m e r i c a n sociology. K u h n (1970:83) suggested that, u n l i k e psychoanalysis, field theory, a n d l e a r n i n g theory, SI is logically consistent w i t h basic social science propositions. As a research trad i t i o n , SI has p r o d u c e d insightful accounts of h u m a n interaction in natural settings. Y e t e v e n its adherents are doubtful about its methodology and the status of its findings. B l u m e r (1969:1) p o i n t e d out that the position of SI h a d never b e e n clearly formulated and no reasoned statement of the methodological approach existed. T h e SI tradition is related to a n u m b e r of other approaches and techniques such as labelling theory, sociological phenomenology and existentialism, participant observation, qualitative sociology, and naturalism. No attempt to deal w i t h the differences and similarities of these approaches to the SI tradition w i l l be m a d e in this paper, w h i c h is concerned, rather, w i t h the overall historical drift. Yet their relationship to SI is i m p o r Joan H u b e r , " S y m b o l i c Interaction as a Pragmatic Perspective: The Bias of E m e r g e n t Theory," American Sociological Review, vol. 38, A p r i l 1973, p p . 2 7 4 - 2 8 4 . R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n . A n e a r l i e r d r a f t o f this p a p e r w a s p r e s e n t e d a t t h e A S A m e e t ings, A u g u s t 1972.1 a m d e e p l y g r a t e f u l to J . D a v i d L e w i s , C l a r k M c P h a i l , a n d an anonymous reader, but especially to W i l l i a m F o r m for their c o m m e n t s o n o n e o r m o r e successive drafts. A l l errors are m y o w n .

tant because e v e n if, as E h r l i c h (1972) asserts, what was scientifically most useful in the SI approach has already b e e n absorbed into the m a i n stream of social psychology, m a n y of the problems of SI methods still plague these other approaches. Events in the last decade have t h r o w n the problems of SI methods into e v e n greater relief. M a n y y o u n g sociologists are u n h a p p y w i t h the d i r e c t i o n of the discipline, particularly w i t h what they see as an overemphasis on quantification. T h e y feel that social science has failed to c o m e to grips w i t h the real w o r l d (Blumer, 1966: v i i ) . Such c o n c e r n has l e d to increasing c r i t i c i s m of standard methodology; the procedures w h i c h methodologists f o u n d so i n t r i g u i n g have not h a d the desired i m p a c t on research because the m e t h odologists failed to c o m m u n i c a t e the substantive relevance of the tools they a d m i r e d so m u c h ( H i l l , 1970:18,19). A p p a r e n t l y the SI tradition a n d s i m i lar approaches answer a n e e d in the discipline; and, whatever their inadequacies, they w i l l probably be a r o u n d for some time.
1 2

F o r e x a m p l e , B e c k e r (1958:653) p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e o b s e r v a findings; to B r u y n (1966:174) says t h a t t h e r e is c u r do this. Lofland (1971 :vii) notes that,

t i o n a l r e s e a r c h e r faces t h e p r o b l e m o f c o n v i n c i n g o t h e r s o f t h e validity o f his rently no method

strangely, f e w instructions are available to show h o w qualitative o b s e r v a t i o n a n d analysis i s d o n e .

2

F i l s t e a d (1970:1, 8) cites B l u m e r , C l i n a r d , B r u y n , D e u t s c h e r ,

Becker, G o u l d n e r , a n d H o r o w i t z as showing a concern with the current direction of the field.

410 T h e m a i n thesis of this paper is that the SI t r a d i t i o n shares w i t h the philosophy of pragmat i s m , f r o m w h i c h i t originates, a n epistemology w h i c h makes it reflect the social biases of the researcher and of the people whose behavior is observed. In a b e n i g n l y l i b e r a l climate of o p i n i o n this outcome tends to go u n n o t i c e d ; but in the l o n g r u n , this k i n d of methodology is sensitive to the forces of social control. So far as I have b e e n able to discover, SI methods have not b e e n c r i t i c i z e d f r o m this point o f v i e w . T h e explication of this thesis begins by s h o w i n g the relationship of SI a n d pragmatism.
3

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

T h e progenitors of the SI tradition i n c l u d e D e w e y , Cooley, B a l d w i n , a n d Z n a n i e c k i , a m o n g others; but the chief architect was G e o r g e H e r bert M e a d (Manis a n d M e l t z e r , 1967:1; K u h n , 1970:71). M o s t of the p u b l i s h e d materials on w h i c h k n o w l e d g e of his position is based w e r e not originally i n t e n d e d for p u b l i c a t i o n (Meltzer, 1959:27). H i s books, based on student notes, w e r e p u b l i s h e d posthumously (Stevens, 1967:553). H i s articles w e r e scattered in journals a n d out-of-print books u n t i l Reek's (1964:v) selection appeared. M e a d was not a systematic w r i t e r . He f o u n d extemporaneous speaking to be his best m e d i u m a n d felt that m e n do their best t h i n k i n g in conversation (Lee, 1945:v). D e w e y (1932:xl) observed that at about the time of his death M e a d was beg i n n i n g to get a c o m m a n d of his ideas w h i c h m a d e c o m m u n i c a t i o n to others easier a n d m o r e effective. SI thus began w i t h an oral t r a d i t i o n w h i c h t e n d e d to persist. By the early sixties n e i t h e r Faris, Thomas, n o r B l u m e r h a d presented a r o u n d e d theoretical conception; hence m u c h t i m e was devoted to casuistical debating over questions of orthodoxy ( K u h n , 1970:71-2). M e a d was one of the l e a d i n g figures of pragm a t i s m (Shibutani, 1968:83; G a l l i e , 1966:31). D e w e y , its m a i n expositor, b e c a m e a close f r i e n d of M e a d ' s at the U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n a n d their
T h e p a p e r refers m a i n l y to D e w e y ' s v e r s i o n of p r a g m a t i c p h i -

intellectual exchange c o n t i n u e d at the U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago w h e r e M e a d taught f r o m 1893-1931. D e w e y p r o v i d e d the range a n d vision, M e a d , the analytical d e p t h a n d precision (Morris, 1934:xi). D e w e y ' s daughter r e p o r t e d that the influence of M e a d o n D e w e y , f r o m the nineties o n , r a n k e d w i t h that of James (Mills, 1966:296). Y e t D e w e y is usually i g n o r e d as a major influence on A m e r i can sociology (Petras, 1968:18). L i k e w i s e , M e a d tends to be i g n o r e d by philosophers (Mills, 1966:464). Possibly one reason for their neglect is that M e a d ' s ideas w e r e not readily accessible in his l i f e t i m e (Shibutani, 1968:83). H o w e v e r , A m e r i c a n sociologists typically take little interest in philosophy and philosophers show little interest in the output of sociologists.
4

P r a g m a t i s m , as D u r k h e i m (1960:386) observed, was a reaction to the ideas of t r a d i t i o n a l r a t i o n a l i s m . D e w e y a n d M e a d , l i k e M a r x before t h e m , thought that traditional philosophy was a r i d , f o r m a l , a n d useless. M o r e o v e r , the d o m i n a n t social v i e w h e l d that customs d e r i v e d f r o m a fixed h u m a n nature w h i c h was, i n t u r n , d e r i v e d f r o m an i m m u t a b l e god. S u c h ideas supported a r i g i d legal system w h i c h shored up a p r i v i l e g e d social order. To use m a t e r i a l a n d social factors to e x p l a i n h u m a n arrangements u n v e i l e d the conservative bias of traditional ideas. Ironically, p r a g m a t i s m h a d a similar bias, although D e w e y a n d M e a d a n d their followers w e r e not aware of it. Nevertheless, all sociologists owe a debt to the pragmatists (and to Marx) for w h a t n o w appears to be c o m m o n sense: m e n m a k e their o w n social w o r l d .
5

B u t p r a g m a t i s m w e n t far b e y o n d this g e n e r a l assumption. A c c o r d i n g to K a p l a n (1964:36, 42), p r a g m a t i s m is a variant of semantic e m p i r i c i s m w h i c h , in t u r n , was a d e v e l o p m e n t of epistemic e m p i r i c i s m . F r o m L o c k e t h r o u g h K a n t , epistemic e m p i r i c i s m was the doctrine w h i c h h e l d that ex4

M i l l ' s (1966) d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n , a r a r e e x c e p t i o n , is a s o c i o -

l o g i c a l analysis o f p r a g m a t i s m r a t h e r t h a n a n assessment o f t h e i m p a c t o f p r a g m a t i c p h i l o s o p h y o n sociology. S u c h a n analysis

3

is y e t t o b e m a d e . M i l l s (1966:464) o m i t t e d a d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of M e a d ' s w o r k b u t felt that the omission was intellectually unwarranted.

5

losophy. Pierce's conception is different (Lewis, forthcoming.) H e t h o u g h t that o t h e r pragmatists m i s u n d e r s t o o d his theories a n d his d o m i n a n t attitude t o w a r d t h e m was o n e o f c o n t e m p t . From Kant's pragmatisch P e i r c e adopted the name pragmat i s m , w h i c h b e c a m e p o p u l a r . T h i s s o irritated P e i r c e that h e r e f e r r e d t o his o w n f o r m u l a t i o n a s " p r a g m a t i c i s m , " a n a m e w h i c h he t h o u g h t was so u g l y that no o n e w o u l d use it ( W e n n e r b e r g , 1962:14-15). I n this o p i n i o n h e was c o r r e c t .

Durkheim

lectured on

pragmatism at the

Sorbonne,

1913-

14. H e w a n t e d t o f i n d a f o r m u l a t h a t w o u l d p r e s e r v e t h e e s s e n tials o f r a t i o n a l i s m b u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e a n s w e r t h e v a l i d c r i t i cisms that pragmatism had made. Stone and Farberman ( 1 9 7 0 : 1 0 0 - 1 2 ) s e e D u r k h e i m as m o r e s y m p a t h e t i c t o p r a g m a tism t h a n I d o .

Huber p e r i e n c e was a necessary c o n d i t i o n of k n o w l e d g e . Semantic e m p i r i c i s m , d e v e l o p e d i n the last h u n d r e d years, holds that not o n l y k n o w l e d g e but also m e a n i n g must necessarily i n c l u d e an exp e r i e n t i a l component. T w o of the three major variants of semantic e m p i r i c i s m , logical positivism a n d operationism, ask the same question of any scientific assertion: C a n its m e a n i n g be establ i s h e d a n d , if so, how? T h a t is, c a n sense data be used for verification a n d , if so, w h a t k i n d of rules g o v e r n such use? P r a g m a t i s m asks w h a t difference it w o u l d m a k e if a statement w e r e true. T h e m e a n i n g of objects is the effect they p r o d u c e ( D e w e y , 1916:309). T h a t is, w h e t h e r a belief is good or b a d depends u p o n w h e t h e r the activities w h i c h i t inspires i n the organism e n t e r t a i n i n g the belief have consequences w h i c h are satisfactory or unsatisfactory to it (Russell, 1945:825). W h a t counts is not the o r i g i n of a proposition b u t its outcome, not the connections w i t h experience antecedently g i v e n but w i t h those to be instituted. T r u t h is thus dependent on h u m a n action. Those w h o f e e l that h u m a n beings are not always rational see pragmatism as a step on the r o a d to madness, an intoxication w i t h p o w e r (Russell, 1945:828) or as an all-out assault on h u m a n reason ( D u r k h e i m , 1960:363). SI shares this stress on the outcome of h u m a n action as a c r i t e r i o n of scientific t r u t h . W h y should the stress on the outcome of an event as a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h r e n d e r k n o w l e d g e susceptible to social control? B r i e f l y , because the future, u n l i k e the past, is subject to m a n i p u l a t i o n by those w h o c u r r e n t l y have p o w e r . " T h e past cannot be affected by what we do, a n d therefore, if t r u t h is d e t e r m i n e d by w h a t has h a p p e n e d , it is i n d e p e n d e n t of present or future volitions; it represents, i n logical f o r m , the limitations o n h u m a n p o w e r . B u t i f t r u t h , o r rather " w a r r a n t e d assertibility," depends u p o n the future, t h e n , i n so far as it is in our p o w e r to alter the future, it is in our p o w e r to alter w h a t should be asserted" (Russell, 1945:826). In order to clarify the l i n e of argument, I shall outline it here. In the SI approach, as in the pragmatic, f o r m a l logic has an ambiguous status. T h e place of the rational (logico-theoretic) c o m p o n e n t in validation is n e v e r spelled out clearly. W h e n the place of theory is unclear, w h e n

411 the theoretical expectations are not explicated, t h e n the social givens of the present serve as an i m p l i c i t theoretical f o r m u l a t i o n . I n pragmatic doctrine, scientific t r u t h is defined as w h a t e v e r works best in a g i v e n situation, as j u d g e d by the investigator w h o observes the emergent outcome. A belief is j u d g e d by its effects; if the effects are good, t h e n the belief is true, or has w a r r a n t e d assertibility. L a t e r formulations h e l d that t r u t h is the e m e r g i n g consensus of the participants in an interactive situation. A l l of these formulations have a status quo bias for, w h e n no theoretical expectations are specified, and w h e n t r u t h is exp e c t e d to emerge f r o m interaction, t h e n w h a t is taken to be true tends to reflect the d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p o w e r a m o n g the participants. This assertion is supported by theory a n d research in group r a n k i n g a n d c o n f o r m i t y (Zajonc, 1968:25360). D e w e y a n d M e a d a v o i d e d c o n f r o n t i n g the p o w e r implications of the pragmatic m o d e l because they thought that the w o r l d was e v o l v i n g f r o m worse to better. Therefore, w h a t e v e r w o r k e d was b o u n d to be right, at least in the l o n g r u n . H o w e v e r , the views of the latterday adherents of SI a n d related approaches are not explicitly evolutionary, n o r is the i m p l i c a t i o n of d e f i n i n g t r u t h as an e m e r g e n t social consensus of p a r t i c i pants systematically confronted. I shall n o w discuss the m a i n threads of this argument in detail, f i r s t , the relevant views o f D e w e y a n d M e a d .
6

THE PRAGMATISM OF DEWEY A N D MEAD An aspect of p r a g m a t i s m a n d SI basic to t h e i r sensitivity to social c o n t r o l is the ambiguous status of f o r m a l logic ( H u b e r a n d L o o m i s , 1970). Philosophers of science distinguish b e t w e e n the logically necessary a n d the logically contingent, i.e., bet w e e n mathematics-theory-logic a n d e m p i r i c a l
6

T h e c l a i m t h a t S I m e t h o d s h a v e a status q u o b i a s d o e s n o t

i m p l y t h a t s c h o l a r s i n this t r a d i t i o n a r e m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e t h a n o t h e r sociologists. I a m a r g u i n g o n l y t h a t t h e m o d e l i s e s p e c i a l l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o i n f l u e n c e . W h e t h e r s c h o l a r s i n this t r a d i t i o n h a v e a distinctive p o l i t i c a l v i e w p o i n t is a q u e s t i o n I h a v e n o t e x a m i n e d . I h a v e no reason to suppose that t h e y are a n y t h i n g b u t h u m a n i t a r i a n liberals. D e w e y was a k i n d l y a n d a d m i r a b l e m a n . B u t this fact has n o b e a r i n g w h a t s o e v e r o n t h e s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of these m e t h o d s to social bias.

412 observations; both are necessary for scientific k n o w l e d g e (Braithwaite, 1963). A commonsense translation of this statement says that facts do not speak for themselves. B u t the status of the logicotheoretic component is not clear in SI and prag matism. T h e difficulty derives f r o m the influence of Hegel's dialectic. H e g e l claimed that the dialectic was a n e w logic, but this c l a i m is false if one uses the usual definition of the w o r d 'logic' (Mills, 1962:130). H e gel w a n t e d to k n o w if history h a d any m e a n i n g and posited the dialectic as a f o r m a l device to enable h i m to explain social change. In dialectical f o r m , k n o w l e d g e moves in stages f r o m thesis, to antithesis, to synthesis; history obligingly repeats these stages empirically. " P r o c e s s " a n d " e m e r g e n t " are key words. To understand the result, one must understand the entire process because each stage contains the earlier stages in solution, so to speak; all have their place in the final whole. Because only the W h o l e is Reality, n o t h i n g partial can be quite true. H e n c e t r u t h and falsehood are not sharply defined opposites. In Aristotelian logic, an entity can be defined as A or n o n - A . That is, entities can be analytically a n d e m p i r i cally distinguished f r o m one another. In the dia lectic, entities simply merge into one another. Re ality is one great W h o l e . O n e ought not study the eye of John Jones for Jones is an organic whole a n d to study his eye alone is pointless. D e s c r i b e d in this fashion, the dialectic may strike some ob servers as nonsense. Most of the writers w h o use the w o r d today leave it undefined, w h i c h is proba b l y just as w e l l . In his early days D e w e y was a H e g e l i a n (Mead, 1936:151) and H e g e l r e m a i n e d the chief source of D e w e y ' s logic (Mills, 1966:357). T h e con tradictions b e t w e e n thesis and antithesis became conflicting elements in a problematic situation (White, 1943:152). D e w e y confused logic and e m p i r i c i s m ; logic was thought to be b o t h e m p i r i c a l and normative (Dewey, 1920:137), a n d ultimately d e r i v e d f r o m the acts p e r f o r m e d (Dewey, 1929:163). B u t Dewey's v i e w of what was good differed f r o m that of W i l l i a m James in a way that was important for sociology. James had equated t r u t h w i t h what was good for the i n d i v i d u a l . D e w e y saw the difficulties w i t h this idea and de clared that t r u t h was public. A belief was to be

PART VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

j u d g e d by the consequences it had for m a n y per sons, not for just one person. This aspect of prag m a t i s m may be what l e d Stone and F a r b e r m a n (1970:15) to c o m m e n t that pragmatism c a r r i e d social psychology away f r o m the psychologistic fallacy. F r o m the standpoint of the present c r i tique, it matters little w h e t h e r the warranted assertibility of a proposition is based on the way it works out for one person or many. U n l i k e D e w e y , M e a d was w e l l aware o f con temporary developments in symbolic logic (1943:202; 1936:Ch. 15; 1964:199 ff). A l t h o u g h he once c l a i m e d that the theory of the intelligent act f e l l w i t h i n the r e a l m of Hegel's logic (1964:8), and passages in his later w o r k still indicate a strong dialectical aroma (1964:189), he finally con c l u d e d that the dialectic was a scientifically use less device that c o u l d be used to prove a n y t h i n g (1936:143). Yet his thought shows the influence of H e g e l in a n u m b e r of ways. H i s idea of sociality is basically holistic: The principle of sociality is that in the present within which emergent change takes place, the emer gent object belongs to different systems in its passage from the old to the new because of its systematic relationship with other structures, and possesses the characters it has because of its membership in these different systems (Mead, 1932:65). W i t h this concept M e a d attempts to avoid some of the difficulties of Aristotelian logic. Perhaps a clearer statement of the concept is the assertion that sociality is the capacity of being several things at once. " T h e a n i m a l traverses the g r o u n d in pur suit of his p r e y and is at once a part of the system of distribution of energies w h i c h makes his loco m o t i o n possible a n d a part of the jungle system w h i c h is a part of the life system on the surface of the inanimate g l o b e " (Mead, 1932:49). In a d d i t i o n to glossing over the distinctions b e t w e e n entities w h i c h characterize A r i s t o t e l i a n logic, M e a d t e n d e d to ignore the logico-theoretic c o m p o n e n t in his notion of scientific m e t h o d o l ogy. H i s prescriptions for the practice of science sound v e r y like the methods that W i l i e r (1970:19) has described as e m p i r i c a l or magical t h i n k i n g , w h e n events A and are connected only at the observational level. Mead's example of science i n dicates that he is discussing e m p i r i c a l t h i n k i n g :

Huber A child's explanation of the conduct of others and the savage's appeal to magic are uncritical uses of a method which requires only analysis and recognition of the implications of its technique to become scientific (Mead, 1938:91). T h e basic difficulty is that M e a d fails to make a sufficient distinction b e t w e e n a hypothesis a n d a theory, w i t h the result that his w o r k fails to describe the theoretical c o m p o n e n t adequately. Facts define themselves in scientific problems (Mead, 1964:260). L i k e D e w e y , M e a d sees science as beginning w i t h an immediate problem, w i t h an exception that conflicts w i t h a l a w a n d leads to the appearance in the m i n d of the scientist of a hypothesis that w i l l solve his p r o b l e m (Mead, 1936:136). T h e test of an hypothesis is that the conduct that was going on c a n be c o n t i n u e d . "It is the same sort of test w h i c h the a n i m a l finds. If it finds itself in a difficult situation a n d sees escape, it rushes off in that direction a n d gets away. T h i s is a fair test of what we call a hypothesis" (Mead, 1936:349). An a n i m a l and a scientist do the same t h i n g w h e n they face a p r o b l e m . T h e y select some element in the situation to carry the act through to its c o m p l e t i o n . " T h e only test the a n i m a l can b r i n g to such a reconstruction of its habits is the ongoing of its activity. T h i s is the e x p e r i m e n t a l test; can i t continue i n action? A n d that is exactly the situation f o u n d in science" ( M e a d , 1936:346). T h e test of t r u t h is the ability to continue a process w h i c h has b e e n i n h i b i t e d (1936:350; 1964:328). If an hypothesis works, it becomes an accepted theory (Mead, 1936:353). T h e test of t r u t h is ongoing conduct a n d t r u t h is synonymous w i t h the solution of a p r o b l e m (Mead, 1964:328). H i s v i e w of the relationship of a scientific l a w to an hypothesis is m u c h the same: You are undertaking to set up another law in place of the one which has been overthrown. The new law is tentatively set up as a hypothesis. You test it. When you have tested it, it becomes a working hypothesis. A n d if others test it and it works, it becomes an accepted theory (Mead, 1936:825). To illustrate the scientific m e t h o d , almost all of M e a d ' s examples refer to the natural or physical sciences w h e r e consensus on goals is h i g h and the solutions are technological. In a rare discus-

413 sion of a social p r o b l e m , M e a d (1964:261-2) says that various c u l t v a l u e s w h i c h are i n c o m m e n surable^will p r e v e n t a solution; hence the scientist must l e a r n to state, as far as possible, our social customs in terms of their functions. W h a t the scientist is supposed to do w h e n this m u c h is accomplished M e a d does not say. Because his works are cast in phylogenetic frame of reference (Petras, forthcoming) a n d because, l i k e D e w e y , M e a d assumes that evolutionary processes w i l l m a k e the w o r l d better, the p r o b l e m i s m i n i m i z e d . I n d e e d , M e a d often expressed the v i e w that history was on the side of progress; inevitably the brotherhood o f m e n o n earth w o u l d emerge (Lee, 1945:75; Shibutani, 1968:87). If this assumption w e r e true, t h e n consensus on goals w o u l d trouble neither scientist n o r c i t i z e n alike. T h e scientific m e t h o d , M e a d thought, was only the evolutionary process g r o w n self-conscious; scientific technique is simply d o i n g " c o n sciouslessly" what takes place naturally in the evol u t i o n of forms ( M e a d , 1936:371). As an example, M e a d mentions the food p r o b l e m , b y w h i c h h e means digesting materials that have cellulose coverings. H u m a n s h a d to w o r k out a means to get r i d o f the c o v e r i n g , i.e., m i l l i n g . B u t M e a d n e v e r mentions the p r o b l e m of distribution. H i s position tends to be a p u r e l y analytical scheme w h i c h lacks content (Meltzer, 1959:29). In a d d i t i o n to assuming that e v o l u t i o n was progressive, M e a d a n d D e w e y b o t h assumed that m e n w e r e naturally rational. I n m a k i n g inquiries, m e n " n a t u r a l l y " test a n d i m p r o v e the operations in the course of what they are d o i n g (Dewey, 1929:124). M e a d (1934:379) thought that m e n w e r e rational, capable of logical t h i n k i n g , because they w e r e social. E t h i c a l judgments can be u n i versal because the voice of all is the universal voice; that is, everyone w h o c a n rationally appreciate the situation w i l l agree. Social reconstruct i o n w o u l d presuppose a basis of c o m m o n social interests, by a l l of those whose minds b r i n g about the reconstruction: A n d the way in which any such social reconstruction is actually effected by the minds of the individuals involved is by a more or less abstract intellectual extension of the boundaries of the given society to which these individuals all belong, and which is undergoing the reconstructionthe exten-

414 sion resulting in a larger social whole in terms of which the social conflicts that necessitate the reconstruction of the given society are harmonized or reconciled, and by reference to which accordingly, these conflicts can be solved or eliminated (Mead, 1934:308-9). T h e H e g e l i a n influence appears in this passage. T h e conflicts are somehow going to dissolve in the larger social whole that is created. M e a d s i m p l y d i d not allow for irreconcilable conflict. H e felt that every interest i n v o l v e d w o u l d b e considered, but a d d e d that " y o u cannot lay d o w n in advance fixed rules as to just what should be d o n e " (Mead, 1934:388). Indeed, w e r e all m e n r a t i o n a l a n d evolution progressive, rules w o u l d not be v e r y important. As D e w e y p u t it, the educative process is all one w i t h the m o r a l process, since the latter is a continuous passage of experience f r o m worse to better ( D e w e y , 1920:183). Science, reason, and progress w e r e isomorphic a n d inevitable. T h e problems o f the pragmatic m o d e l w o u l d be less obvious in a small c o m m u n i t y w i t h a h i g h l e v e l of education and homogeneity of the values that people often squabble over. If people can agree on the way things are supposed to w o r k , it is not so difficult for t h e m to agree on w h e t h e r things really do w o r k out that way. On technological matters the degree of agreement is often h i g h . It is on social matters that fights occur.

