MAGALLONA VS ERMITA FACTS OF THE CASE: The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic

Act 3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. More so, it has identified the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands", generating their own maritime zones. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. To their opinion, the law has effectively reduced the maritime territory of the country. With this, Article I of the 1987 Constitution will be violated. The petitioners also worried that that because of the suggested changes in the maritime baselines will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to traverse the Philippine territory freely. In effect, it steps on the states sovereignty and national security. Meanwhile, the Congress insisted that in no way will the amendments affect any pertinent power of the state. It also deferred to agree that the law impliedly relinquishes the Philippines claims over Sabah. Lastly, they have questioned the normative force of the notion that all the waters within the rectangular boundaries in the Treaty of Paris. Now, because this treaty still has undetermined controversies, the Congress believes that in the perspective of international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it. Thus, this case of prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is filed before the court, assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. THE COURTS RULING: The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it clear that it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. Secondly, the Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and the Scarborough. Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah remained even with the adoption of the amendments. Further, the Court importantly stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories. With regard to the petitioners assertion that RA 9522 has converted the internal waters into archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to be persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the political branches of Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the competent security measures and policies that will regulate innocent passage. Since the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary law, it also believes that no state can validly

invoke sovereignty to deny a right acknowledged by modern states. In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required the imposition of innocent passage as a concession in lieu of their right to claim the entire waters landward baseline. It also made it possible for archipelagic states to be recognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III.

Government it is the agency through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and carried out. The Government of the Philippines is defined as "the corporate governmental authority which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other form of local government." The political system in the Philippines takes place in an organized framework of a presidential, representative, and democratic republic whereby the president is both the head of state and the head of government within a pluriform multi-party system. This system revolves around three separate and sovereign yet interdependent branches: the legislative branch (the law-making body), the executive branch (the law-enforcing body), and the judicial branch (the lawinterpreting body). Executive power is exercised by the government under the leadership of the president. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the two-chamber congress -the Senate (the upper chamber) and the House of Representatives (the lower chamber). Judicial power is vested in the courts with the Supreme Court of the Philippines as the highest judicial body. Functions of government in two groups,

1. Constituent Functions usual governmental function, the protection of life, liberty, and property, together with all other functions that are necessary to the civic organization of society,

2. The Ministrant. functions which are undertaken, not by way of governing, but by way of advancing the general interests of society (such as education, posts and telegraphs, and the care, say, of forests), - functions which are optional, being necessary only according to standards of convenience or expediency, and not according to standards of existence; functions which assist without constituting social organization.

Romualdez-Yap v. CSC 225 SCRA 285 Facts: Petitioner, who has a consanguinial relation with Imelda Marcos, was a senior vice president of the Fund Transfer Department of PNB, while she was on Leave, EO no. 80 was approved which authorized the restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the fund transfer department was abolished and its functions were transferred to the international department. Petitioner was notified of her separation. Thus a petition filed by petitioner seeking her reinstatement to her former position as SVP of the fund transfer department or reappointment to a position of comparable or equivalent rank. Arguing that her separation from the service was illegal and in bad faith considering that her termination was made effective prior to the effectivity of the EO. And that the FTD was reestablished after 4 yrs showing bad faith. Ruling/Ratio: Petition DISMISSED. CSC resolution AFFIRMED the reorganization was made in Good Faith, to improve economy and efficiency. There-establishment of the FTD can be attributed to the banks growth after its financial crisis. Whether there is political agenda to prosecute petitioner, it is not clearly shown.

SHIPSIDE INC. V COURT OF APPEALS GR 143377, February 20, 2001 SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing the requisite certification on nonforum shopping but failed to attach proof that the person signing the certification was authorized to do so. The CA dismissed the petition. The petitioner submits a motion for reconsideration which attached a secretarys certificate attesting to the signatorys authority to sign certificates against forum shopping on behalf of the petitioner. When the court of CA denied the motion, the petitioner sought relief with the SC.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Shipside Inc.

Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. The SC revised the decision of CA recognizing the belated filing of the certifications against forum shopping as permitted in exceptional circumstances. It further held that with more reason should a petition be given due course when this incorporates a certification on non-forum shopping without evidence that the person signing the certifications was an authorized signatory and the petitioner subsequently submits a secretarys certificate attesting to the signatorys authority in its motion for consideration. The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of the signatorys authority in signing the certification of forum shopping.

