NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. HONORABLE MAURO T. ALLARDE G.R. No.

106593 November 16, 1999 FACTS: Lots 836 and 839, registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 34624 and No. 34627, respectively, were acquired by the Republic on April 2, 1938 from Philippine Trust Company. 4 Said lots form part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, which, on April 26, 1971, was reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the housing programs of the National Housing Authority. According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the disputed lots since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working on a six-hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of the same lots. 5 On September 1, 1983, the National Housing Authority notified the respondent spouses of the scheduled development of the Tala Estate including the lots in question, warning them that it would not be responsible for any damage which may be caused to the crops planted on the said lots. 6 In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the award to them of subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). 7 In January 1992, in pursuance of the implementation of Proclamation No. 843, petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging the dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process. On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses, relying on their claim that subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, 8 brought before the respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from bulldozing further and making constructions on the lots under controversy. Petitioner traversed such complaint, contending that the said lots which were previously reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and resettlement purposes, are not covered by the CARP as they are not agricultural lands within the definition and contemplation of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. ISSUE: Whether or not the Compressive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers government lands reserved for specific public purposes prior to the effectivity of said law. HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.

In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 16 the Court succinctly held that lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies other than the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), are not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said law. Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots) was reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, 19and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL.

REMIGIO ISIDRO vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-105586 December 15, 1993

FACTS: Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject top the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. Hence, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. ISSUE: WON THE SUBJECT IS A FISHPOND AND UNDER THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FISHPONDS ARE CLASSIFIED AS AGRICULTURAL LANDS. HELD: It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 15 and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or

industrial land. 16 Republic Act No. 6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or judicial.

ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 103103 June 17, 1996 FACTS: Isabel Tupas was the registered owner of a parcel of rice land, designated Lot No. 901-B-1, with an area of 120,000 square meters (12 hectares), in Taloc, Bago City, under TCT No. T-26014. 3 On 24 February 1977, she leased her landholding, excluding the 33,438-square-meter portion already tenanted by one Jose Jacinto, for the amount of P10,000.00 to petitioner Enrique P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a contract that was set to expire on 31 May 1982. 4 Some time in 1979, Armada started tilling an area of 32,945 square meters, identified to be Lot No. 901-B-1-D, 5 of the farmland under an agreement with Enrique Suplico. Armada undertook to till the land while Suplico agreed to provide the farm implements and work animals. Suplico was to receive from Armada 62 cavans from the palay harvest per crop yield by way of rental for the use not only of the land but also of the work animals and a hand tractor. 6 Private respondent resided with his family in a farmhouse on the land. When, years later, Suplico threatened to eject Armada from the property, Armada initiated, on 03 May 1982, an action for damages and injunction against Suplico in the Court of Agrarian Relations ("CAR") in Bacolod City. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Armada should be held a tenant farmer entitled to security of tenure or a mere hired farm laborer. HELD: Firstly, private respondent was in actual possession of the land, 18 and he there resided, with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would. 19 Secondly, private respondent and his wife were personally doing the farm work of plowing, planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary hiring of persons outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant himself had control in the farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the status of tenancy. 20 Thirdly, the management of the farm was left entirely to private respondent who defrayed the cultivation expenses. 21 Fourthly, private respondent shared the harvest of the land, depositing or delivering to petitioner Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans of palay per crop yield.

REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJASA vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 108941 FACTS: This case involves two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-581917 and TCT No. T59172,8 measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares more or less, situated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. The parcels of land are indisputably owned by Isabel Candelaria. On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land with Pio Malabanan (hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan"). In the contract, Malabanan agreed among other things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase or procure calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits, etc."9 Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. The Bejasas claim that they planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the land and shouldered all expenses of production. On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying their first agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria.10 Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died. On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan (hereinafter referred to as "Jaime) as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land.11 On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife (hereinafter referred to as "Victoria"). The contract had a term of one year.12 On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga"13 agreement, with a term of one year. During the first week of December 1984, the Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as agreed. The balance of P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the amount of P4,000.00 was paid on January 11, 1985.15 After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest.16 July 6, 2000

On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land.17 The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime was also renewed by Candelaria on the same date.18 On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the Bejasas. ISSUE: Whether there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas. HELD: The elements of a tenancy relationship are:37 (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties. Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land.1avvphi1 However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed. There was no proof that they shared the harvests. Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent. Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did. Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the "aryenduhan",49which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the contract.

Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny the petition.

RODRIGO ALMUETE and ANA AMUETE vs. MARCELO ANDRES G.R. No. 122276 FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of agricultural land identified as Lot 8449 Pls-967, located at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela, measuring approximately 72,587 square meters. Way back on March 25, 1957, this parcel was awarded by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete. Since then, Rodrigo Almuete exercised exclusive possession of the property, cultivating it and planting thereon narra, fruit trees, rice corn and legumes. For some twenty-two (22) years, Rodrigo Almuete and his family farmed the subject property peacefully and exclusively. However, unknown to Rodrigo Almuete, on August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name Leticia Gragasin filed a field investigation and inspection report stating, among others, that the whereabouts of the original awardee of the subject property, Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had "waived all his rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and financial hardship." Gragasin also stated therein that "the actual occupant of the land is Marcelo Andres since April 1967 to date." She recommended to the Director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Tuguegarao, Cagayan that the award in favor of Rodrigo Almuete be cancelled and that the land be awarded to respondent Marcelo Andres. Consequently, Marcelo Andres was allowed to file his homestead application. To further support his application, Marcelo Andres represented to the MAR (now DAR) officials that sometime in 1965, Rodrigo Almuete sold the subject property to one Victor Masiglat, who gave the former a radiophono set as consideration therefor. Since Victor Masiglat was disqualified from acquiring the subject property owing to his also being a NARRA awardee, he transferred the said property to Marcelo Andres in exchange for one (1) carabao and the sum of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00). These successive transfers were not covered by written contracts between the parties. On the strength of the MAR Regional Director's recommendation and Marcelo Andres' representations, the latter was granted and issued a homestead patent.1wphi1.nt Unaware that the NARRA award in his favor had been cancelled and that a homestead patent had been issued to Marcelo Andres, Rodrigo Almuete and his family, particularly his daughter Ana Almuete, continued to cultivate and farm the subject property. Shortly thereafter, Marcelo Andres, accompanied by ten (10) other persons armed with bolos and other bladed implements, entered the subject property, claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession. ISSUE: Whether or no the case is an agrarian dispute. November 20, 2001

HELD: " Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, as: (d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.9

LEONARDA L. MONSANTO vs.JESUS AND TERESITA ZERNA G.R. No. 142501 December 7, 2001

FACTS: Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna (herein private respondents) were charged with qualified theft in Criminal Case No. 5896, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 6. The said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each

other, being then the overseers of some banana plants on the land owned by one Leonarda Monsanto and principally devoted to coconut trees, and having access to said land as such, with grave abuse of confidence reposed [i]n them by the said owner, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, harvest and carry away coconuts from the premises of the said plantation, which the said accused then processed into copra with a total value of P6,162.50, belonging to said Leonarda Monsanto, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said Leonarda Monsanto in the aforesaid sum of P6,162.50, Philippine Currency." ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court is automatically divested of jurisdiction over a criminal case where an agrarian issue is argued as a defense. HELD: In Estates Development Corporation v. CA,21 the essential elements of a tenancy relationship were listed in this wise: "For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee 2) subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee." After a careful review of the records of this case, we hold that an agrarian dispute existed between the parties.

GABINO ALITA, et al vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al (G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989) PARAS, J.: FACTS: Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Trial Court. Antecedent Facts: 1. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 2. private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands. ISSUE: The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27. HELD: We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

EUDOSIA DAEZ rep by his HEIRS vs THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, et al [G.R. No. 133507. February 17, 2000] DE LEON, JR., J.: FACTS: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA denied the application of petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez for the retention of a 4.1685-hectare riceland pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, thereby reversing the Decisionof then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres and the Orderof then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, both of which had earlier set aside the Resolutionand Order of the then DAR Sec Ernesto D. Garilao denying exemption of the same riceland from coverage under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Antecedent Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. 1. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 2. Private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers 3. Armed with such document, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. 4. The undersec Medina issued an order denying the claim of the petitioner alleging that the said lot is beyond the retention limit. ISSUE: WON the petitioner has the right to retain. HELD: We grant the petition. First. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts. Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered at all by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are present. LOI No. 474 clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term "other agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the landowner derives adequate income to support his family.

Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowners right of retention, are different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory. Second. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland. In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries.What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. Finally. Land awards made pursuant to the governments agrarian reform program are subject to the exercise by a landowner, who is so qualified, of his right of retention. Under P.D. No. 27, beneficiaries are issued CLTs to entitle them to possess lands. Thereafter, they are issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) after compliance with all necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon their presentation to the Register of Deeds, result in the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCT) in favor of the beneficiaries mentioned therein. Under R.A. No. 6657, the procedure has been simplifiedOnly Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) are issued, in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all prerequisites. Thereafter, upon presentation of the CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs are issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer issued. The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowners retained area. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 28, 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Office of the President, dated July 5, 1996, is hereby REINSTATED. In the implementation of said decision, however, the Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby ORDERED to fully accord to private respondents their rights under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.

