simon.fiala@seznam.

cz

Asuncin Lera St. Clair The World Bank as a Transnational Expertised Institution
Global Governance 12 (2006), 7795

Abstract:
The World Bank has become an expertised transnational institution and thus subject to the problems of expertise identified by social studies of science. The legitimacy and credibility of the Banks expertise is drawn through a circular process between the knowledge it produces and the audiences that legitimize that knowledge. Untangling such circularity is crucial because global poverty and development are not simple social facts awaiting to be described or predicted. Given that processes of knowledge formation and the institutionalization of expertise are in themselves political exercises, the Banks knowledge shapes global governance. This article calls for constructive engagement of academics on the way knowledge is produced and distributed by global institutions.

Notes:
The WB is one of the most important sources of knowledge for development and poverty reduction The WB is an important global governance actor o It represents all member states, but due to structural imbalances (net creditors/lenders, weighted voting system) it is entangled in a complex web of often conflicting relations WBs paradigm o An information intermediary among the different partners of the development process 78 o development became defined as an economic problem developmental economics a virtual monopoly of the Bank the Bank helped to develop a new field of knowledge It established it as the most apt approach in answering problems of development It hires or cooperates with the most influential specialists, publishes the most widely read journals, holds conferences, disseminates knowledge of unmatched comprehensiveness generates data becomes endowed with legitimacy and credibility o the circular process between the knowledge it produces and the audiences that legitimize that knowledge Bank creates its own communities of experts who not only spread this institutions knowledge but also legitimate it 79 The Bank has access to the holy trinity of social research = data, financial resources, and human resources Diverse range of research topics addressed by the Bank through the purview of developmental economics Network of its collaborators encompasses nearly all experts in dev. research The Knowledge bank? o Lending activity pushed into the background provision of intelligence in the forefront o Independence (albeit limited) derived from being an IGO o main source of legitimacy: ideas and approaches derived from meticulous research

simon.fiala@seznam.cz offering by far the best quality knowledge available disinterested, professional, comprehensive 80 o Responsibility? Is the bank a mere provider of funds of knowledge and funds which has no responsibility over its misapplication or side effects? No! The bank is an active political actor with a fundamentally political mandate knowledge is inseparable from action. Expertized institutions o = institutions entrusted with science for policy (incl. the WB) o sorting out knowledge from nonknowledge in contentious and far-reaching agendas in inherently political o the Knowledge Bank draws legitimacy from the assumption that its knowledge is produced through a linear scientific process To do so, it encloses the problem at hand in its economic paradigm within which it seeks consensus through peer review There is no mechanism of identifying flawed, incomplete, or inappropriate scientific views or the possibility of political, economic, or ideological contamination through the consulting the outside Knowledge vs. politics o knowledge is linear and encapsulated / politics are trans-paradigmatic o assumption that the WB can approach messy and ill-structured issues such as global poverty and development in a linear way is unsound o similar issues within national and regional of advanced economies are approached through the means of politics trans-faction interaction Complex issues with substantial political and social importance are scrutinized by congressional panels, hybrid committees of experts, and policymakers and often include the private sector, civil society, and citizens groups 82 development and poverty are ill-structured issues o difficult to frame; rigid framing hurts validity of produced knowledge o entail decisions about distribution of risks inherently political decisions uncertainty and risk are the defining characteristics of knowledge-based economic policy 82 Expertise: The Relations Between Cognitive Authority and Audiences o The Knowledge Bank draws its authority from the idea that it is the most expertised institution in the field of economic development 83 o The separation of expert judgments from non-experts is based on the triad of support, audience, and the legitimating The value of expert knowledge depends on the relations between cognitive authority and audiences taxonomy of five different ideal types 1. Physicists (share the tacit as well as explicit knowledge of this field, acknowledge the limits of their own knowledge claims) 2. Experts, who create their own followers (e.g. self-help gurus) 3. Experts seeking a place in the political arena (e.g. feminists, greens) 4. Expert with a cause o 1) aims at the general public seeks to stir a movement o 2) aims at fellow experts seeks to influence decisionmaking 2

simon.fiala@seznam.cz Type 4 and 5 often combined in the area of social causes Often seek to both establish themselves as experts AND create of public demands for their expertize 84 Constituencies often used to legitimate expertise of an organization vis--vis other political actors (e.g. governments) The World Bank as a state-like expertised bureaucracy o The WB acts as an expert with a cause 85 Legitimizes itself in the eyes of the public (helping the world to develop); aims at influencing expert decisions (proposes policies; governments then adopt) The Bank itself and the actors it is giving advice to have discretionary political powers o the Bank is an expertised institution it dominates the field of development economics, which it largely created AND established as the dominant paradigm in LDC governance expertize The circular dynamics of the legitimacy of the WB: o The financial and political power of the WB allowed it to create a large body of knowledge unmatched in alternative (competing) paradigms of development advice. Thanks to that the developmental economics became the dominant approach and the Bank in turn became the hegemon as it possesses the expertise in it. o I.e. Through the circular legitimation expertized institutions usurp decisionmaking power expertised bureaucracies are a threat to democratic principles, because they end up having state powers without being accountable to democratic mechanisms o the WB and other expertized institutions suffer by a democratic deficit o The WB, as a provider of knowledge AND funds, infringes on democratic principles even further than institutions providing mere expertize The claim to linear approach to production of knowledge in the WB is unsustainable o development and poverty are ill-structured, messy, contentious, far-spanning issues difficult to frame; rigid framing hurts validity of produced knowledge entail decisions about distribution of risks eminently political decisions uncertainty and risk are the defining characteristics of economic policy Peer review as a valid source of legitimacy? NO o In contentious and far-spanning issues peer review doesnt constitute an answer as the peer community is always exclusive closed to many relevant stakeholders o facts-surrogate problems: multiple definitions are possible, scientific truths are elusive o a consensus among invited scientists rather than scientific consensus 90 o + peer review processes of regulatory science hide controversies rather than expose them o + peer review processes themselves are highly undemocratic (research shows) 91 To improve salience, legitimacy and credibility of the WB, we must submit to examination its processes of establishing boundaries between politics and science and knowledge and nonknowledge; there are bodies of global governance that achieved such reform (e.g. IPCC) 93 o The WB resist, because as the number of principals increases, its job gets harder still, it needs to be done