P A R T VI Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism design, r e p l i c a t i o n , hypothesis testing, a n d operational procedures) are c l a i m e d to be inadequate because they c a n give no assurance that premises, problems, data relations, a n d so f o r t h are e m p i r i cally v a l i d . Since these four usual means w i l l not do, B l u m e r concludes that the only w a y to get this assurance is to go directly to the e m p i r i c a l social w o r l d (Blumer, 1969:35). B l u m e r does not m e a n that the investigator should consult census data or surveys but rather that he or she should directly inspect group life. D i r e c t f a m i l i a r i t y is necessary, he says, because most sociologists h o l d their theoretical positions tenaciously; a n d they gratuitously accept concepts and beliefs as i n h e r ently true. These images shape i n q u i r y a n d become a substitute for direct experience. B u t B l u m e r does not e x p l a i n h o w scientists can approach reality w i t h blank m i n d s nor does he offer e v i dence to show that persons w h o follow the SI t r a d i t i o n h o l d to their concepts and positions any less tenaciously t h a n those w h o do not. N o r is his conclusion at this point consistent w i t h his earlier statement that a p r i o r p i c t u r e is necessary in order to study the w o r l d .
8

LATER FORMULATIONS

Of the subsequent attempts to p r o v i d e a methodological basis for SI, B l u m e r ' s (1969) is the most sophisticated. B u t he shows a M e a d i a n a m b i guity w h e n he describes the theoretic component. He generally uses the words f r o m the vocabulary of the hard-science methodologist, such as " t h e o r y " and " c o n c e p t , " but he gives t h e m different meanings. B l u m e r (1969:24) says that a " p r i o r p i c t u r e " of the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d is an unavoidable prerequisite for its study. T h e four customary means for e m p i r i c a l validation (proper research
7

W h a t the investigator should do, B l u m e r says, is to conduct an exploratory study, seeking acute, w e l l - i n f o r m e d observers. T h e investigator should also a i m to cast the p r o b l e m in a theoretic f o r m for analysis. B u t the usual theoretical procedures used in sociology w i l l not do. W h a t is n e e d e d is " i n s p e c t i o n , " an intensive focused examination of the e m p i r i c a l content of whatever elements are used for analysis, a n d the same k i n d of examinat i o n of the e m p i r i c a l nature of the relations bet w e e n such elements (Blumer, 1969:43). T h e prototype of inspection is represented by the h a n d l i n g of a strange physical object. " W e m a y p i c k it u p , look at it closely, a n d test it in one way or another. Inspection is not preset, r o u t i n i z e d ; it is free a n d flexible, the antithesis of i n q u i r y as o u t l i n e d in c u r r e n t m e t h o d o l o g y " (Blumer, 1969:44). T h e c r u c i a l deficiency of social theory, B l u m e r (1954:5) says, is the ambiguous nature of its concepts. T h e r e are t w o ways to solve the p r o b 9
8

In r e c e n t years the two foremost e x p o n e n t s of the SI p o i n t and Meltzer, have 1967:vi), been and four major varieties of

B l u m e r ' s c r i t i c i s m of the discipline is extraordinarily persuaW i l i e r a n d W e b s t e r (1970) also c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e a m o u n t o f

o f v i e w h a v e b e e n H e r b e r t B l u m e r a n d t h e late M a n f o r d K u h n (Manis the tradition identified (Petras and Meltzer,

sive. As a critic, he is w i t h o u t p e e r .
9

t h e o r y i n s o c i o l o g y i s s m a l l b e c a u s e sociologists c o n c e p t u a l i z e incorrectly. T h e i r prescription is unlike Blumer's. Rather than

forthcoming).

Huber l e m . First, t o d e v e l o p precise procedures that w i l l y i e l d a definitive e m p i r i c a l content, r e l y i n g on standardized techniques a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l categories. This w a y w i l l not establish genuine concepts related to the natural w o r l d . T h e other way is to accept sociological concepts as sensitizing rather t h a n definitive. This a p p r o a c h is spared the logical problems c o n f r o n t i n g the first, but it forfeits the achievement of definitive concepts w i t h specific objective b e n c h marks. It depends o n faithful reportorial d e p i c t i o n a n d analytical p r o b i n g ; a n d i t remains i n close a n d continuous relation w i t h the natural social w o r l d (Blumer, 1954:9-10). Thus theory is seen to e m e r g e f r o m direct observation, w i t h little specification of the rules of logic or procedure to be used. T h e investigator is u r g e d to use w e l l - i n f o r m e d observers. B u t if the observers fail to agree a m o n g themselves, on what grounds does the investigator choose one v i e w rather than another? D o the observers u l t i mately shape the theory that emerges? W h a t e n sures the objectivity or reliability of the investigator? M a n y scholars c u r r e n t l y i n v o l v e d in SI a n d related research styles ignore some of these questions and disagree on others. L e t us examine some responses to these questions. T h e M e a d i a n t r a d i t i o n requires the researcher to m a i n t a i n both his o w n a n d the actor's perspective. Unless he addresses this p r o b l e m , he cannot warrant his findings on scientific grounds a n d w i l l be o p e n to the charge that they are no different f r o m those of a lay actor (Cicourel: 1964:52). B u t those w h o do sociology in this style do not always confront this issue clearly. F o r exa m p l e , researchers are advised to cultivate close relationships w i t h those they study because such persons can check on the e m e r g i n g theory (Denz i n , 1971:168). E q u a l w e i g h t cannot be g i v e n to informants because their motives for a i d i n g the observer shape the character of their information. B u t the reader is not t o l d h o w the researcher knows w h i c h informants to d r o p . B e c k e r (1970) avoids the p r o b l e m of separating his views f r o m those of the participants by o p t i n g for the side of the u n d e r d o g . Because values are said to be

415 an i m p l i c i t part of any scientific enterprise, n o t h i n g is gained by not frankly taking sides. This solut i o n fails to distinguish the findings of sociologists f r o m the findings of anyone else, a n d hence is unsatisfactory to those w h o h o l d that sociologists can c l a i m special competence. G o u l d n e r (1968: 105) notes, that the p r o b l e m of i d e n t i f y i n g an u n d e r d o g is i g n o r e d , as w e l l as the p r o b l e m of k n o w i n g w h i c h d o g to side w i t h in a hierarchy of stratified dogs. T h e phenomenologists encourage a c o m p l e t e m e r g i n g of the views of the researcher a n d the interactive situation, for fear that a scientific hypothesis w i l l create the v e r y reality that the scientist defines in his design. As B r u y n (1966:271,273) notes, the traditional empiricist sets up p r e c o n c e i v e d realities w h i c h he seeks to v e r i f y ; the phenomenologist wants to k e e p his preconceptions to a m i n i m u m a n d a v o i d anticipating causal relationships. Research interests are to be g u i d e d by the subject as g i v e n . T h e ambiguous v i e w of theory w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e d the M e a d i a n t r a d i t i o n is thus m a d e consistent by e l i m i n a t i n g the n e e d for theory. T h e objectivity of the scientist is also a source of difficulty. D e w e y ' s (1939:775) c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h was a m e t h o d , to be used by intelligent m e n w h o w o u l d have a sympathetic regard for persons of differing views. T h e guarantee of objectivity was the social sensitivity of the observer to the needs of others (Dewey, 1920:147). To judge the c r e d i bility of g r o u n d e d theory, Glaser a n d Strauss (1967:230) use a c r i t e r i o n based on the feelings of e m p a t h y aroused in the observer; if the reader is so caught up in the description that he feels as if he w e r e in the field, he is m o r e l i k e l y to be c o n v i n c e d of the accuracy of an account t h a n i f the description w e r e f l a t and u n c o n v i n c i n g . T h e j u d g m e n t is also based on the assessment of h o w the researcher came to his conclusions, w h o m he i n t e r v i e w e d , and h o w he m i g h t have a p p e a r e d to those he studied. Douglas (1970:13 ff) advised that a " r e v i e w " of the experience t a k e n for granted by the natural, or everyday-life stance, w i l l enable the researcher to understand w h a t is going o n . W h a t the r e v i e w should consist of a n d h o w the researcher knows that he has done it p r o p e r l y is not e x p l a i n e d . S u m m a r i z i n g earlier efforts, D e n z i n (1970: 26) c o n c l u d e d that no single m e t h o d w i l l ever

using the concepts of e v e r y d a y experience, observables, or des c r i p t i v e t e r m s , sociologists s h o u l d d e f i n e constructs e x p r e s s i n g a b s t r a c t p r o p e r t i e s o f e n t i t i e s f o r use i n t h e o r i e s .

416 meet the requirements for the validation of interaction theory and therefore r e c o m m e n d e d m u l t i ple methods. T h e p r o p e r strategy cannot be der i v e d solely f r o m principles in research manuals because it is an " e m e r g e n t " process, contingent on the investigator, the research setting, and his theoretical perspective ( D e n z i n , 1970:310). T h e f o r m u l a t i o n appears to be a m i x t u r e of standard methods added to a derivative of the research prescription advanced b y D e w e y a n d M e a d .

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

executives of a major corporation. In this situation, the researcher's colleagues m i g h t be uneasy if the researcher c o u l d not distinguish b e t w e e n theoretical concepts and observed behavior, if the hierarchy of c r e d i b i l i t y of the informants w e r e arbitrary, and if other such j u d g m e n t a l procedures c o u l d hardly be replicated. W h i c h of the participants in an interactive setting is to have most influence in d e t e r m i n i n g the shape of an " e m e r g i n g " theory is a question that the SI m o d e l has not confronted. T h e most i m p o r t a n t way to i m p r o v e the practice of SI sociology w o u l d be for its adherents to confront the problems raised by their a m b i g u ity toward the logico-theoretic c o m p o n e n t in their w o r k . T h e i r use of the customary vocabulary of methodology illustrates the ambiguity. O f t e n such words as theory, hypothesis, concept are g i v e n meanings w h i c h are quite different f r o m those they have w h e n used by conventional m e t h odologists. In this situation, the rational discussion of i m p o r t a n t issues in the discipline is difficult. E v e r y group, of course, has a right to define words any way it chooses; but w h e n words already have a consensual definition, to give t h e m a different one obfuscates c o m m u n i c a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , n o t h i n g prevents a detailed observational account f r o m being i n f o r m e d w i t h notions f r o m a stratification theory or any other theory. F o r the researcher to spell out in advance and in detail what is expected and w h y it is exp e c t e d is m o r e w o r k than transcribing events w i t h the atheoretical simplicity of a blank m i n d . B u t such p r e l i m i n a r y spadework w o u l d h e l p to integrate the findings into a larger body of w o r k , hence m a k e t h e m m o r e m e a n i n g f u l . T o b e sure, the p r o d u c t i o n of theory in sociology is beset w i t h m a n y unsolved problems. Nevertheless, the p r i o r construction of logically-related propositions is i m p o r t a n t in science because it gives the researcher a chance to lose the game. A theoretical f o r m u l a t i o n forces researchers to bet on a particular outcome a n d to explain w h y they bet the w a y they do. In the absence of such a f o r m u l a t i o n , the researcher always wins, for any outcome is permissible. T h e paper has c r i t i c i z e d the SI tradition, one of the most i m p o r t a n t approaches in the discipline o f sociology. A l o n g w i t h ethnomethodology a n d

DISCUSSION A major legacy of pragmatism to the M e a d i a n tradition is the ambiguity t o w a r d the logico-theoretic c o m p o n e n t in scientific research. W h e n the theoretical formulation is p r i m i t i v e , w h e n it " e m e r g e s " f r o m the research, or w h e n it is absent, t h e n investigators w i l l t e n d to use i m p l i c i t l y their o w n social givens as a theory. W h e n the subjects studied by the sociologist participate in the f o r m u lation of e m e r g i n g theory, t h e n their o w n givens are a d d e d to the e m e r g i n g theory. T h e subjects studied by sociologists in the SI tradition have m a d e such problems less obvious. M u c h of the research has focused on people w h o have little social p o w e r or influence: little c h i l d r e n , skid r o w bums, d r u g addicts, m e n t a l patients, immigrants, delinquents, and assorted d e v i a n t s . T h e investigators are typically persons w h o are deeply sympathetic to a n d understanding of the underdogs they study, but the fact remains that any lack of consensus a m o n g the participants in such situations can be settled by the researcher w i t h little backtalk f r o m the participants.
10

T h e p r o b l e m of scientific objectivity raised by lack of a p r i o r theoretical formulation, by the absence of clear-cut criteria for selecting credible informants w o u l d be h i g h l i g h t e d w e r e the researcher to inspect a group of topdogs, say, the
1 0

M e a d i a n s o c i o l o g y has b e e n a c c u s e d o f i g n o r i n g t h e r e a l i t y

of social stratification. T h e l a b e l l i n g t h e o r y of d e v i a n c e , a d e r i v a tive of the SI approach, is an apparent exception. D e v i a n c e occurs because s o m e p o w e r f u l groups c a n i m p o s e their rules o n s u b o r d i n a t e s ( B e c k e r , 1963:17). T h e f o c u s o f r e s e a r c h shifts f r o m types o f d e v i a n c e t o the processes b y w h i c h p e o p l e b e c o m e d e v i a n t ( K i t s u s e , 1964:87). T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t s h o w s g r e a t p r o m ise b u t t h u s f a r a d e t a i l e d analysis o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h e n f o r c e d e f i n i t i o n s has n o t b e e n m a d e . T h a t is, t h e t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h has n o t b e e n w e l l d e v e l o p e d .

Huber other styles in the holistic tradition, h o w e v e r , SI has retained a freshness in its approach to data w h i c h is often lost w h e n aggregate data emerge f r o m the bowels of the computer. B l u m e r ' s i n j u n c t i o n to look at real people makes good sense. T h e detailed accounts of the way people behave m a k e good reading. Some of these r i c h reports m a y w e l l survive studies awash w i t h mathematical f o r m u l a t i o n s . But the practitioners of SI rem a i n nervous lest their reports be confused w i t h m e r e journalism. T h e i r fear is justified. W h a t is n e e d e d is a frank confrontation w i t h a major legacy of pragmatism. In the absence of theory, the social givens of the researcher a n d the participants serve as a theoretical framework, g i v i n g the research a bias w h i c h reflects the unstated assumptions of the researcher, the climate of o p i n i o n in the discipline, and the distribution of p o w e r in the interactive setting. M u c h SI research reflects a k i n d l y concern for the people w h o are studied because SI methods attract those w h o delight in observing the nuances of h u m a n behavior. Nevertheless, w h e n the c r i t e r i o n for t r u t h is what people do, w h e n theory emerges f r o m practice, t h e n the biases of those w h o do a n d act are e m b e d d e d i n the theory.
11

417
Braithwaite, R. B. Scientific Explanation. New York:

Cambridge University, 1963. Bruyn, Severyn T. The Human Perspective in Sociology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
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ogy. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Curtis, James E. and John W. Petras. The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader. New York: Praeger, 1970. Denzin, Norman K.
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Edited by William H . Filstead. Chicago: Markham, 1970, pp. 15-25. Blumer, Herbert. "What Is Wrong with Social Theory." American Sociological Review 19 (February 1954):3-10. . "Foreword." The Human Perspective in Sociology. Edited by Severyn T. Bruyn. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956, pp. iii-vii.
. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and

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Chicago: Markham, 1970. Gallie, W. B. Peirce and Pragmatism. New York: Dover, 1966. Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm L . Strauss. The Discovery
of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research.

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t i o n a r e also e x a m p l e s o f e m p i r i c a l t h i n k i n g ( W i l i e r , 1970), a n d are relatively atheoretical.

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Gouldner, Alvin W. "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociol-

418 ogy and the Welfare State." The American Sociologist 3 (May 1968):103-16. H i l l , Richard J. " O n the Relevance of Methodology." Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook. Edited by Norman K. Denzin. Chicago: Aldine, 1970, pp. 12-19. Huber (Rytina), Joan and Charles Loomis. "Marxist Dialectic and Pragmatism: Power as Knowledge." American Sociological Review 35 (April 1970): 308-18. Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science. San Francisco: Chandler, 1964. Kitsuse, John I. "Societal Reactions to Deviant Behavior: Problems of Theory and Method." The Other Side: Perspectives on Deviance. Edited by Howard S. Becker. New York: Free Press, 1964, pp. 87-102. Kuhn, Manford. "Major Trends in Symbolic Interaction Theory in the Past Twenty-five Years." Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction. Edited by Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman. Waltham, Mass.: Xerox, 1970, pp. 70-87. Lee, Grace Chin. George Herbert Mead: Philosopher of the Social Individual. New York: King's Crown, 1945. Lewis, J. David. "Peirce, Mead, and the Objectivity of Meaning." Kansas Journal of Sociology. Lofland, John. Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis. Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1971. Manis, Jerome G. and Bernard M. Meltzer. Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967. Mead, George Herbert. The Philosophy of the Present. Edited by Arthur E. Murphy with prefatory remarks by John Dewey. Chicago: Open Court, 1932. . Mind, Self ir Society. Edited, with introduction, by Charles W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934. . Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. Edited by Merritt H. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1936. . The Philosophy of the Act. Edited, with introduction by Charles W. Morris in collaboration with John M. Brewster, Albert M. Dunham, and David L. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1938. . Selected Writings. Edited, with introduction, by Andrew J. Reck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964. Meltzer, Bernard N. The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead. Kalamazoo, Mich.: Western Michigan University, 1959.

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

Mills, C. Wright. The Marxists. New York: Dell, 1962. . Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America. New York: Oxford University, 1966. Morris, Charles W. "Introduction." Mind, Self <b Society. Edited by George H. Mead. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934, pp. ix-xxxv. Petras, John W. "John Dewey and the Rise of Interactionism in American Social Theory." Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 4 (January 1968):18-27. . "George Herbert Mead's Theory of Self: A Study in the Origin and Convergence of Ideas." The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology. Petras, John W. and Bernard N. Meltzer. "Theoretical and Ideological Variations in Contemporary Interactionism." Catalyst. Reck, Andrew J. "Preface" and "Editor's Introduction." Selected Writings. Edited by George Herbert Mead with introduction by Andrew J. Reck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964, pp. v-lxxii. Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945. Shibutani, Tamotsu. "Mead, George Herbert." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 10. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, pp. 83-87. Stevens, Edward. "Biographical Note: G. H. Mead," American Journal of Sociology 72 (March 1967): 551-7. Stone, Gregory P. and Harvey A. Farberman (eds.). Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction. Waltham, Mass.: Xerox, 1970. Wennerberg, Hjalmar. The Pragmatism of C. S. Peirce: An Analytical Study. Lund, Sweden: C W K Gleerup, 1962. White, Morton C. The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism. New York: Columbia, 1943. Wilier, David and Murray Webster, Jr. "Theoretical Constructs and Observables." American Sociological Review 35 (August 1970):748-57. Wilier, David and Judith Wilier. Systematic Empiricism: Critique of a Pseudo-Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972. Wilier, Judith. The Social Determination of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. Zajonc, Robert B. "Conformity." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 3. Edited by David L. Sills. New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968, pp. 253-260.

