Anthropology as Empirical Science Author(s): J. Tim O'Meara Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Jun.

, 1989), pp. 354-369 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/681080 . Accessed: 08/02/2011 17:27
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J. TIM

O'MEARA Universityof North Carolina at Wilmington

Anthropology As Empirical Science

outside the realm of Many anthropologists argue that humanaffairs are subjectiveand therefore based on observations about the process of While this is science. empirical position important human affairs, the argumentsemployeddo not imply that the application of emunderstanding as some pirical scienceto the explanationof humanaffairs is either impossibleor inappropriate, critics maintain.

surRETURNING prised to find that the rejection of empirical science is still gaining popularity among anthropologists as critics make ever bolder declarations. Labeled the "romantic rebellion" by Shweder (1986), more and more anthropologists are rejecting the empirical basis, logical methods, and explanatory goals of the so-called "natural" sciences as being inappropriate for the study of human affairs. These anthropologists are, as Tyler says, "dedicated more to honesty than truth" (1984:335). What began as a salutory attempt to "challenge the epistemological orientation which would rule interpretation out of the sciences of man" (Taylor 1979:39) lately has become the more extreme argument that an empirical science of human affairs is impossible or inappropriate, and that interpretation alone is possible. I fear that the pendulum has now swung too far. My purpose here is to nudge the pendulum in the other direction. I will attempt to show that whatever benefits an interpretive approach may offer, such benefits neither derive from nor imply that the application of the scientific method to the explanation of human affairs is either impossible or undesirable.

RECENTLY FROM AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF FIELDWORK, I was

The Rejection of Empirical Science In orderto evaluatethe arguments an empirical scienceof humanaffairs,we rejecting firstneed to accept a workingdefinitionof what is being rejected.Since the term "science" is embracedby some advocatesof both opposingpositions,I will continueusing the morespecificterm,"empirical and classcience,"to meanthe systematic description sification of objects,events,and processes,and the explanation of thoseeventsand proall of the descriptive cessesby theoriesthat employlawfulregularities, and explanatory statements testable observable data. employedbeing againstpublicly Criticsarguethat the goal of empiricalscience(i.e., lawfulexplanation)and the "sciand testingthat have been used with such sucentificmethod"of hypothesisformation cessin the physicaland biologicalsciencesare bothinappropriate forthe studyof human
social or cultural phenomena. Their reasons differ, but doubts generally stem from dif-

in the obficultiesarisingfromthe role of choicein humanaffairsand fromsubjectivity of social phenomena.Becauseof these problems,some anservationand interpretation arguethat we must abandonempiricalscienceand turninsteadto the huthropologists manitiesfor guidance.Forexample,Shweder(1984:28)states:

is Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology/Anthropology, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, j. TIM O'MEARA Wilmington,NC 28403.

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A central tenet of the romanticist view holds that ideas and practices have their foundation in neither logic nor empirical science, that ideas and practices fall beyond the scope of deductive and inductive reason, that ideas and practices are neither rational nor irrational but rather nonrational. [following Winch 1958; emphasis in original] Leach (1984) ridicules anthropologists for even speaking of their work as "science." He denies the "underlying assumption that the ethnographic 'facts' recorded by anthropological observers in the field have some kind of objective reality," claiming instead that "the data which derive from fieldwork are subjective not objective" (1984:3-4).' WatsonFranke and Watson believe that "the concern of the ... social sciences with being 'scientifically objective' (i.e., as in the natural sciences)" is a "false issue that confounds [their] true operating characteristics" (1975:248). Perhaps the most vocal critic is Stephen A. Tyler. He believes that all science is impossible, in part because "There is no origin of perception, no priority to vision, and no data of observation" (1986:137), and he claims that "scientific discourse, particularly in the social sciences, is deeply mendacious" (1984:335). Instead, Tyler advocates ethnopoetics or the postmodern ethnography, an "emergent fantasy" whose goal is "neither goal that places it "beyond truth and imdescription nor production, but evocation"-a mune to the judgement of performance" (1986:123, 125). While the critics differ in many of their other views, most are united by a belief that the study of social phenomena is unlike the study of purely physical phenomena in two fundamental ways. First, they assert that the most interesting and distinctive aspect of social and psychological phenomena is their "subjective nature"-that is, people's thoughts and other actions are characterized by sensations, feelings, and emotions that are experienced privately by individuals and are thus not directly observable. Consequently, they argue, it is not possible to analyze social phenomena using logical methods that require objective proof or "brute data" that are "beyond subjectivity" (Taylor 1979:29). As Vendler concludes, "science has no foothold on subjective states" (1984:201). Second, critics argue that social phenomena have multiple meanings ascribed to them by actors, and that knowledge or understanding is gained by discovering those meanings and their logical structure rather than by scientific explanation of the phenomena themselves. They acknowledge that the problems of subjectivity and multiple meanings may lead different researchers to different (though equally "valid") interpretations. Some authors (e.g., Tyler 1984, 1985) believe that this is their method's greatest strength-producing a Babel of voices that expresses, evokes, or enriches the world of experience. Others seem more embarrassed by this slippery state of affairs. For example, Geertz states, "The besetting sin of interpretive approaches to anything.. . is that they tend to resist.. . systematic modes of assessment" (1973a:24). Other than his prescription to maintain a hold on the minutiae of ethnographic description, however, Geertz does not propose criteria by which different interpretations might be appraised. He suggests only that "we must measure the cogency of our explications ... against the power of the scientific imagination to bring us into touch with the lives of strangers" (1973a:24). Thus, Geertz and other critics believe that statements concerning subjective phenomena can only be assessed subjectively.

