Wittgenstein and Cambridge Family Resemblances

A presentation by Michael Nedo

Clare Hall Herschel Road Cambridge CB3 9AL

Wittgenstein and Cambridge Family Resemblances

An Exhibition at Clare Hall Cambridge 31 March to 4 May 2011 by Michael Nedo 2011 supported by the AUSTRIAN CULTURAL FORUM London Michael Nedo, Wittgenstein Archive Cambridge Exhibition and Catalogue in Cooperation with Andrea Baczynski, Photo-Artist, Vienna Cambridge Philip Ball, PandIS, Cambridge University and Bruce Godfrey, Cambridge University Computing Service Print Room The Paolozzi Composites of Wittgenstein were donated by the artist to Michael Nedo, Director of the Wittgenstein Archive Cambridge Typeset in Baskerville and Gill Sans by Berthold

Ludwig Wittgenstein
born in Vienna 26 April 1889 died in Cambridge 29 April 1951 In the autumn of 1911 Wittgenstein came to Cambridge, following the advice of Gottlob Frege, to study philosophy under Bertrand Russell. Before that, Wittgenstein had studied aeronautical engineering in Berlin and subsequently, on the advice of his father, in Manchester, where he invented an aeroplane engine for which he received a patent an engine still in use today. But his main interests had always been philosophical: he had intended to study physics in particular its epistemological aspects under Ludwig Boltzmann in Vienna, but Boltzmann committed suicide in 1906, when Wittgenstein was leaving school. In February 1912 Wittgenstein became an undergraduate at Trinity College, later an advanced student. He studied logic and the foundations of mathematics under Bertrand Russell and psychology under G.E. Moore; he became friends with Russell, John Maynard Keynes and G.H. Hardy and with David Pinsent, a mathematics student in Trinity. It was not long before the student Wittgenstein became the teacher of his teachers and they developed great expectations regarding his work. Thus Russell mentioned in 1912 to Wittgensteins sister Hermine: We expect the next big step in philosophy to be taken by your brother. and later in Mind: Getting to know Wittgenstein was one of the most exciting intellectual adventures of my life. In collaboration with Moore, Wittgenstein reformed the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club, establishing rules that still apply today. In October 1913 Wittgenstein moved to Norway to Skjolden, a small village north-east of Bergen to concentrate on his work. There, before his 25th birthday, he made groundbreaking discoveries in logic, for instance a new symbolism for truthfunctions, which explains logical truth as tautologies. At the beginning of the Great War Wittgenstein joined the Austrian army. While on leave from the front, in August 1918, he finished his first book, the LogischPhilosophische Abhandlung, published in Germany in 1921 and in London in 1922 in a bilingual edition under the title of the English translation Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein was convinced that with the completion of his book he had exhausted his means to do philosophy. After the war he found a new vocation: he qualified as a teacher and taught in small villages in Lower Austria. Frank Ramsey, who translated his book into English visited Wittgenstein and together with Keynes, tried to persuade him to return to Cambridge and to philosophy but Wittgenstein remained in Austria. From 1926 he was building a house for his sister Margarethe Stoneborough, which he completed in the autumn of 1928. On the 18th of January 1929 Wittgenstein was back in Cambridge. On 2nd February he started work on his first manuscript volume, and on 20th January of the following year he started teaching. Wittgensteins election to a research fellowship of Trinity College was based on a summary of his work (published posthumously as Philosophical Remarks), evaluated by the Trinity mathematicians Hardy and Littlewood, and by Russell, who reported to the College Council: The theories contained in the work of Wittgenstein are novel, very original and indubitably important. Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician who likes simplicity, I should wish to think that they are not [] During the summer of 1930 Wittgenstein started working on a publication of his new ideas. He failed with his first attempt, the so-called Big Typescript, as he found his thoughts distorted and his thinking paralysed by the linear discourse required by a traditional book. His second attempt was an organic, multidimensional representation of his work, which he described in August 1938 in a preface to the book:

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I begin this publication with the fragment of my last attempt to arrange my thoughts in a linear form. This fragment has perhaps the advantage of giving comparatively easily an idea of my method. I intent to follow up this fragment with a mass of remarks more or less loosely arranged; and I shall explain the connections between these remarks, where the arrangement does not itself make them apparent, by a system of cross-references thus: each remark should have a current number and besides this the numbers of those remarks which stand to it in important relations. This book, for which he had a contract with Cambridge University Press, would have been published as a bilingual publication under the title Philosophical Remarks. It failed in consequence of the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany. Wittgenstein no longer had access to the manuscripts he had been writing since 1929, the manuscripts on which he was working for his book in Vienna. In February 1939 Wittgenstein was elected by Cambridge University to the Chair of Philosophy as successor to G.E. Moore; in April he received British citizenship. Wishing to contribute to Britains war effort, Wittgenstein worked as a volunteer at Guys Hospital in London, first as a dispenser and laboratory assistant, later as a technician with a research group studying the phenomenon of wound shock, where he developed apparatuses for the continuous measurement of pulse, blood pressure, breathing frequency and volume. At the beginning of 1944 he was called back to Cambridge to continue his research and his teaching. Wittgensteins last attempt to publish his work, his Philosophical Investigations, alongside his earlier book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, failed, because the publisher of the Tractatus, Kegan Paul in London, refused a licence to Cambridge University Press. Wittgenstein withdrew from all further publication attempts and instead prepared his literary estate as a form of publication. At the beginning of the Michaelmas Term 1947, he resigned his chair to concentrate on his writing; he travelled to Ireland, to Austria, to the US, back to Ireland and then to Norway. At the end of 1949 his doctor, Edward Bevan, diagnosed cancer of the prostate. In 1950 he moved back to Cambridge, into Dr Bevans house, Storeys End in Storeys Way. In 1951 he wrote his will, making Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and G.H. von Wright the heirs of his literary estate. On April 25th, 1951 he began his last piece of writing. The last entry is from April 27th. On April 28th he lost consciousness, dying on the morning of the 29th of April 1951.

Wittgensteins Philosophy
The reception of Wittgensteins Philosophy was already controversial while he was teaching at Cambridge University from 1930 to 1947. The establishment in the departments of philosophy in universities throughout England was on the whole hostile towards Wittgenstein certainly those in Oxford and Cambridge where he was described as a charlatan. At the same time there was, in particular in Cambridge and Oxford, no essay, talk or dissertation in philosophy, which was not influenced by Wittgenstein. After Wittgensteins death, self declared apostles were teaching the true gospel of Wittgenstein. To counter those problematic teachings, Wittgensteins literary heirs, Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, began publishing his manuscripts. Not an easy task if one keeps in mind Wittgensteins own difficulties in publishing his writings and not surprisingly, the results are problematic. They represent in the first instance the understanding of Wittgensteins work by his pupils and heirs

and as practically all of Wittgensteins manuscripts are fragments (with the exception of Part I of the posthumously published Philosophical Investigations), many of these publications are selections from manuscripts, often under misleading titles. The editions by Wittgensteins heirs represent about 20% of Nachla, a literary estate from which, with the exception of the corpus of the so-called Big Typescript, Wittgenstein had removed everything that he did not regard essential to his work. Judging from his manuscripts and from his teachings Wittgensteins plan was to write a trilogy. Part one, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus together with the Philosophical Investigations under the Title Philosophical Investigations juxtaposed with Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus presents his philosophical method. Part two would have had the title Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology; this part would have incorporated what is now published as Part II of the Philosophical Investigations. Part three Wittgenstein would have called Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics as he argues at the end of the posthumously published Investigations: An investigation is possible in connexion with mathematics which is entirely analogous to our investigation of psychology. It is just as little a mathematical investigation as the other is a psychological one. It will not contain calculations, so it is not for example logistic. It might deserve the name of an investigation of the foundations of mathematics. In an entry in the Chambers Encyclopaedia from 1950, Wittgenstein says about his work: His researches since 1929 (unpublished) bear chiefly on the philosophy of psychology and mathematics. Wittgensteins work on the foundations of mathematics and the foundations of science in general has, until today, hardly been studied. This is in part the result of a rather problematic publication of this material by his heirs: The posthumous publication, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is, according to its preface, a selection made by the editors from a large number of manuscripts which span a period of ostensibly seven, but actually closer to 15 years. No wonder it is described in the secondary literature as disorganised, lacking structure and failing to work out what looks like a very promising approach. In the essay and the talk at Clare Hall on 13 April, Wittgensteins Philosophy or a Reorientation of Science I attempt to show in his words the importance of his philosophy to the foundations of mathematics and of sciences. It will, I hope, give a sense of the importance of Wittgensteins philosophy to the understanding and possibly to resolution of problems we are having today with and within our world.

