LIM VS.

FELIX (1991) Certification by the fiscal of the existence of probable cause does not bind the judge. Preliminary inquiry determines probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant (prosecutor); preliminary examination (judge) - investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; preliminary investigation proper ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. Facts: Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and three of his security escorts and the wounding of another. They were initially charged, with three others, with the crime of multiple murder with frustrated murder. After conducting a preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued on July 31, 1989. Bail was fixed at P200,000. On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane, designated to review the case, issued a Resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but ruled that a case of Murder for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the survivor be filled instead against the suspects. Thereafter, four separate informations to that effect were filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended. On November 21, 1989, a motion for change of venue, filed by the petitioners was granted by the SC. It ordered that the case may be transferred from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati. Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents showing recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. They likewise filed a motion to order the transmittal of initial records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge of Barsaga of Masbate. These motions were however denied by the court because the prosecution had declared the existence of probable cause, informations were complete in form in substance , and there was no defect on its face. Hence it found it just and proper to rely on the prosecutors certification in each information. ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists? Held: 1. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. In the case of Placer vs. Villanueva, the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscals certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the search and seizure provision of the 1973 Constitution. Under this provision, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of order of arrest. If on the face of information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witness to aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. 2. In the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under the 1987 Constitution, the Court noted that the addition of the word personally after the word determined and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to other respondent officers as to may be authorized by law does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.What the Constitution

underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. 3. The case of People vs. Honorable Enrique B. Inting reiterates the following doctrines: (1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the judge alone makes this detemination. (2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assist him to make the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutors present to him. By itself, the prosecutors certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination. (3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary investigation proper. While the former seeks to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest, the latter ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. 4. 4. In the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, the court ruled that judges of RTC no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations: This authority was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985. 5. In the present case, the respondent judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor. Considering that all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The determination was made by the provincial prosecutor. The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied. The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his personal determination regarding the existence of probable cause from the issuance of warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not have possibly known what has transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Although the judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can perform the same functions as commissioner for taking of evidence) there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of these should be before the judge.

MANALILI VS COURT OF APPEALS (1997) FACTS: Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery due to reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be high on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet which they examined and found to contain crushed marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.(In his defense, Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until the three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his entity was framed up by the policemen.) Issue: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible. Held: Yes. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant. However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law: 1.Search incidental to a lawful arrest 2.Search of moving vehicles 3.Seizure in plain view 4.Customs search 5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as essential requirement. Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. A stop-and-frisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was established with Manalilis suspicious behaviour.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO (1991) Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossingin front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another tea bag from Macabante. Issues: (1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful. YES (2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible. YES Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfil requirements for its issuance. However, warrantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ FACTS: Valdez made an extrajudicial confession admitting ownership of the marijuana seized without counsel assisting him. ISSUE: Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused? NO HELD: The marijuana plants seized were product of an illegal search because of the absence of search warrant and are therefore inadmissible in evidence. The voluntary confession of ownership of marijuana was in violation of the custodial rights because of the absence of competent and independent counsel, and thus, inadmissible too. In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to the appellants voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellants guilt failed to meet the test of constitutional competence. Without these, the prosecutions remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellants conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence on his favor stands.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man chang ed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what theyre saying. And by resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. RULING: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases, to wit: (1)search of moving vehicles, (2)seizure in plain view, (3)customs searches, (4)waiver or consent searches, (5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6)search incidental to a lawful arrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conductingsurveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant. Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant. PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON FACTS: When the on duty frisker at Gate 16 of NAIA frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Johnson was directed to the nearest womens room for inspection. When ask to to bring out the thing under her girdle, Johnson brought out three plastic packs containing a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. ISSUE: WON the search is valid. HELD: YES. what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked-in luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.

PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT (1991) Facts: NARCOM stationed at Camp Dangwa set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. It was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant. Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

VALMONTE V. DE VILLA, SEPTEMBER 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211) FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. the residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, w/o a Search Warrant and/ or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. ISSUE: Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures? HELD: NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures. xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

PEOPLE VS ROLANDO DE GRACIA (1994) FACTS: Rolando de Gracia was subjected to a warrantless search and seizure sometime in 1989 during the height of the coup attempts against then President Cory Aquino. Confiscated from him were various explosives and ammunition. Thus, charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion. ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and seizure is valid? YES HELD: Search warrant can be dispensed with due to the exigent circumstances attendant to the case. This case still stands unchallenged jurisprudence-wise.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD ( 2008) RE: Constitutional mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. The issues Petitioner Senator Pimentel claimed that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. He therefore raised the following issue: DoSec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? Petitioners Social Justice Society and Laserna also assailed the constitutionality of paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36. The ruling of the Court A unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr., GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It alsoPARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. On the first issue, the Court sustained the contention of petitioner Pimentel and held that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 indeed impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator. The Court also held that Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

On the second issue, the Court held that paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court however held that paragraph (f) is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court cited American jurisprudence on random drug testing for school children ( Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al.) to sustain paragraph (c), thus: In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people, particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students. The Court also sustained paragraph (d), which covers officers and employees of public and private offices, and held: As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable -cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. BRICCIO RICKY A. POLLO V. KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, ( 2011) Right to privacy two-fold requirement: 1. that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and 2. that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). I. THE FACTS

On January 3, 2007, an anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairperson alleging that the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division of Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV) has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in information technology and issued a memorandum directing them to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions. The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and the Legal Services Division. It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice. Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous lettercomplaint. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo of CSC-ROIV that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent [are] thus inadmissible as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree.

II.

THE ISSUE

(1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files? NO (2) Was the search authorized by the respondent Civil Service CommissionChair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer, reasonable in its inception and scope? YES III. THE RULING

1. NO. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC, he normally would have visitors in his office. Even assuming that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, the same is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers. The CSC had implemented a policy that puts its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers. Under this policy, the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that computer resources were used only for legitimate business purposes. On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with an investigation of work-related misconduct. Under the facts obtaining, the Court held that the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception and in scope.