PART 4: LAGUNA METTS VS. CA& CAALAM & ESGUERRA DOMDOM VS. SANDIGANBAYAN ST.

MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS NLRC& ARICAYOS JOHNSON&J VS. JOHNSON OFFICE &SALESUNION J.PHIL MARINE & CANDAVA VS. NLRC & DUMALAOG PNB VS. VELASCO F: Velasco, a PNB audit officer, employed for 18yrs, and his wife, Belen Amparo E. Velasco, maintained Dollar Savings Account. he PNB Ligao, Albay Branch and withdrew US$15,000.00 from the dollar savings account. At that time, the account had a balance of US$15,486.07. his New York-based brother, Gregorio Velasco, sent him various checks through his kin totaling US$15,000.00 and that the checks would just be deposited in time in Velasco's account. Velasco updated his dollar savings account by depositing US$12.78, reflecting a balance of US$15,486.01. He was allegedly satisfied with the updated balance, as he thought that the US$15,000.00 in his account was the amount given by his brother. An audit was conducted & it was found that the withdrawal was not posted and credited. Velasco was notified. Velasco went to Dolorita Donado, assistant vice president of the Internal Audit Department and team leader of the Escolta Task Force, and delivered (3) checks in the amount of $5k each but this was rentered stating he should deposit it himself. Velasco described the inter-branch withdrawal at PNB Ligao, Albay Branch on June 30, 1995 as " no-book" but later he said that it was with passbook. he filed a Complaint against PNB for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, and damages LA,NLRC,CA: dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal. PNB to pay complainant unpaid wages for the period May 12, 1996 to October 31, 1996 in the amount of P103,796.00. I: w/n Appeal correctly made R: The mode of appeal resorted to by Velasco is wrong because appeal is not the proper remedy in elevating to the CA the decision of the NLRC. Section 2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit that Rule 43 "shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code. The correct remedy that should have been availed of is the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 [the party may also seasonably avail of the special civil action for certiorari, where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer].Velasco committed serious misconduct, hence, his dismissal is justified. The law is explicit that the misconduct should be serious. It is settled that in order for misconduct to be serious, "it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant". the misconduct must (1) be serious; (2) relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (3) show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. CA erred in directing PNB to pay Velasco separation pay and backwages. PNB has no other liability to Velasco, except his unpaid wages from May 27, 1996 to July 31, 1996. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE VS. NACINO F; AMA Computer College Santiago City, Inc. (AMA) employed Chelly P. Nacino (Nacino) as Online Coordinator of the college. HR found Nacino absent from his post. On the same day, San Pedro issued a Memorandum requiring Nacino to explain his absence. Nacino filed with San Pedro a written explanation claiming that he had to rush home due to LBM and that the facilities in the school were inadequate and inefficient, but he had gone back to the school. Not satisfied with the explanation, San Pedro sought another explanation because the earlier explanation "does not conform to a previous investigation conducted. San Pedro then filed a formal complaint against Nacino for false testimony, in addition to the charge of abandonment. The Investigating Committee found Nacino guilty as charged, and was dismissed from the service. Nacino filed on December 13, 2002 a Complaint for Illegal Suspension and Termination before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) in Tuguegarao City. Before the Voluntary Arbitrator, the parties agreed to settle the case amicably, with Nacino discharging and releasing AMA from all his claims in consideration of the sum of P7,719.81. The Decision embodying the Compromise Agreement and the corresponding Quitclaim and Release, both dated February 21, 2003, were duly prepared and signed, but the check in payment of the consideration for the settlement had yet to be released. acino died in an accident. the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered the assailed Decision, ordering Nacino's reinstatement and the payment of his backwages and 13th month pay. Therein, the Voluntary Arbitrator manifested that, due to AMA's failure to pay the sum of P7,719.81, Nacino withdrew from the Compromise Agreement. Voluntary Arbitrator issued a Writ of Execution upon motion of Nacino's surviving spouse, one Bernadeth V. Nacino. AMA filed a Motion to Quash the said Writ but the Voluntary Arbitrator allegedly refused to receive the same. Thus, on May 22, 2003, the heirs of Nacino were able to garnish AMA's bank deposits in the amount of P52,021.70. AMA filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. On June 23, 2003, the CA dismissed the said petition because it was a wrong mode of review. It held that the proper remedy was an appeal by way of Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the CA opined, an erroneous appeal shall be dismissed outright pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Civil Procedure I: w/n appeal was correct R:We are not unmindful of instances when certiorari was granted despite the availability of appeal, such as (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. However, none of these recognized exceptions attends the case at bar. AMA has sadly failed to show circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule. in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, a petition for certiorari may be treated as having been filed under Rule 45, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before the CA cannot be treated as such, without the exceptional circumstances mentioned above, because it was filed way beyond the 15day reglementary period within which to file the Petition for Review. AMA received the assailed Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator on April 15, 2003 and it filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA only on June 16, 2003. By parity of reasoning, the same reglementary period should apply to appeals taken from the decisions of Voluntary Arbitrators under Rule 43. Based on the foregoing disquisitions, the assailed Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had already become final and executory and beyond the purview of this Court to act upon. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAWA HYATT VS. BACUNGAN F: In 1995 and 1996, Mario Dacles and Teodoro Valencia respectively assumed their duties as glass cleaners at Hyatt ursuant to the cleaning service contract executed between respondent Hyatt and City Service Corporation (CSC). Hyatt hired Amelia Dalmacio and Renato Dazo on a casual basis as florist/sales clerk and helper/driver their contracts expired on 30 August 1998, Dalmacio and Dazo continued reporting for work. On 16 September 1998, Dalmacio and Dazo signed another employment contract with respondent Hyatt. During the Labor Management Committee Meeting (LMC), petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL (petitioner union), a legitimate labor organization composed of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Hyatt, questioned the status as non-regular employees of Dacles, Valencia, Dalmacio and Dazopetitioner union and respondent Hyatt agreed to submit the matter for resolution through the grievance machinery as provided for in their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Petitioner union claimed that Dacles, et al. were regular employees on account of the nature of their functions as well as the length of their service. On the other hand, respondent Hotel maintained that Dalmacio and Dazo were mere project employees whose employments were co-terminus with the existence of the flower shop outlet and that Dacles and Valencia were employees of CSC, an independent contractor. Hyatt dismissed Dacles and Valencia and disallowed them from reporting to work on the ground that the service contract between respondent Hyatt and CSC had been terminated. Failed to compromise. Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that:Dacles and Valencia are not employees of the Hotel. Petitioner union moved for reconsideration, which was denied. union elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, to wit: Contrary to Secs. 1, 4 and 6, in relation to Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner resorted to the instant special civil action for certiorari, instead of a petition for review. f the action were to be treated as a petition for review, then it was filed out of time I: REMEDY FOR ASSAILING THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR IS AN APPEAL BY PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE R: proper recourse to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has already been settled in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlines * in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and consistent with the original purpose to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities. G&M VS. RIVERA F: G & M (Phil.), Inc., petitioner, is a corporation engaged in the placement and recruitment business of overseas contract workers. It deployed Lorenzo Rivera, respondent's husband, to work as equipment driver for its foreign principal, Mohammad Al-Hammad Recruiting Office in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia for a period of two (2) years. After working for one 1 year, 7 months and 17 days, Lorenzo met an accident and died. Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unpaid salary differentials for her late husband alleging that he was not paid his salary for 23 days before he died. Respondent further claimed that her husband actually received only a monthly salary of SR 700, way below than that he ought to receive under his contract of employment which is US$ 600. etitioner's allegation that her husband received only a monthly salary of SR 700 is inconsistent with the claim for unpaid salaries as it is not possible for a worker receiving SR 700 per month to have unpaid salaries in the amount of SR 843.33 for 23 days. It likewise questioned respondent's basis for filing the complaint, she not being a privy to her husband's working conditions while abroad. LA ordered petitioner to pay respondent. NLRC denied pet. Appeal stating: Rivera ought to receive US $600.00 basic monthly salary. Since respondent's foreign principal keeps and maintains the employment records, omplainant in this case is the real party in interest because "she stands to be benefited by the judgment in this suit or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit" Petitioner filed the instant Petition

for Review alleging that: (1) the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the rule on "burden of proof" against petitioner inasmuch as non-payment of salaries, as claimed by respondent was not sufficiently shown; and in holding that there is no inconsistency between the salary of petitioner's husband appearing in the OCW Information Sheet and in the Final Settlement considering that no evidence supports such conclusion. R: Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials' findings rest. As such, the findings of fact and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. This is because it is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below; or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses; or substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has expertise in its special field. In this case, we defer to the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, who is deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within his jurisdiction, specially since his findings were affirmed in toto by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals DIOKNO VS. CALDAC F: FLAMES is a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco. Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES. FLAMES onduct of its union elections. private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano filed their respective certificates of candidacy. OMELEC rejected Jimmy S. Ong's candidacy on the ground that he was not a member of FLAMES. Meanwhile, the certificates of candidacy of Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano were similarly rejected on the basis of the exclusion of their department from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The employees assigned to the aforesaid department are allegedly deemed disqualified from membership in the union for being confidential employees. hey prayed, inter alia, for the nullification of the order of the COMELEC which disallowed their candidacy. 5 They further prayed that petitioners be directed to render an accounting of funds with full and detailed disclosure of expenditures and financial transactions; and that a representative from the (BLR) be designated to act as chairman of the COMELEC in lieu of petitioner Dante M. Tong. petitioners filed a Petition with the COMELEC seeking the disqualification of private respondents. Petitioners alleged that Daya, et al., allowed themselves to be assisted by non-union members, and committed acts of disloyalty which are inimical to the interest of FLAMES. In their campaign, they allegedly colluded with the officers of the Meralco Savings and Loan Association (MESALA) and the Meralco Mutual Aid and Benefits Association (MEMABA) and exerted undue influence on the members of FLAMES. COMELEC issued a Decision, declaring Daya, et al., officially disqualified to run and/or to participate in the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections. a subsequent election was held on 30 June 2004, which was participated in and won by herein private respondents Daya, et al. The validity of the 30 June 2004 elections was assailed by herein petitioners before the DOLE and taken to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, which case does not concern us in the instant Petition. The Court of Appeals, in the aforesaid case, rendered a Decision dated 12 Jan 2007, upholding the validity of the 30 June 2004 elections, and the declaration of herein private respondents Daya, et al., as the duly elected winners therein. EC ed-Arbiter's Decision states, viz: [P]etition to Nullify the Order of Disqualification; Nullify Election proceedings and counting of Votes; and Declare a Failure of Elections is hereby granted. The disqualification of Daya, et al., is null and void. BLR issued a Resolution, affirming in toto the assailed Decision of the Med-Arbiter.CA: held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC concerns the dismissal and/or expulsion of union members, which power is vested in the FLAMES' Executive Board, and not the COMELEC. It affirmed the finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., committed a procedural shortcut.petitioners contend that the instant Petition falls under the exceptions to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. They implore this Court to make factual determination anent the conduct of the 7 May 2003 elections. They also question the jurisdiction of the BLR on the case at bar because of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al., to exhaust administrative remedies within the union. It is the stance of petitioner that Art226 of the Labor Code which grants power to the BLR to resolve inter-union and intra-union disputes is dead law, and has been amended by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6715, whereby the conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration functions of the BLR had been transferred to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. I: whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the jurisdiction of the BLR to take cognizance of the case and then upheld the ruling of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter, nullifying the COMELEC's order of disqualification of private respondents Daya et al., and annulling the 7 May 2003 FLAMES elections R: BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. We said that since Article 226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions. ERWIN REYES VS. NLRC, COCACOLA & TAGUIBAO F: a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees filed by petitioner against respondents Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines (CCBP) and Rotaida Taguibao (Taguibao) before the Labor Arbiter. petitioner alleged that he was first employed by respondent CCBP, through Interserve Manpower Agency (Interserve), as a Leadman in February 1988. Petitioner was initially assigned to the Mendiola Sales Office of respondent CCBP. Petitioner's employment contract was renewed every five months and he was assigned a different task every time. Such an arrangement continued until petitioner was directly hired by respondent CCBP as a Route Salesman one year from the time of petitioner's employment as a Route Salesman, respondent CCBP, thru Taguibao, terminated his services on 15 September 2001. Since he already acquired the status of a regular employee, petitioner asserted that his dismissal from employment without the benefit of due process was unlawful. CCBP refuted petitioner's allegation that he was a regular employee. Petitioner's employment was for a fixed period of three months, which was subsequently extended with petitioner's consent. Petitioner was employed pursuant to the mini-bodega project of respondent CCBP wherein respondent CCBP sought to extend its market to areas that cannot be serviced by its regular salesmen. After the viability of this marketing scheme was found to be unsuccessful, respondent CCBP was constrained to discontinue petitioner's fixed-term employment. In addition, respondent Taguibao had no liability for terminating petitioner's employment when it was not effected in bad faith. LA: in favor of petitioner; to reinstate him. CCBP and Taguibao immediately reinstated petitioner. CCBP and Taguibao, by filing a Memorandum of Appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and posting the corresponding Supersedeas Bond, sought the stay of the execution of the