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Hermine Wittgenstein, Familienerinnerungen p. 108 Russell, Mind, 60, 1951 Wittgenstein in Cambridge, Oxford 2008, Letter 129 MS 225, p. II Philosophical Investigations, Part II, xiv, Oxford 1976, p. 232 Chambers Encylopedia, new edn, vol 14, London 1950 Crispin Wright Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, London 1980 Virginia Klenk Wittgensteins Philosophy of Mathematics, Den Haag 1976

Russell to Ottoline Morell, 18 October 1911 He turned out to be a man who had learned engineering at Charlottenburg, but during his course had acquired, by himself, a passion for the philosophy of maths, and has now come to Cambridge on purpose to hear me. 19 October 1911 My German friend threatens to be an infliction, he came back with me after my lecture and argued till dinner-time obstinate and perverse, but I think not stupid. 1 November 1911 My German engineer very argumentative and tiresome. 2 November 1911 My German engineer, I think is a fool. He thinks nothing empirical is knowable I asked him to admit that there was not a rhinoceros in the room, but he wouldnt. 13 November 1911 [M]y German ex-engineer, as usual, maintained his thesis that there is nothing in the world except asserted propositions, but at last I told him it was too large a theme [] 16 November 1911 My ferocious German came and argued at me after my lecture, [] He is armour-plated against all assaults of reasoning it is really rather a waste of time talking with him. 27 November 1911 My German is hesitating between philosophy and aviation; he asked me today whether I thought he was utterly hopeless at philosophy, and I told him I didnt know but I thought not. 29 November 1911 I am getting to like him, he is literary, very musical, pleasant-mannered (being an Austrian) and I think really intelligent. Russell in his Autobiography, 1959 He was perhaps the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating. Wittgenstein to Russell, Skjolden, 29 October 1913 Identity is the very Devil and immensely important; very much more so than I thought. It hangs like everything else directly together with the most fundamental questions, especially with the questions concerning the occurrence of the same argument in different places of a function. I have all sorts of ideas for a solution of the problem but could not yet arrive at anything definite. However I dont lose courage and go on thinking. November 1913 Lieber Russell! I intended to write this letter in German, but it struck me that I did not know whether to call you Sie or Du so I am reduced to my beastly English jargon! In his answer Russell offered Wittgenstein to call him Du. The following letter Wittgenstein wrote already in German, Russell answered as always in English. This continued until Wittgenstein was taken prisoner in Italy after the Great War. From there he wrote in English, as well as his last two letters to Russell from 1935.

Russell to Wittgensteins mother Dear Mrs. Wittgenstein, I have heard from your son which was a great happiness to me, as I have a profound affection and respect for him. I am writing now to ask whether you would do me a great kindness. If anything happens to him, would you let me know? I only ask because the anxiety is trying. Apart from affection it is to him that I look for the next real important advance in philosophy. Yours sincerely, Betrand Russell Russell to Wittgenstein, Cambridge, 5 February 1915 It was a very great happiness to hear from you I had been thinking of you constantly and longing for news. I am amazed that you have been able to write a MS. on logic since the war began. I cannot tell you how great a joy it will be to see you again after the war, if all goes well. If only your MSS come to me, I will do my utmost to understand them and make others understand them; but without your help it will be difficult. Please remember me to your mother, and tell her that you are constantly in my mind with anxious affection. Russell to Ottoline Morrell, 1916 Do you remember [] I wrote a lot of stuff about Theory of Knowledge, which Wittgenstein criticized with the greatest severity? His criticism, tho I dont think you realized it at the time, was an event of first-rate importance in my life, and affected everything I have done since. I saw he was right, and I saw I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy. My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces against a breakwater. Wittgenstein to Russell, 10 March 1919 Ive written a book which will be published as soon as I get home. I think I have solved our problems finally. Write to me often. It will shorten my prison. God bless you. Russell to Ottoline Morrell, Den Haag, 20 December 1919 I have much to tell you that is of interest. I leave here today, after a fortnights stay, during a week of which Wittgenstein was here, and we discussed his book every day. I came to think even better of it than I had done; I feel sure it is a really great book, though I do not feel sure it is right. I told him I could not refute it, and that I was sure it was either all right or all wrong, which I considered the mark of a good book; but it would take me years to decide this. This of course didnt satisfy him, but I couldnt say more. Russell to Moore, 27 May1929 I think [] that unless Wittgenstein has changed his opinions of me, he will not much like to have me as an Examiner. The last time we met he was so much pained by the fact of my not being a Christian that he has avoided me ever since; I do not know whether pain on this account has grown less, but he must still dislike me, as he has never communicated with me since. I do not want him to run out of the room in the middle of the Viva, which I feel is the sort of thing he might do. Rush Rhees, Personal Recollections of Wittgenstein As Wittgenstein came to be examined by Russell and Moore, Russell said smiling: I have never known anything so absurd in my life Ronald Clark, The Life of Bertrand Russell Moore and Russell first chatted informally to Wittgenstein as old friends rather than as examiners and examinee. Then Russell turned to Moore. Go on, he said, youve got to ask him some questions youre the Professor. There was a short discussion. Russell made a brief attempt to argue that Wittgenstein was inconsistent in stating that little could be said about philosophy and that it was possible to reach unassailable truth. Then the Viva ended unexpectedly with Wittgenstein clapping each of his examiners on the shoulder and exclaiming, Dont worry, I know youll never understand it.

Moore to Russell, 9 March 1930 The Council of Trinity made a grant to Wittgenstein last June to enable him to carry on his researches on the foundations of Mathematics. There is now a question of making him a further grant; and they wish, before they decide, to have expert reports on the work he has done since the last grant was made. They have authorised me to ask you to make such a report for them. Im afraid it will involve a good deal of trouble. Wittgenstein has written a great deal; but he says it would be absolutely necessary for him to explain it to you in conversation, if you are to understand it. I think he would be very glad to have an opportunity of doing this, but it would no doubt take up a good deal of your time. I hope very much that you will nevertheless be willing to do it; for there seems to be no other way of ensuring him a sufficient income to continue his work, unless the Council do make him a grant; and I am afraid there is a very little chance that they will do so, unless they can get favourable reports from experts in the subject: and you are, of course, by far the most competent person to make one. They would, of course, pay a fee for the report. There would be no need for you to come here to see Wittgenstein. He would arrange to see you, when and where it suited you best. Russell to Moore, 11 March 1930 I do not see how I can refuse to read Wittgensteins work and make a report on it. At the same time, since it involves arguing with him, you are right that it will require a great deal of work. I do not know anything more fatiguing than disagreeing with him in argument. Obviously the best plan for me would be to read the manuscript carefully first; and see him afterwards. How soon could you let me have his stuff? Moore to Russell, 13 March 1930 Wittgenstein says that he has nothing written which it would be worth while to let you see: all that he has written is at present in too confused a state. I am sorry that I had not clearly understood this when I wrote to you before. What he wants is merely to have a chance of explaining to you some of the results which he has arrived at, so that you might be able to report to the Council whether, even if you thought them mistaken, you thought them important and such that he ought to be given a chance of going on working on the same lines; and I hope that a report of this kind would be sufficient for the Council. And I should think 3 days would be ample for this, and that it wouldnt be necessary for you to argue with him much. Russell to Moore, 5 May 1930 I had a second visit from Wittgenstein, but it only lasted thirty-six hours, and it did not by any means suffice for him to give me a synopsis of all that he has done. He left me a large quantity of typescript, which I am to forward to Littlewood as soon as I have read it. Unfortunately I have been ill and have therefore been unable to get on with it as fast as I hoped. I think however, that in the course of conversation with him I got a fairly good idea of what he is at [] His theories are certainly important and certainly very original. Whether they are true, I do not know; I devoutly hope they are not, as they make mathematics and logic almost incredibly difficult [] I am quite sure that Wittgenstein ought to be given an opportunity to pursue his work. Wittgenstein to Russell, Autumn 1935 Two years ago, or so, I promised to send you a M.S. of mine. Now the one Im sending you today isnt that M.S. Im still pottering about with it and God knows whether I will ever publish it, or any of it. But two years ago I held some lectures in Cambridge and dictated some notes to my pupils so that they might have something to carry home with them, in their hands if not in their brains. And I had these notes duplicated. I have just now been correcting misprints and other mistakes in some of the copies and the idea came into my mind whether you might not like to have a copy. So Im sending you one. I dont wish to suggest that you should read the lectures; but if you should have nothing better to do and if you should get some mild enjoyment out of them I would be very pleased indeed. (I think its very difficult to understand them, as so many points are just hinted at. They are meant only for the people who heard the lectures). As I say, if you dont read them, it doesnt matter at all.