PVTA vs. CIR, 65 SCRA 416

Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours daily.

Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction. Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED. ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No. 444. HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete.

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED.

Doctrine of Parens Patriae A doctrine that grants the inherent power and authority of the state to protect persons who are legally unable to act on their own behalf.

Government v. Monte De Piedad Digest

Facts: 1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake. 2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4) 4 instalments. As a result, various petitions were filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it to pay with interest. 3. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry loans. Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action YES. The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae of the people. These principles are based upon public policy. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. Finally, if said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities. A de jure government (government of law) is an organized government of a state which has the general support of the people.

A de facto government (government of fact) is a government which actually exercises power or control but without legal title.

There are three kinds of de facto government: 1. the government that gets possession and control of, or usurps by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter; 2. that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state; and 3. that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated as a government of paramount force.

Republic vs. SB, Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas, et al., (G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003) The 1986 February Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government, assumed under international law. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was inoperative during that period, as it was abrogated by the Revolutionary government. But since the Philippines is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Declaration of Human Rights, the protection accorded to individuals under the same remained in effect even without the 1973 Constitution.

SOVEREIGNTY
The supreme power of the State to command and enforce obedience to its will from people from within its jurisdiction and corollarily, to have freedom from foreign control. a. Internal Sovereignty: the power of the State to rule within its territory b. External Sovereignty: the freedom of the State to carry out its activities without subjection or control by other states.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive, comprehensive, inalienable, absolute and unified. Permanence - So long as the state itself exists, sovereignty continues without interruption. Exclusive - There can be but one supreme power in the state. Within the state, there is no other power that possesses equal or superior authority to it. Comprehensiveness - Sovereign power extends over all persons, associations, and things within such territorial limits except those over which the state has voluntarily consented to waive the exercise of its jurisdiction. Inalienability - An attribute of the state by virtue of which it cedes away any of its essential elements without self-destruction. Absolutism - Sovereignty is a primary power. It does not derive its power from anything, There is no other body that determines the nature and the extent of the power as a matter of legal right. Unity - Sovereignty cannot be divided without producing several wills of the people, which is inconsistent with the notiion of sovereignty.

EFFECT OF CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Political laws of the former sovereign are abrogated unless they are expressly re-enacted by the affirmative act of the new sovereign. Municipal laws remain in force.

PEOPLE VS PERFECTO G.R. NO. L-18463

FACTS: In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887) the accused was charged with having published anarticle reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. Inthis Court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court holding thatArticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over thePhilippines and with six members holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of Article256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, thedefendant was neither guilty of a violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the Libel Law. In thecourse of the main opinion in the Perfecto case is found this significant sentence: Act No. 292 of thePhilippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected Article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.

ISSUES: Whether or not Mr. Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Penal Code.On the subject of whether or not Article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented,is in force. HELD: The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in theinformation do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe thatarticle 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and isinconsistent with democratic principles of government

Macariola vs Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J 114 SCRA 77 May 31, 1982 Petitioner: Bernardita R. Mecariola Respondent: Hon. Elias B. Asuncion, in his capacity as Judge of Court of First Instance (CFI) Leyte FACTS: Respondent judge rendered a final decision in Civil Case No. 2012 for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to him, which he later approved. Among the parties thereto was petitioner Macariola. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot was adjudicated t the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five (5) lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. The fifth lot, Lot 1184-E, was sold to a Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of the lot to respondent Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria. Spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc, owned and managed by Judge Asuncion. Macariola then filed an instant complaint in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion charging him with "Acts Unbecoming of a Judge" invoking Art 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, pars.1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of RA No. 3019, Section 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. A certain Judge Nepomuceno however dismissed such complaints. Hence, the case at bar. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion's act does not violate the above-mentioned provisions.

HELD: The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion's acts did not constitute an "Act Unbecoming of a Judge" but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities for next time. Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. Respondent judge purchased the said lot after the decision rendered was already final because no party filed for an appeal within the reglementary period which makes the lot in question no longer the subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from plaintiffs, rather from a Dr. Arcadio Galapon. Petition is hereby DENIED.