FLORENCIA PARIS vs DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, et al [G.R. No. 139083. August 30, 2001] PANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS: The Petition for Review before us assails the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Antecedent Facts: 1. Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon with an area of 10.6146 hectares, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8275 and another property with an area of 13.2614 hectares covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4985, also located at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon; 2. The aforementioned lands were tenanted by the respondentswho are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27; 3. Petitioner and the tenants have not signed any Land Transfer Production Agreement. 4. Petitioner contends that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire the subject land and the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are null and void for being contrary to law. 5. Petitioner also contends that the property covered by OCT No. P-4985 as original homestead grantee who still owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants.

6. The CA rejected the claim of petitioner. It ruled that she could not retain her homesteads, since she was not the actual cultivator thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act [are] exempted from the operation of land reform. HELD: Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law. The right to retain seven hectares of land is subject to the condition that the landowner is actually cultivating that area or will cultivate it upon the effectivity of the said law. The Petition is partly meritorious. Respondents are entitled to the lands they till, subject to the determination and payment of just compensation to petitioner. First Issue: Petitioners Homesteads Not Exempt from Land Reform Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to retain any portion of her landholdings. Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original homesteads, only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage. However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled to retain such area. WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the provincial agrarian reform adjudicator is REINSTATED with the modification that the lease rentals, which respondents have already paid to petitioner after October 21, 1972, are to be considered part of the purchase price for the subject parcels of land. ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION vs Sec of DAR [G.R. No. 93100. June 19, 1997] PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF FISHFARM PRODUCERS, INC. vs Sec of DaR [G.R. No. 97855. June 19, 1997] ROMERO, J.: FACTS: Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the constitutionality of some portions of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Antecedent Facts: 1. Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation,Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitionerin-intervention Archies Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acunaare engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. 2. They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. 3. The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reformregarding the inclusion of land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. ISSUE: The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the same above-mentioned provisions insofar as they include in its coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms. HELD: The above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. RP rep. by the DAR vs CA and GREEN CITY ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT CO. [G.R. No. 139592. October 5, 2000] GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS: This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision of the CA hat reversed the Order of petitioner, the Department of Agrarian Reform (petitioner DAR), by exempting the parcels of land of private respondent from agrarian reform. Antecedent Facts: 1. The five parcels of land in issue has a combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. M-45856, M-45857, M-45858, M-45859 and M-45860 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. 2. The tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural. 3. The DAR issued a notice of coverage, however, the private respondent filed for an exemption. 4. DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of the said petition, on the ground that private respondent failed to substantiate their (sic) allegation that the properties are indeed in the municipalitys residential and forest conservation zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable. ISSUES/ Petitioner's Contentions: WON THERE WAS NO DEFINITE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPERTIES INVOLVED WHEN, PER THE CORRESPONDING TAX DECLARATIONS, THEY ARE GENERALLY CLASSIFIED AS AGRICULTURAL. WON THE PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE LAND AS OF 1980 OR BEFORE AS APPEARING IN TABLE 3-3 OF THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS THE PRESENT CLASSIFICATION OF THE LANDHOLDINGS INVOLVED; and WON THE RULING ON HOW SUBJECT LANDHOLDING BE CLASSIFIED (WHETHER COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM FOR BEING AGRICULTURAL LAND OR NOT) AND DISPOSED OF SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE LAND IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LEGAL ISSUE RAISED ON THEIR LEGAL CLASSIFICATION, A FUNCTION THAT IS VESTED IN CONGRESS. RULING: The petition has no merit. Private respondent sought exemption from the coverage of CARL on the ground that its five parcels of land are not wholly agricultural. The land use map of the municipality, certified by the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) of Jala-Jala and the report of the commission constituted by the Court of Appeals established that the properties lie mostly within the residential and forest conservation zone. There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED.

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs COURT OF APPEALS, et al. [G.R. No. 112526. October 12, 2001] PARDO, J.: FACTS:The casebefore the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the decision of the DARABordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioners property under the CARP. Antecedent Facts: 1. Petitioner was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area. 2. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. 3. Respondents filed a case before the RTC of Laguna seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of countter-claim the petitioners sued the private respondents for ejectment. 4. The respondent petitioned the DAR for the compulsary acquisition of the landholdings of the petitioners. 5. MARO issued a notice of coverage which affected the parcels of lands owned by the petitioners. A conference ensued and the representatives of the petitioners are present, as well as the potential farmers-beneficiaries.

6. The farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna. Thus, the MARO conducted a summary investigation on the claim of the respondents. 7. Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition [11 to petitioner, stating that petitioners landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. ISSUE: The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657. HELD: The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. Watersheds may be defined as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as PARK by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution voiding the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now classified as agricultural land. The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now. Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No. 6657. Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes. To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234. In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program. In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.

LUZ FARMS vs HE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DAR [G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.] EN BANC PARAS, J.: FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. Antecedent Facts: 1. R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage; 2. Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657; 3. Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of the said Law as well as the implementing rules and regulations; 4. Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith. HELD: There is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.