Herbert Blumer

46

Action vs. Interaction

E r v i n g Goffman has gained well-deserved recognition as an innovative scholar of h i g h order. T h r o u g h a series of n o t e w o r t h y publications he has s h o w n himself to be the dissector p a r excellence of the close interplay b e t w e e n h u m a n beings in face-to-face association. H i s forte is the m i n u t e analysis of the social positioning of participants as they take h e e d of each other, inspect each other, address each other, m o v e t o w a r d or away f r o m each other, parade before each other, lay claims on each other, insulate themselves against each other and m a k e a range of v a r i e d adjustments to each other. W i t h his gifts of sensitive p e r c e p t i o n , creative imagination and adroit conceptualization he can take an area of intimate h u m a n interplay w h i c h appears to us as flat and h u m d r u m and show it to be intricate, d y n a m i c and dramatic. F u r t h e r , he forces us to see order in such areas of complex i n t e r p l a y a n order that is seemingly rooted in the generic requirements of h u m a n association. H i s analyses are m a d e f r o m the perspective of sociology and social psychology and must be recognized as contributions to these disciplines. T h e general characterization of Goffman's scholarly w o r k applies to the present v o l u m e , Relations in Public. This v o l u m e c a r r y i n g the subtitle Microstudies of the Public Order consists of six interrelated articles w i t h an i l l u m i n a t i n g preface a n d a lengthy a p p e n d e d essay. T h e c o m m o n area of the studies is the " f i e l d of p u b l i c l i f e " w h i c h Goffman identifies as the " r e a l m of activity
H e r b e r t B l u m e r , " A c t i o n vs. I n t e r a c t i o n , " p u b l i s h e d b y p e r m i s s i o n o f T r a n s a c t i o n , Inc. f r o m Society, v o l . 9 , n o . 6 , C o p y r i g h t 1 9 7 2 b y T r a n s a c t i o n , Inc.

that is generated by face-to-face interaction and organized by norms of c o - m i n g l i n g a d o m a i n containing weddings, family meals, chaired meetings, forced marches, service encounters, queues, crowds and couples." Goffman's special c o n c e r n is w i t h the g r o u n d rules (the " n o r m s of c o - m i n gling") that regulate face-to-face contact in this field of p u b l i c life. T h e g r o u n d rules establish " p u b l i c o r d e r . " P u b l i c order consists of the "patterned adaptations" to such rules, " i n c l u d i n g conformances, by-passings, secret deviations, excusable infractions, flagrant violations, a n d the l i k e . " At the cost of o m i t t i n g a great deal of the insightf u l observations m a d e in this book by G o f f m a n , the gist of his analysis can be s u m m a r i z e d in the f o l l o w i n g points. 1) In their face-to-face relations in the p u b l i c arena h u m a n beings are engaged in scanning or reading each other and, in t u r n , presenting t h e m selves through externalization so that they are read in appropriate ways by others w h o are scann i n g t h e m . T h e interplay that takes place in public situations occurs through such externalization and scanning. 2) H u m a n beings b r i n g a series of territorial claims into their p u b l i c relations. These territorial claims or " p r e s e r v e s " are represented by such forms as "personal space," "the t u r n " (as in f o r m i n g a queue at a ticket window) and the " s t a l l " (a w e l l - b o u n d e d space such as a chair or a beach mat). In their association in p u b l i c situations h u m a n beings are engaged in staking out their preserves, in m e e t i n g the encroachments of others o n their respective preserves and i n a v o i d i n g i n trusion into the preserves of others. T h e interplay

420 of territorial claims constitutes a v e r y i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n of the p u b l i c order. 3) In their face-to-face encounters a n d c o n tacts h u m a n beings e m p l o y interpersonal rituals (such as gestures of recognition, greeting ceremonies and inquiries as to one's health) w h i c h serve to o p e n access to each other, establish the degree of such access, l i n k persons to each other in g i v e n ways, m a i n t a i n or reestablish contact w i t h one another, a n d place people in p r o p e r position to each other. G o f f m a n calls these interpersonal r i t u als, " s u p p o r t i v e interchanges." T h e y permeate p u b l i c life, i n t r o d u c i n g a h i g h l y i m p o r t a n t d i m e n sion of order. 4) T h e maintenance of p u b l i c order (as defined above) is not, as it w o u l d seem, a m e r e matter of obedience to social norms but involves an e m p l o y m e n t o f " r e m e d i a l interchanges" w h i c h a l l o w for the reestablishment of relations that have b e e n breached by the i n f r a c t i o n of norms. These r e m e d i a l interchanges take the f o r m chiefly of " a c c o u n t s " (explanations w h i c h strip the i n f r a c t i o n of its offensive character), " a p o l o g i e s " a n d "requests" (solicitations for permission to perf o r m the infraction). T h e use of accounts, apologies a n d requests define the i n f r a c t i o n in such a w a y as to leave intact the integrity of the social n o r m that has b e e n violated. R e m e d i a l interchange is a constant feature of interaction in publ i c life, p r o v i d i n g an organizational means of sustaining the p u b l i c order in the face of its violation. 5) Of great importance in the arena of p u b l i c life are " a n c h o r e d relations"those b e t w e e n i n dividuals w h o k n o w each other and k n o w that they k n o w each other. Such individuals i n each other's presence in a p u b l i c gathering r e v e a l the nature of their relationship by the use of posture, gesture a n d vocal expression. G o f f m a n calls these indications of anchored relationship "tie-signs." Tie-signs represent both the existence and the f u n c t i o n i n g of an i m p o r t a n t part of the social order; they enable observers to classify one another, a n d they p r o v i d e self-assurance to those w h o recognize that they are t i e d together. 6) T h e conditions of l i v i n g for h u m a n beings, as for animals, r e q u i r e individuals to be constantly on the alert for happenings that seem unnatural, dangerous or w r o n g . Thus, the activity of humans

P A R T VI Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism falls i n t o t w o modes: going about their business a n d b e i n g at the same t i m e on the w a t c h for alarms, threats a n d dangers. This latter m o d e of activity constitutes an i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n of h u m a n conduct i n face-to-face association, w i t h participants h a v i n g to be ready to detect the unusual a n d the a b n o r m a l in the appearance or acts of others. T h e i n t e r p l a y of participants thus e m b o d ies a r e c u r r i n g scanning of the actions of others for signs of threats a n d alarms a n d a concealing of signs of one's o w n actions that m i g h t lead others to suspect something unusual or a b n o r m a l . Goffm a n borrows the t e r m " U m w e l t " f r o m a n i m a l ethology to stand for the area of potential a l a r m , and t h e n he classifies the sources of a l a r m as they exist i n the U m w e l t s o f h u m a n beings. T h e p u b l i c order consists of a process of participants f o r m i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g their respective U m w e l t s . A s m u t u a l trust a n d the sense of n o r m a l presentation become shaky in face-to-face association the p u b lic o r d e r deteriorates. T h e foregoing bare-boned six-point digest necessarily ignores the r i c h panoply of treatment contained i n the w o r k u n d e r r e v i e w . B u t the d i gest is sufficient to allow us to make a c r i t i c a l assessment of the approach to sociology a n d social psychology w h i c h the book reflects. S u c h an assessment is definitely in order in the light of Goffman's p r o m i n e n c e in these disciplines a n d of his g r o w i n g influence on sets of disciples. T h e assessment should b e g i n w i t h the rem i n d e r that G o f f m a n is dealing w i t h the area of h u m a n group life that is constituted by face-toface meetings a n d association. He regards this area as h a v i n g a distinctive m a k e u p , w i t h its o w n structure of relations, its o w n forms of interaction, its o w n sets of norms a n d its o w n array of investments by the h u m a n "self." It thus constitutes in its o w n right a d o m a i n for study. This p r e o c c u pation w i t h the area of face-to-face relations p r o vides both the strength and the weakness of Goffman's analyses. We n e e d not d w e l l on the positive side of Goffman's w o r k . It is sufficient to note that his penchant for p r o b i n g into face-to-face relations has l e d h i m to d i g out a n d treat seriously what social scientists, p r e t t y m u c h across the board, never see or at the best r e g a r d as t r i v i a . W h o a m o n g t h e m , for example, w o u l d be l i k e l y to take

Blumer such a c o m m o n p l a c e matter as the utterance of greetings a n d show its i m p o r t a n t role in social interaction? Or w h o w o u l d seek to analyze the social role o f hand-holding i n A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y a m a t t e r w h i c h G o f f m a n has done in a most discerning and illuminating manner? In showing, t h r o u g h his perceptive analyses, the i m p o r t a n t role w h i c h these kinds o f matters have i n h u m a n group life Goffman forces social scientists to i n clude what they have b e e n notoriously p r o n e to neglect. A l f r e d N o r t h W h i t e h e a d has w r i t t e n somewhere words to the effect that genius in scientific scholarship consists of subjecting to m i n u t e inspection objects w h i c h are taken for granted just because they are u n d e r our noses. In terms of this c r i t e r i o n Goffman's w o r k ranks h i g h . In the o p i n i o n of this r e v i e w e r an additional w o r d o f c o m m e n d a t i o n i s i n o r d e r i n this i n stance w i t h r e g a r d to Goffman's research proced u r e . In the true spirit of a scientific pioneer he is ever ready to probe a r o u n d in fresh directions in place of forcing his investigation into the fixed p r o t o c o l so frequently d e m a n d e d in c o n t e m p o rary social science research. Fortunately, his i n terests are in u n t a n g l i n g the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d rather than in p a y i n g obeisance to some sanctified scheme for d o i n g so. T h r o u g h the use of choice accounts of h u m a n experience he cuts t h r o u g h to i m p o r t a n t observations that are not y i e l d e d by hosts of stylized findings. N o w for the weaknesses. T h e weaknesses i n Goffman's approach stem f r o m the n a r r o w l y constricted area of h u m a n group life that he has staked out for study. He has l i m i t e d the area to face-to-face association w i t h a c o r r e s p o n d i n g exclusion of the vast mass of h u m a n activity f a l l i n g outside of such association. F u r t h e r , he has confined his study of face-to-face association to the interplay of personal positioning, at the cost of i g n o r i n g what the participants are d o i n g . V a l i d questions are set by each of these two lines of restriction. L e t m e explain. In the case of the first restriction one m a y ask h o w realistic it is to treat face-to-face association as a distinctive d o m a i n , w i t h a m a k e u p i n d e p e n d e n t of the group activities in w h i c h the face-to-face interaction takes place. D e s p i t e a theoretical position w h i c h stakes out face-to-face association as such a conceivable separate d o m a i n ,

421 G o f f m a n wavers on this matter in his actual treatmentas in c o n f i n i n g several of his face-to-face analyses in the present book to A m e r i c a n society. T h e issue here, however, is m o r e than the o l d question of the relation b e t w e e n culture a n d faceto-face association; it is rather a matter of ascertaining h o w concrete ongoing group activities affect the face-to-face interaction i n v o l v e d i n t h e m and h o w , contrariwise, the face-to-face interaction influences the o n g o i n g activities. Goffman's scheme deters h i m , i n d e e d theoretically excludes h i m , f r o m addressing this v i t a l question. Thus, the f r a m e w o r k of the present book rules out a consideration of h o w the p u b l i c order, w h i c h he n a r r o w l y conceives in terms of the g r o u n d rules of face-to-face association, interacts (if at all) w i t h the w i d e r p u b l i c order conceived of in terms of the interplay of o r g a n i z e d groups and institutions. Unless G o f f m a n a n d his followers address e m p i r i cally the question of the relation b e t w e e n faceto-face association a n d the w i d e r context of group activity in w h i c h such association is l o d g e d , his type of study w i l l r e m a i n on a question-begging premise. T h e deficiencies set by the second line of restriction are m o r e decisive a n d p r o f o u n d . Goffm a n does not treat the content of face-to-face association in its n a t u r a l b r e a d t h but picks out, instead, a n a r r o w p o r t i o n of it as his d o m a i n of study. This p o r t i o n is restricted to the personal positioning of the participants to one another as they observe each a n d thus ignores, essentially, their acts or what they are doing. G o f f m a n recognizes that the participants in face-to-face interact i o n are engaged in d o i n g something; he refers repeatedly to this something as " t h e i r business i n h a n d . " This business i n h a n d must b e seen, in the o p i n i o n of this r e v i e w e r , as the activity w h i c h initiates and sustains face-to-face association. Y e t it is precisely this central strand of activity in face-to-face association that G o f f m a n casts aside. G o f f m a n states his position n i c e l y in t w o sentences, " T h e i n d i v i d u a l does not go about m e r e l y going about his business. He goes about constrained to sustain a viable image of h i m s e l f in the eyes of others." G o f f m a n is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the area represented by the second sentence a n d is u n c o n c e r n e d w i t h the area represented by the first sentence. This restriction of c o n c e r n has

422 highly i m p o r t a n t implications that should be spec ified a n d discussed briefly. First, it follows that G o f f m a n covers only a part of the social interaction that takes place be t w e e n h u m a n beings in their face-to-face associa tion. Indeed, he leaves out what is most central in social interaction, namely, the fitting together of the respective acts of the participants as they endeavor to do what is called for in their group or joint action. To restrict interaction to the nice ties of personal interadjustment is to swerve far f r o m the process w h i c h George H e r b e r t M e a d has m a d e the keystone of his p r o f o u n d analysis of social interaction. W h a t G o f f m a n elects to re jectthe interaction of people as they go about their business, as they fit their lines of action to one anotheris precisely what M e a d sees as the p r i m e stuff of h u m a n association, whether it be face-to-face or more remote association. H u m a n interaction, as M e a d emphasized, consists funda mentally of efforts of the participants to grasp what each other is doing or plans to do and then to direct one's o w n act in the light of this k n o w l edge. Instead, to treat face-to-face interaction as though it consists of efforts to create and sustain personal impressions is to misrepresent its true nature. T h e interdependency of the interaction w i t h others a n d the interaction w i t h oneself is ines capable in the case of h u m a n beingsthat is what a " s e l f " means. Consequently, the severe con striction that Goffman has i m p o s e d on social inter action necessarily distorts, in t u r n , the extent and the m a n n e r in w h i c h he sees the h u m a n being as h a n d l i n g himself in face-to-face association. T h e r e can be no doubt that b e g i n n i n g w i t h his early notable book, The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, G o f f m a n sees the h u m a n b e i n g as p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the kinds of impressions he is m a k i n g on others. This theme runs through his works, i n c l u d i n g the book u n d e r r e v i e w . W i t h o u t m i n i m i z i n g the fact that h u m a n beings in one another's presence are sensitive to h o w they are b e i n g regarded, it is farfetched to assume that this f o r m of self-awareness constitutes the major c o n c e r n of the h u m a n b e i n g in h a n d l i n g himself. People in association just do not go around w i t h their attention constantly focused on h o w they

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are being regarded and on how they can influence the way i n w h i c h they are regarded. A t various times they do this, and some people do it m o r e than others. B u t this does not constitute the cen tral content of what the person does in interacting w i t h himself. Instead, self-interaction is con c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y i n g u i d i n g oneself i n what one does. T h e scanning of others and the externaliza tion of oneself, to w h i c h Goffman gives such a conspicuous place in face-to-face association, are m u c h m o r e than ascertaining or controlling h o w one is being r e g a r d e d by one's associates; such scanning and externalization are p r i m a r i l y a mat ter of ascertaining what one's associates are i n tending to do and of indicating to t h e m what one intends to do. In his treatment Goffman has shifted self-interaction away f r o m the construc tion of action by the actor to meet the actions of others; instead, he has put in its place the m u c h narrower f o r m of self-interaction concerned w i t h self-regard. This leads to a one-sided treatment of the " s e l f " and gives an inadequate and inaccu rate picture of h o w the h u m a n being handles h i m self in face-to-face interaction. L e t me t u r n f r o m the deficiencies that stem f r o m the failure of Goffman's perspective to cover certain v i t a l dimensions of the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d he is addressing. In the final words of this r e v i e w w o u l d like to note an additional weakness that lies strictly w i t h i n the d o m a i n to w h i c h he has l i m i t e d himself in the present book. This d o m a i n , as he states, consists of the "patterned adapta tions" (my emphasis) to the "norms of c o - m i n g l i n g " in face-to-face association. E v e n the infrac tions of these norms come in the f o r m of patterned adaptations. This v i e w of the d o m a i n of co-mingling as already organized sets up a static w o r l d ; theoretically, it shuts out consideration of h o w norms and the patterned adaptations to t h e m either come into b e i n g or deteriorate and pass away. Yet, the norms and the patterned adapta tions to t h e m must obviously have a history and be subject to transformation in the course of their careers. This aspect of his d o m a i n is left u n touched by Goffman. O n e w o u l d hope that G o f f m a n w o u l d b r i n g his fertile m i n d to bear on the weaknesses that have been outlined.

Alvin W. Gouldner

47

E thnomethodology

A m o n g other e m e r g i n g theoretical standpoints based u p o n infrastructures fundamentally at variance w i t h the Parsonsian is that advanced i n H a r o l d Garfinkel's E t h n o m e t h o d o l o g y . L i k e Parsons, G a r f i n k e l is deeply interested in the requisites of social order. U n l i k e Parsons, h o w e v e r , he assigns no special importance either to the role of a mutuality of gratifications or to that of shared m o r a l values. Instead, and in a m o r e D u r k h e i m i a n m a n n e r , G a r f i n k e l is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the cultural l e v e l and, in particular, w i t h a k i n d of secularized " c o l l e c t i v e conscience." Influenced b y A l f r e d Schutz's phenomenology, his attention is focused largely on the structure of the shared a n d tacit that is, ordinarily unutterablerules and k n o w l edge that make stable social interaction possible. F o r G a r f i n k e l , then, the social w o r l d is h e l d together not by a morality t i n g e d w i t h the sacred, but by a dense collective structure of tacit understandings (what m e n k n o w a n d k n o w others know) c o n c e r n i n g the most m u n d a n e and " t r i v i a l " matters, understandings to w h i c h no special i m p o r t a n c e , let alone sacred significance, is norm a l l y attributed if, i n d e e d , they are noticed at all. L i k e Goffman, G a r f i n k e l focuses on everyday life and on routine activities, rather than on c r i t i c a l events or dramatic p u b l i c incidents. He regards all people as b e i n g " p r a c t i c a l theorists," collaboratively creating meanings a n d understandings of one another's activities. H i s methodology has a strongly monistic vector, there
From The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, by Alvin W. Inc.,

being no radical difference b e t w e e n sociologists and other m e n . A t the same t i m e , h o w e v e r , G a r finkel criticizes all n o r m a l sociology for f a i l i n g to understand this p r o p e r l y . In other words, w h i l e he sees the continuity b e t w e e n professional a n d practical theorists, he also wants professional social theorists to behave in a m o r e selfconscious m a n n e r than practical theorists, by b e c o m i n g aware o f their o w n i n v o l v e m e n t i n the c o m m o n sense w o r l d . Seeing social reality as created a n d sustained in the m u n d a n e activities of o r d i n a r y m e n , G a r f i n k e l seeks to understand social situations f r o m the " i n s i d e " as it were, as it appears to the m e n w h o l i v e it; he seeks to c o m m u n i c a t e their sense of things, w i t h an almost N i e t z s c h e a n hostility to conceptualization and abstraction, a n d particularly by a v o i d i n g the conceptualizations conventional to n o r m a l sociology. Thus he erects few or none of the conceptual towers that b o t h Parsons a n d G o f f m a n like to b u i l d . E v e n though he stresses the significance of t i m e as intrinsic to m e a n i n g , Garfinkel's, l i k e Goffman's, social w o r l d is a w o r l d outside of t i m e . He is ahistorical a n d does not l i m i t his generalizations to a g i v e n era or a specific culture. W h i l e deeply concerned w i t h h o w definitions of social reality become established, he is not interested in w h y one definition of social reality becomes prevalent in one t i m e , or place, or group, and another elsewhere. T h e process by w h i c h social reality becomes defined a n d established is not v i e w e d by G a r f i n k e l as entailing a process of struggle a m o n g c o m p e t i n g groups' definitions of reality; a n d the outcome, the c o m m o n sense conception of the w o r l d , is not seen as h a v i n g b e e n shaped by insti-

Gouldner,

1970 b y

A l v i n W.

Gouldner,

Basic Books,

Publishers, N e w York.

424 tutionally protected p o w e r differences. T h e r e is a way in w h i c h Garfinkel's c o n c e r n w i t h the anc h o r i n g character of shared meanings expresses a sense of a w o r l d not in conflict so m u c h as in dissolution, of a diffuse m u l t i f o r m i t y of values rather than a clearly structured conflict of p o l i t i cal a n d ideological groups. He seems to be res p o n d i n g to a social w o r l d in w h i c h sex, drugs, r e l i g i o n , family, school, all are uncertain, a n d in w h i c h the threat is more of an entropic w i n d i n g d o w n rather than of taut conflict. In an o l d conceptual distinction, G a r f i n k e l is the ethnographer of the folkways rather than of the mores. Q u i t e unlike Parsons, G a r f i n k e l apparently does not believe that social stability requires that the rules or values be deeply i n t e r n a l i z e d w i t h i n persons or their character structure. In fact, the tacit i m p l i c a t i o n of his ingenious a n d u p setting " e x p e r i m e n t s " is that m e n (most particularly college students) may rather easily be m a d e to act at variance w i t h t h e m . In this, G a r f i n k e l seems to operate w i t h m u c h the same assumption that G o f f m a n does: that is, b o t h seem to premise a social w o r l d resting on tacit understandings that, h o w e v e r important as a foundation for a l l else, are still fragile and rather readily eluded. T h e c u l t u r a l foundation, in short, is precarious, a n d its security apparently rests, in some part, on its sheer invisibility or taken-for-grantedness. O n c e m a d e visible, however, it rather readily loses its h o l d . U n l i k e Parsons, G a r f i n k e l communicates n o sense of the unshakable stability of social foundations. T h e concrete differences in the specific character of these v a r y i n g tacit rules is not e x a m i n e d by G a r f i n k e l . H i s attention, rather, is largely focused, first, on demonstrating their sheer existence, a n d , second, on demonstrating their role in p r o v i d i n g a secure b a c k g r o u n d for social interaction. As a result, there is a strong tendency for each rule thus exposed to appear somewhat arbitrary, for each is assigned no distinct f u n c t i o n or differential importance a n d is, in effect, interchangeable w i t h a variety of others, a l l m a k i n g some c o n t r i b u t i o n to a stabilizing f r a m e w o r k for interaction. To p e r f o r m this stabilizing function, some other rule m i g h t conceivably do just as w e l l . H i s emphasis, then, leads to a c o n c e p t i o n of these rules as conventions, and thus to a v i e w of society

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

as d e p e n d e n t on the merely conventionalthat is, on what are, in effect, rules of the game. G a r finkel n o r m a l l y exposes these rules through gamelike " d e m o n s t r a t i o n s " of what happens w h e n some m e n , w i t h o u t i n f o r m i n g others of their i n tent, deliberately p r o c e e d to violate these tacit understandings. A n d all parts o f society, i n c l u d i n g science (with its rigorous method), are seen to d e p e n d on these c o m m o n sense, arbitrary rules and procedures. U n l i k e G o f f m a n , G a r f i n k e l takes no sensuous delight in the w o r l d of appearances. Rather, he conceives of the t r u l y important part in the social w o r l d as practically invisible, as so familiar that it is a w o r l d taken-for-granted and u n n o t i c e d . T h e task G a r f i n k e l sets himself is to destroy this takenfor-grantedness a n d to strip the cultural foundat i o n of its cloak of i n v i s i b i l i t y . He is not engaged i n locating the familiar commonplaces w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of some theory thereby to e n d o w it w i t h deeper m e a n i n g a n d e n r i c h experience w i t h it, w h i c h is one of the most deeply R o m a n t i c of Goffman's tactics. G a r f i n k e l aims, p r i m a r i l y , at b a r i n g a n d u n m a s k i n g the invisible c o m m o n p l a c e by v i o l a t i n g it in some m a n n e r u n t i l it betrays its presence. It w o u l d be a mistake, however, to c o n c l u d e that G a r f i n k e l is engaged only in an archaeological excavation of h i d d e n cultural foundations, for his excavations p r o c e e d largely t h r o u g h the d e m olition of small-scale worlds. If Goffman's w o r k m a y be c o n c e i v e d of as an attack u p o n certain forms of lower-middle-class smugness, or m o r a l ity, Garfinkel's is an attack u p o n the c o m m o n sense of reality. T h u s students are i n s t r u c t e d to engage friends or acquaintances in ordinary conversation a n d , w i t h o u t i n d i c a t i n g that a n y t h i n g special is afoot, to p r e t e n d ignorance of e v e r y d a y expressions: " W h a t do y o u m e a n , she h a d a 'flat t i r e ' ? " " W h a t do y o u m e a n , ' h o w is she f e e l i n g ' ? " Undergraduates are assigned the task of s p e n d i n g t i m e w i t h their families, a l l the w h i l e acting as i f they w e r e boarders i n their o w n homes. A g a i n , students are instructed to engage someone in conversation a n d , w h i l e d o i n g so, to assume that the other person is t r y i n g to t r i c k or mislead t h e m ; or they are instructed to talk w i t h peop l e w h i l e b r i n g i n g their noses almost to the touchi n g point.