G.E. Moore to F.A. Hayek [At] the beginning of the October term 1912, he came again to some of my psychology lectures; but he was very displeased with them, because I was spending a great deal of time in discussing Wards view that psychology did not differ from the Natural Sciences in subject-matter but only in point of view. He told me these lectures were very bad that what I ought to do was to say what I thought, not to discuss what other people had thought; and he came no more to my lectures. But this did not prevent him from seeing a great deal of me. He was very anxious at the beginning of this year to improve the discussion of our philosophical society, which is called the Moral Science Club; and he actually persuaded the Club, with the help of the Secretary and me, to adopt a new set of rules and to appoint me as Chairman. He himself took a great part in these discussions. In this year both he and I were still attending Russells Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics; but W. used also to go for hours to Russells rooms in the evening to discuss Logic with him. Wittgenstein arranged to be coached in Logic by W.E. Johnson; but Johnson soon found that W. spent so much time in explaining his own views that he ( Johnson) felt that it was more like being coached by W. than W. being coached by him; and Johnson therefore soon put an end to the arrangement. Wittgenstein to Moore, Skjolden 19 November 1913 Dear Moore, Many thanks for your P.C. I am very sorry that you feel so miserably at times about your work. I think, the cause of it is, that you dont regularely discuss your stuff with anybody who is not yet stale and is really interested in the subject. And I believe that at present there is no such person up at Cambridge. Even Russell who is of course most extraordinarily fresh for his age is no more pliable enough for this purpose. Dont you think it would be a good thing if we had regular discussions when you come to me at Easter? Not of course that I am any good at the subject! But I am not yet stale and care for it very much. I cant help thinking that this would make you lose your feeling of sterility. I think you ought to think about your problems with the view to discussing them with me at Easter. Now dont you think that I am arrogant in saying this! I dont for a moment believe that I could get as clear about your questions as you can, but as I said before I am not yet wasted and am very interested in the stuff. Do think this over. let me hear from you soon. March 1914 Why on earth wont you do your paper here? You shall have a sitting-room with a splendid view all by yourself and I shall leave you alone as much as you like (in fact the whole day, if necessary). On the other hand we could see one another whenever both of us should like to. And we could even talk over your bussines (which might be fun). Or do you want so many books? You see I have plenty to do myself, so I shant disturb you a bit. Do take the Boat that leaves Newcastle on 17th arriving in Bergen on the 19th and do your work here (I might even have a good influence upon it by preventing too many repetitions). I think, now, that Logic must be very nearly done if it is not already. So do think over what Ive said!! Yours, etc., etc. L.W. P.S. Oh Do buy the Schicksalslied by Brahms in an arrangement for 4 hands and bring it with you. And, please, send a telegram if you come on the 19th. I hope you will. G.E. Moore to F.A. Hayek I arrived late on March 26th, 1914, and found W. there to meet me. We spent two nights at Bergen, and then went on by train, sledge, steamer and motor-boat to Skjolden, where Wittgenstein was staying, spending one night on the way at Flaam, at a hotel which was mostly shut up, because it was out of season; W. had arranged beforehand that we should be able to sleep there, but we were the only guests. I was with him at Skjolden only 15 days. He dictated to me there some notes on Logic, which I still have. He also took me to a site where he proposed to build a house; but the house which he afterwards actually built near Skjolden was on a different site. At the end of the 15 days he accompanied me back to Bergen, and we again spent one night together at Flaam, and one night at Bergen.

Skjolden, 7 May 1914 Dear Moore, Your letter annoyed me. When I wrote Logik I didnt consult the Regulations, and therefore I think it would only be fair if you gave me my degree without consulting them so much either! As to a Preface and Notes; I think my examiners will easily see how much I have cribbed from Bosanquet. If Im not worth your making an exception for me even in some stupid details then I may as well go to Hell directly; and if I am worth it and you dont do it then by God you might go there. The whole business is too stupid and too beastly to go on writing about it so L.W. Wittgenstein left Cambridge University without a degree. Logik, his B.A. dissertation no longer exists. How this work, written in German, relates to his Tractatus Logiko-Philosophics is not known. Wien XVII Neuwaldeggerstrae 38 July 3rd, 14 Dear Moore, Upon clearing up some papers before leaving Skjolden I popped upon your letter which had made me so wild. And upon reading it over again I found that I had probably no sufficient reason to write to you as I did. (Not that I like your letter a bit now.) But at any rate my wrath has cooled down and Id rather be friends with you again than otherwise. I consider I have strained myself enough now for I would not have written this to many people and if you dont answer this I shant write to you again. Yours, etc., etc. L. W. Moore did not answer. The friendship is renewed on the day of Wittgensteins return to Cambridge, when, on the 28 th of January, they accidetally meet in the train from London to Cambridge. Diary of G.E. Moore, 12 October 1915 Dream of Wittgenstein, he looks at me as if to ask if it is all right, and I cant help smiling as if it was, though I know it isnt; then he is swimming in the sea; finally he is trying to escape arrest as an enemy alien. Wittgenstein to Moore, March - April 1930 I am in Vienna now, doing the most loathsome work of dictating a synopsis from my manuscripts. It is a terrible bit of work and I feel wretched doing it. I saw Russell the other day at Petersfield and, against my original intention, started to explain to him Philosophy. Of course we couldnt get very far in two days but he seemed to understand a little bit of it. My plan is to go and see him in Cornwall on the 22nd or 23rd of April and to give him the synopsis and a few explanations. 23 August 1931 Ive had a very busy time since I left Cambridge and have done a fair amount of work. Now I want you to do me a favour: I dont intend to give any formal lectures this term as I think I must reserve all my strength for my own work. Maurice OConnor Drury, Recollections 1938 G.E. Moore was retiring from the Professorship of Philosophy at Cambridge. Wittgenstein was debating whether he would apply for the chair. Wittgenstein: I would never be elected. I am now only a has been. Nobody wants a has been. One of the electors is Collingwood of Oxford. Can you imagine him voting for me? After his election, Wittgenstein told me that Broad had said: To refuse the chair to Wittgenstein would be like refusing Einstein a chair of Physics. Wittgenstein knew how antipathetic Broad was to anyone of Wittgensteins temperament, and he appreciated this tribute.

Wittgenstein to O.K. Bouwsma during his trip to the US, 11 October 1949 Moore is a man who is full of questions but he has no talent for disentangling things. It is one thing when you have a tangle of thread to lay it down that some threads run so: = and some: || and some: //, but it is quite another thing to take an end and follow it through, pulling it out, and looping it on, etc. Moore could not do this. He was barren. Now Russell was different in his good days. He was wonderful. Wittgenstein to Moore Rosss Hotel, Parkgate Street, Dublin, Eire 16 December 48 Dear Moore, The enclosed card is to wish you as much happiness and as little unhappiness as possible. But Im also writing you this note: for two reasons. I had a letter and Christmas card from Malcolm, and he says that he hasnt yet heard from you. When I read this I thought of your telling me that youd write to him; that was in October in your room when I mentioned the fact that he had complained to me about not hearing from you. And at the same time I thought of something else you promised me then, i.e., putting it into your will that my typescripts, now in your possession, should, after your death, go to my executors, or to me if I should then be alive. This letter is to remind you of both matters, in case you have forgotten. You are in a position to give a great deal of pleasure (in the first case) and to avert a great deal of distress (in the second) by comparatively simple means. Rhees is coming here for 10 days next week. I am well and working pretty hard. May you be well, too! Forgive me this lengthy letter. Yours Ludwig Wittgenstein 31 December 1948 Dear Moore, Thanks for your letter and for having fulfilled both promises. My executors are Rhees and Burnaby of Trinity. I wish you all good luck! Yours L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein to Norman Malcolm, 18 February 1949 Now as to Moore: I dont really understand Moore, and therefore, what Ill say may be quite wrong. But this is what Im inclined to say: That Moore is in some sense extraordinarily childlike is obvious, and the remark you quoted (about vanity) is certainly an example of that childlikeness. There is also a certain innocence about Moore; he is, e.g., completely unvain. As to its being to his credit to be childlike, I cant understand that; unless its also to a childs credit. For you arent talking of the innocence of a man who has fought for, but of an innocence which comes from a natural absence of a temptation. I believe that all you wanted to say was that you liked, or even loved, Moores childlikeness. And that I can understand. I think that our discrepancy here is not so much one of thoughts as of feelings. I like and greatly respect Moore, but thats all. He doesnt warm my heart (or very little), because what warms my heart most is human kindness, and Moore just like a child is not kind. He is kindly and can be charming and nice to those he likes and he has a great depth. Thats how it seems to me. If Im wrong, Im wrong.