monetary awards made by the Labor Arbiter in his Decision. Respondents CCBP and Taguibao asserted in their appeal that petitioner was merely employed for a particular project which turned out to be not viable. Petitioner was subsequently terminated from work on account of the expiration of his employment contract. Petitioner's claim of illegal dismissal was, therefore, tenuous. NLRC: dismissing the appeal. petitioner elevated his case before the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for his failure to give any explanation why a copy of the said Petition was not personally served upon the counsel of the adverse parties. failed to provide the Court of Appeals a written explanation as to why he did not personally serve a copy of his Petition therein upon the adverse parties, as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court. The records also readily reveal that petitioner did not file a timely Motion for Reconsideration. . Petitioner, however, submits that he raised meritorious arguments in his Petition before the Court of Appeals, and the dismissal thereof on a mere technicality defeated the greater interest of substantial justice. CBP and Taguibao also argue that petitioner's procedural faux pas cannot be excused by merely attributing the same to his former counsel, in view of the doctrinal rule that negligence of the counsel binds his client. I: w/n negligence of counsel in technicalities will bind the client R: negligence of counsel binds the client. Hence, if counsel commits a mistake in the course of litigation, thereby resulting in his losing the case, his client must perforce suffer the consequences of the mistake. The reason for the rule is to avoid the possibility that every losing party would raise the issue of negligence of his or her counsel to escape an adverse decision of the court, to the detriment of our justice system, as no party would ever accept a losing verdict. This general rule, however, pertains only to simple negligence of the lawyer. Where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable, pervasive, reckless and inexcusable, then it does not bind the client since, in such a case, the client is effectively deprived of his or her day in court. circumstances of this case qualify it under the exception, rather than the general rule. The negligence of petitioner's former counsel may be considered gross since it invariably resulted to the foreclosure of remedies otherwise readily available to the petitioner. Not only was petitioner deprived of the opportunity to bring his case before the Court of Appeals with the outright dismissal of his Petition on a technicality, but he was also robbed of the chance to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition. What further impel this Court to heed the call for substantial justice are the pressing merits of this case which, if left overshadowed by technicalities, could result in flagrant violations of the provisions of the Labor Code and of the categorical mandate of the Constitution affording protection to labor. he Court overrules the deletion by the NLRC of the Labor Arbiter's award for attorney's fees to petitioner. Petitioner is evidently entitled to attorney's fees, since he was compelled to litigate to protect his interest by reason of unjustified and unlawful termination of his employment by respondents CCBP and Taguibao. Petitioin granted MAGBANUA VS. UY F: Felipe O. Magbanua, Carlos dela Cruz, Remy Arnaiz, Billy Arnaiz, Rolly Arnaiz, Domingo Salarda, Julio Cahilig and Nicanor Labuen were employees of petitioner, a private contractor engaged principally in the construction business. On September 27, 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Iloilo City, Department of Labor and Employment for illegal dismissal, payment of back wages, overtime pay, separation pay, 13th-month pay, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, premium pay and damagesOn October 20, 1997, (6) of the (8) [petitioners] filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be considered closed and terminated as they are already satisfied of what they have received (a total of P320,000) from [respondent]. Together with said Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit in the local dialect, dated October 20, 1997, of the six (6) [petitioners] attesting that they have no more collectible amount from [respondent] and if there is any, they are abandoning and waiving the same. On February 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter issued an order denying the motion for issuance of writ of execution and [considered] the cases closed and terminated .On appeal, the 'NLRC' reversed the Labor Arbiter and directed the immediate issuance of a writ of execution, holding that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered and that quitclaims and releases are normally frowned upon as contrary to public policy." CA held that compromise agreements may be entered into even after a final

judgment. Thus, petitioners validly released respondent from any claims, upon the voluntary execution of a waiver pursuant to the compromise agreement. I: 1.Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court could be subject to compromise settlement R: compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy; and must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. To have the force of law between the parties, it must comply with the requisites and principles of contracts. Upon the parties, it has the effect and the authority of res judicata, once entered into. When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. issue, which refers to the timely filing of petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed with the CA, will no longer be discussed because this Court's decision has resolved the case on the merits.petition denied. EUROTECH HAIR SYSTEM VS. GO F: Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of wigs and toupees. Petitioners Lutz Kunack and Jose E. Barin are the company's president and general manager, respectively. Go served as Eurotech's operations manager from September 2, 1996 until he was dismissed on September 