Vilas vs. City of Manila, 229 U.S. 345

Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, are creditors of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 1754]. Upon the theory that the city, under its present charter from the government of the Philippine Islands, is the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city, these actions were brought against it. The supreme court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. [220 U.S. 345, 352] The fundamental question is whether, notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, followed by a reincorporation of the city, the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to the United States. We shall confine ourselves to the question whether the plaintiffs in error are entitled to judgments against the city upon their several claims. Whether there is a remedy adequate to the collection when reduced to judgment is not presented by the record. But whether there is or is not a remedy affords no reason why the plaintiffs in error may not reduce their claims to judgment. Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 530 , 25 S. L. ed. 699, 703. The city confessedly may be sued under its existing charter, and that implies at least a right to judgment if they establish their demands. The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property rights of the old city and to the right to enforce all of its causes of action. There is identity of purpose between the Spanish and American charters and substantial identity of municipal powers. The area and the inhabitants incorporated are substantially the same. But for the change of sovereignty which has occurred under the treaty of Paris, the question of the liability of the city under its new charter for the debts of the old city would seem to be of easy solution. The principal question would therefore seem to be the legal consequence of the cession referred to upon the property rights and civil obligations of the city incurred before the cession. And so the question was made to turn in the

court below upon the consequence of a change in sovereignty and a reincorporation of the city by the substituted sovereignty. This disposes of the question of the jurisdiction of this court, grounded upon the absence from the petition of the plaintiffs of any distinct claim under the treaty of Paris, since, under 10 of the Philippine organic act [220 U.S. 345, 353] of July 1, 1902 [32 Stat. at L. 695, chap. 1369, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 226], this court is given jurisdiction to review any final decree or judgment of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands where any treaty of the United States 'is involved.' That treaty was necessarily 'involved,' since neither the court below nor this court can determine the continuity of the municipality nor the liability of the city as it now exists for the obligation of the old city, without considering the effect of the change of sovereignty resulting from that treaty. See Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U.S. 16, 22 , 54 S. L. ed. 72, 75, 30 Sup. Ct. rep. 1. The historical continuity of a municipality embracing the inhabitants of the territory now occupied by the city of Manila is impressive. Before the conquest of the Philippine Islands by Spain, Manila existed. The Spaniards found on the spot now occupied a populous and fortified community of Moros. In 1571 they occupied what was then and is now known as Manila, and established it as a municipal corporation. In 1574 there was conferred upon it the title of 'Illustrious and ever loyal city of Manila.' From time to time there occurred amendments, and, on January 19, 1894, there was a reorganization of the city government under a royal decree of that date. Under that charter there was power to incur debts for municipal purposes and power to sue and be sued. The obligations here in suit were incurred under the charter referred to, and are obviously obligations strictly within the provision of the municipal power. To pay judgments upon such debts it was the duty of the ayuntamiento of Manila, which was the corporate name of the old city, to make provision in its budget. The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was destroyed by a mere change of sovereignty is obviously one which is without a shadow of moral force, and, if true, must result from settled principles of rigid law. While the contracts from which the claims in suit resulted were in progress, war between the United [220 U.S. 345, 354] States and Spain ensued. On August 13, 1898, the city was occupied by the forces of this government, and its affairs conducted by military authority. On July 31, 1901, the present incorporating act was passed, and the city since that time has been an autonomous municipality. The charter in force is act 183 of the Philippine Commission, and now may be found as chapters 68 to 75 of the compiled acts of the Philippine Commission. The 1st section of the charter of 1901 reads as follows: 'The inhabitants of the city of Manila, residing within the territory described in 2 of this act, are hereby constituted a municipality, which shall be known as the city of Manila, and by that name shall have perpetual succession, and shall possess all the rights of property herein granted or heretofore enjoyed and possessed by the city of Manila as organized under Spanish sovereignty.' The boundaries described in 2 include substantially the area and inhabitants which had theretofore constituted the old city. By 4 of the same act, the government of the city was invested in a municipal board.

Section 16 grants certain legislative powers to the board, and provides that it shall 'take possession of all lands, buildings, offices, books, papers, records, moneys, credits, securities, assets, accounts, or other property or rights belonging to the former city of Manila, or pertaining to the business or interests thereof, and, subject to the provisions herein set forth, shall have control of all its property except the building known as the ayuntamiento, provision for the occupation and control of which is made in 15 of this act; shall collect taxes and other revenues, and apply the same in accordance with appropriations, as hereinbefore provided, to the payment of the municipal expenses; shall supervise and control the discharge of official duties by subordinates; shall institute judicial proceedings to recover property and [220 U.S. 345, 355] funds of the city wherever found, or otherwise to protect the interests of the city, and shall defend all suits against the city,' etc. Section 69 of the charter expressly preserved 'all city ordinances and orders in force at the time of the passage of this act, and not inconsistent herewith,' until modified or repealed by ordinances passed under this act. Section 72 is the repealing clause, and provides for the repeal of 'all acts, orders, and regulations' which are inconsistent with the provisions of the act. The charter contains no reference to the obligations or contracts of the old city. If we understand the argument against the liability here asserted, it proceeds mainly upon the theory that inasmuch as the predecessor of the present city, the ayuntamiento of Manila, was a corporate entity created by the Spanish government, when the sovereignty of Spain in the islands was terminated by the treaty of cession, if not by the capitulation of August 13, 1898, the municipality ipso facto disappeared for all purposes. This conclusion is reached upon the supposed analogy to the doctrine of principal and agent, the death of the principal ending the agency. So complete is the supposed death and annihilation of a municipal entity by extinction of sovereignty of the creating state that it was said in one of the opinions below that all of the public property of Manila passed to the United States, 'for a consideration, which was paid,' and that the United States was therefore justified in creating an absolutely new municipality, and endowing it with all of the assets of the defunct city, free from any obligation to the creditors of that city. And so the matter was dismissed in the Trigas Case by the court of first instance, by the suggestion that 'the plaintiff may have a claim against the Crown of Spain, which has received from the United States payment for that done by the plaintiff.' [220 U.S. 345, 356] We are unable to agree with the argument. It loses sight of the dual character of municipal corporations. They exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private or business character. In the one character a municipal corporation is a governmental subdivision, and for that purpose exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state. In the other character it is a mere legal entity or juristic person. In the latter character it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred. The distinction is observed in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 461 , 50 S. L. ed. 261, 269, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110, 4 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 737, where Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y.

369, 374, 55 Am. Dec. 347, and Western Sav. Fund Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175, 72 Am. Dec. 730, are cited and approved. In Lloyd v. New York, supra, it is said: 'The corporation of the city of New York possesses two kinds of powers: one governmental and public, and to the extent they are held and exercised, is clothed with sovereignty; the other private, and to the extent they are held and exercised, is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public purposes, the latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the former, the corporation is a municipal government; and while in the exercise of the latter, is a corporate legal individual.' See also Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. 66; Petersburg v. Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321, 343, 26 Am. Rep. 357, and Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 3 Am. Rep. 485. In view of the dual character of municipal corporations there is no public reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The suspension of such governmental functions as are obviously incompatible with the new political relations thus brought about may be presumed. [220 U.S. 345, 357] But no such implication may be reasonably indulged beyond that result. Such a conclusion is in harmony with the settled principles of public law as declared by this and other courts and expounded by the text-books upon the laws of war and international law. Taylor, International Pub. Law , 578. That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in confiict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. Alvarez y Sanchez v. United States, 216 U.S. 167 , 54 L. ed. 432, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367. But it is equally settled in the same public law that that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 , 29 S. L. ed. 270, 271, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005, it was said: 'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the [220 U.S. 345, 358] press, or

authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed.' The above language was quoted with approval in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 298 , 45 S. L. ed. 1088, 1110, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770. That the United States might, by virtue of its situation under a treaty ceding full title, have utterly extinguished every municipality which it found in existence in the Philippine Islands, may be conceded. That it did so, in view of the practice of nations to the contrary, is not to be presumed, and can only be established by cogent evidence. That during military occupation the affairs of the city were in a large part administered by officials put in place by military order did not operate to dissolve the corporation, or relieve it from liability upon obligations incurred before the occupation, nor those created for municipal purposes by the administrators of its affairs while its old officials were displaced. New Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co. 20 Wall. 387, 394, 22 L. ed. 354, 358. During that occupation and military administration the business of the city was carried on as usual. Taxes were assessed and taxes collected and expended for local purposes, and many of the officials carrying on the government were those found in office when the city was occupied. The continuity of the corporate city was not inconsistent with military occupation or the constitution or institutions of the occupying power. This [220 U.S. 345, 359] is made evident by the occurrences at the time of capitulation. Thus, the articles of capitulation concluded in these words: 'This city, its inhabitants, . . . and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army.' This was quoted in President McKinley's instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Philippine Commission, and touching this he said: 'I believe that this pledge has been faithfully kept.' And the commission was directed to labor for the full performance of this obligation. This instruction was in line with and in fulfilment of the 8th article of the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. Under the 3d article of that treaty the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay to Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the 8th article, Spain relinquished to the United States 'all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.' It is under this clause, in connection with the clause agreeing to pay to Spain $20,000,000 for the cession of the Philippine group, that the contention that all of the public rights of the city of Manila were acquired by the United States, which country was therefore justified, as absolute owner, in granting the property rights so acquired to what is called the 'absolutely new corporation' created thereafter. But the qualifying words touching property rights relinquished by Spain limit the relinquishment to 'property which, in conformity with law, belonging to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of

Spain.' It did not affect property which did not, in 'conformity with law, belong to the Crown of Spain.' That it was not intended to apply to property which, 'in conformity with law,' belonged to the city of Manila as a municipal cor- [220 U.S. 345, 360] poration, is clear. This is demonstrated by the second paragraph of the same article, which reads: 'And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments . . . having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals.' Thus, the property and property rights of municipal corporations were protected and safeguarded precisely as were the property and property rights of individuals. That the cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations is herein recognized, for the stipulation against impairment of their property rights has this plain significance. The conclusion we reach, that the legal entity survived both the military occupation and the cession which followed, finds support in the cases which hold that the Pueblos of San Francisco and Los Angeles, which existed as municipal organizations prior to the cession of California by Mexico, continued to exist with their community and property rights intact. Cohas v. Raisin, 3 Cal. 443; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530; Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326, 18 L. ed. 547; Merryman v. Bourne, 9 Wall. 592, 602, 19 L. ed. 683, 686; Moore v. Steinbach, 127 U.S. 70 , 32 L. ed. 51, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1067; Los Angeles Farming & Mill. Co. v. Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217 , 54 L. ed. 736, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452. Were corporate identity and corporate liability extinguished as a necessary legal result of the new charter granted in 1901 by the Philippine Commission? The inhabitants of the old city are the incorporators of the new. There is substantially identity of area. There are some changes in the form of government and some changes in corporate powers and methods of administration. the new corporation is endowed with all of the property and [220 U.S. 345, 361] property rights of the old. It has the same power to sue and be sued which the former corporation had. There is not the slightest suggestion that the new corporation shall not succeed to the contracts and obligations of the old corporation. Laying out of view any question of the constitutional guaranty against impairment of the obligation of contracts, there is, in the absence of express legislative declaration of a contrary purpose, no reason for supposing that the reincorporation of an old municipality is intended to permit an escape from the obligations of the old, to whose property and rights it has succeeded. The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities. Broughton v. Pensacola 93 U.S. 266 , 23 L. ed. 896; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 520 , 25 L. ed. 699; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 , 29 L. ed. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U.S. 646, 655 , 42 S. L. ed. 310, 313, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957; O'Connor v. Memphis, 6 Lea, 730; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866, 1870, in which case, when a municipality became disabled to act and obtained a new charter, in an action upon an obligation of the old corporation, there was judgment for the creditor, Lord Mansfield saying:

'Many corporations, for want of legal magistrates, have lost their activity, and obtained new charters. Maidstone, Radnor, Carmarthen, and many more are in the same case with Colchester. And yet it has never been disputed but that the new charters revive and give activity to the old corporation; except, perhaps, in that case in Levinz, where the corporation had a new name; and even there the court made no doubt. Where the question has arisen upon any remarkable metamorphosis, it has always been determined 'that they remain the same as to debts and rights." Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728, 730. [220 U.S. 345, 362] In Shapleigh v. San Angelo, supra, this court said in a similar case: 'The state's plenary power over its municipal corporations to change their organization, to modify their method of internal government, or to abolish them altogether, is not restricted by contracts entered into by the municipality with its creditors or with private parties. An absolute repeal of a municipal charter is therefor effectual so far as it abolishes the old corporate organization; but when the same or substantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new corporation, whether with extended or restricted territorial limits, such new corporation is treated as in law the successor of the old one, entitled to its property rights, and subject to its liabilities.' The cases of Trigas and Vilas went off upon demurrers, and no question of remedy arises here. The appeal of Aguado is from a decree upon a final hearing denying him all relief. That all three of the plaintiffs in error are entitled to proceed to judgment when they shall establish their several claims is obvious from what we have said. But in the Aguado Case it is sought to establish his claim as a charge against certain property and funds held by the city as trustee, known as the Carriedo fund. In 1734 one Don Francisco Carriedo y Perodo bequeathed to the city a fund for the establishment of waterworks, to be kept as a separate fund and devoted to the erection and maintenance of the works. This fund was loyally kept and greatly increased, and was enlarged by a special tax upon meat, devoted to that purpose. The works were finally completed in 1878, and have been since operated by the city, the income and special tax going to maintenance. Certain securities belonging to the fund are now held by the city, the income being applied to the operation of the works. Aguado took a contract to supply coal for the use of the [220 U.S. 345, 363] Carriedo works, and made a deposit to guarantee the contract. When the city was occupied by the American Army it was indebted to him for coal so supplied, as well as for the deposit so made. That the coal was bought for and used in the operation of the Carriedo works is not denied. But there is no evidence that the credit was given to the Carriedo fund so held in trust under the will of Carriedo. The contract was made with the ayuntamiento of Manila, just as all other contracts for city supplies or works were made. The contract not having been made with special reference to the liability of the fund held in trust by the city, but apparently upon the general credit of the city, we are not disposed to reverse the judgment of the court below, holding that the claim of Aguado did not constitute a charge upon the Carriedo fund.

Aguado is, nevertheless, entitled to a judgment. The designation of the city in the petition as trustee may be regarded as descriptive. The debt having been incurred by the city, it must be regarded as a city liability. Taylor v. Davis (Taylor v. Mayo), 110 U.S. 330, 336 , 28 S. L. ed. 163, 165, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147. Our conclusion is that the decree in the Aguado Case must be reversed and the case remanded, with direction to render judgment and such other relief as may seem in conformity with law. The judgments in the Trigas and Vilas Cases will be reversed and the cases remanded, with direction to overrule the respective demurrers, and for such other action as may be consistent with law, and consistent with this opinion.

EFFECT OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION

There is no change in sovereignty. However, political laws, except those of treason, are suspended; municipal laws remain in force unless changed by the belligerent occupant.

PRINCIPLE OF JUS POSTLIMINIUM

At the end of the occupation, when the occupant is ousted from the territory, the political laws which have been suspended shall automatically become effective again.

EFFECT OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

It is bound by no constitution. However, it did not repudiate the Covenant or Declaration in the same way it repudiated the Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives or orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration.

PERALTA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined by the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve time by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the Republic. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Courts existence was void ab initio because it was created as a political instrumentality under the command of the Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions of said ordinance violate his constitutional rights; that the penalties provided for are much more severe than the RPC. Sol. Gen. is of the opinion that the petition should be granted because the Ordinance mentioned in creating said court is tinged with political complexion, that the procedure does not afford a fair trial and violates constitutional right of accused persons under a legitimate Constitution. The court is of the opinion that:

As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7 the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military codeof the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted. It appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that is, whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time. We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgment of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the

petitioner of a crime of apolitical complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.

ALCANTARA VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 75 PHIL. 749

FERIA, J.: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA- G.R. No. 790) and sentence the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and twentyone days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days of prison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on September 12, 1944,and June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944, which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Kehand Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 (p. 113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes. In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the socalled Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those apolitical complexion. In that the same case this Court held that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of the number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called Republic effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the court which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good

and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have apolitical complexion, as this court held in its decision in the above mentioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein cited. Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable. A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national security, such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied. Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

RUFFY VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, 75 PHIL. 875

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy. HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.