Narratives

Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license.

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Table of Contents

Lozano v. Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986] 1 Del Rosario v. Bengzon [GR 88265, 21 December 1989] 1 Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987] 2 Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967] 3 Sangalang v. IAC [GR 71169, 25 August 1989] 4 Villanueva v. Castaneda [GR L-61311, 21 September 1987] 4 De la Cruz v. Paras [GR L-42571-72, 25 July 1983] ... 5 Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983] 6 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994] 7 Tano v. Socrates [GR 110249, 21 August 1997] 7 Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984] 8 Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982] 9 Anglo-Fil Trading v. Lazaro [GR L-54958, 2 September 1983] 10

This collection contains thirteen (13) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).

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2 Lozano v. Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986] En Banc, Yap (J): 9 concur Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 7581213, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief. Issue: Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act. Held: Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Further, a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, the Court should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute. 3 Del Rosario v. Bengzon [GR 88265, 21 December 1989] En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in result Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead. Issue: Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import
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in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation. Held: Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with "no substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority. 4 Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional. Held: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
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who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. 5 Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967] En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City of Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together; (3) provides that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila lack authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees, partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid and/or constitutional. Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
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registration of transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract , insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. 6 Sangalang v. IAC [GR 71169, 25 August 1989] En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 11 concur, 3 took no part Facts: The Supreme Court promulgated its decision on 22 December 1988. Two (2) motions for reconsideration were filed by Atty. Sangco (in behalf of the Sangalangs, GR71169) and Atty. Sison (in behalf of Bel-Air Village Association [BAVA]), and a motion for reconsideration/clarification filed by Atty. Funk (GR 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281). The motion for reconsideration (GR 71169), filed by the Sangalangs, was anchored on two grounds: (1) that contrary to the SC decision, Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents; and (b) that the Ayala Corporation did contrive to acquire membership at BAVA purposely to bargain for access to Jupiter Street by the general public. Subsequently, BAVA informed the Court that it was adopting the Sangalangs' motion for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration (in GRs 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281) raises more or less the same questions and asks furthermore that the Supreme Court delete the award of damages granted by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether the general public has right to to use Jupiter and Orbit streets in Bel-Air Village, and whether the demolition of the gates in said streets was valid or lawful. Held: Yes. The Deed of Donation executed by the Ayala Corporation covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets effectively required both passageways open to the general public. The donation gave the general public equal right to it. The opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. The opening of Orbit Street is upheld for the same rationale. The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter Streets does not amount to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation, as there is no taking of property involved in the case. The challenged act of the Mayor is, rather, in the concept of police power. The gate, the destruction of which opened Orbit Street, has the character of a public nuisance in the sense that it hinders and impairs the use of property. Article 699 of the Civil Code provides that the remedies against a public nuisance are (1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or (2) A civil action; or (3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings. In addition, under Article 701 of the Code, summary abatement (without judicial proceeding) may be carried out by the Mayor himself. 7 Villanueva v. Castaneda [GR L-61311, 21 September 1987] First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave. Facts: On 7 November 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando (Pampanga) adopted Resolution 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association (FUMTA) to construct permanent stalls and sell along Mercado street, on a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters
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(talipapa). The action was protested on 10 November 1961 by Felicidad Villanueva, Fernando Caisip, Antonio Liang, Felina Miranda, Ricardo Puno, Florencio Laxa, and Rene Ocampo (claiming that they were granted previous authorization by the municipal government to conduct business therein), in Civil Case 2040, where the Court of First Instance (CFI) Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the FUMTA members from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On 18 January 1964, while the case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality," thereby impliedly revoking Resolution 218 (series of 1961). On 2 November 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by Villanueva, et. al., being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. The decision was not enforced as the petitioners were not evicted from the place. The number of vendors in the area (talipapa) ballooned to 200. The area deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general, as the makeshift stalls render the area as virtual fire trap. The problem festered for some more years under a presumably uneasy truce among the protagonists, none of whom made any move, for some reason. On 12 January 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution 29, to restore the property to its original and customary use as a public plaza. Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, OIC (Office of the Mayor) Vicente Macalino issued on 14 June 1982 a resolution requiring the municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls beginning 1 July 1982. The Villanueva, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI Pampanga (Civil Case 6470) on 26 June 1982. The judge denied the petition on 19 July 1982, and the motion for reconsideration on 5 August 1982, prompting Villanueva, et. al. to file a petition on certiorari with the Supreme Court. Paterno Guevarra, who replaced Macalino as OIC of San Fernando, was impleaded. Issue: Whether the demolition of the stalls in the place known as talipapa, pursuant to Resolution 29 of the municipal government, is valid; notwithstanding alleged contractual arrangements of market lessees (Villanueva, et.al.) with the municipal government. Held: Yes. Police power under the general welfare clause authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. Police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, a public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. The lease of a public plaza of a municipality in favor of a private person is null and void. A plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. On the other hand, a portion of a public sidewalk is likewise beyond the commerce of man. Any contract entered into in connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra vires. The sidewalk was intended for and was used by the public, in going from one place to another. The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation. Stalls block the free passage of pedestrians resulting to clogged with vehicular traffic. 