Russell to Keynes on Wittgensteins election to the Apostles, 11 November 1912 All the difficulties I anticipated have arisen with Wittgenstein. I persuaded him at last to come to the first meeting and see how he could stand it. Obviously from his point of view the Society is a mere waste of time. But perhaps from a philosophical point of view he might be made to feel it worth going on with. I feel, on reflection, very doubtful whether I did well to persuade him to come next Saturday, as I feel sure he will retire in disgust. But I feel it is the business of the active brethren to settle this before next Saturday. If he is going to retire, it would be better it should be before election. Keynes to Wittgenstein, 10 January 1915 I am astonished to have got a letter from you. Do you think it proves that you existed within a short time of my getting it? I think so. I hope you have been safely taken prisoner by now. Russell and I have given up philosophy for the present I to give my services to the Govt for financial business, he to agitate for peace. But Moore and Johnson go on just as usual. Ramsey to Keynes, Vienna, 24 March 1924 With regard to Wittgenstein I do not think it is any good at all trying to get him to live any pleasanter a life, or stop the ridiculous waste of his energy and brain. I only see this clearly now because I have got to know one of his sisters and met the rest of the family. They are very rich and extremely anxious to give him money or do anything for him in any way, and he rejects all their advances; even Christmas presents or presents of invalids food, when he is ill, he sends back. And this is not because they arent on good terms but because he wont have money he hasnt earned except for some very specific purpose like to come and see you again. I think he teaches to earn money and would only stop teaching if he had some other way of earning money which was preferable. And it would have to be really earning, he wouldnt accept any job which seemed in the least to be wangled for him. Wittgenstein to Keynes, 18 October 1925 My dear Keynes, Thanks so much for your letter! I am still teacher and dont want any money at present. I have decided to remain teacher, as long as I feel that the troubles into which I get that way, may do me any good. If one has toothache it is good to put a hot-water bottle on your face, but it will only be effective, as long as the heat of the bottle gives you some pain. I will chuck the bottle when I find that it no longer gives me the particular kind of pain which will do my character any good. That is, if people here dont turn me out before that time. If I leave off teaching I will probably come to England and look for a job there, because I am convinced that I cannot find anything at all possible in this country. In this case I will want your help. Summer 1927 Its ages since you have heard from me. [] I wont try to explain my long silence: there were lots of reasons for it. I had a great many troubles one overlapping the other and postponed writing until they would be all over. But now I have interrupted my troubles by a short holiday and this is the occasion to write to you. I have given up teaching long ago (about 14 months)* and have taken to architecture. Im building a house in Vienna. This gives me heaps of troubles and Im not even sure that Im not going to make a mess of it. However I believe it will be finished about November and then I might take a trip to England if anybody there should care to see me. I should very much like to see you again and meanwhile to get a line from you. About your book I forgot to say that I liked it. It shows that you know that there are more things between heaven and earth etc. Please remember me to your wife. Yours ever Ludwig * I couldnt stand the hot bottle any longer.

Wittgenstein to Keynes, October/November 1928 Ive just finished my house that has kept me entirely busy these last two years. Now however I will have some holidays and naturally want to see you again as soon as possible. The question is, would you mind seeing me. If not, write a line. I could come to England in the first days of December but not before, as I must first set to rights part of my anatomy. Enclosed you will find a few photos of my house and hope you wont be too much disgusted by its simplicity. Keynes to his wife Lydia Lopokova, 18 November 1928 A letter from Ludwig. He has finished his house and sends photographs of it la Corbusier; and wants to come to stay with me here in about a fortnight. Am I strong enough? Perhaps if I do not work between now and then, I shall be. Wittgenstein to Keynes, December 1928 I had to postpone my trip, as my health was not quite strong enough in the first days of this month. But I am nearly well now and want to come to England in the beginning of January. Please write a line letting me know if I can see you then. Keynes to his wife, 18 January 1929 My dearest sweet, Well, God has arrived. I met him on the 5.15 train. He has a plan to stay in Cambridge permanently. Meanwhile we have had tea and now I retire to my study to write to you. I see that the fatigue is going to be crushing. But I must not let him talk to me for more than two or three hours a day. 25 February 1929 Last night Ludwig came to dinner. He was much more normal in every way than I have ever known him. One woman at last has succeeded in soothing the fierceness of the savage hunter Lettice Ramsey, under whose roof he stayed in the end for nearly a fortnight, before moving to Mrs. Dobbs 19 January1930 Frank Ramsey died last night. We are all very much overwhelmed by feelings about it. All yesterday the news seemed desperate. He was in his way the greatest genius in the College and such a dear creature besides. Poor Lettice and her two babies Wittgenstein to Keynes, 6 July 1935 I want to speak to officials at two institutions; one is the Institute of the North in Leningrad, the other the Institute of National Minorities in Moscow. These Institutes, as I am told, deal with people who want to go to the colonies the newly colonized parts at the periphery of the U.S.S.R. I want to get information and possibly help from people in these Institutes. 30 June 1935 Im sorry I must trouble you with my affairs again. There are two things I want to ask you: (a) I thought the other day when we talked in your room you were not disinclined to give me some sort of introduction to Maisky the Ambassador. I then said I thought he would not be the man who would give me the advice I wanted. But Ive been told since that if he were inclined to give me a letter of introduction to some officials in Russia it would help me a lot. Therefore my first question is, would you be willing to give me an introduction to Maisky so as to make it possible for me to have a conversation with him, as the result of which he might give me an introduction? (b) I have now more or less decided to go to Russia as a Tourist in September and see whether it is possible for me to get a suitable job there. If I find (which, Im afraid is quite likely) that I cant find such a job, or get permission to work in Russia, then I should want to return to England and if possible study Medicine. Now when you told me that you would finance me during my medical training you did not know, I think, that I wanted to go to Russia and that I would try to get

permission to practise medicine in Russia. I know that you are not in favour of my going there (and I think I understand you). Therefore I must ask you whether, under these circumstances, you would still be prepared to help me. I dont like to ask you this question, not because I risk a No, but because I hate asking any questions about this matter. If you reply please just write on a P.C.: (a) No or (a) Yes, etc. (b) No, etc. as the case may be. I shall not think it the least unkind of you if you answer both a and b negatively. I left your room the other day with a sad feeling. It is only too natural that you shouldnt entirely understand what makes me do what I am doing, nor how hard it is for me. Keynes introduction to Maisky, 10 July 1935 I must leave it to him to tell you his reasons for wanting to go to Russia. He is not a member of the Communist Party, but has strong sympathies with the way of life which he believes the new rgime in Russia stands for. Wittgenstein to Keynes, 18 March 1938 I want to describe to you my present situation and ask you whether you can by any chance, in some way not too difficult for you, give me some advice or help. You know that by the annexation of Austria by Germany I have become a German citizen and, by the German laws, a German Jew (as three of my grandparents were baptised only as adults). The same, of course, applies to my brother and sisters (not to their children, they count as aryans). As my people in Vienna are almost all retiring and very respected people who have always felt and behaved patriotically it is, on the whole, unlikely that they are at present in any danger. I have not yet heard from them since the invasion and there hasnt been time as they would wait in any case with giving me news until things had settled down a bit. I wrote to them a week ago saying that if they needed me I would come home any time. But I believe that they arent going to call me and also that I couldnt at present do anything for them, except possibly cheering them up a little. If however I went to Vienna now the consequences would be a) that my passport, being an Austrian one, would be taken away from me and b) that, in all likelihood, no passport would be given to me; as passports, except in very special cases, are not, I gather, issued to German Jews. I could therefore c) not leave Austria again and d) never again get a job. My people, who were rich before the war, are still wealthyish and will probably, even when a lot will be taken away from them, still have enough money to keep me (and they would gladly do so) but I neednt say this would be the last thing that Ild wish to happen. I also must say that the idea of becoming (or being) a German citizen, even apart from all the nasty consequences, is appalling to me. (This may be foolish, but it just is so.) For all these reasons I have now decided to try 1) to get a University job at Cambridge, 2) to acquire British citizenship. The thought of acquiring British citizenship had occurred to me before; but I have always rejected it on the ground: that I do not wish to become a sham-Englishman (I think you will understand what I mean). The situation has however entirely changed for me now. For now I have to choose between two new nationalities, one of which deprives me of everything, while the other, at least, would allow me to work in a country in which I have spent on and off the greater part of my adult life, have made my greatest friends and have done my best work. Now if I wish to try to become naturalised here Im afraid I have to make haste; one of the reasons being that (as Sraffa pointed out to me) it would be easier as long as I hold an Austrian passport. And this I might have to give up before so very long. As to getting a job at Cambridge you may remember that I was an assistant faculty lecturer for 5 years, and that the regulations dont allow one to hold this job for more than 5 years. When my 5 years had expired the faculty allowed me to go on lecturing as before and they went on paying me as before. Now it is for this that I shall apply, for there is no other job vacant. I had, in fact, thought of doing so anyway; though not now, but perhaps next autumn. But it would be important now for me to get a job as quickly as possible; for a) it would help me in becoming naturalised and b) if I failed in this and had to become a German I would have more chance to be allowed out of Austria again on visiting my people if I had a Job in England. [] I want to add that Im in no sort of financial difficulties. I shall have about 300 or 400 and can therefore hold out for another year or so.

Wittgenstein to Ramsey, Summer 1923 Ive got a letter from Mr. Ogden the other day saying that you may possibly come to Vienna in one of these next months. Now as you have so excellently translated the Tractatus into English Ive no doubt you will be able to translate a letter too and therefore Im going to write the rest of this in German. Minutes of Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club, 26 January 1923 The basis of Wittgensteins logic is his theory of symbolism. His main concern is to express the conditions under which a proposition can express a fact. The reader held that in Wittgensteins analysis there is only what he calls sentence no third entity, the proposition the sentence is not a name for the proposition but they are equivalent. A series of words, to express a proposition, must have the logical form of the fact. The sentence has logical structure only if the proposition is true. The world consists of facts. Facts may contain parts which are other facts. The analysis of these parts yields finally the constituents which may be called singles or objects, from which all complex entities are built up. An interesting point which was not revived in the later discussion dealt with Wittgensteins denial of the causal nexus. He seems here to be denying two different things and incidentally to remove the possibility for holding the propositions of the natural science, which he yet seems to wish to retain. The reader of the paper raised among others three questions for discussion 1) Is the picture theory expungable? 2) Assuming it to be true what does it rule out? 3) What are the simples? The discussion however turned largely on the question of the identification of sentence and proposition a position which was attacked by the chairman (Moore). A great many difficulties on this and other points were revealed, but not resolved by the discussion which terminated at 11.30 p.m. Ramsey to his mother, Velden am Wrther See, 22 July 1924 We really live in a great time for thinking, with Einstein Freud and Wittgenstein all alive(, and all in Germany or Austria those foes of civilisation!) Puchberg am Schneeberg, 20 September 1923 Wittgenstein is a teacher in the Village school. He is very poor, at least he lives very economically. He has one tiny room whitewashed, containing a bed, washstand, small table and one hard chair and that is all there is room for. His evening meal which I shared last night is rather unpleasant coarse bread, butter and cocoa. His school hours are 8 to 12 or 1 and he seems to be free all the afternoon. He looks younger than he can possibly be; but he says he has bad eyes and a cold. But his general appearance is athlethic. In explaining his philosophy he is excited and makes vigorous gestures but relieves the tension by a charming laugh. He has blue eyes. Ramsey to Wittgenstein, 20 February 1924 Thanks for your letter; except that I think you might enjoy it, I [all underlining by Wittgenstein] no longer want you to come here this summer, because I am coming to Vienna, for some and perhaps the whole of it! I cant say exactly when or for how long, but very likely, next month, so I shall hope to see you quite soon now. This is for various reasons: I hope to settle permanently in Cambridge, but as I have always lived here, I want to go away for a time first, and have the chance now for six months. And if I live in Vienna I can learn German, and come and see you often, (unless you object) and discuss my work with you, which would be most helpful. Also I have been very depressed and done little work, and have symptoms so closely resembling some of those described by Freud that I shall probably try to be psychoanalysed, for which Vienna would be very convenient, and which would make me stay there the whole six months. But Im afraid you wont agree with this. Keynes still means to write to you; it really is a disease his procrastination; but he doesnt (unlike me) take such disabilities so seriously as to go to Freud! He very much hopes you will come and see him.

I havent seen Johnson for a long time but I am going to tea with his sister soon, and unless he is ill I will give him your love (last time I went there he was ill). The third part of his Logic is to be published soon. It deals with Causation. I am so sorry you are using up all your strength struggling with your surroundings; it must be terribly difficult with the other teachers. Are you staying on in Puchberg? When I saw you, you had some idea of leaving if it got too impossible, and becoming a gardener. I cant write about work, it is such an effort when my ideas are so vague, and Im going to see you soon. Anyhow I have done little except, I think, made out the proper solution rather in detail of some of the contradictions which made Russells Theory of Types unnecessarily complicated, and made him put in the Axiom of Reducibility. I went to see Russell a few weeks ago, and am reading the manuscript of the new stuff he is putting into the Principia. You are quite right that it is of no importance; all it really amounts to is a clever proof of mathematical induction without using the axiom of reducibility. There are no fundamental changes, identity just as it used to be. I felt he was too old: he seemed to understand and say yes to each separate thing, but it made no impression so that 3 minutes afterwards he talked on his old lines. Of all your work he seems now to accept only this: that it is nonsense to put an adjective where a substantive ought to be which helps in his theory of types. He indignantly denied ever having said that vagueness is a characteristic of the physical world. He has 2 children now and is very devoted to them. I liked him very much. [] I had a long discussion with Moore the other day, who has grasped more of your work than I should have expected. Im sorry Im not getting on better with the foundations of mathematics; I have got several ideas but they are still dim. I hope you are well, and as happy as you can be under the circumstances. It gives me great pleasure that probably I shall see you soon. Ramsey to Keynes, Vienna, 24 March 1924 With regard to Wittgenstein I do not think it is any good at all trying to get him to live any pleasanter a life, or stop the ridiculous waste of his energy and brain. I only see this clearly now because I have got to know one of his sisters and met the rest of the family. They are very rich and extremely anxious to give him money or do anything for him in any way, and he rejects all their advances; even Christmas presents or presents of invalids food, when he is ill, he sends back. And this is not because they arent on good terms but because he wont have money he hasnt earned except for some very specific purpose like to come and see you again. I think he teaches to earn money and would only stop teaching if he had some other way of earning money which was preferable. And it would have to be really earning, he wouldnt accept any job which seemed in the least to be wangled for him. It is an awful pity; it seems to be the result of a terribly strict upbringing. Three of his brothers committed suicide they were made to work so hard by their father: at one time the eight children had twenty-six private tutors; and their mother took no interest in them. Ramsey to his mother, Puchberg am Schneeberg, 20 September1923 He is prepared to give 4 or 5 hours a day to explaining his book. I have had two days and got through 7 (+ incidental forwards references) out of 80 pages. And when the book is done I shall try to pump him for ideas for its further development which I shall attempt. He says he himself will do nothing more, not because he is bored, but because his mind is no longer flexible. He says no one can do more than 5 or 10 years work at philosophy. (His book took 7.) And he is sure Russell will do nothing more important. His idea of his book is not that anyone by reading it will understand his ideas, but that some day someone will think them out again for himself, and will derive great pleasure from finding in this book their exact expressions. I think he exaggerates his own verbal inspiration, it is much more careful than I supposed but I think it reflects the way the ideas came to him which might not be the same with another man. He has already answered my chief difficulty which I have puzzled over for a year and given up in despair myself and decided he had not seen. (It is not in the 1st 7 pages but arose by the way.) He is great. I used to think Moore a great man but beside W! He says I shall forget everything he explains in a few days; Moore in Norway said he understood W completely and when he got back to England was no wiser than when he started.

Its terrible when he says Is that clear and I say no and he says Damn its horrid to go through that again. Sometimes he says I cant see that now we must leave it. He often forgot the meaning of what he wrote within 5 minutes, and then remembered it later. Some of his sentences are intentionally ambiguous having an ordinary meaning and a more difficult meaning which he also believes. He is, I can see, a little annoyed that Russell is doing a new edition of Principia because he thought he had shown R that it was so wrong that a new edition would be futile. It must be done altogether afresh. He had a week with Russell 4 years ago. Wittgenstein to his sister Hermine, September 1923 Auch ich konnte jetzt ein paar Tage kaum reden, weil ich in der letzten Zeit den ganzen Tag reden mute. Vormittags in der Schule und nachmittags mit Ramsey aus Cambridge der beinahe 14 Tage hier geblieben ist. Es war ein Vergngen auch fr mich, wenn auch eine sehr groe Anstrengung. Ramsey wird mir in einiger Zeit ein Exemplar der Abhandlung schicken und das kannst Du dann haben. For a few days, I too could hardly speak as I have had to talk the whole day. Mornings at school and in the afternoon with Ramsey from Cambridge, who has stayed here for nearly a fortnight. It was a pleasure for me too, but at the same time a huge effort. Ramsey will send me a copy of the Tractatus, which then you can have. Frank Ramsey to G.E. Moore, 14 July 1929 In my opinion Mr Wittgenstein is a philosophic genius of a different order from anyone else I know. This is partly owing to his great gift for seeing what is essential in a problem and partly to his overwhelming intellectual vigour, to the intensity of thought with which he pursues a question to the bottom and never rests content with a mere possible hypothesis. From his work more than that of any other man I hope for a solution of the difficulties that perplex me both in philosophy generally and in the foundation of Mathematics in particular. It seems to me, therefore, peculiarly fortunate that he should have returned to research. During the last two terms I have been in close touch with his work and he seems to me to have made remarkable progress. He began with certain questions in the analysis of propositions which have now led him to problems about infinity which lie at the root of current controversies on the foundations of Mathematics. At first I was afraid that lack of mathematical knowledge and facility would prove a serious handicap to his working in this field. But the progress he had made has already convinced me that this is not so, and that here too he will probably do work of the first importance. He is now working very hard and, so far as I can judge he is getting on well. For him to be interrupted by lack of money would be a great misfortune for philosophy. F.R. Leavis, Memoirs of Wittgenstein [A]s midnight approached I said, as if suddenly recalling the fact: Didnt you tell me that you were reading a paper to the Aristotelian Society at Nottingham tomorrow? I added, by way of reinforcing the stimulus: lts nearly twelve. He exclaimed: Im a bloody fool! Walk back with me. [] Arrived at the front door, I knocked, and said to Wittgenstein: Youll go to bed at once, wont you? He answered, with the inertness of exhaustion: You dont understand. When Im engaged on a piece of work Im always afraid I shall die before Ive finished it. So I make a fair copy of the days work, and give it to Frank Ramsey for safe-keeping. I havent made todays copy. [] I was walking once with Wittgenstein when I was moved, by something he said, to remark, with a suggestion of innocent inquiry in my tone: You dont think much of most other philosophers, Wittgenstein? No. Those I have my use for you could divide into two classes. Suppose I was directing someone of the first to Emmanuel it was then my college I should say: You see that steeple over there? Emmanuel is three hundred and fifty yards to the west-southwest of it. That man, the first class, would get there. Hm! very rare in fact Ive never met him. To the second I should say: You go a hundred yards straight ahead, turn half-left and go forty . . . and so on. That man would ultimately get there. Very rare too; in fact I dont know that Ive met him. Thereupon I asked, referring to the well-known young Cambridge genius (who was to die while still young): What about Frank Ramsey? Ramsey? He can see the next step if you point it out.

Ein berer Pdagog mu kommen, und dem Kinde das erschpfte Elementarbuch aus den Hnden reien. Lessing Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts A better teacher must come and tear the primer from the child that has outgrown it. Lessing Education of Mankind

Wittgensteins Philosophy or a Reorientation of Science

Wittgensteins Philosophy In Ludwig Wittgensteins own view, his work was primarily concerned with the foundations of mathematics, the language of science. Der Philosoph sprt Wechsel im Stil einer Ableitung, an denen der Mathematiker von heute, mit seinem stumpfen Gesicht ruhig vorbergeht. Eine hhere Sensibilitt ist es eigentlich, was den Mathematiker der Zukunft von dem heutigen unterscheiden wird; und die wird die Mathematik gleichsam stutzen; weil man dann mehr auf die absolute Klarheit als auf ein/das/ Erfinden neuer Spiele bedacht sein wird. A philosopher feels changes in the style of a derivation which a contemporary mathematician passes over calmly with a blank face. What will actually distinguish the mathematician of the future from those of today will be a greater sensitivity, and that will as it were prune mathematics; since people will then be more intent on absolute clarity than on the invention of new games. Die philosophische Klarheit wird auf das Wachstum der Mathematik den gleichen Einflu haben, wie das Sonnenlicht auf das Wachsen der Kartoffeltriebe. (Im dunkeln Keller wachsen sie meterlang.) Philosophical clarity will have the same effect on the growth of mathematics as the sun has on the growth of potato sprouts. (In a dark cellar they grow metres long.) Scientists, who divide the world into disciplines assigned to specialists, argue that Wittgenstein was mistaken about himself in the same way as Goethe, who considered himself more of a naturalist than a poet. Not surprisingly, Wittgensteins work on the foundations of mathematics is largely ignored. It is considered unworthy of the author of the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations. This is clearly an important problem for anyone studying Wittgenstein: Only a genius like Frank Ramsey, who to this day exerts a major influence on mathematics, was able to correctly assess Wittgensteins work in mathematics and its impact on his philosophy. In 1929 Ramsey wrote to G.E. Moore: In my opinion Mr Wittgenstein is a
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philosophical genius of a different order from anyone else I know. [] From his work more than that of any other man I hope for a solution of the difficulties that perplex me both in philosophy generally and in the foundation of mathematics in particular. The investigation of the foundations of intellectual edifices not only those of mathematics is the hub of Wittgensteins work. His whole work shows an enormous and continuous effort to attain clarity and truth, and above all the separation of what is real from what is fantastic. In the preface to his first book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in 1918, Wittgenstein writes that the philosophical problems that he is grappling with are largely the problems (and the expectations) of Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, and those of similar intellectual frameworks. He goes on to say that through his work he has resolved these problems, which in his opinion are caused by a misunderstanding of the logic of language. Ich bin also der Meinung, die Probleme im Wesentlichen endgltig gelst zu haben. Und wenn ich mich hierin nicht irre, so besteht nun der Wert dieser Arbeit zweitens darin, da sie zeigt, wie wenig damit getan ist, da diese Probleme gelst sind. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essential been finally solved. And if I am not mistaken in this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved. In the autumn of 1919 Wittgenstein advised Ludwig Ficker, whom he approached as a potential publisher of his book, das Vorwort und den Schlu zu lesen, da diese den Sinn am unmittelbarsten zum Ausdruck bringen. to read the preface and the end since they express the meaning in the most immediate fashion. The penultimate sentence of the Tractatus shows how Wittgenstein overcame, with the propositions of his book, the problems caused by misunderstanding the logic of language: Meine Stze erlutern dadurch, da sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie auf ihnen ber sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er mu sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Er mu diese Stze berwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig. My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless [in the sense of direction or use], when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. After completing his Tractatus, Wittgenstein was convinced to have exhausted his capacity for philosophy he was looking for a new vocation. After the Great War he remained in Austria for ten years, working as a gardener, and, for six years, as a primary school teacher, later as an architect, building a house for his sister Margarete Stonborough. However, on his return to philosophy in 1927 and to Cambridge 1929, he resumed the central idea of hisTractatus in the second manuscript volume of his Philosophical Remarks: Warum ist die Philosophie so kompliziert? Sie sollte doch ganz einfach sein? Die Philosophie lst Knoten in unserem Denken auf die wir unsinnigerweise
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hinein gemacht haben; dazu mu sie aber ebenso komplizierte Bewegungen machen wie diese Knoten sind. Obwohl also das Resultat der Philosophie einfach ist kann es nicht ihre Methode sein dazu zu gelangen. In der Wissenschaft ist ein Resultat so einfach oder so kompliziert wie die Methode durch die wir dazu gelangen. Die Kompliziertheit der Philosophie ist nicht die ihrer Materie sondern die unseres verknoteten Verstandes. Why is philosophy so complicated? It ought to be entirely simple. Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking that we have, stupidly, put there. To do this it must make movements that are just as complicated as these knots. Although the result of philosophy is simple, its method cannot be simple if it is to succeed. The complexity of philosophy is not a complexity of its subject matter, but of our knotted mind. In the following year, in a draft preface for a publication of his current thoughts, he described his striving for clarity, and the significance of his investigations of the foundations, that is to say, on the foundations of the intellectual structures of our time: Unsere Zivilisation ist durch das Wort Fortschritt charakterisiert. Der Fortschritt ist ihre Form, nicht eine ihrer Eigenschaften da sie fortschreitet. Sie ist typisch aufbauend. Ihre Ttigkeit ist es ein immer komplizierteres Gebilde zu konstruieren. Und auch die Klarheit dient doch nur wieder diesem Zweck und ist nicht Selbstzweck. Mir dagegen ist die Klarheit die Durchsichtigkeit Selbstzweck. Es interessiert mich nicht ein Gebude aufzufhren, sondern die Grundlagen der mglichen Gebude durchsichtig vor mir zu haben. Mein Ziel ist also ein anderes als das der Wissenschaftler und meine Denkbewegung von der ihrigen verschieden. Our civilization is characterized by the word progress. Progress is its form, not one of the properties that allow it to make progress. Typically, it builds. Its activity is to build a more and more complex structure. And clarity, again, is only a means to this end and not an end in itself. For me however, clarity and transparency, are ends in themselves. I am not interested in erecting a building but in having the foundations of possible buildings transparently before me. So my aim is different from that of the scientists and my thoughts move differently from theirs. Wittgensteins last manuscript entry, made two days before his death, on the 27th of April 1951, and just before losing consciousness, refers to the distinction between the real and the fantastic, be it in the form of belief and superstition, or education and misinformation. Wenn Einer glaubt, vor wenigen Tagen von Amerika nach England geflogen zu sein, so glaube ich, da er sich darin nicht irren kann. Ebenso, wenn Einer sagt, er sitze jetzt am Tisch und schreibe. Aber wenn ich mich auch in solchen Fllen nicht irren kann, ist es nicht mglich, da ich in der Narkose bin? Wenn ich es bin und wenn die Narkose mir das Bewutsein raubt, dann rede und denke ich jetzt nicht wirklich. Ich kann nicht im Ernst annehmen ich trume jetzt. Wer trumend sagt Ich trume, auch wenn er dabei hrbar redete, hat so wenig recht, wie wenn er im Traum sagt Es regnet, whrend es tatschlich regnet. Auch wenn sein Traum wirklich mit dem Gerusch des Regens zusammenhngt. If someone believes he flew from America to England a few days ago, then, I believe, he cannot be making a mistake. Just as someone who says that he is at this moment sitting at a table, writing.
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But even if in such cases I cannot be wrong, isnt it possible that I am under anaesthesia? If I am and if the anaesthesia has robbed me of my consciousness, than I am not now really talking and thinking. I cannot seriously assume that I am at this moment dreaming. The dreamer who says I am dreaming, even if he speaks audibly, is no more right than if he said in his dream it is raining, while it was in fact raining. Even if his dream were actually connected with the noise of the rain. Wittgensteins philosophical method In November 1931, in his eighth manuscript volume Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Grammatik, Wittgenstein contrasts his philosophical method with the intellectual habits and with thinkers of his time, in particular in contrast to his friend Frank Ramsey, who had died, aged 26, in January 1930: Ramsey war ein brgerlicher Denker. D.h. seine Gedanken hatten den Zweck die Dinge in einer gegebenen Gemeinde zu ordnen. Er dachte nicht ber das Wesen des Staates nach oder doch nicht gerne sondern darber wie man diesen Staat vernnftig einrichten knne. Der Gedanke da dieser Staat nicht der einzig mgliche sei beunruhigte ihn teils, teils langweilte er ihn. Er wollte so geschwind als mglich dahin kommen ber die Grundlagen dieses Staates nachzudenken. Hier lag seine Fhigkeit und sein eigentliches Interesse; whrend die eigentlich(e) philosophische berlegung ihn beunruhigte bis er ihr Resultat (wenn sie eins hatte) als trivial zur Seite schob. Ramsey was a bourgeois thinker, i.e. his thinking aimed at clearing up things in some particular community. He did not reflect on the very nature of the state or at least he did not like doing so but on how this state might reasonably be organized. The idea that this state might not be the only possible one partly unsettled and partly bored him. He wanted to get down as quickly as possible to reflecting on the foundations of this state. This was what he was good at and what really interested him; whereas real philosophical reflection unsettled him until he put its result (if it had one) on one side as trivial. Die Unruhe in der Philosophie entsteht dadurch/kommt daher/, da die Philosophen die Philosophie falsch ansehen, oder falsch sehen, nmlich gleichsam in (unendliche) Lngsstreifen zerlegt statt in (endliche) Querstreifen. Diese Umstellung der Auffassung macht die grte Schwierigkeit. Sie wollen also gleichsam den Unendlichen Streifen erfassen und klagen da es/dies/ nicht Stck fr Stck mglich ist. Freilich nicht wenn man unter einem Stck einen endlosen Lngsstreifen versteht. Wohl aber wenn man einen Quersteifen als Stck/ganzes definitives Stck/ sieht. Aber dann kommen wir ja mit unserer Aufgabe/ Arbeit/ nie zu Ende! Gewi/Freilich/ nicht, denn sie hat ja auch keins. The disquiet in philosophy arises/comes about because philosophers view or see philosophy in the wrong way, as if it were dissected into (infinite)longitudinal strips rather than into (finite) cross-sections. This change of perception causes the greatest difficulties. They want to grab the infinite strip and then lament the fact that this cannot be done piece by piece. It is indeed impossible, if one thinks
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of a piece as an infinite longitudinal strip, but possible if a cross-section is seen as a piece/a complete, definitive piece. But then we never come to an end with our task. Quite so, since there is no end to it. Der Philosoph ist nicht Brger einer Denkgemeinde. Das ist, was ihn zum Philosophen macht. The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him a philosopher. In that same year, in a draft for a lecture, he explains to his students the significance of his philosophy for science: how to ask the right questions, that is the right way to look at philosophical problems, and how to dissolve the knots in our language and in our thinking: What I should like to get you to do is not to agree with me in particular opinions but to investigate the matter in the right way. To notice the interesting kind of things (i.e. the things which will serve as keys if you use them properly). What different people expect to get from religion is what they expect to get from philosophy. I dont want to give you a Definition of Philosophy but I should like you to have a very lively idea as to the characters of philosophical problems. If you had, by the way, I could stop/start/ lecturing at once. To tackle the philosophical problem is difficult as we are caught in the meshes of language. Has the universe an end/beginning/ in Time (Einstein) You would perhaps give up Philosophy if you knew what it is. You want explanations instead of wanting descriptions. And you are therefore looking for the wrong kind of thing. Philosophical questions, as soon as you boil them down to . . . . change their aspect entirely. What evaporates is what the intellect cannot tackle. Wittgenstein and science Wittgensteins critique of modern science becomes particularly clear after the dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 6th and on the 9th of August 1945. In fact, it is quite similar to that of Bertolt Brecht. On the occasion of the second performance of his historical drama The Life of Galileo, on the 30th of July 1947 in Beverly Hills, Brecht extends the moral argument of his didactic play by accusing Galileo of the betrayal of science: G gab den eigentlichen Fortschritt preis, als er widerrief, er lie das Volk im Stich, die Astronomie wurde wieder ein Fach, Domne der Gelehrten, unpolitisch, isoliert. G abandoned real progress when he retracted, he abandoned the people, astronomy became a discipline again, a domain of the academics apolitical, isolated. That is, Galilei relegated science from a means for everyone to understand the world better and with it themselves, back into a domain for specialists. And it is only in the context of specialization that a development such as that of the atom bomb was possible; the world and everything that exists on it does not need it. When Albert Einstein, whom Brecht deeply
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respected, warned that the atom bomb must not be released to other powers, least of all to Russia, Brechts comment was: Das brilliante Fachgehirn, eingesetzt in einen schlechten Violinspieler und ewigen Gymnasiasten mit einer Schwche fr Generalisierungen in der Politik. A brilliant experts brain inside a bad violin player and eternal grammar-school boy with a weakness for generalizations in politics. Wittgensteins view is very similar. In a comment about Einstein and the scientists of his day he writes on the 1st of August 1946: Je weniger sich Einer selbst kennt und versteht um so weniger gro ist er, wie gro auch sein Talent sein mag. Darum sind unsre Wissenschaftler nicht gro. Darum sind Freud, Spengler, Kraus, Einstein nicht gro. The less well someone knows and understands himself the less great he is, however great his talent. For this reason our scientists are not great. For this reason Freud, Spengler, Kraus, Einstein are not great. But the atom bomb represented for Wittgenstein also a ray of hope. The hope, that its very existence, not its use, might herald the end of a science perverted by its specialization and its association with industry. This is how he describes it on the 19th of August 1946: Die hysterische Angst, die die ffentlichkeit jetzt vor der Atom-Bombe hat, oder doch ausdrckt, ist beinahe ein Zeichen, da hier einmal wirklich eine heilsame Erfindung gemacht worden ist. Wenigstens macht die Furcht den Eindruck der, vor einer wirklich wirksamen bitteren Medizin. Ich kann mich des Gedanken nicht erwehren: wenn hier nicht etwas Gutes vorlge, wrden die Philister kein Geschrei anheben. Aber vielleicht ist auch das ein kindischer Gedanke. Denn, was ich meinen kann, ist doch nur, da die Bombe das Ende, die Zerstrung eines grlichen bels, der ekelhaften, seifenwssrigen Wissenschaft, in Aussicht stellt. Und das ist freilich kein unangenehmer Gedanke; aber wer sagt, was auf eine solche Zerstrung folgen wrde? Die Leute, die heute gegen die Erzeugung der Bombe reden, sind freilich der Auswurf der Intelligenz, aber auch das beweist nicht unbedingt, da das zu preisen ist, was sie verabscheuen. The hysterical fear of the atom bomb the public now has, or at least expresses, is almost a sign that here, for once, a really salutary discovery has been made. At least the fear gives the impression of being fear in the face of a really effective bitter medicine. I cannot rid myself of the thought that, if there were not something good here, the philistines would not be making an outcry. But perhaps this too is a childish idea. For all I can mean really is that the bomb creates a prospect of the end, the destruction of a ghastly evil, the disgusting dishwater science and certainly that is not an unpleasant thought; but who is to say what would follow such destruction? The people now making speeches against producing the bomb are undoubtedly the dregs of the intelligentsia, but even that does not prove beyond question that what they abominate is to be praised. However, twelve months later, he has given up this hope, realizing that the kind of science that he so detests has associated itself ever closer with industry a development that has not only persisted into the present time, but has gained speed. On the 14th of July 1947 he writes: Es knnte sein, da die Wissenschaft und Industrie, und ihr Fortschritt, das Bleibendste der heutigen Welt ist. Da jede Mutmaung eines Zusammenbruchs