Sources and Implications of the Critics' Arguments

Many of the problems raised by the critics are important and deserve serious consideration. Having perceived these problems, however, the solution the critics advocate is too extreme, and now somewhat outdated. As I hope to demonstrate below, their solution is largely an overreaction to earlier characterizations of empirical science that were too restrictive. The critics' arguments appear to be primarily a reaction against excessive claims by logical empiricists several decades ago and more recent overstatements by logical posi-

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tivists. For example, Taylor advocates an "interpretive science of man" because of inadequacies that he perceives in logical empiricism, with its unrealistic requirements of objective or "brute data" and "non-arbitrary verification" (1979). The criticism is certainly justified. It is commonly recognized today that logical empiricism does not offer an inductive method for constructing true statements out of "brute data." Nor, as I shall argue below, does Popper's brand of logical positivism offer a "non-arbitrary" system of verification. Such criticisms are relevant to the study of human affairs, but they are just as relevant to the study of physical phenomena, and thus need not lead to the conclusion that the study of human affairs requires a separate logical method of inquiry, as the critics maintain.

or as D'Andrade says, all facts are "interpretive" (1986:24-25; see also Jarvie 1984:53, 1986:215; Feyerabend 1975:19). But while this recognition critically damages an earlier, inductionist philosophy of science such as logical empiricism, it does not imply that we should abandon empirical science. The rejection of inductionism mayjust as well support the need for an empirically based, deductionist philosophy, asJarvie argues (1984:49, 53; 1986:214-215, 224). As the critics have also pointed out, objectivity in the study of human affairs is limited because we cannot directly observe our neighbors' thoughts, motives, or emotions. True, private thoughts do not qualify as the "publicly observable data" that are the necessary foundation of an empirical science. But we can infer what our neighbors' private thoughts are from their public words and deeds. These public words and deeds are the data of an empirical social science. We can use these empirical data to first construct and then check our inferences about subjective or otherwise unobservable aspects of human affairs. In making and checking these inferences we use the same logical method of hypothesis formation and testing that physical scientists use to infer the existence of gravity, subatomic particles, and other unobservable aspects of the physical world. Once we are satisfied that our primary inferences are correct, we can use them as the building blocks of secondary inferences. For example, using knowledge gained from past experience, we might infer from the observation of a person's facial expressions, utterances, and other actions that the person is angry, and then use the emotion "anger" as part of our explanation for the person's having directly observed or felt that person's emotion itself. subsequent behavior-never In the search for knowledge, the limits of objectivity are characteristic of human beings as observers, rather than the things we observe. Therefore, the recognized limits to objectivity do not require separate methods of inquiry into physical and social phenomena, as some critics conclude.

The Limits of Objectivity are relative and "objective" at the outset that "subjective" We shouldacknowledge and thoughts,and all of ourverbaland physicalexpressions terms.All of ourperceptions are filteredthroughand formedby our senses, our knowledge,our culturallyformed All facts are "theory-laden," and a host of privateperversions. "tropes"and "frames,"

Research Techniques and Logical Methods

It is also obvious that inquiries into different questions may require different research techniques-such as participant observation, computer modeling, heliospectrometry, or Rorschach analysis-but it does not follow that they must also rely on different methods of argument or evaluation (see also Rudner 1966 and Spiro 1986). It is the unity of logical methods-not research techniques-that is in question here. The debate over the unity of logical methods in the physical and social sciences is an ancient one. The current debate in anthropology is but a minor skirmish in a battle ignited by John Locke over 300 years ago, the war itself having begun centuries earlier. Many of the current arguments have been dealt with adequately in previous campaigns and should not have to be repeated. Other recent criticisms are sufficiently novel, how-

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ever, to warrant inspection. I will examine five related arguments, beginning with one concerning the nature of refutation, upon which hinges much of the critics' position.

cial 'facts' " are amenable to "simple refutation in the Popperian sense" (1983:936, emphasis added). He argues that "Simply bringing to bear on a statement evidence that is contradictory is not in the humansciencessufficient to disprove that statement" (1983:943, emphasis added). Shore maintains that contradictory evidence is irrelevant: "Freeman's 'facts'-correct though they are--do not invalidate Mead's arguments in any significant sense" (1983:939). Scheper-Hughes similarly denies the possibility of refutation in the analysis of social affairs by arguing that Mead "captured a Samoan truth, as James Clifford called it... but not the Samoan truth. Derek Freeman, it appears, had access to another Samoan truth-again not the truth" (1984:90, emphasis in original). These researchers thus seem to argue that two contradictory statements about social phenomena (e.g., rape is unknown/rape is common) can both be the "truth," depending on one's point of view.2 This rejection of refutation is not, however, just a reaction to Freeman's advocacy of it. For example, in support of his interpretive approach, Geertz states that negative instances are "as inherently inconclusive as any other" (1973a:23, 27).

Argument I: Refutation Is Inappropriate is inappropriate Many criticsclaim that use of the scientificmethodin anthropology becausethat methodrequiresstatementsto be testedagainstempiricaldata. According to thesecritics,statements aboutsocialphenomena-unlikestatementsaboutbiological or physicalphenomena-are not susceptibleto empiricalrefutation or disproof. Forexample,in the heat of the so-calledMead/Freeman debateShoredeniesthat "so-

The Impossibility of Disproof The argument combination of the correctperception abovehingeson the unfortunate in the studyof humanaffairs thatempirical(as opposedto logical)disproof is impossible with the mistakennotionthat such disproofis possiblein the studyof physicalphenomena. Likethe overreaction to logicalempiricism, this argument againstan empiricalscienceof humanaffairs comeson the heelsof statements scienceadvocates. by overzealous Forexample,it is axiomaticamongmanypeoplewho advocatean empirical scienceof humanaffairs(as well as amongtheircritics)that while one can neverprovethat a particularhypothesisis true, "one single observationmay falsifyit, servinglogicallyas a
counter-example to it" (Ember 1985:911, citing Bartley 1982:264; see also ScheperHughes 1984:88, and Jarvie 1984:132). This is the method used by Margaret Mead in her famous "negative instance" where she argued that her cultural data on Samoan society disproved the then-current theory that adolescent rebellion is caused by the biological process of puberty (Mead 1928). And 55 years later Derek Freeman used the same logic, formalized in the writings of Sir Karl Popper, to refute Mead's original argument (Freeman 1983a). Popper states that no accumulation of positive cases can ever justify the acceptance of a theory as true (1972:1-6), a position that is now universally accepted. He also contends, however, that "the assumption of the truth of test statements sometimes allows us tojustify the claim that an explanatory universal theory is false" (1972:7), an overstatement that has confused both supporters and critics. This confusion, in turn, underlies much of the debate over the use of the scientific method in anthropology. The rejection of refutation in social analysis is unnecessary. As I will try to show below, while the critics are correct that refutation is not absolute in the analysis of human affairs, neither is it absolute in the analysis of purely physical or biological phenomena. There are two logical limits of refutation, limits that apply equally to the analysis of social and physical phenomena. Understanding these limits will show why the rejection of refuta-

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tion in anthropology, because of a supposed uniqueness of social phenomena, is unwarranted. Limit 1: In order to disprove a statement, we would first have to prove conclusively that an object or event under scrutiny is indeed a "negative instance." But no accumulation of positive evidence can prove this to be true. Thus we can never prove that we have found a negative instance that would, in turn, prove the statement to be false. Popper notes this restriction when he says that, in order to proceed with a refutation, we must first assume the truth of the test statements. And Freeman (1983b: 108) acknowledges that his refutation is "not absolute," quoting Miller's statement that "all test statements are themselves fallible and open to dispute" (1982:25). Limit 2: Even assuming that the descriptive test statement is true and relevant, and that it contradicts the prediction of the explanatory theory, this never allows us to mechanically reject the theory as false. For contradictory evidence tells us only that at least one of the premises of the explanatory argument is false, but not which one or ones. There are always many stated and unstated premises to an argument, any of which might be false. And the number of these assumptions is not just very large, it is infinite. The premises of any explanatory argument include not only an explicit statement of all those conditions that are thought to cause the particular event (and perhaps an explicit statement of various auxillary hypotheses, assumptions, or boundary conditions [e.g., Hempel 1966:23]), but also include the implicit assumption that every other condition not stated is irrelevant. This implicit assumption, of course, consists of an infinite number of parts, for there are always an infinite number of conditions that we think are irrelevant to the argument at hand. Unfortunately, later experience may show that one or more of these conditions is relevant after all. Since there is an infinite number of premises, no accumulation of "negative instances" can ever narrow the field to a single premise that must, of logical necessity, be false. Therefore, even if we assume that we have a negative instance, this does not necessarily imply that the theory itself, rather than one of the other premises, is false. As Feyerabend concludes, "theories cannot be refuted by facts" (1975:113). The import of this conclusion is not, as critics maintain, that hypothesis testing is pointless. The import is simply that all conclusions are open to question, that nothing is known to be absolutely true or false. We may only know things with greater or lesser certainty. The critics are correct, then, in noting that contradictory evidence cannot disprove a descriptive statement or a theory, but this has nothing to do with a presumed uniqueness of social inquiry. The reasons for the impossibility of disproof are formal and logical and apply equally to all descriptive and explanatory statements about the natural world.

Subjectivity in the Acceptance or Rejection of Arguments

Since refutation is never "mechanical" or "absolute" but requires in every case the informed judgment of individuals, it follows that all science is practiced within a social, historical, and psychological matrix, as Feyerbend (1975), Kuhn (1962), Hammond (1964), and others have forcefully argued. This subjective element undoubtedly slows progress in both the physical and social sciences, but overcoming the difficulty requires not the rejection of refutation or of empirical science itself-a position that neither Feythe adoption of refutation as a method for erabend, Kuhn, nor Hammond reaches-but controlling and gradually eliminating human bias and error. For example, although Feyerabend's Against Method has become a sourcebook for anthropologists who reject empirical science, he advocates "anything goes . .. philosophic Dadaism" not as a rejection of empirical science, but as an extension and improvement of Popper's logical positivism. Feyerabend does not shy away from giving explicitly causal explanations of human affairs (e.g., 1975:24-25) or from presenting empirical tests of explicitly stated hypotheses.

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Feyerabend advocates philosophic Dadaism as a means to scientific, social, and moral ends, not as an end in itself. He rejects positivism because he feels that it is not extreme enough (McEvoy 1975:54). As noted above, Popper's view of refutation requires the (conscious and temporary) assumption of the truth of various "basic statements." But Feyerabend (extending Popper's own call for criticalism) refuses to accept such a limit, insisting that even basic observation statements be subjected to criticism and, if necessary, revision (1975). Feyerabend's argument follows directly from his recognition of the logical impossibility of disproof and the social context of all scientific endeavors. Realizing that interpretation and judgment are inherent in all science, he advocates more criticism-not the construction of interpretive analyses that are beyond criticism. Taylor believes that "the ideal of a science of verification is to find an appeal beyond differences of interpretation. .. this ideal can be said to have been met by our natural sciences. But a hermeneutic science cannot but rely on insight" (1979:66). This common belief polarizes the debate unnecessarily, for as Feyerabend argues, a "science of verification" does not exist. There is a logical method only for testing the truth of statements-that is, the deductive logic of refutation-not for decidingwhether the statements should be accepted or rejected on the basis of those tests. Acceptance or rejection is always based on the subjectivejudgment of the individual researcher. As Jarvie says, "inferences are arguments and arguments do not force assent, assent is a psychological matter" (1984:136). Given the same data, reasonable people may calculate the probability of truth or falsity of an argument differently. Sometimes the subjective element is large. For example, when judging the veracity of the tales of sexual intrigue told to Mead by her young informants, different people hold widely different opinions on the probability that Mead could have been duped. Another test of the same question may have a very small subjective element. For example, there would be more unity of opinion on the probability that 12 menstruating and thus presumably fertile girls could have engaged in sex for periods ranging from two months to four years without a single pregnancy occurring, as Mead claimed (1928). Since there is no logical method of verification, and since the physical sciences have progressed splendidly without one by using empirical refutation combined with professional judgment, there is no inherent need for social scientists to do otherwise. Two additional arguments have been advanced, however, to support the rejection of refutation in anthropology.

Argument II: Culture As Arbitrary Code

Some critics argue that empirical science is not appropriate in anthropology because our primary subjects are "nonrational" or "arbitrary" and therefore neither explainable by lawful regularities nor subject to true-false testing. For example, Shweder (1984) notes that declarative statements such as "God blesses men in the sign of their prosperity" are not amenable to true/false testing--that is, they are "nonrational." From this premise he infers "that there's something more to thinking than reason and evidence-culture, the arbitrary, the symbolic, the expressive, the semiotic-that many of our ideas and practices are beyond logic and experience" (1984:38), and that "language, thought, and society are built up out of ideas that fall beyond the sweep of logical and scientific evaluation" (1984:40). He concludes his argument by defining "culture as arbitrary code" whose study is "outside the realm of science" (1984:45).

Nonrational Statements Do Not Imply Nonrational Actions

The argument that culture is nonrational and thus beyond the scope of empirical science is unacceptable on at least three grounds (see alsoJarvie 1986:77 ff.; Spiro 1986): 1. The view that culture consists of various forms of nonrational meaning simply excludes by definition the more obviously rational human affairs such as political, economic, and technological thought and activity (see also Keesing 1987).

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2. Statements such as "God blesses men in the sign of their prosperity" are non-falsifiable (and hence nonrational), as Shweder says, but his subsequent argument does not spring from this observation. Instead, he has equated the rationality status of belief in and action upon a statement with the rationality status of the statement itself. His implicit argument is that if a statementof belief is nonrational, to believein and act upon that statement must also be nonrational. Given a nonrational statement of belief, such as "God blesses men in the sign of their prosperity," an anthropologist faces two distinct questions. First: Why does God bless men in the sign of their prosperity? For this question there is no scientific explanation. The answer is, as Shweder observes, simply another cultural construct. In giving the purported reason for God's action, the anthropologist is simply reporting another nonrational statement of belief (of course, the anthropologist's descriptive statements are themselves rational and subject to true/false testing). But a second question remains: Why do some people believe that God blesses men in the sign of their prosperity? To answer that question requires an explanation, which is not arbitrary. 3. According to Webster, arbitrary means either (1) depending on choice or discretion, (2) arising from will or caprice, or (3) selected at random and without reason. The first two definitions identify actions resulting from willful choice among alternatives. Such actions are explainable in principle, and those explanations are testable. Such actions may be "rational" or "irrational" (depending perhaps on whether they are justified by one's own standards), but they are not "nonrational." Only the third definition of arbitrary, meaning "random," identifies a case of truly "nonrational" action. Thus, if Shweder's argument that certain broad classes of human behavior are "nonrational" or "arbitrary" has any unusual significance, it appears to be the somewhat awkward claim that human cultural behavior is random.

Argument III: Culture Is Contradictory

The third argument that some critics use to justify their rejection of refutation is that cultures, personalities, and behavior are composed of contradictory elements. Since contradiction is inherent in our cultural world, no contradictory evidence can refute a statement about culture. For example, adding to the Mead/Freeman debate, Shore (1983:943) states: What is wrong, in the end, with the kind of absolute, formal refutation that is the hallmark of Popperian science and that informs Freeman's book is that it pretends that the "facts" of human existence operate like some bloodless, mindless machine according to the strictest principles of Aristotelian noncontradiction. And yet human life is riddled with contradiction.... Simply bringing to bear on a statement evidence that is contradictory is not in the human sciences sufficient to disprove that statement .... Does the Samoan orator refute the dignified ali'i? Does the passive in us refute the aggressive, or our virtue refute our vice?

The "Truth Value" of Things

Shore's argument equates the truth value of statements made about worldly things with a supposed truth value of the things themselves. Descriptive or explanatory statements concerning the real world are always either true or false. As statements about the real world they are refutable, keeping in mind the limits discussed above. But Samoan orators and ali'i, the passive and aggressive in us, virtue and vice are all things. As things, they are neither true nor false: they simply are, or are not. As Shore correctly notes, these things are incapable of being refuted. But equating Mead's and Freeman's statements about worldly things with the things themselves, Shore, Scheper-Hughes, and other critics argue that Freeman's refutation of Mead's statements is invalid because two contradictory statements about social phenomena may both be "the truth." What they perhaps mean is that two things having contrasting qualities, such as Samoan orators and ali'i or virgins and non-virgins, may coexist, but that

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is an unsurprising conclusion. Human life itself may be "riddled with contradiction," but as anthropologists we may strive to describe and explain that riddle without our statements themselves being contradicted.

Argument IV: Human Affairs Are Without Cause

In addition to rejecting the primary method of empirical science-refutation-critics also reject its goal: lawful explanation. These critics argue that empirical science is inappropriate for the study of human affairs because those affairs are not caused in the same "mechanistic" way that they see as the dominant "paradigm" in the physical and biological sciences. They believe that human affairs have meanings rather than causes, and since those meanings vary with context, explanations requiring universal laws are therefore impossible. Instead, understanding of human affairs is achieved by interpreting those meanings and giving detailed (or "thick") descriptions of those contexts; or as Frankel says, by "describing patterns rather than discovering causes" (1986:356). Similarly, Geertz claims that "it is not possible (though there are those who try) to isolate the y's from the x's" (1973a:23), and Ortner notes that "symbolic anthropologists renounce all claims to [causal] explanation" (1984:134). The reason for this denial of cause is not entirely obvious, especially since one of the interpretive scientists' main gurus, Max Weber, advocated the determination of cause as the ultimate goal of interpretive understanding: "Sociology . . is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects" (Weber 1968[1947]:20). Whatever their source, the major historical arguments supporting the denial of cause in human affairs are identified by Nagel (1961), Brodbeck (1968c), and Gellner (1974), among others. I will not repeat their rebuttals here. I will, however, discuss another common argument that mistakenly equates causal explanation with prediction. According to this argument (e.g., Taylor 1979:68-71), the test of any causal explanation is whether it allows the accurate prediction of the explained phenomenon in the future; and since human affairs are infrequently predicted accurately, it is therefore impossible to causally explain those affairs. This conclusion might seem to follow from Hume's classic argument that "cause" is not a force that impels things to occur, but is instead simply the "constant conjunction" of certain conditions, their "contiguity" in time and in relation to their effects of the causal conditions space, and the "priority" in human affairs are often inconstant, the Since (1955[1748]:186-187). "conjunctions" causal explanations are thought to be inappropriate or invalid. Such a conclusion is unnecessary.

Cause and Prediction

While an explanatory argument states the conditions under which a certain phenomenon will (always) occur, that statement of conditions includes not only an explicit list of the (few) "causal" conditions, but also implicitly includes lists of other necessary conditions that are thought to be understood (and therefore need not be stated) and the remaining (infinite) ceterusparibus conditions that are thought to be irrelevant.3 A change in one of those "irrelevant" conditions, however, may confound the effect of the original "causal" conditions. For example, consider an explanation for the occurrence of the Russian Revolution which states six "causal" social, cultural, political, and economic conditions. One might argue that in order for this explanation to be correct it must infallibly predict that if these six conditions ever occur together again, another Russian Revolution will also occur. But this prediction holds only ceterus paribus, assuming that none of the other, formerly "irrelevant" conditions has changed (from Brodbeck 1968c). For example, the same six causal conditions might have occurred again under Stalin's reign of terror, but in that case the increased military power of the central government prevented another revolution from

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occurring. A related problem when trying to predict the future is that, in addition to the valid requirement that an explanation correctly predict the occurrence of a phenomenon when its causal conditions occur (ceterusparibus),we would also have to predict when each of those conditions will themselves co-occur. Causal explanation and the prediction of future events are not the same thing. A true explanation is neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving accurate prediction. A true explanation is not necessary since false explanations and wild guesses may also give accurate predictions, and it is not sufficient since the ceterusparibus conditions may change in the future, leading to a failure of prediction even for true explanations.

Humanistic Causal Explanations

Some researchers also feel that causal explanations are "bloodless" and "mechanistic," and that such explanations are consequently either impossible or immoral. This conclusion is also unnecessary, however, being apparently a reaction to the excesses of early knee-jerk behaviorists. Causal explanations simply state (1) the conditions under which specified events or processes will occur, and (2) the mechanism through which those conditions have their effect (Salmon 1984; without a causal mechanism to connect the causal conditions with their effect, the explanation asserts that the conditions act at a distance to produce their effect, like voodoo spells). There is certainly no requirement that all of the conditions and mechanisms must be external to human actors just because the conditions and mechanisms in Newtonian physics are all external to humans. Anthropologists and physicists try to explain different processes, so obviously the substance of their explanations will differ. Differences of substance do not imply, however, that the form of their explanations must also differ. Among their causal conditions, valid explanations of human affairs must always include (at least implicitly) the desires, perceptions, values, knowledge, and emotions of individual human beings. In addition, the causal mechanisms that translate both internal and external conditions into action must be the minds of individual human beings. To omit them, or to substitute reified or super-organic entities such as "culture," "symbols," or "structures," would indeed be dehumanizing.

Argument V: The Interpretation of Meaning

Some critics would argue that whether or not causal explanations are possible, they are unnecessary for understanding human affairs. Before examining this claim, let us look at what some of these critics say they do: 1. Understand people (Vendler 1984; Geertz 1973a: 13). 2. Understand cultures through interpretation and Watson (Watson-Franke 1975:247). 3. "Interpret ... a person, a history, a ritual, an institution, a society" (Geertz 1973a:18). 4. Analyze cultural forms (Geertz 1973b:448). A common thread running through these examples, and through the interpretive literature in general, is the attempt to understand or "explain" things: people, cultures, symbols, concepts, or rituals. This classical search for knowledge through discovering the essential nature of things, rather than through explanations of their behavior, follows directly from the denial of cause. If human affairs are "arbitrarily chosen," then understanding of these affairs is limited to discovering assigned meanings and their structure. It becomes impossible to "explain why," for example, Balinese men are fascinated by cocks and cockfighting, for knowledge is gained by understanding the nature of cocks as symbols, or "explaining what" the cockfight "means" in the symbolic structure of Balinese life.

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By this tack, human affairs can be understood only if they have referential or "symbolic" meaning. But most objects and behaviors have not been assigned referential meanings by people in a society. Analysts overcome this problem first by objectifying behavior as symbols (e.g., cockfighting becomes a symbolic drama of Balinese life) and then by determining that some quality, aspect, or association of the objectified behavior is its "symbolic meaning." For example, in semantic analysis one (or more) of the meanings of the root derivatives of a word that is used to describe a behavior is identified as the symbolic meaning of that behavior (e.g., Shore 1982). Analysts employ extraordinary uses of the terms "symbolic" and "meaning" that allow the identification of any object or behavior as having "symbolic meaning." Brodbeck identifies five standard uses of the term "understand" in the English language, each with its attendant use of the term "meaning" (1986a:66-68): 1. I do not understand Finnish because I do not know the referential meanings of its symbols. 2. Nor do I understand what it meant to be a member of the Italian Resistance because I have not had the special feelings, emotions, or attitudes that are aroused only by having undergone certain experiences or participated in certain kinds of events. 3. However, I do understand what it meant to be a member of the Resistance because, having also experienced fear, patriotism, courage, and hatred of tyranny, I can empathize with members of the Resistance. 4. I understand why Tom Jones left school; that is, I know that his motive was his desire to earn money. 5. I also understand that increased costs of production mean an increase in selling price; that is, I believe I know the significance of the increase in costs. Only in the first usage does "meaning" normally refer to referential or symbolic meanthese associations reflect empirically testable, ing. Only in the last two usages-when lawful connections-does "understanding" coincide with scientific explanation. In symbolic analysis, however, these different uses of "mean" and "understand" are treated as if they were the same. For example, Vendler equates the "understanding" of sentences with the "understanding" of theories, explanations, novels, poetry, individual people, Orientals, the Bungo-Bungo, and "some machines and higher animals-at least on a limited basis" (Vendler 1984:202). Most radical in this conflation of terms is the extension of the definitional meaning of a term to include both defining and non-defining properties. For example, D'Andrade states the interpretive scientists' position that "ideas, feelings, and intentions are all activated by symbols and are thus part of the meaning of symbols" (1984:99); and Geertz states that the meaning of a symbolic act includes the total context of the act (Geertz 1973a:6-7). The result of this conflation and extension of terms is the creation of a sixth usage: 6. Symbolic meaning includes anything or all that is known about, related to, felt, or intended by any object or act that the analyst identifies as a "symbol." Using this conflation of terms, researchers conclude that since different people may know, feel, or intend different things at different times, the "meaning" (6) of anything is subjective and situational, and thus immune to both explanation and refutation. The conflation of "meanings" thus forms a foundation for the rejection of science: since "the same physical event can mean [uses 1, 2, 3, and 6] different things, the establishment of an empirical science based solely on the observation of human action becomes problematic" (D'Andrade 1986:31). Previously, only objects and behaviors that had been assigned referential meanings (1) were called "symbols," but by extraordinary usage "symbolic meaning" may now be discovered in all objects and behaviors. By collapsing the other five uses of the term "meaning" into symbolic or referential meaning (1), the possibility of identifying causes (4 and 5) is obscured. This conflation of terms allows interpretive scientists to apply the methods of hermeneutics, literary criticism, and linguistic analysis (which were originally designed to dis-

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cover referential meaning) to objects and events that lack referential meaning. Having denied cause, they search for symbolic meaning. Having conflated motive (4) and significance (5) with the other uses of "meaning," they conclude that understanding calls only for the explication of referential meaning (1), feelings (2), empathy (3), or tangential matters (6), rather than explanation by lawful significance (4 and 5). Perhaps the most radical departure is the conflation of the referential meaning of a term with its significance-that is, the definition of a rabbit is one thing, and what we know about rabbit behavior is another. As Brodbeck notes, "Referentialmeaning is a matter of convention; it is something we give the concept. Significanceor lawfulness, however, is not a matter of convention, but a factual matter" (1968c:387, emphasis in the original). Having conflated significance and referential meaning, however, some researchers conclude Shweder's that significance, like referential meaning, is also a matter of convention-in therefore immune to explanation and testing. words, "nonrational" or "arbitrary"-and We do not "understand" (4 and 5) people in the same sense that we "understand" (1) the meaning of symbolic objects like sentences or poetry, as Vendler (1984) and Geertz (1973a) maintain. "Understanding people" (4 and 5) is simply another way of saying that we can explain their behavior. I suggest that when Vendler says, "I do not understand Joe," he does not mean (as he claims) that he does not understand the meaning of Joe as a symbolic object, like a poem. What he means is that he does not know the reasons for Joe's behavior-for example, whether Joe's golf game is off today because he is worried about cheating on his wife last night, or simply because he is tired from staying out all night. The hollowness of the critics' denial of causal explanation becomes even more apparent when such explanations regularly appear in their own writings.4 These explanations are usually disguised in interpretive euphemisms, but they are there nonetheless. Geertz is the most prolific euphemizer, circumventing the standard English word "explain" with such terms as "render accessible," "dissolve the opacity of," "grasp," "clarify," "reduce the puzzlement of," "render intelligible," "interpret," and of course "thickly describe" (Geertz 1973a). In spite of these circumlocutions and his programmatic statements to the contrary, however, Geertz gives believable explanations of much Balinese behavior. For example, in the first few pages of "Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight" (1973b), Geertz explains why the Indonesian government tries to stop cockfighting, opium smoking, begging, and the uncovering of breasts (it sees them "as 'primitive,' 'backward,' 'unprogressive,' and generally unbecoming an ambitious nation"); why illegal cockfights can be held in the village (the officials are bribed); why he and his wife were accepted by the villagers (they showed their solidarity by fleeing with the villagers from a police raid); why Balinese men are obsessed with their fighting cocks (fighting cocks are masculine symbols par excellence); why babies are not allowed to crawl and children's teeth are filed (to distinguish them from beasts, which are abhorred); and so on. Geertz also gives more explicit explanations (1973b:432-433): The question of why such matches are interesting ... takes us out of the realm of formal concerns into more broadly sociological and social-psychological ones ... the explanation lies [not in irrationality, but] in the fact that in such play, money is less a measure of utility, had or expected, than it is a symbol of moral import, perceived or imposed. Nor are his explanations devoid of explicit, law-like generalizations. For example: the power of the center bet to pull the side bets toward its own even-money pattern is directly proportional to its size, because its size is directly proportional to the degree to which the cocks are in fact evenly matched. As for the volume question, total wagering is greater in large-centerbet fights because such fights are considered more "interesting," not only in the sense that they are less predictable, but, more crucially, that more is at stake ... [1973b:431]

Culture As Object and As Theory

As Geertz has just shown, we do not have to objectify human affairs as "symbolic behavior" in order to understand them. Nor does there appear to be much profit in the

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currently revived search (e.g., Shweder and Levine 1984) for the essence or the essential it is variously objectimeaning of that grandest of anthropological objects-culture-as fied in learned behavior, patterns of behavior, ideals, values, norms, rules, symbols, and so on. Culture is the unifying concept of anthropology, but not "culture" defined as any or all of those objects. The unifying concept of anthropology is the general theory called "culture," which explains much human behavior by noting that it is socially learned rather than biologically determined. "Culture," as a general theory, rivals "heredity" in the explanation of human affairs. The myriad things that other definitions identify as "culture" are all "cultural" by virtue of being amenable to cultural explanations rather than biological ones. Thus, explanations of human affairs are not only possible; they constitute the foundation of our discipline.

The Use of Metaphors in the Interpretation of Meaning

An important corollary of the objectification of behavior and the subsequent search for symbolic meaning is the creation of metaphors for interpreting that behavior. For example, patterns of "meaning" become "structures" with different "levels," culture becomes an "acted document," and behavior becomes "text." This use of metaphor explains why it is impossible to objectively assess differing interpretations, whether in poetry or in anthropology. Unlike explanations, metaphors cannot be wrong. The problem, however, is not the use of metaphors per se. A well-understood model can often be used to suggest new hypotheses or relationships in a less well-understood subject. This is the context of discovery, about which empirical science has little or nothing to say. A problem arises only if the properties of the model come to replace the properties of the original subject. In symbolic analysis, cultural acts are said to be a drama or a text. As a leading advocate of symbolic analysis recognizes, however, human affairs display only "some of the features constitutive of a text" (Ricoeur 1971:529). Substitution of the properties of an analytical model for the properties of the original subject would normally be thought of as a logical error. In symbolic analysis, however, it is the prescribed procedure (e.g., Ricoeur 1971; Taylor 1979). But while "viewing" social phenomena as if they were texts may help researchers see new relationships, life does not thereby becomea text of symbols. As Perelman notes, metaphors and analogies play an essentially heuristic role as instruments of invention; they give the researcher hypotheses to organize his investigations. Eventually, however, they must be put aside.... What is efficacious in one realm [discovery] is completely worthless in another [validation]. [1979:91, 93-94] The process of verstehen, or empathic understanding, is a good example of equating the properties of a model (the researcher's thoughts and emotions) with the properties of the subject (the subject's thoughts and emotions). Advocates of verstehenbelieve that "we reach understanding through re-experiencing mental processes" (Watson-Franke and Watson 1975:247). Through an act of empathy, "we always can project, or at least try to project, ourselves into the situation in which the agent finds himself by imagining what it must be like for him to be in that situation" (Vendler 1984:208-209). By empathizing we "perform total transference and try to assume in addition our subjects' beliefs, values, prejudices, hang-ups, and the rest" (Vendler 1984:209). But as Nagel (1961:484), citing Abel (1948), warned, a social scientist's: empathic identification with [other] individuals does not, by itself, constitute knowledge ... [nor] annul the need for objective evidence, assessed in accordance with logical principles that are common to all controlled inquiries. [emphasis in original] The critical question is not whether empathic understanding is beneficial or even possible, but whether it demonstrates that the method of testing in the social sciences must be radically different from that in the physical or biological sciences, as some critics claim. Rudner shows, however, that empathy is, at best, redundant as a validating device:

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What check does the empathizer have on whether his empathic state is reliable? ... in order to accept some specific empathic act as validational, we must presuppose an investigation establishing [that] hypothesis. [1966:73]

Science As a Process of Reconstruction

The scientific method is a two-part process, alternating continually between the formation and testing of hypotheses. It is thus similar to the hermeneutic circle, except that empirical science requires that at some point the circle must include testing against relevant empirical data. If the possibility of refutation has been denied, however, then progress cannot be made toward the creation of better explanations. Shore (1983:936), for example, arrives at that position in his response to Freeman: It is a telling commentary on this categorical style of argument [i.e., refutation] that it does not invite reconciliation of any kind, proposing instead a radical dissociation between mutually exclusive positions or facts. Shore proposes instead to "reconcile" Mead's and Freeman's "mutually exclusive positions or facts" by opposing them in a "dialectical whole" which he claims achieves a reconciliation that is beyond the reach of empirical science. His argument is superficially similar to Perelman's "dialectical pluralism," but Perelman specifically restricts his dialectics to discussions of values, justice, morals, and biblical interpretations (1979:12). For example, "in the tradition of the Talmud ... it is accepted that opposed positions can be equally reasonable; one of them does not have to be right" (1979:12). He goes on to say, however, that "When a result can be either demonstrated or verified, nobody would think of resorting to dialectical discussion" (1979:13). The relevant dialectic is not between Samoan orators and ali'i or between virgins and non-virgins, or between any such "contradictory" cultural objects. The relevant dialectic is between the processes of refutation and the creation of new descriptions and new explanations that are not contradicted by our observations.

Conclusion
Critics have attempted to deny the viability of both halves of the scientific process in anthropology. They claim that empirical refutation is impossible or useless, and that human affairs have only meanings rather than causes, and are therefore amenable only to subjective interpretation rather than to scientific explanation. I have suggested, however, that while these arguments contain important observations concerning the difficulty of acquiring knowledge of human affairs, their conclusions are unnecessarily extreme, being based largely on overstatements and misunderstandings by both science advocates and their interpretive critics. From the models that I have sketched of refutation and of causal explanation, it should be clear that there is ample room in empirical science for the operation of subjective states. Some critics may conclude, nevertheless, that empirical science ultimately fails to fully "capture" or "represent" the subjective world of human experience. That conclusion would certainly be correct, but as Einstein remarked, the aim of science is not "to give the taste of the soup" (quoted in Rudner 1966:69, emphasis in original). The aim of anthropology as an empirical science, as I see it, is to describe and explain human affairs-not to represent them. If the goal of humanistic anthropology is to represent or evoke the subjective meaning of human experience, then the scientific and humanistic goals of anthropologists are complementary, not contradictory.

Notes
The ideas in this article were first presented to a seminar at the University of Acknowledgments. California at Santa Barbara in 1985. My thanks to the seminar participants for their comments. The article itself has been circulating since early 1986, and so has received the benefit of comments,

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criticisms, and encouragement from many people. My thanks to George Appell, Doug Bamforth, James Birkhead, Don Brown, Hiram Caton, Tom Harding, Elvin Hatch, Ian Jarvie, Eudene Luther, Hector Neff,Jim Peoples, Benson Saler, Paul Shankman, George Spindler, Albert Spaulding, Melford Spiro, Don Symons, Sharon Tiffany, and several anonymous referees. I have perhaps taken too little of their advice, so errors must remain my own. 'Spaulding (1988:266) concludes that despite such remarks, Leach is not antiscientific in any fundamental way. 2Different but noncontradictory statements, such as "some girls are promiscuous" and "some girls are not promiscuous," can both be true, but this is a trivial observation, and such highly qualified statements are neither characteristic of Mead's Samoa writing nor are they the object of Freeman's refutation. 3Some conditions may also be incompletely understood, such ignorance resulting in imperfect prediction--hence the appearance of so-called "statistical explanations" (e.g., Hempel 1966). Salmon (1984) leaves open the possibility that truly random events may occur, at least in quantum mechanics. 4Similarly, critics who deny the possibility of refutation may also use it in their substantive work. See, for example, the lengthy formal refutation of Piaget's work in Shweder (1984).

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