8 De la Cruz v. Paras [GR L-42571-72, 25 July 1983] En Banc, Fernando (J): 9 concur, 1 reserved right to dissent, 2 on official leave, 1 on sick leave Facts: The municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan issued Ordinance 84 (Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan) prohibited the operation of night clubs, and such clubs employing hostesses. On 5 November 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the CFI Bulacan. The cases were assigned to Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), who
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issued a restraining order on 7 November 1975. The answers were thereafter filed. On 15 January 1976, the lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence the petition for certiorari by way of appeal. Issue: Whether the prohibition on the operation of night clubs, to foster public morals, is reasonable and/or valid. Held: Reasonableness is consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. Sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power could not qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. On its face, the Ordinance is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. A prohibition is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed. Republic Act 938 (An Act granting municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within their respective territorial jurisdiction) granted the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city to have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction. The power to regulate, was amended to likewise prohibit on 21 May 1954; but the title remained intact. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. The power claimed to enact the ordinance is at the most dubious and under the present Local Government Code non-existent. The law mandates the sangguniang bayan to "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage parlors; and (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. 9 Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983] En Banc, Fernando (J): 10 concur, 1 reserving vote, 1 took no part Facts: Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any operator of any barbershop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room(s) of said barber shop, or in any room(s) within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco, Lourdes Ramirez, Sy Pin, Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes Lomibao, as component members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed petition for declaratory relief with the lower court, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance as it allegedly amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The petition was denied by the lower court as its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure. Held: The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers."
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The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. It has made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. The clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence and it has continued to be. 10 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994] En Banc, Cruz (J): 12 concur Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines (the constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gambling Corporation). Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16. Its Sangguniang Panglungsod derives its powers, duties and functions under Section 458 of said Code. In 1992, following its success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore). Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of the decision was denied on 13 July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro can prohibit the establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution. Held: The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The suggestion that the Local Government Code (LGC) authorize Local Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of legislature. Ordinances should not contravene a statute as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. 11 Tano v. Socrates [GR 110249, 21 August 1997] En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 5 concur, 4 join ponencias of Davide & Mendoza, 1 on official leave. Facts: On 15 December 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance 15-92 (taking effect on 1 January 1993; An ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside
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Puerto Princesa City from 1 January 1993 to 1 January 1998, and providing exemptions; penalties and for other purposes thereof). To implement said ordinance, Acting Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order 23 (series of 1993) dated 22 January 1993 authorizing the inspection of cargoes shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Wharf, and any other port within the jurisdiction of the City. On 19 February 1993, the Sangguniang Lalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution 33 [A resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: Family: Scaridae (Mameng), Epine Phelus Fasciatus (Suno), Cromileptes Altivelis (Panther or Senorita), Lobster below 200 grams and spawning, Tridacna Gigas (Takllobo), Pinctada Margaritefera (Mother pearl, Oysters, Giant clams, and other species), Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn, Breeder size or mother), Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green grouper), and Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters]. Puerto Princesa City and the province of Palawan implemented said ordinances. Tano, et. al., who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution 33 and Ordinance 2 of Palawan in Criminal Case 93-05-C of the 1st MCTC of Palawan; and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, who were charged with violating City Ordinance 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance 2 of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa, questioned the validity of the said ordinances before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the fishing of certain marine species in Palawan, are constitutional and/or valid. Held: Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Local Government Code (LGC) and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)(vi), which involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the Ordinances cannot be doubted. The ordinance also find full support under Republic Act 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act), approved on 19 June 1992; which adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province. The first objective (to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years) is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The second objective (to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities) falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. 12 Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984] En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 took no part Facts: Letter of Instruction 869 was issued on 31 May 1979 to respond to the protracted oil crisis dating back to 1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays from 12 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the holiday; but exempting service, truck, diplomatic, consular corps, and tourist cars. Pursuant thereto, Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on 11 June 1979, Memorandum Circular 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Memorandum Circular 39 does not impose the penalty of