27, 1999. As operations manager, he drafted and implemented the plans for the production of wigs and toupees. Respondent's responsibilities included manpower planning to meet the monthly production targets.In 1999, the company suffered production shortfalls. Thus, on September 2, 1999, petitioner Barin issued respondent a memorandum, strongly advising him to improve his performance. He was also admonished because of the late shipment of 80 units of hairpieces to one of petitioners' clients, Bergmann Company. September 7, Eurotech issued another memorandum reiterating the previous reminder for respondent to improve his performance. Again, on September 21, , Eurotech issued two memoranda, reminding respondent of his continued failure to improve his performance. He was given 24 hours to explain in writing why the company should not terminate his services on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. On September 27, 1999, petitioner Kunack finally issued respondent a termination letter citing loss of trust and confidence. Respondent filed against petitioners a complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay, backwages, and damages. LA:ruled for respondent. NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court set aside the decision of the NLRC and essentially reinstated the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent received said Decision of the Court of Appeals on July 21,2003. Prior to such receipt, he had executed a quitclaim in consideration of P450,000. Hence, on Jul16the Labor Arbiter issued an Order dismissing with prejudice the complaint for illegal dismissal in view of the said waiver. I: Is the compromise agreement entered into by the parties valid? I R: A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to respondent's contention, the employee's counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of the compromise agreement.In this case, we find the consideration of P450,000 fair and reasonable under the circumstances. In addition, records show that respondent gave his personal and specific individual consent with a full understanding of the stakes involved. In our view, the compromise agreement in this case does not suffer from the badges of invalidity.The fact that the Order, which dismissed the case in view of the compromise agreement, was issued during the pendency of the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals does not divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari is an original action and does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding. The Labor Arbiter thus acted well within his jurisdiction. Therefore, the Labor Arbiter's Order dismissing the case with prejudice in view of the compromise agreement entered into by the parties must be upheld.the petition is GRANTED. YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS VS. CA, SAMAR ANGO & WESTERN GUARANTY F: petitioner alleged that a sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) erroneously levied upon certain properties which it claims ownership. As a consequence, it filed an adverse claim with the NLRC, which was dismissed by the labor arbiter. The dismissal was appealed by the petitioner to the NLRC, but the same was also dismissed for lack of merit. In the meantime, petitioner filed an original mandatory injunction with the NLRC. While the injunction case was pending before the NLRC, petitioner filed a complaint for accion reivindicatoria with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court dismissed the complaint, hence, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping and lack of jurisdiction. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed this appeal before the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that there was no forum shopping in the case at bar as there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of action and reliefs sought. The case before the NLRC was a labor case on which petitioner was not a party, while the reivindicatoria case filed by the petitioner in the trial court was to recover the property illegally levied upon and sold at public auction. The Court also ruled that a third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the alternative remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of. The Supreme Court annulled the sale on execution of the subject property and the subsequent sale of the same. I: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was guilty of forum shopping, and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner's accion reivindicatoria on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court. R: In the case at bar, there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of action and reliefs sought.The case before the NLRC where Labor Arbiter Reyes issued a writ of execution on the property of petitioner was a labor dispute between Artex and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was not a party to the case. The only issue petitioner raised before the NLRC was whether or not the writ of execution issued by the labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property of petitioner, not a party to the labor case.On the other hand, the accion reivindicatoria filed by petitioner in the trial court was to recover the property illegally levied upon and sold at auction. Hence, the causes of action in these cases were different.The rule is that "for forum-shopping to exist both actions must involve the same transactions, the same circumstances. The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues." 11 a third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of.Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:a)File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, andb)If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC. In light of the above, the filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing a subsequent action for recovery of property and damages with the Regional Trial Court. And, the institution of such complaint will not make petitioner guilty of forum shopping. Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals