THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners vs.

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents. FACTS: In Gonong Case, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City. Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong. Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force. Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations. Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of: 2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied) Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. Page | 1 PUBCORP CASES MVB

ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of such delegated power.is valid? NO HELD: According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions. Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied). In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of

their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction. PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES, GR NO. 40243 (207 SCRA 157) FACTS: The Municipal Council of Virac issued a resolution declaring the warehouse of Tatel, who is engaged in import and export of abaca as a public nuisance, and directed Tatel to move. The warehouse is said to have violated Ordinance 13 which provided that warehouses should be at a distance of 200 meters from the blocks of houses nearest to it. HELD: The ordinance was held valid. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local selfgovernment and thus endowed with police powers to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria. What is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored within 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a Page | 2 PUBCORP CASES MVB

warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire, which is one of the primordial obligations of government. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994 FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The trouble arose when in 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. It enacted Ordinance No. 3353 (An Ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino). Other similar Ordinances followed. The validity of these Ordinances was questioned. HELD: The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function

belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. One of the requisites in order that an ordinance be valid is It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.

Subsequently, Tayaban was informed by the Governor that his proposal was approved and that the project shall be funded by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB). Subsequently, a bidding was conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong (Pugong) won the contract for the construction of the said public market. A formal contract was executed by and between Pugong, as the contractor, and the CEB, as the project owner. Actual construction of the public market was commenced in June 1989. On August 15, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20 which provide for the demolition of the erected structures of the ongoing public market. Petitioner argue that the applicable law at the time of the passage of Resolution No. 20 is Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337 or the Local Government Code of 1983. Claiming that Pugong failed to obtain the requisite building permit pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096, petitioners assert that their act of demolishing the structures erected on the construction site is an implementation of the provisions of the Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 19 which empowers certain public officials, like the municipal mayor, to remove illegal constructions which were built, either in public places or private property, without permit. Petitioners further contend that the demolition is a valid exercise of police power and that their act is justified by the general welfare clause under the LGC which empowers them to enact and implement measures for the general well-being of their constituents. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 20 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: The Court is not persuaded by petitioners contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This principle applies to nuisances per se, or those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Petitioners claim that

ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE* y LANGA, FRANCISCO MAYUMIS y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA y CUYAHEN, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents. FACTS: Mayor Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial governor Benjamin Cappleman for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market. Page | 3 PUBCORP CASES MVB

the public market would pose danger to the safety and health of schoolchildren if it were built on the place being contested. However, petitioners never made known their supposed concerns either to the Governor or to the CEB. Instead, they took the law into their own hands and precipitately demolished the subject structures that were built without the benefit of any hearing or consultation with the proper authority, which in this case is the CEB. CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner, vs. JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN,* respondents. FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared: a) xxx the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law to wit: Petitioner insists that (1) the legal maxim of ejusdem generis did not apply to her case; (2) the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latter's police powers and (3) it was the principle of res judicata that applied in this case. ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latter's police powers? HELD: Yes, Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner's gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160,14 the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably Page | 4 PUBCORP CASES MVB

necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either. Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

RURAL BANK VS. MAKATI, GR NO. 150763, JULY 2, 2004 (433 SCRA 362) HELD: The general welfare clause has two branches. The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property. In the present case, the ordinances imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati, fall within the purview of the first branch of the general welfare clause.

down by the accepted municipal corporations.

principles

governing

BATANGAS CATV, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR, respondents FACTS: Respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod." Sometime in 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210. Petitioner then filed a petition for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 4254. It alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. ISSUE: May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? HELD: While we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry. Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid Page | 5 PUBCORP CASES MVB