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confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer. Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC 39 through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular 39, banning certain vehicles from using the motorways in specified time, are constitutional and/or valid. Held: A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations. When a questioned statute deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power, and which is asked to be declare void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products and measures conducive to energy conservation (require and establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and communication systems; strict implementation and observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries; strict observance of traffic rules; effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and quick repair of roads and efficient operation of double decker buses; rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car owner the option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; allow neon and electrically devised advertising signs only from five o'clock p.m. to nine o'clock p.m.; prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars and seriously re-examine the car manufacturing program) are left to the discretion of the political branches. The question before the Court is limited to whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. On the other hand, as to MC 39, while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law. 13 Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982] En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 2 concur in the result Facts: On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capital Region (NCR), to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition with the BT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the BT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et. al., through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of
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the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, TOMMI, et. al., instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Memorandum Circular 77-42, phasing out 6-year old taxicabs and older, is a valid administrative issuance. Held: Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42 is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. 14 Anglo-Fil Trading v. Lazaro [GR L-54958, 2 September 1983]; also Philippine Integrated Port Services v. Lazaro [GR L-54966] En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (p): 7 concur, 2 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on leave Facts: 23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services, Inc. (PIPSI), Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation, Aduana Stevedoring Corporation, Anda Stevedoring Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service, Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (members of the Philippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc. [PASOC]), competed at the South Harbor for the performance of stevedoring work. The licenses of these contractors had long expired when the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, created by Presidential Decree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by Presidential Decree 857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and management of ports but they continued to operate afterwards on the strength of temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May 1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approving and adopting a set of policies on Port Administration, Management and Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs' policy of placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April 1980, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A which, among other things, directed PPA to expeditiously evaluate all recognized cargo handling contractors and port-related service operators and to determine the qualified contractor or operator in order to ensure effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This was followed by the President's memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr. dated 18 April 1980, directing submission of a report on the integration of the stevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and emphasizing the need for such integration as well as the strengthening of the PPA in order to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980, the committee submitted its report recommending the award of an exclusive contract for stevedoring services in the South Harbor to Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI) after
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finding it the best qualified among the existing contractors. The PPA submitted the committee report to the President, who, on 24 May 1980, approved the recommendation to award an exclusive management contract to OTSI. On 27 June 1980, PPA and OTSI entered into a management contract which provided, among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of stevedoring services in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The Board of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On 23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of gross stevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction with preliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining order was issued. On 21 August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaint in intervention. The motion was granted and on 22 August 1980, the CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980, the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders "in view of the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the countervailing public interest involved." On 1 September 1980, the CFI dissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without prejudice to the Court's resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent a letter to the General Manager of PIPSI informing him that due to the lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was withdrawing PIPSI's holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at South Harbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI, therefore, filed the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging that the lifting of the restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI was clearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulations implemented by the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is an unlawful deprivation of property rights. Held: From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte the temporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte. Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the CFI heard the parties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after hearing the parties' evidence and arguments, denied the application for the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte abuse of discretion when a court dissolves exparte a restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that due process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al. were operating merely on "hold-over" permits, which were based on PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over permits were by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelines as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served as sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSI's and Anglo-Fil et.al.'s authorities may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and regulations that the latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of power. The latter, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property without due process because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right but a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and to findings of fact.

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