[G.R. No. 149375.

November 26, 2002]

MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen, was charged with and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which he and his coaccused were sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.[1] The case before us concerns only the petition for review of accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his conviction, and arguing that the Court of Appeals having increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, [2] of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court of Appeals. In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon by petitioner, was applicable only when the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the appellate court on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538,[3] which is not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.[4] The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v. Omotoy[5] where the Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of arson and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is involved, albeit joined to prision mayor in its maximum period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the appeal should have gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at least reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to delay the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on the accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any party.

Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the instant case considering that the penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years. Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls within that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a single indivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal Code.[6] More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal Code since those terms apply only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in special penal laws.[7] This is because generally, special laws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code.[8] The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under RA 6538 is essentially within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal. However, such technical term under The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or applied to the penalty for carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance of violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, does not correspond to that in The Revised Penal Code.[9] But it is different when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, since this is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death.[10] Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of x x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum.[11] For these reasons the use of the term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its decision is not proper. Besides, we see no basis for the trial court to set the minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. We see no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote in Omotoy[12] to affirm the conviction of the accused. The substance of the Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the case, but it still constitutes an important part of the decision since it enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this rule is stated in a Footnote to a decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter of style. It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant case since the former involves an appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this doctrine is the Constitution itself which empowers this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify

or affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments of lower courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.[13] Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire records to this Court for review.[14] This will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case. [15] On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may be had only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45[16] where only errors or questions of law may be raised. Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of whether there was indeed a violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act. This issue is factual, as we shall find hereunder. In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle was owned by Augustus Zamora but was used by Bhagwani as a service vehicle in their joint venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani to report its disappearance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR) Division which immediately issued an Alarm Sheet.[17] On 31 May 1996 Bhagwanis neighbor, fireman Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he learned from his daughter, a common-law wife of accused Michael Cummins, that the accused Rommel Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins himself stole the Isuzu Trooper. Alvarezs daughter however refused to issue any statement regarding the incident.[18] In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 Miling Flores brought to his house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen, Rommel Flores, and complaining witness Bhagwani. In that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and Flores admitted that they took the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and Baguio.[19] They claimed however that it was with the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that on the night they took the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him instead if they could borrow the Isuzu Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even turned over the keys to them.[20] Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in the house of SPO3 Miling Flores but his co-accused narrated his participation in the crime.[21] The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the penalty imposed on the four (4) accused from a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.[22]

Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun rather than theft in taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that they merely took the vehicle for a joyride with no intention of stealing it. If they were really thieves, according to petitioner, they would have sold the vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.[23] Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for review on certiorari where only questions of law, and not questions of fact, may be raised. The issue before us being factual, a reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may not be entertained in this appeal. Besides, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. [24] This rule may be disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. But there is no ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all over again the evidence adduced by the parties particularly where as in this case the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.[25] However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things. The evidence in this case shows that the accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it, thus demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle; nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit the imposition of the full penalty. With the application of The Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may be reduced to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals denying the Motion and Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to an indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years. No costs. SO ORDERED. Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO* SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.
DECISION MARTINEZ, J.: Which should prevail between the ration decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabels petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmothers estate by virtue of her right of representation. The suit stemmed from the following: On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a criminal case[1] against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI)[2] a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living with their mother. [3] The suit was docketed as civil case number Q-7180. On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion which reads: WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the records that the question of the case and custody of the three children have been the subject of another case between the same parties in another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case. With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third party defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded the sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00. SO ORDERED.[4] (Emphasis supplied) As basis thereof, the CFI said:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment. It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong. There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage: (3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife. There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of the plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy that in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).[5] (emphasis supplied) On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabels paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.[6] Five years later or on October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[7] a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay which case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M95. In her petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be appointed as administratrix of the estate.[8] On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.[9] On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent

Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedents estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of the respondent Isabels parents is null and void, the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent.[10] On October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss.[11] When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998,[12] petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabels parents null and void must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become f inal and had, in fact, been executed. On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioners motion to dismiss was late having been filed after the opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent Isabels allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedents son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing a marriage voidable otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is voidable. The petition must fail. Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.[13] There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.[14] A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder. To with: The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent laws applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not adversarial in nature and

the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of action against a particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance of the proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat. The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file ad maintain this special proceedings, that in the case at bench, the body of the decision determines the nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration of nullity. The oppositors contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex A Motion) prevails over the body thereof is not of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction. Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgement (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive portion must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi. Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex A of oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.).[15] The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.[16] The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for. Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint. Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of petitioners opposition. [17] which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions. Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but also dilatory. The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged conflict between the body of

the decision and the dispositive portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is null and void and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage is illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83[18] of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled.[19] The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89[20] irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.[21] (Emphasis supplied) Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union produced during its continuance.[22] Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with [23] whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that isannulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status condition which already exists from the very beginning. There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision which must control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabels parents was void or voidable. Such argument springs from a

miscomprehension of the judgment of the Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion. Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing,[24] the same is not without qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction which usually is the case where the order or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is based.[25] Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic v. delos Angeles[26] the Court said: Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that [i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments. x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864 [Emphasis supplied] Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is voidable: It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong. There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxx

xxx

xxx

G.R. No. L-4316

May 28, 1952

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; xxx xxx xxx

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG, HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, HON. RAMON SAN JOSE, as Chairman and Members, respectively; of the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, and ANTONIO GUILLERMO, alias, SLIVER, as an interested party, respondents. LABRADOR, J.: This is an action of prohibition against the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission, composed of Honorables Higinio Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, and Ramon R. San Jose, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to restrain and prevent it from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, who was convicted and sentenced by this Court on May 19, 1950, for murder in G.R. No. L-2188. * The grounds upon which the petition are based are (1) that this Court has already expressly ruled in its judgment of conviction of said case that said Antonio Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because the murders of which he was convicted were committed "not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerilla units," and (2) that the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2, 1946 (date of Administrative Order No. 1 of the President), at that time. The respondents filed answers independently of each other, and with the exception of Judge Ramon R. San Jose, they oppose the petition, alleging (1) that the decision of this Court does not prevent the respondent Antonio Guillermo from invoking his right to the provisions of the amnesty, because said right was not an issue at the trial on the case against him, and the pronouncement of this Court thereon is not final and conclusive and is merely an obiter dictum, and (2) that under a liberal interpretation of the administrative orders implementing the President's Amnesty Proclamation, the respondent Commission has jurisdiction of said petition. The record discloses that the original information against respondent Antonio Guillermo was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte on September 16, 1946, and as amended information, on July 15, 1947. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment on March 29, 1948. Thereupon, Guillermo presented an appeal to this Court, and this Court rendered its judgement on May 19, 1950. On June 5, 1950, Guillermo's Counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, but this motion was denied on July 13, 1950. On June 20, 1950, even before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon, respondent Guillermo filed a motion with this Court for the suspension of the proceedings and the reference of the case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission, but this motion was denied by this Court on July 13, 1950. Antonio Guillermo filed his petition for amnesty for respondent Commission on July 8, 1950. On August 2, 1950, the records of the case against Guillermo were remanded to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the execution of the judgment, and on October 17, 1950, the respondent Commission required the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte to forward the records of the case to it, and on

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the finding of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).[27] Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Arti cle 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation in the estate of their grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether Letters of Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities involved over the decedents estate. It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation.[28] WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

November 9, 1950, it is set the case for hearing over the opposition of the Solicitor General. It was at this stage that this action of prohibition was filed in this Court. The first ground upon which the opposition to the petition is based, namely, that the holding of this Court that the respondent Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, is merely an obiter dictum, is without any legal foundation, and must be dismissed. An obiter dictum is an opinion "uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects" (Newmanvs. Kay, 49 S.E. 926, 931, 57 W. Va. 98, 68 L.R.A. 908, 4 Ann. Cas. 39 citing United States ex rel. Johnston vs.Clark County Court, 96 U.S. 211, 24 Ed. 628), or the opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide (29 Words & Phrases 15), or an opinion of the court which does not embody its determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the point, and is not professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself (29 Words & Phrases 13.). A cursory reading of the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L2188 **against respondent Antonio Guillermo discloses that the ruling of the Court that the said respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an obiter dictum, but is a ruling of the Court on an issue expressly raised by the party appellant on facts or evidence adduced in the course of the trial of his case. It is not an opinion uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by a party. It was not unnecessary to make that ruling; the ruling was absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and of law directly in issue. It was not made without argument or full consideration of the point; it was deliberately entered by the Court after arguments on both sides had been heard. This Could not have avoided determining the issue without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision. Hereinbelow we quote portions of the decision of this Court, from it which it can readily be seen that it had before it evidence of the claim of amnesty expressly raised before the Court, and its ruling that appellant was not entitled thereto. Apparently realizing the inconsistency and untenability of that position appellant also contends that granting for the sake of argument that the accused was the author of the crime, there is proof "that the ill-starred seven were charged of (with) being spies for the Japanese. The insincerity and weakness of this last-ditch plea is manifest. Appellant does not claim that he killed the seven victims because he had proof and believe that they were spies for the Japanese. He merely says that they were charged (by Sagad) with being spies for the Japanese. At any rate, the amnesty proclamation now invoked is not applicable. We are satisfied from the proofs that the massacre in question was committed not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fracticidad strife between two rival guerrilla units. That was to hinder and not a further the resistance against the Japanese enemy. It was a shame: and it would be adding insult to injury to stigmatize the memory of the unfortunate victims of such lust for power of and supremacy as spies and traitors to their

country, in the absence of the competent proof as they really were. We spurn the baseless suggestion as rank injustice. A more serious contention is, May not respondent Guillermo raise the issue before the corresponding guerrilla amnesty commission in view of our ruling in the case of Viray vs. Crisologo, et al.*** G. R. No. L-2540, in which we held that the fact that the defendant has declined to take advantage of the amnesty proclamation at the beginning of his trial before a court martial does not preclude him from invoking it after he was found guilty and convicted. The express holding of this Court is that case is as follows: In our opinion the fact that respondent Crisologo had declined to take advantage of the amnesty proclamation at the beginning of his trial before the court martial does not now preclude him from invoking it, especially after he was found guilty and convicted. Before his trial he may and he must have entertained the idea and the belief that the killing was justified and was done in the performance of his duties as an official according to the criminal law, and that consequently there was no need for amnesty. However, after the court martial had disagreed with him and disabused him of his belief, he realized the necessity of invoking amnesty. There is nothing in the law that stands in his way toward seeking the benefits of a law which in his opinion covers and obliterates the act of which he had been found criminally responsible. We hold that the above cited is not applicable to the case at bar, for in that case the defendant did not invoke the benefits of the amnesty at the time of the trial or on appeal, and only did so after he had been adjudge guilty and convicted, while in the case at bar he did so. It is true that the appellant Guillermo did not expressly plead amnesty, but the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the act charged against him as an offense were disclosed at the trial, from which facts and circumstances he later predicated the issue, before this Court, that he was entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. It may be true that the appellant Guillermo did not expressly plead amnesty as a defense at the trial of his case. But the rules on the criminal procedure do not include to be expressly pleaded. (Section 1, Rule 113, Rule of Court.) Even without an express plea of amnesty, a defendant may submit evidence that the commission of the act imputed to him falls within the provisions of the amnesty proclamation, without a previous formal announcement of such a defense before or during the trial. And even without such express plea, if the court finds that the case falls under the provisions of the amnesty proclamation, it is the duty of the court to declare the fact, if the fact justify such a finding, and extend the benefits of the amnesty to him. . . .; and the accused, during such trial, may present evidence to prove that his case falls within the terms of this amnesty. If the fact is legally proved, the trial judge shall so declare and this amnesty shall be immediately affective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged. (Proclamation No. 8, September 7, 1946, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 9 p. 2073.)

That the respondent herein Guillermo did not submit evidence to that effect is inferred from the claim of his counsel in the case against him that "there is proof that the ill starred seven were charged with being spies for the Japanese." Not only that, he expressly raised that issue in this Court on appeal. May he rise this issue again before the guerrilla amnesty commission, and thus have this administrative body reverse or change the finding of this Court? Under the circumstances of the present case, we hold that he should no longer be permitted to do so in view of "the general rule common to all civilized systems of jurisprudence that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed it has been well said that this more maxim is more than a rule of law, more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society." (Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil., 303, 310; section 44, Rule 39, Rules of Court). It is also argued, in support of the claim that this Court had no jurisdiction to make the ruling that respondent Guillermo is not entitled to amnesty, that the guerrilla amnesty commissions are the first ones to pass upon petitions for amnesty, that regular judicial tribunals can not rule upon such an issue (of amnesty) unless it has first been resolved by a commission, and that these are not judicial tribunals but administrative bodies acting as arms of the executive in carrying out the purposes of the amnesty proclamation, which is merely a form of executive clemency. It is true that the grant of amnesty originates in an exclusive act. But the proclamation was issued under expressly authority in the Constitution [Article VII, section 10 (6)], was expressly sanctioned by the Congress (Resolution No. 13 dated September 18, 1946), and has the nature, force, effect, and operation of a law. That the cognizance of applications for amnesty is vested in the guerrilla amnesty commissions are mere screening bodies is not denied, but there is nothing in the proclamation to support the contention that the authority to decide any claim for amnesty is to be exercised but said commissions alone, to the exclusion of the courts. Neither can it be denied that any one charged before the courts may claim as a defense, waive the filing of an application therefor, and submit evidence thereof in the trial of his case. In this latter case it would be a cumbersome procedure, indeed, if said defense were first required to be submitted to commission for decision, latter to be reviewed by a court. The only sensible interpretation of the law is that while all applications should be passed upon by commissions, an accused may, instead of filing an application, choose the alternative remedy of just raising the issue in a court of justice in the trial of his case. And if this second alternative is chosen, the applicant should be declared estopped from contesting the decision, as well as the authority of the court that adversely passed upon his claim. But there are further and other considerations, also weighty and important, that attend respondent Guillermo's petition for amnesty. He is not one filed during the pendency of this case in the Court of First Instance it is a petition filed after final judgment of conviction in this Supreme Court. It does not appear in the record that during the one and a half-year period (September 16, 1946, to March 29, 1948) that this case was being coursed and tried in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, that he ever filed

an application for amnesty. Neither does it appear that the provincial fiscal has ever reported Guillermo's case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission for Ilocos Norte, pursuant to the direct mandate of the amnesty proclamation. Nor did Guillermo ever claim amnesty as his defense at the time of the trial. May we not justly infer from these positive circumstances that, during all the time the case was pending and up to the filling of appellant's brief in the Supreme Court, amnesty was never thought of as a defense, either by the accused himself or by the fiscal, or by the judge trying the case? As a matter of fact, this Court found that the issue of amnesty raised in this Court of Appeal was a "last-ditch plea." Guillermo only thought of amnesty on June 20, 1950, after this Court had found him guilty, overruling his defense of amnesty, and before his motion for reconsideration was denied. We are therefore, constrained to hold that his present petition is not entirely free from a reasonable suspicion as to its ends and purposes. It seems to us to be a last desperate attempt by technicality to avert or delay the execution of the judgment of conviction rendered against him. Of course, no court of justice would countenance such ill-advised attempt. The second ground upon which the petition for prohibition is based is that the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent Guillermo's application. We also find this contention to be correct. Administrative Order No. 11, which creates the guerrilla amnesty commission, expressly assigns to the Seventh "cases from the different provinces and cities now pending appeal in the Supreme Court." (Emphasis ours.) Said administrative order was promulgated on October 2, 1946, on which date the criminal case against respondent Guillermo was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. His case was a case in the province (Ilocos Norte) assigned to the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission. Respondents cite administrative Order No. 217 of the Department of Justice dated December 1, 1948 to support their claim that the Seventh has jurisdiction of the application, because of that date Guillermo's case was already pending in the Supreme Court. This department order was issued, as it expressly states, "in view of the appointments of new Judges of First Instances," not for the purpose of setting forth cases cognizable by each of the different commissions, which the President had already done. Besides, it can not be interpreted to modify the President's administrative order apportioning the cases among the amnesty commissions. In resume of our conclusions, we state (1) that the finding of this Court that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty, is not an obiter dictum but a pronouncement on a material issue, and is final and conclusive against him and may not, under the principle of res judicata, be again raised in issue by him in any tribunal, judicial or administrative; (2) that having voluntarily raised the issue in this Court during the consideration of his case, he is now estopped from contesting the judgment, of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling; (3) that this petition is an illadvised attempt of doubtful good faith, to arrest or delay the execution of a final judgement of conviction; and (4) that the respondent Commission has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for amnesty. Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby granted, and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 24, 1950, made absolute, with costs against respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver.