Gouldner At first blush, these demonstrations seem to have a p r a n k i s h collegiate quality, but this v i e w of t h e m as "harmless f u n " wears t h i n as one reads the reactions of the " v i c t i m s , " as G a r f i n k e l sometimes correctly calls t h e m : "She b e c a m e nervous a n d jittery, her face and h a n d m o v e m e n t s . . . u n c o n t r o l l e d . " " Q u a r r e l i n g , b i c k e r i n g , a n d hostile motivations become discomfitingly v i s i b l e . " T h e r e was " i r r i t a t i o n a n d exasperated a n g e r , " "nasty developments f r e q u e n t l y o c c u r r e d . " "I actually came to feel somewhat hated and by the t i m e I left the table I was quite a n g r y . " " A t t e m p t e d avoidance, b e w i l d e r m e n t , acute embarrassment, furtiveness, and above all uncertainties of these as w e l l as uncertainties of fear, hope, a n d anger w e r e characteristic." These, then, are the p a i n e d responses n o r m a l to persons whose conceptions of social reality have b e e n violated, and, i n d e e d , quite deliberately assaulted. It must be understood, h o w e v e r , that p a i n f u l though they are, these responses are not u n a n t i c i p a t e d but expected by G a r f i n k e l . As he says in one c o n n e c t i o n , the responses "should be those of b e w i l d e r m e n t , uncertainty, i n t e r n a l conflict, psycho-sexual isolation, acute, a n d nameless anxiety along w i t h various symptoms of acute depersonalization." T h e cry of p a i n , then, is Garfinkel's t r i u m p h a l m o m e n t ; it is dramatic confirmation of the existence of certain tacit rules g o v e r n i n g social interaction a n d of their i m p o r t a n c e to the persons i n v o l v e d . T h a t he feels free to inflict these costs on others, on his students, their families, friends, or passersbyand to encourage others to do s o is not, I w o u l d suggest, evidence of a dispassionate a n d detached attitude t o w a r d the social w o r l d , but of a readiness to use it in c r u e l ways. H e r e , objectivity a n d sadism become delicately intert w i n e d . T h e demonstration is the message, a n d the message seems to be that a n o m i c normlessness is no longer m e r e l y something that the sociologist studies in the social w o r l d , but is n o w somet h i n g that he inflicts upon it a n d is the basis of his m e t h o d of investigation. T h e r e is n o t h i n g that is quite so r e m i n i s c e n t of Garfinkel's demonstrational methodology as the " h a p p e n i n g , " w h i c h , h o w e v e r , usually lacks the u n b l i n k i n g hurtfulness of Garfinkel's techniques, and m a y also have a larger social purpose.

425 In the " h a p p e n i n g , " something like this occurs: shortly before n o o n , say, in A m s t e r d a m , a g r o u p of youths gathers in one of the busier squares a n d , just as l u n c h e o n traffic begins to mount, they release into the streets one h u n d r e d chickens. These, of course, distract a n d amaze the drivers; accidents m a y h a p p e n ; traffic halts; crowds gather, further t y i n g up traffic; routines c o m e to a stop as everyone gathers a r o u n d to w a t c h a n d laugh as the police attempt to catch the chickens. G a r f i n k e l m i g h t say that the c o m m u n i t y has n o w learned the i m p o r t a n c e of one hitherto u n n o t i c e d r u l e at the basis of everyday life: chickens must not be d r o p p e d in the streets in the midst of the l u n c h hour rush. B e h i n d b o t h the " h a p p e n i n g " and the ethnomethodological demonstration there is a c o m m o n impulse: to b r i n g routines to a halt, to m a k e the w o r l d a n d t i m e stop. B o t h rest on a similar perception of the c o n v e n t i o n a l character of the u n d e r l y i n g rules, on a v i e w of t h e m as l a c k i n g in intrinsic value, as arbitrary albeit essential to the conduct of routine. A n d b o t h are forms of hostility to the " w a y things a r e , " although the e t h n o m e t h odologist's is a v e i l e d hostility, a i m e d at less d a n gerous targets. B o t h communicate at least one lesson: the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the everyday w o r l d to d i s r u p t i o n by violation of tacitly h e l d assumptions. U n d e r n e a t h the ethnomethodological d e m onstration, then, there is a k i n d of anarchical impulse, a genteel anarchism, at least w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h the " h a p p e n i n g . " It is an anarchism that w i l l , to some extent, appeal to y o u t h a n d others alienated f r o m the status quo, and that m a y also congenially resonate the sentiments of some on the N e w L e f t . It is a way in w h i c h the alienated y o u n g m a y , w i t h relative safety, defy the established order and experience their o w n potency. T h e ethnomethodological " d e m o n s t r a t i o n " is, i n effect, a k i n d of microconfrontation w i t h a n d n o n violent resistance to the status quo. It is a substitute and symbolic r e b e l l i o n against a larger structure w h i c h the y o u t h cannot, a n d often does not wish to, change. It substitutes the available rebell i o n for the inaccessible r e v o l u t i o n . In any event, it seems quite e v i d e n t that, w h i l e n o m i n a l l y c e n t e r e d on the analysis of social order, Garfinkel's ethonomethodology is infused w i t h a structure of sentiments directly at variance

426 w i t h the Parsonian. T h e v e r y frequency w i t h w h i c h its often dense and elephantine formulations are attractive to the y o u n g is indicative of its congeniality to the n e w structure of sentiments h e l d by some of t h e m , as w e l l as of their readiness to seize u p o n almost a n y t h i n g that promises an

P A R T VI Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism alternative to Parsonsianism. If Goffman's social theory was a " c o o l " or " h i p " sociology congenial to the politically passive 1950's, Garfinkel's is a sociology m o r e congenial the the activistic 1960's, and particularly to the m o r e politically rebellious campuses of the present p e r i o d .

Edwin M. Lemert

48

Beyond Mead: The Societal Reaction to Deviance

W h a t I prefer to call the sociology of deviance n o w appears to be u n d e r attack f r o m so m a n y quarters, both for what it is and what it is not, that a sense of embattlement is inescapable. T h e diverse, perverse, and tangential nature of the criticisms makes it difficult to tell f r i e n d f r o m foe. Sensitive to this state of affairs, Peter M a n n i n g (1973) in a r e v i e w essay of surpassing excellence asserts that a grey fog has settled over the field. This I can discount as the natural fog of good men's minds; but his further allegations that the theoretical impetus of deviance sociology is spent and that a state of exhaustion and conceptual decay prevails, I found p a i n f u l and m u c h harder to reconcile w i t h my proprietary interests. I should say parenthetically that r e a d i n g the essay left me spelled by the beauty of its words a n d niceties of expression, as w e l l as o v e r w h e l m e d by its sense of prophecy. It recalled me to an
E d w i n M . L e m e r t , " B e y o n d M e a d : T h e Societal Reaction t o D e v i a n c e , " Social Problems 2 1 : 4 ( A p r i l 1974), p p . 4 5 7 - 4 6 8 . R e printed by permission. P r e s i d e n t i a l address, Society for the S t u d y of Social P r o b l e m s , annual meeting, August, 1973.

old auctorial i d e a l espoused by James B r a n c h C a b e l l , n a m e l y that we should w r i t e beautifully of things as they are. B u t having had t i m e to cast off M a n n i n g ' s spell, I conclude that sociologists sometimes w r i t e beautifully of things as they are not and that in striving for rhetorical s y m m e t r y their conclusions m a y go b e y o n d what facts w i l l support. In this case I must object that the allegations of its sadness and senility ignore the theoretical potential of deviance sociology, its c o n t i n u i n g research output, its influence on the d i v e r s i o n m o v e m e n t i n c r i m i n a l justice, a n d its striking i m pact on younger, h i g h l y articulate sociologists in B r i t a i n . G r a n t i n g the slow stain and constant erosion of all ideas, it seems to me that e v e n w i t h age deviance sociology still is "majestic in d e c a y . " B u t w i t h o u t further pause on the decadence issue, I w o u l d like to deal w i t h what m a y cause some of the faithful to cry sacrilege, n a m e l y the deficiencies o f G . H . Mead's conception o f symbolic interaction and their implications for the study of deviance. My purpose is not to a d d to the theoretical confusion but to clear some of it away, a n d hopefully free up sociological energies

Lemert to exploit in the measure it deserves its least w o r k e d area, namely the societal reaction. In order to m a x i m i z e the clarity of my discussion I w i l l recap what the t e r m has m e a n t to m e . Some years ago in my early w o r k on deviance I used the t e r m societal reaction to c o m p r e h e n d a n u m b e r of processes by w h i c h societies respond to deviants either i n f o r m a l l y or t h r o u g h their officially delegated agencies ( L e m e r t , 1951). W h i l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n of invidious definitions of persons or groups a n d the public expression of disapproval w e r e i n c l u d e d as part of the societal reaction, the i m p o r t a n t point was made that these h a d to be validated in order to be sociologically m e a n i n g f u l . V a l i d a t i o n was conceived as effective social control t a k i n g f o r m as isolation, segregation, penalties, supervision, or some k i n d of organized "treatm e n t . " In effect, this was a k i n d of m i d d l e range conceptual orientation to a body of data. Societal reaction theory distinguished objective as w e l l as subjective aspects of deviance, reco g n i z i n g a relationship b e t w e e n the nature, degree, extent, a n d visibility of deviance a n d corresponding f o r m a n d intensity of the societal reaction. It also allowed that attributes of deviants a n d the f o r m of their deviance affected the way i n w h i c h societal definitions w e r e i n t e r n a l i z e d , most easily seen in biological anomalies a n d physical handicaps. A m o n g the objective influences on the societal reaction were n o t e d technology, procedures, a n d l i m i t a t i o n of agency personnel a n d resources. H o w e v e r , these d i d not get m u c h elaboration or application, save in the discussion of c h a n g i n g tolerances for c r i m e . T h e n , as in my later w o r k on deviance ( L e m e r t , 1973), I emphasized the n e e d to b e g i n the analysis w i t h the societal reaction, m o r e particularly social control, rather than w i t h etiology. H e r e i n lay the distinctiveness of the societal react i o n approach, w h i c h sought to show h o w d e v i ance was shaped a n d stabilized by efforts to e l i m i nate or ameliorate it. In retrospect, the break w i t h structural conceptions of deviance a n d the traditional c o n c e r n of sociology w i t h causes was by no means complete. This I n o w believe to have b e e n less a matter of theoretical asymmetry than an encounter w i t h a p e r e n n i a l p r o b l e m of sociological theory, namely h o w to establish a connection between symbolic systems, social systems,

427 a n d physical systems, without d e n y i n g the o b v i ous fact that h u m a n beings make choices that affect as w e l l as are affected by the system. A c c o r d i n g to J. F. Scott's (1963) i n f o r m e d analysis, e v e n the g r a n d theorist of our age, Talcott Parsons, failed to reach an ultimate solution of this problem. This question was pretty w e l l obscured d u r i n g the 1950's a n d 1960s, probably because of the tremendous g r o w t h in our national p r o d uction a n d the belief that affluence was easily procurable for all, abetted by Keynesian e c o n o m i c theory a i m e d at little m o r e than p r e v e n t i v e m a i n tenance of the marvelous machine m a k i n g it all possible. But recently the avalanche of population g r o w t h , swift exhaustion of resources, e n v i r o n mental destruction, plus an " e n e r g y crisis" have made an awareness that h u m a n choices can either sustain or destroy the physical and technological basis on w h i c h they are made. Physical e n v i r o n ments formerly taken as constants a n d m e r e l y l i m i t i n g now can be seen changing in foreseeable time spans, and it becomes possible to speak of responses a n d feedback f r o m the physical w o r l d . E v e n the vulgarization and deserved c r i t i c i s m of the ecology m o v e m e n t cannot quiet the deepeni n g appreciation that m a n is inescapably part of a larger bio-physical system.

SYMBOLIC INTERACTION O v e r the decades of the present century sociology m o v e d steadily away f r o m early social science, w h i c h h a d sought standing g r o u n d on b i o l ogy, geography, a n d economics. W i t h i n sociology, social psychologists pushed farthest along this path, retaining only some n o m i n a l allegiance to organic a n d natural history analogies. A n d w i t h i n social psychology, it has been those sociologists c o n c e r n e d w i t h deviance w h o have l a i d the greatest a n d most exclusive emphasis on the sociopsychological process as the d e t e r m i n i n g e l e m e n t in social life. It has b e e n asserted that the one t h e m e u n i t i n g the otherwise diverse views of l a b e l i n g theorists, Neo-Chicagoans, or West Coast school, as they are variously called, is their fealty to the symbolic interactionism of G. II. M e a d (Schur, 1969).

428 Nevertheless, it m a y be asked w h e t h e r the p r e v a i l i n g definition of deviance as a group creation t h r o u g h labeling and the adoption of an " u n d e r d o g " v i e w of the symbolic process do not do a disservice to M e a d . L a b e l i n g unfortunately conveys an impression of interaction that is both sociologistic and unilateral; in the process deviants w h o are "successfully l a b e l e d " lose their i n d i v i d u ality; they appear, as B o r d u a (1967) says, like " e m p t y organisms" or, as G o u l d n e r (1968) puts it, " l i k e m e n o n their b a c k s " (Walton 1973). T h e extreme subjectivism made explicit by the underd o g perspective, reflecting sympathy for the v i c t i m a n d antipathy towards the establishment, also distorts by m a g n i f y i n g the exploitative a n d arbitrary features of the societal reaction. B u t m o r e i m p o r t a n t , it leaves little or no place for h u m a n choice at either l e v e l of interaction. A c t u a l l y the difficulties m a y lie in the ambiguities a n d uncertainties of Mead's ideas themselves. W h i l e M e a d r e c o n c i l e d the objective a n d the subj e c t i v e i n general terms b y m a k i n g self a n d other d u a l aspects of a c o m m o n behavioral process, the specifics of the process w i t h respect to choice m a k i n g w e r e far f r o m clear. O t h e r strictures i n here in Mead's conception of the societal other; his u n f o r m e d ideas about society, p r i m a r i l y that of one generalized other; are a poor source for a m o d e r n theory of the societal reaction (Meltzer 1967; K o l b 1967). This is a m p l y demonstrated in the dramatistic descriptions of the societal react i o n w h i c h revolve a r o u n d the i d e a of symbolic interaction.

PAST VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

constructed i n c i d e n t of clan reaction to incest in the far off M e l a n e s i a n islands to e p i t o m i z e the contingency of the labeling process. T h e anachronistic overtones in these figures are u n m i s takable. W h i l e fabrication of a pristine state of affairs, a n d the use of analogies and metaphors for p u r poses of analysis are i n v i t i n g , it is also true that they m a y b e c o m e the ties that b i n d ; in this case the dramatistic metaphors, or life-as-a-theatre analysis, traceable f r o m Mead's comparison of social interaction to dramatic play a n d games, carry reductionistic implications h a r d to evade. T h e inescapable concomitants of the play are a scenario, actors w h o play prescribed parts, s t r i k i n g conjunction of actions, o u t w a r d expression of i n n e r conceptions, a n d denouement to an u n e q u i vocal end. T h e significant i m p l i c a t i o n is that the societal reaction rests u p o n a k i n d of p r o g r a m m e d consensus, a p o i n t m a d e explicit by the concepts e m p l o y e d in m a n y studies of agencies of social control. W h e n " o t h e r s " are agents of groups their decisions a n d actions are seen as the expression of rules, " r o u t i n e practices," " c o m m o n typifications," " p r o v e r b i a l characterizations," or racialclass bias, all strongly reminiscent of D u r k h e i m i a n collective representations. Reification of one locus of p o w e r , insistence on group sustaining functions of deviance a n d u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of custodial treatment institutions as " t o t a l " give a f u r t h e r cast of D u r k h e i m i a n solidarity to groups against w h i c h deviants are said to stand as outsiders (for c r i t i c i s m of dramaturgic analysis, see Messinger, 1962, Z i c k l i n , 1968, G a r f i n k e l , 1967, 145 ff.). O n e consequence of the use of the abovem e n t i o n e d analogies to describe the societal reaction is to restrict conflict to that b e t w e e n the group a n d the person it seeks to label. No questions rise about possible effects of dissensus w i t h i n the d o m i n a n t group n o r that generated by the intrusive claims of other groups. Becker's rules w h i c h create deviance appear as agreed u p o n , i f not d e r i v e d f r o m a n o v e r a r c h i n g establishment, at least f r o m the subculture or occupational c u l ture of the labelers; this despite k n o w l e d g e that the salient p r o b l e m for agents of social c o n t r o l such as police a n d court people is h o w to choose f r o m a m o n g a p l e t h o r a of rules at h a n d a n d h o w to find a basis for choice itself. T h e r e is little that

T H E DRAMATISTIC METAPHOR M o s t of the c u r r e n t l y h e l d representations of the societal reaction are metaphors h a v i n g in c o m m o n a curious p r i m i t i v e quality. In his one article on the subject, M e a d (1928) spoke of the " m o d e r n organization of taboo"; later T a n n e n b a u m (1937) called the process the d r a m a t i z a t i o n of e v i l , equatable w i t h ancient H e b r a i c scapegoati n g ; G a r f i n k e l (1956) d e p i c t e d it as c e r e m o n i a l degradation based on suprapersonal values of the tribe; others have t e r m e d the process stigmatizat i o n , v i c t i m i z a t i o n , exclusion, a n d conferral of an invidious property. B e c k e r (1963) d r e w on a re-

Lemert I can find in labeling theory w h i c h deals w i t h this k i n d of conflict and choice m a k i n g in the context of a pluralism of groups so conspicuous in m o d e r n society.

429 In arguing for this position its partisans d e e p e n the entanglement of deviance study in reductioni s m and subjectivism. T h e denial of any objective reality is made explicit in a statement by E r i c h Goode (1969): The only reality available to individual consciousness is a subjective reality . . . meaning is read into every situation, event, object and phenomenon.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGYTHE METHODOLOGY OF CULTURE To say that revolutions in thought come to devour their o w n may overstate the case but there n o w comes a younger generation of ethnomethodologists, existentialists, or phenomenologists in sociology who attack labeling theory as insufficient explication of the societal reaction process. Sensitive to the fragmentation, divisiveness, and pluralism of the contemporary social w o r l d , these writers stress the fluidity and p r o v i sional nature of the dynamics by w h i c h good and e v i l , a n d conformity and deviance emerge. W h i l e these thinkers are still allied w i t h symbolic interactionism, they reject the M e a d i a n concept of social role, and insist that " r e a l i t y " lies under, bey o n d , or apart f r o m institutional structures. Rules are r e p l a c e d by concepts of " d e e p e r r u l e s , " " r e l a tional rules," or preconceptions of social interact i o n (Douglas, 1970). In starkest f o r m the ethnomethodologists assert that confrontations or collective action generating deviance are little m o r e than negotiated understandings c o n t r i v e d in a w o r l d without m e a n i n g or w h i c h is " a b s u r d " ( L y m a n and Scott, 1970). T h e concomitant process has b e e n called " w o r k " or the "social construction of r e a l i t y , " situated in nature. A p a r t f r o m this, h o w e v e r , clarificat i o n is meager, suggesting the difficulties w h i c h ethnomethodologists have in rising above a k i n d o f raw " h e r e and n o w " e m p i r i c i s m i n the research application of their ideas. T h e l o w l e v e l of characterization of the stigmatization of clients at the hands of a welfare organization as a process of " m u d d l i n g t h r o u g h . " He concludes (Scott 1970): This, in turn, implies that one can only speak of constructed meanings of stigma in the sense that they are genuinely manmade. As the t e r m denotes, ethnomethodology contends that cultures or subcultures set fundamental rules for d e t e r m i n i n g what is p e r c e i v e d as real.

FURTHER DILEMMAS Insofar as ethnomethodologists hold that constructions of deviance rest on perceptions or " g r o u n d s " w h i c h are d e t e r m i n e d by c u l t u r a l or subcultural screens, their ideas t u r n into solipsisms, recapitulating the difficulty f r o m w h i c h M e a d t r i e d to rescue Watsonian behaviorism. In a narrow sense it is true that culture sets up an apperceptive base f r o m w h i c h those e n c u l t u r a t e d respond selectively to define good and e v i l indep e n d e n t l y of other aspects of the actions they perceive. C u l t u r e m a y p r o v i d e people w i t h meanings that keep t h e m acting for l o n g periods in ways that appear to be irrational, meaningless, or e v e n fantastic. T h e p u r e culturologist or ethnomethodologist l o o k i n g at such behavior concludes that culture or social construction of reality c a n make a n y t h i n g good or bad, d e n y i n g that there is any standard c o m m o n to m a n k i n d that affects his efforts. This k i n d of generalization can be made true only by d e n y i n g that m a n learns or responds on any other basis than what is symbolically transmitted. A c t u a l l y it is only in cases w h e r e a c u l t u r a l definition of what happens is reinforced by anticipated results that m e n are free to selectively define reality in this circular manner. In effect they may react as if only part of what h a p p e n e d actually h a p p e n e d , thus i d e n t i f y i n g a whole pattern of action as a c u l t u r a l or perceptual p h e n o m e n o n . B u t as W. F. C o t t r e l l (1972) c o n v i n c i n g l y demonstrates, w h i l e some of our responses dep e n d on symbolically acquired meanings, others require for their validation direct feedback f r o m our bodies or the physical w o r l d ; a n d still other responses can be m a d e or learned only t h r o u g h direct experience of the d o i n g of t h e m . F r o m this

430 p o i n t of v i e w any pattern of h u m a n reaction to others, i n d i v i d u a l or collective, is a m i x t u r e or p r o d u c t of prior symbolically transmitted k n o w l edge, past k n o w l e d g e a c q u i r e d f r o m experience w i t h the objective w o r l d and n e w l y i n v e n t e d meanings d e r i v e d f r o m i m m e d i a t e experience w i t h the social and physical worlds.