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der Wissenschaft und Industrie einstweilen, und auf lange Zeit, ein bloer Traum sei/ist/, und Wissenschaft und Industrie noch und mit unendlichem Jammer die Welt einigen werden, ich meine, sie zu einem Reich zusammenfassen werden, in dem/welchem/ dann freilich alles eher als der Friede wohnen wird. Denn die Wissenschaft und Industrie entscheiden doch die Kriege, oder so scheint es. It may be that science and industry, and their progress, are the most enduring thing in the world today. That any conjecture of a collapse of science and industry for now and for a long time to come, is simply a dream, and that science and industry will unite the world causing infinite misery, merging it into one single realm, in which however anything but peace will reign. For it is science and industry that decide wars, or so it seems. In the meantime, however, industry and politics have appeased us: They have made us believe that the atom bomb is, after all, a good thing that has granted us more than 50 years of peace; that without nuclear power, the earth would warm up even more quickly and a large part of the inhabited world would be submerged under water; and that without the further development of the neurotoxins, invented during the wars to kill people, into so-called agrochemicals, a large part of humanity would be starving, etc. etc. Wittgenstein believes, like Lessing, that science needs to re-define itself: It must free itself from the orthodox primer, from orthodox elementary thinking, where, as Lessing writes, the enforcement of rules and laws is ensured by penalties and rewards, where questions about the rules are not allowed. Results achieved by this method are either correct or wrong. They are free from ethical or moral ballast. If this opens up possibilities that cause conflicts with our world (like when Edward Teller argued that his hydrogen bomb was merely the result of a strict application of the laws of nature) society steps in with orders and interdictions. A science, on the other hand, that acts responsibly is not in need of an ethics commission that keeps it in check. Moral and ethical criteria have to derive directly from science itself, only that way will they be effective. Remarks 107, 108 and 116 of the Philosophical Investigations explain how we, and science, need to change our way of looking at the world: Je genauer wir die tatschliche Sprache betrachten, desto strker wird der Widerstreit zwischen ihr und unserer Forderung. (Die Kristallreinheit der Logik [das Ideal einer Orthodoxie] hatte sich mir ja nicht ergeben; sondern sie war eine Forderung.) The more narrowly we view actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For crytalline purity of logic [the ideal of an orthodoxy] was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) Das Vorurteil der Kristallreinheit kann nur so beseitigt werden, da wir unsere ganze Betrachtung drehen. (Man knnte sagen: Die Betrachtung mu gedreht werden, aber um unser eigentliches Bedrfnis als Angelpunkt.) The prejudice of crystalline clarity can only be removed by turning our whole view round. (One might say: the view must be rotated, but on the pivot of our actual need.) Wenn die Philosophen ein Wort gebrauchen Wissen, sein, Gegenstand, ich, Satz, Name und das Wesen des Dings zu erfassen trachten, mu man
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sich immer fragen: Wird denn dieses Wort in der Sprache, in der es seine Heimat hat, je so gebraucht? Wir fhren die Wrter von ihrer metaphysischen, wieder auf ihre alltgliche Verwendung zurck. When philosophers use a word knowledge, being, object, I, proposition, name and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it has its home? We take words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. When speaking of our need Wittgenstein does not mean the needs of stakeholders, of industry, of specialists, of politicians, but the needs of the world in general, and of everything that exists on it, not of mankind in particular. During the Great War, on the 2nd of September 1916, while serving as a soldier at the front in Galicia, Wittgenstein described how he sees the significance and the role of man in the world: Das philosophische Ich ist nicht der Mensch, nicht der Menschliche Krper oder die Menschliche Seele mit den Psychologischen Eigenschaften, sondern das Metaphysische Subjekt, die Grenze (nicht ein Teil) der Welt. Der Menschliche Krper aber, mein Krper insbesondere, ist ein Teil der Welt unter anderen Teilen der Welt, unter Tieren, Pflanzen, Steinen etc. etc. Wer das einsieht, wird seinem Krper oder dem Menschlichen Krper nicht eine bevorzugte Stelle in der Welt einrumen wollen. Er wird Menschen und Tiere ganz naiv als hnliche und zusammengehrige Dinge betrachten. The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with its psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary (not a part) of the world. The human body, however, my body in particular, is part of the world among others, among animals, plants, stones etc., etc. Those who realize this will not want to assign to their own or the human body in general a privileged place in the world. They will regard humans and animals quite navely as similar objects that belong together.
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References 1 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, Werke, Bd 7, Theologiekritische Schriften I und II, Mnchen 1970 ff., Paragraph 53, p. 488. 2 WA5.23.1 Wiener Ausgabe (Vienna Edition), Wien New York 1993 ff.: (quoted as: WAVolume.Page.Remark) 3 WA5.123.3 4 G.E. Moore Philosophical Papers, London 1951, p. 254 5 Wittgenstein Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, London 1922, p. 28 6 Wittgenstein Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker, Salzburg, p. 97 7 Wittgenstein Logisch Philosophische Abhandlung, London 1922, p. 188 8 WA1.157.6 9 WA3.112.2 10 Wittgenstein ber Gewiheit, Frankfurt 1984, paragraph 675 f. 11 WA4.172.7 12 WA4.163.6 13 WA4.173.7 14 WA3.VII 15 Bertold Brecht, Leben des Gallei (1955/56), Stcke 5, Frankfurt 1988, p. 342 16 ibid. p. 346 17 Wittgenstein Culture and Value, Oxford 1998, p. 516 18 ibid. p. 518-519 19 ibid. p. 538-539 20 Wittgenstein Philosophische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt 1963, paragraph 107 21 ibid. section 108 22 ibid. section 116 23 Wittgenstein Tagebcher, Frankfurt 1984, p. 177

Wittgensteins composite photograph, based on Galtons composite-photography. Wittgenstein made this experiment in the 1920s with the help of his friend, the photographer Moritz Nhr. It shows how Wittgensteins practical work is connected to his philosophy, and further, that during his time as a schoolmaster, gardener and architect, Wittgenstein was indeed concerned with philosophy. Lecture on Ethics, given to the Cambridge Heretics 17 November 1929 My subject, as you know, is Ethics and I will adopt the explanation of that term which Professor Moore has given in his book Principia Ethica. He says: Ethics is the general enquiry into what is good. Now I am going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider sense, in a sense in fact which includes what I believe to be the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics. And to make you see as clearly as possible what I take to be the subject matter of Ethics I will put before you a number of more or less synonymous expressions each of which could be substituted for the above definition, and by enumerating them I want to produce the same sort of effect which Galton produced when he took a number of photos of different faces on the same photographic plate in order to get the picture of the typical features they all had in common. And as by showing to you such a collective photo I could make you see what is the typical say Chinese face; so if you look through the row of synonyms which I will put before you, you will, I hope, be able to see the characteristic features they all have in common and these are the characteristic features of Ethics.

The composite photo marks the beginning of the development of the central terms of his Philosophical Investigations: Spiel (games) and Familienhnlichkeit, (family resemblance) 66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call games. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic-games, and so on. What is common to them all? Dont say: There must be something common, or they would not be called games but look and see whether there is anything common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: dont think, but look! [] And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities in detail. 67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than family resemblances; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. And I shall say: games form a family. 71. One might say that the concept game is a concept with blurred edges. But is a blurred concept a concept at all? Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isnt the indistinct one often exactly what we need?

Components of Wittgensteins composite photo from his photo album (not exactly the ones used for the composite photo, but from the same series of portraits): Wittgensteins sisters Gretl and Hermine, below his sister Helene and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The components can be identified by the background, shown only in the photo of his sister Gretl and further by the necklaces and dresses of his sisters as well as by Ludwig Wittgensteins tweed jacket and his open collar.