G.R. No. L-11986

July 31, 1958

BERNARDO MANALANG, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. ELVIRA TUASON DE RICKARDS, ET AL., respondent-appellees. Luis Manalang and Associates for appellants. Jorge V. Jazmines for appellees. FELIX, J.: Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards is the owner of private subdivision located at Sampaloc, Manila, with an area of 44,561.80 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 40961 (Exhibit 13) in 1954, the lots therein were leased to various tenants among whom were Bernardo Manalang, Vicente de Leon and Salvador de Leon occupying Lots Nos. 174-C, 160 and 158, respectively. As the City of Manila allegedly increased the assessment of said land effective January 1, 1954, the administrator thereof notified the tenants of the corresponding increase of the rentals of the lots therein, such that the rental for the lot occupied by Bernardo Manalang was raised from P36 to 80; the rental for Lot No. 160 was raised from P10 to P43.12; and from P24 to P51.24 for Lot No. 158. The said tenants, however, insisted on paying the former rate, and as the landowner refused to accept the same, the former consigned them in court. On April 27, 1954, Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards, assisted by her husband, Jose A. Rickards, instituted with the Municipal Court of Manila Civil Case No. 31401 against Bernardo Manalang; Civil Case No. 31406 against Salvador de Leon; and Civil Case No. 31411 against Vicente de Leon, all for ejectment. Therein defendants filed separate motions to dismiss invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1162, which was approved on June 18, 1954. The matter was duly heard and on July 14, 1954, the Municipal Judge of Manila issued an order denying the motions to dismiss and suspending the proceedings for 2 years from the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 or until further order from the Court. On April 13, 1955, upon motion of the plaintiffs, the Municipal Judge issued an order setting the cases for hearing on the merits. Defendants tried to secure a reconsideration of the aforesaid order, but as their motion was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 26135) against the spouses Rickards and the Judges of the Municipal Court of Manila, alleging that the order of the same Court of July 14, 1954, already disposed of the action and determined the rights of the parties. It was thus prayed that a writ enjoining the respondent Judges from proceeding with the hearing the cases be issued; that said respondents be declared without jurisdiction to hear the same; and that the orders of Municipal Judge Estrella Abad Santos setting the case for hearing on the merits and the order of Acting Judge Sumilang Bernardo denying their motion for reconsideration be set aside and declared null and void.

To this petition, the respondent spouses filed their answer denying some of the averments of the same. And special defenses, it was contended that the order of July 14, 1954, did not settle the controversy it being merely an interlocutory order, and as such could not be reviewed by a petition for certiorari. It was, therefore, prayed that the petition be dismissed and the Municipal Judges be ordered to hear the cases on the merits. On February 6, 1956, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petition on the ground that the order of the inferior court was merely interlocutory in nature, and that the statements contained in the body thereof were the basis of the court's ruling, as embodied in the dispositive part thereof denying the motion to dismiss and suspending the proceedings therein for 2 years or until further order from the court. From this decision, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter tribunal certified the case to Us on the ground that it involves only a question purely of law. The main issue presented by the instant action is whether the order of the inferior court of July 14, 1954, is interlocutory or not and consequently, whether the lower court erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed therein. The aforementioned order of the Municipal Judge dated July 14, 1954, is hereunder copied in full: ORDER After a thorough consideration of the Motion to Dismiss and the opposition thereto, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceedings should be instituted or prosecuted against any tenant or occupant and that the unpaid rentals of the tenants, if any they have, shall be liquidated and shall be paid in 18, equal monthly installments from the date or time of liquidation and that the landlord cannot charge more than the amount being charged or collected by them from their tenants as of December 31, 1953. It is undisputed fact that the premises occupied by the herein-defendants have been and are actually being leased to tenants, for which reason it is governed by the provisions of the aforesaid Act. But inasmuch as these three cases of ejectment have been instituted before the approval of said Act, it is the considered opinion of this Court that its prosecution should be suspended. As to the motion to dismiss same is untenable and without merit, for if these cases of ejectment will be dismissed as claimed by the herein defendants, the liquidation of the unpaid rentals could not be carried out effectively as provided by said Act. As to the unconstitutionality of section 5 of the Republic Act in question, the presumption is that same is valid and constitutional until it is declared otherwise by the competent tribunal, for which reason we deem it our bounden duty to enforce the avowed policy of the Republic of the

Philippines, as expressed in said Act (Pastor Mauricio et al. vs. Hon. Felix Martinez et al., CA-G. R. 5114-R, promulgated January 31, 1952). WHEREFORE, this Court orders the denial of the motion to dismiss, and the suspension of the proceedings in the three above-entitled cases during the period of two years from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 or until further order of this Court. We see no reason why the ruling of the lower Court should not be affirmed. The order of the Municipal Judge of July 14, 1954, is clear enough to call for any construction or interpretation, for while it opens with the paragraph stating that it was the opinion of the court "and so holds that from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceedings should be instituted", etc., the dispositive portion of the order decreed the denial of the motion to dismiss which was based on the same Republic Act No. 1162. And this ruling is understandable. It appears that the actions for ejectment were filed before the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 and conceivably under the general principle that laws can only be enforced prospectively, the Municipal Judge for one reason or another saw it fit to suspend the proceedings for quite a long period, probably with the expectation that the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1162 might be in the meantime duly passed upon. It can be seen from the foregoing that the issues presented in the ejectment proceedings were not settled thereby, for precisely the motion to dismiss filed by defendants based on the provisions of Republic Act No. 1162 was denied. Certainly, said actions having been merely suspended, and the jurisdiction of the court over said proceedings not having been assailed, the said court has the power to reopen the same for trial on the merits in order that the rights of the parties therein could be finally determined. It is argued, however, by appellants that the body of the order recognized the prohibition laid down by Republic Act No. 1162 against the institution of ejectment proceedings after the effectivity of said Act. It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declarations in the body of said order that may be confusing. In the case at bar, considering that the dispositive part of the order merely suspended the proceedings without touching on the merits of the case or disposing of the issues involved therein, said order cannot be said to be final in character but clearly an interlocutory one which in this case cannot be the subject of an action for certiorari. Wherefore, and acting merely on the question of procedure submitted to Us by the instant appeal, We have to affirm, as We do hereby affirm, the order of the lower Court dismissing appellant's petition for certiorari and prohibition. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is ordered. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-40675 August 17, 1983 PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE ERICTA, Judge, Court, of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch XVIII; THE ACTING BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, Branch XVIII; REGISTER OF DEEDS- OF QUEZON CITY; and JAIME 0. RIVERA,respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Renato B. Herrera for respondents. TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J: The Court dismisses for lack of legal basis and merit this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to set aside the questioned orders of respondent judge granting execution of its final and executory decision and judg[nent ordering petitioner corporation to execute the sale of the subject property in favor of private respondent and to annul the corresponding transfer certificate of title issued by respondent register of deeds in favor of said respondent pursuant to the deed of sale executed by respondent branch clerk of court on behalf of petitioner corporation as authorized by respondent judge. Private respondent Jaime O. Rivera had obtained as plaintiff the judgment of December 28, 1971 granting his 6tction for specific performance and "ordering the defendant petitioner [PHHC] to execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff [respondent Rivera] of the entire property described in paragraph 2 of the complaint" and to pay P2,000.00 - attomey's fees and costs. The judgment was - entered pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3802 enacted by Congress on June 22, 1963 providing for the sale at cost to registered tenants/lessees like respondent of the dwelling units occupied by them and for the application in full in their favor of an the past rentals paid by them to the purchase price. Petitioner failed to appeal the said judgment which has long since become final and executory. In fact, in Resolution No. 17 of its board approved on July 25, 1972, petitioner formally accepted respondent's proposal to waive the P2,000.00 - attorney's fees awarded in his favor by the judgment and approved the sale of the entire property (Lots 12-A to 12-H, Block 447, together with the rowhouses thereon) with one unit for residential purposes and the others for a general and maternity clinic. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to execute the corresponding deed of sale in favor of respondent despite two writs of execution issued by respondent judge at respondent's instance, with the claim not set forth in the aforesaid board resolution that respondent had not completed payment of the purchase price (at cost). Respondent consequently filed a motion for the lower court to appoint and authorize the clerk of court to execute the deed of sale on behalf of petitioner corporation in his favor, expressly asserting that "as duly proven during the trial of this case, [that] he has completed payment of the total consideration of the sale as he is covered by Republic Act No. 3802 which provided for the sale at cost [of the 'properties] to registered tenants." 1 Overruling

10

petitioner's opposition thereto, respondent judge issued the questioned Order of March 14, 1975 granting the motion, as follows: Acting on the plaintiff's motion dated March 3, 1975, and the defendant's opposition thereto dated March 6, 1975, the Court hereby orders Atty. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, Acting Branch Clerk of Court, to execute a Deed of Sale of the property described in paragraph 2 of the complaint for the amount of P31,427.01 which, as per decision of this Court dated December 28, 1971, had already been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. The execution of this Deed of Sale shall be done at the cost of the defendant People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and the Deed of Sale shall have the same effect as if it was executed by the defendant itsell " 2 Petitioner filed an extended motion for reconsideration and respondent judge, squarely meeting the issues raised, denied the same in the questioned extended Order of April 21, 1975, as follows: The motion for reconsideration is based on the allegation that the dispositive portion of the decision of this Court dated December 28, 1971 does not contain the purchase price of the property and, therefore, its inclusion in the Order of the Court dated March 14, 1975 is allegedly contrary to Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The PHHC contends that only the dispositive portion of the decision constitutes the real judgment which should be executed. The dispositive portion which is being executed reads as follows among others: WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment ordering the defendant to execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff of the entire property described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;' Precisely, the Order of the Court dated March 14, 1975 orders the execution of the aforecited dispositive portion of the decision. This decision has become final and executory. The inclusion of the purchase pyice of P31,427 01 in the Deed of Sale to be executed by the Clerk of Court does not prejudice the PHHC nor does it alter the decisiom Although the purchase pyice does not appear in the dispositive part; it can be found on page two of the decision itself The Court does not wholly subscribe to the view that the judginent can be found only in the dispositive portion of the decision.

It is true that the resolution of the court in a given issue, which determines and settles the rights of the parties, is ordinarily embodied in the last or dispositive portion of the decision (Manalang vs. Rickards, G.R. No. L- 11986, promulgated July 31, 1958), yet, not infrequently such resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts thereol Style in decisionmaking or preparation is personal to its writer. As long as the decision satisfied the requirement of the law (Art. VIII Sec. 12, Philippine Constitution; Rule 35, Sec. 1. Rules of Court), we find no compelling reason to adopt a definite and stringent rule underlining how and where the judgment would be framed. Indeed it is well said that to get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but same must be considered in its entirety (Escarella vs. Director of Lands, 83 Phil. 491; 46 Off. Gaz. No. 11, p. 5487; I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed. p. 478, Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans' Board and AssGciates Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., No. L-12779, dated August 28, 1929, 106 Phil. 125). 3 Hence, the present action of petitioner contending that respondent judge's court "abused its discretion or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction" in issuing the aforesaid questioned Orders leading to the execution of the deed of sale by the clerk of court on behalf of petitioner corporation and the issuance of T.C.T. No. 206668 of Quezon City in respondent's favor "by adding therein matters which were not included in the dispositive portion of the decision dated December 28, 1971. " As above stated, the Court has found the petition to be without legal basis and merit. Respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion nor did he act "capriciously or whimsically" as to amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Orders. As correctly stated by respondent judge in denying reconsideration, his court was merely ordering the execution of the dispositive portion or judgment of the decision for 11 execution of a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff [herein respondentj," no more, no less. Said judgment ordered the execution of such deed of sale unqualifiedly and unconditionally and has long become final and executory. The entire record shows that no claim is made by petitioner that the amount of P31,427.01 paid by respondent by way of rentals for a period of ten years (1954 to 1964) (as expressly found in the decision) does not cover the full cost to it of the property. The decision's clear implication is that these rentals did fully cover the cost to petitioner of the property and therefore constituted full,,payment of the purchase price as fixed by

11

Republic Act No. 3802. Hence, the judgment ordering unqualifiedly the execution of the sale to respondent, subject to no further payment of any amount. If petitioner wanted to dispute such judgment, it should have appealed the same but it did not do so. Nevertheless, when respondent moved for authority for the branch clerk of court to execute the sale due to petitioner's failure to heed the writs of execution, pursuant to Rule 39, section 10 of the Rules of Court, 4 petitioner was given full opportunity both in its opposition and at the hearing of respondent's motion to show that such rentals paid by respondent did not cover the fun cost to petitioner of the property (as fixed by the cited covering Act) but it could not cite any deficiency. It still had another opportunity when it filed its motion for reconsideration, but could not do so. Manifestly, respondent's rental payments fully covered the purchase price (at cost) of the property. All petitioner could do was raise a technical question that the trial court's final decision of December 28, 1971 did not contain the purchase price of the property. This was utterly untenable since the judgment unqualifiedly ordered the execution of the sale without any further payment and petitioner failed to show that respondent's substantial rental payments over a ten-year period did not fully cover the cost of the property. Finally, having submitted this issue for respondent judge's resolution, petitioner is now in estoppel from "speculating on the fortunes of litigation" and now challenging the adverse orders in these certiorari and prohibition proceedings. 5 Two other submittals of petitioner are equally without merit. First, the fact that respondent branch clerk of court executed the deed of sale before petitioner was furnished a copy of the execution order of March 14, 1975 (due to an oversight of the mailing clerk) in no way constitutes a jurisdictional defect that affects the validity of the order. 6The order for execution of the deed of sale was a matter of right flowing from a final and executory judgment and could have been issued ex parte under Rule 39, section 1 of the Rules of Court. At any rate, petitioner had fuu opportunity to contest the order, through its motion for reconsideration which was denied in due course by respondent judge per the reasoned Order of April 21, 1975. Second, contrary to petitioner's claim, no abuse of disicretion was committed when respondent judge issued the execution order notwithstanding the pendency in the Court of Appeals at the time of CA-G.R. No. 51545-R entitled "Jaime O. Rivera, petitioner-appellee vs. PHHC,respondent-appellant," which was an appeal by petitioner from the adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City permanently enjoining it from enforcing an ejectment order agikinst respondent in view of petitioner's subsequent approval of the sale of the property to respondent pursuant to Republic Act No. 3802. Clearly, the pendency of such appeal had no bearing on the questioned execution orders at bar. At any rate, the ejectment order had manifestly become moot and academic as correctly held therein by the lower court. Finally the records of said case show that as per judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals on September 14, 1978, the judgment appealed from by herein petitioner PHHC was affirmed and final entry of judgment was therein made on October 13, 1978. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is lifted effective immediately. No costs.

Brother Mike Velarde vs. Social Justice Society (G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004)
Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a decision not conforming to the form and substance required by the Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent (Panganiban) Mike Velarde, Petitioner vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent. Date promulgated: April 28, 2004 Ponente: J. Panganiban Facts: -On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTCManila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano. -SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on theseparation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. -The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy. -The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons: 1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law. 2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." -The trial courts essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to this aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts. -The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review. On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14 -In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution: 1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid; 2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief; 3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief; 4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination; 5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,

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6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent. Issues: In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed Velardes issues and divided it into 2 groups: A. Procedural Issues 1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? 2. Did it state a cause of action? 3.Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief? B. Substantive Issues 1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? 2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative) Decision: Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action. Holding: Procedural Issues: 1. NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim. The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a jusiciable controversy. Why? a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter. b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution, c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights (duh, wala ngang rights na sinabi eh). It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. (tantamount to making laws, remember the questionability of justice panganibans guidelines for article 36 of the family code) It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to the breach of rights they were claimed to have committed. As pointed out by Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds that the election season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even

allege any indication or manifest intenton the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

2. NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800) Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter. The court held that the complaints failure to state a cause of action became a ground for its outright dismissal. Why? The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit allegation of fact that SJS had a legal right to protect. (trigger for the cause of action) In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened. The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was its mention of its (SJS) thousands of members who are citizens -taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested. Aside from the fact that this general averment did not constitute a legal right or interest, the courts inferred interest too vague and speculative in character. Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument. To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris Secundum and submitted that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. (???) During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents. Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents.

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3. NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it. Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy: First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation, particularly that of Congress' taxing power. Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents. Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizenstaxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or importance to the people (IBP v Zamora). The Court deemed the constitutional issue raised to be both transcendental in importance and novel in nature. Nevertheless, the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court would prevent the resolution of the transcendental issue. Substantive Issues 1. NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1. which states that :

A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the contsitution. This was evinced in Yao v. Court of Appeals where Davide, CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It was truly obvious that the RTCs Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin precedent because of its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent (how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?). Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body (p. 10) of the assailed Decision. Stating Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

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The following is a narration by the Court of Appeals of the undisputed facts: The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards where the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor thatdetermines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing. In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant proper relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion. Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void. 2. It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (So no answer) The Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union-PTGWO is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular route salesmen, regular relief route salesmen, regular lead helpers, regular relief lead helpers, regular route helpers, regular relief route helpers and order-taker collectors who are assigned in various sales offices specified in the parties collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, the respondent company is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of its soft drink products. In January 1989, the UNION filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board raising certain issues for conciliation. As a result of said dispute, the UNION staged a strike. Subsequently, the Board succeeded in making the parties agree to a voluntary settlement of the case via a Memorandum of Agreement signed by them on February 9, 1989. Among others, the petitioner and the respondent agreed, as follows: 1. Christmas Bonus

The Company shall grant to all those covered by the Bargaining Unit represented by the Union an amount equivalent to fifty (50%) percent of their average commission for the last six (6) months. The union hereby acknowledges that the granting of a Christmas bonus is purely a Management prerogative and as such, in determining the amount thereof the same is solely a discretion of Management. The parties however agree that henceforth whenever Management exercises this prerogative, the same shall include the average commission for the last six (6) months prior to the grant. Since then, the management granted to each covered employee every December of the year a certain percentage of his basic pay and an amount equivalent to fifty (50%) percent of his average commission for the last six months prior to the grant. However, in December 1999, the respondent granted a fixed amount of P4,000.00 only, eliminating thereby the said 50% employees average commission for the last six months for members of the union. Thus, claiming the same as violation of the MOA, the union submitted its grievance to the respondent. No settlement was reached, hence, the case was then referred to a Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Petitioner claimed that the MOA establishes the companys obligation to pay additionally 50% of the average commission whenever it decides to grant a bonus and that the fixed amount of P4,000.00 granted in December 1999, although denominated as ex-gratia was actually a Christmas bonus. In support of its stand, the Union submitted sample payslips for the prior years wherein the company granted a

[G.R. No. 155651. July 28, 2005] COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., SALES FORCE UNION-PTGWOBALAIS, petitioner, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision[1] and Resolution[2] dated 22 May 2002 and 03 October 2002, respectively, affirming the 21 January 2001 Decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators (Panel) of the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB) for the reason that the Panel decision had already attained finality.

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performance grant or one time grant computed as a percentage of the employees basic salary. An illustrative example was that given to Jose Manalusan. His payslip dated December 6, 1996 shows his basic rate at P5,080.00 and an item SPL GRNT in the amount of P4,786.41. On top of the payslip (sic) appear the words 80% performance grant. According to the Union, this amount of P4,786. is P722.41 more than 80% of Manalusans then basic rate (80% of P5,080.00 being PhP4,064.00). Thus, the Union concludes that the difference of P722.41 represents additional 50% of average commission. In sum, the Union asseverates that the grant of the additional 50% of the average commission has become a practice since 1989 and has ripened into a contractual obligation. On the other hand, the respondent company countered that in 1999 it suffered its worst financial performance in its history; that its sales volume was twenty percent (20%) behind plan and ten percent (10%) below the sales in 1998, as a result, it suffered an abnormal loss of Two Billion Five Hundred Million Pesos (P2,500,000,000.00); that faced with tremendous losses, the management decided not to grant bonuses to its employees in 1999; that through Memorandum 99010 dated December 14, 1999, its President, Mr. Peter Baker explained to the employees the companys financial situation and the decision not to grant bonuses; that in the same memo however, the company granted a special ex gratia payment of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) to all its permanent employees, . . . During the past year (sic) we have suffered greatly as a result of a number of internal and external issues including the effect of the general economic pressures in the Philippines. Our sales volume in 1999 is approximately 20% behind the plan and 10% below last year. This together with lower than expected prices and increased costs will result in a financial performance which is undoubtedly the worst in our history. The Coca-cola Amatil Board has announced that it expects an abnormal loss of PhP2.5 Billion (AUD100 million) before tax at CCBPI in 1999 and that reported ongoing results will be below everyones expectations. In these circumstances the CCBPI Executive Committee has decided that the CCBPI is not able to pay bonuses to any staff in 1999. As your new president, it disappoints me greatly to have to inform you of this situation. Our situation has been discussed with the CCA Board and they are understanding of the difficulties we face a (sic) present and grateful of the efforts of our associates at all levels. Furthermore, the management of CCA has agreed to make a special Ex Gratia payment PhP4,000.00 to all permanent employees of CCBPI. Our hope that [t]his will assist in some way to allow you and your families to enjoy the festive season. In denying the claim of the Union for the payment of the additional 50% of the average commission for the last six months, the respondent argues that the said MOA is not applicable since the company did not grant Christmas bonus in 1999.

After hearing and the submission of evidence and position papers, the Arbitration Panel composed of Apron Mangabat and Noel Sanchez, as chairman and member, respectively, denied petitioners claim and declared that the P4,000.00 given as ex gratia is not a bonus, while Arnel Dolendo, another member dissented. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the special Ex Gratia payment of P4,000.00 made pursuant to the Memo of Mr. Peter Baker dated December 14, 1999 was not a Christmas bonus and therefore, the claim of the Union for an additional 50% of average commission on top of said P4,000.00 is hereby denied.[3] A copy of this Decision dated 21 January 2001 was received by petitioners counsel on 20 February 2001. Said Decision was signed only by the Chairman of the Panel, Mr. Apron Mangabat, and one of its members, Atty. Noel Sanchez. As to the third member, Atty. Arnel Dolendo, instead of a signature on top of his printed name, the following notation appears: Dissented during deliberation. Will file a separate opinion. No separate opinion, however, was attached to the Decision as received by petitioner, through its counsel. Thus, on 22 February 2001 (two days after receipt of the Decision), petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion where it essentially questioned the validity of the decision, opining that the Panels decision without such dissenting and separate opinion attached thereto makes the decision incomplete and prematurely issued. It consequently prayed that the questioned Decision be held in abeyance and for the Panel to immediately issue an order to the effect that the prescriptive period available to any of the parties to seek any legal remedy or relief be suspended in the meantime. The Panel did not directly act on this motion. Instead, on 02 March 2001, petitioner received a Notice of Transmittal from the NCMB furnishing it a copy of Atty. Dolendos separate opinion together with the 21 January 2001 Decision. Thus, on 12 March 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 21 January 2001 Decision. On 30 May 2001, the Panel denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. A copy of the Order of denial was received by petitioner on 09 July 2001. By virtue thereof, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals on 24 July 2001. In dealing with the controversy, the Court of Appeals adopted a two-tiered approach. First, it held that contrary to the view of the Panel, theP4,000.00 special ex gratia payment is a Christmas bonus, hence, petitioners members are entitled to the additional 50% average commission for the last six months prior to the grant pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners motion for reconsideration dated 12 March 2001 of the Decision of the Panel that was originally received on 20

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February 2001 was filed out of time; hence, the said Decision already became final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the Decision by the parties pursuant to Article 262-A of the Labor Code. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus: On the matter of procedure, Article 262-A of the Labor Code governs. It provides that the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Moreover, Section 6, Rule VII of the NCMB Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings, dated July 28, 1989, states categorically, to wit: Section 6. Finality of Award or Decisions. Awards or decisions of voluntary arbitrator become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the award or decision by the parties. The above-mentioned rule makes the voluntary arbitrators award final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt of a copy of the decision or award by the parties. Presumably, the decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed during that period. Thus, the seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration following the receipt by the petitioner of a copy of the decision or award of the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such decision or award. In the case at bar however, the petitioner filed on March 12, 2001 a motion for reconsideration of the arbitrators decision, which it received on February 20, 2001. Without doubt at the time the said motion was filed, which was beyond the reglementary period of ten (10) days, the decision had already become final and executory. It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating bodies must become final and executory on some definite date fixed by law. In the more recent case of DBP v. NLRC, the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of immutability of final judgment is adhered to by necessity notwithstanding occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must somehow come to an end for otherwise, it would be even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to correct. And, acting on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals held: We cannot simply yield to the submission of the petitioner that the decision of the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators had not yet became final and executory. It is not correct to say that March 2, 2001, the date when the petitioner union received the January 21,

2001 decision of the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators together with the dissenting opinion of Voluntary Arbitrator Arnel Dolendo should be considered as the reckoning date for purposes of filing a motion for reconsideration. The absence of the dissenting opinion in the copy of the assailed decision duly received by the petitioner on February 20, 2001 did not make the said decision incomplete, for it disposed of all the issues of the case validly raised. Well settled is the rule that a dissenting opinion, as it is, is a mere expression of the individual view of the dissenting justice from the conclusion held by the majority of the court and therefore, not binding. It is the dispositive portion of the decision or the fallo, which contains the final and actual adjudication of the rights of the parties that constitutes the judgment of the court. Hence, to forestall the finality of the arbitrators award, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of ten (10) days, without waiting for the dissenting opinion of Voluntary Arbitrator Dolendo. Thus, the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the arbitrators award only on March 12, 2001 was way beyond the ten (10) day reglementary period and had the effect of rendering the panel of Voluntary Arbitrators decision final and executory. Certainly, in allowing the arbitrators award to lapse into finality on the flimsy excuse that it has to receive the dissenting opinion of Arnel Dolendo does not find support in law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses, and no appeal is perfected within such period. It is a jurisdictional event which can not be made to depend on the convenience of a party.[4] From this aspect of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution, petitioner now comes before us for redress, assigning as sole issue the following: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION ON MERE TECHNICALITY CONTRARY TO SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, AFTER FAVORABLY RULING ON THE MERITS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER The resolution of the present controversy hinges for the most part on the correct disposition of petitioners argument that the Panels Decision sans the dissenting opinion of one of its members was irregularly issued; hence, did not toll the running of the prescriptive period within which to file a motion for reconsideration. To sustain petitioners argument would mean that the subject Decision could still be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. A contrary resolution would stamp the subject decision with finality rendering it impervious to review pursuant to the doctrine of finality of judgments. Rule VII, Section 1 of the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings provides the key. Therein, what constitutes the voluntary arbitrators decision (and, by extension, that of the Panel of voluntary arbitrators) is defined with precision, to wit: Section 1. Decision Award. -- The final arbitral disposition of issue/s submitted to voluntary arbitration is the Decision. The disposition may take the form of a dismissal of a claim or grant of specific remedy, either by way of prohibition of particular acts or specific performance of particular acts. In the latter case the decision is called an Award.

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In herein case, the Decision of the Panel was in the form of a dismissal of petitioners complaint. Naturally, this dismissal was contained in the main decision and not in the dissenting opinion. Thus, under Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision by the parties even without receipt of the dissenting opinion unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration[5] or a petition for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court[6] is filed within the same 10-day period. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, a dissenting opinion is not binding on the parties as it is a mere expression of the individual view of the dissenting member from the conclusion held by the majority of the Court, following our ruling in Garcia v. Perez[7] as reiterated in National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries v. NLRC.[8] Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition before it as it no longer had any appellate jurisdiction to alter or nullify the decision of the Panel.[9] The Panels Decision had become final and executory, hence, unchallengeable. We are not unmindful that in labor disputes, social justice exhorts courts to lean backwards in favor of the working class. Corollary thereto, it is doctrinal that in labor disputes, rules of procedure cannot be applied in a rigid and technical sense. [10] Thus, in appropriate cases, we have not hesitated to relax matters of procedure in the interest of substantial justice.[11] As applied herein, however, our hands are tied by the fact that the case had already attained finality long before it got here. As we declared in Nacuray v. National Labor Relations Commission[12] -. . . Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court of the land. The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 22 May 2002 and its Resolution dated 03 October 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-45404 August 7, 1987 G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner, vs. ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint for damages against defendant-appellee on the ground of res judicata. The issue involved being a pure question of law, the appellate court certified the appeal to us for decision on the merits. The facts are not disputed, Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt Ilocos Norte. In her answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer. Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings in the libel case, complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and participated as private prosecutor. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused. Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. As earlier stated, on appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel. Before going into the merit of this appeal, it is noteworthy to mention that there are actually two cases now before us involving the contending parties. Defendant-appellee

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Ucol filed an "appeal by certiorari" before this Court questioning the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals. Ucol prays for a ruling "that the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the present case but instead in ordering the same remanded to the lower court for further proceedings ... ." Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what comprises a decision which can be the subject of an appeal or a special civil action is the majority opinion of the members of the court, but never the dissenting opinion. Moreover, no decision on appeal has as yet been rendered in this case. The act of the defendant-appellee's counsel in filing such a petition defies logic or reason. It is totally inexplicable how a member of the bar could be so careless or, if the act was deliberate, could have the courage to come before this Court asking us to review a dissenting opinion. Counsel is warned that we do not find his mistake in the slightest bit amusing. Turning now to the present appeal, plaintiff-appellant Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata since nowhere in its decision did the trial court pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case nor did it make any express declaration that the fact on which said case was predicated did not exist. He cites the pertinent provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code and Rule III, Section 3 subsection (c) of the Rules of Court which respectively provide: ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. ... RULE III, Sec. 3(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. ... We may also mention Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action separate and distinct from the criminal proceedings whether or not a reservation was made to that effect. The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant under the above provisions to file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation. We find the appeal of G. Jesus B. Ruiz without merit. We see no advantage or benefit in adding to the clogged dockets of our trial courts what plainly appears from the records to be a harassment suit.

In acquitting Encarnacion Ucol of the libel charge, the trial court made these factual findings: Clearly then, Atty. Ruiz filed the instant Criminal Case against Encarnacion Ucol as retaliation for what he believed was an act of ingratitude to him on the part of her husband. The precipitate haste with which the administrative complaint was filed shows that he was the one personally interested in the matter. All that Agustina Tagaca told him was double hearsay. The incident, if there was, happened between the accused and Ceferino in the absence of Agustina; so that, all that Ceferina allegedly told her, and she in turn told Atty. Ruiz, was undoubtedly double check hearsay; and Atty. Ruiz should therefore check the facts with Ceferino, but he did not do that, and he did not even present Ceferino as a witness. For these reasons, accused has every reason to believe that Atty. Ruiz was the author who concocted the charges in the administrative complaint and had his laundrywoman, complainant Agustina Tagaca, sign it. Agustina has very little education and could hardly speak English, yet the administrative complaint was written in polished English, and who else but Atty. Ruiz could have authored those phrases in the complaint: "The retention of Mrs. Ucol in this government service is inimical to the good intentions of the Department to serve humanity and a disgrace and liability to present administration." As will be shown later on, it appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's answer; and even, assuming that the administrative complaint may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charge(s) were certainly reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give bent to their prejudice. The poor and the humble are, as a general rule, grateful to a fault, that intrigues and ingratitude are what they abhor. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 8-10). The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of harassment. First, petitioner Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint. The complaint was dismissed. Second, he filed a criminal case for libel based on portions of Mrs. Ucol's answer in the administrative case. Third, he acted as private prosecutor in the criminal case actively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant. And fourth, after the accused was acquitted on the basis of the facts stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols with implacability by filing a civil action for damages. As stated by the trial judge, "court actions are not established for parties to give bent to their prejudice." This is doubly true when the party incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He should set an example in sobriety and in trying to prevent false and groundless suits. In Roa v. de la Cruz, et al. (107, Phil. 10) this Court ruled:

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Under the above provisions (Art. 33 of the Civil Code), independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. It is apparent, however, from the use of the words "may be," that the institution of such suit is optional." (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. I, p. 54) In other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. (The case of Reyes v. de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil., 1013) cited by plaintiff in support of her contention that under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code the injured party is not required to reserve her right to institute the civil action, is not applicable to the present case. There was no showing in that case that the offended party intervened in the prosecution of the offense, and the amount of damages sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal court so that a reservation of the civil action was useless or unnecessary.) (Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25]4633.]) In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa upon whose initiative the criminal action for defamation against the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed did not reserve her right to institute it, subject, always to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4 of Rule 106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil., 197). The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his right to institute the civil action is that by such action her interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. (Gorospe, et al., v. Gatmaitan, et al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 2526). The rule, therefore, is that the right of intervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. (People v. Orais, 65 Phil., 744; People v. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People v. Flores, et al., G.R. No. L-7528, December 18,1957; see also U.S. v. Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U.S. v. Heery, 25 Phil., 600). Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her appearance or intervention as private prosecutor we hold that the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for damages based upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.).

We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the present appeal. Atty. Ruiz has more than had his day in court. The then court of first instance acquitted Mrs. Ucol and stated in the dispositive portion of its decision that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. A review of the court's findings, however, indicates that the disputed Answer of Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. As stated by the trial court, "As will be shown later, it appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's answer." (Emphasis supplied). The court found the charges against Ucol, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances. The trial court stated. Analyzing defendant's answer Exh. "5", even with meticulous care, the Court did not find any defamatory imputation which causes dishonor or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in her answer, to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood. Every sentence in her answer (Exh. "5") is relevant, and constitutes privileged matter. She did not go further than her interest or duties require. She did not go beyond explaining what was said of her in the complaint for the purpose of repairing if not entirely removing the effects of the charge against her. She had absolutely no motive to libel Atty. Ruiz who, by the way, cast the first stone. ... (Amended Record on Appeal pp. 10-11) WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for patent lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave. Gancayco, J., took no part.

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G.R. No. L-17938

April 30, 1963

123, Rules of Court). Appellant's alleged predecessor-in-interest was not, therefore, denied due process of law. Appellant's position that the decision was erroneous and unjust is entirely untenable, because the issue sought to be reopened is res judicata, aside from its having stood unchallenged for 30 years. The ridiculous prayer to enforce a dissenting opinion requires no discussion, it being sufficient to state that there is nothing to enforce in a dissenting opinion, since it affirms or overrules no claim, right, or obligation, and neither disposes of, nor awards, anything; it merely expresses the views of the dissenter. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t Lastly, the appellant's claim that "the lower court erred in not allowing plaintiffappellant's cause as a proceedingcoram nobis", is devoid of merit. The ancient common law writ of error coram nobis, now substantially obsolete even in common law jurisdictions (49 CJS 561), does not lie after affirmance of a judgment on writ of error on appeal (49 CJS 562); nor can it be grounded on facts already in issue and adjudicated on the trial (49 CJS 567). Moreover, the jurisdiction of a writ of error coram nobis lies exclusively in the court which rendered the judgment sought to be corrected (49 CJS 568), so that it should have been sought by appellants, if at all, in the Supreme Court, and not in the Court of First Instance. In the Philippines, no court appears to have ever recognized such writ, the rule in this jurisdiction being that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.1 Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium. The order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

ESPERIDION TOLENTINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADELA ONGSIAKO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Esperidion Tolentino for and in his own behalf as Edmundo M. Reyes and Senen Ceniza for defendants-appellees. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal from the order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its Civil Case No. 3197. The plaintiff-appellant, Esperidion Tolentino, prays in the complaint that he filed with the lower court on 20 May 1959, for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion rendered in the case entitled "Severo Domingo, et al. vs. Santos Ongsiako, et al., G.R. No. 32776." The decision in said case (in favor of appellees' predecessors, and adverse to those of appellant) was promulgated by this Court on 4 December 1930, and, together with the dissenting opinion, appears in Volume 55 of the Philippine Reports, starting on page 361. Unfortunately, the records of said case were lost, or destroyed, during the war. The plaintiff-appellant claims to be the successor-interest of the late Severo Domingo, who died without having received a copy of the decision, and alleges that plaintiffappellant learned of the decision, only about a week before he filed the aforementioned complaint; that the decision of the majority of the Court was erroneous and unjust; that the dissenting opinion is the correct view of the case, and should be enforced. The court below, on motion of one of the several defendants, dismissed the case, for lack of cause of action. Not satisfied, the plaintiff-appellant interposed the present appeal, and urges that the failure of service of a copy of the decision upon the late Severo Domingo was a denial of due process, which invalidates the decision, and asks that, on equitable grounds, the present case be heard as a proceeding coram nobis. Assuming the truth of the allegation that Severo Domingo, appellant's predecessor-ininterest, was never furnished a copy of the decision in G.R. No. L-32776, it appears in the printed report of the case (55 Phil. 361) that he was represented by Atty. Ramon Diokno. Being represented by counsel, service of the decision is made upon the latter by the clerk of the Supreme Court (Sec. 250, Act 190), and not upon the client (Palad vs. Cui, 28 Phil. 44); and the unrebutted presumption is that the said official of this Court had regularly performed his duty (No. 14, Sec. 334, Act 190; Sec. 69 [m], Rule plaintiff-appellant.

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G.R. No. 79255 January 20, 1992 UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), petitioner, vs. BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly FILIPRO, INC.), respondents. Jose C. Espinas for petitioner. Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the holiday pay award and the change of the divisor in the computation of benefits from 251 to 261 days. On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's decision in Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople (138 SCRA 273 [1985]). Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator. On January 2, 1980, Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to: pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the Code. (Rollo, p. 31) Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. (Rollo, pp. 138-145) Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.

On January 14, 1986, the respondent arbitrator issued an order declaring that the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the Labor Code. He adjudged, however, that the company's sales personnel are field personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He likewise ruled that with the grant of 10 days' holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251 days as divisor. Both Nestle and UFE filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration. Respondent Arbitrator treated the two motions as appeals and forwarded the case to the NLRC which issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 remanding the case to the respondent arbitrator on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to review decisions in voluntary arbitration cases pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code as amended by Section 10, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and as implemented by Section 5 of the rules implementing B.P. Blg. 130. However, in a letter dated July 6, 1987, the respondent arbitrator refused to take cognizance of the case reasoning that he had no more jurisdiction to continue as arbitrator because he had resigned from service effective May 1, 1986. Hence, this petition. The petitioner union raises the following issues: 1) Whether or not Nestle's sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and 2) Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days and whether or not the previous use of 251 as divisor resulted in overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay. The petitioner insists that respondent's sales personnel are not field personnel under Article 82 of the Labor Code. The respondent company controverts this assertion. Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as "non-agritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The controversy centers on the interpretation of the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. if they are Makati-based.

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The petitioner maintains that the period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises the sales personnel's working hours which can be determined with reasonable certainty. The Court does not agree. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours in between in actual field work. We concur with the following disquisition by the respondent arbitrator: The requirement for the salesmen and other similarly situated employees to report for work at the office at 8:00 a.m. and return at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. is not within the realm of work in the field as defined in the Code but an exercise of purely management prerogative of providing administrative control over such personnel. This does not in any manner provide a reasonable level of determination on the actual field work of the employees which can be reasonably ascertained. The theoretical analysis that salesmen and other similarly-situated workers regularly report for work at 8:00 a.m. and return to their home station at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., creating the assumption that their field work is supervised, is surface projection. Actual field work begins after 8:00 a.m., when the sales personnel follow their field itinerary, and ends immediately before 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. when they report back to their office. The period between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises their hours of work in the field, the extent or scope and result of which are subject to their individual capacity and industry and which "cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." This is the reason why effective supervision over field work of salesmen and medical representatives, truck drivers and merchandisers is practically a physical impossibility. Consequently, they are excluded from the ten holidays with pay award. (Rollo, pp. 36-37) Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides: Rule IV Holidays with Pay Sec. 1. Coverage This rule shall apply to all employees except: (e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer . . . (Emphasis supplied) While contending that such rule added another element not found in the law (Rollo, p. 13), the petitioner nevertheless attempted to show that its affected members are not covered by the abovementioned rule. The petitioner asserts that the company's sales personnel are strictly supervised as shown by the SOD (Supervisor of the Day)

schedule and the company circular dated March 15, 1984 (Annexes 2 and 3, Rollo, pp. 53-55). Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds that the aforementioned rule did not add another element to the Labor Code definition of field personnel. The clause "whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee's actual working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employee's time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer. The SOD schedule adverted to by the petitioner does not in the least signify that these sales personnel's time and performance are supervised. The purpose of this schedule is merely to ensure that the sales personnel are out of the office not later than 8:00 a.m. and are back in the office not earlier than 4:00 p.m. Likewise, the Court fails to see how the company can monitor the number of actual hours spent in field work by an employee through the imposition of sanctions on absenteeism contained in the company circular of March 15, 1984. The petitioner claims that the fact that these sales personnel are given incentive bonus every quarter based on their performance is proof that their actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty. The Court thinks otherwise. The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection performance; (3) proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns; and (6) proper truck maintenance. (Rollo, p. 190). The above criteria indicate that these sales personnel are given incentive bonuses precisely because of the difficulty in measuring their actual hours of field work. These employees are evaluated by the result of their work and not by the actual hours of field work which are hardly susceptible to determination. In San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Democratic Labor Organization (8 SCRA 613 [1963]), the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of the job of a salesman. Citing the case of Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, C.C.A. Okla., 118 F. 2d 202, the Court stated: The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are fairly apparent. Such a salesman, to a greater extent, works individually. There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall work and he can earn as much or as little, within the range of his