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

preneurs or crusaders w i t h a sense of mission to impose their m o r a l i t y on others (Becker 1963). O n e version of this i d e a has it that such crusaders seize on a single m o r a l issue as a s y m b o l for r e f o r m in an effort to preserve a c o m m o n w a y of life threatened by social change. M o t i v a t i o n presumably is p u r e l y symbolic, m o n o l i t h i c , a n d d i v o r c e d f r o m distributive material or means considerations (Gusfield, 1966). L o o k i n g b e y o n d symbolic politics for p e r t i nent theory on the societal reaction is scarcely m o r e r e w a r d i n g . Radical critics a n d those w h o w r i t e on the politicization of deviance p r o p e r l y have n o t e d the superficiality of the m o r a l c r u sader f o r m u l a t i o n , as w e l l as faulting labeling theory generally for its neglect of conflict and p o w e r . B u t the alternative theory of so-called radical sociology I find v e r y generalized, as w e l l as d o c t r i naire. N e i t h e r the M a r x i a n concept of class, the p o w e r elites of M i l l s , n o r the n e w left " u r b a n a l l i a n c e " of blacks a n d students have m u c h i m m e d i ate or practical use for research into the dynamics of the societal reaction. At best they substitute ideologies for things like group rules and define p o w e r as outcome of action or an attribute rather than as a process, e.g., " p o w e r is the ability to enforce one's m o r a l c l a i m s . " In sum, radical critics reify p o w e r o n l y slightly less than those they criticize; a n d in o r d e r to d r a m a t i z e their criticisms they sometimes get caught up in the subjective, phenomenological perspective they seek to reject. I n d e e d some recent radical critiques seem bent on restoring m a chismo to the deviant and distinguishing the stout hearted and r e d b l o o d e d deviants w h o defy the system f r o m those w h o live in its chinks a n d c r a n nies. B u t e v e n those on the sinistral side w h o c a l l for sociologists to stigmatize the oppressor instead of their victims c o m p o u n d contradictions of p o w e r by insisting that h i g h r a n k i n g persons are deviants e v e n t h o u g h they admittedly h o l d the p o w e r indispensable to defining deviance (Liazos, 1972). E m p i r i c a l materials t o a i d i n f o r m u l a t i o n o f theory on the e v o l u t i o n of morals and l a w u n f o r t u nately are sparse, for history seldom has r e c o r d e d the kinds of events relevant to the task. Y e t that w h i c h is available: J. Hall's (1935) studies of the evolution of the l a w of theft, research on the

C H A N G E IN THE SOCIETAL REACTION It is p r i m a r i l y by treating the societal reaction as a residue after all factors operating to p r o d u c e it have o c c u r r e d that the impression of its subjective symbolic character can be m a i n t a i n e d . W h i l e g r a n t i n g that the residues of social action are symbolically transmitted, l o o k i n g at the action f r o m the perspective of change directs attention to its non-symbolic antecedents. This is made clear in Cottrell's (1972) words: If culture be treated as a residue . . . then of course what is found there includes all the norms, the results of all strivings, as well as all knowledge that will be symbolically transmitted. But how much of what was there yesterday is still there . . . How much of what is there now is new, now to be symbolically transmitted but not learned that way? . . . if . . . our model permits us to look elsewhere we may see that culture change was preceded by technological invention, or that certain kinds of deleterious social relationships were selected out of that culture when new knowledge made it possible to discover their influence . . . It is only in the comparative short run that culture can make anything good. . . . A great many of the studies of agencies cont r o l l i n g deviance have b e e n synchronous in nature, describing and analyzing portions and pieces of a social process. M a n y have b e e n timeless and w i t h o u t provenience. Consequently w h e n attention is t u r n e d to the rise and fall of m o r a l ideas a n d the transformation of definitions of deviance, labeling theory a n d ethnomethodology do little to e n l i g h t e n the process. This is especially true as it pertains to the interaction of groups. A sociopsychological m o d e l focused on symbolic interaction in the M e a d tradition either leaves groups vague entities or psychologizes their action. This c a n be seen in the proposition that n e w m o r a l a n d legal categories are the w o r k of m o r a l entre-

Lemert g r o w t h of vagrancy laws (Chambliss, 1964), c o m mission reports on the poor laws, recent E n g l i s h articles on the politics of deviance (Taylors, 1973), m y o w n w o r k o n change i n the C a l i f o r n i a J u v e n i l e C o u r t L a w (1970), along w i t h investigations into the origins a n d w o r k i n g of the P r o b a t i o n Subsidy P r o g r a m i n C a l i f o r n i a , m a k e i t d o u b t f u l that the e m e r g e n c e of n e w m o r a l i t y a n d procedures for d e f i n i n g deviance can be l a i d to the creations of any one group, class, or elite. R a t h e r they are the products of the i n t e r a c t i o n of groups. T h e w o r k i n g s of legislatures r e v e a l the m u l t i f a c e t e d i n t e r a c t i o n they have w i t h such groups as w e l l as the complexities of their o w n i n t e r n a l interact i o n t h r o u g h committees, majorities, a n d m i n o r i ties. Judges, court workers, administrators, a n d police further interact to qualify the effective r e a c h o f n e w substantive l a w b y j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a n d p r o c e d u r a l adaptations. To understand the interplay of m a n y groups out of w h i c h materialize n e w categories of m o r a l a n d legal control requires a m o d e l of interaction quite different t h a n those fathered by the psychologically o r i e n t e d thought of M e a d or f r o m those of the class conflict theorists.

431 group c o m m i t m e n t s so that they must pass bills w h i c h are grossly contrary to values they personally espouse. T h e order in w h i c h interests, claims, or values get satisfied reflects not only group allegiance but also the availability of means for their satisfaction and the costs of such means, measurable by t i m e , energy, a n d other values expended. L a w s and rules made by this k i n d of process often express the values and norms of no group or person but rather their dilemmas, compromises, expeditious adherence to procedures, and strictures of t i m e a n d budgets. F o r this reason it becomes difficult or impossible to p r e d i c t the emergence of n e w definitions a n d controls of deviance by introspecti n g or " t a k i n g the role of the o t h e r " to discover what it is the m i n d s of those m a k i n g the change. N o r can predictions b e made successfully b y i m p u t i n g cultures, subcultures, or life styles to the agents of change. W h a t has b e e n said is w e l l illustrated by reference to the i n t e r a c t i o n of a variety of professional associations w h i c h took part in r e v i s i n g the Juven i l e C o u r t l a w i n C a l i f o r n i a i n 1961, a change w h i c h n a r r o w e d the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court a n d effectively m o d i f i e d definitions of d e l i n q u e n c y (Lemert, 1970). E a c h association sorted out the proposed changes in terms of its o w n values, supp o r t i n g or resisting according to w h e t h e r the changes w e r e seen as a means of a c h i e v i n g their existing values or called for sacrifices d e e m e d i n tolerable. In the change, probation officers gave up their accustomed right to e m p l o y a n u m b e r of i n f o r m a l procedures but got m o r e p o w e r vis-avis the police in decisions to detain juveniles. Police lost this p o w e r but got badly n e e d e d clarification of arrest powers. Judges lost their considerable f r e e d o m to handle the court i n f o r m a l l y , b u t they along w i t h interested attorneys g a i n e d by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of guarantees of certain rights to minors. A l l three professional groups h a d splits for and against the changes, and their conflicting positions w e r e a r r i v e d at for different reasons a n d in different ways. U l t i m a t e l y resistance a m o n g probation officers disappeared because the resisters h a d to choose b e t w e e n c o n t i n u e d opposition a n d preservation of their association, w h i c h it threatened to destroy. O p p o s i t i o n a m o n g judges centered a r o u n d one of their m e m b e r s w h o re-

GROUP INTERACTION G r o u p interaction is best understood as a process resting o n evaluation i n w h i c h individuals sort out their purposes or values in terms of their dependence on groups necessary for their satisfaction. In so d o i n g they give up some values in order to satisfy others, at the least possible sacrif i c e . T h e pattern o f g r o u p action w h i c h results w i l l reflect the claims a n d p o w e r of a l l those i n v o l v e d in the interaction; a n d the priorities it follows often are at considerable variance f r o m the value hierarchies o f i n d i v i d u a l participants. W h e n a c h a i n of interaction occurs b e t w e e n groups, the disparity b e t w e e n values dominate in final action, a n d the values of any one group m e m b e r m a y be enormous. P o l i c e m a y acquiesce in positions of legislation taken by their representative association w h i c h d e e p l y offend their sense of m o r a l i t y a n d justice because other values w h i c h have b e e n g i v e n precedence are at stake in concurrent legislation. Legislators, too, m a y be c a p t u r e d by their

432 m a i n e d against the changes throughout but u l t i mately chose not to risk loss of reputation a m o n g his other colleagues by protracted resistance. Police resistance, p r i m a r i l y a m o n g Juvenile Officers f r o m the south state, got s t y m i e d by the structure of their l o b b y i n g committee, w h i c h was d o m i nated by chiefs who w e r e m o r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h evidentiary bills and a death penalty b i l l than they w e r e w i t h juvenile justice.

P A R T VI Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism to the traditional parens patriae c o n c e p t i o n of the j u v e n i l e court, although it was not so represented. Social action grew out of an accumulation of n e w facts a n d i n f o r m a t i o n that raised serious doubts about the efficacy of the basic philosophy of the court. T h e m a i n source of such i n f o r m a t i o n was i n p u t at the B o a r d created for a different purpose, to hear and dispose all cases r e f e r r e d to C Y A . This, together w i t h reports f r o m its field consultant division, allowed staff and B o a r d m e m bers for the first time, circa 1944, to develop a statewide impression of what the j u v e n i l e courts were like in fact a n d to b e g i n to appreciate the discrepancies b e t w e e n their ideology and their performance. A n u m b e r of B o a r d m e m b e r s after repeatedly listening to stories of y o u t h c o m i n g before t h e m g r e w c o n v i n c e d that injustices w e r e b e i n g done. T h e p r o b l e m of the C o m m i s s i o n became one of c o n v i n c i n g persons w i t h p o w e r to change the law that this was true. G i v e n this general stance, the C o m m i s s i o n d i d in a sense try to reconstruct the symbolic reality of the j u v e n i l e court, chiefly by means of a statewide survey, hearings, a n d presentations before legislative committees. B u t their report was late in appearing and was not very good at that; and the Commission's presentations before the p o w e r f u l Senate Judiciary C o m mittee, a majority of whose members w e r e opposed to any change, f e l l short. T h e event w h i c h d i d more than any other to u n d e r c u t a n d select out the existing parens patriae conception of the juvenile court came f r o m the unsolicited testimony of a single upstate judge who had come to defend the o l d style court and fight the changes sought by the C o m m i s s i o n . A somewhat quaint, anachronistic figure in a black suit and a f u r l e d u m b r e l l a , he told in fine detail h o w he r a n what was in effect an inquisitorial system of j u v e n i l e justice, o r d e r i n g arrested youths into detention u n t i l by confessing their misdeeds they showed the remorse he considered necessary for their rehabilitation. T h e i m p a c t on a committee composed entirely of lawyers, form e r district attorneys, and a former judge was like that of a b o m b in an echo chamber. This strongly indicates that w h e n a radical change is contemplated on the basis of n e w ideas about reality, it most likely occurs w h e n there

STRUCTURES A N D T H E SOCIETAL REACTION It is clear f r o m what has b e e n said that social structures influenced the outcome of the legislat i o n in question. This h a p p e n e d in several ways, such as l i m i t i n g the access of some groups to the legislature, allocating p o w e r in a m a n n e r so that the decision of one c o m m i t t e e was crucial, and the special autonomy to act g i v e n to the group w h i c h initiated the changes. H o w e v e r , here I wish to emphasize for theoretical reasons h o w structures become instrumentally i m p o r t a n t as v e h i cles or channels by w h i c h feedback f r o m direct experience w i t h the objective w o r l d modifies c h o i c e i n this instance h o w n e w structures affect dissemination of n e w k n o w l e d g e w h i c h selects out old patterns or paradigms. T h e m o v e m e n t to change the juvenile court l a w , although it had outside leadership, was somet h i n g less than a m o r a l crusade, nor c o u l d it be described realistically as a popular m o v e m e n t shaped by public opinion. Leaders w e r e a few attorneys, some probation officers, correctional administrators, and college professors, f r o m a m o n g w h o m was organized a commission w i t h i n the C a l i f o r n i a Y o u t h A u t h o r i t y and the Departm e n t of Corrections. Joint sponsorship by the two organizations and later loss of interest by the C Y A top people i n the m o v e m e n t made i t m u c h like an autonomous staff operation. Several of the attorneys w e r e attracted to the m o v e m e n t in its early stages mainly f r o m frustrating encounters w i t h h i g h h a n d e d judges i n j u v e n i l e courts, but the focus and articulation of the m o v e m e n t o w e d m u c h to organizational features i n t r o d u c e d w i t h creation of the C Y A . In essence, the m o v e m e n t was a challenge

Lemert is a validation of the ideas in direct sensory experie n c e i n this case a l i v i n g b r e a t h i n g j u d g e of the type the commissioners i n e p t l y t r i e d to fix as an image. T h e situation was dramatic because it was so r e a l a n d because it was not staged. Legislatorsat least those in Californiaare w e l l accustomed to staged presentations a n d h i g h l y sophisticated efforts to create realities favorable to the causes of lobbyists. As a matter of fact, they have committee techniques of their o w n designed to cope w i t h these, that w h i c h m i g h t be called counter staging, set up to give the impression of responding to the voices of the p u b l i c . U n d e r n e a t h , legislators t e n d to be toughm i n d e d ; a n d the prevalence of lawyers a m o n g t h e m sets rigorous standards for w h a t w i l l be acc e p t e d as facts or evidence. T h a t they have problems of obtaining objective measures of the h a r m f u l effects of deviance a n d of consequences of proposed programs for its c o n t r o l none w i l l deny. T h e problems face social scientists as w e l l as legislators, but they do not seem sufficient reason to believe that legislators have no way of getting feedback f r o m the objective w o r l d . It remains to c o m m e n t on the effects of direct experience w i t h physical or ecological consequences of patterns of social c o n t r o l as influences on change. F r o m these flow costs, by w h i c h is m e a n t the time, energy, a n d m o n e y costs of means to i m p l e m e n t various methods of control. In a context of change this refers to anticipated as w e l l as experienced costs. An i m p o r t a n t p r i n c i p l e is that changes in the definition a n d control of deviance m a y be due not to any alteration in value systems but to changes in their costs of satisfaction. An increase in costs, such as the t i m e n e e d e d to d e l i v e r a y o u t h to detention, may change the disposition of cases by police or probat i o n officers e v e n though their preferences are to follow an o l d pattern. A n t i c i p a t e d changes in the costs of means to ends affected both the support for a n d opposition t o the 1961 Juvenile C o u r t L a w revision. L o s A n geles county sheriff people favored the change because the n e w arrest procedures s i m p l i f i e d a n d h e l p e d the efficiency of their d e l i n q u e n c y control operations. Police, on the other h a n d , b o t h n o r t h a n d south, w e r e concerned that the 48-hour l i m i t i m p o s e d in the n e w law for investigations p r i o r

433 to d e t e n t i o n hearings w o u l d make their jobs i m possible. A n d i n d e e d this was the case so far as their o l d procedures w e r e concerned, especially in counties like L o s Angeles, w h i c h had set up a detention control unit w i t h i n its probation department. As a result, it became harder to use the j u v e n i l e court as an adjunct for extra-legal police methods. " W e e k e n d e r s , " y o u t h swept up by police a n d detained in order to break up or curb local disorders, t e n d e d to disappear as a category. Judges, p r o b a t i o n officers, supervisors, a n d county executives i n m a n y instances w e r e p a i n fully aware that the proposed law revision w o u l d cost a great deal m o r e m o n e y in order to p r o v i d e counsel for minors, engage court reporters, a n d prepare records for court hearings. H o w to raise such funds was a c r i t i c a l issue in a n u m b e r of counties. T h e r e q u i r e m e n t of two a n d possibly three court hearings c o u l d only increase the w o r k l o a d of the court a n d probation department, w h i c h meant either m o r e tax funds or greater expenditures of t i m e a n d effort by court personn e l f r o m judges o n d o w n . T h e strong opposition to the l a w change by police a n d probation officers in the southern part of the state came f r o m recognition of the h a r d fact that it w o u l d e n d the use of j a i l for detention, w h i c h was an intrinsic feature of the d e l i n q u e n c y control system there. This eventuality was felt keenly in L o n g B e a c h , w h e r e a n e w w i n g of the j a i l had b e e n constructed for such a purpose. H i g h e r standards of proof mandated by the law change a n d the n e w power of probation officers to dismiss at intake meant that m o r e t i m e h a d to go into police investigations and reports. This was m o r e fully appreciated after some experience w i t h the n e w law, and it fostered a c h a n g e d categorical attitude that "either y o u have a case, o r you d o n ' t . " A n organizational reflection o f this change was the decision of the Los Angeles P o l i c e to eliminate its j u v e n i l e bureau a n d t u r n its w o r k over to the detective bureau. H e r e i n may lie one of the m a i n outcomes of the 1961 law change, n a m e l y a g r o w i n g tendency to redefine d e l i n q u e n c y m o r e exclusively as law violations, a n d to differentiate such cases f r o m so-called d e l i n q u e n t tendencies cases, m a n y of w h i c h began to be h a n d l e d by other means.

434 C o m m e n t s n o w are heard f r o m p r o b a t i o n officers that " 6 0 T s (the code t e r m for such cases) are on their way out."

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

CONCLUSION It has b e e n my contention that existing theories of deviance are i l l suited to account for the complexities of the societal reaction in m o d e r n society. In place of a sociopsychological m o d e l I have proposed a group interaction m o d e l a n d t r i e d to show h o w it clarifies the shifting significance of ends a n d means a n d their costs in the emergence of n e w patterns of social control. T h e chief gain is a m e t h o d for specifying the w a y in w h i c h h u m a n choices affect the societal reaction w i t h o u t g e n e r a l i z i n g the claims of others or red u c i n g t h e m to reified ideas of culture, class, or p o w e r . It also shows h o w costs of changes in social c o n t r o l f e e d back into decisions to m a k e changes, w i t h o u t the necessity of r e l y i n g on older deterministic conceptions of the effects of the physical w o r l d on the social. T h e possibility exists that the special subject matter of procedural l a w change w i t h i n a bureaucratic context of correctional agencies puts the group interaction m o d e l in a m o r e favorable light than if it w e r e a p p l i e d to substantive legislation of a m o r e obviously " m o r a l " nature, such as m a r i huana laws, temperance laws, a n d anti-pornograp h y statutes. Yet I note a recent study of the evol u t i o n of our m a r i h u a n a laws w h i c h advisedly chooses an organizational perspective emphasizi n g bureaucratic utilitarian values in its explanat i o n (Dickson, 1968). I am also r e m i n d e d of A . M . Lee's (1944) older pluralistic analysis o f the t e m p e r a n c e m o v e m e n t , w h i c h still stands unrec o n c i l e d w i t h the symbolic crusade theory of the same p h e n o m e n o n . A study of social c o n t r o l in C u b a , t o u c h i n g on censorship and sex behavior, not only has chall e n g e d the validity of the n o t i o n of m o r a l entrepreneurs but also accentuates the n e e d to fit concepts of social control to the differentiation of interests a n d groups in particular societies (Looney, 1973). A l l of w h i c h tells me that deviance sociologists can do better w i t h w o r k i n g tool concepts t h a n w i t h ambitious theory. T h e y obviously

"can't go h o m e a g a i n " to o l d style structural, positivist sociology any m o r e than conservative sociologists can stomach the extremes of l a b e l i n g theory. B u t there m a y be a less pretentious m i d g r o u n d o n w h i c h t o m e e t i f not they, t h e n a less c o m m i t t e d generation of sociologists yet to come.

REFERENCES Becker, Howard. Outsiders. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963. Bordua, David. "Recent Trends: Deviant Behavior and Social Control." Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Science 57: (1967)149-163. Chambliss, William. "A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy." Social Problems 12 (1964): 67-77. Cottrell, W. F. Technology, Man and Progress. Columbus: Charles Merrill Pubs, 1972. Dickson, Donald. "Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade." Social Problems 16 (1968):143-156. Douglas, Jack. Deviance and Respectability. New York, London: Basic Books, 1970. Garfinkel, Harold. "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies." Amer. Jr. Social. 61 (1956): 420-24. Goode, Erich. "Marihuana and the Politics of Reality." Jr. Health and Social Behavior. 10 (1969):84. Gouldner, Alvin. "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State." American Sociologist (May 1968): 103-116. Gusfield, Joseph. Symbolic Crusade. Urbana, London: Univ. Illinois Press, 1966. Hall, Jerome. Theft, Law and Society. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1935. Kolb, William. "A Critical Evaluation of Mead's T and 'Me' Concepts." Symbolic Interaction (Manis and Meltzer). Lee, A. M. "Techniques of Reform: An Analysis of the New Prohibition D r i v e . " Amer. Sociol. Rev. 9 (1944):60-69. Lemert, Edwin. Social Pathology. New York: McGrawHill, 1951. . Legal Action and Social Change. Chicago: A l dine Pub. Co., 1970. . Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall Inc.; 1973.

Lemert Liazos, Alexander. "The Poverty of the Sociology of De viance: Nuts, Sluts and Perverts." Social Problems 20 (1972):103-120. Looney, Martin. "Social Control in Cuba." Politics and Deviance. Edited by Ian and Laurie Taylor. Lon don: Penguin, 1973, pp. 42-60. Lyman, Standford, and Marvin Scott. A Sociology of the Absurd. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970. Manning, Peter. "Survey Essay on Deviance." Contemporary Sociology 2 (1973): 123-128. Mead, G. H. "The Psychology of Primitive Justice," 1928. Meltzer, Bernard N. "Mead's Social Psychology." Symbolic Interaction. Edited by Jerome Manis and Bernard Meltzer. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967. Scott, John. "Changing Foundations of a Parsonian Scheme of Action." Amer. Soc. Rev. 28 (1963):716734. Scott, Robert A. "Construction of Conceptions of Stigma by Professional Experts." In Douglas, 1970. Schur, Edwin. "Reaction to Deviance: A Critical Assess ment." Amer. Jr. Sociol. 75 (1969):309-322. Tannenbaum, Frank. Crime and the Community. New York: Col. Univ. Press, 1937. Taylor, Ian, and Laurie Taylor. Politics and Deviance. London: Penguin, 1973. Walton, Paul. "The Case of the Weathermen: Social Re action and Radical Commitment." Politics and De viance. Edited by Ian and Laurie Taylor. London: Penguin, 1973.

435 202-214. Favorable evaluations of dramaturgical sociology and ethnomethodology. Coser, Lewis A. "Two Methods in Search of a Sub stance," American Sociological Review, vol. 40 (De cember 1975), pp. 691-700. An unfavorable ap praisal of ethnomethodology (and of path analysis). Cuzzort, R. P. Humanity and Modern Sociological Thought. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969, pp. 173-192. A balanced appraisal of Goffman's work. Gouldner, Alvin F. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociol ogy. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970, pp. 378395. An appraisal of Goffman's and Garfinkel's per spectives by a distinguished critic of sociological theorizing. Huber, Joan. "Reply to Blumer: But Who Will Scrutinize the Scrutinizers?" American Sociological Review, 38 (December 1973), pp. 798-800. Pertains to her selection in this part. Kanter, R. M. "Symbolic Interactionism and Politics in Systematic Perspective." Sociological Inquiry, 42 (1972), pp. 77-92. A critical appraisal of the rele vance of symbolic interactionism. Lichtman, Richard. "Symbolic Interactionism and Social Reality: Some Marxist Queries." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 15 (1970), pp. 75-94. The author con tends that symbolic interactionism ignores objec tive conditions. McNall, Scott G. and James . M. Johnson. "The New Conservatives: Ethnomethodologists, Phenomenologists, and Symbolic Interactionists." The Insurgent Sociologist, vol. V (Summer 1975), pp. 49-65. At tacks the assumptions and political implications of major theoretical perspectives. Petras, J. W. and B. N. Meltzer. "Theoretical and Ideo logical Variations in Contemporary Interaction ism." Catalyst, 7 (Winter 1973), pp. 1-8. Discusses various forms of bias among symbolic interac tionists. Reynolds, Janice and Larry Reynolds. "Interactionism, Complicity and the Astructural Bias." Catalyst, 7 (Winter 1973), pp. 76-85. Supports criticisms of ide ological bias of symbolic interactionism with survey data. Schmitt, Raymond L. "SI and Emergent Theory: A Reexamination." American Sociological Review, 39 (June 1974), pp. 453-456. Another reply to the H u ber selection. Stevens, Edward. "Sociality and Act in George Herbert M e a d . " Social Research, vol. 34 (Winter 1967), pp. 613-631. A critical analysis of some of Mead's ideas.

SELECTED REFERENCES P A R T SIX Bales, Robert F. "Comment on Herbert Blumer's Pa per," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. L X X I (March 1966), pp. 545-547. A critique of Blumer's rendition of the Meadian perspective. Blumer, Herbert. "Comment on 'Symbolic Interaction as a Pragmatic Perspective: The Bias of Emergent T h e o r y . ' " American Sociological Review, 38 (De cember 1973), pp. 797-798. Response to the selec tion by Huber. Brittan, Arthur. Meanings and Situations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. 189-204. A symbolic interactionist's reservations about the perspective. Collins, Randall, and Michael Makowsky. The Discovery of Society. New York: Random House, 1972, pp.

436 Stone, Gregory P., David R. Maines, Harvey A. Farberman, and Norman K, Denzin. " O n Methodology and Craftsmanship in the Criticism of Sociological Perspectives." American Sociological Review, 39 (June 1974), pp. 456-463. Still another rebuttal of the Huber article. Wilson, Thomas R. "Conceptions of Interaction and Forms of Sociological Explanation." American Soci-

P A R T VI

Appraisals of Symbolic Interactionism

ological Review, 35 (August 1970), pp. 697-710. A useful analysis of normative and interpretation perspectives. Zeitlin, Irving M. Rethinking Sociology: A Critique of Contemporary Theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973, pp. 183-256. Discusses purported shortcomings of dramaturgical sociology, ethnomethodology, and symbolic interactionism.

Conclusion
H a v i n g presented the major ideas and criticisms of symbolic interactionism, we shall conclude this book by repeating its basic propositions and assessing the more c o m m o n and significant adverse criticisms leveled against it. Listed below are the basic theoretical a n d methodological propositions: 1 . T h e m e a n i n g component i n h u m a n conduct: Distinctively h u m a n behavior and interaction are c a r r i e d on t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of symbols a n d their meanings. 2. T h e social sources of humanness: T h e i n d i v i d u a l becomes h u m a n i z e d through interaction w i t h other persons. 3. Society as process: H u m a n society is most usefully c o n c e i v e d as consisting of people i n interaction. 4 . T h e voluntaristic c o m p o n e n t i n h u m a n conduct: H u m a n beings are active i n shaping their o w n behavior. 5. A dialectical conception of m i n d : Consciousness, or t h i n k i n g , involves interaction w i t h oneself. 6. T h e constructive, emergent nature of h u m a n conduct: H u m a n beings construct their behavior in the course of its execution. 7. T h e necessity of sympathetic introspection: An understanding of h u m a n conduct requires study of the actors' covert behavior. T h e major adverse criticisms of symbolic interactionism have focused on: (1) the indeterminism adopted by many of its exponents; (2) its presumed inapplicability to the study of social organization; (3) related to the preceding criticism, its unconcern with the power aspect in h u m a n relationships; (4) its neglect of the emotional dimension in h u m a n conduct; (5) its failure to come to grips with the unconscious; and (6) the limited researchability of some of its concepts. In the f o l l o w i n g paragraphs, we shall review and evaluate these negative allegations. 1. V i e w i n g behavior in terms of the interplay between the " I " and the " M e " aspects of self, Mead's closest followers built into such behavior an unpredictable, indeterminate dimension. F o r some, this interplay is the fundamental source of innovation in society. Exponents of the Iowa School, however, reject the concept of the " I " (the chief source of indeterminism)

438

Conclusion a n d the explanation of social innovation on the basis of the emergent, creative element in " I " - " M e " interaction. H o w e v e r , a probabilistic approach to explaining a n d predicting behavior may provide a m i d d l e ground between the M e a d i a n view a n d its critics. 2. In the continuing debate between advocates of symbolic interactionism a n d those of both structural-functionalism a n d Marxist sociology, each side refers to the putative shortcomings of the other relative to level or scope of analysis. T h e former perspective is h e l d to be limited to such microsociological p h e n o m e n a as intra- a n d interpersonal relations, while the latter is presumed to a p p l y only to such macrosociological p h e n o m e n a as institutional a n d societal patterns. At the same time, adherents of each theory reject the restrictions in scope placed u p o n their theory by their critics. T h a t symbolic interactionists have failed to give adequate attention to macroscopic social p h e n o m e n a cannot be denied; but that this failure is intrinsic to the perspective is debatable. F o r , a m o n g numerous possible examples, T a m o t s u Shibutani and K i a n M . K i w a n a n d Niels Winther B r a r o e have dealt with ethnic stratification; R a l p h H . T u r n e r a n d L e w i s M . K i l l i a n w i t h collective behavior; M e l v i l l e D a l t o n with f o r m a l organization in industry; C . A d d i s o n H i c k m a n a n d M a n f o r d H . K u h n w i t h economic p h e n o m e n a ; a n d H a r v e y A. F a r b e r m a n with the automobile industry. A n d , finally, a recent m o n o g r a p h by R a n d a l l C o l l i n s clearly demonstrates the feasibility of integrating at least one variant of symbolic interactionism, Goffman's dramaturgical approach, with the macro level of analysis.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. O n e feature of social structure that has been singled out by critics as particularly intractable to treatment by symbolic interactionism is that of power. It is alleged that the perspective appears to treat h u m a n relationships as though all actors have equal influence in the negotiation of shared realities. W h i l e this allegation is frequently a v a l i d one, the cited studies of ethnic relations certainly recognize the existence of differential power a n d its effects u p o n m u t u a l perceptions and interaction. E v e n more evident consideration of power is f o u n d in interactionist theories of deviance (e.g., labeling theory), w h i c h attend to power differentials in the defining a n d h a n d l i n g of deviant behavior.
8

4. Present-day symbolic interactionists have f o l l o w e d M e a d in overlook-

Ethnic Indian

Stratification and

(New

York:

Macmillan,

1965). Press, 1974). 1957).

White ( S t a n f o r d :

Stanford Cliffs,

University N.J.:

Collective Behavior ( E n g l e w o o d Who Manage ( N e w Groups, and York:

Prentice-Hall,

* Men
5

Wiley,

1959). (New York: Dryden, Industry," 1956). Sociological Quarterly, v o l . Press, 1975), 16 (Autumn chapter

Individuals,

Economic

Behavior

"A C r i m i n o g e n i c Conflict Sociology:

M a r k e t Structure: Toward An

The Automobile Science (New

1975), p p . 4 3 8 - 4 5 7 .
7

Explanatory

York:

Academic

especially

3, "Microsociology a n d Stratification."
8

See, for e x a m p l e , L . Shaskolsky, " T h e D e v e l o p m e n t o f Sociological T h e o r y i n A m e r i c a A S o c i o l o g y o f The Sociology o f Sociology ( N e w Y o r k : M c K a y ,

K n o w l e d g e I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " i n L . T . a n d J . M . R e y n o l d s (eds). 1970).

Conclusion ing the role of the emotional component in h u m a n behavior a n d interaction. T h e affective aspects of the self, personal relationships, a n d large-scale social phenomena are so thoroughly ignored, except in considerations of "emotional contagion," in the area of collective behavior, as to suggest an unacceptable image of h u m a n beings as p u r e l y rational. In partial extenuation of this oversight, however, has been an occasional concern with the sentiments, those emotions w h i c h C o o l e y characterized as entailing sympathy, or role-taking. T h u s , E r v i n g G o f f m a n a n d E d w a r d Gross and Gregory P. S t o n e have analyzed embarrassment, K u r t R i e z l e r has written on shame, a n d Cooley's concern with self centered u p o n self-feeling. It is nonetheless true of symbolic interactionists, as of most other social psychologists, that they have given scant attention to such emotions as love, hate, anger, joy, and sorrow.
9 10 11

439

5. Closely related to the preceding stricture is another that concerns scanting of the irrational aspect in h u m a n behavior. It is difficult to find a considered discussion of the unconscious in the writings of symbolic interactionists. T h e few references tend to renounce the concept without substituting adequate explanations. T h e r e is no reason to assume that the perspective cannot accommodate unconscious phenomena, obdurate though they may be. Just as different levels of awareness are recognized for symbolic interaction a n d nonsymbolic interaction, so can they be recognized for conscious a n d unconscious (as w e l l as subliminal) processes of behavior. 6. It is with regard to its heuristic value that most critics of symbolic interactionism believe themselves to be on firmest ground. T h e paucity of significant research generated by the perspective is especially reflected in the parts of this book on society and on m i n d . Contributing to this deficiency is the vague, intuitive character of various concepts formulated by M e a d , some of w h i c h have not yet been revised or discarded. " I m p u l s e , " "meani n g , " the " I , " "objects," "images," a n d other ambiguous a n d inconsistently used concepts persist in substantially the same nonoperationalized f o r m in w h i c h M e a d used them. It remains to be seen whether N o r m a n K. D e n z i n ' s fairly recent textbook and collection of readings, w h i c h emphasize the methodology of symbolic interactionism, w i l l h e l p to facilitate an increase in the research output of the perspective's users.
1 2

T h e considerable number of empirical studies in this book, a n d the m a n y more listed in the Selected References, attest to the researchability of this perspective. Yet it continues to be true that such researches are still comparatively sparseand difficult. T h i s fact may be accounted for, in part, by some of the shortcomings described above. Also influential in
9

Interaction Ritual ( G a r d e n C i t y : "Embarrassment "Comment on and the the

Doubleday,

1967), p p . 9 7 - 1 1 2 . Requirements," American Journal o f Sociology, vol. 48 vol. 60 (July 1943),

10

Analysis

of R o l e

1964), p p . 1 - 1 5 .
11

Social Psychology

of S h a m e , " to

American Journal o f Sociology,

(January

p p . 457-465.
la

The Research Act: A 1970); a n d

Theoretical Introduction Sociological Methods: A

Sociological Research

Methods ( C h i c a g o :

Aldine

Publishing 1970).

Company,

Sourcebook ( C h i c a g o :

Aldine Publishing C o m p a n y ,

440

Conclusion this regard is the symbolic interactionist injunction to "respect the nature of the empirical w o r l d a n d organize a methodological stance to reflect that respect." T h e view of humans as constructing their o w n behavior, a n d of h u m a n society as a process of interaction, has appeared to be b e y o n d the research capabilities of most social psychologists. G i v e n the adverse criticisms of symbolic interactionism, w h y has this frame of reference c o m m e n d e d itself to most sociologically oriented social psychologists? T h e answer probably lies in the fact that symbolic interactionism clearly constitutes the most sociological of social psychologies. A d o p t i n g a distinctly sociological perspective, it directs attention to the social derivation of the h u m a n being's unique attributes; it describes m i n d a n d self as society in microcosm; it describes h o w the members of any group develop a n d f o r m a c o m m o n w o r l d ; it illuminates the character of h u m a n interaction by showing that humans share the meaning of one another's behavior instead of merely responding to each other's overt behavior; a n d , in numerous other ways, it implicates the i n d i v i d u a l with society a n d society w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l .
13

As we have suggested more than once in the foregoing material, the perspective of symbolic interactionism is not a finished product. E a c h succeeding edition of this v o l u m e has demonstrated modifications, b o t h substantive a n d methodological. Moreover, symbolic interactionists have been increasing their reflexive awareness, as m u c h of the material in Part VI demonstrates. T h e perspective of symbolic interactionism affords us an u n derstanding of its o w n development. L i k e other perspectives, it undergoes continual construction, rather than perennially expounding a set of received truths, a n d it can be expected to undergo periodic criticism a n d modification. As with our past editions, our hope is that the present v o l u m e w i l l facilitate its testing a n d revision. T h a t hope is sustained by the previously mentioned growing reflexiveness of symbolic interactionists.

13

Herbert

Blumer,

Symbolic Interactionism:

Perspective

and Method ( E n g l e w o o d

Cliffs,

N e w Jersey:

Pren-

t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1969), p . 6 0 .

Index

Abstract other, 131 Accounts, 317,420 and interaction, 309 Act(s), 23, 24, 27, 243, 325. See also Action(s) alternative, 302 and attitude, 192-93 automatic, 23 blocked, 21,23 communicative, 140 credentialing, 312 and definition of the situation, 254 and face-to-face interaction, 421-22 and gestural communication, 17 hedging, 311-12 and " I " and " M e , " 19,45 incomplete, 23 internal organization of, 247-48 and meaning, 309-10 and motivation, 23n object as collapsed, 250-51 retrospective, 23 and sin licenses, 312 social (see Social act) and typification, 310 Action(s) collective, 429 and culture, 110 constructing, 46, 98 definition of, 380 direction of, 247-48 group, 99,101 and " I , " 194 v. interaction, 419-22 and internalization, 317-18 interpretation of, 97-99 and language, 301-02 meaning of, 97 and mind, 105

and motive, 303-04 and organism, 3 and perception, 263 plans of, 234, 261,262 processual, 403 and scientific truth, 411 and self, 24 and self-indication, 98-99 situated, 301-08 and situation, 101 social (see Social action) and stimulus, 3 unusual, 420 verbal, 302 Actor communicative intent of, 139-40 human beings as, 48-51 and meaning, 309 and motive, 302, 303 and self, 166 Aesthetic orientation, 394, 398, 399 Akeret, R.U., 201 Alcoholism, and military psychiatric diagnoses, 383, 388-89 Alexander, C.N., 139 Allon, Natalie, 120, 127 Allport Ascendence-Submission scale, 86n Altercasting, 316-17 Anderson, Nels, 405 Angell, James R., 3 Aphasia, 22, 244, 296-301 Apple, D., 38 Argyris, C, 38 Aspiration, 107 Associationism, 12 Assumptions, 146 Attitudes, 25. See also Self-attitudes abstract, 298, 299 and act, 192-93 and action, 248

changes in, 338-39 concrete, 299 conversation of, 249, 251 and definition of the situation, 269 differentiation, 195-96 and generalized other, 214 and " M e , " 192 and personality, 46 and self, 233 Attributes, of self, 198 Audience, 187-88 and performer, 179 significance, 181 Awareness paradigm, 406 Backman, CarlW., 129, 137, 201 Bain, Read, 240 Baldwin, James M . , 4, 27, 91, 165, 323,410 Bales, Robert F., 435 Ball, D.W., 262, 263, 270 Barker, R., 346, 351 Bates, Alan P., 34, 41 Baumann, Bedrich, 240 Bayley, David H . , 148,162 Bayley, JoeM., 241 de Beauvoir, Simone, 210 Becker, Ernest, 38, 178,179, 189, 273 Becker, Howard S., 13, 25, 35, 38, 60,61-62,63,64,67, 68,127, 322, 345,351,391,403,406, 407,415,417,428,430, 434 on becoming a marihuana user, 331-44 comparison of participant observa tion and interviewing, 76-82 Becker, S., 225, 270 Behavior abstract, 297 adaptive, 3

442 Behavior (continued) and biological factors, 194-95 change, and stigmatization, 121-28 collective, 438 concrete, 297 covert, 8, 12, 16,43,437 and social act, 15 deviant, 94 and obesity, 119-28 emergent, 437 and emotions, 263, 438-39 and experience, 252-54 habitual, 25 holistic, 12 and " I " and "Me," 19, 45 irrational, 439 and meaning, 337 and meaning of objects, 3 and monism, 11 and motivation, 269 non-symbolic, 47 and "nothing unusual" stance, 272-80 overt, 8, 43, attitudes as, 234 changes in, 322, 353, 356, 361 as consequent variable, 30 in the emotionally disturbed, 354,355 inhibition of, 20 stability in, 353 as performance, 48-52 as processual, 45-46, 54, 62 and response to stimuli, 17 shaping of, 7, 8 "something unusual" stance, 272-80 stable, 62 as structural, 45-46 and symbols, 11 traits, 338 and voluntarism, 12 Behaviorism, 8, 11-12, 165, 247, 429 Behavior modification, 11 Bell Adjustment Inventory, 86 Benjamin, ., 211 Berardo, Felix, 210 Berger, Peter I., 127, 145, 146, 202, 203,210,319 Bergin, A., 201 Bergman, Gustav, 42 Bergson, Henri, 2 Berk, Richard A., 154, 163 Bernreuter Personality Inventory, 86 Bernreuter Self-Sufficiency Scale, 86n Bias, and TST, 226-28 Biblarz, Arturo, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 221, 240 Bilingualism, and using TST, 225-28 Bittner, Egon, 406 Blaisdell, E.L., 131, 137 Blau, Peter, 145, 146, 152, 162 Blau, Zena S., 38 Blaylock.B., 131, 137 Blood, R.O., 137 Blum, A . F . , 180, 189 Blumberg, Abraham, 331, 336 Blumer, Herbert, 13, 25, 26, 27, 28, 41-48,56,59,68,91,94,138, 146,162,163,189,202,210, 319, 393, 394,400-03, 406, 408, 409-17,435 on action v. interaction, 419-22 on society as symbolic interaction, 97-103 on sociological analysis and the "variable," 68-75 Boesel, David P., 154, 163 Bonner, Hubert, 26 Boogs, Steven ., 38 Bordua, David J., 38,428,434 Boskin, Joseph, 150, 162 Bottomlcy, A . K . , 331, 336 Brain lesions, 244, 296 and mind, 248-49 Braithwaite, R.B., 412, 417 Braito, Rito, 241 Braroe, Niels, W., 240, 438 Bressler, Marvin, 230, 231 Briedis, Catherine, 163 Brim, OrvUlc J.,Jr., 38 Brissett, D., 179, 189 Brittan, Arthur, 52, 56, 435 Bronfcnbrenner, U., 131, 137 Brooks, Richard S., 391 Brown, H.C.,417 Brown, J.C., 38 Bruner, Jerome, 32 Bruyn, Severyn ., 415, 417 Bucher, Rue, 38 Burgess, E.W., 26, 97, 155, 163, 323 Burke, Kenneth, 34, 35, 38, 48, 179, 180, 189, 261, 270, 319 Burns, Tom, 172n Byre,D., 131, 137 Cabell, James, 426 Calonico, James M . , 95,133, 135, 137 on role-taking and power, 128-37 Cameron, Norman, 38 Campbell, D.T., 260, 269, 270 Camus, Albert, 332, 336

Index

Caplow, Theodore, 158, 162 Career, of the mental patient, 362-80 Carlen, Pat, 321 on the staging of magistrates' justice, 331-36 Carper, James, 38 Carroll, John ., 319 Carroll, Lewis, 332, 336 Carson, R.C., 51 Cartwright, Rosalind Dymond, 37, 38 Case study, 403 Cassirer, Ernst, 35, 36, 319 Categories, 326 Centers, Richard, 137 Central nervous system, and act, 248, 249 Chambliss, William, 431,434 Chapman, D.W., 109 Chicago school of symbolic inter actionism, 41-48, 55-56 Cicourel, Aaron V., 54, 56, 139, 141, 146, 239, 318, 345, 351,415, 417 Clark, John P., 38 Classification, as symbol, 326 Clausen, John A . , 365 Clifton, Rodney A., 240 Cline, V.B., 131, 137 Coates, Charles H . , 38 Coehlo, George V . , 288-30 Cohen, Albert K.,391 Cognition, 12 Coleman, Richard, 204, 211 Collective action, 429 Collective behavior, 438 Collective conscience, 423 Collective mind, 105 Collective organizations, 401 Collins, Randall, 49, 51, 52, 56, 394, 435,438 on interpretive social psychology, 397-99 Common-sense knowledge, 281-95 Communication, 18,112-13 during analysis, 140 and expression, 171-73,174 in magistrates' courts, 333-34 and meaning, 250 and social life, 94 and symbols, 325 Community, definition of the situation by, 255-57 Compulsive eating, 121-22 Concepts definitive, 415 and interaction research, 63

Index Concepts (continued) mini, 404,405,407,408 operational, 44-45 sensitizing, 44,64-65, 401-02, 415 Conditioned reflex, 257 Conduct, purposive, 302 Conflict, 154-56 and labeling theory, 430 and motive, 304 Conflict theory, 400 Conformity, 283 Consciousness, 105,139,437 Consensual reference (or response), 84-91,222-31,237,238, 259 Consensus, 17 and mind, 21 Consequence, and motive, 302-03 Constant comparative analysis, 404 Content analysis, 139 of TST, 222-23, 238-39 Conversation and motive, 302 theory of internal, 195,196 Converse, P.E., 260, 271 Cooley, Charles Horton, 4-5, 26, 27, 28,30-33,91,94, 97, 165, 166,179,189,197,201,222, 240, 261,262, 270,323,397, 410,439 on looking-glass self, 169-70 on primary group and human nature, 106-08 Cooper, Joseph, 166 on self-conceptions and others, 211-21 Corwin, Ronald G . , 38 Coser, Lewis, 155, 162,435 Cottrell, Leonard S., Jr., 33, 38, 129, 137, 180,189 Cottrell, W.F., 429,430, 434 Couch, Carl J., 38, 57,163, 201, 240 Courts, as theatre of absurd, 332-36 Coutu, Walter, 26, 39 Crime, 148 Crises, and actions, 302 Cues, and inference, 315 Cultural definitions, 259, 260, 261, 262-63 Culture and action, 317-18 areas, 112-13 and behavior, 308 common, 281 and language, 35-36 and perception, 429 and perspective, 110 and TST, 229-30 Cumming, Elaine, 210 Cumming, John H . , 40 Curtis, James E., 417 Custom, 104-06 Cuzzort, R.P., 50, 56, 435

443 252-54 Diagnosis, and mental illness, 381-91 Dialectic, 412 Dick, Harry R.,34, 39 Dickson, Donald, 434 Diggory, James O., 153,162 Dinitz, Simon, 34, 39, 40, 127 Disclaimers, 308-18 Disturbance, 149 and social protest, 148-63 Dittes, J.E., 201 Documentary method of interpre tation, 282-83, 291-92, 295 Donohue, George, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 221, 240 Dornbusch, Sanford M . , 34, 40, 213, 214,218,220, 221,240 Douglas, Jack D., 52, 54, 56-57,417, 429,434 Dramaturgical approach, 13, 34, 48-52, 55-56,166, 321, 393, 394,438 and deviance, 428-29 to psychiatric disorders, 178-90 Dramaturgic competence, 179-80 Dramaturgic incompetence, 179,180 and psychiatric disorders, 181-89 Dreitzel, H.P., 52, 54, 55, 57 Driver, Edwin D., 167 on self-conceptions in India and the U.S., 222-31 Duncan, Hugh D., 50, 57, 179, 189, 398 Durkheim, Emile, 48, 410,417, 423, 428 Dwyer, Johana ., 120, 127 Dymond, Rosalind F. See Cartwright, Rosalind Dymond Dynamic assessment, 26 Dynes, Russell, 148, 162

Dahlberg, Francis M., 230 Dai, ., 39 Dalton, Melville, 405-06,438 Daniels, ArleneK., 322 on the social construction of mili tary psychiatric diagnoses, 380, 391 Darwin, Charles, 2, 170 Davidson, H.H., 201 Davis, Barbara, 120, 128 Davis, Fred, 163, 347, 348, 351 Davis, James A . , 39 Davis, Kingsley, 26, 261, 270 Degradation ceremony, 367 Dell, S., 331, 336 Dembo, ., 346,351 Denzin, Norman K., 13, 52, 55, 56, 91, 163,240,391,392,415, 416,417,436,439 on the research act, 58-68 Deprivation, relative, 109 Destigmatization, 121 Determinacy, 29-30 v. indeterminacy, 44-45 Determinism, 8, 12,48 Deutsch, Morton, 34, 39 Deutscher, Irwin, 52, 56, 258, 270, 391 Deutschberger, P., 261, 271, 316, 319, 349, 352 Deviance, 148,322,438 and definition of the situation, 272-80 disavowal, 348-49 display, 126 as label, 149 stigmatizing, 119, 127 and labeling, 120, 345-51, 390 as societal reaction, 395 societal reaction to, 426-34 Deviation, theory of secondary, 119 120, 124, 126, 127 Dewey, John, 3,4, 20, 27, 28, 30, 33,94,97,112,179,189,243, 247, 302,323,410-17 on communication in social life, 104-06 on mind, experience, and behavior,

Eating, compulsive, 121-22 Edgerton, R., 54, 57 Edgley, Charles, 392 Education, and identity, 203-04 Ego, 19, 98-99 Ehrlich, Howard, 409,417 Eidson, Bettye K., 154,163 Elementarism, 12 Elkin, Frederick, 391 Embarrassment, 49 Emergence, 260-6 In, 324, 325 Emerson, Joan P., 244 on the "nothing unusual" stance, 272-80 Emerson, Richard M 129, 137,

444 Emerson, Richard M . , (continued) 331, 336 Emotion, 26, 263 Empathic competence, 180 Empathic incompetence, 180 Empathy. See Role-taking Empiricism, 410-11, 415 Encounter, 143 face-to-face, 49, 51 Environment and objects, 22 and organism, 2, 3, 20, 252-53, 325 and symbols, 326 Episodes, 140-41 connectedness of, 140 Erikson, Erik, 250, 283 Erikson, K., 345, 351 Et cetera clause, 52, 54, 318 Ethnic stratification, 438 Ethnomethodology, 13, 52-55, 244, 393, 394-95, 397-99, 423-26 and content analysis, 139-40 and deviance, 429-30 Etzioni, Amitai, 160, 162 Evolution, 1-3 Exchange theory, 95, 138,142-43 Existentialism, 409 Experience, 252-54 Experience and Nature (Dewey), 28 Face, maintaining, 48-49 Factor analysis, 132 of TST, 228 Factors, orthogonal, 132 Family, 94, 108,321 research, 323-31 and role, 116, 117 role-taking and power in, 130-37 Farberman, Harvey A . , 129, 137, 163,412,418,436,438 Faris, Ellsworth, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 41,97,391,410 Faris, R.E.L., 28, 39, 189 Fearn, Gordon F.N., 392 Feldman, Jacob J., 127 Ferguson, Adam, 2 Fichte, Johann, 2 Fiedler, Fred E., 39, 131,137 Field theory, 409 Filmer, P., 52-53, 54, 57 Filstead, William J., 345, 351, 417 Fisher, Sefhard, 127 Flesch, Regina, 210 Fogelson, Robert M . , 149, 162 Folk concept, of social protest, 150-52 Foote, Nelson N . . 34, 39, 179, 180, 189, 261,262, 268, 269, 270, 319, 330, 331 Formalism, 139 Foster, Jack D., 127 Frank, Jerome, 332, 336 Franks, David D., 95 on role-taking and power, 128-37 Freidson, E., 345, 351 Freud, S., 19n, 35, 307 Friedan, Betty, 210 Fromm, Erich, 19n Functionalism, 400 Functional psychology, 2, 3 Gallagher, Ruth, 33 Gallie,W.B.,410,417 Gallwey.M., 131, 137 Game theory, 405 Garfinkel, Harold, 13, 52-55, 91, 146,163,244,331,336,351, 394-95, 397,423-26,428, 434 on common-sense knowledge of social structures, 281-95 Garretson, Wynona S., 34,49,40 Gecas, Viktor, 391 Geer, Blanche, 13, 38, 406,407 comparison of participant obser vation and interviewing, 76-82 Generalized other, 2, 19, 24, 25,110, 111, 327 and " I " and " M e , " 194 and mind, 21 and motives, 304 and self-concept, 214-15, 217, 219-21 and social reaction, 428 German Idealism, 1, 2 Gerth, Hans, 39, 94, 262, 270 on institutions and persons, 116-18 Gestalists, 12 Gesture, 25, 325, 420 conversation of, 16-17, 24, 25,47, 250 definition of, 17 emotional, 117n and meaning, 328 meaning of, 17, 325 response to, 17 and roles, internalization of, 117n and self, 18 and social act, 250 symbolic, 17 vocal, 249 Gctzcls, J.W., 39 Ghurye, Govind S.,231

Index Gibbs, J., 345, 351 Gist, N.P., 231 Glaser, Barney, 36, 270, 273, 391, 404, 406,408,415,417 Glaser, Daniel, 36, 39 Goffman, Ervin, 13, 34, 35, 39, 55, 56,57,64-65,66,68,119, 120, 124, 127, 129,137, 139, 143, 144, 146, 164, 166, 179, 180, 187, 189-90, 202, 206, 210, 283,318,319,322,332, 336, 346, 347, 351,352, 391, 394, 404,406, 408,419-22, 423-26, 438,439 and the dramaturgical approach, 48-52 on the moral career of the mental patient, 362-80 on the presentation of self to others, 171-78 Goldhamer, H.,39 Goldstein, Kurt, 2 2 , 244 on speech and thinking, 296-301 Gonick, M . , 346, 351 Goode, Erich, 429, 434 Goode, William J., 145,147 Gordon, R.L., 258, 270 Gough, Harrison G., 39, 178, 185, 188,190 Gouldner, Alvin W., 51-52, 55, 57, 157, 162, 395,415,417,428, 434,435 on ethnomethodology, 423-26 Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, 147, 162 Greer, Germain, 210 Grimshaw, Allen D., 149,162 Gross, Edward, 164,439 Gross, Neal, 31, 39 Group interaction, 431-32, 434 Group life and face-to-face inter action, 420-21 Groves, W. Eugene, 154, 163 Grummon, Donald L., 38 Guba, E.G., 39 Gumperz, N.P., 231 Gurevitsch, A., 52 Gusfield, Joseph, 430,434 Guttman scale, 85, 91, 223 Haas, H.L.,201 Habitual definitions, 259, 261, 262-63, 270 Habsbaum, Eric J., 161, 162 Halbwachs, M . , 39 Hall, Edward ., 334, 336 Hall, Jerome, 430,434

Index H a l l , Peter M . , 164, 309, 319, 391 Handel, Gerald, 204, 211 Handicapped, and labeling, 345-51 Hansen, D . A . , 260, 270 Harding, J., 1 3 1 , 1 3 7 Harper, Dean, 153, 162 Hartley, Eugene L . , 32 Harvey, O . J . , 201 Haskell, Martin R., 391 Hays, William I., 137 Heap, J . L . , 52, 57 Hegel, G . W . F . , 3 2 3 , 4 1 2 , 4 1 4 Heider, F r i t z , 39, 263, 270 H e n r y , William E . , 210 Hewitt, J o h n P., 9 1 , 2 4 4 on disclaimers, 3 0 8 - 2 0 H i c k m a n , C . A . , 4 3 , 4 6 , 57, 9 1 , 235, 438 H i l l , Reuben, 155, 163, 260, 270, 323,330 H i l l , Richard J . , 4 0 9 , 4 1 8 Hinkle, G.J., 52,57 Hollingshead, August ., 186, 190 Homans, George C , 66, 6 8 , 1 5 2 , 1 6 2 , 231 Homes, Henry. See Karnes, L o r d Homosexuality, and military psy chiatric diagnosis, 3 8 3 , 3 8 9 - 9 0 H o o d , Roger, 3 3 1 , 3 3 6 Horney, K a r e n , 19, 196 H o r o w i t z , Irving L . , 149, 162 Hsu, Francis L . K . , 228-30, 231 Huber, Joan, 314, 435 on symbolic interaction as a pragmatic perspective, 409-17 Hughes, Everett C , 3 5 , 4 8 , 4 0 3 , 406, 407 H u l l , Clark, 23 H u m a n cooperation, 16 Humanistic coefficient, 26 H u m a n nature, 9 4 , 1 0 7 - 0 8 and society, 4 - 5 H u m e , D a v i d , 2, 253 Humphrey, N o r m a n D . , 1 4 7 , 1 5 6 , 162 H u n t , R . G . , 190 Hurlburt, Julia K . , 37 Hurvitz, Nathan, 126, 127 Husserl, E . , 52 Hutcheson, Francis, 2 H y m a n , Herbert, 3 1 , 3 9 , 9 4 , 108, 109, 234 Hypothesis, and theory, 413 " I , " 2 , 7 , 1 9 , 24, 25, 2 9 , 4 4 - 4 5 , 166, 1 9 1 - 9 6 , 4 3 7 , 4 3 9 . See also " M e " Ichheiser, G . , 39, 77, 171, 262, 270 Id, 19 Identification, 185 Identity. See also Self-identity confirmation of, 179 crisis, 230, 283, 330 and definition of situation, 186, 259 and disclaimers, 314, 316-17 family, 330 and interaction, 179 loss of, 1 8 0 , 1 8 1 and meaning, 310 negotiation, 1 8 5 , 1 8 6 and performance, 187 presentation of, 185 reformulation, 204-09 and self-attitude test, 87 and stigmatization, 121 Image, 2 5 , 4 3 9 Imagery, interactionist, 4 0 2 - 4 0 8 Impression, management of, 49, 50, 283 Impulse, 4, 24, 25, 439 and acts, 23 and behavior, 44 Indeterminacy, 29-30 v. determinacy, 44-45 Indexical expressions, 52, 54 India, self-conceptions i n , 2 2 2 - 3 0 Individual, 324 and definition of the situation, 255 and m i n d , 248 and others, 171 and role-taking, 128 and society, 6-7, 93, 100, 233 Inference and disclaimers, 314-15 errors of, 80-82 in institutionalized emotionally disturbed, 354, 356, 357-67 Influence, 129 Inhibition, 254 Instinct, 4 Institution and behavior change, 124 and roles, 117-18 Intention and definition of situation, 261-62 and human cooperativity, 16 and motive, 302 Interaction, 143-46 v. action, 4 1 9 - 2 2 definition of, 177-78 and definition of the situation, 145, 146 emergent, 139 episode of, 140-41 as face maintaining, 49 face-to-face, 394, 4 1 9 - 2 2 and human nature, 6 levels of, 47 non-symbolic, 47 perspective of, 59 process, 138, 400 and purpose, 143 and remedial interchanges, 420 and response control, 172 and supportive interchange, 420 theory of, 324-27 Interest groups, 395

445
Internalization, and action, 317-18 Interpersonal task, 143 Interpersonal theory of psychiatry, 34, 35 Interpretation of actions, 100-01 and definition of situation, 101 documentary method of, 282-83, 2 9 1 - 9 2 , 295 negotiation of, 273 process of, 71-73 and role-taking, 101 Interviewing, 225-26, 261, 322 compared w i t h participant obser vation, 7 6 - 8 2 Iowa school of symbolic inter actionism, 4 1 - 4 8 , 5 5 - 5 6 , 437 Jackson, Edgar N . , 210 Jackson, Jay, 31 James, W i l l i a m , 3, 4, 27, 97, 114, 165, 1 9 0 , 3 2 3 , 4 1 0 , 4 1 2 Janeway, Elizabeth, 210 Jeffries, Vincent, 147, 154, 163 Johnson, James . , 435 Johnson, Wendell, 22 Jones, E. E . , 261, 262, 270 Jones, J o h n Pierce, 39 J u d d , Charles, 3 Justice, staging of, 331-36 Justification, 317 and motive, 303 K a f k a , Franz, 3 3 2 , 3 3 7 Karnes, L o r d , 2 K a n g . T . S . , 182 K a n t , Immanuel, 2, 253, 2 5 4 , 4 1 0 Kanter, R . M . , 435 K a p l a n , Abraham, 4 1 0 , 4 1 8 Kardiner, A b r a m , 194 Karve, Irawate, 231 Katz, Elihu, 159,162 K a u f m a n n , F e l i x , 295 K a y , Barbara, 4 0 K e l l e y , Harold H . , 3 1 , 145, 146, 201 Kellner, Hansfried, 203, 210 Kemper, T . D . , 22,231 K e n n e d y , J . L . , 201 Kerner Report, 147 Kiffian, Lewis M . , 149, 1 6 3 , 4 3 8 K i m , J.O., 1 8 2 , 1 9 0 K i n c h , J o h n , 166, 240 experiments on self-concept change, 197-201 King,M.,331,337 Kitsuse, J . I . , 3 4 5 , 3 5 2 , 4 1 8 K i t t , Alice S., 3 1 , 4 0 , 1 0 9 , 1 5 2 , 162 K l e i n , V i o l a , 210 K l u c k h o l m , C l y d e , 36, 231 K l u c k h o h n , Florence, 283 Knowledge, common-sense, 281-95 K o h n , A . Robert, 3 9 K o h n , Melvin L . , 3 9

446 Kolb, William, 25,428,434 critical evaluation of Mead's " I " and " M e " concepts, 191-96 Kolb, William L., 166 Komarovsky, Mirra, 31, 210 Kuenzli, Alfred E.,39 Kuhn, Manfred H . , 13, 41-48,57, 129, 137,164, 167,179, 188, 190, 222-32,264,393,409, 410,418,438 investigation of self-attitudes, 83-92 methodological problems of his self theory, 232-40 on recent developments in sym bolic interaction theory, 27-41 Kwiam, Kian M . , 438 Labeling, 322, 395 and deviance, 149, 272, 279, 345-51 and disturbances, 149 and mental illness, 381-91 negative, 122,127 Labeling theory, 94,119,120,409, 430 and deviance, 427,428-29,430 Laird Introversion-Extroversion Schedule, 86n Lambert, Richard D., 230, 231 Lang, Gladys E., 149, 162, 201 Lang, Kurt, 149,162 Langer, Suzanne, 319 Language, 4, 22n, 244, 301. See also Motive, vocabularies of and action, 301 and culture orientation, 35-36 and emergence, 325 hedonistic, 307-08 internalization of, 29 learning, 77-78 and object, 233 and perception, 233 as representative speech, 297-98 and roles, internalization of, 117 and self, 18 as significant symbols, 325 and socialization, 18n and symbols, 298-99 Laslett, Barbara, 94 on promoting behavior change to lose weight, 119-28 Lasswell, H.D., 201 Lauer, Robert H . , 164 Lazarsfeld, Paul, 159,162, 283 Learning, 23 Learning theory, 409 Lee, Alfred M . , 147,156,163,434 Lee, Grace C, 410, 413, 418 Lee, G.S., 15 Lemert, Edwin M . , 36, 39,119,120, 121,124,126,127,149,162, 178, 190, 345, 352, 391, 395 on societal reaction to deviance, 426-34 Lerner, M.J., 258, 270 Levitin, Teresa E., 322 on deviants as active participants in the labeling process, 345-51 Leviton, G., 346, 351 Levy, David M . , 319 Lewin, Kurt, 162 Lewis, J. David, 92,418 Liazos, Alexander, 430,435 Libby, Roger, 391 Lichtman, Richard, 435 Liebowitz, Martin, 149, 162 Lifestyle, change of, 122-23, 124 Lindemann, E., 206, 210 Lindesmith, Alfred R., 26, 28, 39, 392, 403,404 Linguistic communication, 41 Linguistic relativity, 22 Linton, Ralph, 30, 224, 231 Lipsky, Michael, 149,158,162 Littman, Richard A., 39 Locke, John, 253,410 Locus scores, 85, 86, 87-91, 223 Locus variable, 223 Lofland, John, 48, 57, 392, 394,418 on interactionist imagery and analytic interruptus, 402-08 LogicAristotelian, 412 formal, 411-12 Logical positivism, 411 Loomis, Charles, 411,418 Looney, Martin, 434, 435 Lopata, Helena Z., 166 on self-identity in marriage and widowhood, 202-11 Lorber, J., 346, 352 Lowe, ., 231 Luckmann, Thomas, 127, 145, 146, 202, 218 Lundy, Richard M . , 39 Lyman, Stanford M., 50, 57, 180, 190,309,317,319, 397,429, 435 McCall, George I, 202, 210, 262, 271, 319,351, 352 MacAndrew, C.,54,57 McCart, C.,42,57 Maccoby, Eleanor R., 32 McClelland, David C, 228, 229, 231 McCone Commission, 147 McDougall, William H . , 7 McEachern, Alexander, W., 31, 39

Index McHugh, Peter, 54, 57, 180, 189, 258, 261,271,309,319 Maclver, R.M., 26, 261, 271 McKee, John P., 34, 40 McNall, Scott G.,435 McPartland, Thomas S., 13, 34, 40, 222-32, 264 investigation of self attitudes, 83-92 McPhail, Clark, 164, 240 Maddison,D., 206,210 Maehr, M . , 201 Magistrates court, as a theatre of absurd, 332-36 Mahoney, E.R., 240 Maines, David R., 436 Makowsky, Michael, 49, 51, 52, 56, 435 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 283 Mangus, A.R.,34,39 Manis, Jerome G., 164, 190,410, 418 Manneheim, Karl, 282, 337 Manning, Peter, 426, 435 Maranell, Gary M . , 34 Marihuana, 322 and fear of discovery, 60 using, 337-44 Mark, Robert, 333,337 Marriage, and self-identity, 202-11 Marshall, Victor W., 392 Martin, Wilfred ., 392 Martin, William ., 164 Martindale, D., 51,57 Marx, Karl, 410 Marxism, 307, 438 Maslow, Abraham, 34, 36 Mason, WardS., 31, 39 Matza, D., 352 Mayer, Jean, 127 " M e , " 2, 7,19, 24, 25, 29,44-45, 166,191-96. See also " I " Mead, George Herbert, 4, 8, 12-13, 28,29,30,31,33,35,40,41, 43,48,57,90,92,97-99, 110, 111, 114, 128, 137,164, 165, 179,180,190,197,201,212, 213,214-15,221,222,240, 303,317,319,323,325,327, 353,357,360, 361,395,397, 403,410-18,422,426-30, 435,437-38,439 basic assumptions and concepts of, 15-27 critical evaluation of " I " and " M e , " concepts of, 191-96 theory of mind, 247-51

Index Meaning, 25, 243, 380-81, 437, 439, 440 behavior as, 325 changes in, 344 and congruence, 329 and communication, 250 and definition of the situation, 259, 261-62 disrupted, 309 and gesture, 17, 328 and law courts, 332 loss of, 180,181 and mind, 24 and objects, 3, 59, 71, 233, 234, 237,250-51,411 and performance, 180 problematic, 309-10 and public disturbance, 161 and response, 429-30 shared, 54,128,424 and social act, 250 and social process, 146 and spacing, 334 of stimulus, 6 and time, 423 and TST, 238-39 and working consensus, 144 Mehan, Hugh, 92 Meltzer, Bernard N . , 42, 52, 57, 92, 190, 258,410,413,428,435 on Mead's social psychology, 15-27 on the varieties of symbolic inter actionism, 41-58 Membership groups, 111 Mensing, J., 201 Mental illness, 188-89, 322. See also Psychiatric disorder diagnosis of, 381-91 as dramaturgic incompetence, 179, 186 and identity, 187 Mental patient, career of, 362-80 Merleau-Ponty, M . , 52, 397 Merrill, Francis, 26, 40, 240 Merton, Robert K., 31,40, 67, 68, 109, 141, 147,152,162,212, 234, 283, 404 Messinger, S.E., 50, 57,190, 428 Methodology of Chicago and Iowa schools, 42-48 and interaction theory, 59-68 problems of, in Kuhn's self theory, 232-40 in sociology, 58 Meyer, J., 346, 352 Michael, Stanley ., 211 Millar, John, 2 Miller, D.L,, 92 Mills, C. Wright, 39, 40, 58, 68, 94, 180, 190, 244, 261, 262, 268, 270, 271,309,319,403,410, 412,418,430 on institutions and persons, 116-18 on situated actions and vocabularies of motive, 301-08 Mind, 24, 243-45, 252-54, 440 and action, 105 biological basis of, 248-49 collective, 105 and communication, 21 development of, 20-22 internal conversation, 21 and organism, 3 and selfhood, 20 social basis of, 248-50 social emergent, 26 as social product, 2 as symbolic behavior, 22 theory of, 247-51 Mind, Self and Society (Mead), 13, 15,27 Mittenzwey, Kuno, 307 Miyamoto, S. Frank, 34, 40, 213, 214, 217,218,220, 221,240,319 Mob action, 255 Mob psychology, 105 Moehr, M.L., 201 Monism, 11 Moore, A . M . , 417 Moore, Michael, 334, 337 Moore, Robert C.A., 39 Morality, as definition of the situation, 255 Moreno, J.L., 30 Morrione, Thomas J., 92 Morris, Charles W., 228, 229, 231, 251,410,418 Morris, Monica ., 92 Morris, Richard ., 147, 154, 163 Motivation, 23, 430 and behavior, 337 and definition of situation, 268-69 Motivational theory, 338 Motive, 244 and marihuana use, 344 and question, 302 unconscious, 305 vocabularies of, 301-08, 309 Motive incompetence, 180, 181 Motz, A.B., 40 Movements of Thought in the 19th Century (Mead), 15, 27, 55 Mulford, Harold A . , Jr., 36 Mullahy, Patrick, 40 Mullins, N.C., 54,457 Murray, Ellen, 40 Myerson, L., 346, 351

447

Nafager, S., 201 Nardini, William, 36 Nass, Gilbert D.,37 Natanson, Maurice, 40 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 147, 163 Naturalism, 409 Nature of Human Nature, The (Faris), 28 Nett, R.,44, 57 Newcomb, T.M., 26, 29, 31, 32, 222, 260,261,264, 271 Non-consensual reference, 259, 260. See also Subconsensual reference Norms internalization of, 111 and meaning, 234 and reference groups, 111 "nothing unusual" stance, 272-80 Obesity defined, 119 as deviance, 119 and stigma, 119-28 Object, 22, 25, 223, 234, 439. See also Social object as collapsed act, 250-51 and definition of the situation, 186 and meaning, 3, 24, 59, 71, 233, 234,250-51,411 naming of, 296, 297-301 and self, 49, 83, 165,202 and social structures, 400,401 and stimulus, 98, 325 Objectivism, fallacy of, 60-61 Ogburn, William, 210 Olsen, Marvin E . , 149,152, 163 Operant conditioning, 11 Operational definitions, 64 Operationism,411 Organism and action, 3, 247 and environment, 2, 3, 20, 250, 252-53, 325 and gesture, 47 and mind, 3 and stimulus, 3 Orientational others, 233, 234-35, 236

448 Other, 31 abstract, 131 and meaning, 250 and presentation of self to, 171-78 response of to individual, 197-98, 233 and role, 116 and self, 37, 118 and self-conceptions, 211-21 taking role of, 60-62,128,327 Park, Robert E 26, 41, 97,101,155, 163,403,405 Parkes, M . , 206,211 Parsons, Talcott, 30, 52, 306, 317, 319,395,400,423-26,427 Participant observation, 13, 43, 63, 120-21,165,362,409 compared with interviewing, 76-82 Particular other, 118, 216-17, 220, 221 Partisans, 159, 161 Passamanick, Benjamin, 39 Patterson, A . , 331, 337 Peirce, Charles, 3, 323 Pellegrin, Roland J., 38 Perception, 20 and action, 263 and culture, 429 of definition of the situation, 261-62 interpersonal, 354, 356 and language, 233 person, 32 of protest by public, 147-63 of responses, 197-98, 199, 213, 233 selectivity, 110 social, 32 Performance behavior as, 48-52 definition of, 178 and identity, 187 incompetent, 180 Performative competence, 179-80 Performer, and audience, 179 Perinbanayagan, R.S., 319 Personality, 191-92 as attitudes, 46 as behavior patterns, 324 and definition of the situation, 254 structure, 194-95, 400 tests, validation of, 86 theory, 402 trait notions of, 238 Perspective and culture, 110 organized, 111, 115 and reality, 61-62,115 and reference group, 109-10 Petras, John W., 13, 52, 57, 92, 392, 410,413,417,418,435 on the varieties of symbolic inter actionism, 41-58 Petrullo, Luigi, 32,40 Pfuetze, Paul E., 40, 240 Phenomenologists, 12 Phenomenology, 13, 34, 397,409, 415,432 Phillips, Bernard S.,40
Philosophy of the Act (Mead), 15, 27
Philosophy of the Present (Mead), 15

Index

Quarantelli, Enrico L., 148, 162, 166 on self-conceptions and others, 211-21 Quasi-theories, and interaction, 309 Question, and motive, 302, 303 Questionnaire, 76, 261 and definition of the situation, 267-68 use of, 292-93, 322 Race, 107 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 231 Rainwater, Lee, 204, 211 Rationalism, 410 Raven, Bertram H . , 137 Reality. See also Social reality conception of, 61-62 defining, 429 shared, 438 Rebellion, and social protest, 156 Reck, Andrew J., 410,418 Reckless, Walter L., 36,40,127 Redfield, R., 110 Redlich, Fredrick C, 186,190 Reeder, Lee, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 221,240 Reese, H.W., 201 Reference group, 25n, 37, 108-15, 152,234-35,327 meaning of, 31-32 religious group as, 223 and self-attitudes, 88-90 and significant others, 114 Reference group theory, 26, 31-32, 94,109,111 Reflex, 247,257 Reid, Thomas, 2 Reinforcement, 11 Reiss, Ira, 133,137 Relations anchored, 420 face-to-face, 419-22 Relativity, and definition of the situation, 260 Relevant others, 261, 262 Religion, and motive, 306, 307 Religious affiliation and identification, 225 and locus scores, 88-91, 223 Remedial interchanges, 420 Research, survey method of, 63 Resistance, in interviewing, 78 Resources, realization of, 143-44 Response, perceived v. actual, 211-21 Reynolds, J.M., 57,435

Physical handicaps, and labeling, 345-51 Physical therapy, 349-50 Piaget, Jean, 36 Plummer, Kenneth, 392 Political marginal (person), 149 Position, 326 Positivism, 11-12, 13, 397, 398 Power, 145,438 balancing, 129 defined, 129 and labeling theory, 430 and role-taking, 128-37 types of, 132-33 Pragmatism, 2, 3 and symbolic interaction, 409-18 Predispositional theories, 338 Predispositions, 260 and definition of the situation, 262, 263, 264, 268-270 and marihuana use, 344
Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, The (Goffman), 422 Primary groups, 31, 106-08 Principal axis factor analysis, 132 Process and interaction, 138-39 and role, 141 Protest. See also Social protest public definitions of, 149-50 public perceptions of, 147-63 Psathas, G., 54, 57, 92 Psychiatric disorder and dramaturgic incompetence, 179,181-89 and social class, 186 and social interaction, 178 Psychoanalysis, 409 Public order, 419, 420

Qualitative sociology, 409

Index Reynolds, Larry ., 13, 42, 57, 58, 92,435 on the varieties of symbolic inter actionism, 41-58 Riesman, David, 318, 319 Riezler, Kurt, 110,439 Riley, Matilda W., 211 Ritual, 48, 125 interpersonal, 420 and schizophrenia, 178 Rodrigues, Aroldo, 137 Rogers, Carl, 33, 36 Rogler, Lloyd H . , 34 Role, 116-18,420-21 agent-, 366-69 avoidance, 84 and behavior, 49-50 conflict, 31 and deviance, 347 expectations, 30, 31, 84, 141, 326 family, 330 and generalized other, 111, 112 head, 117-18 interpersonal, 310 -making, 46, 318 and marriage, 203 and neurosis, 178 as object, 223 of the other, internalization of, 29 performance, 30, 31 -playing, 25, 30,46, 114, 318 preference, 84 and process, 141 and self, 116-17 social, 310 and social structure, 118 and structural-functionalism, 141-42 -taking, 2, 5, 17-18, 24, 25, 30, 31, 34,46,99,191,197,249,327 ability, 331 and accuracy, 130-37 and analysis, 140 and empathic competence, 180 and generalized other, 19 and interpretation, 101 as methodology, 60-61 and power, 94-95, 128-37 Role theory, 26, 30-31,46 Rose, Arnold M . , 31, 32, 37, 40, 56, 178, 190,211,212 Rose, Jerry D., 130, 137 Rosenberg, Florence, 241 Rosenberg, Morris, 241 Rosengren, William R., 40, 201, 322 on the self in the emotionally disturbed, 353-61 Ross, Edward A . , 7, 28 Rossi, Alice, 211 Rossi, Peter ., 154, 163 Roth, Julius A., 406 Roth, P.A., 52, 57 Royce, Josiah, 3, 165 Rubington, E., 345, 352 Rudwick, Elliott M . , 147, 156, 163 Runciman, W.G., 152, 162 Russell, Bertrand, 411,418 Sacks, H . , 334, 337 Salience, and self-attitudes, 87, 89-90 Sampson, H . , 57, 190 Sapir, Edward, 22, 34, 35, 36 Sarbin, Theodore R., 31, 40, 180, 185, 188, 190 Schaefer, Robert, 240 Scheff, Thomas, 164, 179, 180, 190, 345,351 Schegloff, E.A., 334, 337 von Schelling, Friedrich, 2 Schelling, Thomas C, 405 Schilpp, Paul, 15 Schizophrenia, 178, 383, 385-86 Schmitt, Raymond L., 164, 241, 394, 435 Schneider, D.M., 231 Schuessler, K.F., 40 Schur, Edwin, 128,345, 351,427, 435 Schutz, Alfred, 52, 261, 262, 271, 281,310,319,337,397,423 Schwartz, Charlotte G . , 92 Schwartz, Michael, 128, 392 Schwartz, Morris S., 92 Scientific method, 413 Scottish moralists, 1, 2 Scott, John F., 427,435 Scott, Marvin ., 50,57, 180,190, 309,317,319,320,397,405, 429,435 Scott, Robert A . , 429,435 Sears, David O., 149, 163 Secord, Paul F., 129, 137, 201 Seem an, Julius, 38 Self, 18, 25, 97-98,100, 165-68, 191,202,326-27,440 actual, 33 -actualizing, 36 as antecedent variable, 29-30 as attitudes, 83, 223 -attitudes, 37-38, 83-90, 212 and situation, 233 social anchoring, 238 test of, 83-91

449 changes, 353 -concept(ion) change, 37,197-201, 322 operationalizing (using TST), 236 and others, 211-21 and Twenty Statements Test, 43-44,222-31 -consciousness, 327 as consequent variable, 29-30 core, 46, 238 definition of, 233, 347, 348, 357, 359,360 test, 354 development, 18, 24 and education, 203-04 in emotionally disturbed, 353-61 and face-to-face interaction, 422 genesis of, 18-19, 328 -hood, 20 and " I " and " M e , " 7,19,44-45, 437-38 ideal, 33 -identification, 321, 326, 329 -identity, in marriage and widow hood, 202-11 -indication, process of, 98-101 -interaction, 422 looking-glass, 4, 117, 169-170,197 material, 4 and mental patients, 362, 377, 378, 379-80 and mind, development of, 20 models for, 84 and motive, 302 and object, 49, 128 as object, 250,326 operational definition of, 44 and other, 37 presentation of, 171-78,318 as processual, 46,47 as pure ego, 4 and role, 116-17,327 and role-taking, 128 social, 4 social emergent, 26 as social product, 2 and society, 249 spiritual, 4 as structural, 47 Self theory, 26, 32-34,47, 48, 87, 167, 222, 223, 230 Kuhn's, 43, 232-40 Sensitizing concepts, 44,401-02,415 Sentiment, 439 Sevareid, Eric, 151,162 Shand, A.F.,261,263, 271

450 Shapiro, M.M., 201 Shaskolsky,L.,42, 57 Sherif, M . , 26, 31, 109 Sherriffs, Alex C, 34,40 Shibutani, Tamotsu, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35,40, 94,128,137, 261,269, 271,351,352,403,404,410, 413,418,438 on reference groups as perspective, 108-15 Shott, Susan, 92 Siegel, S., 271 Sign definition of, 17 and expressiveness, 171 meanings of, 2 In tie-, 420 Signal, and disclaimers, 314-15 Significant others, 25, 114, 202, 321, 327 and identity, 330 and self-concept, 198 Silver, Allan A., 147, 150, 163 Simmel, G., 48, 59, 65, 66, 68, 113, 138, 155, 163, 271 Simmons, J.L., 202, 210, 261, 262, 271,351,352,405 Simmons, Roberta G., 241 Simpson, Ida Harper, 40 Simpson, N.F., 332, 337 Simpson, Richard L., 40 Singelmann, Peter, 92 Singleman, Fred, 142,147 Situation(s) and action, 101 common-sense, 292-94, 295 definition of, 5, 26, 101, 110, 145-46, 233, 244, 254-58, 326,329,380 and actions, 173,192-93 by audience, 181 change in, 202 and claims, 314 disruption of, 176-77 and identity, 186-87 and "nothing unusual" stance, 272-80 phases of, 262-64 and presentation of self, 171, 172,174-75,176-78 studying, 258-71 and working consensus, 175 and disclaimers, 308-18 interpretation of, 101 as normal, 273, 274 question, 302 recurrent, 260, 261 and reference group, 109 studying, 62 and TST, 236, 237-38 and vocabulary of motives, 303 Situational identity, 95, 141,142, 144 Situationality, and TST, 237-38 Sjoberg, G.,44,57 Slater, Philip E., 40 Smelser, Neil J . , 163 Smith, Adam, 2 Smith, Thomas E., 137 Social act(ion), 15, 34,100,102, 247, 325. See also Act(s); Action(s) and gesture, 250 Social behaviorism, 13, 15-16, 165, 247 Social change, 81-82, 102-03 Social class, and psychiatric disorder, 186 Social control, and role-taking, 128 Social group, 105 Social identity, 259 and deviance, 347 Socialization, 18, 114,324,327 and action, 317-18 theory, 402 Social locations, 405,407,408 Social object, 233, 234, 238. See also Object meaning of, 237 and physical objects, 251 Social organization, 102,400-02 and race capacity, 107 and situations, 102 Social perception. See Perception, social Social process, 81-82 Social protest, 148-63. See also Protest and bargaining, 150,159-61 and coalition, 150, 158-59 and conciliation, 150,157-58 and conflict, 150,154-57 credibility of, 150-53 meaning of, 148-49 and messages of appeal and threat, 150,153-54 Social psychology, interpretive, 397-99
Social Psychology (McDougall), 7 Social Psychology (Ross), 7, 28
Social Psychology

Index meaning of, 62 violation of, 424,425 Social structure, 394 common-sense knowledge of, 281-95 and interaction, 141,143, 146 and roles, 118 and role-taking, 136 Societal other, 428 Societal reaction theory, 427-34 Society and consensus, 17, 21 and definition of the situation, 255 and humanness, 6 and individual, 6-7, 93,100, 233 as process, 138-39,437 and social behavior, 324 structure of, 400 as symbolic interaction, 97-103 Sociological determinism, 99 Sociological events, 295 Sociological imagination, 58-59 Sociology of sociology, 54 Solomon, Leonard, 34, 39 "Something unusual" stance, 272-80 Sorokin, P., 26
Source Book in Social Psychology

(Young), 28 Social reality, 395. See also Reality definitions of, 423 and interaction, 401

(Young), 28 Spacing, in magistrates' courts, 333-34 Speech, and thinking, 296-301 Spence, K., 42 Spencer, Herbert, 107 Spitzer, Stephan P., 44, 57, 241, 392 Srinivas, Mysore N . , 231 Status, 46 as object, 223 and reference groups, 108,109 Stebbins, Robert A . , 244, 320, 392 on definition of the situation, 258-71 Stegner, Wallace, 34 Steinhart, F., 210 Stevens, Edward, 410,418, 435 Stewart, Kenneth L., 320 Stewart, Robert L., 34 Stigma, 65,119-21,123,124,429 definition of, 119 display, 126 effects of, 127 and mental illness, 382, 383 physical disability as, 348 and widowhood, 206 Stigmatizing labels, 120-28 Stimulus and activity, 3

Index Stimulus (continued) interpreted, 17 meaning of, 6 v. object, 98 and organism, 3, 20 -response arc, 247 Stokes, Randall, 244 on disclaimers, 308-21 Stoll, C, 347, 352 Stone, Gregory, 34, 62, 68, 129, 137, 164,179,190, 261,262, 272, 394,403,412,418,436,439 Stone, Philip J., 230 Strategic analysis, 405,406,407 Strategic constitution, 408 Stratton, J.,57 Strauss, Anselm L., 26, 28, 38, 40, 180,190, 261,262, 270, 271, 273,320, 391,398, 403, 404, 406, 408,415,417 Strong, Samuel W., 320 Structural-functionalism, 95,138, 145,438 and interaction, 141-42 and purpose, 142 and role, 141-42 Structure, 141 Stryker, Sheldon, 34,40, 128, 129, 137, 139,164,212,321, 392 on symbolic interaction as an approach to family research, 323-31 Stuart, Richard ., 120,128 Subconsensual reference, 84-91, 222-23, 224, 226-27, 237, 238. See also Non-consensual reference Sudnow, David, 54, 57,406 Sullivan, Harry Stack, 19, 31, 34, 35,40,114,117,178, 190, 222, 353, 364 Superego, 19n Supportive interchanges, 420 Survey method of research, 63 Swanson, Guy E, 40,92,143,147 Sykes, G . , 352 Symbol, 25,60,243 and action, 97-98 and behavior, 11,325-26 and communication, 171-72 and conflict, 155,156 definition of, 17 gesture as, 17 and language, 298-99 meanings of, 20n, 437 and object, 298-299,301 and perception, 22n significant, 17, 18, 24, 128, 243, 251,325,328 and act, 248 gesture as, 249 and mind, 20, 22 and objects, definition of, 23 Symbolic environment, 326 Symbolic Interaction (Blumer), 13 Symbolic logic, 412 Sympathetic introspection, 4 , 5 , 9 , 26,43,50,165,431 Szasz, Thomas, 187 Tagiuri, Renato, 32,40 Tannenbaum, Frank, 428,435 Tanur, Judith M., 95 on meanings, purposes, and structural resources in social interaction, 138-47 Taylor, Ian, 431,435 Taylor, Laurie, 431,435 Theatre of the absurd, magistrates' court as, 332 Thematic Apperception Test, 229 Theme, and meaning, 309-10 Theory defined, 323 formal, 65-67 grand, 67 and hypothesis, 413 in sociology, 58 Theory of internal conversation, 195-96 Theory of secondary deviation, 119, 120,124,126,127 Thibaut, JohnW., 145, 146, 261, 262, 270 Thinking as internal conversation, 243 and language symbols, 327 and speech, 296-301 Thomas, Darwin L., 95, 131,135, 137 on role-taking and power, 128-37 Thomas, W.I., 5, 27, 28, 30, 31, 97, 101,110,172,179,190, 243-44, 258,403,410 on definition of the situation, 254-58 Threat, perception of, 153-54 Thurston Personality Inventory, 86 Tie-signs, 426 Time and meaning, 423 and self-concept, 211-12, 213 Tomlinson, T.M., 149,163 Tonne, R.D., 57,190 Townsend, Peter, 211

451 Trait rating, 131 Traits, 338 Tremmel, William C, 40 Troyer, William L., 40, 243 on Mead's theory of mind, 247-51 Truth, 409-17 TST. See Twenty Statements Test Tucker, Charles W., 43,46, 58,167 on methodological problems of Kuhn's self theory, 232-40 Tunstall, Jeremy, 211 Turner, Johnathan H . , 394 on symbolic interactionism and social organization, 400-02 Turner, Ralph H . , 30, 31,41,46, 58, 95, 128, 137,149, 150,163, 164, 260, 261,262, 271,318, 319,347,352, 392,438 on the public perception of protest, 147-63 Turner, Ronny E.,392 Twenty Statements Test (TST), 13, 43-44,46,47,48, 84-91,165, 167, 264 administration of, 235 validity of, 222-30 Typification, and disclaimers, 310-11, 312,315,316 Umwelt, 420 Unique personal definitions, 259-60 United States, self-conceptions in, 222-30 Urry, John, 164 Useem, John, 230, 231 Useem, RuthH., 230, 231 Variable dependent, 72 generic, 69-70 independent, 72 locus, 86 relations, 73-74 and vocabulary of motives, 306 Variable analysis, 68-75 Vaughan, T.R., 58 Vercors, Jean Bruller, 392 Verimax factors notation solution, 132n Verstehen, 26, 43 Videbeck, Richard, 34,41, 201 Vigotsky, L.S., 320 Vocabularies, of motive, 301-08, 309 Volition, 327 Volkhart, Edmund H . , 211 Volkmann, J., 109 .

452 Voluntarism, 12 Wach, Joachim, 231 Waisanen, Carl R., 34 Waisanen, F.B., 34 Walker, W.L., 206, 210 Wallace, W.L., 52, 58 WaUer, Willard, 155, 163, 172,323 Walton, Paul, 428, 435 Warner, W.L., 48 Warren, Carol A.B., 94 on promoting behavior change to lose weight, 119-28 Warriner, Charles K., 164 Warrington, W.G., 131, 137 Warshay, L., 53, 55, 58 Watson, James ., 8, 15, 16 Watson, Jeanne, 41 Watson, John, 247, 248 Weber, Max, 26, 261, 271, 303, 306 Webster, Murray, Jr., 418 Weigert, Andrew J., 131, 137 Weinberg, J., 345, 351, 352 Weinstein, Eugene A., 95, 261, 271, 316, 319,349,352,406 on meanings, purposes and structural resources in social interaction, 138-47 Wenncrberg, Hjalmur, 418 Wheelis, Allen, 318, 320 White, L.A.,41 White, L.A.,41 White, Leslie ., 320 White, Morton C, 412, 418 Whitehead, Alfred N.,421 "Who Am I?" Test. See Twenty Statements Test Whorf, Benjamin, 22n, 34, 35, 36,41 Whyte, W.F., 175-76 Wieder, D.L., 52, 58 von Wiese, Leopold, 155,163 Wilcoxan Matched-Pairs SignedRanks Test, 356 Wilkinson, Gregg S., 166, 180,186, 190 a dramaturgic consideration of psychiatric disorder, 178-90 Wilier, David, 418

Index Wilier, Judith, 412,418 Williams, C, 352 Williams, James M . , 97 Williams, Robin M . , Jr., 320 Wilson, Thomas R., 380,436 Wolfe, D . M . , 132, 137 Wolff, K . H . , 254, 271 Women, self-identities of, 202, 211 Wood, Houston, 92 Working consensus, 144-45,175 and deviance, 347 Wright, ., 346, 347, 351,352 Wrong, D.H.,46, 58, 129,137, 318, 319 Wylie, Ruth, 41,222, 231 Yarrow, Marion R., 365 Young, Kimball, 27, 28,42, 194 Zajonc, Robert ., 411, 418 Zeitlin, Irving M . , 436 Zimmerman, D . H . , 52, 58 Znaniecki, Florian, 26, 97, 244, 258,410