On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. No. 205 and R.A. No. 7160, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This recourse finds application here. Thus, we hold that the NTC, under E.O. No. 205, has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting CATV operation, including specifically the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing herein precludes LGUs from exercising its general power, under R.A. No. 7160, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of their constituents. In effect, both laws become equally effective and mutually complementary. The grant of regulatory power to the NTC is easily understandable. CATV system is not a mere local concern. The complexities that characterize this new technology demand that it be regulated by a specialized agency. When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To rule otherwise is to render the States policy ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State, LGUs cannot defeat national policies through enactments of contrary measures. Verily, in the case at bar, petitioner may increase its subscriber rates without respondents approval. At this juncture, it bears emphasizing that municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local units of local selfgovernment, but as governmental agencies of the state.51 The legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was granted. NOTES: Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that: "The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units

can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it." Lim vs. Pacquing, GR No. 115044 (240 SCRA 649) ISSUE: whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila? HELD: It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or Page | 6 PUBCORP CASES MVB

license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of jaialai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB. Since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. LLDA vs. CA, GR Nos. 120865-71, December 7, 1995 (251 SCRA 42) FACTS: Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), RA No. 4850, the provisions of PD No. 813, and Section 2 of EO No. 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA No. 7160, the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. ISSUE: Which agency of the Government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? HELD: We hold that the provisions of RA No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The LGC does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the LLDA. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal RA No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.

It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA No. 7160 (LGC) is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the LGC. Binay vs. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508 (1991) FACTS: Petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads: A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY. Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati. Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Page | 7 PUBCORP CASES MVB

Assistance Program. Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof. ISSUE: whether or not Resolution No. 60, reenacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause? HELD: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S., p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102). Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace

and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. The Municipality of Makati approved a resolution providing a burial service to be taken out of the unappropriated funds. This resolution was held valid. The police power of a municipal corporation extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. The drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services , the promotion of general welfare and social justice. SALVADOR VILLACORTA as City Engineer of Dagupan City, and JUAN S. CAGUIOA as Register of Deeds of Dagupan City, petitioners, vs. Page | 8 PUBCORP CASES MVB

GREGORIO BERNARDO and HON. MACARIO OFILADA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan respondents. Victor T. Llamas, Jr. for respondents. FACTS: ORDINANCE 22 AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE CITY OF DAGUPAN. Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City in session assembled: Section 1. Every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shalt before the same is submitted for approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission, be previously submitted to the City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on any portion of the public domain, that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations are observed. Section 2. As service fee thereof, an amount equivalent to P0.30 per square meter of every lot resulting or win result from such subdivision shall be charged by the City Engineer's Office. Section 3. It shall be unlawful for the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to allow the registration of a subdivision plan unless there is prior written certification issued by the City Engineer that such plan has already been submitted to his office and that the same is in order. Section 4. Any violation of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred (P200.00) pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both in the discretion of the judge. Section 5. This ordinance immediately upon approval. shall take effect

ISSUE: whether or not ordinance 22 adopted by the municipal board of Dagupan City is valid? HELD: To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even

if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. So many excesses are attempted in the name of the police power that it is time, we feel, for a brief admonition. Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes more and more complex, the police power becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has to be so for the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good, on the time honored justification of Salus populi est suprema lex. We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness. Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

accordance with the general law on municipal waters" nor to charge foes for fishing and hunting in the park, much less sell forest products, wild games and fish from the area. Neither can the Municipality grant the exclusive privilege of fishing for a period more than five (5) years, whereas in the instant case, the period granted the Manager-Administrator was for twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five years. Moreover, under the specific provision of Act No. 4041, there is the proviso that the timber and other forest products therein shall be placed under the administration and control of the forest service so that insofar as the ordinance relates to the timber and other forest products and the reforestation of the timberland portions indicated in Plan Ipd-92 including the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Manager-Administrator affecting the forestry portions are violative of Act No. 4041.
It is of no moment that at the pre-trial hearing of Civil Case No. SCC-648 (which was transferred to Branch 111, CFI Dagupan and docketed as D5118) the parties had admitted the legality of Ordinance No. 8. The issue as to the legality of Ordinance No. 8 is not a question of fact that the parties may stipulate and agree at the pre-trial hearing of the case which is for annulment of the contract under Ordinance No. 8. Such is a question of law for if the Ordinance is illegal and contrary to law, the contract executed in pursuance thereto is consequently illegal. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

SPOUSES LYDIA TERRADO & MARTIN ROSARIO, and DOMINGO FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON, Judge, CFI of Pangasinan, Deputy Sheriff OSCAR SIBUNA of Pangasinan, and GERUNCIO LACUESTA, respondents. FACTS: ISSUE: validity or legality of the Municipal Ordinance HELD: The Ordinance is clearly against the provisions of the law for it granted exclusive fishery privileges to the private respondent without benefit of public bidding. Under the Fisheries Act, the Municipality may not delegate to a private individual as Manager-Administrator to "use or dispose of the fisheries portion in
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In sum, We hereby pronounce the nullity of Ordinance No. 8, series of 1974 of the Municipal Council of Bayambang, Pangasinan and the contract of management and supervision executed between the Municipality of Bayambang and Geruncio Lacuesta as Manager-Administrator of the Bayambang Fishery & Hunting Park and Municipal Watershed.
MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC., petitionerappellee, vs. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, AMIR M. BALINDONG and

HADJI PANGILAMUN MANALOCON, MUNICIPAL MAYOR and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, respondentsappellants. PURAKAN PLANTATION COMPANY, intervenor-appellee. FACTS: Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, invoking the authority of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 45-46, entitled "AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION FEE OF P.30 PER SACK OF CASSAVA STARCH PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF." The ordinance made it unlawful for any person, company or group of persons "to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without paying to the Municipal Treasurer or his authorized representatives the corresponding fee fixed by (the) ordinance." It imposed a "police inspection fee" of P.30 per sack of cassava starch or flour, which shall be paid by the shipper before the same is transported or shipped outside the municipality. Any person or company or group of individuals violating the ordinance "is liable to a fine of not less than P100.00, but not more than P1,000.00, and to pay Pl.00 for every sack of flour being illegally shipped outside the municipality, or to suffer imprisonment of 20 days, or both, in the discretion of the court. The validity of the ordinance was challenged by the Matalin Coconut, Inc. alleging among others that the ordinance is not only ultra vires, being violative of Republic Act No. 2264, but also unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner prayed that the ordinance be declared null and void ab initio, and that the respondent Municipal Treasurer be ordered to refund the amounts paid by petitioner under the ordinance. The petitioner also prayed that during the pendency of the action, a preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the ordinance. The respondents-appellants contend that the municipality has the power and authority to approve the ordinance in question pursuant to Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act No. 2264). ISSUE: Whether not Ordinance No. 45-66 enacted by respondent Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, is valid? HELD: No, The so-called "police inspection fee" levied by Page | 10 PUBCORP CASES MVB

the ordinance is "unjust and unreasonable." The Court finally finds the inspection fee of P0.30 per bag, imposed by the ordinance in question to be excessive and confiscatory. It has been shown by the petitioner, Matalin Coconut Company, Inc., that it is merely realizing a marginal average profit of P0.40, per bag, of cassava flour starch shipped out from the Municipality of Malabang because the average production is P15.60 per bag, including transportation costs, while the prevailing market price is P16.00 per bag. The further imposition, therefore, of the tax of P0.30 per bag, by the ordinance in question would force the petitioner to close or stop its cassava flour starch milling business considering that it is maintaining a big labor force in its operation, including a force of security guards to guard its properties. The ordinance, therefore, has an adverse effect on the economic growth of the Municipality of Malabang, in particular, and of the nation, in general, and is contrary to the economic policy of the government. Quezon City vs. Ericta, GR No. L-34915 (122 SCRA 759)

FACTS: It involves Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%

space intended for paupers burial.

Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers
HELD: We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance: "The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power? An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City (Sub-sections 'C,' Sec. 12, R.A. 537). The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33; Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be justified under sub-section 't,' Section 12 of Republic Act 537. Page | 11 PUBCORP CASES MVB

There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation." We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537. Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. "It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation." Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Taada and Carreon, V-II, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Velasco vs. Villegas, GR No. L-24153, 120 SCRA 568(1983) FACTS: It is declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it

amounts to a deprivation of property of petitionersappellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." ISSUE: whether or not ordinance is valid? HELD: The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person." As pointed out in the brief of respondentsappellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." As it was then, so it has continued to be. There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.

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