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ability, as his ambition dictates. In lieu of overtime he ordinarily receives commissions as extra compensation. He works away from his employer's place of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no way of knowing the number of hours he works per day. While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled to overtime pay, the same rationale for their exclusion as field personnel from holiday pay benefits also applies. The petitioner union also assails the respondent arbitrator's ruling that, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days to include the additional 10 holidays and the employees should reimburse the amounts overpaid by Filipro due to the use of 251 days' divisor. Arbitrator Vivar's rationale for his decision is as follows: . . . The new doctrinal policy established which ordered payment of ten holidays certainly adds to or accelerates the basis of conversion and computation by ten days. With the inclusion of ten holidays as paid days, the divisor is no longer 251 but 261 or 262 if election day is counted. This is indeed an extremely difficult legal question of interpretation which accounts for what is claimed as falling within the concept of "solutio indebti." When the claim of the Union for payment of ten holidays was granted, there was a consequent need to abandon that 251 divisor. To maintain it would create an impossible situation where the employees would benefit with additional ten days with pay but would simultaneously enjoy higher benefits by discarding the same ten days for purposes of computing overtime and night time services and considering sick and vacation leave credits. Therefore, reimbursement of such overpayment with the use of 251 as divisor arises concomitant with the award of ten holidays with pay. (Rollo, p. 34) The divisor assumes an important role in determining whether or not holiday pay is already included in the monthly paid employee's salary and in the computation of his daily rate. This is the thrust of our pronouncement in Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople (supra). In that case, We held: It is argued that even without the presumption found in the rules and in the policy instruction, the company practice indicates that the monthly salaries of the employees are so computed as to include the holiday pay provided by law. The petitioner contends otherwise.

One strong argument in favor of the petitioner's stand is the fact that the Chartered Bank, in computing overtime compensation for its employees, employs a "divisor" of 251 days. The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the ten (10) legal holidays from the total number of calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid for all non-working days, the divisor should be 365 and not 251. In the petitioner's case, its computation of daily ratio since September 1, 1980, is as follows: monthly rate x 12 months 251 days Following the criterion laid down in the Chartered Bank case, the use of 251 days' divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday pay is not yet included in the employee's salary, otherwise the divisor should have been 261. It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a constant figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay and commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate should also be the same basis for computing the 10 unpaid holidays. The respondent arbitrator's order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which represents the employee's annual salary, should correspondingly be increased to incorporate the holiday pay. To illustrate, if prior to the grant of holiday pay, the employee's annual salary is P25,100, then dividing such figure by 251 days, his daily rate is P100.00 After the payment of 10 days' holiday pay, his annual salary already includes holiday pay and totals P26,100 (P25,100 + 1,000). Dividing this by 261 days, the daily rate is still P100.00. There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle's claim of overpayment of overtime and night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the computation of which are all based on the daily rate, since the daily rate is still the same before and after the grant of holiday pay. Respondent Nestle's invocation of solutio indebiti, or payment by mistake, due to its use of 251 days as divisor must fail in light of the Labor Code mandate that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." (Article 4). Moreover, prior to September 1, 1980, when the company was on a 6-day working schedule, the divisor used by the company was 303, indicating that the 10 holidays were likewise not paid. When Filipro shifted to a 5-day working schebule on September 1, 1980, it had the chance to rectify its error, if ever there was one but did not do so. It is now too late to allege payment by mistake.

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Nestle also questions the voluntary arbitrator's ruling that holiday pay should be computed from November 1, 1974. This ruling was not questioned by the petitioner union as obviously said decision was favorable to it. Technically, therefore, respondent Nestle should have filed a separate petition raising the issue of effectivity of the holiday pay award. This Court has ruled that an appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. (Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989], citing La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, 142 SCRA 394 [1986]). Nevertheless, in order to fully settle the issues so that the execution of the Court's decision in this case may not be needlessly delayed by another petition, the Court resolved to take up the matter of effectivity of the holiday pay award raised by Nestle. Nestle insists that the reckoning period for the application of the holiday pay award is 1985 when the Chartered Bank decision, promulgated on August 28, 1985, became final and executory, and not from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code. Although the Court does not entirely agree with Nestle, we find its claim meritorious. In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v . Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 [1984], hereinafter referred to as the IBAA case, the Court declared that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, issued by the then Secretary of Labor on February 16, 1976 and April 23, 1976, respectively, and which excluded monthly paid employees from holiday pay benefits, are null and void. The Court therein reasoned that, in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay, the aforementioned implementing rule and policy instruction amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion. The Chartered Bank case reiterated the above ruling and added the "divisor" test. However, prior to their being declared null and void, the implementing rule and policy instruction enjoyed the presumption of validity and hence, Nestle's non-payment of the holiday benefit up to the promulgation of the IBAA case on October 23, 1984 was in compliance with these presumably valid rule and policy instruction. In the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 38 SCRA 429 [1971], the Court discussed the effect to be given to a legislative or executive act subsequently declared invalid: . . . It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in

operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the government organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1952]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (21 SCRA 1095 [1967]. (At pp. 434-435) The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. It is now almost the end of 1991. To require various companies to reach back to 1975now and nullify acts done in good faith is unduly harsh. 1984 is a fairer reckoning period under the facts of this case. Applying the aforementioned doctrine to the case at bar, it is not far-fetched that Nestle, relying on the implicit validity of the implementing rule and policy instruction before this Court nullified them, and thinking that it was not obliged to give holiday pay benefits to its monthly paid employees, may have been moved to grant other concessions to its employees, especially in the collective bargaining agreement. This possibility is bolstered by the fact that respondent Nestle's employees are among the highest paid in the industry. With this consideration, it would be unfair to impose additional burdens on Nestle when the non-payment of the holiday benefits up to 1984 was not in any way attributed to Nestle's fault. The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of promulgation of the Chartered Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of the IBAA case. WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED. The divisor to be used in computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed from October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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EN BANC

CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention. x--------------------------------------------------x

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, - versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,

G.R. No. 176951

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.: For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City. On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.

However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason, the CourtEn Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009. Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

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The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.[1] The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides: Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: x x x. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Considering the Legislatures primary intent to curtail the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not a single word or phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this income requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income

requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one. [2]

B. Operative Fact Doctrine Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional. However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact doc trine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. Under the minoritys novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[3] the Court stated: The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

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The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact, the minority concedes that the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer be repeated. Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009. In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied) The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads: A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION. IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied)

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself. Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality. C. Equal Protection Clause As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11thCongress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts prior majority action on the main

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decision stands affirmed.[4] This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc. The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive.[5] The judgment stands in full force.[6] Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied. Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left undecided because there remain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of the Court en bancconcurred in declaring the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.[7] These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action. The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008 Decision final. In fact, in its Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc reiterated that no further pleadings shall be entertained and stated that entry of judgment be made in due course. The dissenting opinion stated that a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.[8] Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative action, that is the 18 November 2008 Decision striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents second motion for reconsideration, nevertheless remains binding on the parties.[9]

all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that [n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision and REINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491. We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009. SO ORDERED.

Conclusion Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that no x x x city shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is,

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Parts of the Case

Ratio decidendi (Latin plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning "the reason" or "the rationale for the decision". The ratio decidendi is "the point in a case which determines the [1] [2] judgment" or "the principle which the case establishes". Obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta, often referred to simply as dicta or obiter) is Latin for a statement "said in passing". An obiter dictum is a remark or observation made by a judgethat, although included in the body of the court's opinion, does not form a necessary part of the court's decision. In a court opinion, obiter dicta include, but are not limited to, words "introduced by way of [1] illustration, or analogy or argument." Unlike the rationes decidendi, obiter dicta are not the subject of the judicial decision, even if they happen to be correct statements of law. A dissenting opinion (or dissent) is an opinion in a legal case written by one or more judgesexpressing disagreement with the majority opinion of the court which gives rise to its judgment. When not necessarily referring to a legal decision, this can also be [1][2] referred to as a minority report. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion The resolutory or dispositive portion is important. The resolution of the court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.

Doctrine of operative fact The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statue prior to a determination of unconstitutionality law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

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